05000482/FIN-2012005-02: Difference between revisions
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{{finding | {{finding | ||
| title = Failure | | title = Failure to Ensure That All License Conditions Are Met for Licensed Operators | ||
| docket = 05000482 | | docket = 05000482 | ||
| inspection report = IR 05000482/2012005 | | inspection report = IR 05000482/2012005 | ||
| Line 12: | Line 12: | ||
| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.11 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71111.11 | ||
| Inspector = C Long, C Osterholtz, C Peabody, J Laughlin, N O | | Inspector = C Long, C Osterholtz, C Peabody, J Laughlin, N O'Keefe, S Hedger, T Buchanan | ||
| CCA = H.7 | | CCA = H.7 | ||
| INPO aspect = WP.3 | | INPO aspect = WP.3 | ||
| description = The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 55.53, Conditions of License, for the failure of the licensee to ensure that licensed operators met all the conditions of their licenses in order to be considered an active watch stander. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure that six licensed operator reactivations met the complete plant tour requirement specified in 10 CFR 55.53(f) prior to license reactivation and subsequent performance of licensed operator duties. The licensee entered this finding into their corrective action program as Condition Report 58233. - 4 - Failure to ensure that all authorized individuals who operate the controls of the facility met the conditions of their licenses as defined in 10 CFR 55.53 was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the human performance attribute of the Mitigating System Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone's objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, licensed operators that do not properly complete the requirements of 10 CFR 55.53(f) prior to resuming control room watch standing duties may commit operator errors that could cause mitigating systems to fail to respond properly. Using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 worksheets, the team was directed to use Appendix I, Licensed Operator Requalification Significance Determination Process, to process the violation. However, the team determined that NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix I, could not be used to process this finding due to a recent revision to the appendix. Based on direction from headquarters and regional management to use NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix M, Significance Determination Process Using Qualitative Criteria, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because a prior similar violation's significance bounded this finding's significance. The prior similar violation occurred at Comanche Peak (NCV 05000445/2011004-02), and was determined to have very low safety significance per the last revision of NRC Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix I, because more than 20 percent of the license reactivation records reviewed contained these deficiencies. This finding was determined to have a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, associated with resources, because the licensee failed to ensure complete, accurate, and up-to-date procedures were available and adequate to assure nuclear safety. Specifically, the licensee failed to specify in a procedure what plant areas must be included to meet the requirements of a complete plant tour | | description = The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 55.53, Conditions of License, for the failure of the licensee to ensure that licensed operators met all the conditions of their licenses in order to be considered an active watch stander. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure that six licensed operator reactivations met the complete plant tour requirement specified in 10 CFR 55.53(f) prior to license reactivation and subsequent performance of licensed operator duties. The licensee entered this finding into their corrective action program as Condition Report 58233. - 4 - Failure to ensure that all authorized individuals who operate the controls of the facility met the conditions of their licenses as defined in 10 CFR 55.53 was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the human performance attribute of the Mitigating System Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone\'s objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, licensed operators that do not properly complete the requirements of 10 CFR 55.53(f) prior to resuming control room watch standing duties may commit operator errors that could cause mitigating systems to fail to respond properly. Using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 worksheets, the team was directed to use Appendix I, Licensed Operator Requalification Significance Determination Process, to process the violation. However, the team determined that NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix I, could not be used to process this finding due to a recent revision to the appendix. Based on direction from headquarters and regional management to use NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix M, Significance Determination Process Using Qualitative Criteria, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because a prior similar violation\'s significance bounded this finding\'s significance. The prior similar violation occurred at Comanche Peak (NCV 05000445/2011004-02), and was determined to have very low safety significance per the last revision of NRC Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix I, because more than 20 percent of the license reactivation records reviewed contained these deficiencies. This finding was determined to have a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, associated with resources, because the licensee failed to ensure complete, accurate, and up-to-date procedures were available and adequate to assure nuclear safety. Specifically, the licensee failed to specify in a procedure what plant areas must be included to meet the requirements of a complete plant tour | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 23:18, 21 February 2018
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000482/2012005 Section 1R11 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2012 (2012Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.11 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Long C Osterholtz C Peabody J Laughlin N O'Keefe S Hedger T Buchanan |
| CCA | H.7, Documentation |
| INPO aspect | WP.3 |
| ' | |