05000259/FIN-2015007-01: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.21M | | Inspection procedure = IP 71111.21M | ||
| Inspector = D Terry | | Inspector = D Terry-Ward, G Ottenberg, J Bartley, M Yeminy, R Patterson, W Deschaine | ||
| CCA = P.1 | | CCA = P.1 | ||
| INPO aspect = PI.1 | | INPO aspect = PI.1 | ||
| description = A NRC identified NCV of 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, was identified for the failure to specify adequate test instrumentation for performing MSIV leak rate testing. Specifically, the licensee test procedure allowed the use of high range test instruments to measure low leakage rates while performing the combined leak rate testing on the Unit 1 B Main Steam Line. This resulted in instrument uncertainties large enough to impact the validity of the test results. The licensee immediately entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR 1117381. The licensee performed an evaluation and determined that the latest test results provided reasonable assurance of operability. This performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected had the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern by masking the failure to meet test acceptance criteria. The finding was screened for significance using the Barrier Integrity cornerstone column of IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, dated 7/1/2012, and IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, dated 7/1/2012, and was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment. This finding was assigned a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution because the licensee did not initiate a corrective action to identify the cause of the negative leak rate results obtained during the recent performance of the test procedure (P.1). | | description = A NRC identified NCV of 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, was identified for the failure to specify adequate test instrumentation for performing MSIV leak rate testing. Specifically, the licensee test procedure allowed the use of high range test instruments to measure low leakage rates while performing the combined leak rate testing on the Unit 1 B Main Steam Line. This resulted in instrument uncertainties large enough to impact the validity of the test results. The licensee immediately entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR 1117381. The licensee performed an evaluation and determined that the latest test results provided reasonable assurance of operability. This performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected had the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern by masking the failure to meet test acceptance criteria. The finding was screened for significance using the Barrier Integrity cornerstone column of IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, dated 7/1/2012, and IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, dated 7/1/2012, and was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment. This finding was assigned a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution because the licensee did not initiate a corrective action to identify the cause of the negative leak rate results obtained during the recent performance of the test procedure (P.1). | ||
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Latest revision as of 20:53, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000259/2015007 Section 1R21 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2015 (2015Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.21M |
| Inspectors (proximate) | D Terry-Ward G Ottenberg J Bartley M Yeminy R Patterson W Deschaine |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XI |
| CCA | P.1, Identification |
| INPO aspect | PI.1 |
| ' | |