05000285/FIN-2016004-01: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = Self-Revealing | | identified by = Self-Revealing | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71114.05 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71114.05 | ||
| Inspector = G Miller, J O,' | | Inspector = G Miller, J O, 'Donnelll Brandt, P Elkman, P Voss, S Hedger, S Schneider | ||
| CCA = H.3 | | CCA = H.3 | ||
| INPO aspect = LA.5 | | INPO aspect = LA.5 | ||
| description = The inspector reviewed a self-revealed non-cited violation associated with Fort Calhoun Stations failure to provide radiological emergency response training to those who may be called upon to assist in an emergency, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(15). Specifically, in December 2014, 10 shift managers and 6 Technical Support Center and Emergency Operations Facility staff, responsible for making and reviewing protective action recommendations, were not trained on Procedure EPIP-EOF-7, Protective Action Recommendations, Revision 26, and flowchart EP-FC-111-AD-F-02, before they were implemented on December 23, 2014. As immediate corrective actions, the licensee issued a reading package covering the new protective action recommendation process to the 16 individuals who had not been trained. The issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report CR-2015-08951. The failure to provide radiological emergency response training to those who may be called upon to assist in an emergency is a performance deficiency within the licensees ability to foresee and correct. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the procedure quality attribute of Emergency Prepardness Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring that the licensee is capable of implementing adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. The finding was evaluated using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix B, Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process, dated September 22, 2015, and was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was a failure to comply, was not a risk significant planning standard function, was not a loss of the planning standard function, and was a degraded planning standard function. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with change management because the emergency preparedness department failed to identify all of the emergency response organization staff who required training on revisions to the process for making protective action recommendations [H.3]. | | description = The inspector reviewed a self-revealed non-cited violation associated with Fort Calhoun Stations failure to provide radiological emergency response training to those who may be called upon to assist in an emergency, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(15). Specifically, in December 2014, 10 shift managers and 6 Technical Support Center and Emergency Operations Facility staff, responsible for making and reviewing protective action recommendations, were not trained on Procedure EPIP-EOF-7, Protective Action Recommendations, Revision 26, and flowchart EP-FC-111-AD-F-02, before they were implemented on December 23, 2014. As immediate corrective actions, the licensee issued a reading package covering the new protective action recommendation process to the 16 individuals who had not been trained. The issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report CR-2015-08951. The failure to provide radiological emergency response training to those who may be called upon to assist in an emergency is a performance deficiency within the licensees ability to foresee and correct. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the procedure quality attribute of Emergency Prepardness Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring that the licensee is capable of implementing adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. The finding was evaluated using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix B, Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process, dated September 22, 2015, and was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was a failure to comply, was not a risk significant planning standard function, was not a loss of the planning standard function, and was a degraded planning standard function. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with change management because the emergency preparedness department failed to identify all of the emergency response organization staff who required training on revisions to the process for making protective action recommendations [H.3]. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Revision as of 19:55, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000285/2016004 Section 1EP5 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2016 (2016Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Emergency Prep |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71114.05 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | G Miller J O 'Donnelll Brandt P Elkman P Voss S Hedger S Schneider |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50.47 10 CFR 50.47(b)(15) |
| CCA | H.3, Change Management |
| INPO aspect | LA.5 |
| ' | |