05000424/FIN-2012005-03: Difference between revisions
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{{finding | {{finding | ||
| title = Inadequate Operations | | title = Inadequate Operations and Maintenance Procedures Results in Brittle Failure of the LOOP 2 and LOOP 3 Outboard MSIV Stems | ||
| docket = 05000424, 05000425 | | docket = 05000424, 05000425 | ||
| inspection report = IR 05000424/2012005 | | inspection report = IR 05000424/2012005 | ||
| Line 12: | Line 12: | ||
| identified by = Self-Revealing | | identified by = Self-Revealing | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71152 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71152 | ||
| Inspector = A Nielsen, F Ehrhardt, A Vargas | | Inspector = A Nielsen, F Ehrhardt, A Vargas-Mendez, J Laughlin, M Cain, B Caballero, T Chandler, R Williams, C Dykes, W Pursley | ||
| CCA = H.5 | | CCA = H.5 | ||
| INPO aspect = WP.1 | | INPO aspect = WP.1 | ||
| description = A self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) for failure to meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings was identified for failure to provide adequate work instructions in the operations and maintenance procedures used to open main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) that were bound in their closed seat. Specifically, the operations and maintenance procedures used to open the loop 2 and loop 3 outboard MSIVs did not provide instructions to limit the magnitude of the force applied to the valve stems while attempting to open the valves, which ultimately resulted in the brittle failure of the valve stems. The licensee conducted ultrasonic testing of the remaining six Unit 1 MSIVs to verify that the valve stems were intact. The two failed valve stems were replaced, and the reactor was restarted nine days later. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the procedure quality attribute of the reactor safety - initiating events cornerstone and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the failure to provide adequate work instructions to operations and maintenance personnel resulted in the failure of both the loop 2 and loop 3 outboard MSIVs and the subsequent manual reactor trip. Since the inspectors answered no to the Exhibit 1, section B, initiating events screening question, the inspectors concluded that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). The cause of the finding was related to the work control component of the human performance cross-cutting area due to less-than-adequate work planning. [H.3(a)] Specifically, the licensees procedures used to open the MSIVs that were stuck on their closed seat did not contain instructions or precautions to limit the magnitude of the force applied to the valve stems while attempting to open the valves. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR 530916. | | description = A self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) for failure to meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings was identified for failure to provide adequate work instructions in the operations and maintenance procedures used to open main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) that were bound in their closed seat. Specifically, the operations and maintenance procedures used to open the loop 2 and loop 3 outboard MSIVs did not provide instructions to limit the magnitude of the force applied to the valve stems while attempting to open the valves, which ultimately resulted in the brittle failure of the valve stems. The licensee conducted ultrasonic testing of the remaining six Unit 1 MSIVs to verify that the valve stems were intact. The two failed valve stems were replaced, and the reactor was restarted nine days later. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the procedure quality attribute of the reactor safety - initiating events cornerstone and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the failure to provide adequate work instructions to operations and maintenance personnel resulted in the failure of both the loop 2 and loop 3 outboard MSIVs and the subsequent manual reactor trip. Since the inspectors answered no to the Exhibit 1, section B, initiating events screening question, the inspectors concluded that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). The cause of the finding was related to the work control component of the human performance cross-cutting area due to less-than-adequate work planning. [H.3(a)] Specifically, the licensees procedures used to open the MSIVs that were stuck on their closed seat did not contain instructions or precautions to limit the magnitude of the force applied to the valve stems while attempting to open the valves. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR 530916. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 19:46, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Vogtle  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000424/2012005 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2012 (2012Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Nielsen F Ehrhardt A Vargas-Mendez J Laughlin M Cain B Caballero T Chandler R Williams C Dykes W Pursley |
| CCA | H.5, Work Management |
| INPO aspect | WP.1 |
| ' | |