05000382/FIN-2010006-02: Difference between revisions

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| CCA = N/A for ROP
| CCA = N/A for ROP
| INPO aspect =  
| INPO aspect =  
| description = The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.36 (b), "Technical Specifications," for failure to derive technical specifications from the analyses and evaluation included in the safety analysis report. Specifically, the licensee failed to derive an action statement for Technical Specification 3.7.5 that meets the assumptions included in the Waterford Unit 3 Updated Safety Analysis Report. The Updated Safety Analysis Report evaluation assumes an instantaneous levee failure occurs at a Mississippi River level of +27 feet mean sea level. The inspectors determined that the action statement for Technical Specification 3.7.5, to complete procedures to secure doors and penetrations in 12 hours, was not derived from the evaluation included in the safety analysis report because the actions would take place after the assumed instantaneous levee failure. The licensee entered this condition into the corrective action program as CR-WF3-2010-03232. As a short term compensatory measure, the licensee established criteria for taking appropriate action before the Mississippi River level would reach the +27 feet mean sea level safety limit
| description = The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.36 (b), \"Technical Specifications,\" for failure to derive technical specifications from the analyses and evaluation included in the safety analysis report. Specifically, the licensee failed to derive an action statement for Technical Specification 3.7.5 that meets the assumptions included in the Waterford Unit 3 Updated Safety Analysis Report. The Updated Safety Analysis Report evaluation assumes an instantaneous levee failure occurs at a Mississippi River level of +27 feet mean sea level. The inspectors determined that the action statement for Technical Specification 3.7.5, to complete procedures to secure doors and penetrations in 12 hours, was not derived from the evaluation included in the safety analysis report because the actions would take place after the assumed instantaneous levee failure. The licensee entered this condition into the corrective action program as CR-WF3-2010-03232. As a short term compensatory measure, the licensee established criteria for taking appropriate action before the Mississippi River level would reach the +27 feet mean sea level safety limit


The finding is more than minor because, if left uncorrected the performance deficiency would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. In addition, the performance deficiency adversely affects the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of external events to ensure the availability and reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, "Phase 1 - Initial screening and Characterization of Findings," the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it was a nonconforming condition that did not result in complete unavailability of the equipment.
The finding is more than minor because, if left uncorrected the performance deficiency would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. In addition, the performance deficiency adversely affects the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of external events to ensure the availability and reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, \"Phase 1 - Initial screening and Characterization of Findings,\" the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it was a nonconforming condition that did not result in complete unavailability of the equipment.
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Latest revision as of 20:41, 20 February 2018

02
Site: Waterford Entergy icon.png
Report IR 05000382/2010006 Section 4OA2
Date counted Jun 30, 2010 (2010Q2)
Type: NCV: Green
cornerstone Mitigating Systems
Identified by: NRC identified
Inspection Procedure: IP 71152
Inspectors (proximate) G George
S Garchow
M Hay
D Overland
H Freeman
INPO aspect
'