05000255/FIN-2012012-01: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 93812 | | Inspection procedure = IP 93812 | ||
| Inspector = E Sanchez | | Inspector = E Sanchez-Santiago, C Phillips, A Shaikhc, Zoias Sheldon, M Phalen, J Lennartz, K Walton, M Jones, T Taylor, A Scarbeary, E Sanchez-Santiago, D Alley | ||
| CCA = N/A for ROP | | CCA = N/A for ROP | ||
| INPO aspect = | | INPO aspect = | ||
| description = On August 9, 2012, licensee management decided a plant shutdown was necessary to investigate the source of elevated PCS unidentified leakage. At the point of the shutdown on August 12, 2012, unidentified leakage was approximately 0.3 gpm and had been gradually increasing. The plant was required to be shut down per TSs when the unidentified leak rate exceeded 1.0 gpm. The NRC had been monitoring the increased trend in unidentified leakage since July 2012, when the plant was restarted from a forced outage, to ensure that the plant was taking action as the leakage increased. The operators completed a controlled reactor shutdown on August 12, 2012. Following containment entry, the cause of the rise in leakage was determined to be from a steam leak originating on CRDM-24 housing. The licensee reported that the leakage was PCS pressure boundary leakage. The TS for PCS pressure boundary leakage was 0 gpm. The licensee concluded that they operated the plant in a condition prohibited by TS 3.4.13, PCS Operational Leakage, and reported this condition to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72. The NRC had previously granted enforcement discretion for situations where the licensee met all associated NRC regulations with regard to CRDM nozzle inspections and the violation was the result of equipment failure that could not have been reasonably avoided or detected (Enforcement discretion was granted under EA-02-011 in 2002 for the 2001 Palisades pressure boundary leak). Whether or not the licensee appropriately implemented their quality control program during the manufacture and installation of the CRDM-24 housing in 2001 or whether this failure was the result of an unavoidable equipment failure, is an unresolved item pending the review of the licensees root cause evaluation. It is not known, at this time, what caused the flaw which eventually propagated. (Unresolved Item (URI) 05000255/2012012-01, TS for PCS Pressure Boundary Leakage) | | description = On August 9, 2012, licensee management decided a plant shutdown was necessary to investigate the source of elevated PCS unidentified leakage. At the point of the shutdown on August 12, 2012, unidentified leakage was approximately 0.3 gpm and had been gradually increasing. The plant was required to be shut down per TSs when the unidentified leak rate exceeded 1.0 gpm. The NRC had been monitoring the increased trend in unidentified leakage since July 2012, when the plant was restarted from a forced outage, to ensure that the plant was taking action as the leakage increased. The operators completed a controlled reactor shutdown on August 12, 2012. Following containment entry, the cause of the rise in leakage was determined to be from a steam leak originating on CRDM-24 housing. The licensee reported that the leakage was PCS pressure boundary leakage. The TS for PCS pressure boundary leakage was 0 gpm. The licensee concluded that they operated the plant in a condition prohibited by TS 3.4.13, PCS Operational Leakage, and reported this condition to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72. The NRC had previously granted enforcement discretion for situations where the licensee met all associated NRC regulations with regard to CRDM nozzle inspections and the violation was the result of equipment failure that could not have been reasonably avoided or detected (Enforcement discretion was granted under EA-02-011 in 2002 for the 2001 Palisades pressure boundary leak). Whether or not the licensee appropriately implemented their quality control program during the manufacture and installation of the CRDM-24 housing in 2001 or whether this failure was the result of an unavoidable equipment failure, is an unresolved item pending the review of the licensees root cause evaluation. It is not known, at this time, what caused the flaw which eventually propagated. (Unresolved Item (URI) 05000255/2012012-01, TS for PCS Pressure Boundary Leakage) | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 19:47, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Palisades  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000255/2012012 Section 4OA5 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2012 (2012Q3) |
| Type: | URI: |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 93812 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | E Sanchez-Santiago C Phillips A Shaikhc Zoias Sheldon M Phalen J Lennartz K Walton M Jones T Taylor A Scarbeary E Sanchez-Santiago D Alley |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |