05000390/FIN-2015002-02: Difference between revisions

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| identified by = NRC
| identified by = NRC
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.15
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.15
| Inspector = A Blarney, C Cheung, J Eargle, J Hamman, J Nadel, J Rivera,-Ortiz P, Cooper R, Egli R, Hickok T, Palmer W, Russel
| Inspector = A Blarney, C Cheung, J Eargle, J Hamman, J Nadel, J Rivera-Ortiz, P Cooper, R Egli, R Hickok, T Palmer, W Russell
| CCA = H.12
| CCA = H.12
| INPO aspect = QA.4
| INPO aspect = QA.4
| description = The NRC identified a NCV of technical specification (TS) 5.7.1.1.a, Procedures, for the licensees failure to implement OPDP-8, Operability Determinations and Limiting Conditions for Operations (LCO) tracking. Specifically, the licensee failed to track the applicability of action statement A of TS LCO 3.5.2.A, emergency core cooling systems, during planned testing. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR 1010269. The performance deficiency was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it would have had the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern in that, the failure to track an applicable technical specification action statement could lead to plant operations outside of TS analyzed conditions. The inspectors determined that this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent an actual loss of function of a single train for greater than its TS allowed outage time and did not represent an actual loss of function of one or more non-technical specification equipment for greater than 24 hours. The performance deficiency had a cross-cutting aspect of Avoid Complacency in the area of Human Performance because licensee personnel were complacent and failed to question long held assumptions about the ability of the valves to fail to their safe position under all design basis conditions.
| description = The NRC identified a NCV of technical specification (TS) 5.7.1.1.a, Procedures, for the licensees failure to implement OPDP-8, Operability Determinations and Limiting Conditions for Operations (LCO) tracking. Specifically, the licensee failed to track the applicability of action statement A of TS LCO 3.5.2.A, emergency core cooling systems, during planned testing. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR 1010269. The performance deficiency was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it would have had the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern in that, the failure to track an applicable technical specification action statement could lead to plant operations outside of TS analyzed conditions. The inspectors determined that this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent an actual loss of function of a single train for greater than its TS allowed outage time and did not represent an actual loss of function of one or more non-technical specification equipment for greater than 24 hours. The performance deficiency had a cross-cutting aspect of Avoid Complacency in the area of Human Performance because licensee personnel were complacent and failed to question long held assumptions about the ability of the valves to fail to their safe position under all design basis conditions.
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Latest revision as of 20:53, 20 February 2018

02
Site: Watts Bar Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Report IR 05000390/2015002 Section 1R15
Date counted Jun 30, 2015 (2015Q2)
Type: NCV: Green
cornerstone Mitigating Systems
Identified by: NRC identified
Inspection Procedure: IP 71111.15
Inspectors (proximate) A Blarney
C Cheung
J Eargle
J Hamman
J Nadel
J Rivera-Ortiz
P Cooper
R Egli
R Hickok
T Palmer
W Russell
Violation of: Technical Specification - Procedures

Technical Specification
CCA H.12, Avoid Complacency
INPO aspect QA.4
'