05000445/FIN-2017002-04: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.13 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71111.13 | ||
| Inspector = J Josey, R Kumana, S Janicki, M Chambers, L Carson, J O,' | | Inspector = J Josey, R Kumana, S Janicki, M Chambers, L Carson, J O, 'Donnellk Clayton, I Anchandoj, Joseyr Kumana, S Janicki, M Chambers, L Carson, J O, 'Donnellk Clayton, I Anchondo, M Haire | ||
| CCA = H.5 | | CCA = H.5 | ||
| INPO aspect = WP.1 | | INPO aspect = WP.1 | ||
| description = Green. The inspectors identified a non- cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants, for the licensees failure to adequately assess risk and implement required risk management actions for a planned maintenance activity. Specifically, the licensee failed to evaluate the risk and implement required risk management actions associated with disabling a hazard barrier and breeching the control room envelope when blocking open door E -40A. This issue did not represent an immediate safety concern because, at the time of identification, the licensee stopped the activity and secured the door. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program for resolution as Condition Report CR- 2017- 006019. The failure to adequately assess the risk and implement required risk management actions for proposed maintenance activities was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency was more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it was associated with the configuration control attribute o f the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone and affected the associated objective to ensure physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix K, Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Management Significance Determination Process, dated May 19, 2005, Flowchart 2, Assessment of Risk Management Actions, the inspectors determined the need to calculate the risk deficit to determine the significance of this issue. A senior reactor analyst determined the finding to have very low safety significance (Green) based on combining the effects of the degradation of the radiological barrier and tornado missile barrier functions. The analyst performed a qualitative review of the screening criteria in Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At -Power, for the degradation of the radiological barrier function for the control room and considered the short exposure time (2.9E -5 years) and the Comanche Peak specific high winds frequency (3.0E -4/year) for the tornado missile barrier function of the control room to determine that the incremental core damage probability deficit and the incremental large early release probability deficit were less than 1E -6 and 1E -7, respectively. The finding has a human performance cross -cutting aspect associated with procedure adherence, in that operations personnel failed to follow procedures when allowing door E -40A to be opened | | description = Green. The inspectors identified a non- cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants, for the licensees failure to adequately assess risk and implement required risk management actions for a planned maintenance activity. Specifically, the licensee failed to evaluate the risk and implement required risk management actions associated with disabling a hazard barrier and breeching the control room envelope when blocking open door E -40A. This issue did not represent an immediate safety concern because, at the time of identification, the licensee stopped the activity and secured the door. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program for resolution as Condition Report CR- 2017- 006019. The failure to adequately assess the risk and implement required risk management actions for proposed maintenance activities was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency was more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it was associated with the configuration control attribute o f the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone and affected the associated objective to ensure physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix K, Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Management Significance Determination Process, dated May 19, 2005, Flowchart 2, Assessment of Risk Management Actions, the inspectors determined the need to calculate the risk deficit to determine the significance of this issue. A senior reactor analyst determined the finding to have very low safety significance (Green) based on combining the effects of the degradation of the radiological barrier and tornado missile barrier functions. The analyst performed a qualitative review of the screening criteria in Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At -Power, for the degradation of the radiological barrier function for the control room and considered the short exposure time (2.9E -5 years) and the Comanche Peak specific high winds frequency (3.0E -4/year) for the tornado missile barrier function of the control room to determine that the incremental core damage probability deficit and the incremental large early release probability deficit were less than 1E -6 and 1E -7, respectively. The finding has a human performance cross -cutting aspect associated with procedure adherence, in that operations personnel failed to follow procedures when allowing door E -40A to be opened | ||
}} | }} | ||
Revision as of 20:56, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000445/2017002 Section 1R13 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2017 (2017Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.13 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Josey R Kumana S Janicki M Chambers L Carson J O 'Donnellk Clayton I Anchandoj Joseyr Kumana S Janicki M Chambers L Carson J O 'Donnellk Clayton I Anchondo M Haire |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50.65 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) |
| CCA | H.5, Work Management |
| INPO aspect | WP.1 |
| ' | |