05000424/FIN-2012007-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Identify and Repair an Inoperable Fire Penetration Seal |
| Description | An NRC-identified non-cited violation of Vogtle Unit 2, Operating License Condition 2.G, was identified for the licensees failure to identify and repair an inoperable fire penetration seal. The NCV was associated with the licensees failure to identify and repair Auxiliary Feedwater Pumphouse penetration seal 2-59-031-1 that was missing half of 1 damming board material on one side of the seal. The inoperable fire penetration seal is in a 3-hour fire rated wall of the Auxiliary Feedwater Pumphouse. The licensee took immediate corrective actions to declare the penetration seal inoperable, entered the issue in their corrective action program as CR 467932, established a continuous fire watch, and repaired the penetration seal to its design condition. Additionally, the licensee performed an extent of condition inspection of the Auxiliary Feedwater Pumphouse to verify that there were not any other penetration seals in the same degraded condition. The inoperable fire penetration seal represented a performance deficiency, since the partial missing damming board would be expected to be identified and corrected by the licensee during performance of Procedure 29144-C, Fire Boundaries and Fire Rated Penetration Seals-18 Month Visual Inspection. The finding adversely affected the fire containment capability defense-in-depth element. The finding was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the protection against external events attribute, (i.e., fire), and degraded the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability of systems that respond to initiating events. Using NRC IMC 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection SDP Phase 1 Worksheet, the inspectors conducted a screening and determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the remaining penetration seal depth and damming material provided at least 2- hours of fire resistance. The team identified a cross-cutting aspect in the resources component of the human performance area because the licensee did not ensure that personnel and procedures were available, and adequate to assure nuclear safety. Specifically, because the licensee did not identify any work activities that may have damaged the seal since the completion of the most recent inspection, it was reasonable to assume that the deficiency was missed during the surveillance performed on May 9, 2012. |
| Site: | Vogtle  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000424/2012007 Section 1R05 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2012 (2012Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.05 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | R Rodriguez M King D Jones K Ellis J Montgomery P Braxton J Dymek |
| CCA | H.7, Documentation |
| INPO aspect | WP.3 |
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Finding - Vogtle - IR 05000424/2012007 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Vogtle) @ 2012Q3
Self-Identified List (Vogtle)
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