ENS 46763: Difference between revisions
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| event date = 04/16/2011 22:52 EDT | | event date = 04/16/2011 22:52 EDT | ||
| last update date = 04/17/2011 | | last update date = 04/17/2011 | ||
| title = Hpci Inoperable Due | | title = Hpci Inoperable Due to Lube Oil Pressure Low Out of Band | ||
| event text = Event Description: On 4/16/2011 at 2252 [EDT], the Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System was declared inoperable due to the determination that its Lube Oil System was not providing adequate lube oil pressure and flow to the HPCI Turbine/Pump bearings. This was determined following the high steam pressure operability run (i.e., within 48 hours of achieving adequate test pressure following a scheduled refueling/maintenance outage) as required by Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.5.1.7. The HPCI system is inoperable in accordance with Technical Specification 3.5.1. | | event text = Event Description: On 4/16/2011 at 2252 [EDT], the Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System was declared inoperable due to the determination that its Lube Oil System was not providing adequate lube oil pressure and flow to the HPCI Turbine/Pump bearings. This was determined following the high steam pressure operability run (i.e., within 48 hours of achieving adequate test pressure following a scheduled refueling/maintenance outage) as required by Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.5.1.7. The HPCI system is inoperable in accordance with Technical Specification 3.5.1. | ||
This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3){v)(D), as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. | This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3){v)(D), as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. | ||
Latest revision as of 22:07, 1 March 2018
| Where | |
|---|---|
Brunswick  North Carolina (NRC Region 2) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+1.48 h0.0617 days <br />0.00881 weeks <br />0.00203 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Mike O'Dell 04:21 Apr 17, 2011 |
| NRC Officer: | Steve Sandin |
| Last Updated: | Apr 17, 2011 |
| 46763 - NRC Website
| |
Brunswick with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |