ENS 43487: Difference between revisions
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| event date = 07/12/2007 10:15 CDT | | event date = 07/12/2007 10:15 CDT | ||
| last update date = 07/12/2007 | | last update date = 07/12/2007 | ||
| title = Fire Inspection Analysis | | title = Fire Inspection Analysis of Pressurizer Porvs and Block Valves | ||
| event text = During a review of abnormal operating procedure (AOP) 10A, Safe Shutdown-Local Control, by the NRC triennial fire inspection team, it was identified that fire damage to the reactor coolant system (RCS) power-operated relief valve (PORV) and block valve circuits as a result of a fire in the cable spreading room could also result in simultaneous damage to a block valve circuit and spurious actuation of a PORV. While the actions included in abnormal operating procedure (AOP)-10A provide reasonable assurance that positive control of RCS Inventory is maintained, these steps do not ensure that simultaneous failure of the block valve circuit and spurious operation of a PORV will not result in RCS depressurization. Therefore, a postulated fire may potentially remove the ability to fully implement the Safe Shutdown Strategy. Compensatory measures in the form of twice-per-shift fire rounds in the cable spreading room have been implemented. | | event text = During a review of abnormal operating procedure (AOP) 10A, Safe Shutdown-Local Control, by the NRC triennial fire inspection team, it was identified that fire damage to the reactor coolant system (RCS) power-operated relief valve (PORV) and block valve circuits as a result of a fire in the cable spreading room could also result in simultaneous damage to a block valve circuit and spurious actuation of a PORV. While the actions included in abnormal operating procedure (AOP)-10A provide reasonable assurance that positive control of RCS Inventory is maintained, these steps do not ensure that simultaneous failure of the block valve circuit and spurious operation of a PORV will not result in RCS depressurization. Therefore, a postulated fire may potentially remove the ability to fully implement the Safe Shutdown Strategy. Compensatory measures in the form of twice-per-shift fire rounds in the cable spreading room have been implemented. | ||
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
Latest revision as of 22:16, 1 March 2018
| Where | |
|---|---|
Point Beach  Wisconsin (NRC Region 3) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | |
| LER: | 05000266/LER-2007-006 |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+3.33 h0.139 days <br />0.0198 weeks <br />0.00456 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Dean Raasch 18:35 Jul 12, 2007 |
| NRC Officer: | Mark Abramovitz |
| Last Updated: | Jul 12, 2007 |
| 43487 - NRC Website
| |