ML20138C973: Difference between revisions

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| document type = OPERATING LICENSES-APPLIATION TO AMEND-RENEW EXISTING, TEXT-LICENSE APPLICATIONS & PERMITS
| document type = OPERATING LICENSES-APPLIATION TO AMEND-RENEW EXISTING, TEXT-LICENSE APPLICATIONS & PERMITS
| page count = 5
| page count = 5
| project =  
| project = TAC:55782
| stage = Request
| stage = Request
}}
}}

Latest revision as of 03:49, 13 December 2021

Application for Amend to License NPF-3,identifying Water Source for Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps,Safety Grade Flow Indication for Flow Verification & Bases
ML20138C973
Person / Time
Site: Davis Besse Cleveland Electric icon.png
Issue date: 08/29/1985
From: Williams J
TOLEDO EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20138C971 List:
References
TAC-55782, NUDOCS 8510230120
Download: ML20138C973 (5)


Text

. . -- . - _ -

APPLICATION FOR AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATINQ LICENSE NO. NPF-3 FOR DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION .

UNIT NO. I l

Enclosed are forty-three (43) copies of the requested changes to the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit No. 1 Facility Operating License No. NPF-3, together with the Safety Evaluation for the requested change.

The proposed changes include Section 3.7.1.2, 4.7.1.2 and Bases.

By /s/ Terry D. Murray

. Terry D. Murray Assistant Vice President, Nuclear e

i.

4 For Joe Williams, Jr.

Senior Vice President, Nuclear i

i I Sworn and subscribed before me this 29th day of August, 1985.

8510230120 850829 PDR P ADOCK 05000346 PDR

/s/ Beverly J. Szydlowski Notary Public - State of Ohio SEAL My Commission Expires Feb. 26, 1988 1

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), Docket No. 50-346 '

License No. NPF-3 Serial'No. 1180 August 29, 1985 Attachment I. Changes to Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit 1, Appendix A Technical Specifications 3.7.1.2, 4.7.1.2 and Bases.

A. Time required to Implement. This change is to be effective 14 days after.NRC approval.

B. Reason for Change (Facility Change Request 83-032 Rev. E).

NRC request dated May 9, 1985 (Log No. 1748) to revise

' our August 27, 1984 (Serial No. 1074) submittal.

C. Safety Evaluation (See Attached)
D. Significant Hazard Consideration

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Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3 Serial No.-1180 Page 1 Safety Evaluation

, This FCR revision is to amend the Technical Specification surveillance requirement Section 4.7.1.2 to add flow test requirement for Auxiliary

, Feed Water (AFW) system operability following: (1) refueling outage

!- (every 18 months), (2) an extended outage (>30 days in Mode 5) and (3) modification to the system that could affect the system's capability.

It also requires verification of locked valves positions.

l The safety function of the Technical Specification surveillance require-j ment 4.7.1.2 is to insure that the AFW system's availability is maintained

! during Modes 1, 2 and 3 to provide heat sink.to the Reactor Coolant System l (RCS) when main feedwater is lost.

1 The proposed change to Technical Specification 4.7.1.2 will provide i

adequate assurance that the AFW flow paths to the steam generators (SGs) l are maintained. The flow test will be conducted prior to entering Mode 3, except the requirement under 4.7 1.2.b.2, so that the feedwater can be j properly cleaned up before full power operation to minimize the impact on l

the steam generators. The existing surveillance requirement under 4.7.1.2.b.2 cannot be performed in Mode 4 prior to entering Mode 3 due to inadequate steam supply in the SGs. Therefore, this surveillance require-

, ment is modified to allow it to be tested in Mode 3. The steam supply from auxiliary steam cannot be auto-initiated-by steam and feed rupture control system'(SFRCS).

i When performing tests required under 4.7.1.2.e.2, a dedicated individual will be stationed at those manual valves, with direct communication to '

control room, so that system can be restored to normal operable status if necessa ry.

Those valves that are locked in the AFW system are currently controlled by administrative procedures. With the proposed change, they will be a Technical Specification required ' item for . verification. The change as i

proposed meets NRC staff's position as outlined in NRC letter log No. 1455 dated February 21, 1984. TED has committed to make these changes in letter Serial No. 1049 dated May 10, 1984. The changes as proposed do not degrade the safety function of the AFW system.

I Pursuant to the above evaluation, it is concluded that there is no unreviewed l safety questions involved.  !

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Dockst No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3 Serial No. 1180

'Page 1

! Significant Hazard Consideration This amendment request for the Surveillance requirement for the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) system does not represent a Significant Hazard. The proposed change includes the following:

l

  • Flow verification after modification, extended cold shutdown
(>30 days in Mode 5), using safety grade flow indication,

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  • Identification of AFW primary water source for AFW pumps,
  • Valve position verification,
  • Operator for valve realignment during testing, and
  • Mode requirement for AFW actuation test signal The 18 month and extended outage (>30 days in Mode 5) flow path verification will provide adequate assurance that the AFW flow paths to the Steam Generators (SG) are maintained. Flow path verification using safety grade indicators after maintenance and/or modification ensures that the AFW i l System is capable of delivering the primary water source to the SG.

i When the plant is in Modes 1, 2 or 3 which requires Local Manual j realignment of valves that make the system inoperable, a dedicated  ;

individual shall be stationed at the valves (in communication with the  !

control room) able to restore the valves to the normal operating status. [

This ensures that the AW system will be realigned should the safety >

! system be required to function. .

The current requirement for AFW actuation testing is in Mode 4, 5 or 6.

But this test cannot be performed in the modes due to inadequate steam ,

supply in the SG and the Auxiliary Boiler will not actuate on the steam i and feed rupture. control system (SFRCS) signal. The revision is to have f this test performed in Mode 3 with sufficient steam in the SG and allow [

SFRCS signal to actuate appropriate components, pumps and valves.

, The granting of the request would not:

1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of i i

an accident previously evaluated 10CFR50.92(C)(1).  !

! This proposed amendment request is to verify the AFW system operability j after extended shutdown, outages and modifications, thereby ensuring the system operability. Provisions are provided for communication ,

during the testing should the system be required to perform its  ;

safety function in Mode 1, 2 or 3. The mode change for actuation i testing also ensures that the system will perform as required.

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Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3 Serial No. 1180 Page 2 All'of the proposed changes do not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. These additional requirements provide for assurance that the AFW system can perform its intended safety fur: tion.

2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident previously evaluated 10CFR50.92(C)(2).

All accidents are still bounded by previous analysis and no new accidents are involved.

3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety 10CFR50.91(c)(3).

All margins of safety assumed in previous analysis remain unchanged.

On the basis of the above, Toledo Edison has determined that the amendment request does not involve a significant hazard consideration.