ENS 51845: Difference between revisions
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| event date = 04/02/2016 12:57 CDT | | event date = 04/02/2016 12:57 CDT | ||
| last update date = 04/02/2016 | | last update date = 04/02/2016 | ||
| title = Insulator Failure | | title = Insulator Failure on Reserve Auxiliary Transformer | ||
| event text = At approximately 1257 [CDT] on 4/02/16, the Main Control Room received numerous annunciators that indicated a trip of the Reserve Auxiliary Transformer (RAT) Static VAR Compensator (SVC) that was caused by an insulator failure of the 'A' phase 345kV Circuit Switcher. As a result of the voltage transient, the Division 1 Fuel Building Ventilation (VF) system isolation dampers closed causing a trip of VF supply and exhaust fans. With no running VF fans, secondary containment differential pressure rose to slightly greater than 0 inches water gauge which exceeded the Technical Specification requirement of greater than 0.25 inches vacuum water gauge. The Control Room entered EOP-8, Secondary Containment Control. This event is being reported as a 'Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function' under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C). Secondary Containment differential pressure was restored within Technical Specification requirements at 1300 [CDT] by starting the Standby Gas Treatment HVAC (VG) system. | | event text = At approximately 1257 [CDT] on 4/02/16, the Main Control Room received numerous annunciators that indicated a trip of the Reserve Auxiliary Transformer (RAT) Static VAR Compensator (SVC) that was caused by an insulator failure of the 'A' phase 345kV Circuit Switcher. As a result of the voltage transient, the Division 1 Fuel Building Ventilation (VF) system isolation dampers closed causing a trip of VF supply and exhaust fans. With no running VF fans, secondary containment differential pressure rose to slightly greater than 0 inches water gauge which exceeded the Technical Specification requirement of greater than 0.25 inches vacuum water gauge. The Control Room entered EOP-8, Secondary Containment Control. This event is being reported as a 'Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function' under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C). Secondary Containment differential pressure was restored within Technical Specification requirements at 1300 [CDT] by starting the Standby Gas Treatment HVAC (VG) system. | ||
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
Latest revision as of 21:45, 1 March 2018
| Where | |
|---|---|
Clinton  Illinois (NRC Region 3) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+0.5 h0.0208 days <br />0.00298 weeks <br />6.849e-4 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Justin Reynolds 18:27 Apr 2, 2016 |
| NRC Officer: | Mark Abramovitz |
| Last Updated: | Apr 2, 2016 |
| 51845 - NRC Website
| |