05000313/FIN-2016007-14: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 95003 | | Inspection procedure = IP 95003 | ||
| Inspector = B Correll, C Osterholtz, D Betancourt, D Lackey, D Willis, E Duncan, G Hansen, J Brand, J Dixon, J Mateychick, L Mckown, M Holmberg, M Keefe, M Phalen, N O,' | | Inspector = B Correll, C Osterholtz, D Betancourt, D Lackey, D Willis, E Duncan, G Hansen, J Brand, J Dixon, J Mateychick, L Mckown, M Holmberg, M Keefe, M Phalen, N O, 'Keefep Mckenna, R Alexander, R Deese, R Kopriva, R Kumana, S Graves, S Morrow, S Rich, S Smith, T Hartman, W Sifre, Z Hollcraft | ||
| CCA = H.3 | | CCA = H.3 | ||
| INPO aspect = LA.5 | | INPO aspect = LA.5 | ||
| description = The team identified a Green finding and an associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the licensees failure to follow corrective action program procedures. Specifically, the team identified that condition reports were not being promptly screened for operability by the control room as required by procedure EN-LI-102-ANO-RC, Corrective Action Program. The licensees corrective actions included ensuring that there was no direct impact on safety and performing an operability determination for the identified condition reports, revising station policy to require that all condition reports be routed to the control room for review, and documenting the issue in the corrective action program as condition reports CR-ANO-C-2016-00359, CR-ANO-C-2016-00400, and CR-ANO-C-2016-00558. The failure to properly evaluate condition reports for classification and operability determination was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because, it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to properly evaluate condition reports in accordance with applicable procedures could result in conditions adverse to quality being left uncorrected or not being evaluated to ensure operability was maintained. The finding was evaluated using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, Exhibit 2 Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, dated June 19, 2012. The team determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating system, structure or component, but the system, structure or component maintained its operability. This finding had a human performance cross-cutting aspect of Change Management because the licensee failed to adequately implement changes, including the training of staff concerning those changes, so that nuclear safety remained an overriding priority. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure that station personnel were able to identify the difference between an adverse and non-adverse condition following the change which added these criteria to procedure EN-LI-102-ANO-RC [H.3]. | | description = The team identified a Green finding and an associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the licensees failure to follow corrective action program procedures. Specifically, the team identified that condition reports were not being promptly screened for operability by the control room as required by procedure EN-LI-102-ANO-RC, Corrective Action Program. The licensees corrective actions included ensuring that there was no direct impact on safety and performing an operability determination for the identified condition reports, revising station policy to require that all condition reports be routed to the control room for review, and documenting the issue in the corrective action program as condition reports CR-ANO-C-2016-00359, CR-ANO-C-2016-00400, and CR-ANO-C-2016-00558. The failure to properly evaluate condition reports for classification and operability determination was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because, it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to properly evaluate condition reports in accordance with applicable procedures could result in conditions adverse to quality being left uncorrected or not being evaluated to ensure operability was maintained. The finding was evaluated using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, Exhibit 2 Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, dated June 19, 2012. The team determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating system, structure or component, but the system, structure or component maintained its operability. This finding had a human performance cross-cutting aspect of Change Management because the licensee failed to adequately implement changes, including the training of staff concerning those changes, so that nuclear safety remained an overriding priority. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure that station personnel were able to identify the difference between an adverse and non-adverse condition following the change which added these criteria to procedure EN-LI-102-ANO-RC [H.3]. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Revision as of 20:55, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000313/2016007 Section 4OA4 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2016 (2016Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 95003 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Correll C Osterholtz D Betancourt D Lackey D Willis E Duncan G Hansen J Brand J Dixon J Mateychick L Mckown M Holmberg M Keefe M Phalen N O 'Keefep Mckenna R Alexander R Deese R Kopriva R Kumana S Graves S Morrow S Rich S Smith T Hartman W Sifre Z Hollcraft |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V |
| CCA | H.3, Change Management |
| INPO aspect | LA.5 |
| ' | |