05000334/FIN-2010005-02: Difference between revisions
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| CCA = H.12 | | CCA = H.12 | ||
| INPO aspect = QA.4 | | INPO aspect = QA.4 | ||
| description = A self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) was identified in that a chemical addition pump [1WT-P-15B] was misaligned to an isolated main feed water header, and upon starting caused an unexpected pressure transient. which affected the 'B' Fast Acting Main Feedwater Isolation Valve (HYV-1FW-100B) (MFIV). Specifically, the main feed water piping was inadvertently isolated and Pressurized beyond its normal operating pressure, causing significant packing leakage of the 'B' MFIV. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program under CR 10-84891. Traditional enforcement does not apply because the issue did not have an actual safety consequence or the potential for impacting NRC's regulatory function, and was not the result of any willful violation of NRC requirements. The inspectors determined that the finding was not similar to the examples for minor deficiencies contained in IMC 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues. The finding was more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affects the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors performed a Phase 1 SOP evaluation in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix G, Attachment 1, Checklist 3 PWR Cold Shutdown and Refueling Operation RCS Open and Refueling Cavity Level <23' OR RCS Closed and No Inventory in Pressurizer with Time to Boiling <2 hours. There was no loss of control, and all mitigating capabilities were available, therefore a Phase 2 quantitative assessment was not required and the issue screened to Green (very low safety significance). The cuase of this finding relates to the cross-cutting aspect of Human Performance, Work Practices, in that FENOC did not utilize human error prevention techniques, pre-job brief and peer checking, to prevent the misalignment of the chemical addition pump. | | description = A self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) was identified in that a chemical addition pump [1WT-P-15B] was misaligned to an isolated main feed water header, and upon starting caused an unexpected pressure transient. which affected the \'B\' Fast Acting Main Feedwater Isolation Valve (HYV-1FW-100B) (MFIV). Specifically, the main feed water piping was inadvertently isolated and Pressurized beyond its normal operating pressure, causing significant packing leakage of the \'B\' MFIV. This issue was entered into the licensee\'s corrective action program under CR 10-84891. Traditional enforcement does not apply because the issue did not have an actual safety consequence or the potential for impacting NRC\'s regulatory function, and was not the result of any willful violation of NRC requirements. The inspectors determined that the finding was not similar to the examples for minor deficiencies contained in IMC 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues. The finding was more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affects the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors performed a Phase 1 SOP evaluation in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix G, Attachment 1, Checklist 3 PWR Cold Shutdown and Refueling Operation RCS Open and Refueling Cavity Level <23\' OR RCS Closed and No Inventory in Pressurizer with Time to Boiling <2 hours. There was no loss of control, and all mitigating capabilities were available, therefore a Phase 2 quantitative assessment was not required and the issue screened to Green (very low safety significance). The cuase of this finding relates to the cross-cutting aspect of Human Performance, Work Practices, in that FENOC did not utilize human error prevention techniques, pre-job brief and peer checking, to prevent the misalignment of the chemical addition pump. | ||
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Latest revision as of 20:40, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000334/2010005 Section 1R20 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2010 (2010Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.2 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | D Werkheiser E Bonney P Kaufman R Bellamy T Moslak |
| CCA | H.12, Avoid Complacency |
| INPO aspect | QA.4 |
| ' | |