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| issue date = 11/28/2016 | | issue date = 11/28/2016 | ||
| title = Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC - Response to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Request for Additional Information Regarding the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report and Environmental Review | | title = Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC - Response to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Request for Additional Information Regarding the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report and Environmental Review | ||
| author name = Haass | | author name = Haass C | ||
| author affiliation = Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC | | author affiliation = Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC | ||
| addressee name = | | addressee name = | ||
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| page count = 131 | | page count = 131 | ||
| project = TAC:MF6138 | | project = TAC:MF6138 | ||
| stage = Request | |||
}} | }} | ||
=Text= | =Text= | ||
{{#Wiki_filter:. | {{#Wiki_filter:.:;.*.~*. .NWMI | ||
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***:=* NDRTHWESTMEOICALISOTOPES ATTACHMENT 3 Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC Response to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Request for Additional Information Regarding the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report and Environmental Review of the Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC Construction Permit Application Docket No. 50-609 Dated: September 29, 2016 | |||
{Document No. NWMl-2016-RAl-004, November 2016) | |||
Public Version Information is being provided via hard copy | |||
* | |||
* e * * | * e * * | ||
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* 0 * | * e **** | ||
* NORTHWEST MEDICAL ISOTOPES | * 0 * | ||
* NORTHWEST MEDICAL ISOTOPES Response to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Request for Additional Information Regarding the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report of the Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC Construction Permit Application Docket No. 50-609 NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 November 2016 Prepared by: | |||
Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC 815 NW 9th Ave, Suite 256 Corvallis, OR 97330 | |||
NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 REVISION IDSTORY Rev Date Reason for Revision Revised By 0 11/28/2016 Issued for Submittal to the NRC N/A NWMl-2016-RAl.,004, Rev. 0 CONTENTS General Information ................................................................................................................................ 1 Chapter 2.0-Site Characteristics ............................................................................................................ 4 Chapter 3. 0 -Design of Structures, Systems, and Components .............................................................. 20 Chapter 5.0 -Coolant Systems .............................................................................................................. 35 Chapter 6.0-Engineered Safety Features .............................................................................................. 37 Chapter 7.0-Instrumentation and Control Systems ............................................................................... 46 Chapter 8.0-Electrical Power Systems .................................................................................................. 53 Chapter 9 .0 -Auxiliary Systems ............................................................................................................ 54 Chapter 11.0 -Radiation Protection and Waste Management ................................................................. 66 Chapter 12.0-Conduct of Operations ................................................................................................... 78 Chapter 13.0 -Accident Analysis ............. * ............................................................................................. 83 Chapter 14.0 -Technical Specifications ................................................................................................ 91 References ............................................................................................................................................. 93 ATTACHMENTS Attachment A-Section 3.5, "Systems and Components" ofNWMI-2013-021, Construction Permit Application.for Radioisotope Production Facility .......................................... A-i Attachment B-NWMI-2014-RPT-006,MCNP 6.1 Validations with Continuous Energy ENDFIB-Vll.1 Cross-Sections (Rev. 0) (Public Version) ........................................... B-i Attachment C -NWMI-2015-CSE-008, NWMI Preliminary Criticality Safety Evaluation: Hot Cell Uranium Purification (Recovery and Recycle) (Rev. A) (Public Version) ........... C-i NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 TERMS Acronyms and Abbreviations 99Mo 235u mu ADAMS ALARA ALI ANECF ANS | |||
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. | NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 | ||
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- .. ~~.~~:* UGlltm'VlSTMf[l(CAllSOTOf(S Response to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Request for Additional Information Regarding the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report of the Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC Construction Permit Application Docket No. 50-609 NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 Date Published: | |||
November 28, 2016 Document Number: NWMl-2016-RAl-004 IRevision Number. O | |||
==Title:== | |||
Response to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Request for Additional Information Regarding the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report of the Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC Construction Permit Application Docket No. 50-609 Approved by: Carolyn Haass Signature: | |||
CUM)~C.~ | |||
NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 REVISION IDSTORY Rev Date Reason for Revision Revised By 0 11/28/2016 Issued for Submittal to the NRC N/A | |||
NWMl-2016-RAl.,004, Rev. 0 CONTENTS General Information ................................................................................................................................ 1 Chapter 2.0- Site Characteristics ............................................................................................................ 4 Chapter 3. 0 - Design of Structures, Systems, and Components .............................................................. 20 Chapter 5.0 - Coolant Systems .............................................................................................................. 35 Chapter 6.0- Engineered Safety Features .............................................................................................. 37 Chapter 7.0-Instrumentation and Control Systems ............................................................................... 46 Chapter 8.0- Electrical Power Systems .................................................................................................. 53 Chapter 9 .0 - Auxiliary Systems ............................................................................................................ 54 Chapter 11.0 - Radiation Protection and Waste Management ................................................................. 66 Chapter 12.0-Conduct of Operations ................................................................................................... 78 Chapter 13.0 - Accident Analysis .............*............................................................................................. 83 Chapter 14.0 -Technical Specifications ................................................................................................ 91 References ............................................................................................................................................. 93 ATTACHMENTS Attachment A- Section 3.5, "Systems and Components" ofNWMI-2013-021, Construction Permit Application.for Radioisotope Production Facility .......................................... A-i Attachment B- NWMI-2014-RPT-006,MCNP 6.1 Validations with Continuous Energy ENDFIB-Vll.1 Cross-Sections (Rev. 0) (Public Version) ........................................... B-i Attachment C - NWMI-2015-CSE-008, NWMI Preliminary Criticality Safety Evaluation: Hot Cell Uranium Purification (Recovery and Recycle) (Rev. A) (Public Version) ........... C-i | |||
NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 TERMS Acronyms and Abbreviations 99Mo molybdenum-99 235u uranium-235 mu uranium-238 ADAMS Agencywide Documents Access and Management System ALARA as low as reasonably achievable ALI annual limits on intake ANECF average neutron energy causing fission ANS American Nuclear Society ANSI American National Standards Institute AOA area of applicability ASCE American Society of Civil Engineers ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials BMS building management system C-I Seismic Category I C-II Seismic Category II CDE committed dose equivalent CEDE committed effective dose equivalent CF2 carbon fluoride CFR Code of Federal Regulations CP Construction Permit DAAP diamylamylphosphonate DAC derived air concentration DBE design-basis event EDE effective dose equivalent EOI end of irradiation ESF engineering safety feature FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency FPC facility process control FSAR final safety analysis report H2 hydrogen gas HEGA high-efficiency gas adsorption HEPA high-efficiency particulate air HEU high-enriched uranium HMI human-machine interface HVAC heating, ventilation, and air conditioning I&C instrument and control IBC International Building Code IEU intermediate-enriched uranium IROFS items relied on for safety ISA integrated safety analysis ISG Interim Staff Guidance ketr k-effective LEU low-enriched uranium MCER maximum-considered earthquake MCNP Monte Carlo N-Particle MHA maximum hypothetical accident MMI Modified Mercalli Intensity MoS margin of subcriticality ii | |||
*.\,* ..... NWMI | |||
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* ~. :~.~~:' ~~MTll\'llSTUmt;AilSG'ft)JF[S NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 MU University of Missouri MURR University of Missouri Research Reactor NCS nuclear criticality safety NESHAP National Emission Standards for f:Iazardous Air Pollutants NFPA National Fire Protection Association NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NS non-seismic NSR nonsafety-related NWMI Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC OBE operating basis earthquake OSL optically stimulated luminescence OSTR Oregon State University TRIGA Reactor osu Oregon State University PGA peak ground acceleration PHA process hazard analysis PPE personal protective equipment PSAR preliminary safety analysis report QA quality assurance QAPP quality assurance program plan QL quality level RAI request for additional information RAM radioactive material RCA radiologically controlled area RPF Radioisotope Production Facility "' | |||
RSAC Radiological Safety Analysis Computer SAR safety analysis report SEP standby electrical power SNM special nuclear material SR safety-related SSC structures, systems, and components SSE safe-shutdown earthquake TEDE total effective dose equivalent TLD thermoluminescent dosimeter TRIGA Training, Research, Isotopes, General Atomics u uranium U.S. United States UC uranium carbide UH3 uranium trihydride U02 uranium dioxide U02(N03)2 uranyl nitrate UPS uninterruptable power supply USGS United States Geological Survey UZrH uranium zirconium hydride WCDE weighted committed dose equivalent iii | |||
.;.,. ~;:. NWMI NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 | |||
~--~~-~'::* f~OIUHWESfWDU:AJ.ISQT{li![S" Units oc degrees Celsius op degrees Fahrenheit | |||
µ rmcron cm centimeter cm2 square centimeter ft feet ft2 square feet g gram g ground acceleration gal gallon ha hectare hp horsepower hr hour | |||
: m. inch in. 2 square inch kg kilogram km kilometer km2 square kilometer kPa kilopascal kW kilowatt L liter lb pound m meter MeV million electron volts mg milligram rm mile mi2 square mile mm minute mrem millirem mSv millisievert rem roentgen equivalent in man wk week yr year iv | |||
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...... NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 | |||
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'~ ~~.~!'."', Ntml'HWfSTMU!ltAL tsOlOPES GENERAL INFORMATION No. Request for Additional Information 1of96 | |||
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\The maximum hypothetical accident (MHA) discussion was inappropriately included in Section 13.2.1 | |||
!of the preliminary safety analysis report (PSAR) (NWMI-2013-021, Construction Permit Application for | |||
)Radioisotope Production Facility). NWMI interpreted NUREG-1537, Guidelines for Preparing and jReviewing Applications for the Licensing ofNon-Power Reactors: ~tandard R~view Plan and 1Acceptance Criteria, Part 2, Chapter 13, as augmented by the Interun Staff Gui.dance (ISG) (NRC, | |||
]2012), as requiring.an analysis consistent with both 10 CFR 70.61, "Performance Requirements," and lwith the MHA approach. Additionally, the PSAR combined the two in its approach to the MHA, jproducing an analysis inconsistent with the intended requirements of an MHA analysis. | |||
t fThe accident analyses in the final safety analysis report (FSAR); as part of the Operating License | |||
!Application, will be consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 70.61. As stated in Chapter 13b, | |||
!"Radioisotope Production Facility Accident Analyses,'.' of the ISG Augmenting NUREG-1537, Part 1: | |||
I . | |||
l NRC staffhas determined that the use ofIntegrated Safety Analysis methodologies as described in 10 CFR Part 70 Subpart Hand NUREG-1520, application ofthe radiological and chemical consequence and likelihood criteria contained in the performance requirements of 10 CFR | |||
: 70. 61, designation ofitems relied on for safety, and establishment ofmanagement measures, are acceptable ways ofdemonstrating adequate safety for the medical isotopes production facility. | |||
fThe accident analyses in the PSAR are based on (1) use of integrated safety analysis (ISA) | |||
!methodologies, as described in 10 CFR 70 Subpart Hand NUREG-1520, Standard Review Plan for the | |||
!Review ofa License Application for a Fuel Cycle Facility, (2) application of the radiological and | |||
!chemical consequence and likelihood criteria contained in the performance requirements of 10 CFR l?0.61, (3) designation of items relied on for safety (IROFS), and (4) establishment of management jmeasures to demonstrate adequate safety. | |||
\The ISA includes a systematic analysis and discussion of credible accidents for determining the limiting ievents for several accident categories. The limiting event in each category is analyzed quantitatively to | |||
!determine consequences. Radiological accident consequences, as mitigated by structures, systems, and jcomponents (SSC) and administrative safety measures, are evaluated against the performance | |||
!requirements of 10 CFR 70.61. The safety measures are designated as IROFS. | |||
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'- Request for Additional Information | |||
!Based on the response to RAI G-3, PSAR.Section 13.2, "Analysis ofAccidents with Radiological and | |||
!Criticality Safety Consequences" Will be revised and the MHA discussion in PSAR Section 13.2.1 will | |||
\be deleted. | |||
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. J/~;;:::~::*i*~ | |||
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!SSCs will be designed to protect against both high and immediate consequences. PSAR Section 3.5.1.3.1 jdescribed both the high and the immediate consequence performance requirements from 10 CFR 70.61. | |||
jTo eliminate confusion and ensure completeness, these bullets were removed from PSAR .Section 3.5.1.3 j(see Attachment A), and the 10 CFR 70.61 performance requirements are referenced. | |||
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NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 CHAPTER 2.0 - SITE CHARACTERISTICS No. Request for additional information 1;{;~~j~~()!ji(fl!~~a~i1~~~~:~~i~JifS~~i~~l~~~~~1J~iJ if;,;; 4. '* :l'" ***','\);;analySjfi; should t{?!no.nst,rate:Biatthe!',e is. a lowpotent~t;J/;rb.atgnyair,q~aft ca,u,Id ajfe:qUhe ~,FJ~ ,.:'' i ~.,''' | |||
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!'+ **'~~!t':','.*'I \:i:ae'tennifie:the *. oteiitial,raWo?o** *cal fiisfiSf*(f an *.*to'the'facility)staff,?thit ubliC*.ana*tlfee'nVir.ohment ">*\ | |||
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<l;qssoqlqt~d ~itli thr'refere[lc~i(.helip()rts a1:trJat(po:ft~;~oi;fzow 'the*J?.!:'E: 'fl.esig!J 1;.::*~2~2.":~£:21~~~~~~~f§f:J}t~~:e~f~~i.s~~f;£~J~~~~i~~{~?f~~:~~i.~trl/Jl!}if~~t-1!fle?5lf.!S1~~~:/i.:1li1Jl~~.~~. :*,~-,:z:~::,.~~ | |||
:There are three airports and three helicopter ports located within 16 kilometers (km) (10 miles [mi]) of | |||
:the proposed RPF site. The three airports include: | |||
* Columbia Regional Airport (public) located approximately 10.4 km (6.5 mi) south of the RPF site 1 | * Columbia Regional Airport (public) located approximately 10.4 km (6.5 mi) south of the RPF site 1 | ||
* Cedar Creek Airport (private) located approximately 10.6 km (6.6 mi) northeast of the RPF site Sugar Branch Airport (private) located approximately 15.6 km (9.7 mi) northwest of the RPF site iTuese airports are identified in PSAR Chapter 2.0, Figure 2-30, of the Construction Permit Application. :The nearest airport to the RPF is the Columbia Regional Airport, which is used by commercial and 'privately owned aircraft. The airport is situated on approximately 0.532 ha (1,314 acres) and is owned :and operated by the City of Columbia. This airport is the only public use airport located in Boone ;county, Missouri, for which records are kept. For the 12-month period ending October 31, 2013, the 'airport had 16,610 aircraft operations for an average of 26 flights per day, including: | * Cedar Creek Airport (private) located approximately 10.6 km (6.6 mi) northeast of the RPF site Sugar Branch Airport (private) located approximately 15.6 km (9.7 mi) northwest of the RPF site iTuese airports are identified in PSAR Chapter 2.0, Figure 2-30, of the Construction Permit Application. | ||
:The nearest airport to the RPF is the Columbia Regional Airport, which is used by commercial and | |||
'privately owned aircraft. The airport is situated on approximately 0.532 ha (1,314 acres) and is owned | |||
:and operated by the City of Columbia. This airport is the only public use airport located in Boone | |||
;county, Missouri, for which records are kept. For the 12-month period ending October 31, 2013, the | |||
'airport had 16,610 aircraft operations for an average of 26 flights per day, including: | |||
81 percent general aviation l * | |||
. 16 percent air taxi 2 percent military 1 percent air carrier | |||
:Cedar Creek airport is a private turf landing strip approximately 10.6 km (6.6 mi) northeast of the RPF ; | |||
'.site. The facility houses two private single engine aircraft. The specific number of flights to and from the i | |||
;facility is not available. | |||
The Sugar Branch airport is a private, turf landing strip approximately 15.6 km (9.7 mi) northwest of the | |||
;RPF site. The facility houses one single engine aircraft. The specific number of flights to and from the | |||
:facility are not available. | |||
'Three helicopter ports are located within 16 km ( 10 mi) of the RPF site and support hospital operations, | |||
,including: | |||
~ | |||
* University of Missouri Hospitals and Clinics heliport located 6 km (3. 7 mi) northwest | * University of Missouri Hospitals and Clinics heliport located 6 km (3. 7 mi) northwest | ||
* University of Missouri (MU) heliport located 6 km (3.7 mi) northwest Boone Hospital Center heliport located 6.3 km (3.9 mi) northwest. | |||
4 of96 | |||
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*".. ~~..~!:' NqrtrnwuT,MflMCAl tsotOPfS NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 | |||
!No operations data are available for these heliports. | |||
1Based on NUREG-1537, sites located between 8 km (5 mi) and 16 km (10 mi) from an existing or . | |||
\projected commercial or military airport with more than approximately 200 d2 (where dis the distance in ; | |||
!kilometers from the airport to the RPF site) commercial or military aircraft movements per year, the | |||
)probability of aircraft accidents is considered less than an order of magnitude of 10-7 per year. * | |||
!Tue number of operations at the Cedar Creek and Sugar Branch airports are not available. However, daily) 1operations were assumed based on the aircraft housed, including two operations per day from Cedar '. | |||
iCreek (730 operations/year) and one operation per day from Sugar Branch (365 operations/year). Based '. | |||
jon the results presented in Table 1, all three airports are under the 200 d2 limits. | |||
* i Table 1. 200 D2 Limits Distance Airport km (mi) Flights per year 200 d 2 limitsa i a~ is the distance in kilomete~s from the airport to the .RPF site (200. x qistance, squared) ..... | |||
!Based on this requirement, none of these airports needs to be further evaluated. The guidance also jrequires that special consideration be given to facilities sited within the trajectory of a runway of any | |||
;airport. The RPF site is not located within a trajectory of a runway of the airport. | |||
iBecause the three heliports are closer than 8 km (5 mi) to the RPF site, the frequency of an aircraft jcrashing into the site needs to be evaluated. NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan for the Review of iSafety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants, Subsection 3 .5 .1. 6, provides a methodology for , | |||
!determining the probability of an aircraft crash into a facility from airways. However, the approach requires : | |||
!knowledge of the number of flights per year along the airway. Because this information is not available 1for the flight paths near the RPF, DOE-STD-3014-2006, Accident Analysis for Aircraft Crash into | |||
!Hazardous Facilities, was used to determine the frequency of crashes. The following equation is used. | |||
Fh = Nh x Ph x fh(x,y) x Ah | |||
!Where: | |||
Fh Crash impact frequency N Flight per year Ph Probability of a crash fh(x,y) Probability, given a crash, that the crash occurs in a l-mi2 area surrounding the facility | |||
= Effective plant area. | |||
I | |||
\The effective area for an aircraft was determined by two components: the aircraft crashing into the | |||
!facility either by skidding or by flying directly into it. The effective area was calculated based on an laircraft skidding or flying into the facility in the direction that produces the largest area (i.e., crashing in a; jdirection perpendicular to the largest diagonal of the building). | |||
iThe following formula was used to calculating the skid and fly in areas of an aircraft crashing into the | |||
!facility. | |||
\Where: | |||
(2 xL x W x WS) | |||
Ar = (WS + R) x H x cot</J + R +L x W 5 of 96 | |||
.:;**~;*. NWMI | |||
. ~. ~~.~!: | |||
* NORIHWUT M£DIW lSOTCIP£S NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 and: | |||
As = (WS + R) x S | |||
!Where: | |||
l, | |||
: Ar Effective fly-in area | |||
' As Effective skid area ws = Aircraft wingspan R = Length of the diagonal of the facility = ..JL2 + W 2 H Facility height, facility-specific cot<l> Mean of the cotangent of the aircraft impact angle L Length of facility, facility-specific w Width of facility, facility-specific s = Aircraft skid distance (mea.Ii value). | |||
'.DOE-STD-3014-2006 notes that in calculating an effective area, the analyst needs to be cognizant of the | |||
;"critical areas" of the facility. The critical areas are locations in a facility that contain hazardous material and/or locations that, once impacted by a crash, can lead to cascading failures (e.g., a fire, collapse, | |||
'.and/or explosion that would impact the hazardous material). The critical areas of the RPF are considered , | |||
*to be the hot cell and waste management areas. * | |||
*The critical areas dimensions are estimated at 30.5 x 24 meters (m) (100 x 80 feet [ft]), which provides a ; | |||
diagonal (R) of39 m (128 ft). The facility height (H) of22.9 m (75 ft) was used. DOE-STD-3014-2006 l | |||
.provides estimates for aircraft wingspan, mean of the cotangent of the aircraft impact angle, and skid | |||
.distance for five different aircraft types. For helicopters, the cot<l> value is 0.58 and the skid length is | |||
'typically assumed to be 0. The effective area is calculated in Table 2. | |||
Table 2. Affective Area for Helicopter Wing spana Skid distancea Effective plant area Ah Aircraft ws (ft) cot<l>a s (ft) (mi 2 ) | |||
Helicopter : 50 0.58 0 0.00079 a DOE-STD-3014-2006, Accident Analysis for Aircraft Crash into Hazardous Facilities, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C., 1996 (R2006). | |||
For a helicopter, fh(x,y) is estimated based on half the average length of a flight with the lateral | |||
:variations in crash locations assumed to be one-quarter mile on the average from the centerline of the | |||
*flight path or 2/L. The probability Ph (2.50E-05) is taken from DOE-STD-3014-2006, Appendix B | |||
:Table B-1. The total number of flights from the three helipads are estimated at 1,825 per year. A ; | |||
!conservation estimate is that 5 percent of these helicopters overfly the facility. In addition, a conservative i | |||
:estimate of total flight path is the distance to the closest helipad or 6 km (3.7 mi). | |||
I | |||
!Based on these assumptions, the helicopter impact frequency is calculated as follows: | |||
2 Fh = 91 x 2.SE- 05 x _ x 7.9£- 04 37 Fh = 9.7E-o7 The calculated crash impact frequency from the heliport is less than the requirement ofNUREG-0800 of f | |||
'.being within an order of magnitude of 10-7 per year. Therefore, no further analysis is required. This ; | |||
'information will be added to PSAR Section 2.2.2. | |||
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iPSAR Section 2.2.2.1 had a typographical error. 10.4 km (6.5 mi) is the correct distance from the Request for additional information | |||
!Columbia Regional Airport to the RPF site, based on Google Earth measurements, and 10.4 km (6.5 mi) | |||
\is the distance used in the associated calculations. The stated distance of 10.5 km will be changed to | |||
; 10.4 km (6.5 mi) in PSAR Section 2.2.2.1. | |||
1i:-R"A1r2=i~]W'fJRiG!Tfif?ai1'1':secti6h'2.-2:~(:;'.A;;tizy;i~:ifP.61<iFiti~IA."Jci"d~Tii~.a,i~"(;iiiHi~;-:;;:*~1~"iJ,iili'd?iJa*:~T~ | |||
' ' ' \' *.' '/1('aqility (i.,~.,- nearby inqustn~l, tr~nspor~(i'tio~~ or mi(i_ta,ryfaci~!tyJ "cannotaJfep['.the/Rf!llJ! th,e.~ .:. :~' ' *. ' l | |||
* * * : *: ~ | |||
* j!applic;ant::sh'ould make a* stat~ment_to: t~at e.ffe~t imd giy<? the ba~is fot t!Jis '.statement. '.' (:* : ', _. ': * -~*--*' .* ** .. *~: | |||
. \IFurthermore, NuREG-1537;part2, $ection 7;2, .'.'Nei1rbylndu~trial, irm;sportation,,c:i,nd_Militqry., . ; | |||
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* ti . *. | * ti . *. | ||
* Minimize reliance* admfrilstra:five or com'plex.actwe erigineering.c<Jntl'o./s tq pro'vide.(l .: ~ .; * ,:";,, :::, | |||
* *** n**;*,.*~a'rifiii-e/neni~stem*~sstmf;1e*afidfai1::s~fea~~ea;'O~a61ypo'sst61'e'.,."** :;:. ~ . " , ~-* , .. * * .. ::.J | |||
~,.~*H*'.:~.'*'. ::~_~*,<*'.:~'.-;*~"'*....*~*-'*'~: *"" ..j:,~<~*::'_,~>.*.~<~ 5 *:**::*-_;>*.** . **~-~\*,~. "* .*. '*:*,~>::,_f * ......._,,. , . , ~,.. ~.T,.'tr; | |||
* .uPSAR. S,eczyo~ 3,5,.2.7.11 *tfien lrsts.des1gn ~pszs.:<*values. :a$follows.'/" '*"' . , * . . : ".,_ . ."' . : >>./f | |||
..:l *:~.. Pr~vent iruidvertenl ~ruicatitya~d mfitntainpri~a,.Y JissiiJn prqduet iioundary'liiirini:?ifia after' , ~; | |||
~t. ;: ' riot:'nia,l op?rations; *shutdown conditi~ns; :afld PBEs *~*, ': . :* ;' ' ' , , ' :, ' ' ' ,' "*' ' i | |||
- | |||
* i1 * ~ | |||
* 3()-yem: design life ; ,: . ,, , . . * * . *; ' . | |||
* _ *'.'* :< ": .... * ';,-?;;~ | |||
, . *. " * ,,,Coi;tain :andsto~~no~.le gases geher~~ed i~:~~;m;Ffor,at ~e~~!.:~t*~t[:. i~~~~:~-~['i;:_,, *"_,L;~-~ ,;*~(:~ | |||
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-.*:;: | |||
* Re uest for additional information rf Ji~,~i ~.~ '. ~~~~:~~s::;~~~r~% :*i~d~irr,f~ih.~11~°.i~~ew:~i~~:f '.,ft~?i~~*~t:~:1t1~!~:r~~;f .*;:~~~~~:~}~. | |||
1 t:*": *t -* ~ ***, -,,,01* >~ .*1?.'eflfrs td/~he -~'proc¢sSyes~etveh_#l[Jtipnisy,~te_m;**~f:whi'e,,h i~ appi;u:ehtly.call~d;{he,: ~'pffgas,; ,_;,;,, ;; ~ '.:,:1 f | |||
~t; :. ,;;{ :,,1;::. /': '1f .:,\ :tr~a~enf ~Si~lfv'! :_i~ 'fMB S.~b'f.i~&-*9::{ .i* *;;:: . :~:' | |||
* Maintains working knowledge of the waste acceptance criteria, standards, guides, and codes with respect to waste disposal | * Maintains working knowledge of the waste acceptance criteria, standards, guides, and codes with respect to waste disposal | ||
* Conducts self-assessments of waste management practices and compliance with procedures in accordance with the waste management self-assessment program | |||
'.These responsibilities will be added to PSAR Section 11.2.1.3.2. . | |||
"r * -- *"*~* *. ,.,. .. ~*:-.-.iJ .... ,.,.*J**'~ ......-,"' ..,..;,*..;...~';' ~..::;;. *"+'~"'-~... -... -~ .,,~.--.-..~-**'*-"'-<**<<*:.* *' *r,.'*'"*'*:...o.-*.-~ '-*** ,,,,,.,_,,,._, - '..;;~ .-.~ *- ,..-_,"f-<*--;--;""~ -*:..--;:-*-n,,f'..r..;,. '"""' <'.7 --~-*""."'~'"""'"""'-":.*J--..:.:~ 0 *:=*"'"'"'**..,.-*,,,,,..-~--....:.~ -=--~---""' ~*::.;....r~.--- ~-""'~-"; -*'""---e>..--*-""--,! | |||
'. RAI. 11.2'--1 b ~iClarijjrtheline of/iuth(J~ityfor,radipactJv~ ~~~t~iJi/mdg<pi!'en[. ** " * ).,;*- -~.. : . *;. ; * **__ * *,, * ** *.* *.* *' | |||
~- ~-* vi"'""::.. | |||
* Procurement records | * Procurement records | ||
* Test procedures | * Test procedures | ||
Line 396: | Line 3,832: | ||
* Supplier evaluation reports | * Supplier evaluation reports | ||
* Training records | * Training records | ||
* Project-specific Quality Assurance Plan Corporate Environmental, Safety, and Health Program Plan ; | * Project-specific Quality Assurance Plan Corporate Environmental, Safety, and Health Program Plan | ||
; | |||
* Corporate Quality Assurance Program Plan l | * Corporate Quality Assurance Program Plan l | ||
* Implementing procedures i | * Implementing procedures i | ||
* Material test reports ! | * Material test reports | ||
! | |||
* Certifications of conformance I | * Certifications of conformance I | ||
* I | |||
. Personnel qualification/certification records Design review reports i | |||
* Project-specific procedures I | |||
! | |||
* Calibration records i | |||
I | |||
* Nonconformance reports I | |||
I | |||
* Corrective Action reports i | |||
I | |||
* Stop work requests | |||
\All quality records will be retained for the life of the RPF. | |||
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* : ~~.~':: | |||
* l{ORIHWEST MEDlCA1. IS.OTOP£5 | |||
-jRAI C2.17-2l'ANS J5,8.stat(!s th;_t some records shall l.J~ maintained,by;or for the plant owrier]or thelife*ofthe** | |||
i~, : . * .* ** ~ '.'particplar item_tyhile it is ii]stqf.lec( iri the p!ant,orstor~dforfut!'~e*use. $~ch /ecor~s shal(b~ ci'assi.fiedJ | |||
;. * ~ | |||
Re uest for additional information | |||
;:in a,ccor.dance with the following driteri(j: (aJthose whichw_ould be ofvalue in demonstrating* * . :. * \ | |||
l ' ' . . *~ i!r:qpabilityfopafe operation;. (/J) those. whJcb w<J,~?dofvalue Jn ma~ntaintng.,:rewor!dnk/repairiijg;: ... : ']: | |||
( | |||
::,: '*, ;, **. .'replacing,:. or ffjOdifj;irig phoi~em~:::(c) those, which wo}1l4,og of,vali.{e iri ii~termiriing the CllUSe~ofreiults*' f i*** ..r.; -~ '.qfah acCident 'qr malfli'!ctloh 'of(i safety"relat<!cd'item~* * (d) *thos~:w,hich pro~ide .reiJ.~ired* baselin_e''dat~.* *'*1 r . ':.~ | |||
I,> .lfor.in-service'inspeciions; or (e/those\vhte~'wouldb(J ofyalu,ejn plqn~iflgforfacililJ,I,~: ~* <<, : , | |||
::decqmm~s'sioning." ., ". ", ' *, . . ., . ' : . *,. . ~ . :*. *,' *,' . '. ' | |||
*' *~ | |||
*.. . . ' . .: :~NWMTPSAR; 'Chript~r.J ~; Sectibn.C2.L7.2.2, f'Cias~fications, ":;t{i.tes'tnflah, ih~t {vhai rs ;onsid~ied t | |||
*. . *. .;tliJetime records willbe delineqted:withift implemenfingpro~editr~s. JfoweV_ei:, {t does no/s(ale ifNWMJ)1 | |||
,: :;: . '.',. :~ill.b'efolldll! | |||
* Items to prevent nuclear criticality accidents (e.g., preventive controls and measures to ensure that under normal and credible abnormal conditions, all nuclear processes are subcritical) | * Items to prevent nuclear criticality accidents (e.g., preventive controls and measures to ensure that under normal and credible abnormal conditions, all nuclear processes are subcritical) | ||
* Items credited to withstand credible design-bases external events (e.g., seismic, wind) | * Items credited to withstand credible design-bases external events (e.g., seismic, wind) | ||
* Items to prevent degradation of structural integrity (e.g., failure or malfunction of facility) QA Level 2 will be applied to non-QA Level 1 safety SSCs. The QA program is important to the acceptability and suitability of the item or service to perform as specified. Acceptance methods shall be specified (including acceptance and other applicable performance criteria), documented, and verified before use of the item or service. Some of the required characteristics may be examined less rigorously than for QA Level 1. Examples of QA Level 2 items include: | * Items to prevent degradation of structural integrity (e.g., failure or malfunction of facility) | ||
* SSCs to meet 10 CFR 20 normal release or exposure limits Fire protection systems Seismic detection systems Safeguards and security systems Material control and accountability systems QA Level 3 will include non-safety-related quality activities performed by NWMI that are deemed necessary to ensure the manufacture and delivery of highly reliable products and services to meet or exceed customer expectations and requirements. QA Level 3 items include those items that are not classified as QA Level 1 or QA Level 2. QA Level 3 items are controlled in accordance with standard commercial practices. 3-45 . | QA Level 2 will be applied to non-QA Level 1 safety SSCs. The QA program is important to the acceptability and suitability of the item or service to perform as specified. Acceptance methods shall be specified (including acceptance and other applicable performance criteria), documented, and verified before use of the item or service. Some of the required characteristics may be examined less rigorously than for QA Level 1. Examples of QA Level 2 items include: | ||
.:; ... NWM. I | * SSCs to meet 10 CFR 20 normal release or exposure limits | ||
* Fire protection systems | |||
* Seismic detection systems | |||
* Safeguards and security systems | |||
* Material control and accountability systems QA Level 3 will include non-safety-related quality activities performed by NWMI that are deemed necessary to ensure the manufacture and delivery of highly reliable products and services to meet or exceed customer expectations and requirements. QA Level 3 items include those items that are not classified as QA Level 1 or QA Level 2. QA Level 3 items are controlled in accordance with standard commercial practices. | |||
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.:;. .~:. NWM. I NWMl-2015-021, Rev. OA Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components | |||
. *. :~.:!;* NDRTHWESTMEDICAlJSOTOP£S These quality activities are embodied in NWMI's QAPP and will be further specified in the Operating License Application, and when necessary. | |||
3.5.1.3.2 Seismic Classification for Structures, Systems, and Components SSCs identified as IROFs will be designed to satisfy the general seismic criteria to withstand the effects of natural phenomena (e.g., earthquakes, tomados, hurricanes, floods) without loss of capa~ility to perform their safety functions. ASCE 7, Chapter 11, sets forth the criteria to which the plant design bases demonstrate the capability to function during and after vibratory ground-motion associated with the safe-shutdown earthquake conditions. | |||
The seismic classification methodology used for the RPF complies with the preceding criteria, and with the recommendations stated in Regulatory Guide 1.29, Seismic Design Classification. The methodology classifies SSCs into three categories: seismic Category I (C-1), seismic Category II (C-11), and non-seismic (NS). | |||
Seismic C-1 applies to both functionality and integrity, while C-11 applies only to integrity. SSCs located in the proximity ofIROFs, the failure of which during a safe-shutdown earthquake could result in loss of function of IROFs, are designated as C-11. Specifically: | |||
* C-1 applies to IROFs. C-1 also applies to those SSCs required to support to shut down the RPF and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition. | * C-1 applies to IROFs. C-1 also applies to those SSCs required to support to shut down the RPF and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition. | ||
* C-11 applies to SSCs designed to prevent collapse under the safe-shutdown earthquake. SSCs are classified as C-11 to preclude structural failure during a safe-shutdown earthquake, or where interaction with C-1 items could degrade the functioning of a safety-related SSC to an unacceptable level or could result in an incapacitating injury to occupants of the main control room. | * C-11 applies to SSCs designed to prevent collapse under the safe-shutdown earthquake. SSCs are classified as C-11 to preclude structural failure during a safe-shutdown earthquake, or where interaction with C-1 items could degrade the functioning of a safety-related SSC to an unacceptable level or could result in an incapacitating injury to occupants of the main control room. | ||
* NS SSCs are those that are not classified seismic C-1 or C-11. 3.5.2 Radioisotope Production Facility Systems and components within the RPF are presented in Section 3 .5 .1. The RPF design basis evaluated the general design criteria from 10 CFR 70.64, "Requirements for New Facilities or New Processes at Existing Facilities." This evaluation is presented in Table 3-23. These general design criteria provide a rational basis from which to initiate design but are not mandatory. There are some cases where conformance to a particular criterion is not directly measurable. For each of the criteria, a specific assessment of the RPF design is made, and a complete list of references is included to identify where detailed design information pertinent to each criterion is treated. The Chapter 13. 0 accident sequences for credible events define the DBE. The safety-related parameter limits ensure that the associated design basis is met for the events presented in Chapter 13.0. 3-46 | * NS SSCs are those that are not classified seismic C-1 or C-11. | ||
*::.**.-.* | 3.5.2 Radioisotope Production Facility Systems and components within the RPF are presented in Section 3 .5 .1. The RPF design basis evaluated the general design criteria from 10 CFR 70.64, "Requirements for New Facilities or New Processes at Existing Facilities." This evaluation is presented in Table 3-23. These general design criteria provide a rational basis from which to initiate design but are not mandatory. There are some cases where conformance to a particular criterion is not directly measurable. For each of the criteria, a specific assessment of the RPF design is made, and a complete list of references is included to identify where detailed design information pertinent to each criterion is treated. The Chapter 13. 0 accident sequences for credible events define the DBE. The safety-related parameter limits ensure that the associated design basis is met for the events presented in Chapter 13.0. | ||
3-46 | |||
* | |||
* | .:;.-.~:.. NWM I | ||
* | *::.**.-.* NWMl-2015-021, Rev. OA | ||
* | .. ****~* | ||
* | *.* NORTHWEST MEDICAllSOllJPES Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components Table 3-23. Design Criteria Requirements (4 pages) | ||
Design criteria and description Application and compliance j 10 CFR 70.64, "Requirements for New Facilities or New Processes at Existing Facilities" a , | |||
( "'7-t~" ,,.,;.~;~*;~'j_=~** :;:'~~-~_..c..._.;,*;,=:,~:o*-*i)-;-:.._*, 4-;.-~*t:--:.n*.i<f*~*r, "' .r,~ ""4.:-*~-~*"'"""' "f,__..,.,_:,,_;.,.*:~*7"---<::;,.,;,a.~-;,--:r-*"-';'-:'"'"~-,;:;: ..~i"'"~,1 :--;--;-;* **~-.;--*-- ~- :;,~';*,.,.,..,;. ~ ..c;.:-;~,..-!...,.~"c:''~'"' ::_...;.;~'i-' *'-~";.,.",!,"""~:--:~;.'"'.'"~; -:;:,.. ;-~*~*.-r,~'-::--'1"R"*"0* . ~-*~- | |||
i! Quality-standards ,and recordsi* *., ~ .*,* ' 1: ~ | |||
* | * SSGs. unpprtant to safety.. 'W1ll be <f.es1gned; fl!,bnpated, erected; te$.d,. operated; '. ;;. | ||
* | 1 | ||
* | ;". * :Develbp"and uiipiemdrii*ci:~;ik in* . **. f *. :;a,nd mamtamed to <i.¥1-if.y;standafds commensw::ate"*mtn tlie imp.ortance* o:rt:he:::., i | ||
* | ;C | ||
* | .~ .: ."*a:~coiffeince mill lnrulliierrient .::* .. : '. : : ~ sate~ -~~ti~hs t.o be perr~nhea:.\v~ere~~enerany*re~g_ilize4 *~~d~s ~d _. .. , *.. :.; *~ | ||
I mefiliuresto enSiire'tba:tIROFSfile' * 'rl .stan¥:d~ ~e*:used, th~y ';Vlll be1q~n~.ed and.7val:uatedto :detenrune th~*~, * *** ): | |||
j r availabl~- and reliable:to perronn'fueirW. app~cab1lity, adequa~y,.~d s:ufiic~ei;i~y ~nd,~ill ~ supplemen~e\i IJr 1Ilodifi~~*ii.s'J. | |||
J. function.when needed.. . " : ' " " ' ;: n~essary to, e1rn~e a. quality product lll K:~epmg w1.fh.11).e requ1red ~ety . , ~. | |||
': | |||
* | * Mainfuin'approp~tl!.rec~rdS.ofihese .; . fun~tion:*, ,: .. ". * * .. ' . " ' , . . * . ";, * ~ *: * ": . , *": . | ||
F.. items'py or under the CO'ntrol ~f.the , .:::*:, ?JY{MI'.s-Q~~* Will b~:.~bli~hed:and iinple~eµ~d to :pro~d.e,~~~q~mte* | |||
\ .... licensee'tbroughout the-life of the*. :J. aSS1!1fnce, that'S.SCS sati~factp,rily pcrfqIDl*therr,Sflfe1Y fipcµonS: , . '<,"- ' .... ,J | |||
* | :i**: fa~ilitY'.*. _"_"*; :**** .:* '.: * )'.,~** *~ ."-. ;;~' ~pP,ropriatele~ords.,~(.d~sign?:fa~ricatio~.-er~tion,.illld*~~g*or~ss~* :*' ::--:., *.J | ||
* | * .' '" ... , . , * ' . * !i .,unportant,to.safefy:*:w1llbemamtained*l;>y,or.UAder.control:otJ.qWM:ffot@~lifeof'. | ||
} ,. ,_. .. . .. *.: * *;: .,... . iJ*** :~ ~llus~: ~ ~a~fo~t~d* QAP~ ilia~ liiik~ 4~i~*~fassiriiaH6n filicl~:6~iate<l. i | |||
'* ..*. ,;;i : , qocurnentatibn to"safety'claSsifiC~tion.,!lllcl'fo,the manufacfiiring.and <;lelivery o('. | |||
:i. ,.0" *:'' ' ' .. ' ' , k: 'highly :reliable i>r9ducis and equipment, . '* * '" . :. ' >' ' ' ' ' ": . ' ,. ", '. 'ii t~.:~,:.~~;~j(~---~,:2r.::*::.*.~.~'-;_',.:~~.,~:~~~. ~~-:;_:~l:k~~i;t41t~~~~;J~ii~~~~;~1?:~~:C:~~:~J~~~:i::_;_,::~ ,': ;:j | |||
* The FPC system will provide monitoring and control of safety-related components i behavior of items relied on for safety. I and process systems within the RPF. | !Natural phenomena hazards i* SSCs important to safety will be designed, fabricated, erected, tested, operated, Provide for adequate protection against j and maintained to quality standards commensurate with the importance of the natural phenomena, with consideration I safety functions to be performed. Where generally recognized codes and of the most severe documented I standards are used, they will be identified and evaluated to detennine their | ||
* The BMS (a subset of the FPC system) will monitor the RPF ventilation system and mechanical utility systems. : | , historical events for the site. i applicability, adequacy, and s:ufiiciency and will be supplemented or modified as ; | ||
necessary to ensure a quality product in keeping with the required safety function. | |||
;' | |||
* The design basis for these SSCs will include: : | |||
Appropriate consideration of the most severe natural phenomena that have been\ | |||
historically reported for the RPF site and surrounding area, including sufficient margin for limited accuracy, quantity, and period of time for which historical data has been accumulated Appropriate combinations of natural phenomena effects during normal and accident operating conditions i | |||
: Importance of the safety functions to be performed J : | |||
* Specific RPF design criteria and NRC general design criteria are discussed in l -~----~---*""-'**_. .. __ ._,~~-- ,__ ..,._.,,....,..,..._ -~---- | |||
, Sections 3.1 and 3.5, respectively. | |||
~ ------.....,.,.._-*'*'"'**-<A-*""',.-"''-*-..-----~-~~ - - - * -**--****~~w~~---*- ~---~*~_....,,_,~ *---~ ----~-***-*-*..._,-.>-*-~----*"'****"'-"--*"'"'--**-">, -** -~-*-**.-...! | |||
1 3-47 | |||
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**.:~.~~:* NORTJfW"t.STMEDICAl.ISOTOPES Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components NWMl-2015-021, Rev. OA Table 3-23. Design Criteria Requirements (4 pages) | |||
Design criteria and description Application and compliance i\ ~re, p~ote~o~',: :;t.*:*':'(', :tfr'..; ::;~} .~4-~,'. *ss~'s*llµpo~~ *t~. ~'af~~-~1l ~* des~~~.ci:illid"'\~7~t,e<l~thibighci~tJh:e:~F~t9¥.';'/~ ~ | |||
;fProyHle.f~r ad~~~~ p~~~~ti~~ ag~ii}.st **;jj "'.. ~e;. cm~si~leti~ ~~t;h1 o_thetS?fetY,-~e~uir~~~t~ :1fi~p~o~~R~}i1Y*:~~-~~fc!,~f: :i; | |||
!fires.and e:iqJlos1Qns * .. ;. ,.e..... ;. : ,. *. *,<< . *;frres_ and ~'.CI>l<,>s1ons.,,. ,_ *." .: . . *. '" -. , * , " ..* ~ * ... * '.* ".' ... "\. :*; * :.''l | |||
;::".- ,. .*;,* .*. * * ;-* .. ,, '" :.'.;, .* """ * ~-,"ii~. Noncombustible and'h~ftesistantniatenalsWillbtfosedwherever*=acticBl *. .: .J 0 | |||
I ' 1 ' ~ I * ' " ' ' - * " ~ ' '}}'::. *j ~ ' ' , ...... , * ,. ,, ",;' -- '* ' ' .. " '" 1:'~1 ' - "" ~~1~ | |||
;,. '* * *"> ,,.'. ,; *. ,, 1 *.:, * *** *:; ~" ~t~ .. ~1.mghoutthe~If, particularly ip. locations ~gh;as*confinement and tJi.e~coiltrol "-) | |||
::*:, ;~,"'.,,i".?,.::;; ,' ,: ,*:.:: ;'.*;-. | |||
:.:.~,* -i~, :*~(, .. :.:,,:, ~r~ip:,/ "1 ~:*:**:.: <<;: ,'f,:_' ,:._" ,;-.-.:: *: * '. ,~:H:. ~ *~~ . ;z.~'-:c,-*;;. '.<<:*" " *.;~*; --" -:-~r-* ;~*;::::f: ,**~?:~ | |||
it:'- 1 J'. :'(: :.~/, : /: , | |||
1 r: :, :::,::,~ ::)"~.; Ti*::::* .,-r ir-.~**fiJ:e ~~.ctJ~rrand-~J?pi"f5si?r.~~~ ~fafyr?pri~t¢*~Pa¢ity an~ 9lria,qµitY ~ | |||
~* -.-. ,** :, -*J "it ~-l"' ~"'...' :~. : ,~:,,: . ..*, {1 ., ,be.prQvided anddes1gtJ.ea to.numnnze the adverse effects ot'.frres:on*SSCs> ,;-.,-"*, 1:*h J | |||
("' '.*,:. /" *; {::. :-t\: ;:*:: j'-~.:-":,*** *)\ ~: ., :~"~;}riiµ,pttiltl~io;_~fil'.eM';-;:*> )': ~;~-:; ~::t! ;*:* :*-,r( | |||
~'.1 :.: ~..*. * "" ,:* ::,->:" : .~. if~ '.,.Firefig'\itirtg sySienls' will-J:if:'.*ciesignea to-en.Suie'thattheit rupture'or inadvenerif' :d | |||
;."?~:*;1/**"*," ~r<* :~: ,>;:"**- '.: .. . <. :.<"t, | |||
~ * '' . . > """'*._.*-: .:'. :' :.!.** *jl/ op~ratii?1!cide$notsiglljfic!iiit1yitllpafrthe.saf~tycapa~ility.oftljesessc~." ::._,) | |||
f~' .. .',' ... ' ' *: 1 ' £".'. ';"-: >:* '* -~i!." 'Wli'ere iie'cessary:;withln ioiied areas or~wb:ere'critiCalitY and ~c~ss are aD. .iSsue, ::! | |||
F:,*,..~*:,:.;*~* * .": ::*;* :, *.::'.:>:*'.:. *~* *,_*:: :\~t /'rc:;q~e~sySt7µi's~~-~-~~~x:~ti~te~*br9p~fittiop.~:~~-~~Vi~:?r~.\**:,.,~ .: t | |||
~ ° )~ j'{- ""._:*r, "; :~ ;'.,? ~ ~, ;:*.~.. :* </~:~ ,: :*.:?*t ,;::}.~,fl:" "1?ete~ti9ri. ~i~*:'~; ;~*' ,"": | |||
1 1 | |||
1 | |||
,. . , ' \ : , | |||
1 | |||
,~0 \:':, ~ / ,:'~t :* >,: / ~;-.~~ ~~ :, ,. {';\: f::,,/r~i ~~: :r: ~"J' '~~ ,~,~:.:~,:>11 f,:* :_.* ;..:.::!; "'. :_:* *1r* .\ * .. ',;, *:; *:.~" :: ~ ,' . / .. ,;'..ii* _;:RBF; fir~'pr~ti:cP,olf systei;it wil~ be desigued'~sl);sli. tpat af<#lure>>of any conipoperi(, ;oi t (:: *:-. : .:;< *.: .,: *. ;; ., :~. 1::..+'** ~,:-: *~ >lf:".'{>Yp.i!ot ~P~fi!e.~\jiJi!Y;!>~.s~etf~~l~~<t'~~y~~fs~~l)'.,S~~t*do~ Md:~o~afr(_;.~ | |||
f: <.:: ~ *::. *i:*:\::~,. *. "_,_* ~ ;: .>~ .L* * ;," ':; ** t;-_*. tp:e.RPF:orl1:JJ1lttlic:;.rel!!ase of ra4~?~~ti:vi~ to.J?ro".1?~ ~~~?naple ass~~ce}f!lt*,: :i | |||
*~ *. "° ':* . ., "". " * * ** ** * ,*'. ..":., :' | |||
* the publi9 \Yil).,be pr'?t~t:d from ra4i.ologichl l}!!~ resUI~g.fy9m RPf opef!!ti9ns., ! | |||
J ..: *... ;<.* " =:. "., : .. .,' ,.. " *. '.<~i * *RPF fire pr9!~ction system'will.be desigileqJp provide reasonable a8Sw-arice thilt '.i' F.. ; "., c ... ,-; ' : .." ' :'.. *:, ,. AL ';the public ,will,be proted:eafrom* radiological risks resmtirtg* from RPF operations I | |||
~ **/ :, '* ~" .:~ .,::-* * *: ; .. : ,, "" * : ;*; :" :c;' | |||
~,_~~"r,; l,>-t,?\~*~,..*~";..,*t;c | |||
;~-:~!!: '(e.g,; failure, of kiy oomponent*Wiifnot impfilr,tlie;abillfy r,.::~,~,,, 0 \,<~'tiJ-0*' ,~ : 1 ~ *~- "4*,.,* | |||
ofsafety':.related SSCsto*I!"f | |||
,;r~.;'.r"'*.r*t'~'J,. | |||
1, a " ' - , " ,'-'.,,,.,,.,, '** ;, *;;,'*' < r;_' | |||
?' -~~_' ;:::;,*~,i: ;_;: *;:,', /!*:*'.~,:.~~;. :'_ "~/;;*; :*.'.,>- :*" :;: ~.s~~~Y.~hu~~~~*~d,~s~l~~*tf:e~~~~o~~lIIl!~~~:~~~se"'~~r~~o~.~tr,yi~~;*:,;c,\:* ;'.~>~ | |||
:t:" i. ,,, -:*,.,.,..... .,..."' *; . . ,:,.. *::, * ;*:*;l**;CJliapterS6.0and:.9.0prov1deadditional'irlfonnation~"'<<"* .. ..r*: .. "->* , .. :' .*._.. ":J, | |||
*,:;;_ i.l>.~~~1:rJ../,1.4.J""'""-'r.;:_R;fo..;...,i;~-..**-' ,..~~~.......},':':',;i.;.r.,fr.~#.~....fd::.~J~)_.,,*.-f~~..,\:1<':4~~ ;r.*,,,,,,f,~-,--~* ..{"'-~"-~..~'hA~ ._,,,.,,.,....-...,11,.~ ~~'"'"-"~_,,J....,.,.,.~,.,.;._~,,._.,.~;:_'i~no:;~-!.iµ.,:'~:<" _,,,~~""~~-,,,.,.... ~*.!)~'..,.~,;}.4;1"="']:.;__,,,J,:;.;:; ~! | |||
!Environmental f Provide for adequate protection from and dynamic effects f | |||
* SSCs ~po~ to safety_ are designed to ~~commo~te effe~ts of, and to be . | |||
1 compatible with, the envrronmental conditions associated with nonnal operation, l | |||
j environmental conditions and dynamic i maintenance, testing, and postulated accidents. Due to low temperature and I l effects_ associated with no~ 1 pr~sure RPF proc~sses, dynamic effects due to pipe rupture and discharging 1 j operations, maintenance, testing, and I flmds are not applicable to the RPF. I 1postulated accidents that could lead to ! I 1 loss of safety functions l I l Emergency capability 1* Emergency procedures will be developed and maintained for the RPF to control j | |||
!Provide for emergency capability to , SNM and hazardous chemicals produced from the SNM. ' | |||
j maintain control of: I" A preliminary Emergency Preparedness Plan is provided in Chapter 12.0, l 1 AppendixB. | |||
l | |||
* Licensed material and hazardous ! | |||
1 chemicals produced from licensed l l l material I | |||
: i. | |||
* Evacuation of on-site personnel j | |||
/ | |||
* On-site emergency facilities and i ! | |||
t.. _ ~~~~;k~;:~i!~~i.~~:~~~____J___ .,~--** _,,_________.,____ ,. ,._.__~*----. --------*. -*-*----*-"-**------~*----*J 3-48 | |||
~ ~:.NWMI NWMl-2015-021, Rev. OA Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components | |||
. *. ~ ~---~; | |||
* NORTHWEST MEDI CA\. ISOTOPES Table 3-23. Design Criteria Requirements (4 pages) | |||
Design criteria and description Application and compliance tutm~, seJ'Vic~' ' . . :; ' '.'.; ".: . : .~ ': '*':. ~'.* ;; ~ : 'X'h~ RPf i~ deiiigµt:d fof. Pakive; ~te sh,utdo~1i,fui.4 ~o*~eyen'fain(;onfrol,i~ ' ;; | |||
i:ProVide (or contillued operation of . *:.' ii* : :telease'of iiidioactive.niirteriatlfriormiil electric power is.iiiterrupted'o1;Jos6'. . . | |||
* ti fessentiat tlfility. se{yices: ; : *:.: ;: .: *~ *:. .. *.~ ,*:r*; .h*~tiin4by~<liese1*i~ciitt~r*~W:{;e proy!de<l .for asset'protectj~ri ii scileGtea :RP:F **.,*~ | |||
r* ; .-* * * * :* .* .**. *.: .' .: .*: .. >;!' y,~s.tems. ,:*.':~::: '*:. : ;:*** : :: * ::~ >. *. "* ,: :L*. . 1.:** ..:.:: :* *. *,:: :~ '.. . .f | |||
;!:' - ' ., . j; *. t:JnPiterrtiptable power .sypplies Will autom~titall'y prqvick power tO sy~* tha1 .* ;; | |||
~" | |||
* _ ' ., -* ;* . , *> i' * | |||
* support the safety fun,ctions protecting workers and the public': . .. ; - * : _ * -- 0 *"' | |||
:; - '.. . ". ' .).* '.A combinati.on <?fUnit\tenuptable pO\\'.t)r SJfppliesanA ~ stfilidby elecfri,c~ p~w~r ' J i . .. 0 | |||
* , . : * .'. .**. * ;. * . | |||
* Y(:. systen;i~l provide emergency electiicalpo:werto theRPFA l;OO.O;.icw .c .. *.. - ;i j"; * * ,. * *:* H\.'.(1;34Thp):diese1gen.erator~prpVide'fa9ilitYel~ctric,,p!Jwe(/' '"*:*.;'***.' "*'.: * ~* | |||
f~~**"'** L;.:i:L.,~~:: . :.:;.;, _ ::,t::~:~):},,;.*jt:L~§lg\~-.~-~~~:::~~~.~:~~R~~-~~~M~~,,,01~0f~~~!~~~~'..:~~:* :.*-~}~C~:.~._::;.:~:~~~.:i | |||
\ Inspection, testing, and maintenance \ | |||
* The RPF is designed to provide access and controls for testing, maintenance, and | |||
! Provide for adequate inspection, testing, I inspection of safety-related SSCs, as needed, throughout the RPF. | |||
land maintenance ofIROFS to ensure ( | |||
* Chapters 4.0, 6.0, 7.0, and 9.0 provide additional information. | |||
; availability and reliability to perform ' | |||
: their function when needed i " | |||
1*cs;i~~~~;*~~~~;;~::*;T;~r~~*,:~-~::,;::~r:**.:tt:~ii;kFi.~4~;;~~~;~;;ir;~~t~.ii~;;rtr~~~g~f~fi1ii!fil+/-t;~z~~&~ciirt;<ll | |||
*(Prov1(je forcr,itjcahfy ..cor1trolj*1!1~fodiJig. ~: , ' ~ t() $e.~pra9e; .h~dljfig, and.pro9,t:~~mgp.fSNJv.l;*whif~:~fl'.~e;acc()D?-J?hs~ea;by: :/ | |||
\ i,tdherence ~o:the dou~re~coritirig~ncy * . *' '. :: * **: :--. )ndudµig<eqµipirient,;fi:tcilities; arid pfocedpres* ~o* protect \\'.ork:er*ario public:* : .*,{; | |||
j prfu.ciple * . ; . . Y< , :: . '.' *: *. | |||
* h~*alth an~ to lniillil)jze* dang~r to life o:tprop~rty *: *.*' * * :* : : * :. ;; '.'.... : '* '\ | |||
;i.. . . . . . *' il_ . Ensinillg that the d~sign.provtdes for ¢ticWity. control;' inclu~g adher~~e to .f | |||
!, ; . .. * , i1 .. , * ~e'do~ble.,c~ntipgepcY'.J)rinciple . . . '._,. .. * * '*:.' * . | |||
* I . " .* *. h * :~ In.'~~wor~t.in~ ~ 994~o/. ID:onitonn~ ~d iµartn SY,stemirit(),th~ fii:~ty.desi~. t L * ; * ** ... . .. ;. ".. ~.*.\}* . :* .;compli~ce.witilthei:~qillremeilt$;<?t~riti'*lityc0Wol;.fud1~ding*i0!i~r~1\c~to*.J l*' . : :<. ':' ' ,-: :. . .'~ ': /: '. . '. ;:,*: ;, ' the.: ~ou.bl~~conting~cy'.prihciple, are'4es~!ib¢ µi <;k:f!iµin (?eyptei 65);; ': ' . ' | |||
L:::.:,...~~.:~::,.,,.;.::'":::~:~->~~;:.~:.:::.::,_:,_:~_~;:~". Jt::~:~.:~§§?~:~~~~,. :,~:.~~~-*.-:~~~*:::~-.. . :*:*" . . .,y, > . . * .. . . "*' | |||
!Instrumentation and control l | |||
* RPF SNM processes will be enclosed predominately by hot cells and glovebox IThe design must provide for inclusion of i designs except for the target fabrication area. ! | |||
l I&C systems to monitor and control the !* The FPC system will provide monitoring and control of safety-related components i behavior of items relied on for safety. I and process systems within the RPF. | |||
* The BMS (a subset of the FPC system) will monitor the RPF ventilation system and mechanical utility systems. : | |||
* ESF systems will operate independently from the FPC system or BMS. Each ESF 1 safety function will use hard-wired analog controls/interlocks to protect workers, | * ESF systems will operate independently from the FPC system or BMS. Each ESF 1 safety function will use hard-wired analog controls/interlocks to protect workers, | ||
* the public, and environment The ESF parameters and alarm functions will be integrated into and monitored by the FPC system or BMS. | * the public, and environment The ESF parameters and alarm functions will be integrated into and monitored by the FPC system or BMS. | ||
* RPF designs are based on defense-in-depth practices and incorporate a preference for engineered controls over administrative controls, independence to avoid common mode failures, and incorporate other features that erihance safety by reducing challenges to safety-related components and systems. | * RPF designs are based on defense-in-depth practices and incorporate a preference for engineered controls over administrative controls, independence to avoid common mode failures, and incorporate other features that erihance safety by reducing challenges to safety-related components and systems. | ||
* The FPC system will provide the capability to monitor and control the behavior of i safety-related SSCs. These systems ensure adequate safety of process and utility ' service operations in connection with their safety function. Controls are provided to maintain these variables and systems within the prescribed operating ranges under all normal conditions. I | * The FPC system will provide the capability to monitor and control the behavior of i safety-related SSCs. These systems ensure adequate safety of process and utility ' | ||
* The FPC system is designed to fail to a safe-state or to assume a state demonstrated to be acceptable if conditions such as loss of signal, loss of energy or motive power, or adverse environments are experienced. ( | service operations in connection with their safety function. Controls are provided to maintain these variables and systems within the prescribed operating ranges under all normal conditions. | ||
* Chapter 7.0 provides additional I&C system information. Safety-related SSCs are described in Section 3.5 and Chapters 4.0, 5.0, 6.0, 7.0, and 8.0. 3-49 | I | ||
* The FPC system is designed to fail to a safe-state or to assume a state demonstrated to be acceptable if conditions such as loss of signal, loss of energy or motive power, or adverse environments are experienced. | |||
* NWMI'::i ri.Skinsights,oqfaine9' through 'oftne accident analysis will ,i :: *:. | ( | ||
* 9ver. , , :'. ; . *." ,. . | * Chapter 7.0 provides additional I&C system information. Safety-related SSCs are described in Section 3.5 and Chapters 4.0, 5.0, 6.0, 7.0, and 8.0. | ||
3-49 | |||
* Qhapfur 6.0 iind | . .;. . NWM. I | ||
* Features that enhartee*.i>afetfby * , . . ,, * ' * * * ' ' challenges.t9-lRQFS, , . *** , * * * * *. . :;. '" ' | .*:e**.-.* | ||
~~- . | |||
Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components NWMl-2015-021, Rev. OA | |||
'*-~~**.~:* NORTif'lJESTMEDlCA.LISOTOPES Table 3-23. Design Criteria Requirements (4 pages) | |||
Design criteria and description Application and compliance | |||
)lefe~s_e4n-d~pth~< .*.:. :: .* **, :.*. "" ;;* :n~feris¢,~~A~pthjs a. 4esign philospp'hyt11at~h~s-ap~li(id*from.th~ .* ... :. i | |||
~Base facility arid system.design and''* . << _9egini:rin"rof th~'ptoject ajld will po~tiiuie'_tlyough completion bf a d~sign ~tis* . :i | |||
*; f~cili~~ l~yotit on Aefe~e~~-:<fepth ' . 'f bas~ orq)roviding*'.S\}cc;e~si¥e}evel~ ~f Protection ~UC~ that health ~d safety are *;, | |||
:; practices::, The design must* mcorporate, :i ,, not.:whqlJ.y dependCI).t on any. srngle elem~nt .of tf\e design,. construction, , | |||
;to'theextentpractic!il?le:: ... : .. *, . . :\!_mairitenance,or:opera~on.c)fthe;J:{PF._<*. : :*;. :. :*;_.**. *.. * '***,. .*: | |||
". - .,, * - ' " ' " .,. ** ., ., ** ' ' *- * ' : ' _* .'' ' ' * ' ' ' * * , ' *' .~ *+ * * ' ? | |||
! *,, Preference for the-selection of * * .,.,".. JJ .* | |||
* NWMI'::i ri.Skinsights,oqfaine9' through ~<>nhimce 'oftne accident analysis will ,i | |||
:'I | |||
* ad.in.iniSt:rative: controls .to increase *,_, | |||
f ;' :; | |||
: *:. *e~gilieci~ :gc}~Jrols 9ver. ,, :'. ; -~ . *." ,. . b(\IB.e~. t~. supp~t!~~n~,th~ .friiitl oe~gn;~r: fqcu~jilg .attt;nti9~ ()~ *e pre~e~tion'kci:_f | |||
.1; . ffiltigation,' of, the higher nsk: potential accidents:*. *,. " . . ,, * . ' , *: ..* '~ | |||
I,*.: *,~ve~allsxstemrelial;>ili~: ';.:'>. * * | |||
* Qhapfur 6.0 iind .13_0 provide aCiditioii!ll ilifonnation.-:. | |||
, | |||
* Features that enhartee*.i>afetfby * ,. . ,, * ' * ** ' ' | |||
re~tfcing challenges.t9-lRQFS, , . *** , * * * * *. . :;. '" ' | |||
* 1 | * 1 | ||
* 10 CFR 70.64, ''Requirements for New Facilities or New Processes at Existing Facilities," Code | * 10 CFR 70.64, ''Requirements for New Facilities or New Processes at Existing Facilities," Code ofFederal Regulations, Office of the Federal Register, as amended. | ||
* | b As used in 10 CFR 70.64, requirements for new facilities or new processes at existing facilities, defense-in-depth practices means a design philosophy, applied from the outset and through completion of the design, that is based on providing successive levels of protection such that health and safety will not be wholly dependent on any single element of the design, construction, maintenance, or operation of the facility. The net effect of incorporating defense-in-depth practices is a conservatively designed facility and system that will exhibit greater tolerance to failures and external challenges. | ||
.: . | BMS building management system. NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. | ||
* Under environmental and dynamic service conditions in which they are required to function For the length of time the function is required Additionally, non-safety-related components and systems will be qualified to withstand environmental stress caused by environmental and dynamic service conditions under which their failure could prevent satisfactory accomplishment of the safety-related functions. | CFR Code of Federal Regulations. NWMI Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC. | ||
* The RPF instrumentation and control (I&C) system (also known as the facility process control [FPC] system) will provide monitoring and control of the process systems within the RPF that are significant to safety over anticipated ranges for normal operations and abnormal operations. The FPC system will perform as the overall production process controller. This system will monitor and control the process instrumented functions within the RPF, including monitoring of process fluid transfers and controlled inter-equipment pump transfers of process fluids. The FPC system will also ensure that process and utility systems operate in accordance with their safety function. Controls will be provided to maintain variables and systems within the prescribed operating ranges under all normal conditions. In addition, the FPC system is designed to fail into a safe state or to assume a state demonstrated to be acceptable if conditions such as loss of signal, loss of energy or motive power, or adverse environments are experienced. The building management system (BMS) (a subset of the FPC system) will monitor the RPF ventilation system and mechanical utility systems. The BMS primary functions will be to monitor the facility ventilation system and monitor and control (tum on and off) the mechanical utility systems. ESF systems will operate independently from the FPC system or BMS. Each ESF safety function will use hard-wired analog controls/interlocks to protect workers, the public, and environment. The ESF parameters and alarm functions will be integrated into and monitored by the FPC system or BMS. ' The fire protection system will have its own central alarm panel. The fire protection system will report the status of the fire protection equipment to the central alarm station and the RPF control room. This integrated control system will be isolated from safety-related components consistent with IEEE 2 79, Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations. In addition, the RPF is designed to meet IEEE 603, Standard Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, for separation and isolation of safety-related systems and components. Chapter 7.0 provides additional details on the integrated control system. 3-51 | ESF engineered safety feature. QAPP quality assurance program plan. | ||
.: .... | FPC facility process control. RPF Radioisotope Production Facility. | ||
.:;.-.;* .. NWMI | I&C instrumentation and control. SNM special nuclear material. | ||
lROFS items relied on for safety. SSC structures, systems, and components. | |||
The criteria are generic in nature and subject to a variety ofinterpretations; however, they also establish a proven basis from which to provide for and assess the safety of the RPF and develop principal design criteria. The general design criteria establish the necessary design, fabrication, construction, testing, and performance requirements for SSCs important to safety (i.e., SSCs that provide reasonable assurance that the facility can be operated without undue risk to the health and safety of workers, the public, and environment). | |||
Safety-related SSCs for the RPF will be designed, fabricated, erected, and tested as required by the NWMI QAPP, described in Chapter 12.0, Appendix C. In addition, appropriate records of the design, fabrication, erection, procurement, testing, and operations of SSCs will be maintained throughout the life of the plant. | |||
* | The RPF design addresses the following: | ||
* Radiological and chemical protection | |||
* Natural phenomena hazards | |||
* | * Fire protection | ||
* Environmental and dynamic effects | |||
* | * Emergency capability (e.g., licensed material, hazardous chemicals, evacuation of on-site personnel, on-site emergency facilities/off-site emergency facilities) | ||
* Utility services | |||
* Inspection, testing, and maintenance | |||
* Criticality safety | |||
* | * Instrumentation and controls | ||
* J)efense-in-depth 3-50 | |||
.:..-.~:.*.* NWM I NWMl-2015-021, Rev. OA Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components | |||
.: ~~-~! ." ,. NDRTHWESTIAEDICAltSOTDPES Safety-related systems and components will be qualified using the applicable guidance in the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standard IEEE 323, IEEE Standardfor Qualifying Class IE Equipmentfor Nuclear Power Generating Stations. The qualification of each safety-related system or component needs to demonstrate the ability perform the associated safety function: | |||
* | * Under environmental and dynamic service conditions in which they are required to function | ||
* | * For the length of time the function is required Additionally, non-safety-related components and systems will be qualified to withstand environmental stress caused by environmental and dynamic service conditions under which their failure could prevent satisfactory accomplishment of the safety-related functions. | ||
* | * The RPF instrumentation and control (I&C) system (also known as the facility process control [FPC] | ||
system) will provide monitoring and control of the process systems within the RPF that are significant to safety over anticipated ranges for normal operations and abnormal operations. The FPC system will perform as the overall production process controller. This system will monitor and control the process instrumented functions within the RPF, including monitoring of process fluid transfers and controlled inter-equipment pump transfers of process fluids. | |||
* 3-57 | The FPC system will also ensure that process and utility systems operate in accordance with their safety function. Controls will be provided to maintain variables and systems within the prescribed operating ranges under all normal conditions. In addition, the FPC system is designed to fail into a safe state or to assume a state demonstrated to be acceptable if conditions such as loss of signal, loss of energy or motive power, or adverse environments are experienced. | ||
The building management system (BMS) (a subset of the FPC system) will monitor the RPF ventilation system and mechanical utility systems. The BMS primary functions will be to monitor the facility ventilation system and monitor and control (tum on and off) the mechanical utility systems. | |||
ESF systems will operate independently from the FPC system or BMS. Each ESF safety function will use hard-wired analog controls/interlocks to protect workers, the public, and environment. The ESF parameters and alarm functions will be integrated into and monitored by the FPC system or BMS. ' | |||
The fire protection system will have its own central alarm panel. The fire protection system will report the status of the fire protection equipment to the central alarm station and the RPF control room. | |||
This integrated control system will be isolated from safety-related components consistent with IEEE 2 79, Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations. In addition, the RPF is designed to meet IEEE 603, Standard Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, for separation and isolation of safety-related systems and components. Chapter 7.0 provides additional details on the integrated control system. | |||
3-51 | |||
.:....~*- . NWMI | |||
-::.~*.*.*.: | |||
NWMl-2015-021, Rev. DA Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components | |||
*:~~ ~!:~ NDRTHlNmMEOICAl.ISOTOPES 3.5.2.1 System Classification Table 3-24. System Classifications The RPF is classified as a non-reactor Classification nuclear production facility per 10 CFR 50. description Classification Source In addition, a portion of the RPF will fabricate LEU targets, similar to fuel Hazard category I Intermediate rumrrd I NRC fabrication per 10 CFR 70. Due to the nature of the work performed within ~;~f::1J~~~~~ | |||
Construction type l 11-B l IBC 2012a facility, a hazardous occupancy applies: | |||
Table 3-24 provides the RPF classification for hazards occupancy, construction, risk, | |||
[fil~~~t~3~~itrJ{0a{EEiillit~~~}l:IJ\~{E11~§~z5i~~ | |||
Seismic design category j C ! ASCE 7h and seismic design categories. | |||
a IBC 2012, ~'International Building Code," as amended, 3.5.2.2 Classification of Systems and International Code Council, Inc., Washington, D.C., February 2012. | |||
h ASCE 7, Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Components Important to Structures, American Society-of Civil Engineers, Re~on, Virginia, 2013. | |||
Safety NRC = U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. | |||
RPF SSCs, including their foundations and supports, designed to remain functional in the event of a DBE are designated as C-1. SSCs designated IROFS are also classified as C-1. SSCs co-located with C-I systems are reviewed and supported in accordance with II over I criteria. This avoids any unacceptable interactions between SSCs. | |||
C-1 structures should be designed using dynamic analysis procedures, or when justified, equivalent static procedures using both horizontal and vertical input ground motions. For dynamic analyses, either response spectra or time history analyses approaches may be used. Dynamic analysis should be performed in accordance with the procedures of ASCE 4, with the exception of the damping limitations presented in Section 3 .4 .1. | |||
Table 3-25 lists the RPF SSCs and associated safety and seismic classifications and quality level group for the top-level systems. Subsystems within these systems may be identified with lower safety classifications. For example, the standby power supply (UPS) is an IROFS, while the standby diesel generator is classified as safety-related. | |||
Table 3-25. System Safety and Seismic Classification and Associated Quality Level Group (2 pages) | |||
Highest safety Seismic Quality level System name (code) classification 8 classificationb group 3-52 | |||
.:;.-.;*.. NWMI | |||
........!.* Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components NWMl-2015-021, Rev. OA | |||
. *, ~~.~!;. NORTJIWtSTMEDICALISOTOPES Table 3-25. System Safety and Seismic Classification and Associated Quality Level Group (2 pages) | |||
Highest safety Seismic Quality level System name (code) classificationa classificationb group 1!~2t~~~~.Y~~!~}:_y~~P!~~~{l~~TIQ_*:~~-**Le:~c;~~-,x*~;~~JL~.~:.~L~9t§::;.:~.~-,~~;L_~-~~*~~i_5:-&2:.L"::u!;_;~,;._'.::r~.~~:~:~.-*,;~~-J Facility ventilation (FV) ] IROFS ; C-I i QL-1 f""' .,___ -- ;'**:- ..... '"'*** ---***** *::* *.-*****--:-c.-..... .......... ....,., .., -----. .. .;***:**1r .......,...... ....... 'f"*'r-* ..,,_ ...-...,............. | |||
tFireprotectioii | |||
- -1._ - -:,,-. ,.- | |||
t"~ | |||
.,..-,~.- ~ | |||
~---** | |||
(FP) * ....,....~,,-;_-_,.__..~,_,.,,_-"!.-,:- | |||
,,~'"*****' | |||
. ;* -*...,,.~...:::'*.'*'~~-""'-::-.:~-~ | |||
~ -~--c::~*-----~,.-.;;-*("-'""'":r::* | |||
*'! ..=,_..._ | |||
* '__,._,". ~...., ~ *~-.,_.,,._.._..r"_.,,, | |||
*-"ti. | |||
. ...... SR---. ._** | |||
~.-, | |||
* ,_-~**"-~h.--:.--:"".,,,..,....,,.:;.-.~ | |||
.o.. _--*~,~- | |||
1: * .- | |||
* C-II- .. ''f | |||
._.,.;***--~-- | |||
< "'QL-2"._~ .. l | |||
.... -**~~,,.,,.,.J'"'"*--..._-::.,.,--.~.~ ..*=- ""'-..:"'"!"~.:;*_~---~",-~....".Jr"'-::- .,. .:;..,.._,,,,,_,._,".;_,,....-....,_ ~ .... | |||
*;~*-~~----**i e> ,. __,,,,....'...,.. *._ | |||
Plantandinstrumentair(PA) 1 NSR i C-II ! QL-2 | |||
[~~~i~!~2r&~~-i~~~iji:~~;~~L~::~::.~::,~=-~~=T,2"*.:.~_ Jt~~~;::::~2t~:~~-:~"~'.JC~:;~~~~~I=~~~2::;r::=?:l.9~t.I~~~;T~~J Gas supply (GS) ! NSR i C-II j QL-2 r~£i~~~~:'f~~~~~f;,~:~?SY2~!.:;:~:-rf. ::~:~-~:,:z::~,*::~E~0:c:T~!~:~*::z~1,;2~~::~~-:-~~~1,:;:::~~~~~1r:2::T~~§~:I~::_;*::=i Facility chilled water (FCW) i NSR l C-II QL-2 1--*~.----:-::""------~,~- ----*--.**-~,--~* ~--***"'-:'"**-,-. ***::."-*--~. . -...,. ...........-.-~---~---,~-."". | |||
Lf:ac11ity.*heat~dwater{HW) * .. , . *.*.* * * . . ..) | |||
+"-** ~:. *--*-. -~~-----*~- . | |||
-. --;NSR .* . .{ -*: -G-IT_. * **.*)c.,.;_. QL-2 .. _ *.* | |||
* , . ~,.ir*~--. .,.,.~ . ~-**~-**:'*-:-*-* -*~-;,...--..*--*~::.~,.-*--*:.-:--.... ,,,,,~-.] | |||
.~ ~- .,....,.. ..,,.,........" -:-,* _._,_,,~*-*.:-- | |||
* r-* *~---*:;=--o-.-*~-,,,-~* ~,--.--v-....-:'-:-.*.,....,"' .* *."**.._,.._,,,....,__,,..,s~:--1*_,__,,,_....!_,-*.,,-~.*-.,,or.F'*rr....,, ..,..,....,,..*.--,,*-,....z.*.**-"'*~-,.~ .. _, . ._,,. -~.,..~-....,"'""'"-~~-;;- ,,,-,~-.,,.._.,,,,-~*-"..,,,,..-_'""'._._1,.,,,_.,.._-,....,,..""Z-..,._,.""'" ..._.,~-- ...,.. .--***~ ~. -~-.* ' | |||
Process steam (boiler) ! IROFS 1 C-II l QL-2 f£~~~g~~~i~I\i?.~~'*:~:;~,:~~=~::~r~:Ft::::~:IJD~::z~:~~flt~::ucE~*::.:.'.:I£~~~~~z:;~jJ~:IEI3~~~~::'.:~::DJ Chemical supply (CS) j NSR i C-II ! QL-2 | |||
,. ":,.._,.-.,~.*""~ **;;..r.1---. __. ~ ~~...,,"-'--~-=---. --:~-¥-0 -:. o--~-r~:~ ..--,_,.:*,~~ '""''";-!""';"' -:;..c- ** ~:"':~~--- ..... -;-*~.!:":-:.:.-.~~~}T.~*y.-. .*-,.;;..., _ ..,.,;~....,_"' ~.:......~""''*.:. ~-~:--*:""'{('~~""* -:-*;;~* >;.":-~*-~~-- -* *:;-~*-:*~.:rr"'* .-~'"':'[-: ~.:.<:.-'- -";**"~~;:--:*.,--r..... ~~'.:!"}"---~fl **-1 Biological | |||
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shield (BS) " , ,. * .: " i: IROFS * :r , . | |||
* C-I. , *:* :* , | |||
,~,,,,,..~-'--"*=~=*::-~-*.:.'"'.-o-"<'----.' --,. ""---"'"-';--..,--r,..>-*""""'"'~.. -~:~"" '~**.!.:,,..,,-.._-.:-.~*.~,<-.~ -.*. ~-- *;;.,_ ,,...,..,_;._.;,...~..:.:;,.-:;,~...,..:;:~'"°-4.""'~"*~*;.,,_£._,.,.::,'.1,..~-- °"'"""~:..._,..-,.__,--"~..,-"'..,...*,,...*E""''*''1''-'~,,.-J(-"~.- ..~~~.,..;.," .,;1* | |||
QV*l. " * -1 | |||
...,,;_.,_:_./,£-!,.-...:,,..,..__.".,,.. *..,*o~~! | |||
Facility process control (FPC) l SR C-II \ QL-2 ,f. | |||
* Safety classification accounts for highest classification in the system. Systems that are classified as safety-related may include both safety-related and non-safety-related components. Only safety-related components will be used to satisfy the safety functions of the system, whereas non-safety-related components can be used to perform non-safety functions. For example, there are non-safety-related components, such as fans, within the safety-related ventilation systems that perform non-safety-related functions. | |||
b Seismic category may be locally revised to account for II over I design criteria and to eliminate potential system degradation due to seismic interactions. | |||
c Ventilation zone classifications vary -Ventilation Zone I and II are considered safety-related, C-I and QL-1; Ventilation Zone III and N are considered non-safety-related, C-II and QL-2. | |||
IROFS = items relied on for safety. RPF = Radioisotope Production Facility. | |||
NSR = non-safety related. SR = safety-related (not IROFS). | |||
SSCs that must maintain structural integrity post-DBE, but are not required to remain functional are C-11. | |||
All other SSCs that have no specific NRC-regulated requirements are designed to local jurisdictional requirements for structural integrity and are C-III. All C-1 SSCs are analyzed under the loading conditions of the DBE and consider margins of safety appropriate for that earthquake. The margin of safety provided for safety-class SSCs for the DBE are sufficient to ensure that their design functions are not put at risk. Table 3-26 presents the likelihood index limit guidelines and associated event frequency and risk index limits. | |||
3-53 | |||
:. . ~:.NWMI | |||
.......... ~ . | |||
*. Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components NWMl-2015-021, Rev. OA | |||
* *. ~~.~~:* NORTHWEST MEDICAL ISOTOPES Likely normal facility process condition Table 3-26. Likelihood Index Limit Guidelines r~~£~-~~~;;_;~~:~~~~1r~~iiIEriif~~~.~~~~~¥~~4):;:Jf~;~~-~2~::,::srg~~i.~~~~~?.3~~ii!Y~-~:rp~~1~r;::~~t~~tj~:] | |||
! 4 , | |||
Event frequency limits Multiple events per year i > or= 0 Unlikely (infrequent facility process condition) 2 i Between 10-" and 10- per event, f -4 to 5 5 | |||
. , per year 1 r--_--* , ._., --.~ _..,-~ . . ."'---- ,-,._ ..,.,.;..=*-**-'*"'-"'-*~,.,..-* ** ..:;.....,-~..---**"''+---: ~~*"**'~---:--t*: ::....__:,,,.*- *"--':'*-::* _,;....-~:-,.:- ..,*~*--.,,.., ~--';'-""'----....--'-**-'--.;;:..*/':. .''-~~-~:;:._:;-,,.-.-;...:..*-~..c-:v-..~......:-"""""-f* -~"'"'~"""*~... --~-.-*-.-*'"-".- - --"',-;,- *,.:..;. ~-.;.,;;:.,~~r"~.,.-,,,._~:*::"'-"'*-'~4 IFfighly .Unlikely (limiajlg:facillfy ;pitjc~ss coridifii?n) '.;;. : ;') l ,"'. , [! -1:_,ess ~:,l 0:5 per~ve11_t,* per year -;1; * : . I .> < | |||
3.5.2.3 Design Basis Functions, Values, and Criteria The design basis for systems and components required for safe operation and shutdown of the RPF are established in three categories, which are described below. The preliminary design basis functions and values for each major system are provided in the following subsections. | |||
Design Basis Functions | |||
* License conditions, orders, or technical specifications | |||
* Functions credited in the safety analysis to ensure safe shutdown of the facility is achieved and maintained, prevent potential accidents, or mitigate the potential consequences of accidents that could result in consequences greater than applicable NRC exposure guidelines Design Basis Values | |||
* Values or ranges of values of controlling parameters established as reference bounds for RPF design to meet design basis function requirements | |||
* Values may be established by an NRC requirement, derived from or confirmed by the safety analysis, or selected by the designer from an applicable code, standard, or guidance document Design Basis Criteria | |||
* Code-driven requirements established for the RPF fall into seven categories, including fabrication, construction, operations, testing, inspection, performance, and quality | |||
* Codes include national consensus codes, national standards, and national guidance documents | |||
* Design of safety-related systems (including protection systems) is consistent with IEEE 379, Standard Application ofthe Single-Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power Generating Station Safety Systems, and Regulatory Guide 1.53, Application ofthe Single-Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power Plant Protection Systems | |||
* Protection system is designed to provide two or three channels for each protective systems and functions and two logic train circuits: | |||
Redundant channels and trains will be electrically isolated and physically separated in areas outside of the RPF control room Redundant design will not prevent protective action at the system level 3-54 | |||
.:;.-.~:. NWMI | |||
*::.**.-.:. NWMl-2015-021, Rev. OA | |||
. ":. !~.~~:. NORTHV'JEST MEDltAl.ISOTOP!S Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components 3.5.2.4 System Functions/Safety Functions The NWMI RPF will provide protection against natural phenomena hazards for the personnel, SNM, and systems within the facility. The facility will also provide protection against operational and accident hazards to personnel and the public. Table 3-2 lists the IROFS defined by the preliminary hazards analysis. | |||
3.5.2.5 Systems and Components 3.5.2.5.1 Mechanical RPF C-1 mechanical equipment and components (identified in Table 3-25) will be qualified for operation under the DBEQ seismic conditions by prototype testing, operating experience, or appropriate analysis. | |||
The C-1 mechanical equipment is also designed to withstand loadings due to the DBEQ, vibrational loadings transmitted through piping, and operational vibratory loading, such as floor vibration due to other operating equipment, without loss of function or fluid boundary. This analysis considers the natural frequency of the operating equipment, the floor response spectra at the equipment location, and loadings transmitted to the equipment and the equipment anchorage. | |||
The qualification documents and all supporting analysis and test reports will be maintained as part of the permanent plant record in accordance with the requirements of the NWMI QAPP. | |||
The safety-related equipment and components within the RPF will be required to function during normal operations and during and following DBEs. This equipment will be capable of functioning in the RPF environmental conditions associated with normal operations and design basis accidents. Certain systems and components used in the ESF systems will be located in a controlled environment. This controlled environment is considered an integral part of the ESF systems. | |||
3.5.2.5.2 Instrumentation and Electrical C-1 instrumentation and electrical equipment (identified in Table 3-25) is designed to resist and withstand the effects of the postulated DBEQ without functional impairment. The equipment will remain operable during and after a DBEQ. The magnitude and frequency of the DBEQ loadings that each component experiences will be determined by its location within the RPF. In-structure response curves at various building elevations have been developed to support design. The equipment (e.g., batteries and instrument racks, control consoles) has test data, operating experience, and/or calculations to substantiate the ability of the components and systems to not suffer loss of function during or after seismic loadings due to the DBEQ. | |||
This certification of compliance with the specified seismic requirements, including compliance with the requirements of IEEE 344, is maintained as part of the permanent plant record in accordance with the NWMIQAPP. | |||
3.5.2.6 Qualification Methods Environmental qualification of safety-related mechanical, instrumentation, and electrical systems and components is demonstrated by tests, analysis, or reliance on operating experience. Testing will be the preferred method of qualification. Qualification testing will be accomplished either by tests on the particular equipment or by type tests performed on similar equipment under environmental conditions at least as severe as the specified conditions. The equipment will be qualified for normal and accident environments. Qualification data will be maintained as part of the permanent plant record in accordance with the NWMI QAPP. | |||
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.........!:* Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components | |||
**.! ~.:!: . NORTHWEST fmJICAL JS{IJQPES 3.5.2.7 Radioisotope Production Facility Specific System Design Basis Functions and Values The design basis functions and values for each system identified in Table 3-1 are discussed in the following subsections. Additional details for each system described below will be updated during the development of the Operating License Application. | |||
3.5.2.7.1 Target Fabrication System An overview and detailed description of the target fabrication system are provided in Chapter 4.0, Sections 4.1.3.I and 4.4, respectively. | |||
Design Basis Functions | |||
* Store fresh LEU, LEU target material, and new LEU targets | |||
* Produce LEU target material from fresh and recycled LEU material | |||
* Assemble, load, and fabricate LEU targets | |||
* Reduce or eliminate the buildup of static electricity | |||
* Minimize uranium losses through target fabrication | |||
* Safety-related functions: | |||
- Maintain subcriticality conditions within target fabrication system | |||
- Prevent flammable gas composition within target fabrication system | |||
- Limit personnel exposure to hazardous chemicals and offgases Design Basis Values | |||
* 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., pumps) | |||
* Maintain primary fission product boundary during and after normal operations, shutdown conditions, and DBEs 3.5.2.7.2 Target Receipt and Disassembly System An overview and detailed description of the target receipt and disassembly system are provided in Chapter 4.0, Section 4.1.3.2, and Sections 4.3.2/4.3.3, respectively. | |||
Design Basis Functions | |||
* Handle irradiated target shipping cask, including all opening, closing, and lifting operations | |||
* Retrieve irradiated targets from a shipping cask | |||
* Disassemble targets and retrieving irradiated target material from targets | |||
* Reduce or eliminate the buildup of static electricity | |||
* Safety-related functions: | |||
Provide radiological shielding during receipt and disassembly activities Maintain subcriticality conditions within target receipt and disassembly system Prevent radiological materials from being released during target receipt and disassembly operations to limit the exposure of workers, the public, and environment to radioactive material Maintain positive control of radiological materials (LEU target material and radiological waste) | |||
Protect personnel and equipment from industrial hazards associated with system equipment (e.g., moving parts) 3-56 | |||
.:.:~*~~:. NWMI | |||
............. NWMl-2015-021, Rev. OA | |||
* :.~~-~~-:. NORTIM'EST MEDICAL ISOTOPES Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components Design Basis Values | |||
* 30-year design life | |||
* Maintain primary fission product boundary during and after normal operations, shutdown conditions, and DBEs | |||
* Crane designed for anticipated load (e.g., hot cell cover block) of approximately 68 metric tons (MT) (75 ton) 3.5.2.7.3 Target Dissolution (DS) | |||
An overview and detailed description of the target dissolution system are provided in Chapter 4.0, Sections 4.1.3.3 and 4.3.4, respectively. | |||
Design Basis Functions | |||
* Fill the dissolver basket with the LEU target material | |||
* Dissolve the LEU target material within dissolver basket | |||
* Treat the offgas from the target dissolution system | |||
* Handle and package solid waste created by normal operational activities | |||
* Safety-related functions: | |||
- Provide radiological shielding during target dissolution activities | |||
- Control and prevent flammable gas from reaching lower flammability limit conditions | |||
- Maintain subcriticality conditions through inherently safe design of target dissolution equipment | |||
- Maintain positive control of radiological materials (LEU target material and radiological waste) | |||
Design Basis Values | |||
* 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., pumps) | |||
* Maintain primary fission product boundary during and after normal operations, shutdown conditions, and DBEs | |||
* Prevent radiological materials from being released during target dissolution operations to limit the exposure of workers, the public, and environment to radioactive material per 10 CFR 20 3.5.2.7.4 Molybdenum Recovery and Purification (MR) | |||
An overview and detailed description of the Mo recovery and purification system are provided in Chapter 4.0, Sections 4.1.3.4 and 4.3.5, respectively. | |||
Design Basis Functions | |||
* Recovery of Mo product from a nitric acid solution created from dissolved irradiated uranium targets | |||
* Purification of the recovered Mo product to reach specified purity requirements, followed by shipment of the Mo product | |||
* Safety-related functions: | |||
Maintain subcriticality conditions through inherently safe design of components that could handle high-uranium content fluid Prevent radiological materials from being released by containing fluids in appropriate tubing, valves, and other components | |||
* 3-57 | |||
;~**. ~;; NWM. I NWMl-2015-021, Rev. DA | |||
!~.~~: NORTHWEST MEDtCAl lSOTUPES Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components Control and prevent flammable gas from reaching lower flammability limit conditions Maintain positive control of radiological materials (99Mo product, intermediate streams, and radiological waste) | |||
Provide appropriate containers and handling systems to protect personnel from industrial hazards such as chemical exposure (e.g., nitric acid, caustic, etc.) | |||
Design Basis Values | |||
* Maintain primary fission product boundary during and after normal operations, shutdown conditions, and DBEs | * Maintain primary fission product boundary during and after normal operations, shutdown conditions, and DBEs | ||
* 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., pumps) | * 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., pumps) | ||
* Replace consumables after each batch 3.5.2.7.5 Uranium Recovery and Recycle (UR) An overview and detailed description of the uranium recovery and recycle system are provided in Chapter 4.0, Sections 4.1.3.5 and 4.3.6, respectively. Design Basis Functions | * Replace consumables after each batch 3.5.2.7.5 Uranium Recovery and Recycle (UR) | ||
An overview and detailed description of the uranium recovery and recycle system are provided in Chapter 4.0, Sections 4.1.3.5 and 4.3.6, respectively. | |||
Design Basis Functions | |||
* Receive and decay impure LEU solution | * Receive and decay impure LEU solution | ||
* Recover and purify impure LEU solution | * Recover and purify impure LEU solution | ||
* Decay and recycle LEU solution | * Decay and recycle LEU solution | ||
* Transfer process waste | * Transfer process waste | ||
* Safety-related functions: Provide radiological shielding during uranium recovery and recycle system activities Prevent radiological release during uranium recovery and recycle system activities Maintain subcriticality conditions through inherently safe design of the uranium recovery and recycle equipment Control and preventing flammable gas from reaching lower flammability limit conditions Maintain positive control of radiological materials Protect personnel and equipment from industrial hazards associated with the system equipment, such as moving parts, high temperatures, and electric shock Design Basis Values | * Safety-related functions: | ||
* 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., pumps) Maintain primary fission product boundary during and after normal operations, shutdown conditions, and DBEs 3.5.2.7.6 Waste Handling An overview and detailed description of the waste handling system are provided in Chapter 4.0, Section 4.1.3.6 and Chapter 9.0, Section 9.7.2, respectively. Design Basis Functions | Provide radiological shielding during uranium recovery and recycle system activities Prevent radiological release during uranium recovery and recycle system activities Maintain subcriticality conditions through inherently safe design of the uranium recovery and recycle equipment Control and preventing flammable gas from reaching lower flammability limit conditions Maintain positive control of radiological materials Protect personnel and equipment from industrial hazards associated with the system equipment, such as moving parts, high temperatures, and electric shock Design Basis Values | ||
* 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., pumps) | |||
* Maintain primary fission product boundary during and after normal operations, shutdown conditions, and DBEs 3.5.2.7.6 Waste Handling An overview and detailed description of the waste handling system are provided in Chapter 4.0, Section 4.1.3.6 and Chapter 9.0, Section 9.7.2, respectively. | |||
Design Basis Functions | |||
* Receive liquid waste that is divided into high-dose source terms and low-dose source terms to lag storage | * Receive liquid waste that is divided into high-dose source terms and low-dose source terms to lag storage | ||
* Transfer remotely loaded drums with high-activity solid waste via a solid waste drum transit system to a waste encapsulation cell 3-58 | * Transfer remotely loaded drums with high-activity solid waste via a solid waste drum transit system to a waste encapsulation cell 3-58 | ||
* Encapsulate solid waste drums Load drums with solidification agent and low-dose liquid waste Load high-integrity containers with solidification agent and high-dose liquid waste Handle and load a waste shipping cask with radiological waste drums/containers Safety-related functions: Maintain subcriticality conditions by maintaining mass limits Prevent spread of contamination to manned areas of the facility that could result in personnel exposure to radioactive materials or toxic chemicals Provide shielding, distance, or other means to minimize personnel exposure to penetrating radiation Design Basis Values | ;~*. *~~; NWM I NWMl-2015-021, Rev. OA | ||
. : !~.*. ~." ' NORTHWEST f.!ED!CAL ISCTilPES Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components | |||
* Encapsulate solid waste drums | |||
* Load drums with solidification agent and low-dose liquid waste | |||
* Load high-integrity containers with solidification agent and high-dose liquid waste | |||
* Handle and load a waste shipping cask with radiological waste drums/containers | |||
* Safety-related functions: | |||
Maintain subcriticality conditions by maintaining mass limits Prevent spread of contamination to manned areas of the facility that could result in personnel exposure to radioactive materials or toxic chemicals Provide shielding, distance, or other means to minimize personnel exposure to penetrating radiation Design Basis Values | |||
* Maintain primary fission product boundary during and after normal operations, shutdown conditions, and DBEs | * Maintain primary fission product boundary during and after normal operations, shutdown conditions, and DBEs | ||
* 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., pumps) 3.5.2.7.7 Criticality Accident Alarm System Chapter 6.0, Section 6.3.3.1, and Chapter 7.0, Section 7.3.7, provide descriptions of the criticality accident alarm system. Design Basis Functions | * 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., pumps) 3.5.2.7.7 Criticality Accident Alarm System Chapter 6.0, Section 6.3.3.1, and Chapter 7.0, Section 7.3.7, provide descriptions of the criticality accident alarm system. | ||
* Provide for continuous monitoring, indication, and recording of neutron or gamma radiation levels in areas where personnel may be present and wherever an accidental criticality event could result from operational processes. | Design Basis Functions | ||
* Provide both local and remote annunciation of a criticality excursion Remain operational during DBEs Design Basis Values | * Provide for continuous monitoring, indication, and recording of neutron or gamma radiation levels in areas where personnel may be present and wherever an accidental criticality event could result from operational processes. | ||
* Provide both local and remote annunciation of a criticality excursion | |||
* Remain operational during DBEs Design Basis Values | |||
* 30-year design life | * 30-year design life | ||
* Capable of detecting a criticality accident that produces an absorbed dose in soft tissue of 20 absorbed radiation dose (rad) of combined neutron or gamma radiation at an unshielded distance of 2 m from reacting material within one minute (except for events occurring in areas not normally accessed by personnel and where shielding provides protection against a criticality) 3.5.2.7.8 Continuous Air Monitoring System Chapter 7.0, Section 7.6, and Chapter 11.0, Section 11.1.4, provide detailed descriptions of the RPF continuous air monitoring system. Design Basis Functions | * Capable of detecting a criticality accident that produces an absorbed dose in soft tissue of 20 absorbed radiation dose (rad) of combined neutron or gamma radiation at an unshielded distance of 2 m from reacting material within one minute (except for events occurring in areas not normally accessed by personnel and where shielding provides protection against a criticality) 3.5.2.7.8 Continuous Air Monitoring System Chapter 7.0, Section 7.6, and Chapter 11.0, Section 11.1.4, provide detailed descriptions of the RPF continuous air monitoring system. | ||
* Provide real-time local and remote annunciation of airborne contamination in excess of preset limits Provide real-time local and remote annunciation ofradiological dose of excess of preset limits Provide environmental monitoring of nuclear radioactive stack releases Provide the capability to collect continuous samples Remain operational during DBEs 3-59 | Design Basis Functions | ||
... NWM I .*:.**.-.* | * Provide real-time local and remote annunciation of airborne contamination in excess of preset limits | ||
* Activate when airborne radioactivity levels exceed predetermined limits Activate when radiological dose levels exceed predetermined limits Adjust volume of air sampled to ensure adequate sensitivity with minimum sampling time 3.5.2.7.9 Standby Electrical Power Chapter 8.0, Section 8.2 provides a detailed description of the RPF standby electrical power (SEP) system. Design Basis Functions SEP includes two types of components: uninterruptible power supplies (UPS) and a standby diesel generator: | * Provide real-time local and remote annunciation ofradiological dose of excess of preset limits | ||
* UPS -Provides power when normal power supplies are absent Standby diesel generator -Provides power when normal power supplies are absent to allow continued RPF processing Design Basis Values | * Provide environmental monitoring of nuclear radioactive stack releases | ||
* 30-year design life Maintain power availability for a minimum of 120 min post-accident (UPS) Maintain power availability for 12 hr (diesel generator) 3.5.2.7.10 Normal Electrical Power Chapter 8.0, Section 8.1 provides a detailed description of the RPF normal electrical power (NEP) system. Design Basis Functions | * Provide the capability to collect continuous samples | ||
* Remain operational during DBEs 3-59 | |||
.:~ . . ;~. .NWM I | |||
.*:.**.-.* NWMl-2015-021, Rev. DA | |||
!~.~~:. NORTHWESTMIDICALISOTOPES Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components Design Basis Values | |||
* Activate when airborne radioactivity levels exceed predetermined limits | |||
* Activate when radiological dose levels exceed predetermined limits | |||
* Adjust volume of air sampled to ensure adequate sensitivity with minimum sampling time 3.5.2.7.9 Standby Electrical Power Chapter 8.0, Section 8.2 provides a detailed description of the RPF standby electrical power (SEP) system. | |||
Design Basis Functions SEP includes two types of components: uninterruptible power supplies (UPS) and a standby diesel generator: | |||
* UPS - Provides power when normal power supplies are absent | |||
* Standby diesel generator - Provides power when normal power supplies are absent to allow continued RPF processing Design Basis Values | |||
* 30-year design life | |||
* Maintain power availability for a minimum of 120 min post-accident (UPS) | |||
* Maintain power availability for 12 hr (diesel generator) 3.5.2.7.10 Normal Electrical Power Chapter 8.0, Section 8.1 provides a detailed description of the RPF normal electrical power (NEP) system. | |||
Design Basis Functions | |||
* Provide facility power during normal operations Design Basis Values | * Provide facility power during normal operations Design Basis Values | ||
* 30-year design life 3.5.2. 7.11 Process Vessel Ventilation System Chapter 9. 0, Section 9 .1 provides a detailed description of the process vessel ventilation system. Design Basis Functions | * 30-year design life 3.5.2. 7.11 Process Vessel Ventilation System Chapter 9. 0, Section 9 .1 provides a detailed description of the process vessel ventilation system. | ||
* Provide primary system functions to protect on-site and off-site personnel from radiological and other industrial related hazards | Design Basis Functions | ||
* Collect air in-leakage sweep from each of the numerous vessels and other components in main RPF processes and maintain hydrogen concentration process tanks and piping below lower flammability limit Minimize reliance on administrative or complex active engineering controls to provide a confinement system as simple and fail-safe as reasonably possible 3-60 | * Provide primary system functions to protect on-site and off-site personnel from radiological and other industrial related hazards | ||
* Collect air in-leakage sweep from each of the numerous vessels and other components in main RPF processes and maintain hydrogen concentration process tanks and piping below lower flammability limit | |||
* | * Minimize reliance on administrative or complex active engineering controls to provide a confinement system as simple and fail-safe as reasonably possible 3-60 | ||
:~~ . .;;; NWM I NWMl-2015-021, Rev. OA | |||
* : ~~-:~ ... | |||
* NDRTWNESTMEDICALISOTOPES Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components Design Basis Values | |||
* Maintain primary fission product boundary during and after normal operations, shutdown conditions, and DBEs | |||
* 30-year design life | |||
* Contain and store noble gases generated in the RPF to meet I 0 CFR 20 requirements 3.5.2.7.12 Facility Ventilation System Chapter 9.0, Section 9. I provides a detailed description of the facility ventilation system. | |||
Design Basis Functions | |||
* Provide confinement of hazardous chemical fumes and airborne radiological materials and conditioning of RPF environment for facility personnel and equipment | |||
* Prevent release and dispersal of airborne radioactive materials (e.g., maintain pressure gradients to ensure proper flow of air from least potentially contaminated areas to most potentially contaminated areas) to protect health and minimize danger to life or property | |||
* Maintain dose uptake through ingestion to levels as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) | |||
* Provide makeup air and condition the RPF environment for process and electrical equipment | |||
* Process exhaust flow from the process vessel ventilation system | |||
* Provide confinement of airborne radioactive materials by providing for the rapid, automatic closure of isolation dampers within confinement zones for various accident conditions | |||
* Provide conditioned air to ensure suitable environmental conditions for personnel and equipment inRPF Design Basis Values | |||
* Maintain primary fission product boundary during and after normal operations, shutdown conditions, and DBEs | * Maintain primary fission product boundary during and after normal operations, shutdown conditions, and DBEs | ||
* Provide an integrated leak rate for confinement boundaries that meets the requirements of accident analyses that complies with I 0 CFR 20 dose limits | |||
* Ensure that air exhausted to the atmosphere meets 40 CFR 61 (NESHAP) and applicable State law | |||
* 30-year design life | * 30-year design life | ||
* Maintain occupied space at 24 degrees Celsius (0 C) (75 degrees Fahrenheit [°F]) (summer) and 22°C (72°F) (winter), with active ventilation to support workers and equipment | |||
* Maintain air quality that complies with 10 CFR 20 dose limits for normal operations and shutdown 3.5.2.7.13 Fire Protection System Chapter 9. 0, Section 9. 7. I provides a detailed description of the RPF fire protection system. | |||
Design Basis Functions | |||
* | |||
* Provide detection and suppression of fires | * Provide detection and suppression of fires | ||
* Generate alarm signals indicating presence and location of fire 3-61 | * Generate alarm signals indicating presence and location of fire 3-61 | ||
.: | |||
.:.... . NWMI | |||
* Execute commands appropriate for the particular location of the fire (e.g., provide varying levels of notification of a fire event and transmitting notification to RPF central alarm station and RPF control room) Provide fire detection in RPF and initiate fire-rated damper closures Remain :functional during DBEs Design Basis Values | ~* | ||
* 30-year design life Provide a constant flow of water to an area experiencing a fire for a minimum of 120 min based on the size of the area per International Fire Code (IFC, 2012) Provide sprinkler systems, when necessary, per National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 13, Standard for the Installation | NWMl-2015-021, Rev. OA Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components | ||
. : ~~-~!: | |||
* NORIB!/JESTPJIEDtCAL ISOTOPES | |||
* Execute commands appropriate for the particular location of the fire (e.g., provide varying levels of notification of a fire event and transmitting notification to RPF central alarm station and RPF control room) | |||
* Provide fire detection in RPF and initiate fire-rated damper closures | |||
* Remain :functional during DBEs Design Basis Values | |||
* 30-year design life | |||
* Provide a constant flow of water to an area experiencing a fire for a minimum of 120 min based on the size of the area per International Fire Code (IFC, 2012) | |||
* Provide sprinkler systems, when necessary, per National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 13, Standard for the Installation ofSprinkler Systems 3.5.2.7.14 Plant and Instrument Air System Chapter 9. 0, Section 9. 7 .1 provides a detailed description of the RPF plant and instrument air system. | |||
Design Basis Functions | |||
* Provide small, advective flows of plant air for several RPF activities (e.g., tool operation, pump power, purge gas in tanks, valve actuation, and bubbler tank level measurement) | * Provide small, advective flows of plant air for several RPF activities (e.g., tool operation, pump power, purge gas in tanks, valve actuation, and bubbler tank level measurement) | ||
* Provide plant air receiver buffer capacity to make up difference between peak demand and compressor capacity | * Provide plant air receiver buffer capacity to make up difference between peak demand and compressor capacity | ||
Line 588: | Line 5,001: | ||
* Provide instrument air receiver buffer capacity to make up difference between peak demand and compressor capacity Design Basis Values | * Provide instrument air receiver buffer capacity to make up difference between peak demand and compressor capacity Design Basis Values | ||
* 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., pumps) | * 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., pumps) | ||
* Provide instrument air dried in regenerable desiccant beds to a dew point of no greater than -40°C (-40°F) and filtered to a maximum 40 micron (µ) particle size 3.5.2.7.15 Emergency Purge Gas System Chapter 6.0, Section 6.2.1.7.5 provides a detailed description of the emergency purge gas system. Design Basis Functions | * Provide instrument air dried in regenerable desiccant beds to a dew point of no greater than -40°C | ||
* Provide nitrogen to emergency purge gas system to the required process tanks Remain :functional during DBEs Design Basis Values | (-40°F) and filtered to a maximum 40 micron (µ) particle size 3.5.2.7.15 Emergency Purge Gas System Chapter 6.0, Section 6.2.1.7.5 provides a detailed description of the emergency purge gas system. | ||
* 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts Maintain hydrogen gas (H2) concentrations less than flammability limit 3.5.2.7.16 Gas Supply System Chapter 9.0, Section 9.7.1 provides a detailed description of the gas supply system. 3-62 NWM I *::. | Design Basis Functions | ||
* Provide helium, hydrogen, and oxygen in standard gas bottles | * Provide nitrogen to emergency purge gas system to the required process tanks | ||
* Provide nitrogen from a tube truck to the chemical supply room where manifold piping will be used to distribute the gas Provide adequate flow to ensure that the accumulation of combustible gases is below hazardous concentrations and reduces radiological hazards due to accumulation of gaseous fission products Design Basis Values | * Remain :functional during DBEs Design Basis Values | ||
* 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts | |||
* Maintain hydrogen gas (H2) concentrations less than flammability limit 3.5.2.7.16 Gas Supply System Chapter 9.0, Section 9.7.1 provides a detailed description of the gas supply system. | |||
3-62 | |||
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* : ~~.~~:. NORTHWtSTMEDlCAllSOTOPES NWMl-2015-021, Rev. OA Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components Design Basis Functions | |||
* Provide helium, hydrogen, and oxygen in standard gas bottles | |||
* Provide nitrogen from a tube truck to the chemical supply room where manifold piping will be used to distribute the gas | |||
* Provide adequate flow to ensure that the accumulation of combustible gases is below hazardous concentrations and reduces radiological hazards due to accumulation of gaseous fission products Design Basis Values | |||
* 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., pumps) | * 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., pumps) | ||
* Provide standard gas bottles, with capacity of approximately 8,495 L (300 cubic feet [ft3]) 3.5.2.7.17 Process Chilled Water System Chapter 9.0, Section 9.7.1 provides a detailed description of the RPF chilled water system. Design Basis Functions | * Provide standard gas bottles, with capacity of approximately 8,495 L (300 cubic feet [ft3]) | ||
* Provide process chilled water loop for three secondary loops through plate-and-frame heat exchangers -One large geometry secondary loop in hot cell -One criticality-safe geometry secondary loop in hot cell One criticality-safe geometry secondary loop in target fabrication area Provide monitoring of chilled water loops for loss of primary containment Provide cover gas to prevent flammable conditions | 3.5.2.7.17 Process Chilled Water System Chapter 9.0, Section 9.7.1 provides a detailed description of the RPF chilled water system. | ||
Design Basis Functions | |||
* Provide process chilled water loop for three secondary loops through plate-and-frame heat exchangers | |||
- One large geometry secondary loop in hot cell | |||
- One criticality-safe geometry secondary loop in hot cell One criticality-safe geometry secondary loop in target fabrication area | |||
* Provide monitoring of chilled water loops for loss of primary containment | |||
* Provide cover gas to prevent flammable conditions Design Basis Values | |||
* 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., pumps) | * 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., pumps) | ||
* Provide saturated steam at 1. 7 kg/square centimeters ( cm2) (25 lb/square inch [in.2]) and 4.2 kg/cm2 (60 lb/in.2) gauge to various process equipment 3.5.2.7.21 Demineralized Water System Chapter 9. 0, Section 9. 7 .1 provides a detailed description of the RPF demineralized water system. Design Basis Functions | * Chilled water to various process equipment at no greater than 10°C (50°F) during normal operations | ||
* Provide demineralized water to RPF except for administration and truck bay areas | * The hydrogen concentration in the coolant system is maintained at less than 25 percent of the lower flammability limit of 5 percent H2 3.5.2.7.18 Facility Chilled Water System Chapter 9. 0, Section 9. 7 .1 provides a detailed description of the RPF facility chilled water system. | ||
* Remove mineral ions from municipal water through an ion exchange (IX) process and accumulate in a storage tank Provide regenerable IX media using a strong acid and a strong base Feed acids and bases from local chemical drums by toe pumps | Design Basis Functions | ||
* Provide cooling media to heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) system | |||
* Supply HVAC system with cooling water that is circulated through the chilled water coils in air-handling units Design Basis Values | |||
* Provide cooling water at a temperature of 9°C (48°F) to the HVAC air-handling unit cooling coils | |||
* 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., pumps) 3-63 | |||
. . . . ~**.:*. NWM-I | |||
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NWMl-2015-021, Rev. OA Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components | |||
'*. ~~-:~:. NORTHWEST MED1CAL rsOTOPES 3.5.2.7.19 Facility Heated Water System Chapter 9. 0, Section 9. 7 .1 provides a detailed description of the RPF heated water system. | |||
Design Basis Functions | |||
* Provide heated media to HVAC system | |||
* Supply the HVAC system with heated water that is circulated through the heated water coils in the air-handling units Design Basis Values | |||
* Provide heated water at a temperature of 82°C (l 80°F) to HVAC air-handling unit heating coils and reheat coil | |||
* 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., pumps) 3.5.2.7.20 Process Steam System - Boiler Chapter 9. 0, Section 9. 7 .1 provides a detailed description of the RPF process steam system for the boiler. | |||
Design Basis Functions | |||
* Generate low- and medium-pressure steam using a natural gas-fired package boiler | |||
* Provide a closed loop steam system for the hot cell secondary loops that meets criticality control requirements | |||
* Provide monitoring of steam condensate for loss of primary containment | |||
* Limit sludge or dissolved solids content with automatic and makeup water streams in the boiler Design Basis Values | |||
* 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., pumps) | |||
* Provide saturated steam at 1. 7 kg/square centimeters (cm2) (25 lb/square inch [in.2]) and 4.2 kg/cm2 (60 lb/in. 2) gauge to various process equipment 3.5.2.7.21 Demineralized Water System Chapter 9. 0, Section 9. 7 .1 provides a detailed description of the RPF demineralized water system. | |||
Design Basis Functions | |||
* Provide demineralized water to RPF except for administration and truck bay areas | |||
* Remove mineral ions from municipal water through an ion exchange (IX) process and accumulate in a storage tank | |||
* Provide regenerable IX media using a strong acid and a strong base | |||
* Feed acids and bases from local chemical drums by toe pumps | |||
* Design Basis Values | * Design Basis Values | ||
* 3 0-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., pumps) | * 3 0-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., pumps) | ||
* Provide the water at 4.2 kg/cm2 (60 lb/in.2) gauge 3-64 | * Provide the water at 4.2 kg/cm2 (60 lb/in.2) gauge 3-64 | ||
. .;.-.::.*.:* NWMI | |||
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NWMl-2015-021, Rev. DA | |||
* ~ !~.~~: | |||
* NORTHWIST MEDICA[ISOTDP.ES Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components 3.5.2.7.22 Chemical Supply System Chapter 9.0, Section 9.7.4 provides a detailed description of the chemical supply system. | |||
Design Basis Functions | |||
* Provide storage capability for nitric acid, sodium hydroxide, reductant, and nitrogen oxide absorber solutions, hydrogen peroxide, and fresh uranium IX resin | * Provide storage capability for nitric acid, sodium hydroxide, reductant, and nitrogen oxide absorber solutions, hydrogen peroxide, and fresh uranium IX resin | ||
* Segregate incompatible chemicals (e.g., acids from bases) | * Segregate incompatible chemicals (e.g., acids from bases) | ||
* Provide transfer capability for chemical solutions mixed to required concentrations and used in target fabrication, target dissolution, Mo recovery and purification, and waste management systems Design Basis Values | * Provide transfer capability for chemical solutions mixed to required concentrations and used in target fabrication, target dissolution, Mo recovery and purification, and waste management systems Design Basis Values | ||
* 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., pumps) 3.5.2.7.23 Biological Shielding System Chapter 4.0, Section 4.2, provides a detailed description of the RPF biological shielding. Design Basis Functions | * 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., pumps) 3.5.2.7.23 Biological Shielding System Chapter 4.0, Section 4.2, provides a detailed description of the RPF biological shielding. | ||
* Provide biological shielding from radiation sources in the hot cells for workers in occupied areas of theRPF '* | Design Basis Functions | ||
* Provide biological shielding from radiation sources in the hot cells for workers in occupied areas of theRPF '* | |||
* Limit physical access to hot cells | * Limit physical access to hot cells | ||
* Remain functional through DBEs without loss of structural integrity Design Basis Values | * Remain functional through DBEs without loss of structural integrity Design Basis Values | ||
* 30-year design life | * 30-year design life | ||
* Provide dose rates consistent with ALARA goals for normally occupied areas 3.5.2.7.24 Facility Process Control System Chapter 7.0, Section 7.2.3 provides a description of the FPC system. Design Basis Functions | * Provide dose rates consistent with ALARA goals for normally occupied areas 3.5.2.7.24 Facility Process Control System Chapter 7.0, Section 7.2.3 provides a description of the FPC system. | ||
* Perform as overall production process controller | Design Basis Functions | ||
* Monitor and control process instrumented functions within the RPF (e.g., process fluid transfers, controlled inter-equipment pump transfers of process fluids) Provide monitoring of safety-related components while BMS (a subset of the FPC system) monitors ventilation system and mechanical utility systems Ensure ESF systems operate independently from FPC system or BMS Use hard-wired analog controls/interlocks for each ESF safety function to protect workers, public, and environment Integrate into and monitor ESF parameters and alarm functions by FPC system or BMS Initiate actuation of isolation dampers for hot cell area or analytical area on receipt of signals from fire protection system Design Basis Values | * Perform as overall production process controller | ||
* 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., controllers) 3-65 Rev. OA This page intentionally left blank 3-66 | * Monitor and control process instrumented functions within the RPF (e.g., process fluid transfers, controlled inter-equipment pump transfers of process fluids) | ||
}} | * Provide monitoring of safety-related components while BMS (a subset of the FPC system) monitors ventilation system and mechanical utility systems | ||
* Ensure ESF systems operate independently from FPC system or BMS | |||
* Use hard-wired analog controls/interlocks for each ESF safety function to protect workers, public, and environment | |||
* Integrate into and monitor ESF parameters and alarm functions by FPC system or BMS | |||
* Initiate actuation of isolation dampers for hot cell area or analytical area on receipt of signals from fire protection system Design Basis Values | |||
* 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., controllers) 3-65 | |||
NWMl-2015~021, Rev. OA This page intentionally left blank 3-66}} |
Latest revision as of 22:32, 18 March 2020
ML16344A053 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Northwest Medical Isotopes |
Issue date: | 11/28/2016 |
From: | Haass C Northwest Medical Isotopes |
To: | NRC/NRR/DPR/PRLB |
References | |
NWMl-2016-RAl-004, TAC MF6138 | |
Download: ML16344A053 (131) | |
Text
.:;.*.~*. .NWMI
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- =* NDRTHWESTMEOICALISOTOPES ATTACHMENT 3 Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC Response to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Request for Additional Information Regarding the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report and Environmental Review of the Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC Construction Permit Application Docket No. 50-609 Dated: September 29, 2016
{Document No. NWMl-2016-RAl-004, November 2016)
Public Version Information is being provided via hard copy
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- NORTHWEST MEDICAL ISOTOPES Response to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Request for Additional Information Regarding the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report of the Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC Construction Permit Application Docket No. 50-609 NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 November 2016 Prepared by:
Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC 815 NW 9th Ave, Suite 256 Corvallis, OR 97330
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NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0
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- .. ~~.~~:* UGlltm'VlSTMf[l(CAllSOTOf(S Response to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Request for Additional Information Regarding the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report of the Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC Construction Permit Application Docket No. 50-609 NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 Date Published:
November 28, 2016 Document Number: NWMl-2016-RAl-004 IRevision Number. O
Title:
Response to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Request for Additional Information Regarding the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report of the Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC Construction Permit Application Docket No. 50-609 Approved by: Carolyn Haass Signature:
CUM)~C.~
NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 REVISION IDSTORY Rev Date Reason for Revision Revised By 0 11/28/2016 Issued for Submittal to the NRC N/A
NWMl-2016-RAl.,004, Rev. 0 CONTENTS General Information ................................................................................................................................ 1 Chapter 2.0- Site Characteristics ............................................................................................................ 4 Chapter 3. 0 - Design of Structures, Systems, and Components .............................................................. 20 Chapter 5.0 - Coolant Systems .............................................................................................................. 35 Chapter 6.0- Engineered Safety Features .............................................................................................. 37 Chapter 7.0-Instrumentation and Control Systems ............................................................................... 46 Chapter 8.0- Electrical Power Systems .................................................................................................. 53 Chapter 9 .0 - Auxiliary Systems ............................................................................................................ 54 Chapter 11.0 - Radiation Protection and Waste Management ................................................................. 66 Chapter 12.0-Conduct of Operations ................................................................................................... 78 Chapter 13.0 - Accident Analysis .............*............................................................................................. 83 Chapter 14.0 -Technical Specifications ................................................................................................ 91 References ............................................................................................................................................. 93 ATTACHMENTS Attachment A- Section 3.5, "Systems and Components" ofNWMI-2013-021, Construction Permit Application.for Radioisotope Production Facility .......................................... A-i Attachment B- NWMI-2014-RPT-006,MCNP 6.1 Validations with Continuous Energy ENDFIB-Vll.1 Cross-Sections (Rev. 0) (Public Version) ........................................... B-i Attachment C - NWMI-2015-CSE-008, NWMI Preliminary Criticality Safety Evaluation: Hot Cell Uranium Purification (Recovery and Recycle) (Rev. A) (Public Version) ........... C-i
NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 TERMS Acronyms and Abbreviations 99Mo molybdenum-99 235u uranium-235 mu uranium-238 ADAMS Agencywide Documents Access and Management System ALARA as low as reasonably achievable ALI annual limits on intake ANECF average neutron energy causing fission ANS American Nuclear Society ANSI American National Standards Institute AOA area of applicability ASCE American Society of Civil Engineers ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials BMS building management system C-I Seismic Category I C-II Seismic Category II CDE committed dose equivalent CEDE committed effective dose equivalent CF2 carbon fluoride CFR Code of Federal Regulations CP Construction Permit DAAP diamylamylphosphonate DAC derived air concentration DBE design-basis event EDE effective dose equivalent EOI end of irradiation ESF engineering safety feature FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency FPC facility process control FSAR final safety analysis report H2 hydrogen gas HEGA high-efficiency gas adsorption HEPA high-efficiency particulate air HEU high-enriched uranium HMI human-machine interface HVAC heating, ventilation, and air conditioning I&C instrument and control IBC International Building Code IEU intermediate-enriched uranium IROFS items relied on for safety ISA integrated safety analysis ISG Interim Staff Guidance ketr k-effective LEU low-enriched uranium MCER maximum-considered earthquake MCNP Monte Carlo N-Particle MHA maximum hypothetical accident MMI Modified Mercalli Intensity MoS margin of subcriticality ii
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- ~. :~.~~:' ~~MTll\'llSTUmt;AilSG'ft)JF[S NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 MU University of Missouri MURR University of Missouri Research Reactor NCS nuclear criticality safety NESHAP National Emission Standards for f:Iazardous Air Pollutants NFPA National Fire Protection Association NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NS non-seismic NSR nonsafety-related NWMI Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC OBE operating basis earthquake OSL optically stimulated luminescence OSTR Oregon State University TRIGA Reactor osu Oregon State University PGA peak ground acceleration PHA process hazard analysis PPE personal protective equipment PSAR preliminary safety analysis report QA quality assurance QAPP quality assurance program plan QL quality level RAI request for additional information RAM radioactive material RCA radiologically controlled area RPF Radioisotope Production Facility "'
RSAC Radiological Safety Analysis Computer SAR safety analysis report SEP standby electrical power SNM special nuclear material SR safety-related SSC structures, systems, and components SSE safe-shutdown earthquake TEDE total effective dose equivalent TLD thermoluminescent dosimeter TRIGA Training, Research, Isotopes, General Atomics u uranium U.S. United States UC uranium carbide UH3 uranium trihydride U02 uranium dioxide U02(N03)2 uranyl nitrate UPS uninterruptable power supply USGS United States Geological Survey UZrH uranium zirconium hydride WCDE weighted committed dose equivalent iii
.;.,. ~;:. NWMI NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0
~--~~-~'::* f~OIUHWESfWDU:AJ.ISQT{li![S" Units oc degrees Celsius op degrees Fahrenheit
µ rmcron cm centimeter cm2 square centimeter ft feet ft2 square feet g gram g ground acceleration gal gallon ha hectare hp horsepower hr hour
- m. inch in. 2 square inch kg kilogram km kilometer km2 square kilometer kPa kilopascal kW kilowatt L liter lb pound m meter MeV million electron volts mg milligram rm mile mi2 square mile mm minute mrem millirem mSv millisievert rem roentgen equivalent in man wk week yr year iv
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...... NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0
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'~ ~~.~!'."', Ntml'HWfSTMU!ltAL tsOlOPES GENERAL INFORMATION No. Request for Additional Information 1of96
NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0
\The maximum hypothetical accident (MHA) discussion was inappropriately included in Section 13.2.1
!of the preliminary safety analysis report (PSAR) (NWMI-2013-021, Construction Permit Application for
)Radioisotope Production Facility). NWMI interpreted NUREG-1537, Guidelines for Preparing and jReviewing Applications for the Licensing ofNon-Power Reactors: ~tandard R~view Plan and 1Acceptance Criteria, Part 2, Chapter 13, as augmented by the Interun Staff Gui.dance (ISG) (NRC,
]2012), as requiring.an analysis consistent with both 10 CFR 70.61, "Performance Requirements," and lwith the MHA approach. Additionally, the PSAR combined the two in its approach to the MHA, jproducing an analysis inconsistent with the intended requirements of an MHA analysis.
t fThe accident analyses in the final safety analysis report (FSAR); as part of the Operating License
!Application, will be consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 70.61. As stated in Chapter 13b,
!"Radioisotope Production Facility Accident Analyses,'.' of the ISG Augmenting NUREG-1537, Part 1:
I .
l NRC staffhas determined that the use ofIntegrated Safety Analysis methodologies as described in 10 CFR Part 70 Subpart Hand NUREG-1520, application ofthe radiological and chemical consequence and likelihood criteria contained in the performance requirements of 10 CFR
- 70. 61, designation ofitems relied on for safety, and establishment ofmanagement measures, are acceptable ways ofdemonstrating adequate safety for the medical isotopes production facility.
fThe accident analyses in the PSAR are based on (1) use of integrated safety analysis (ISA)
!methodologies, as described in 10 CFR 70 Subpart Hand NUREG-1520, Standard Review Plan for the
!Review ofa License Application for a Fuel Cycle Facility, (2) application of the radiological and
!chemical consequence and likelihood criteria contained in the performance requirements of 10 CFR l?0.61, (3) designation of items relied on for safety (IROFS), and (4) establishment of management jmeasures to demonstrate adequate safety.
\The ISA includes a systematic analysis and discussion of credible accidents for determining the limiting ievents for several accident categories. The limiting event in each category is analyzed quantitatively to
!determine consequences. Radiological accident consequences, as mitigated by structures, systems, and jcomponents (SSC) and administrative safety measures, are evaluated against the performance
!requirements of 10 CFR 70.61. The safety measures are designated as IROFS.
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NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0
'- Request for Additional Information
!Based on the response to RAI G-3, PSAR.Section 13.2, "Analysis ofAccidents with Radiological and
!Criticality Safety Consequences" Will be revised and the MHA discussion in PSAR Section 13.2.1 will
\be deleted.
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!SSCs will be designed to protect against both high and immediate consequences. PSAR Section 3.5.1.3.1 jdescribed both the high and the immediate consequence performance requirements from 10 CFR 70.61.
jTo eliminate confusion and ensure completeness, these bullets were removed from PSAR .Section 3.5.1.3 j(see Attachment A), and the 10 CFR 70.61 performance requirements are referenced.
3 of96
NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 CHAPTER 2.0 - SITE CHARACTERISTICS No. Request for additional information 1;{;~~j~~()!ji(fl!~~a~i1~~~~:~~i~JifS~~i~~l~~~~~1J~iJ if;,;; 4. '* :l'" ***','\);;analySjfi; should t{?!no.nst,rate:Biatthe!',e is. a lowpotent~t;J/;rb.atgnyair,q~aft ca,u,Id ajfe:qUhe ~,FJ~ ,.: i ~.,'
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<l;qssoqlqt~d ~itli thr'refere[lc~i(.helip()rts a1:trJat(po:ft~;~oi;fzow 'the*J?.!:'E: 'fl.esig!J 1;.::*~2~2.":~£:21~~~~~~~f§f:J}t~~:e~f~~i.s~~f;£~J~~~~i~~{~?f~~:~~i.~trl/Jl!}if~~t-1!fle?5lf.!S1~~~:/i.:1li1Jl~~.~~. :*,~-,:z:~::,.~~
- There are three airports and three helicopter ports located within 16 kilometers (km) (10 miles [mi]) of
- the proposed RPF site. The three airports include:
- Columbia Regional Airport (public) located approximately 10.4 km (6.5 mi) south of the RPF site 1
- Cedar Creek Airport (private) located approximately 10.6 km (6.6 mi) northeast of the RPF site Sugar Branch Airport (private) located approximately 15.6 km (9.7 mi) northwest of the RPF site iTuese airports are identified in PSAR Chapter 2.0, Figure 2-30, of the Construction Permit Application.
- The nearest airport to the RPF is the Columbia Regional Airport, which is used by commercial and
'privately owned aircraft. The airport is situated on approximately 0.532 ha (1,314 acres) and is owned
- and operated by the City of Columbia. This airport is the only public use airport located in Boone
- county, Missouri, for which records are kept. For the 12-month period ending October 31, 2013, the
'airport had 16,610 aircraft operations for an average of 26 flights per day, including:
81 percent general aviation l *
. 16 percent air taxi 2 percent military 1 percent air carrier
- Cedar Creek airport is a private turf landing strip approximately 10.6 km (6.6 mi) northeast of the RPF ;
'.site. The facility houses two private single engine aircraft. The specific number of flights to and from the i
- facility is not available.
The Sugar Branch airport is a private, turf landing strip approximately 15.6 km (9.7 mi) northwest of the
- RPF site. The facility houses one single engine aircraft. The specific number of flights to and from the
- facility are not available.
'Three helicopter ports are located within 16 km ( 10 mi) of the RPF site and support hospital operations,
,including:
~
- University of Missouri Hospitals and Clinics heliport located 6 km (3. 7 mi) northwest
- University of Missouri (MU) heliport located 6 km (3.7 mi) northwest Boone Hospital Center heliport located 6.3 km (3.9 mi) northwest.
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!No operations data are available for these heliports.
1Based on NUREG-1537, sites located between 8 km (5 mi) and 16 km (10 mi) from an existing or .
\projected commercial or military airport with more than approximately 200 d2 (where dis the distance in ;
!kilometers from the airport to the RPF site) commercial or military aircraft movements per year, the
)probability of aircraft accidents is considered less than an order of magnitude of 10-7 per year. *
!Tue number of operations at the Cedar Creek and Sugar Branch airports are not available. However, daily) 1operations were assumed based on the aircraft housed, including two operations per day from Cedar '.
iCreek (730 operations/year) and one operation per day from Sugar Branch (365 operations/year). Based '.
jon the results presented in Table 1, all three airports are under the 200 d2 limits.
- i Table 1. 200 D2 Limits Distance Airport km (mi) Flights per year 200 d 2 limitsa i a~ is the distance in kilomete~s from the airport to the .RPF site (200. x qistance, squared) .....
!Based on this requirement, none of these airports needs to be further evaluated. The guidance also jrequires that special consideration be given to facilities sited within the trajectory of a runway of any
- airport. The RPF site is not located within a trajectory of a runway of the airport.
iBecause the three heliports are closer than 8 km (5 mi) to the RPF site, the frequency of an aircraft jcrashing into the site needs to be evaluated. NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan for the Review of iSafety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants, Subsection 3 .5 .1. 6, provides a methodology for ,
!determining the probability of an aircraft crash into a facility from airways. However, the approach requires :
!knowledge of the number of flights per year along the airway. Because this information is not available 1for the flight paths near the RPF, DOE-STD-3014-2006, Accident Analysis for Aircraft Crash into
!Hazardous Facilities, was used to determine the frequency of crashes. The following equation is used.
Fh = Nh x Ph x fh(x,y) x Ah
!Where:
Fh Crash impact frequency N Flight per year Ph Probability of a crash fh(x,y) Probability, given a crash, that the crash occurs in a l-mi2 area surrounding the facility
= Effective plant area.
I
\The effective area for an aircraft was determined by two components: the aircraft crashing into the
!facility either by skidding or by flying directly into it. The effective area was calculated based on an laircraft skidding or flying into the facility in the direction that produces the largest area (i.e., crashing in a; jdirection perpendicular to the largest diagonal of the building).
iThe following formula was used to calculating the skid and fly in areas of an aircraft crashing into the
!facility.
\Where:
(2 xL x W x WS)
Ar = (WS + R) x H x cot</J + R +L x W 5 of 96
.:;**~;*. NWMI
. ~. ~~.~!:
- NORIHWUT M£DIW lSOTCIP£S NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 and:
As = (WS + R) x S
!Where:
l,
- Ar Effective fly-in area
' As Effective skid area ws = Aircraft wingspan R = Length of the diagonal of the facility = ..JL2 + W 2 H Facility height, facility-specific cot<l> Mean of the cotangent of the aircraft impact angle L Length of facility, facility-specific w Width of facility, facility-specific s = Aircraft skid distance (mea.Ii value).
'.DOE-STD-3014-2006 notes that in calculating an effective area, the analyst needs to be cognizant of the
- "critical areas" of the facility. The critical areas are locations in a facility that contain hazardous material and/or locations that, once impacted by a crash, can lead to cascading failures (e.g., a fire, collapse,
'.and/or explosion that would impact the hazardous material). The critical areas of the RPF are considered ,
- to be the hot cell and waste management areas. *
- The critical areas dimensions are estimated at 30.5 x 24 meters (m) (100 x 80 feet [ft]), which provides a ;
diagonal (R) of39 m (128 ft). The facility height (H) of22.9 m (75 ft) was used. DOE-STD-3014-2006 l
.provides estimates for aircraft wingspan, mean of the cotangent of the aircraft impact angle, and skid
.distance for five different aircraft types. For helicopters, the cot<l> value is 0.58 and the skid length is
'typically assumed to be 0. The effective area is calculated in Table 2.
Table 2. Affective Area for Helicopter Wing spana Skid distancea Effective plant area Ah Aircraft ws (ft) cot<l>a s (ft) (mi 2 )
Helicopter : 50 0.58 0 0.00079 a DOE-STD-3014-2006, Accident Analysis for Aircraft Crash into Hazardous Facilities, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C., 1996 (R2006).
For a helicopter, fh(x,y) is estimated based on half the average length of a flight with the lateral
- variations in crash locations assumed to be one-quarter mile on the average from the centerline of the
- flight path or 2/L. The probability Ph (2.50E-05) is taken from DOE-STD-3014-2006, Appendix B
- Table B-1. The total number of flights from the three helipads are estimated at 1,825 per year. A ;
!conservation estimate is that 5 percent of these helicopters overfly the facility. In addition, a conservative i
- estimate of total flight path is the distance to the closest helipad or 6 km (3.7 mi).
I
!Based on these assumptions, the helicopter impact frequency is calculated as follows:
2 Fh = 91 x 2.SE- 05 x _ x 7.9£- 04 37 Fh = 9.7E-o7 The calculated crash impact frequency from the heliport is less than the requirement ofNUREG-0800 of f
'.being within an order of magnitude of 10-7 per year. Therefore, no further analysis is required. This ;
'information will be added to PSAR Section 2.2.2.
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NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0
[~,*~~*.¥~~~j~J:;~~~j?~~~ff~ai~!q~~~~Wk~~tfe'.~if~f!J!Jf ih~_!!_~~~t.9*~!~~~rl~.ir~~ft~t]
iPSAR Section 2.2.2.1 had a typographical error. 10.4 km (6.5 mi) is the correct distance from the Request for additional information
!Columbia Regional Airport to the RPF site, based on Google Earth measurements, and 10.4 km (6.5 mi)
\is the distance used in the associated calculations. The stated distance of 10.5 km will be changed to
- 10.4 km (6.5 mi) in PSAR Section 2.2.2.1.
1i:-R"A1r2=i~]W'fJRiG!Tfif?ai1'1':secti6h'2.-2:~(:;'.A;;tizy;i~:ifP.61<iFiti~IA."Jci"d~Tii~.a,i~"(;iiiHi~;-:;;:*~1~"iJ,iili'd?iJa*:~T~
' ' ' \' *.' '/1('aqility (i.,~.,- nearby inqustn~l, tr~nspor~(i'tio~~ or mi(i_ta,ryfaci~!tyJ "cannotaJfep['.the/Rf!llJ! th,e.~ .:. :~' ' *. ' l
- * * : *: ~
- j!applic;ant::sh'ould make a* stat~ment_to: t~at e.ffe~t imd giy<? the ba~is fot t!Jis '.statement. '.' (:* : ', _. ': * -~*--*' .* ** .. *~:
. \IFurthermore, NuREG-1537;part2, $ection 7;2, .'.'Nei1rbylndu~trial, irm;sportation,,c:i,nd_Militqry., . ;
- ;
- 1!E- . **1*n*"'_,,.;;. t ...... "
- t -th tth* .. * * * --"-~........ --.. -.... , *. :*.*.. **** * :. *-,, ... :.>/.*'<.-. : ,,_.-"::. *:" . *.*.? . - ~;
'j'i'.*.*.a_4Cl
- j.'
- : ,,:*,;
I es, . . . ,,,a
",,,' ' "*~'.,'
es, Jn par,- a " . ***"*\'
',** ' \ .: .:<<*',.i* . **, .,t * . ~*
e rev . .'.ew.. - *' , . > . *,,.,;,;,-:.. , ""*>.,;rJ: .. *,* ***".'***.**-, ...* v,
- '.'
- * .* :*(. .,,. '*. * .- '. .*. ~*"::'~~~;" ,,, ,'**,:" ,,. * * (*~*;', * **~'.";S * ",'-'*i**.*...r.: * '.,.'
.',;.,.,,~~Y,:,
. * ...... -.* .'"_"**r"*"
- ,.1-
- :**~',i' ' *- ,,~:. : "*." ,:f
- '. if ' ,:. 'shoukl;'cofifinn thata'iJ.y hazaras*tQ the'[RRF}facilityposed by.'nO,mia/bperations*andpofefJtial * ~,
1 1
' '. l/ *_, rnalfun(:tipns ancf a~cid.enis 'at,n~~;by ,ma[l~a_de s}~ti~nary fqcililies,_:,'. haye,~~~Ji c;lesc,ribed ~n~..*::: :i
,:-~i/: ': il!J(Jlyz?d tq. ,the..,eften~ n~c~ssary::fQ' etJiJl_uat?}lfe pqtenti<,1{ rq'd~<;logtcpf;risks to. ~/:leJ;a~_z_._lity statr;../t~.e '..,\i
- ii ; public,.*and'theenvironrnent. . -' - .. " *
)" " '*<-*-' : . - -.* *; . .** .
- -\*- ,.. .
~
. *1i!Vff7¥J PSjW~Secfi~n 2.2.3)}, "'f'lf:znimablf1 v',apor Clquds (D~ldyedlgn!tio~A'.'.:!ah,le 2~J9,. *;)'., . . j
- . ". !J '.~~~(Jm.~1ab.~e'.vapor:C1ou~s ~nd<Vdpor Cloucl,J#plosfonfri-!ntF;Y;terfl.ql~O.iirce:;~~;,:/dQ.e~ n,bl ini;'.ud_e:th.e.,_. *!1 r ; .. ,i;c;.cceptable_ '4_1$fance for !f1~~<!l at MU.S<;mt~ Fprnt. *:; _- , : . ,; . . O': ' ',,. ~ . -_ ' " : ,';
..' *.* 11PSARSeciion 2.1.3.1.2;' "NeiJrbyFaCilfties, 'f;Table2iliandfoble2-J9_only.c~YJsider;;iiportion.of.* -*i
- -~' .l!if
- J~~'.~a~Z~~=~~1frkJ:/:;i~i::~~~~:1i;:%~f!tc:1$lf:u~~~f~ff~~~~~~:~:fj/e;z+/-~!;~-_rt:;:,.r;;. * ~
. . . lilb!~n. 2). NFVM in<fiCates that an analysis accinlYJtfngfor th?;to(al amount 9fgasoline and~dieselstbred) minitnuni'~e[laration;distdh~il:(i:e., . 'i' 0
. ',1. 'j!at **thelv/iigelldnfactlity yl¢1as.a s'tij;;Stand6]Jdistaiide;)greater*
... *' . * :;than its citr_rent l(Jc_qtion to the R;PF.'Such scenario niajipose q_ ri$k to tlie RPPsirice the location of* i
~. '.:. ;_ * ;. ,'.: **: Jl~~-9~e ,taYJ~~ rf!l p!O,s~[: ihi;ip, 1:k~ s<ff!f.~s/~~.dofff!,.1$~ans~:1~*R~?s~nt,{ t~e ~~91l!iiJ.of7~tf~~ rfsli;[pr_ q~./1.~9..fPsi~(
r ,. . ~ ,*Jrje,coun_ti,ngfor the.to(al-.afri{funt ofj)r.dpdne_'stqi:ed at Af[J,Soutlz)}'m:fnfaoility: Tl]e P~*!feef!1s.to:'_ot11Jl. !,
i .. ' J:consider the acceptable distance to ihe largest tank ofgasoline;-.diesel, or propdne," at these nearby' '.
J_; * . _. * !1fa._ci/ities 'wh,ich is *~tgnificq11tly les~ thawt~e tot~t'inven,tory. *TJ:erefore, a,drJitio,n,qljnjOmiation is .. >. . .*;
, .,,,. ,--
- 1ineededfor the NRG staffto*de(etmine tliat p,otentia(accidents at: nearbyfacilities*wouldnotpose;- ., , -"
- l* . \ *..
- lisuffici enf~isk to' the RPF t6 Fende; t/:le site unsiiitablefor constroction and operation a11dib :..'.* : '.
- i. *, : '. _- '. ,' , . i!u"'dersfandthe I- . ' - ' . . - . ' '
pole_IJfil!/ radi_ofogicq/ risks, ifJJfiy, t9,th,efacil!ty.,stajf, .fh,e,. pu.,b/ic, '(lfldfhe BJ:!l'~Y_OnllJ<fl~t,l j
~~f~=~,~~:~;'"~;_;(ti~!E!JK!i/Lii;;-~E.~~r!.!~J'b~gt~~.fi!i/lllf..~t::l~l'C.:;f;~::~: ':;,~~]~~~~-~:~:~l~;;~~~::~~L*;~~~~,;_~~~~~:c*~
'; : RA.I i~2:..2a:ClarifY whether-the assumptions in PSAR Section 2.2.3.1,. "Deterntinatioh ofDesign-BasisEvents, ',
- 1 E* .:..:. _": *;::_;:. ;;":l!b~~1!.d: C:'!i<Ji~e.rjlqss.fpl~.* ~xpl?;s.i<i?,, }9et.1.~r?~,}yr:~. q$:fth.i:'1#JJ._l~§{Q'l ojthe, ;f?t~l)i/t~i?~9~.~tn<fa~?frt::, .... (
1 ' , * '
- Jlfa_c1bti~s that could poten_tially affecFRPf operatioas or sqfe s_hutdown: ' ; ** * *- . : * * * : .: _- i
.:...~*--*-~~--~--~~-\._.,-~ >---*~- -*----~---~-:....-~ . .-!*--- ~~- -----.-----~;,,__,.._~-----.-1---~--*-~-.:._,__,, __ .---------,..- ____..._... ______________ --~---**- ~---- ---~--=*-
- The analysis performed does not bound an explosion of the total inventory of nearby facilities. The ianalysis uses the largest tank for two identified facilities to determine the effect on RPF operations or
!safe shutdown. It was determined to be highly unlikely for the total inventory from both facilities to be
!involved in the explosion scenario due to the following. At the MU South Farm, the closest facility, the jtotal inventory of propane is in multiple disperse locations. For the Magellan Pipeline facility, an
- accidental explosion of multiple tanks at one time adding to the pressure wave is also highly unlikely .
. """'--;~-:---'--~-i;-~-~;--"t"-~--~--.--:"(""'-.r--*---~-,;- ... ~;~;-:-~::---*--~-- ..-.. - -,.~~~-:--:--:-:--~~-;-.--"\:;,-""'?,~"':"!'"'"'.;~~;~~-~-~~---**-:-~~,.~::-:-~~---:'.~~~-~:0:-,"!!::'":-~7 j _RAI. 2.2-2b;Wrovide the acceptablf!. 'disirince for.die§el 9tMU_SouthKar~1. dr1d descrtbe p(?terft_i_al, e.ffeits in. the'RPF,;
L:.:~--,_~-=~:.: lt~~~!': ,~-~-~~:. . .:;_::L~,::: . ::.. ,:.:~::_,,. ---~,~.~>~_::;,._~-:~--~ . _:,~~;~~'. _ *,_*L~:_: _ _ , . : :-; : -.:*'. ,. , ._ , * -* ., ": --. l
/As identified in PSAR Section 2.2.3 .1.2, Table 2-17, the acceptable distance or diesel at the MU South
- Farm is 0.94 km (0.58 mi). The diesel tanks are 1.6 km (1 mi) from the RPF. Based on the explosion ianalysis conducted in EDF-3124-0016, Analysis ofPotential Accidents at Nearby Facilities, an
- explosion of the tanks would not affect the RFP.
- rn-e:e* ..._..,.__ ,_. .. ~=-:!.<<~.-...~ -~~=-~....,... = =--=~
7 of96
.:... NWM I
.*:.**...~:.*.
.:..****:=*
NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0
- -;~~.~'::* UOlUlf'NESTMtmCALWJTtJPES No. Request for additional information
[*. .* ., .:~:.~~=~*., .*.
- RAI *2:3-1 '.'NURE_G-1537, Part 2, Section 2. l>'Geography and1Jemograpl~y;" States;' in p;,:t, that "aspa;t ojthis .t
- review, the revi~wer should cf;eck the exclusion area dfstances against distqnces used in analysis *. ~:
!ij}resented in Chapter 11 and1~ ofthe SAR [sdfety 'a11alys.(s report]. ,; .* * . . .'., . ./ . ; ." :l
- ::NWJ.;JJ PSAR Secti~n 2:3.2, ,;'Site Meteorology;*,, ~ates, in part, ~hat "cons~rvativ~ asiumptipnswere
.. '*used, tn both the Radiol~gical SafetYAnalysis Computer code to support 10 CFR 10(£11: . , , . :
.'.~"J)ete'rmindt[o/1* ofExcl11sionA.rea; .Jpw Population ~orie~. and.Population Center,distqn,cf!. ':~liowever,
- * ; (he e~clusiOn area is nOt specifically'driscribed in thisS~t:_tion 2::1 oriri *chapter 1:i*and-J3 ofthe PSAR.
- \Conflr'm*that the exclusion ar~a b0undafy is 'w!iat is described itJ. Chap{er il .of PSA
- IJ. as. the the* j
.i"controliedarea. "If not the same, describe th_e exclusion area.poundaryfor the RPF '.* : *
" *"' -*. v: "- ~~ - ..,.,~-,~ - "-***- *- ~--. - .:-;:""'.-.. -~ *,::- ' - '*- ... _,,_*:- * ""'" *- **-**-"'"" *-*-*.**** "*'* -- .* "." - .* -.,;:.~""- ,, __ , . ' ..,. -*-'" ......... ~ .* -; .... ~-='"-~-*- -**. ' ,,,, ~-~ *. <-:*-*- *.:-__ ,,__...
-~-,,..~--.- '"-' -::!*
The boundary of the "controlled area" described in PSAR Chapters 11.0 and 13.0 is the same as the "exclusion area boundary." PSAR Chapters 2.0, 11.0, and 13.0 will be updated to use the same
'terminology when referring to the "exclusion area boundary."
- .c* ~ £a::i-rlJ/iiJla~i}~J7; -p::;~( t.*s~~1it~j~3;1,* -;'.a=:~;~~l.";~:ii~~~tc//,;~;~: ;;~-ii;[;; di;[ ti~i;~;tat;~;;;~~;f~;1/
- * ';annual .freql{encies ofsevere weather phenomena, induding hurricanes, tornadoes, waterspouts,
- -,:thund(!rs~orms, *lightning,* and,hail;:should be .stated; *The ¢pplifJimt should give the known,aiid : ,'.:
' :'.maximuln annual frequency ofdccurrence and time duration offreezing ;ain (ice:sforms) arid'dusi
- il;(sand)
. r
.storms Y1?here', applicable
, . * ~*. ,
..Tl;e applica_nt
~, ' , ' '.,, .
sho"rili:l_estipwte
<"~ , '
lhf! /qO-year<<returrz ll(ind spe,'ei .
" ' ' ', . ; ' ' */"{ '" f
- .. ! "(
.'WWMI PSAR, Se,etion 2.3.1.7, "Extreme Weather,'"statesthaf'the.RPF loe,ationarea exhibits . . * \'
- 'siinificai1t~tmospherid* instilbility, "heavy predpitatfon; afJdmdny int~nse thunder~tor~s and is located*(
- ,in a tornado prone area, but did not provide annual frequencies of severe weather phenomer,a. This '
_ ..mformatiori; is needed to -aete.1:mine *ifa weathe~-re/Cttedevent ofcredible .frequency or consequences at
'.iihe site render it zmsuiia.ble .for operation, as designed, and likely to cause* damage to the RPFfacility
- " ,;\ -,' '.ldurirti tts7ifetim? 'thaf,toillir,elease unciontr6ited rddioa'qtiv~'mdterial tq'
- the unrestriCte<J a;ea. ' 1'. * " '
- ~ ~1_.~:~~2~A*;~-~~~~. t~5'.~i~~~R~1*~~!:~~~~~~~~:i;i~~l~~~tio~~~~~~:~~~~~~~~ig~~~2~~1~~fi,:~,~~*~~i!:. :~.. ~--:.~---
The seasonal and annual frequencies of tornadoes, thunderstorms, lighting, and hail are provided as
.follows in 1:able ~ thr~mgh Tabl~_9. ~s i?fonnati?n.wi~l be ~dded t~ P~~ S_~~tion.?.3.1.7 ..
Table 3. Seasonal Frequency of Historical Tornadoes in Boone County, Missouri (1954 to 2016)
Magnitude (Fujita Scale)
Month l!~~~!Y *~** ~'--
February l:~~hE:*:~_*.:~:~::**-:w April lfil~Y-::? ~::*-;~:*-~*: '
June
[ftiif~::;~~-*. _, -...--
August 1 1.~.epi~mb.~~{~:-:~:::c::~~ :~~*: ~~: **~T ~~ :.~~ ..-:*~ --- *- *
. *'~,~------r-~-'<
~.~--*--;*--- ___ ,_
October 2 l~oyerii~~r~;:;: _* --:, :-*- .-.- ---'--
December Source: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents/
8 of 96
. .;.*.~:.NWMI NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0
~~~~.~~:* r.:oamwESTt.mw:ALJSOTDPES Table 4. Annual Frequency of Historical Tornadoes in Boone County, Missouri (1954 to 2016)
Magnitude (Fujita Scale)
Year Total l::;... ~:.~--~<~:.! ~~~ ~~~ .. *: .~ ~~L, -~- _* ::. ~ .L.,_.)~:-.:~.* .~-:.- -~-~~ . ~J:L 1956 ! 1
- .. 1959
-* ** .*-1,. - .... .:..~-.-,-*
.~
Source: http://www.ncdc.noaagov/stormevents/
Table 5. Boone County Seasonal Thunderstorm Wind Events (8/29/1955 to 5/11/2016)
Wind Velocity (mph)
Month
';* p ; - ;._., :. ; .,~*.
..,...-_t- .-.~..-:- -~...,,..-
2 Source: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents/
9 of96
NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 Table 6. Boone County Annual Thunderstorm Wind Events (8/29/1955 to 5/11/2016)
Year M4@ J?W-M@§.i?W-M4Q4.i?W 1 MfJ§.i?W
~j~~tK~~:dii::" ,,:FE~~~w;~f~i.:~~:};1r~~l 1 1 I
1958 l 3 ! 1973 l 1 , 1989 I - i 2004 8 Source: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents/
Table 7. Boone County Lightning Events (7/5/1998 to 6/30/2016)
Location Description Columbia i 7/5/1998 ILightning strike was blamed for a fire at a residence in southwest
. i Columbia. Firefighters arrived to find flames shooting through a hole in l lthe roof.
fG~@~~i!:~II~:gf3Z~W1~:~~fil~,~~J~li~Ki\l1ni~~~~~~~~~~~!!~t~it~rjFg4~:9]1~i!ili1!1J Columbia l 8/25/2004 lLighting strike melted power lines at Providence and Green Meadows I j roads. About 5,000 people were affected by the resulting power outage, i i including New Haven Elementary School.
~~~1;J~,:~~r:;,Jµ~2I~11~~11til&ljfFI~s:'.i!ms~~I:~~~~irfili[tBI1I~r21~::z::12~~:r1I::~!EJ1 Columbia . I 6/6/2005 ILightning strike started a house fire.
~1r1~t~lrsr~1:111~~11~1~
C:olumbia !7/19/2007 . Lightning strike started a fire at a photography studio. .
~;-~~-~~;;~!~
Browns l 6/17/2009 i Lightnfug strike killed woman in an open field at Rocky Fork Lakes I l Conservation Area.
fHlf{~TJ.::~tJ7Z,&Stzzgi~1[J~S.~filt~~~[i@l[~1f8~¥K4t~Ji1Ziil!3r~?z;;g~~li~~~,:11::11 Columbia I 7/23/2011 i Lightning struck cell phone being used by woman in Cosmo Park.
Source: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents/
10 of 96
.:;.*.;:.NWMI NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0
- ~~~.:~:* NORTHWISTMllHWtSOlDPlS Table 8. Boone County Seasonal Hail Events 4/23/1958 - 5/11/2016 Diameter (in.)
Location Source: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stonnevents/
Year Source: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stonnevents/
11 of 96
......... NWM I
.:.~*~;* NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0
'*.~~.~~:* tl!lRfHWESTMEDlCALISOTOP£S
! RAl*.2:3:-2b i;f!rovide)h~ ~akt'mum ann'u'atfrequ~n(;y ofoccuireric~ /ind fjfn,~ duration L *; . . .
- ilfhe potential effects ofthesi} meteorologicgreyents. on t,he RfF.
(. * -.-"**.***.......... ,, .,..[ ..... ~"""** -~*- ,.. .. ' ... , ***~~'..o., .....~***"'"*'"*'"° .,...~~*'*
iWinter weather events since 1996 in Boone County, Missouri are provided in Table 10. These events Re uest for additional information offreezing tain. a~d discuss ;f
,.- .._._ ,.,*...~......... -.--<<*-* .... ;.c..;,...,.:.". "*'" *-"'..;.,~~-..-...;,*.* .. '*'*r *. **"*""'............ **~~*** ......*.* ...~
1
!include snowstorms, ice storms, and extreme cold events. The RPF is being designed to ASCE 7, iMinimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures, to withstand expected meteorological
\events. This information will be factored in the design requirements of PSAR Section 3.2.5, "Rain,
~o~:...and I~e Loading" for ~e RPF. Ta~O will~~~ t<;>~~~~~~=~~~
Table 10. Boone County Winter Weather Events (1/1/1996 to 6/30/2016) (2 pages)
---01102196 i-o i/d3/9({
- 1r-*wirtt~r~~~ **~;,-."*c* ~'2"~ ~---r~*
- **~-:~ :*~* :~,. *-~- ..
Ill wi~t~;-*s1~;:; T"***-i*------:-6~9~-~h'~; ~r~~~~-i~-;~*;~--*-***
- ....,~,, ~'** ***~.r7 **~-:7"~~
Description
<<-*e-
!*--*-:;:';,--~-~-.. -~-" **-.-*--...,,,,,,,- '::.- *<-*t"'--:--<,-._..;.:_::., -----.<-**-.-**~-- -~.:"':""_ .. --~~_,.,,, -;-...'._-~_Jh.<-*-----"">"- - .....~,,r,_~_--;:--.- ____ ,___;._.,,_~*-.. -- ...... .,,.... ~"'*'""'-----r- ---~-~~*-":;.::....:r---.:---~-_,.._____ <-_*~-. .:..*.- .... ---
11/25/96 Ice storm 1 iNumerous traffic accidents l§ifef?2?r~:~J:~:~#!§i~~9~_r~~c~7~~:_:~-~~s:1~2:w:@~~:9r~.~2~~11~9~&:~~~~:~~-ryl~Rr~*!~ii!~;~§~:~*::-~:=]
01/15/97 Winter storm : 2 : Freezing rain and sleet with 'l4 to Yi in. of ice accumulation
- followed by 3 to 8 in. of snow in the region
[o.}..J~zi9J=~JCWi~e£~gtEf_~!~~~~~-~I~:-~']~~~~~~g~Iiii{~~!!~~~-I£~1"i-_~~~t~~~s~~i~!I~~~*-*":::~.~::2:.~-, .']
7 04/l 0/97 ; Winter storm \ 1 ; 2 to 6 in. of snow in the region f))~1~~Z~~/-:;c5yip!x!~-~2.~:3.~~::7i:.~.=-~:tft~T~~-2T~ii~~J~:i.~i[;~**'.*-~"c-*" **:-~~--:~:~*~"- . . ., . ,~-~,-~----~:*-]
01/12/98 : Winter storm i 1 ! Freezing drizzle resulting in thin glaze of ice on roads 1~~~Q:~!JIS1:*5&1~t~~~¥.£1[~'.:r~~:2~~~z::2rri¥E~~3!iJ~1~~2~:1?J~g~9iE~:~:z::~.::::~~~::~:~::-~:;:~r::~:~~~'c.::::~?J 12/21/98 Winter storm : 2 : Light freezing drizzle, sleet, and snow left a thin coating of ice
'on roads r... ""-* .-...-,.......... ~ *~-*,**--~-***--".,.......~.*~-~*-"* ............*..-~-- **--.:~~- ....... -~*-*.......~ --~.=-~-. -..*-..--~-~--*... -..~"'*** .....~ ............--*.** ..........~*- ........... : --~-~ ... .. . .. *"
i 01f9Jl99 ..;: Win.ter stcinjJ: :; <i .\6._iq 10,;n,i:*of snow acr<)ss region.With about ap. i,nch oL:,. *
- I I./ * :(,'* * :.,.s~t::::, _;\_:*i~ ;;;;~:.~, ~ ;::~~k:~.i::;_',;Jc;1:*~--~;..,.:,1:&'t~~~Pa.~~~~.*~.st~lt~S: ~!t~""~2l~l!~~R~t?:2!2~~k~;1;. . .::..~.,,:t,.::.::: ;~".d 1 .
01/27/00 ' Winter storm 3 i 4 to 5 in. across region l.§~/i;iz~Q:*;:!J~.-:-~{~~r.§iqg)i~~.'.(~~:;:~~l~;,.-'=JiI!.9dlwE~l.~~1f~:::x::~~=:~.,~~=:E~~2~~~z~:::=~~Z,T:T:.~: :=*::.:;*:~.~~:*~;]
12/13/00 ; Heavy snow : 1 : 6 to 12 in. across region
,- .,_--~"--**"'--?- ..... * -""-""--{;- -*------ ----*G. . . . ~-* *---~ ... 1;....,.*.-- ~-~-11t._,_o--o . . :*..;:;~~*--~'-*-"r:::..::.., ..- --*::-.;-.;.--:--....**:-**-*. '"""-. -~.,;::..:;-' __ :*--**---';'"'<;.-.. . . . ~--*..;.,~~---- _.._~...,___,_ . . -.-'"-=---;_;"--,..;;::-:-:-:---::..---_:..;=~~~-._;.o.,,
f 12/16/00 ?( Emret!te ..... >:; , Z ; ir~ind qlp1ls ?-om::.20.°Fto 10°F,* * : * * **
L .*.: .. ~':.. _*__.. ~iE~~_o~.cl{Mn_~~C.1¥!!.![ . -~~- :v:'."c~.,~. ~j~~:~.:.: . . ~-".*.....,..c,.*~'-~~....*~-.o**..--~-*~-****-.*-r-.*"'**"~- . ~*-,,......".*~*****"'"'"'
01/29/02 Ice storm 2 : 1'l4 to Yz in. of ice accumulation; power outages 03/25/02 : Winter storm 2 ; Sleet followed by snow; 3- to 4-in. accumulation of the mix 1 i2104;o2~:c::;u:-wr;£6r'St:~tjh-"1r~~,,,,r:;*-*:;!2' . ws:iii:*. ~r-;Ii6~i~tci~~r:~ii6~T:~
I. ..... .,~ ..........-.~~..- .,.. , .....,....,...................- ...................., .... ., .., _, .. --~. "--.--~ ..- ... ,.._......._........~ ............................-........-=-.....--.. ...-~_~..--~*.-...........,..... ~ ..........
12/24/02 Winter storm : 1 :4 to 8 in. of snow across region 02/23/03 \ Winter storm ; 2 ' 3 to 6 in. of snow across the region I.iif§91g3~;~. '.'JJ:Y~!~~~ii~~~:*~~--~:~~?;::.-. . 1:1~~2:~3tl~f~~~~i~~~"i~th;-~il~~-=~~f~::-~:. :::7~~~:.:. ~-~::~-=. :-'.:]
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. '. 9.r:.:!:. NORTHWISTUBlCCALISUTDPl:S Table 10. Boone County Winter Weather Events (1/1/1996 to 6/30/2016) (2 pages)
- 12/13/03 Storm type
- Winter storm \ -
mmmm
[oi7257o?'Y~Jr:Wi;1~;_$t;@;Jr::~:.~~T-;,-.~'JW~~~i~g~;~J£6U'.~)V~"ifb~"T-.1~;2~itt*:;~6r*~1~ef.;;'cft~eilT10:2:.*ri;~*:1 1 i 3 to 6 in. of snow across the region L:~::::_J;'.J~:~:~,. J;_:~1rl.L:,_;. :t'~~~~-~::~*.:'.~\:;:t.::.~.t::~,,.:::lj2l;!~9lY~:)~:.:.-~~::.~:l~;{:~c:.~.;-~::*,i:.:/.;_~;;.~":JfE:i;::~:;::L;:.:;:~'::;;:~*~:~~;~~ L~:::'.-.:*:,,~~:~::;]
Description 11/24/04 \ Winter storm ( 1 i 4 to 6 in. of snow across region f-7:-~;""*---,. *c~-,:..:*.;..::.*.*<-*""'--,"'-:-'-~J:-'-"',"'""-*~-- ...;.*.-",~-.,;: ~-;* ..:-"'~- ~--:'".;::"'"1;'~*-*-;=** *--**- * .-*.~~o.-* -...,i},}~--"'--;"'~i*~::::-*::; ;:;.~- *-'- ":.**-.c:.*~--r-7-..:.. *..**:-;-';'.i:::.."':'"'-,.,-*'"".- -:- ;.;;,.-;-*~**--::...,*., ;:-~---:-*.._~*.;:-.* r.+.:*;:.~*-.: **:;-.~:.-...:..:..:::;:: ~.::>-:'.'.;--5"'
!.12/08/05 * ::- Winter.storm _ ;;"
- 1
.,~-~-..,.,..,.---**--.-:-c:~-~*~'":!--,-- ":r.r."";-*----
-:J2m.:ofsnow * .,
~--.:-*--.-,-..-,_-"""***--.,~---*...:l-:.--:-~-----.-:~ '-?..,,,~ .. *---~:-~-_:.-,,.-*--~--- ~--~--
11/29/06 i Winter storm I 3 !Over a foot of snow in some areas
~~?~1~1~~~iTul~Ji~~~11~~~:f~~;~~~:~~fi1Jj~~~~~f]}i]
12/8/2007 ; Ice storm ; 4 ! Up to a Y2 in. of ice accumulated along with up to 1 in. of sleet
!"~-.*. ,~*. , .. *** ~-, .*,~ 'c-'~~cc******"~-""'~ ..;~-*~~"-7**=*"'-"~--*-.*'*'*-'-c**;'(':>o,.._.......~,-* :**'"-'.-' -~~~.";r-'<<=~~<-**~**.<<'-.-.-o " .. -... ..=,:.. ~*--"*-*--* "*~'--"---~-o-' ,.,,~...,.-,. ~****-**"-.- "" **<<,' *1 l l/31/2011-:*}* :Wi~ter storm. :j'_ .... 2. : }ll,Tp:to 2_0-in-,of sn6_wfellal9ngwith :WindsguStirig over , : -1 L,~.:. ,...~*..:. . .~~~JL:: . .~;'.._~ . .:. .,.;.~:.:~..,-~i.*~. .:,:.'.'..~. . ~ .Ji.~2~~~:--. ~. . .::..:,'.:c~--~~:~--~'~* . . i~::.L:.., __:,,.~;;,. __ ;:-~~-.. :.!~-~. ,;. ~:;: c. -~c :.:J 12/21/2013 l Ice storm 1
1 \Average ice accumulation on trees and other overhead
' ; surfaces was from 0.25 to 0.30 in; about Y2 inch of sleet also
- : fell in some locations
[11~~1~JI:~~:~5I2=3;J~;~it~:5~~-~:~;ay~~P.ib~2~~J 2/4/2014 ! Winter storm \ 1 !6 to 13 in. of snow across the region Source: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents/
No. Request for additional information L~.~~'.L.~~-*~: ,, -~~~~~~~~~j~Mi:l1:~1l -. .,,:_,,=~-~':.J
'!;Applies to' *,;i!fUR!!,G-153 7;Paft J,' $ection* 2.p;' *".!Geology, _Seisn{IJJogy and Geotechnica/.Engt~eeringt' *sta/es that *~
1.f?Ais 2. ~.c1')\ifir/appl!can_t shout~ detail the seislii{c: an'd geo!Ogi'c~C:~iirdcteristics})jf/le $iie and regio[l :stfr.r~unding._<J
- through ::. j;ine site.: The degref! of detail and'e.fif!nl bfcorisfderdttOns should be,corhme1J8urate, with the. po'tential ' ~.
F'.5~_5 *;*:~::~e~sequen~ei 1 c,":"<.' ' .. ' . :.<<.*>> :**.*.**.~ *~".-',': ~ . *.*/. ~- . -:". * , :_* :X<': .. "* .* .\
- j ' * * . , .. '.\N.,rJREG-153 7, Part .J, Secti_orz id
- 2, ,'.'Si(e .Geology,/Stdtes that /he appli~aiit :s.houl~;di~eµsf in detail : -~
- i' *:. < *.* i(ih~:strµctural geoi<:~ qt tfle faCi_h&.~ite. a~d sfloulfl pdy.particu!a'r attf{htfqn: to speclfi.c+/-"S/i-U.cturqlu~t(s,:,i
- .:.::9/~ignljic{ln<;:e 'to_:tfu{Sife such asfof;Ji;fli_ults,"sy'n_clin~s; 'antiCltiies; d_oriies,and basins.,/~:r;, -:.. *, :.*'. ,. ::~:*ir
- 1. . . :!{*'. . ' " . *," ': . '*. * .. *:.* ' ' "_**** ...... : . ...... "* .. -: .---*.,c'*<<" . ,, ' .'"-(
.*
- J.In.Sec.tions 2:5,S,,* "S:f!:ismicity, :' 2.5,.f,., "-Nfaximuhf Ijarthquake Potentiql,/ ~.5.),.,"V~~ra~f?ry:Qrouhd ** ,i, f~ ~ ., ** .**?J,v.Iotion, :'. 25. 6, .~'.Suiface Faulting, ::,gnd 2.5. 7, "J;i<jiiefqction Potenti(ll, ~*.the NV!ffe:G, stat~s;, jhpar~ that,:: ".!
~- **** . . **'. j;; \*Th~ appliC<lnt sh(ju!d ltstC11M~'st;~i~a11y 'reb,or:aet1~~~th.qua1'res ... ~oJJJ~ai;fied Mefcaiu intehsity'of'. '.i f(:" *: *: ***~*.: *. ,Jh*; '¥r.eqt~r than.!'V(J~-'m~grzituq~- (/((chte"i;J;*greqi~~ t~q~A::o_:;f!n'_tl;ze:1Jf!lt:: tlie,,:ppplt,~4r#~J?9Ul¢1 ~ .. <* :.: ;':\
11.* :: * . , *: :* , ..~r;: : **:ev<;1Jt!~te thelqr~e~t ea~thqud!iif ~hat co.uzaoccur,.::.,gn-µ:tsoseisn_1q1 :tflaps.f<Y!Jh~ ep~tMualles shou/cl.,~.
)".,*. : . . ** ;~lo.: .: bepresentecJ..~: . .
~::.
the.. .applicant.sh0,u/d:assess the ' . . '
gfoun_d motio_n:atthe . . .
- site jrOi11: .the* fJl(!x..LIJlUf!l. ' *
, .::' -~
., .. . *,:I" *potential earthquakes ... and the applicant-should e§tciblish theyibratq'r,y ground:motiori _design ... *,i, r
. '...;! :. ' spectriim ahd}'the applicant should discuss soii s:tructure and prepare an appfopriate state ofthe;- J,
- "..
- . _. _-.)(, '. -~rt analysisifrli_q~efa~tfon. ~(~~e'.sft7~* *** --~- ::;/,. ', ',:* _* ::: _*' . -~_ 0: *, ,;*:::. *... ~,:-~<\;;::*-,}:, :. :.. . )~\;\
- J!]lUREG,. 153 7,.Part~,. Section. 2:5/urther. states thatt~e review sho~za,<J6njirni".'that tHeinformation/.'i -:~
- . }~te's.~~'ted ~a~/b_~?n'6fi~i~edfr~:,ji s9,~r9~s,: di.~adq_~atct :;/pealbi u'ty *an4J~ cO,h~~#eik~it~:'.~t~~r~~~lia~J.~::f
,. '. . . * . *,:~'datci su_ch astfiefiifal safety:analySis'report (FSARfof:a_ n~arbj; nuCle~rj)(JWer:p/ant-":*'.**,;: . . : : .. *..<_:. /
- .-~==*- ...-.**.* **-*- .-.-..O".....~
...._,.-.-~~*,,-,~-::- -;*--,'!-.--.,...,;--=:---- * - ~-,...,--~.- --.*- *o *':*-C.~---.--.;::.*--..~-:.-"**-::-.- *-~- _.-,..,,_._:,. :;-?,.,,"0'.:"'r--;:*.--~-..,- ""'"'"<"".~~,..--,..~"'="-~~-".: .~::-.-,,; -.F-*-**~*:.-~*---:"'.:_**,...-*- *- "'-~*:.~ ._*~- .......... '°'.~ ~..,.,..,,._.,,
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Re uest for additional information c*RP.ri5~1:~i':NWMi?k4R: ;s~~ti~ii 2,.S:T3,* ,;t~;.:iir6p6grdph');.ii/Fd:S~iis:~7BoQ~~lfd';;iziY,:;;:;t"ate}.iif}ii~ef~;~i* d;~-;;;~;
L . . '* .. Xof the cou_nt;I coritain weil d(!J?elqped C,ave.and sii1,kholf!form.ations. fSAR§ection 2:5:'2;"3; *.: :. *. . '. :* -~
l ** * ;;'.'Mississipplan:AgeOsageanSe'fie~Bur.firigton Formation," references.a report by Tep:acon . *
- i i, . "~ ' .:'.(;onsµltants, lnc.':{Ferracon) tfiat ~'tates that "no .cay~'s or sinkhol~s are known to exis~ dt:. arepubUshefJ(
i* _: . .*;*.*itt~ f!X,ist ~ithin _aP!{t:o.x,iin,atdf ,f "rnt!J ,of;fthis pr(?je$~si(eJ.'.:* '. Hqll!iYt;~*riyerat areai_*of}m/J~n: k<irst :*~.A
~::.*.:. i.c. *.;.:'i~.""~~~;~{1J{~~~-~71;~~6:.~~i:;c~;. ~,,.~;.~:*~~~i~~-*;:i;; .;~s:;:~-~.::.<Ji~>~iL~ ;."::,~L~:~~::~[~:~~.:,:Li2..,~*:;).'.;.:;/I;iK~~~t;~:-~:;:;;;:i~-~;,:~:~
- RJ.\l '?
- 5~1 a F<J..o.r,zfirm by refef,f!f]pe~ or 4nvestigdtio.1!_t~at no. new sinkh<jJeformation~/1,Cive aeveloked lj(theproject ..: *if
' : '*'.Site s(nce the T¢rtqconpreliminary'reportwas issued in 2011. * -* .. . . ** * **
- t -,,, --- ~~-: --- -- >>' .:*- i!~<--~....--. -..,.- -___ .:__.,______..:,.:=',_-__*.,. - "'-"'-'" **- _:.. ';'" :.. - ~.:.-.., -.~*:~~-~---~.. -*-_-.-.. ""'--<::'..-=..;.-_.'.~.:;'.*~--- ~!*--:o:--,,,,>-:--..,-:-' ~-..,~+- --::."'"""'"'-.,,.-~~... ., , , ,. . ___ - ~" ., . .. ,:._...~. .: . . .h-:,,
< . -~~.. :*~~"":"-~ *,. ;: v _,.-*~-* .*-~-~-
'.No sinkholes have occurred at the RPF site since the Terracon preliminary report was issued in 2011 i(Terracon, 201 la/b). The most recent study (Boone County, 2015) shows that the project site is northeast tofthe nearest areas considered to have the potential for sinkholes. The most recent sinkhole occurred in ;
1 May 2014 and was located on East Gans Creek Road, approximately 1.17 km (0.73 mi) to the southwest i
- of the RPF site. ,
j *- ~- --- c*-*-* * """-"*"'** -~~*-<*._.,. ___*.- .. --.~*-~ * ._,....;:.,;'*1**-,..,-"'-;~~'-~ * *----** - * -=..--~-'f-.-..~-.--=----:C-~-- .. -*...,.. *- .--~....,<-** *'-*.--:;""-~~~~..._._ .......:.*.-*.* .
~-*-- -...:...*'-i;--.'.,;;.<~*_:,;_,._;._*::...... -'--*:-**r~*'":-'-"*.,_,::-"'..:c.;.. .:~--'-*-*..,:.-: ...._._......__.:-",w-.*
- RAI 2.5-1 b 'lc;I,arif.y alfd iqentifY mea'sures tQ, b~_taken to prec/uefe potentially detriinentdlffffects ofsinkhole * ...
- ;
- . - . . . ;l[o'r,rilati.ons on tflefq,uriqatiofls'in il:!f!Juture.. ....... ' : :: " . ' : ': . ..
/~.... ~ .,,,.: _;_ *** ... ---:.*. -..,,.....~-~.,,!~l:c_-:/ * ~~:.;--*::;.,*r**~---<J*. *l'; -~... ~~~..,;-~\ .~/~**~.-*~.' ._., .. .-,,.~*.~r,* ,;,;,_Fzt,:!',.,,:., ',,._-,.,.: .**~.*-:. ****-'C-:"~,!...,-~~~;.,..* ._.;.+.<<?*....**:':-~.,,*.,,_.~ :.-**. r.-*""-.-'-*'""1-~">J,>>. '~r-
- A site-specific geotechnical investigation of the RPF will be conducted site to ensure that the area does
,not have the potential for sinkholes. If the investigation does identify the potential for sinkholes, the
'.design would incorporate one of the following alternatives: (1) excavate site both vertically and
'horizontally to remove that potential and backfill with structural fill, or (2) install piers to bedrock to
- '.support the substructure if a sinkhole was to occur. If one of these alternatives needs to be implemented,
)t will be determined after the geotechnical investigation is complete, incorporated in the final RPF
- design, and presented in the FSAR as part of the Operating License Application. .
{'.*:*iM1*2:5'.~~"?wwf?/?~_s;~ti~~~7f5._2J:*,,fi~T;i~biizf;Xi;~~i"o?~;;rs;~ff;?i$iiJ;;;1"";tiii;;;**/;;p~((t'kiz~'-'i'iiigh/y~.~;~;f
- - * * * * . * *. ** ;"plastic clays:that exhrb~t volume change 1111th variations m moisture are com,r11_onlye1J.counter~d near * *,
. . . * * : 0 ;~he ground 8urfa~e O'~rr'a_coh' 2p1j/:~'~Tbis: stateme11,t i!i i'.epeated thre<i.time~ in this P$AR section.* *
- .. ; ' .lA,dditional-ifzjo~l!lati_im)sneedecf/o p~eclude*adverS,(effici~ of thispf!~riomenon oil strncht(ai .. * .
- r* , .',*\~4un,~ati~ns..'),~;~<*,.:'*".: : .-\"'/;'.'.'f * * *,~ ,:<':<:: * . *:" * *~::;:,\/~" : *: .,: :J_~:":::: _*... _ . .
- i ** * .... nqarifY anymeasiires*tobe talafn*~opreClud(f adver~e~effectsofthis phemimenon..on.the.~tructural ;: ,
~ ~: . . -* .,. ~.Jt~~~~~~~~~~~-"L~~-:-~~-~~*.~_,: _ >.,":~~.'::.: * . : * . * ?-. ; ....... :* * < *. * *. *: ....*.:" ": . . . *.
.A site-specific geotechnical investigation of the RPF site will be conducted to identify the site-specific isoil characteristics. If highly plastic clays are identified at the site, the design will include excavation of ithe clays and then backfill with structural fill. The structural details will be developed in the final RPF
- design and presented in the FSAR as part of the Operating License Application. ,
f-. -~-- 4 ***~_;.... _ _ . . . _ _ --r-,<-:-""'* ,,.--=.... "~*-=: ~----- ..._ -*--=-~~ *~*?-:~ '""- .* ""'-"""- ...
~"'*-*"<<*~-*-.o.:..-~ ~:~::..;..~*-- . . . . *** '":--~;:;~-.._ __.,. .;;::.;p-:-:---........ . ;:,.:. . . ,_.,__;....** **~.,.;....;;,..~-.--=.1-:0..,-.......--:--~ ..... ..;..~, :'.'°":<"""""---;;-_-"'*"- - .. *f
-~-**~ -~-:-~ *"'-:~
,! .f{AI 2.5+ .,NWMI PSAR Sectign 2.5.3, OnS1~e,S01! Types..... stqtes,t~pt: . . : . *: . * . . . ".: .* . .. , :
, . **. . . :.'.: >,~ S~ils with moi~iure levels ~b<?~~J~~ir measu~ed#~.~ti<; .limi.ts l!lciJ: be pr~ne,to ruttini'and can .. : . ~*
- " * :... * > i},*:~ .develop' ./iirstd/Jk(sub.*grade::condi'ti~hs durin'g-ge.nir;al qonst/-µ¢tf6n'.op°'errit/ons '(!'eAa(:oii )0J.1X. *, . *j
'*:+!:*lt}.*'JfNe~qt~~*~?il~.{~hJ:/~~~.~itfic?C1~~,;~~r,~:<?.~s~1,'l'~if~r;ff</jsiii;:~u~h}t~Mr a~i._~~~~C?:~~{~ffi;i}:<:~:r~:as'~*:t
. * * .'* f,f :;:,.:* *expqn,srve:'w.r. :~'swelfmg sorls., '*i'~: ;Footings, floor.;*s.labs,. qnd pa\!el'J]ents. supported, on expansrye-: . -:*.I
. .. ,,;. soil often shift'itpwafd or downW,ardcausingpo:Ssible distortiofis, '*cn:1cking or Sthj.Ctural damage:. :*;:
' .. . * !Addi~on~l inf~rma~o,n: is needed.~n ~e~sures to preventpoteniial sh-uqtur,~l d~mdge ofth~ foundatio~ )
.,~i,~ifl~iiif~~~~~~~,~,5~~~~:1~f~fi~tt~tt::::'._~1 A site-specific geotechnical investigation of the RPF site will be conducted to identify the site-specific *
- soil characteristics. If highly plastic clays are identified at the site, the design will include excavation of
- the clays and then backfill with structural fill. The structural details will be developed in the final RPF
- desi~n andprese~ted in th~ F_~~ as p~rt- oftlie_<?perat~~ ~~~ense ~pplication.. . ..... .
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- NtmlHWtSTM!m;Atl~IOP£S f::'.'kAi7:~:5~::r111trf@fiSJM.seBilbli*'i5Y4f~t'siis~ilbfi:kit'il*Js~'h!8'.:a:u&tirii'hJJ'P~l'6raltt~tif1ii~rii11iei~rifi.~ii'llill'giJifuJe'r1 f ,:' ., :Z ': * : i1~'rJu~it~ b~ larger°tha'n J:O tn table ;ids,, ;~~c~raJ'lff.{i;sbuf{E/:ir_thqu~ke 'Jii~tdry, ;i/J/'{equtr4,cf6y. ~
- i. **-:: s-Request for additional information
'.WREG~1537,.'Pdrt":J, Section 2:s::3.,<'."SeismiC1 . "Tlie:laSi !Isled earth ual(c;:.withinan(fude"#.*6;,~- . . -1:
1 b~LliJG&fJ~~J~~~~i~ifii~lii.'~
/-
!PSAR Chapter 2.0, Table 2-28, will be revised (as shown below) to incorporate earthquakes since 2002 ;
,with a magnitude over l.._. _
- 3. 0.
__.._~,__-.-.-..,,..,,__....,._-...-. ......,._.._._,_,...__,,"l"_.,_"<"'.. .._,.......__,,.~,_,_._,..,,,.~-"*'--*4~-_,.., _ __.,. .. ~,..,.,_,..,..~~*...,,.._**.-,~"'""*"~...._,.,._._,.,,.,__..,.... __ '"" _ _,.,..,u.,-..._.,.~~-.=.. .... "*'----'-~"'~""°""""""'.......,'....,,._,..,,.~"""""""~~~.,....,.. "!
Table 2-28. Recorded Missouri Earthquake History (3 pages)
' .* ' ' " . ' ' ' ~*
Recorded damage 12/16/1811 j NewMadrid ' -- - ' - -J*t1M:hhtl. -* *- 7.7-- *-* \Ge~~~ted~~t'\V'~~~~~~ili~M'i;;issiwiruvercausingmajor (1811-18121 Region, Missouri i !;flooding, high river back cave-ins. Topographic changes affected series) ! j ,an area of78,000 to 130,000 km2 (30,116 to 50,193 mi2). Later
!geologic evidence indicated that the epicenter was likely in
!, jnortheast Arkansas. The main shocks were felt over an area j !covering at least 5,180,000 km2 (2,000,000 mi2). Chimneys were l !knocked down in Cincinnati, Ohio, and bricks were reported to
! * !have fallen from chimneys in Georgia and South Carolina. The
, I !first shock was felt distinctively in Washington, D.C., 1,127 km I j !(700 mi) away.
!~~IE~f~f~~JIS1[~~~~2]
2/7/1812 l New Madrid, I 7.7 !Three main shocks reaching l\1MI of XII, the maximum on scale.
(1811-1812 ) Missouri l !Aftershocks continued to be felt for several years after the initial series) I ! !tremor. Historical accounts and later evidence indicate that the I ! 1epicenter was close to the town of New Madrid, Missouri. Tiris I ! !quake produced the largest liquefactions fields in the world
-*~*-;';l-...,~"'7'~*"'".;;..:;"'-';.<-0...:.,:.;:,!;<';:','F7.:;~-,-* .;:..;,~~~::......;..l.,~,=.=~f"~"'\";!f~".;"';,,~_-.:.:.:~*;;:,-7".;v_:z*;,;:ff""~"t...-.....-.;..~':":-<::~:~-f';:.,.;..;i:;.:;_-c ~":;:..rz-;.;~=-~~~,;~;..:,;:;;::;<ff;"(-:-;";:j::(.~:.-~--:~~.;.'-C-":'f~~*::-'-,;.,;:c,;.,~..:.-~~~-~*..r~.;.j
-: . l/4118ll-3 * *lhi~ 0 '*Ne:wMadri!i;\~; .;j .*Not;Jisted, ~11CrackoobhimneY,,s and*:.wailsfo:Memphfs~,1fenilessee' :a.net:'['..*_: *:,:, ~1
'I-~~It;~",'~1Ii':~fi~tf;
., . ,..,,. ,, .-*i"' *'**.* . _*,.,,, ,, ,,,.,.;;.:-./ *:.....
':'~~1*:~~4i~~~~~~~~~1
,-,.~- ![ *;, ,."*"' :., **. *"*
.. 1;md1cateo.lli8,t.two:huntersr,:were ,dfowneddunng the,formation of aj 1
jt'::~fi*IT~S'2EJ 4/24/1867 !
I Eastern Kansas 1S~t:J~:~~~:17~!~~¥:~R~~JE:Z1
, Not listed . !Reports indicated that an earthquake occurred in eastern Kansas l land was felt as far eastward as Chicago, Illinois. It may have been j l !noticeable in Columbia r~~~~r~r1~Y~~~~1u 15 of 96
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'*, ~~..~'!:
- fJDRTIRV£STMIIllCAl ISOT\WU Table 2-28. Recorded Missouri Earthquake History (3 pages)
Location 1~1@!.li@M Recorded damage 10/31/1895 Charleston, 6.6 :Largest earthquake to occur in the central Mississippi River valley Missouri :since the 1811-1812 series. Structural damage and liquefaction
'phenomena were reported along a line from Bertrand, Missouri, in
- the west to Cairo, Illinois, to the east. Sand blows were observed lin an area southwest of Charleston, Puxico, and Taylor, Missouri;
!Kentucky. The earthquake caused extensive damage (including idowned chimneys, cracked walls, shattered windows, and broken
- plaster) to schools, churches, and private residences. Every
!building in the commercial area of Charleston was damaged.
- damage. Near Charleston, 1.6 ha (4 acres) of ground sank and a
- lake formed. The shock was felt over all or portions of 24 states
- and in Canada. Ground shaking was recorded along the Ohio
. ;River Valley.
[_??~~i:;*-~~~~~"?:~~~~aJ?Fu~~:**:*;;:~:I*~-:-~~~'.fo_i~j~~:f{~~~~:!~~~,~~:~~:=-~:-~---* ,_._ ~"--- ~ _. ~-~ _* _:?J 4/9/1917 St. Genevieve/ St. Not listed ~A sharp disturbance at St. Genevieve and St. Mary's, Missouri.
Mary's Area, !According to the Daily Missourian, No. 187, dated April 9, 1917, Missouri /the earthquake was not felt in Columbia. However, on the
~following day several people reported feeling the shock and
- attributed it to an explosion. No damage was reported in
!Columbia. Reportedly felt over a 518,000 km2 (200,000 mi2) area
! :from Kansas to Ohio and Wisconsm to Mississippi.
- 5f'i11~20:*'.;fMi~;;;i¢~~~.ii1ifi~i~';r-*NJt:li~1~J1:]Tiri~**;;th4;k~F;~;r~&~"~hbp~~~1~~s:;~;~~~~si~i~~r(~iwb"*11
- .* * . - . *: . ; ..., shocks were felt m Mt. Vernon, -Illmms, and three were felt m
- l
- * * ' Ji."::.:'.*. * ... ~:!G~~~a; lllin.?~~* Th~ ~picent~~-~?f thi~ t<,?filiqu*~ is unl~o~" .* J
- . ' * ;, , ** : 1 ~d i& f4oughtt,o pave oiigitlateg east of Columbil!Jn Illinois. In *1
,, * ** * * . '>>ithe Evening Missourifil4*No. 29:7, dated May l; 1920, th~*U:S.. !
...*,*~, . .~;'" :,'i; Jr>>7eatne,~ :~ure~~~ep.o~~4:~t}n~r ~hbck .~~s riot ft<lt m:Cd~~bia,,';j
- . :, *>'However, ma later mvestigat:J,on a few p1<ople' reported feeling a .. *.!
- ~w- ..,.;....*,**~'**~*:**> '*' ,,:~~~- ..;,~.,-.,)~!~~!..~~~~~--: :..;;;.~. ~;:~:,*.' .~.~.~~:-'. . -:. ,,;,;~" *.. ,~,,~,.. ~ . "....~,.,,.,. *j Listed as !At nearby Charleston, windows were broken and chimneys strong :collapsed or were damaged. Similar effects were observed in
- Cairo, Mounds, and Mounds City, Illinois, and at Wickliffe,
- Kentucky. The area of destructive intensity included more than
- '596 km2 (230 mi2 )
[" .~...-.~*.,. :** ..--:~-*-*,- ***~*-C~"',"' ..;*....~,'"~'**if""'~ '*'j-:' -*.,,,~~.*- i"**i;c***** ,*. *****:**F-...,,. : o**~*'**' .... , *.~ .*. 'e**" **---~:*,,** *-'.*o;*****' ,"., ,.*.;;,.*-..,. .., ..,, ~* ,..,* .*.. *.
111/2~/19.3 9 *i~ <<. ~es~~m. Illinpi~ ), Nci(liS!~d;**:);An ¢ar:Qtquak~ oc6ITT,e4p~ Redf3_ud, J~ois: 'afid, a repqited *
!. ' ;: ..~.: * * *.;;MMI'.ofll was n~cor~ed .m _Columbia, 1\1.issoun:*The ** ...
! '*, :'approxitj:Jately distance from the epicenter* to Columbia W<l!' >
L :. ~;.;:~..;.;: _:. ~J?~~-~J!~? miJ._'.c . ,,:"~~: *:._:.; .* .... '. . * *
- __
3/3/1963 ; Near Menorkanut, Not listed 1MM1 of III was recorded in Columbia. The approximately Missouri ; /distance from the epicenter to Columbia was 317 km (197 mi).
r*i&2i/i96s'r*E:~it~rlrMi~~;;~*.'.;r* 'N6ni~t~;~011R1Mi'cirV.*iti;cb1~bii:sfh~:;p;t~~*J;~-ar~~~~:frQ;*ili~****~****q1 L_*~_*_:;'
- ___._*~: *:' .*;:. > >>* **** Jiepicent~rtoCoh~:mbiawas 163 km)(lOlffii).. * * * .** . *. j 16 of 96 I
.:;~*~~:. .
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- ~;~.~;~:. NORflfWIST M£DiCAl ISOlDPCS Table 2-28. Recorded Missouri Earthquake History (3 pages) mm. 11/9/1968 i Location Wabash Valley !
IM[.!1il@N 5.4 \Strongest magnitude in central U.S. since the 1895 earthquake.
Recorded damage Seismic Zone, ;Moderate damage to chimneys and walls at Hermann, St. Charles, southern Illinois ; St. Louis, and Sikeston, Missouri. Shaking was felt. Areas include i all or portions of 23 states from Minnesota to Georgia and from
!Pennsylvania to Kansas, and in multi-story buildings in Boston,
- ;Massachusetts and southernmost Ontario, Canada.
~-"":'-~- -~~-,;:;:; ~--*-**..:.;~:~:ir:*'C*:.~-:~* -~ ~~ -:*"-'-~:*-, *. ~ *"'--:-~~-.:-~-r-~"" ----.,.,7;*..;.*--~:- ~;,__.,_:.~f "':----~*.:...::-:~..":-.::-7:*'-:*-*---9-*~r .:.--;:,;.,~ ._, """~-::, ........,,.,..,_. ;,_.,,..,7.,..~ -'"';-"*;~,'.*.., -""*, - : ~-~--~,::;;:"f~--~;*.--*- ...~:....;-.:..:~,,.,.. -~~,..,... .:.*, *---*-=: ~.;::.....-** *,,.: ""':~' . . .~*-1
.: .* :* . *.,:if*il
!:'., .'. }~.~r .. !.'.~a~asJ;i:Y@eyS:H " *: . ;~:o *1 ,:*.*:~,~hi.~~ys.aiid:~liq~*feW;1Jll~~~~o:iwd pipes:~~~r't\,~~~geW,.~d .. *1 Se1snuc Z~p.e, near. ;i . * . < . * .*. 1;s1d~walkS ... *. and stre.ets cra.c!(e~. ma.. }~st fo. 11T Cities IQ: Illmo1.s;* .* . 'l I :,>
- t.
, . *.: :; , Olney, Richland, ;\
- d *
- JJndiana, andKe~,tticky. Shaking 'yas felt.m 17 states, from... . ***1
- 1. *. :}!J~ounty,SE;.lliiiioi~*;; *. ~.:::*. * .;:Pemi$Ylvamato,Ifansas~dfronrAlab@ia:t9Mwtesotaanp * *.*
L .~~:._:~.:~--*~-::-~-:-. *____ :-.....-~... ".:_~~:.:,'.,_:~--.--:~.~~--~.-J\~?~~~~0 ~,~~-?.? ~~;~--~-:-~:<** -*,~~~---- _*-- ~:~; _ _:__:c'.,2:~-- *. _:_ _!
2002 l Wabash Valley l 4.6 1Moderate earthquake caused chimney damage and cracked
\ Seismic Zone, ; !windows in and near Evansville, Indiana. Shaking was reported in
J Indiana l
- F8/161'.foo:t{*~*20 bri'.WN\V~rt- ~'"3~7:"**:-~*':1~~;tj;k~;gg*'d;;;i2r~p6;t~r:-:---' ~~y:(*'*:-'*:-*:*:~,~---~-* *-'.~~~: . . .,-. . :*
i---.~-":L ______J_t:-~~!~~~~-~P-~---~r-.- ~"~-=---* _(_ .. -.*-~n_:___ ~----~:.-----~"_:_:_: . .~;~:-- * * - - - ***: ': **
5/18/2005 I Missouri l 3.3 !Minor quake, no damage reported l:?J1i.£.£?,~Jc:---*~~-. ~~i~~~=::::1t~~*~1I~*~-~J~~~~g~~~~?~~~~~;~r?~~~~=:==-~~::=:~~:::*=~0c~~~~-~:::.~ :*~--J 6/7/2011 I 18 km NNW of \ 3.9 !Minor quake, no damage reported r'9/1i2io'i
- Potosi, Missouri .
l't~*:22k;~-~;~:-r**~*~-3*;-*~***1:~~;-qJ;;k~;:;~~g~r~~~ed*=~:**~-~=--~=~~-~-:.:*~;-*- ~*::*~~- .
L..__ :~~~:_,___ :J.~P?~~~L~8!-?~\~---~ ~--* ~.J: ~;:.,__ :*: :* :.' ___ :._~L:~-~--~-i:_:~~~*~L:~-;~~- ----=,_:._;~*=';,_.._<~~: ___ _
1/16/2015 : 15 km N of ! 3.5 ;Minor quake, no damage reported
- Doniphan, Missouri 1 .
r10;i6/2:oj'5' :""'..'14'kili'NN\V9r-7r~~*"":']";2".'=~*'"~:rfyffu~;q_~~:~;-~;e"'~e~~ited: ., .
I_ .* "'"';,.,~_.-.,:#??~P,~~;-~~~?._~,}.-.---'":~*~--~-*-J,*,;:. ~; .: . ' . , , .*. :....
7/5/2016 ; 6 km SW of i . 3.0 !Minor quake, no damage reported
- Caruthersville, Missouri Sources:
USGS, 2013c, "Three Centuries of Earthquakes Poster," pubs.usgs.gov/imap/i-2812/i-2812.jpg, U.S. Geological Survey, Reston, Virginia, accessed July 23, 2013.
USGS, 2002, "Earthquakes in the Central United States 1699 -2002," pubs.usgs.gov/imap/i-2812/i-2812.jpg, U.S. Geological Survey, Reston, Virginia, June 18, 2002.
MU, 2006, Missouri University Research Reactor (MURR) Safety Analysis Report, MU Project# 000763, University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri, August 18, 2006.
USGS, 2016, "Search Earthquake Catalog," http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/search/, U.S. Geological Survey, Reston, Virginia, accessed October 7, 2016.
MMI Modified Mercalli Intensity.
17 of 96
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.:...:*~** *!=*
~.:"!: ' NOffOIWCST MfmtAl ISOTOPES Request for additional information
' RAl;2.:s~. !~1¥MI ft,~; *s~i:tipn li;o/*'~VilJ~qtory;G'foundMotion'. *':'st~Y~stitat(he *seismtq desfgifparamet;r~f()r:i
- . . * :;the proposed project are *discussed in ter.ms bfthe 20I2 Inteifz,citiona!Building:Code (J.BC) and*: * * . (
. . .... 's associatedstandatds..Later.disci.t$sions in tlJif section r{!fer{o.tfie 20Q9 !BC iliJfl.Amei:ican SoCiety of ..:.
- .: :. . !i<JtvilEngin<}_ers, (:fJ.SCEf 7~0.5., :wit!iqytqny ef!j;lanqlicJfziA(fd{tlonal iljforma(idf/.:~s.ne,eded, to resqlve,. tfii&,~
,*. ,,apparen'fdiscr:epancybeiw~en}BC2012al1(1JBC 2009. * .' ,**:.. . '. * ",. ~ -.. * * * * * * '
. . ,. _ ~>~!E~~~~J~:f!!!!E~ti,BJ:l?.2!~fr;E~!121 ~ilf~,Ii~~~ll:*fg/.~~¢zggg~~. :}:2t:,*:**
The correct reference is IBC 2012. The 2009 IBC reference callouts in PSAR Chapter 2.0 will be changed to 2012. ,
)."'"'""'."""'"'*""*-7,*-*,_;,*n -*~* ~~"'v"e J'"i<:"".-".'t*"'*-'~\"".::..;~:;.-.,,;£""': '.*""" ..,.,.'.. -"",":*~~*;**.<,**, :--;..~-~.7'.""~t* -***-' ;"'°P':'c:;'*A('*""'""7 '.
~'~'."';""C'~-)<*' "~"""""1*~,,t:*'=_,,., ___ .,..-""* :1'Y-;;'i'if--*-;,;:c>;.;*.:.=~~;;~*t\'~"'":"~-'"'*";/~*,'.'-';l<'*""'; *.':- ;"-**.:,~-~-~7:;;-~--~.:: ,"'~:_,-,.,., ..,. **'",...**'-'"
- i * ~l~~.5-6
- .f!'fUREG 1537,, Part 2, Sec(ior~ ~:5, .*Geology, S~ismologyand,GeqtechriicalEMineehng. *~tate.s th,at
- J
- * ** * .
- ,;Ct~e* inff
- !f"!ation onpo~f!,n_tial§eis~i¢.effect<should b~ ih a form sui'.qkle f?,r: d<!VelopfJJg de1igh, b.a~is ilJ ~
!, .: .;: :* *'!iG!Japter 3/orthe;SSCs, qnd::x:*this;,i11fo'iynati()ii.pr~~entedshouldbe obtain?d]i:,om soi,trc:¢S,;0fade;guate, f
", . * *.:lif <laiiJit,jty,':*~hllii':C'b~~isten'i' lliiiit,rjt'he'r ffii~ilab le* a~{~,' '*;~ch,:9f *1qt~:/r~>>i *(ii~ :tJS,GS.or%'ihe J7$(JR. *ofd~;
j . *. _"l:m;qrbyri~clearpowerpla~f"*., >'.'..'.'.* "\. * <\ .. >.< ....~*.,*. ..: . :> .. * /' > .. )
- , .*jfiwMJ'.fJ~Sl9,tJ9ii *7. ~~.~'.;::J.':Vfbratory <Jr~~,fiaMotr(;,ri;.ii~idt¥s that 5'.J.orMf!facilit,ie's::~he*-Wii'!BC. ;,j;
. *:,lfds been,]eviei.( as*the req_uired bui(ding coiJ.e~. Therefore, the>seisniic*d,esign pararheter,sfor the . '.' ' ',;:
. * 'proposeq,proj<!ctafe d{scussedinterf!is*ofthe 20121BCand Cissociated:standards." .: ... , . * . , *:
- *~'.
- ;,~:*,7:,*., ... ~*'::)J. ,* '*,*,,.'\_<'~;*'* / .*'{~"- ,'.,~.;:*',,d',, *,-.J*~,'*,.,::, *;*'" _:,:::,< . * ,',;:!\~:\,~~;,*/:~,,*,,'.~-'/"l, c~.' <i*o<_;~ \::-?::>'L.~ ' .'-"~\:,,:' .. ~ ,:*,>>,J '! .. *
. :* .: * .rf/o.w~v?J!/f,he flni:v.ef'rsity ofA;fissoti~iJ?.es~(lJ:(;h ~eaqlb* (N.(CJJY9* 'and, C,allaway;N;ucleat'Plan{'Y,hiqh'(s1*
~: ' '
l ,*.
. ', ji11*;~hepr9ximity oftheRPF.~ite; a(fqpted ~fl~ seislliic re:Spon~e.sp~~traprovided by}lkCJRf!gulatory " J
- " ** * ;{iQu.ide f6,_0; "Desjgn Re,~PP/}Se $p~ctra for S,e'ismic-'Desfgn ?fNticlea,~fower- Plcjnts/' afzif adj11,sted,to .
- !
\,,,
.;: 1f.~.(Je~ith~J§t~oun4accelerli~on 're!JJ.ohse :qj~:~'g_:, :\'7'.:; ': :: *, 't *."'":'.:' * ;: > * * .t;'* , ** ::*'~i; . **':;' *:2 : * . i~
iiNWMI P$AR Sectjon 2.} 5, ..'.'Maximum Earthql(ak,e, Potenti(ll, " st,ates that Boone County )V01fld,be . t iiSeverelyimppctedby a' 7.6jnagnitude ea~thquake :with the epicenter.on or neatihe New Madrid" ' . . f c' ' ... 1'.8:~1~1riic,~dn~, 'W.i(h ar/ ~~ilrt;afed ~nl~h~ify. ofVII at ¥e",sife,' li$,. ~fihw17::6~.: Tab ,~:3.:~9,, ""Pfo}edte~ ~_1:;'.'.-'" : ' : N
). . . .. *, 1f;arthq11,akf!Hqzq1:d~ for B<1,bne Cou~ty.*:Jnfonnf;ltion i,~ 1:!,¢eqed t<? ju~tify that.f~<!RPJi', ifesign Grf,d its* . : :[
,y ' ' .,;J"seismic.:in}Jut pitrameters*are adequate '.fdpreverit ana mitigate any 'ra8iological releases below the ;; ,; :,;,
1.:~-'o:*:c:~* .. :* __;~'.[~~0 f~1f1Jf~:.OJ!~;!~~i~:~~-:~:~~~?!~:~~~!~if~~jflf!~~:~~-k~r*~~. =~7f:;~:._:~~~.*'.:~::L';:."*:11::~'. .~.~:;\<~~~--.;c:;f
- RAI Z
- 5-:6a >Provide a.n. estim/1te4 maxim~m gr.ound ac,ce!er.atimJ irt{he ,site, corresponding to this irrtehsii:y VII." .)
L. _;':':~:~~**:._J1~b~t,'~~l'fke::'.'.'.' *_. ~..,,::;,, . _"~~~::. ".: <t\, ** . *; ;~>, :. ,,._ ~*: . :* -* <:,. *****-~-_.:.:_";, __::;;~~*h*. :~L::::>.~:-.-*.:~_-: . . ~.: ~-J
- Tue estimated maximum ground acceleration atthe RPF site will meet Regulatory Guide 1.60, Design
\Response Spectra for Seismic Design ofNuclear Power Plants, free-field response spectrum anchored to
- a peak ground acceleration (PGA) of 0 .20 g.
- RP.I 2.~-6b\Jtisi@th~t:th;'iU?_ji~~(tit;~~i~~i~p~~~-,;,~7~;;~~~4~;Tg,;;JTo p~;~7tid~i~iifg--;ie -~i1/;~di~1~fi~~i i * . .. :releases b~low'the 10 CFR 'f'qrt 20 iimits {n'the eve17'fof,an e:Jrthqua~'. * *. : , *: -:*~: :. "',:* : .' , '- -;. '
i ... -'.!.*
- _,_ **,. _,.'_ '< "-=:- -'7* ."".. ~[..,,...,_,:,.. _, * *- ~'...:....:-~:Jf:;,.-:__""; --;-* .,.,-'.~~-~ ._v ...-.:. {_.}'.k""l'. :** *.~ -: * .~ -.-c:~O:..-~-..~.--. ; .-~-.*.., *.,,::.. ::...,.,..-,:* ':- -!1 '-** ....;;....J,~ ..~;,.,~ .-,,...:;-;,'-'*r".'...;: :-,:... *:=--'- *¥*,~*;;:-~ ,;._,.:4;<":~..:.. ~-: ~--'-~".~* r;-~ ,-.-~**-"~~--..._: *~- -- "~ *.:;.,,._.,.:. ""'
0<:'.
PSAR Sections 3.4 and 3.5 provide design criteria and the analysis methodology for seismic events,
- including a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE). The seismic design of the RPF and associated IROFS will ensure the functionality and/or integrity of SSCs required to prevent radiological release below the
- performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61. Additional information on the seismic requirements and
.License Application.
18 of 96
.:;.-.~:.NWMI NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0
-~:~..:~;. NOlUlfW!STMEDICALJSOTOPfS Request for additional information 1The geotechnical investigations and analyses of the RPF site will be completed in the first quarter of I
- 1 2017.
!'.:... rm~~"°'"""""'"''~"'~'"'.,*'~"'"":"*-":'"~'n" W"""~~-~,,.,.,.1== -""""""-.="~'"'"""'.,.~
19 of96
_;***~: .
........... . NWMI NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0
. *. ~~~~! .'
- lt'OlUffl'VEST MrotCAl IS:atO.PES CHAPTER 3.0 - DESIGN OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS 20of96
.:;~-~~'-
NWM I NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0
. ~-~~~!:
- ll0fffHW£STM£lllCAl ISOTOPES Request for additional information
- .. ..:::.: **1wowevei."tfzePofwardtoA111S11ANs2.3~2oflstaies'ihai.; ., - ,-. * .?:'" . <<-** ..'..'-.:.'"':, ... ,_, ,' :*;_\~'
'l - *., ', fl ,: ' \.. - '*,, '. - -" . ,--*. ~" " , - *' .*! . - : . :" ~. . ', ..-- ' '
! *- - -* i;' *' This*:Stdndard i~ a r~fsiori to.ANSI/ANS 2.3.,1983; "Staitdar'dfo~ Estimating.Tof?lado and Extreme' ;.
!-*. : * * ' ,. ,fr~:,, TfitJcff~a~apte~!"sticf .~ffu5{l'.~r*EP}V~r ~tt~~;,'.' 'fk~~terisj~iJ:.(}[t,he .f.?~3:;s~aiJ,~<y~;begqr!i~-~aj 9f;t,op~~);
j, -.: "*, :, . .Jit/;Jn th1s;_r~y1~{0_i( fhe scope on~e standat:?J ll!Cl;S _expanded. f(J_'.inc_lude _hl{rri~f;ffle Wirid;r;hardctet:{~ti(:S. * ~
- *** * * -* -'1>
- A change lo the Fujitfi damage §calc; as,afunc_tiori ofwinq:velocities, .ad,optttd:in 200? by th~.:, _.. **
'l-'.* ; ,,_' . . !);.\ \N~~?~P} W,e~[~e". Set:v!~( ~efu(t~t/ W-t~f;;w{~~-~f!~,~ a,~sg_~iate,d_l;!'H~:*t~~~f~Jt,{q-~lf'Y~g~ _sea{~~ _ 1
, _. *,;- .
- bemgr.eplacedby the EnhancedFu11ta Scale as_shown m. Tab(e 1-: ~!llso mduded m the scop? - - - l
- _, ;': expan.~ion is1he.applicabilityofthisstan'dardtoall,nuclearfacility'sites, notjust.!ludearpower*-,'
. --:;~;: _pla~ifife~: ._:,-. .-* ..:_,-*_. __ :~,:** "-;--',>~, *:. >>; "< ,:*: ,'_ *\:;:-:'*--_.,:.\._ ,_-.~--:\: '::_~:_:'.-.:,, :}
., : . _* ;';ANSJ/ANS'2},-201-l*applies tJ?e same criteria;to nuclearfacil~tie,s wh{!'ther_a prod-µctionfacilifjior_ a". _;
>:' .i _ -'iP:~'!er ~e~~~~r. *:/:_:;>>_* _--~ ;:*.-. *:,.: ,,..::;.'. -.l<~ * : .-: _./*_*:< _. -.:: *.:/-.,-: .::,,,-'.:*:_:, . ::;;.;:" ', _*.-;:\:;,;_,_._* ,_-,,~: }*. :f,
-i':~: ~--'. 1
._ te.s:4R s~qfib1 r2; 1,2~ *;'.'to'rfi4do r6cldin~. 'i';4?~crl~e/~ite -a<i~i?~: ~#~i~/of :t<Jrnaait~i:in'ii$/~t1ii'O~pli1;iC:,: ;j
- fJressure*rJrop, and tornad()generatedmzssile tmpacteffects.
- * :* * :-. .... * . -'
i' * ~ ' *' , * ' ,:* ' , ; " ' _,, > * ! ' ' ' * , ',
- I ' *; * ,> ' ' *~\
, :: * * * -- . *i;T~e.NJ?.f:i§tajf iqentijie_d,tha_t the i_nforniatiqnpr,ovideq'in *T.a.ble~3-J 6": ."Torna_aq. fY.indJ.[ie,<d-~ - :., ', ..... - ~ :
- , ,._ :,_. : ;1'¢h'arac,i~f,istics,_ ""imrJ 3,;,1:7.-'*:Tornado *Wind priv_en /Vfissile CNteri a; differsfforn the ddttiprovf(/ed in f,
.. ,* :: *, - ::RegiJla(oryGuide /, 76, "Design B_asis:Toma,do and '[or_nado1yfissilesfor Nucle_arPq11;er'Pla_njs," _: ___ *..\
0
- ._
- .:,;~ev/s~~n*f;-.f,r?r-f'Je,/o~?q<i£'.iv.i7:z,c/.*yefoc,~ti~i-l11J.'~sf;~,efri~-f!r'!siztr~ d{9P[;.tbrn~q~~$~neig/f4:t;iis:>i,k:_-_-':\;:
- ': .;,velo<Jztie,s, gnd t~e '9lti(uqe ()jau(om()b1le m_1~s1le*slf:ifi.es. - --,;< ;- : ~ * ,_} _ * :.'* .>.: ,;:_: .-:, -', . , .: '.__ - * ,.,* : * . _: ~
1
) 1- ~. " *
- f - - ' ' *,' - . * " * ' .. ' - : ** , *. < '. * ' , ' ' ' ; ,, ' ~ ' , ' ;_
. J*The citedANS/IANS23'-2Qll, "Estim_atihg: Tornado, Hurricq~e and,Exfreme 1,. -~. .. . ..... , * ., * ,**. .' , ** . . . -. . .. . ~ .... *_ .-r , . , _. Str.afghtLine. .- * . . .* .,, ... , * "Wind.*_ , , .* -. * .. : -_, _ ""i
... -.-*\"*"'*-
.:;;chara_ctefistics ___ ..
at
"'*--*-,~
Nucleat,Facility
.. ~- ...,. *.. -... _.
Sites,
- --~-1""**.
"has-not yet ,,." ___
been endorsed~bj;.the
.**.. h-"'-- ~
NRG;:
,.-,~-,"-,,"_-*
and'the: refer~nced
- "'t**, .... ,~.*.,,_,.*----_*-r
-, \
- -tWUREG'-15_20, "Standard Review Plan for Fuel Cycle Facilitie_s LiCeJJ.S¢ ApjJlications," sta(es-that_the' ,
1 tornado ocCJ-11'.renc¢ prob'(J/Jifity be_ijuantifie_ef_by'tlie qppiicanf NURE(J!. J520, Pcu{ $.(lppe_hdix J) __ , _ J
~'*; ,;/~iafe:>;
1\ (. ' (' , . , ._
~'.,)(le,periaifig
'"~:** ,,.,, . , *, <<: _ ,
dn. th~,geog~aph,ido0cati,oil ofifre facitifY'the effli:t§ of f:/toriiado- w#h o:, ., _ - , , * ,,) , ,r . , I' , * , , < , ,_f" * , , , , , . ' , ., , ' ',"*
an *G/1nua1
"<.. -" , :' .: . q, .
- ~
' ' ' ,.iWxceedani:e prob{l_bUity of10;.5 orgfeatermiay.rieed.to be considered:':. ' *. ' , '. I ; ,' :--~<- " ' ;*
~, : " ' ' ~ " - -:
, *.. ' ~ ,. , . ~ ' : , ~ . ' '. .* ,, .. ,, . . .'
--_*- :;\~ince*thej~lflR l1,~~ii~r:d-R!!gulat9b/,~!1~'.{;/~-3<1)~i~,i/; f!,S'.-a ¢~.~~1 i,nfilft/q:f.he ~~,~-nd.:W1,sa~s~,t
~ * *;1(1.lfSI!ANS 2. 3~201 J-haS'IJO_f: been accepted ~by 'the *NR;C, 1ustifjt the us~ 'Of!ornaaC! effect parameters : . -----~
_\,which .are less COflSe~ative than* those provided in Regulatory; Gui de )]6, Revision .I. * ..
,..___ ,_ - --,._..._,.,:~.--.:=.-r.-*c:*;,,".,...,.. *-~,,,__~*?-,"+.--,:;"-.<<*,.,_~ ....,:._,,_.,., ;f* .!. ,,,.-.,,...-.~,,.-. ***.c*:. ,_.,....,, '!'-_,-,_,_.,--..,, <"*~-*~**;~,;;,,-'..-,--- .-r-=-** *..;,_-~ .f"-*;*.,-*.,...,,-..';.~.:!,.~..;,.,._,..,-' '--..-,.-..,...,,,..:'U-iThe PSAR, including Section 3.2.4.2 and all appropriate supporting documentation, will be modified to ;
istate that Regulatory Guide 1. 76, Design Basis Tornado and Tornado Missiles for Nuclear Power Plants,'
iwill be the basis for tornado wind loads and wind-generated missiles. 0 f*RP.rs::z::s~ff!i?iii_?Slffi"s~t:ur~~I~~¥fr::*i'.n¥d::aj~a1J;~:Si"aie~;:~i~;;J;;,;rriii'tiiPtaeg'dttJ:g;;~-::;;b;:~1;;t*:o1-;11~':~~;'~ ~~~~
!1- ' ; 0 ' ::weight ofall mdtenals ofcons(rucfiofl ..... [arid] also-consist ofthe weight offixed*equipiiient,' including
- ; the,weight ofcranes.'! It is ngt appgrent thaithe weight and loading from other*sub-syst~n;s wer~ . ..
1
{ .
!~- !Uncludedinthedea~load. "* **. * "':r,*:., *~ ~*-, ~"~'r*
1
~\ ... _*.,~, ,,'~ ~.":., ', ," .. - .. ..: ;, , ,; 1" ' ' ~ r . -~ - -; -:'- '.:' ' , * '* .;:~: ; " _*'
i- .. -:!This inforination is needed to *confirm 'that adequate .uniform loading is in2ludecUn the dead load to L,~ _-, ... :. , .:*::-l:q,~fPu?:~f~f;/~e P:ifs{rg)qkl~. f,;ayS(~f!b,fe:, c.R1~~-1t~ h~fit!n~, ~v~htii<J;fi,9f1.fn~:ii~t:r:Pr:rJi~~nN1~-(If1(1:-f:? .:; t
_ , r:_duc_t m1d;app_w:tenances._.t1fbmg~ etc.:*_-werght~/n the glqbqls[ructural analyszs_ and the de,s1g11 arfd s1z1ng;
- *: * ;:ojtli<t:-stnit;tufal~leinenis. ._" ." .. ' *, ._._ ... _. - - _ -- _: * .. '-_ ': ..... ._.;* )
- (_**
- **-:*:*"* - ;k;~nfi~tha/ad~q~bte tmijor~i i6a4j~g-ts)ki:1udedifl*the -deadl6aa td_di:cou~tfof'ihe~lping a~dhtluir f
\ " .**,.. -: !jS1ib-s)!steins (Le., c~ble trays, coniil{its,_ Hf/A t;*duc!Wo~k and components, -~bingj weight and)oaaings. ;:
- * ,, 1iiil the design and'sizing ofth{! $lructura!elements.. . . ; _
- ,,. .-,:_*, . . , * ';
- _. * : * -- __. *-__ ._ * -" * -
- J
- , <
- .:_.,..-..:"1'1-':,~*.* . . : -.* i!~-.'~.;...~~ -' r"o!<*~.Z;-:'Y.;._~--;-<;;:' ~~,.,:~:.,_~'-:::*'....!-'~-:-- ..;,~""-*~1,.,._.-;:-..., ;..;.~;.!...:--~' ~~o...,.'";"-~-..-.*,,.,,... ~-* .J-~,._~i.,-.;'.:~ ..,:._,.~.;:,_,\~;,'.,,..:::i.*...,,* :.:~~,:f-'..'..,~.":'.,1~ *,..J,~;."~.~->~~---' .~..-_,,.,:J...,.;.:.:L.(r.. .._*** :::~.f,~;--4-t*-,,*-).:q
!The density of all interconnections (e.g., heating, ventilation, and air conditioning [HVAC] ductwork, iconduits, cable trays, and piping) between equipment will be conservatively estimated and included in jthe final design for dead load for fixtures attached to ceilings or anchored to floors in the RPF. This
!information will ?e pr?vided in the FSAR as part of the Operating License Application.~
21 of96
.:..-.;:.NWMI
.:~";.~~-~~:*
.."!..*:=*
NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 NORO!WCSTMfOfCAllSDTOPIS
__._,___ ._._ ._,,.:. _- *;,_, . *~~~~;;:;~ :*>,,,.:(""~~-~J!~m1wfe:~/~:-;.:'*/ ~ >*: * .. . . --r;~
r* ~*';f~~: *,11ir1!!ZJ?J;I:nt~ta~;~~~i:;J~~i;,:~~%J~~~~;;::1~~~r~1'a9t:;;i~~i~~ns*f~-~~i;'ci;g~i~~A 1
'f . .* . :f, :: watei: d_amage ofthe* sf1-uctitres,'_systems /ind compon.ents as~umedto function 'in {hM)AR. This *,
. ,* *';rfr: ;*: shoul/Ji11clud~i:: and(-3,)' the.impact on.equipmen(iSIJch .qs/cjri$,' *rftq(prs,*'a~d wtve~r:esultingfrom :.;
" ;;- . degradatior{ ofthe eieciromechanical fuhciion
- J'. ,' ' .: .::* ' , ~. -~ *.. _.,'. ':' ' " , ._;, -. ",,;' .. *' , .;;* ' ', -',-' .' -.,. . ' ' ',' ' . '
d~e (o lr,at~r:' ' '. ' .. ".' *< ' i_ . ' ..
.'*:_;~
c '-
. : :/-i;: j
'.:l
".* .,dfU[?EG:.r~n..Pa,r_p,Sec!,io.n3.3;,~:JJ!aterD_amage, ..,:s,tates;.inpqr_t,'.fhat:' *. >'*.*" ;' .\ * :*. *, *:*
.. :* , .:.:::i\\~;\>:. '(if1h~* 1/7ipit~f:tm/hte'mif.~~'iiing/r,~fn<;~s~fn~111;ti'cJii 1~~a:iJ~f{ifht~l~c'tiist11;&~2lor_ ._ _ .,: *,:A
- . * -;;- : 1nepiidn,i~<!1-~q,zfunctiq~:*J~~- io *wa,~er~ (lnax3/ ih~:i~.1Jpapi.~:n*:equip~?~1; sµ_~W:ts Ja~c;,: 1n6t01:if ana* *.),
. .;:,,' yalvesresulti,ngjrom, cjegrpdcitioh of?lectromechan,(c'alf.unction due Jo wat?r. ' : ,,;*: . "' ;' f
"., ,~f:<'.~.-1';; :1*,. : ,:< ~.~.; " ' :*,<< ',,'* *";'/': ') ,, *, ~', ,-fi*: J..;~:* ' !} '. ~,-i,*~>'.~,:' ' ' ': ~!\..,::;.:' ~ " . . *~. , ~ ;~'. < ,' :>.-:~.'; , 'r, ~"'.* ' ' ~; ~'"-:::'.*.,
,_:
- _.' : .: , "/;* '.:*, . :* t ~ (,*1, , . '-'"~,
- ,. )'.NUREff:J531: ~art'2,:*sectioh 3B;_ ;'fTfater Eamage~" 'iftat?~ th~t the,'dreas ofre\Jz.ew include the:?esign 1
.i)pnd defigf!,bases for all stru.ctures; 'fY.stems;. pnd: qr>!Jlppnents that coil{<! be affec_ted by predicted. . .**. *(
,. **1\~jjc/r:q~~~~~f!! .f..?~1:t~of1S,.~~f;~~~;*:1~1::it~te{,~q.~~;~< :,:;/*:J£~:- :: *<*i;'.*'., ;.\;;*:.\**~:* ::.;;,,:~:< . .c[~~'.-~ :. :, ,,ff<, * ~: <;>;i
- . >:: *./ :The,i:J.<{§jgn crit(!ria and designi:sfwit/{jpro,vid,e. r,easonaple ClifSUtdncJ_e that st(ticture.J,; 'systems' and. , ;:
- : i~,'.o compq'1e1JtS.W(!.Uld CO~(jn_ue t(/p~fform f,equired_s~fety funcµon unde_r WGl'." . '.. ,_ <:
i
,. * * \. 11-IWMi FS!fJtsections:'}3:J;~:"FlddtJ;ProteC,tiofl;* '.' *an"tl~:3. 1;11:; i*ft'1dod.Protetti&ri:Measµres Joh:: i': *: * :' .-c.1, I;'*
, ** /structure;, Syste11JS, 'and Componen(s,"" refer* to *:pSAR_* Sec'ii,on>> 2.5. 3,, ."Onsite**soit type:;;,;~ for * ; . . : *~
, 1;additiona/:information onfloodprotection ineasures.'.,Section 2.5.3 of;.the. PSAik'does not contain this . i
~ *., . . .. __ ,~,i'hfarmh,ti~"ii: .-:: *:'\=":*: ..:,;.'.*:~::?'_'**: 't:'.f>_. _"'.'";:: . -:'.'.e. 3/ :_':.*.~}-.' ..*.':~ /'_*~':::* }_ ~;; _:t<<.:, .,,:_.~:*:: "::::, ! .... * :t
- . * .r "** .,,._,-~ ~*"
- !'Frovi(i~*the
- .:-"- *.-<<-.,....,, -.-.*,--~:- ...,,".,..._..,.,
corre(;,freference i'ri, the'PSAR/pr
~~-- _,._,-;5:;.,c~r'::> * .... -~-,~*~>:::**-~_.-..$...,,,--*,,.,.*.~'°"'.....,.""°'*~.- .,..._- .- -:*.
ac/ditiom;1l.detailfoi*flo'odprotectio'n measures. . ; . * ,
_,,..""i."I':-::"'-.: --,~_,..---'"":-:--:.-, ,-~~---:-~ ~-~-- ;......"-- .- . -*'":~,,..._-.-*, ...- "':".~"",;-::--:.J~..,..,~ *.,*~-*-* -"*-~--~-...,.~- *'--: --<>', ~.~*~.~_,, ... ..-.,,,, -.,;;-* ---*!:<
'.PSAR Sections 3.3.1and3.3.1.l will be modified to pointto PSAR Section 2.4.3 (instead of PSAR
'8ection 2.5.3) for flood information. .
L~T~~~-~~~1-~lf{f~~i~~~7!i/J%~~~&0~~*~'.~~~~?'~i{i~~F~*~~~~ft'."'.~:E~x::*::;.g~;)~:~~?:~:~;.*~-.~';r~~,:*,:**.-~E:,**{*~;*,::~
l *, . ' ,, . \ ' ' : ,: ' : j,~* (2) (he imp(J.e,(.on systems resultingftO'in)nstriiine,ntatio'h, *atidcontro/elec{tiC,dl or~mechaiiie,al ;. ' t
! , -" *:/- "*-u, \. '*
~ malfunction due to water, and (,3). the impact on e,quipment, such as fans, motors, qn_d valves,:: * .. i I ,, ' >, " *' ' .- * * " ;;. ',; _.. " * .,.,,. ' *' ' f;
- '1
- 1" -. ;,;::: resf,t.ltingfroirJ..flegrada~i~n ofthe*elecfi:qmechanicalfunctjon due fo wdter.; '.*'. ' ' *:;: ' ' >!
'1 ,.,. "'fwuREq1J53t,*?a'ft2;*s~~tio~..~-~?~t~t;1,*1iip~;.t,1h.~t.' f*~,, '. :::'., * * *' *
- j
{ ,*. * . *; in:,.~~,t~e::~~~i~.cr!!~ri'!.CJ~?!;,~~sii;tr~f~u?,~:r1.t?~;~e:t~~~o~agl,~,~f~r<::'~5~~~~~~,~tr:':~tlff¢l1 .:pist~yz~!, G_~d_\J
,, *. * *: J2,, components would continue toperform r,eqwredsdfetyfunctions under.waterdamage conditions .; ... ;
) '* : . ;; ' ' 'jorjhi. de,sign th~* appiicant;#oµld ~~ei6ca/' butiding cod,e~, as qppii~ilble; lb 'help e,n~~e th~t '*.** ' '..~
".* :.;;*. -, *water(d,wnage fO, s(r;Uctrires, 'Sxsi~ins, afid, components a(fhefacilitys~te, 1fou!d*noi cause unsafe. *, l 0
' '*;; _,:., hmetor oper~iion; would nolprevk~t'siiff reaqfbr 'shut(iowh, a~'d'wotild'no~ cause:or alloW: .**. . ::~
- f ;>_ unC01J.troll~d
- r¢/f!t:Jse <Jfr,adiqqq#v~~~qte,riqL ,~ . <<.~ ,. . *, . '-. , , * ~. 1.
, 's J
- ww.M1 RSAR ~ * <~
- Section " ,,.
3.3* c ~' "
discusses.water:d~mag~
' t, ' ' ' " :,<<,' 1' * ~',
~nd' u*
Sections.3.3.1:3,and 3.3.J.4.l I"' '
deal
" ' ""'h ", *',
withjlooding; *
,, ;. ; 1 d,ue tf)Jhalf.urictiqnofthe Ftr_e Protection System; b'ut the NRG *staffcould hotjind.a discussion of the * "
- .-":'. . :_ ' :'8.ffects ofefisc!Jarg~* of the'J!ii;e Proiectioi1Sy$tem.*Qn.strUCtitre,s)systems and*cpmpdnent~. , * .. * ;,':.. .~~
- '\:;5{r;.>.: :*(*:*jjf~is -'~faf~.ati.a~.f:S:>>kil¥d:~6-f!ef~i~N~.: th_~!~d~?i~1~iIAhr~'d~iA~<r~!"b: b,e'fa%~~1~r.f:IJ~/;rqted~?h'.of :[;
'*
- 0 1sens1tive sdfety~related components_ und,e':lh.e iffects of znadv.ertentd1sqhargeofthe Fmf,_ Protection .'1
. J;System Sf!rinkters-br:rµp(1fr'e ofthe 'iiqn'"seisriiic fire prQtectionpiping. as aresifli ofthe postu_la(ed * *<* r
.J~e,1{nJ~~:~~~~:- ~-, -~z:.:~~;_:-~L-'.~- ._ ~*:zr -~, . 2~'- ,.::_~*:~,:~~* <<... ~,:.__ ;: '--*~":,::~':L:~~:~. .,.,:~iL ,_ ,.,,. ;:~.:.-~ ~,::~~*~~~; :. : ~- . -J 22 of96
.:..-.;:.NWMI NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0
~ ~~.:'!;' P4'1mfWISTfJfiHCAL tS'OT09[S
/) : ~13:3~2 '!flro~id~ 1ihf0Yrlzati~;,* disfusstng'mef:t8ureit'b 'i;(/'fiticerifor. the 'iiiite~tiori'.ofs~hstti~~ saft/if':r.?i~t~Ci :,, '.:* !
- ,i (~ont) 1'.equip111ent under the effec.ts ofina<fYertent discharge ofthe.-Fire'j>rotec_tionSxste,m:wa_ter.
- Request for additional information
. . . *_: * . f
~~.,"_,.::.';',.,..,;.,-.".:.*.-~.,,;.;,:,._-.,-ft~.,.,..~"* ;,;.J~,..~*-,:.,..,,.,_C.'"°$,.\*l,..:._,,'.,:,,,._,.:...,:,;,l!o;<'*:"**.' ..,*>;;-;(..:'~~ J. *,,._,_;;,,,:.~*,,.-'..~,~;,~~.:.~.,..,,~,*** _.c,,_ *: ~"+:-*:, *~"P ,*.~:}."'>I}*~.,;,)-"~,;.,..~ '"**..l..'~;.b,.:c ~.,..,.:+/-.':'-..:.,:,, !"': .,..._*;7"..;,,_**:;5:*.J.,~~;- .1-~-*-P-',.;,,;,_,:!.I.',~,. ,._,_,,.'.,.;;,..__ >~:, *. ' ":'~..,_i.::.,.':,f.,.__._** :;~
)Design of fire suppression systems using water (e.g., automatic sprinklers, hose stations) includes
)elements such as the grading and channeling of floors, raising of equipment mounts above floors,
- shelving and floor drains, and other passive means. These features will ensure sufficient capacity for 1
gravity-driven collection and drainage of the maximum water discharge rate and duration to avoid
!localized flooding and resulting water damage to equipment within the area. In addition, particularly I
)sensitive systems and components, whether electrical, optical, mechanical and/or chemical, are typically
!protected within enclosures designed for the anticipated adverse environmental conditions resulting from
!these types of water discharges. If critical for safety, these water-sensitive systems and components will
- be installed within the appropriate severe environment-rated enclosures in accordance with the relevant
\industry standard(s) (e.g., NEMA enclosure standards).
- Selection of specific fire suppression systems for facility locations will be guided by the recommendations
- offered in relevant industry standards (e.g., NFPA 801, Standard for Fire Protection for Facilities
'Handling Radioactive Materials) and will depend on the level of fire hazards at those locations, as
!determined from the final facility and process systems designs. These final detailed designs will include
\any facility design elements and sensitive equipment protection measures deemed necessary for
!addressing the maximum inadvertent rate and duration of water discharges from the fire protection
- systems. The final comprehensive facility design, along with commitments to design codes, standards, iand other referenced documents (including any exceptions or exemptions to the identified requirements), '
lwill be identified and provided in the FSAR as part of the Operating License Application. :
~-""='~"""'""' ....,,.,.. A: ~"""'~*~*~~
8'.rfilis'.'.St?~:W 111 .:!':~**~';t_~::~J.':>.:')W 7i?'1Y~:. **;~:~~':':f)':*'. :::;:~'(::;:* ;~-~~-'~~:j~~i' i )o/:\13,~~1. *(ilf&RfJJ-;l.~3:.0 Pm:t;i, :s~<;fi~~;*(:~: ;:~f$~isn_ii~Dil_m,age,;_~'.,stfJ;tes'. *~n.part;,/h~.tth~ appltcar;f;shou{tj sp~r;i.fy ~
- .* * * ;(and describe stnictures,.systems and components th(Jt are requrred to mamtam .the.necessary safety: '
, . .... \function,* ifdseisntic event should, oct.;µr:: The r{fqeto~facility seis,niic;_ de~}fjn);houltjprovide rx/a~onaf;le i: '" . ;: )iass,ura~ce thaf'th_e feacio~ c.ould be'SHui dow11' a~d lii~in(iii~ed iri 'a ~afe cond,ition: To \ierifY that .,_ .
- ]' " *1~ei~mic-de~{g~funqtto~~*ar.e met, lhf!_t;ippf!cant,s,flouldgi~f!;(fle b'C1sesfor tec/inica/.spe_cificati,01:zs', * ".**
I: ' * ;!necess.ary tij en.sure operability, testing; 'and irispectii:Jn ofassocipted, systems, including . . *" * *
\'. ' ,\ ' : ** ,*.-' : i~~~*U-u~.ef!td~or1:.~~i{cg~~o/.fa:g~tio{1$; as, qp~l~~f!J?l,e.:: :: ~\ .. ' ";>~>'; : " !,, :*: *:' .,;~ .. , * *,,. J
, . :*NUREG-I 53 7, Par.t 2, Sectio!1 3A, *'.:Seismic' 1Jamage, .states that.the review, should inC/ude. the , .- * '
.!k1~sig'rs* and:desi~ ba's~s ofsfruc£ure~, '*systems,; 'arid. cbmponents ,tliat :a_re .require.a to *ma_intciinfltn~ri()nj dn case ofa seismic event 'at t~efacility ~ite .. The finding required is that the facilifY design should , . \
- * ' , iiJ?.to~ide, reasopable assurcmc~;fhat:tfj~ RPI( cqn'be shut. do111n and main{ained in a,sa.fe.:~01idi~iori. *, '<<~; )
- '!;NUREG-J537;"Part 2, Sectton:2. 5, * ~'.Geo(~gy., Seismol~gy (1i1d*G~~techniccj{Engi1Jf!ering, ,," stqt~:;,: tfr . '. !:
_, ._ ::/part, *ilidt: th~JnforJ.natio~ Jia(been"obtat!1{iifref,~(soufcef6/ailequ._ate'i:r'e~;~*iJ11yµ~a:1.s.-cbiisisten? wii6 .;,
- !!other.qilailtible, data, silch as.datafr.oir/ the USG$ orin the:F~ ofci nearby nµclearpower plant:\,,, ., :,
d_,:/,"***' ,,~."~, ,"'f'.,>r.';, ,'*~:.,,~*.,, *~,'l','.:"~' *':;:o*~*"I' .. '.:*.~*'}'I*<* ::~":.:'*., ':,.~: \'~* <',.'":',.__," *,, '*,_.'::*' ,**.,'.,..'r*:*.~ .:~ t"'..*~,. *',*.,-;*,~.';*''.'*:'.*',;',, '... **.:*,~*~*;
- Nff'MIPSAR Section 3.4). 1; *"Desigit Response Spedra Safe~Shutdown Earthquake, . states~hat: >. '"*
- , , *' '. r' * >' *.' "-' ** *" '", \: ,* ~. ***
- o~"" ~*~~. *',,,,.,., "* '.'*f
)i :.;* The,~afe~~hutdown ear,thqyake }for ~he Rfi'Pfaci{itY js,$pecijieda~ risk:.:tqrge(ed m'qximt,11,n _ .. i:
ii>> consi(feredearthquake (MCER); as d(fterm,iried in pccorrja~ce, with.ASCE7 and;the Federal,* , ;;,, -, :. '~! * ~
"' *. *:;.:> ' I'_ - _ , '{ '*, t' ., , *.
En~e.rge~ey_ MCl/!age~f!ntAgency (fEly,,fA)f,~753.i N,.EH_Rf!~e.cpmm~11,de'fl;§eiS!Jlic.f!r()visiqfl..s.!_or;; )
. '.' r, ' '* " ,. -, *
- o' ** > *, : *. r *- ., '* * *' ' ,'"" " l *, '
. : I,:_
- New Burldmgs and Other Structures. Tfie MCERfor;thzs. site 1s goverIJed;b,y the..by, tf?e probabrils,tic '. ~
- * *
- 1 '. *maximufr!;e,onsidereci?art~<ft(ake iro~nd shhlhnifdw[lich:has.'O.n:anliuaifreqµency.of'ixc"eed,ance<Jfj
- :j~:
- 4xio-4. .*;-: . * * . : . < ; . . * : _' *' * " * . > ' , *
- _:.;. :. }_ / o., :; . .: : *; <*
'* . \iMuJ?R -~md. CdllaW_'ay Nuc'ledrElanfi.which is in ihe'proximi/yojtlie RfF siti!,, adapted the. seislJzic'.>.'. :~<i I,,'
- __ ',. . * .
1
- respon~e _spee,U-a P'lo,viqe{f by NRCf!
- effUlat()ry.GuJdeJ:6Q'. De~ign R~spons_e§pe,e,trafo,t_~eisniic(.: *i I ,*' '1\Pf!sigi1,ofNuclear f ower 'pldnts, '.' and adjusted to 'r,ejlect tlie' ground"acceleration respqnse of q, 2 g. :. ~.
h:-:- ~.....,,-:.*"".',.,...-*~,,.,:: '-* ~=)_,;,,,,,,,.-:-,:-;:,,-,.,:--_- -...-..,_~;:,.- ::.*, '.~-'<::~ *-..--~---~**"" .,.--,,:_~'!._:,._ -.--=:.,.._._ .- ~ .,. i.,;1~ ... ~*-~ ....:~:-....-**'~*""'* -;S.,,;.-* --*~--.'""":- *--.;,~**c .. '--' ~-- *-:*.-.-::**.*,,,....,,.,_ ****:~ ......., ..-.~. *.*.* . .,.._.,.__,,,.. ~, ,..,,._.,...;; "'"'J.~.~o**!~-~:!*..-~- ...,..,...;_J.J.*--*':;
23 Of 96
NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0
-:.. ~13.~:~*. ':'.Pr;ovideju$ti}ica,fionfornot 1/sing_RegUlatory GUide '1:60~pe~tid'adju~ted i~ *efl~ct 'fnifrim~tiJ:*gro~na
-\:. ::~-~co~~L ::i~?=~~'!_j~~~~i°!~::~/~£~~!:~?[:~'!!J!~~1'6~~f!~~~~'!L
- As stated in the response to RAI 2.5-6a, the SSE design basis for the RPF will be the Regulatory Re uest for additional information
- *
- , . . <" ,:;, ** * ~.::"~,:~.'.::~-~~:~::L_._, ..__:',;_~:;:;:--J
- Guide 1.60 spectrum anchored to a PGA of 0.20 g. Seismic loads for the design of IROFS will be derived i
,from in-structure floor response spectra generated by the finite element model of the building structure,
.'as outlined in the response to RAJ 3.4-7.
- (ll~iiitt-q
- 7;p/Qifi/a-:.iJ3?;:7>J;.;:*iIIi~tiafi:2~s::;??i~!i!iY:"7$~f;hi~1,a?:YJq;;J'ffea!i;J;~1-;;;,,£~~;;-;~ffi,;':-~s1~t~;,:,,;*-,::1!
'JU!s 3. 4-:-2 ."part, that "the irifqrmation on potential seismic* effects should b? in a jqrm sititdbt~ for (;/eve/Oping '.. .. }
\ihrf1ugh3;4-!J)~design.'Qas.e8Jn'Ghap(e!f3for~strµctures,.sy,ste11Jsaru/cqmponents!'.'. :. * * . , .. :.;: '""'. *. ~ ,;>. .. i:
- -.-:->:::: :;.::_-: -.- *~...;:::r.:::~. -:-:;:.;,~*-:-:.:. -:.::.-.._~::~~1-::-.:-.r.;:::=:.;;.':~*:::*~:--.:::. ,~..:*::... :* *.--;;::!:'~<<...~:-...::: ~-:..-;.-.;.'.::::*_: ":".":~:.. ::::-~::r: .:-~? ~f:-:':.'.c:..:..:.:,_';,;.-*c;~.':: ~r.!(;:::;: *::. .: -.:.":,..,-;.*.v::::::. ~~.- :-:::.;.**:::::-.;.:.~:::..:-.~;..;,.:;~::;.*.:.::;._ *1:-:. .:.r~*~7~;:.:::::~=:.':: .-:::,<::..':..;:*..-.:f:./"-~~:;':.~'7~,.:'--"~i:*"'t 0
!:.1* RAt* 3.4'~2. NWMIPSARSection 25 6, Vibratory GroundMotion/' states that ."TheBoone County site is a soil . ,
- '" ,-., ,. , If< . . " ' *.- * . . . ' " * ,- . ,-:- .. **,,." :<. *. "**. .., ;;; . :,, * '-... . .,.,, *,, * ". . . '*'* \
~ *.*:7.'.'*,. ~r.'*\ **:'!:~ifeC/~ss*B_.:*;Wfie?mo~iffed:(or~:*Gl(1~~{9-sue.,:._:the:fi':e'.c6eJJ}c!~h,fs:'f.~.ah~f($11J.s,,:<j!/S~f;:v91~rsof~
l.' . * , :;0,34lt;mq,0.223respectiyely(Fa=:J.6.andFv72.4)a,r?o.b{ame.<k. ': '*,* . .'; . } , * .... * ..._: * .* *.)
t :*1*;~*.'~' -. ,* . ,./.: ~ *. :~*.~-":I, , ,'/I~~ f~*"*'*:;'". ' ...'. *"'.:,* . .' ):~.*.~,~. '; .', '*.~ -> .' 'C*::~;' **. -,'., :..*:, *', ,"' ' ; <',; .: * , *'.' ~-'. . * * '**~* :.'** , . 1,.** > ." / ~*: .. ', "l ':" ,:, *_ ,,.: *, ' ' t)
! , . _ . l!PSAR &ction 3:4:1. J~ *~T}eSignRe~ponse:Spectra, 'On Tal}le 3:.22,:7sdfe §1~taown Earthq11;d,ke:*, . : . j, L:"'~,~~J".(~_).. _;J}~r~:~Sif:;:~,~?1:;:~~if ,~i!!ff::!~J!:~:~TJ}J.':J/l;~~~f~~8.:<!JL~~~c;};~~!{i,:~i:i~, Jt,.";~:.~~c-_,_,"{.""_ ,; :~,,,. ,,~:;~,::~~
- .RA! 3~4~?,a
- ~esolvJ~ thelncorisi~tency and UP.date Tab.te 3.-c4°2fon;site c;Jass1Jproperties,,aitd demonStrrite .thata. M
- - _
- _i~.'\~d.. *3~~~f-~~:_:~~~~~:::_af:.~~~~{~;t~,~~r;j~~~a!i.~?~3'"": . . *. )::;,,._, ;:{;-',: . *: . , . . . . ;_::::~;"~~-:_,[:.;\/:.~~
- Tue I
NRC has recommended using Regulatory Guide 1.60 for radioisotopes production facilities (e.g., .
10 CFR 5 0, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities"). NWMI will use a spectrum 1
!anchored to 0.20 g PGA for the RPF design basis. Regulatory Guide 1.60 is not indexed to any specific
!soil type, with its frequency content sufficiently broad to cover all soil types. Therefore, soil type for the
/RPF will not be a parameter used to determine the RPF's design response spectra. Tue composition of
- soil in which the RPF is embedded will be included in the soil-structure-interaction analysis as part of the
\building response analysis. This information will be provided in the FSAR as part of Operating License
!Application.
- Table 3-22 will be deleted from PSAR Section 2.5 .6. In addition, Regulatory Guide 1.60 will be added to l iPSAR Section 3.4.1.1 forthe determination of the RPF design response spectra.
'The seismic soil classification for the RPF site is Class C. Thus, the reference to the Boone County site as)
'being soil Class Din PSAR Section 2.5.6 will be changed to Class C.
IPSAR Section 2.5.6 will be modified to reflect the above information.
~*'*":-':';,-*~;-.L--~.:-:*-~- ""~~,f""'..,._",o:-;7;-1;_.:--.:---:~*~..,,;;~:.- *-:-~~f-*'l"~;.,.,--?*:=- -*~*--~:-:~-*:- *:.*~*..;;~~--~----'r7.,":~:*.-*-~~~"""-""'-;,..>'~'i"..:.;--7:'-':...-"'.:-"......-.-.-::--_-....,,..._:;.-7;,~:?-~~-"""~-~F*"r.,,._,.. __ ,_.'.'"'-:::;*-w.~~~=--"'--*---~7"':-.-_:_--'*-r'*=-:'{
!._ _RAI 3:4-:2,b ;['f.roviilejustiftcationfor.dhe: stCl_~(frtiifnl thqt; :*Th_is saje:...s~ij[dpw~-eart~quak,e spech:'wn)s:5%:;rfaff?ped.:
- 0
- I j *.* *... --e* .: . )jwhic}z; per_-ABCI!J;43 i~apprqpria_tefQrth? des_,ign ofthe'structur,_ql sy~l<fJ?ls,_i:obei1sedfo.r th~
- _. ~
- '_:*:... ~-'** ... i1{l~~i3_{~~tgg5_~~t~~.c:f?C'!~fltW:X!F!L:~i .\:_~_~:~~i:~z~'.~~:'.;.,_~-=-L.)t*.'**~ ~:- , 2~.:,:~:~L:::;.E~:._.~):;~--.J~?
- Response spectra corresponding to the recommended damping values of Regulatory Guide 1.61, Damping Values for Seismic Design ofNuclear Power Plants, will be used to derive seismic loads.
'Damping varies depending on the type of SSC. Structural damping will follow the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.61, which range from about 3 to 7 percent. Plotting response spectra at 5 percent
\damping for purposes of illustration is a convention within the nuclear industry, but for analysis loads,
'.damping will vary depending on the earthquake level (operating basis earthquake [OBE] or SSE) and the
!_typ~ ot_SS_C __ ... _____ __ ____________ _
24 of 96
NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. O I .~~f:i~~:*wNwMif>aj.se6"ii~1J~i 4:f i, '*:'De:rig'n R.~~p"on~~:sp~cir'a: safe s1iutdollin Eart~quake; ;,'Pifi1Ire.fi,* j7 * *>)
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..* :(SaJ;.-ShiJtdo~'!.{ar{l1quqlieR,~spoµse ppectrµ~!* '.! l?r<fs,~nts t~d,stJgg~sted;spf4ctrun~ atfiyeifier~ent
- ,;damping: " ' :. ,
!:.. . . .
- rlFrovJde*~ *ai:i<:ussian{hadusdfies.itat .(he iaen.1Ji?<i~~sp~11;~ s/Je<:'rrufn afie~ /Ae*~musineizts ~1aae iat: "1 Request for additional information
- . ,, ' , ' ' ,., ' ' ':' --* *.*: '> , : ' ; '., ': )
, .;,[
- r..*;. ~ . * , ..' \!~IC1s~ [!;Site fas
- diseusseif* in fil;JI 3:f7) is ~~eq~at~ty.represeiiti~~ fhe irotihcl:fk;;pons~:a~c,~le~ation.~
- 4
- .
- . . * **/ .. ;fo,r an Intensity .HI ear.thqual~; establisheci-in, .fSAR Sf4ction :2.5.5,, Tqble 2:::29,.* .'.'ftrbj¢.q~~g E_a,r,thqua/G!.. '.~
1.i::.,"-**,,.".*.-~Jie.~:?~T!~~-1L~~~tc1~~'E.::.t~.~~-~-11Y2~~:-~.*;~.~-~.2-~.::L~*_],,.:~~~~*-.-~.:L. '--~L"'L~~--,~-*.:. . ~-~.~-;:L~;:~~~-0*~:,"J iThe RPF building structure and IROFS analysis will be based on the Regulatory Guide 1.60 ground *
!motion spectrum indexed to a PGA of0.20 g. This PGA matches that of the University of Missouri
!Research Reactor (MURR) and the Calloway Nuclear Generating Station, which both are within 80.5 km i i(50 mi) of the RPF, as suggested by the NRC staff during the November 10, 2016 Public Meeting. The ;
lanalysis procedure develops ground motion acceleration time histories that match or exceed the jRegulatory Guide 1. 60 spectrum as input to the building finite element model. Structural damping will ifollow the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.61, which range from about 3 to 7 percent.
lThe reference to a Class D site is a term used in IBC 2012, and will not be the basis for the RPF seismic
!design. The composition of soil in which the RPF is embedded will be included in the soil-structure-
\interaction analysis as part of the building response analysis.
!Table 3-22 will be deleted from PSAR Section 2.5.6. In addition, Regulatory Guide 1.60 will be added to;
!PSAR Section 3 .4 .1.1 for the determination of the RPF design response spectra. ./
iTue seismic soil classification for the RPF site is Class C. Thus, the reference to the Boone County site as!
~I
- being soil Class Din PSAR Section 2.5.6 will be changed to Class C.
I jPSAR Section 2.5.6 will be modified to reflect the above information.
~:.:--:~:; ""- .._:;,-'-""1::-:..+:;,*:r,.::::....;:i..' ~"";*::. :-...;~.-:-.;* ~~:.-;:-*1*}'"'i-:** ~:--;q:-.-.~* .;';;~*~~'..-:...: *:-* -;;y-..-: :*.-,_,_--....; ,.::0 ~?-'-::"~'~:-:'*.:.-..:. ***.:;-f*:.* '~*-;; r;:c~ ~-.~**=-'.f;:"":..;:*'i.* ~-*.,~.:7**:-;7:f";"*~:-<.:r- -;*,:.<;a-,,.-._~/~;-~ ::r'if~--: ;~~* .;;"'-~*~<?~?-;ff/f:"-: *~/*_~~-:.- * ...-r.:.;,;,rt-~"i? :~;;.;*-l'i:~~-:~-il{!i'*f** '-""-;.'
l..RAI 3.4-4*. NWMTPSAR*S.ection. 3.\4J!2X' 'Equivalent:Static' Seismic Ana/ysfs/' under *Dir.ection ofSeismic*:< * :
/'..., ' * ** * *.* !(49ad)fig, .;;,,stc:_ie~ ihat <<'the i(f~si?zi.c fore.es qne .apf!li~dUndependentiy int}iJo:qrthogo~cil h01:(zqniat :'." . *t
/ : . , :.:;direction~ an.a ~he ~.ff<!fts cpmbi~f d _using th.e 100($0 ('fie,._ Vertie~! s'efSfllic;~ffects .w_ill be acc;,o,un!e.~J:ir:.
~: * * * " - rby the use,*ofse1sm1c/oad*combmatiqns setforthwASCE 7;*Sections'12.4:2.3 andl2.4:3.2:'. * * ;' * ;*
).:.~;:-,~'f- *-;::::;:-.-: :..:.:~ [.:. ~~.:~~.~..,:;..-:*.:. :;.::-.: ~-,--_*.,:..*~-;-*;;i _;;: : -~ .'~;-~-:,~:~-~=<'..".~ ....:~;;;~;_;. -:-:<-:..-7..~;:.-_:,::-::*;.. ~-.. , ~*, ~ ;.;.:*~--::: "'.{G;::.:: r: ~.;;:. ~~ .:;~ :;_ ~ ~;;~* .:,,"'.-f ~:-::"';~;: :~_:,J - .": .;:'.~~;:::..";-;,,-;,--_~-; ~~ p* *.t.~~ 'f :;:*-; '.~f:'i'-';'. '. -.~~,:~~ '.::-;'..fx_:-*.7~ ::r ~;~*::; *.~~~
~ RA1*3;4-4a ;:Provide (!.'disCJ-lsston diatJ~stifies w.hy (he si111ultJ,pwous application ofthree directiohafiwrthq_uake~* 1_
L;,;*::'.~~;_j:l~;Jt!!.~:t~.:~~~~~~~~<f:~~~f~~lf+/-~!"*~:::: ~,...,;,_,:::~~~:-~~::~~::_:.~~-::-~_£,_2_ -~_;ec.~:~::~,fr. ::t:_:~~L~<~~_:.>;J~.* *~ *' .
!Design of IROFS will consider seismic loads in all three directions using a combination of square-root-iof-the-sum-of-squared or 10/40/40 methodologies. The 10/40/40 methodology will be used in the idevelopment of the final RPF design and in the FSAR as part of the Operating License Application. :
y:;-:--*U,..,.;'" ...... .;;,_, - * : ~**.-if°"~---*~-.;.~*"-*,-:.-~ .:,.';'j*- :-~~*::*- *---~~~ :---:-'"'":~":'"-*"*""7.,.;-q*_o;;,._ ,,.._,_71-'i'"-=~-"*,t,':;:'"**--'-'-;'-"...-;'"" ..."""'.-"~~"':"""t~*-.:-;:,:..,_._* *....;,,.. ..
,,.~.,..,,.,.:;.,,-.*,,,,.,.;....~*'(f;'."'" "":"'~1*~--,'-:"'".'f"';--"*~" .> ':i*~""";:-;.---_.,...~ *-;::*~*M ......,.. ....'."!1*'
~
- i RAI 3.4-4b: !'f'rovide a disc;ilssion tljat justifies why the effect$ are iiot.combined pefReguliltorji<;Ju.ide JJJ2, . ': , * * ;:
~; ,;: .... 0, ** * .' :i '.'CC?"f?~n!pg.A{9dql.~ef,spq~s<1s/;md§paiial (lpmJ?en~iJts ~'!: ()eismi~1::,esp_orise Analy$is; '.';'usi~g ~i(/:lery. ,:~
- : t~e square-;root-of-._sum-of-the squares; or,JQ()*4(f40 m_ethodplpgy: ... ,. . .:. , )."**"* ' . ... <. :,~.;, :.:> ., .. ' :*~;!
1
- ~ : * ' *
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!Design of IROFS will consider seismic loads in all three directions using a combination of square-root- j
!of-the-sum-of-squared or 10/40/40 methodologies. The 10/40/40 methodology will be used in the ;
i~~~~~-~~1:1t~!!1?-~..!i~~!_~-~-c!_e~~¥~-~~-?:.!!1:~ F,~~-~.P~.()~.!11~_2P~~!i1:1~-~~c~~~~~£!~~~!i~:':1_:.-*--~-j 25 of96
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'( -;RAI- .J.~~
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- ifiiiii?SjR Se~~~~j. i/j, *;,J3e;f"k~-R~sp~~s~ Sp~~;,~-~ S6i/
- sfi1t~~:;e 1~/e;~~ti~h di;a Dy~ailii~-s~ii !
' -*. ' ' ": Sf'r</SS!Jre.i.~" Sfpte$ tha{'gft~'?dJi_G,se, fizod~l-is-~xpqdedto h-v,e conservative 'results in 'cornpar.ison;to ' -' ~
- ; '; );<1PCO~ritingjor the effects ofsot[,.-sfn}ctut(f ,i11teraction. _, .
- .;~~o~e.ver;jgr)j r~Jgtjviiy,_ ~}Jorti~~§~tt~r/! ~tt~ fqige.J?fafz\~ilif~,n,siins
- :;afixff~bqfe ~nq,c{e)'_fl}ip! n?f~
Re uest for additional information J
. ,_ , :'ac(:Urately represe~t the dynafmc char,actqn,stics.and the:struqtural response; where. the rocking mode *
?*!);i:'!!~<ly:A~fJfedomtli#11i5:fidsignifita?f.'***.,<<:_.;,;::;"_;_:.: :-*:;:,,r**:';,,~ ** *::*.*}*":/*:*~_;-* _ ._ :*::~;-... *. --~*~:: *.*-,.-:_.f
\*:* !11Provide dddil:ibnaljus_tificdtionfot.the:.its~ ofjixed bqse:iJiatff(imq~ical, modelfQ.tififsrelativelyshort_. -!
1 i[acilitywith' a relafively largefootprinfwhere the ror:king mode may bl! predominant infacility - ' '
"~-" * " , * 'J , , ,, I ~ " <~ </J... r* *" " ' f * : < * " < , 0 " *."{_ "'.~
. ., :*response. * * .- , . _* - *: * .
~;1-:~,'*~* ..,,,. ,-';i<<*.'J. ** ,, ....... ~ .'.;:....,~,, :.~.-_'...;..;~ ,,....;,~,,~~* **~.!*"-~::-;,,_,, "*"".: * ¢lff~O",--.~-"!~'-/ -* .::'/'.-<,. ..,,,-~'~~,,..-.:... ~, **: ;,_,~.!'~ -t*N-*.f-., **-'~'~..:::,,;*.. ' ,~,*~ ~,-.,.,-,,
!interaction rather than the assumption of a fixed base. . . _ . . . . .
34 r~~'-: * ~:,._;f}r::;r;~:~ti;:~~t~~~;~~~~:r¥.~t~~;~1~:~;;4~;ii~~~~~=513~I~ib~:~~~:~~;~':1
- \ -Qualification.byTesting. < . * * . * ': 'f. *, * ' * * * ' . * * , -:, . . *t J ~." . \; *~*: , ,... . < - ;' - * -... * * " - -* * * *:-* * ' .,.- ; < - . ' . . -., . ' . . , '. .c - ' ....,. ' ' ,* ' * . ' ' - '" ""'"
- J.
1
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- 1 '/Vfany compone'ntiwhos,'e co11tiriue*a. operability/fu'Yictionality. 'during ana after tJ:ie postulated seismic -. :
,,*.r,
-*~ geveJJts ca~_np(be, ~em_qnsfk~ted_by cmaly#cµl'm<;o/Js,.,feq~jre. ~c;,fu1l sh,gke,,~(q/)l~.(o.r,;~thf!r ,(ijinpin.~c), ,_ *r
\
. i'.f~stt,n~t~:f:~:.~~is"!~;aur ~u,~l~::d,__,. :* . )~). ./, / .*. *;fr*.:.:._-<;.-_, . ;:_ ".:-:. __ * *-. * .. -.* .} ,*;*::**:.* :;*,_ -.. :: ,>.. _._ .' . *.: ')
. ;!ClanfY ifNWA{I *~ j;urch'a_se sjiei;ijfr:ati,on~ will specify tlje' qua/ification method. t6 'b,e use cf will it :be';, or
--"'-~-c-~~"ef!'~~t?~~~~~~~~~:~~~f~::~n~'~:~-~~~t--~: *':~- -~--~-~~~LC.,_,,"'_ . :2~. - .i~~----',, . , . . ::. :_,~~~::~. -~:;~~~~~~-~---:-~A'* ~J NWMI will define specific acceptable qualification methods in the procurement packages to demonstrate iI
- seismic qualifications. Seismic qualification of IROFS will include three options of: (1) calculations and i
- verification that the main structural components of the SSC can withstand the seismic loads derived from;
- the in-structure floor response spectra at the damping value derived from Regulatory Guide 1.61, !
- (2) reference to available shake table testing that demonstrates the seismic capacity of the SSC or of .
\multiple similar items, and (3) demonstration of the seismic capacity through the performance of the type 1
'of SSC in actual earthquakes.
- .""~**"""":'""'*-- *~~r--.::-..--~ ~"'-~~*,,,1._~,.-->y,*:~ r~.v "'::\**~~*~t>;,<':' *'-*"'"~-*-~~-;:-,,,,..,.--,<;-r~,.*":7';'~-*~ .... ~'r;* ,.._, ":'"""'~"- .,.,,.~***~-":.~ --;.,.-*~~*;-::'"'""~-;1r* <"' *~~ ff.~~.7-'~* "'*:--, "-°Jf;-""* ".;':'*~~- -~ '(~:-,'"~ ~!:""'">>* ~~*;~~.:~ .. *"'.'~
- RAI 3A 77 :JVW]VJIPSAR Section_ 3.4. 2.1.2; "'Dyiidmi_c Alwtysis/'. d,escribes-ytirious l1if!thods for seismic* * .'
\. <<*. ,,:*_ i;quatifi~ation:.*ofsfibs]lstems'aiideqzi)pmentlin<i;ciiesASqf[4,j'!'Se'ismtcAntilys(s ofSafety-Related. ,. ., 1
! -; .:*. ;::.-, fN.uclec11;,Structures ri.~rJ {;omm*~JJtq/y, :ioOO,'.':'a111*the _Nl?.CRegu!Gtor)lpuide'.1.122; "Diyefopmenioj * .I
~_ *.'-- ;:, ":'1tf1oori!~siin i;.ewon~~-:sf~ci~afar:sei';;ikl/5eiig11_. Sj:ffo~;~upfortl4 E~uipl:neiitor 'C;,omiJon~hts.'~ _.* ~
i: '1 1*: ,; '. ' ,,, , .'1 '!/~~., ~ ~* ";~~'.~ ' ..0.;: 1
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'.ASC:E 4 '.discusse~'TinieHistorjJMethod: anllDireet.!$pectra7to~SjJecMimethddjof:theH¢_vl!_liJphient:of
- '. -~
- i!in-sfrw:titl:e. r,espbi1se spedl}'a, '.fyhile. Ri!'gitlq.torY.Gittcle ,J}n.;ohfY t;bvef'.s* 7!}fl}g}Iis~o,,Y 1J1ethod. . f *, -. .*..
<' ':r* ~ < ' *** _* ' * : ...... ~* ,*' 't ~, 'r.-"* . . . . . *r"*. ;.<~ '*' .*- . ,., * .-:* ~* ";'
- :: . :~- );Clar.ifY :which,method~of in-,stritp~ure response. d,.e.Ve/opm~ntis_'used_for,:fhe'.f.PF,-andifit isi~e 7)me_ -
~ .. , _ .. ;HistoryMetHod.~hich:o'ptionofASCE4*wil/:beus_ed:_ ,'. * .. * * *. ~- . . * . _ , ** *
~:,:,,_'.'.;~:..:{" :t., -,-.:J_.*,~,.- /. ~:;i.,*. ,:, ~;~,)..;.;,,_;,~ ~:~ ,,)_,*~:;,,~.r.:;"-'.::-* ~t:.:J~."<.-t;~~:...,.:,.:::.,,~:~.:/. ';.;.:,-.-_n.~.,~~.... ~~\.f:f.~.f;,;:':;,~~*~)~~;::*~.-.6 ,f,_~~:w!"*)!;:;;,t,.,:".. ~.. j~"'-""::,~...,,.o<'.~ ,..:. ?:'llJ>-:r:-*<":...;i..~-*:5;*'.-~~-~ ...~,")'"..*.*, '"< ':,,,[,.~*~*<'*,-A*~**,.**,<'
Jn-structure floor response spectra will be developed through a finite element model of the RPF building using an artificial time history that matches or envelops the Regulatory Guide 1.60 spectrum at
.PGA = 0.20 g.
RAl".3,4~ ---~w"Wtil f>S4fi*s~~i~~ti3;4:2:2.T':1/iiili1i}ita'ti;~~'h;t:;';hrii,{;-;/~~tr,;~1~1;;;;~~ti~7l~a-~qi~::Pt;;/,/t~~t::- .
\.-. _, , _.-. - - ;1relif!ifonfornuclea~safetybu{desfinea.a:/pc~mponentofaseismic*.s);Ste'mperIBC 2012,-Chapter
- * } ._j;will _b<~~.i~iredt~ "l?~;seisillict;~1y qual;fied_i;,z. ~scordan/;~ Ji~h 1t;:c-i~;_AtJs6: "fcce'f!~~{;e C,r,itefia
- . :J![or Seismic Ce_rtification.by Shake+.Table Testing ofN.ol'Jstr.ue,tural*Components: **:~;:< ; .;, '"
'* ~ '* ' ',-, ' ' f" ;;; - ; *o* '; ' " ' * ' !' ., ' \"' * *, ' ' ' ' ' *. < -, ' ' ' ' '
"':/;p-o{v~vef~, i/i~.'~9tftated}iihatil,!l:e.4;ure{':arq to:~et(l~rltg'pr~cl~qe gros!f/rijl~i',~*:ojthf! :Sei~ie, ._'.:-.,' ~ i'.; :-.:
-1fa_tego,!Y11 o.~NO,n'-Seism/p S$,_C:stfuringjJ°:stulated~e,is1Jlfc &entsfrqin qam,dging the_sdfety_-related_ *
,,. ;*~SQ((ge~~r_ally'referrelto- as>s~i~inicPJl/I qonsjderdtfotis), ordetr,imer,ital *"!Janging'~ ~jfecis*ofz'~safetj;_~
. *.;irelqted SSCs.-due. 'to the ex<;essive* displ9ce11Jents caysedJjythe postulat(!dearthq1,1(Jke. .;: ,: _\~: *, _
......,...~--o~L ;__ _..'._~~'-" ~ --~~"'~..,-*,_-'c_,.,;....., . . ,.,._. ~--;:_***" -;"~ _,..____..,,_;....__ "!'" *~.;----~~ -~:::i-.*~~~_.-.-,:. - -.,. - ___:_,-:- ~~'--_:..;;:.--;-_--.-;, ~ -*-r..*;~;o"-""O,..;'.. ..,.;~~~,.;___. -. ** ~,:..:.:..'.~--c=-~~- --;~,'..._. .-......:,.*0*.*~-. -~..:;..,~!..,.-;
¥'
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- .!~~~~:*
NOAJKWISiWOtCAllSOTOPES Request for additional information i RAi '3,.4:.Sa fco'Yi}imi that th~ Sei,Sµiic Illizy;tems ~~d tompb~~nts wiiosri g~o~s/atluri~z(ij; impact the functto~ali ty' !'
,h : .. '. . .:. :\ofsafe_iy system~ incf, ~0!11£0n(!,f1ts, (J_re: d,f}sijwec(to r,l!nl,airi s~ab le rJu,ring; m:z_d a.f!er/h?: ppstul~ted .' . '* .
i: * , ' :-earthquake effects. . ' . * . * . . *. '
1L~.,~-. . ~ *~ ~-*,* ~o .r:::-4:."'"'~~,,.~-*-*- !.--.., **;-*--*-**
- **,.._.,.. -~.,.,.,,..:...,>..,...,,~~;-:;.- ,..;\.*.,.,,-*::..,.... :,~, -~\-. .,-'-.* :~.i-~.--....;..:_;..,....,.;,.,.~,,....:~.~.. ._.,., *."-~.....::;..:..._,_,. ~~. . .,_~
rThe capacity of the standard support design for overhead fixtures mounted above RPF IROFS will be
!checked to ensure that the supports can withstand the seismic loads derived from the floor spectra
/(e.g., remain stable during and after postulated earthquake effects) of the attachment floor slab. This jinfonnation will be provided in the FSAR as part of the Operating License Application. .
r~ri4:i6";;c;~"jf;,,~-?'h"d?;;:;Jm;-;;;;;1;~8t;;~/ishidto ~~~;~~thptth~-~~;s;,~rc*1prs;;1~ms-~;;~-~J~jpi;~~~fi-cd:i;;;;t;
- ..... * * .*,
- *;vdamage"the safetj/:relqteqitems due t9 tlfeir"potentially'e~~ess{ve d.eformati_ons quring tlie s'e~smic eVf!,izt {
- *.--....~--"-"* . ' ---~.-- .. ...-.........-, ...,_.., ........ ,,,,._ .., .. *- .... " ....,_.. ,............. ,..-.... =,._ .......... --<<- .;.*. _.... ,~ ..._.,._. ,.,....._.; .., -.,.~}.'" .'.......,.,;-,.~--~..-..,, ..... .., ,. ;j. ....-. ...~*-**"'"*-+-. .....,.......,..
tThe RPF seismic design will include a check to ensure that pounding or sway impact will not occur I
ibetween adjacent fixtures (e.g., rattle space). Estimates of the maximum displacement of any fixture can
)be derived from the appropriate floor response spectrum and an estimate of the fixture's lowest response
\frequency. This information will be provided in the FSAR as part of the Operating License Application.
- '--** .... ".'c.---~'---*** ,,.,::*......-.:*-;-~~".,.,..;.. ... ---;-,;.--** ...:;.,~..-r~. -*.:-."-,:--....._*.->:."".**'f'...:.::o..~ -~'*:<-.\-'"-".-'*-a*-.:- . *~ ~ _,,,,..,.._,tf'; """'-N*~-::<;:c'-"-..*~t*~~J,;v-"*' ,;:;...,*. ;;.*-* ; ........:.- .*
~ ,.,~;,- .,."; 'f:Z~- ..,. *.:.*;:-u.*.;** "-;:""**,"'*;_**~;-.;:~**"""'><""":"",;...'A'<':~. - .:...,,.; ....-,. *;\;:,~~* ~ * ** ..,~.b: ***. ~,1:
i RA!; 3.4.:.9 ::Nrf!Ml PSAR S?c(ion 3.4. 3, * "Seisnlic InstrU_men,iation, "provides a de!Jcription ofthe seismic *' 1
' , ... *"iristrum,entaqqizpr,oviderJ.for:thf!RPF.*-.;*:-- . .. >_._:: ,.. * '.:'.. ._ . *, ._;.,'.:": .. "'.::*;.
,. , . . . : :;*; itfmyey~r,'.it.dq_es.riot,specify if the seismic iiz_strifmentatipfl_ is.cons{der~dto.be,~afe'iY-re!at~d,Ser~!lzic'.\'~- ~;
. .* _' )'.Category}, and is fzi".chased,as:Seif1}1icallY,.Qualifie,,1. sjt~em,to'be abfe. ~qfulfi,fl tiff purp9S,e'.,,. *. , , ~: . :!
- ~:'.: *.:;czardY ~heth~r the sei8mic fn~mentati~n ~ill be a* safety-;elated Seismi~ Category [installation.__ ,. ~
fs~i;ri~-~~~~;ti~;i~;-ili~"ilP:F~i1~*r~-~~~;;rn:0F"s;~i1*-~~~;i<l~;**;~"';~~1;-fu~cti~~-~~i"i~"ili~;~i~;~---<
~not "safety-related." Although the seismic recorders have no safety function, they must be designed to 1 withstand any credible level of shaking to ensure that the ground motion would be recorded in the highly
- iunlikely event of an earthquake. This capability requires verification of adequate capacity from the
- manufacturer (e.g., prior shake table tests of their product line), provision of adequate anchorage (e.g.,
!manufacturer-provided anchor specifications to ensure accurate recordings), and a check for seismic
- interaction hazards such as water spray or falling fixtures. With these design features, the instrumentation;
- would be treated as if it were safety-related QL-2. Additional information on seismic instruction will be :
rprovided in the FSAR as part of the Operating License Application. .
- =*= ~=~~~~~~~~~*~=~*~=-~~~~~-"
Request for additional information LiL:**>*.~~~~~@El~_.. . --,~-~~~ -*:" ~~~~.- :~-~~J
,'(Applies to" ~:The.definition for JROFS is 'provided in 10 CFR 70.4.'The' definition states: *.- *; ..... ' . :;: l
- RAI~~S-2, ;(
- ltemsreli~d~n.jor,sq[etymean~truqlures, sysf~f!lS, t;quipmen{;componenis, aridadivitiesof :.- . i
,and 3. 5-3). * * . personnel./hat tire r,elif!d OYJ _to prevent potential accidents at q. fac;ility_ that 9ould, e,?Cc;eedff;e, . *. , ' . i i:. * .. * * '
- performance: requirenients i11f7.d. 61 otio 1rlitig~te tHeir pot<rntial t:o~s~qi{ende.s. -This Joes not* . .1
' ,. l~mit fhe license'efrom}dentifj;infi'additiQnalsiructures, 'systems, *equipment,' coniponentS,* qr(!* *';.* i i activities ofpersonnel (;.e.,:beyond those'in the minimum set riecessary for complim:ice wi.tli the ... ',
- . * * ' :*. . . p~rforn1an(:e requirements) as itemsre!ted onfor_safet);. ' * .. , . , . '" ., " , i:
'----c'-"-"-"' ____ --~----o~ ~-:...,.,-*.':::-r*~---:=*!'..-.::-.,-r* - * . ..,. --~**~. ---*--""=:_" "."c;-,,.---.--."----"~°"'~"" ""S -~--~-=-~---,.,-~-.-""-*,-,**---*<":-*.'*.** --=:=**,;:-~ ~*- "--~"'*"'-.--.-~,,.----;---_ * *;...:-_ '!". - -:.~ ~-."- ""'".'"""::"*": *- ~-,.,,,*.-'-~-_.,._., ** ..,._ ---=.-**'
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- Re uest for additional information J*' . :,. . :~ ;. E,'.: <*, . *hazard9us. ~het]ucqls ;i>dl not"lealltq}JJ.in:_eyers;ble 'or:oth.er *serwus, long,.fqstingh~alfn 'effects, f.
!**':,~. .. , *':;,i;if<~ *ii,o*~or~e~s,/2)?f1J{q trqris{~nt;h_eatih .e1fe4ts ~~ inf!ividuq!s;Ncate~ Qut-rir/<ttfte}fPFRGA<~;;* : ~;<. :;d 1
~J if~f,~:~:s:a~w~a;it~~!~!fi~1r~t2~~¥~~~1~i1 l r,;~.
- ~_***
<!ofsafety-re.[afed SSGs({):. {IJ,qluifeperfo,1:m(11:!.ce,:re,qu11:e:1J1e11[s
- -f>*'..r*****'<"*..,_ .*."'*~.' .*~*, -#'.~,'\t,,,.,," .. ,L_,;,*.. ,_ '>'.f*,._>>/~JJ"'~'*'>t;;*:.' ...
f.or.$$Cs 1mp0,rtanUO,
- *"*,J/::***_.~_,,*;;,**_,.**-~ **-'ii'"'*: i.;;*}:" -*_?-
safety. in Jl:ze. Rl]F.'.: *. *~.
....,<.. /~...,_ *~v.-~ 1;, '_'* ,*,';.,,~
- rt
- '.: .* .. :,* . ;: '.!Tfhilefour bftHe fiyeji_qfts.of this qejini,tion t;rr;'<(p~iforinfi/ice-:,b'i#~4 th/f;.thir,d j§ri'bfthiSaefinition * : t J;"'*** *'t:'***~>r_: ~ . '1\(iie.~Y':Efisure* tliepJJtentialfof'iin: fnlidverlenN:ntzcallty ?fcdi'dent*is'ni!JFcrediliM(')' isnbip~eform't:iiice:.'f
\~,*'*,,'.':<c,**.~.lj*rJ'.- :"*~ "'~{-
h:;:*;**!;:;-*;;_<* *,/;::.!)bC1se4 /!'Je *r,e$Ulriti?n~,.f11 *~0,G(f?.:.f.ar,t1 ?O;ar,~ngt,:9 *~'!qu/re1fi_!,1'Jt'f<?lj;:dP,t,o4_~cti?hf,ct,cil{ty_;:'f/o~~v.e,t *(~e,(,
<:*:;.-L* _**.-,"*.' * " - < * ' ' - " ' " ' ' ; __ *."1 , , . ;
- r, -. "*',- .- ."*.,, 1(
~",~ , ;:~;.A'>* *:* i'f!owff1.ii )0..9Ffi *1p. 6J1jf6,V.i4~s pef!gniidn¢e rf!q~it;.~ffl#}zts:for ~bC,r{tff:ql,ifJ!..:io Cf"R 10: 61(iifstates,q r
F:: ;~.'. /"r.;~: 'li :~~Jn/ad,llitib~ tci:tomp!jling:'Jlv[thpardg~aphsY(byqnd'i(ci&Jtizi:s s~~#<Jii;*lt~e:h~!t;ofrzuC!ia/!}crlti'C,altty ;;.1(
!*t; * ' ~;* :\~;* **.~:* \i !P~".:rj~Citl.erii~ mi.t~t be l~mited_ fJy.asstJ,r{rig thatyn4,e,f.nJH:"Jal~'IJ,d9redib.(~:abno'>j!Jal*cofiditi~ns,:a11;;. ; i]
\ t *. if:* ;*~:,. ,:~{'Jl, ,,**:n~qle(irf5t~c<;fs~~ ctr,e: sftJ;crj~c~l,,. {!Jf!~gin~ ~~~* ~f;ii~'t!pp1~~fltf/!r$!n.?fsj,bc1,tJi:f!!fifJ?1{s.afe_fY;:~i
\, *~: . *,\,, :. ,< '. \ ~ ,(; >* Prev.~f!tiX~ c9ntr,pls cmd,p~eqsµre.§ lf"tlS.f b,erth.e P.P'!lfl!Y f!U!Ons._ ofprotectiqn :aga11Jst<rzuc/ear:. *. ,: ..,* .; ;;
&:::'.-'.:":;~.:'.::f * ,~;?r ::.rrf~:*¢?Kfi~aUiJ(~-~~1 ~?&.1~::t\i:f* ** :Y '?~~:*):::~: ::r;;'.:~:3;:, :'*::(~ ."z::~;-;*~*, .:,t *~ .*.~~'.;*'-:Li~~:t, : *1r{.*;<::*Y.\':: :>f;:,:*~?; :~*1' '.~:~t: *~?~
~"*':'. *.*~('.;~*~*. :<:::I!VJfo{id~~f;ipiirfo'i,;ir/dhcetb'dse'd:qf:iferionforarffinaavert~IJt*c'rjticiJliif l' *."','". '.... "'" ,,, ,' n ,n*" ',6.,: '.i' ....... *""'**1* .;. t; } ' ,'h*, ' h""", " *.* *" "* ... ., .. ',., ......... , .. ....
- a&:ldentunltZing:t.he(criterid op :ti
~ ~ *' '*' ,,. .,~ .. ' ... , .. ,,.,, "/~
- ':'- :; ~-~* ~:1B,o::}Fiv,/!0. J(d) on/ex'? azn,wh;x.t. <} :JJ) .J.Ffi. /ZQ. 61. *nerfQr,mance,~r,1te,ru:psl1JOt.us,e<J, ,* :*.** .;:, ..,:;,; *, ;;;*;; .... ; <. ' .,;f,.~
c.
f"Ril":;*\:'
~o!<-~~:-=:'"*"?:~!:"'<'"'J..,:;..,__,,.;_._µ.,.,~,~~~:-~~*<\<~~""'1;'!'.-r<"-5-~'!~;.i"'<'t-!"'!~:;.;;:t!_'f..,,...-.;i-.,-~-:vk *"-""*~OW *""';#~;<~"'::l('.,~!f,"~--'L:."'~!-!:~.*~!:~~{'*~,.:"'!:':.~<~~~'-'"*';\;:;'-~.'**--:'".Mf~~~*~"'!.""""'~~-40~.:J::"~"'-~:!"!1*~*,,,..,.,,..-f~**'::>.."'.lur>,-,..,'!J¥,=~'"~""~
iNWMI is using the 10 CFR 70.61 performance requirement for subcriticality. PSAR Section 3.5.1.3 was !
)revised, the bullets removed, and 10 CFR 70.61 performance requirements/criteria are referenced. j
[~~:~;~:~~Jf,VfWRJ~R~§Afi¥~ti~h{~;,rf<<y3-:!~::;~~t:f~<:t(<J:lf~T~Tifli:f;#'~~~;;;;~~::,z;j~;~~;7[~J~,*-;r:~;:;J lt,***?c*i~c*;~*'"'o"'f"~~*i,.d,i~l#;rl~A~~oJ1~0J;~~~(~~ef;~wo,*.,1QfRh2'!~~?.t~~thgt~ ij
- ,.:,)': .' ;'.* .*:/'; 1.: .. **',c;.01J:.l5ll.ra .{)n\mqnx;zg(!.1np1, mam.ef!qtlqe;.; {Jzm.ng<in. l'.qU(J) . cq z<;ms;p vce.*. ures;',aS,~(!$Smen s,;*,;
~!ff~~;~*t~i~ir~£fi!~1!i~r&~~!~~~~m~~i~~~;~0!:r~t]\:
f?:'. ** .:' .* .JiWhi{~ ,Q[,:*]'.ah'?J Ql!:J .ql<f.ai;ly,,stat<r wh'at SSCs (Jri *as~lgi;ze'(,l'to thes<{ leyi.Js and'the:/iv,cl' r!fqualitf ** :* *.
~:d~~lllAflflliilS!~~f~~~J 28 of96
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..._~~.~~:. UORfHWfST MUHCAl. ISUTOPES k~1.~*~:~::?:~. "**~11i~~:~'!~R!.?~iYf~'-~i~~1~~:.!Ji:~i/At~~~Kfi§!ii.~~rg~jj_.~1!1-~{~t*:,:;?:~::;J: .~~:::~~:.:~LL2L~.:,: ~]
!NWMI has revised its Quality Assurance (QA) Plan to clarify the difference between QL-1 and QL-2.
i~PSAR Section 3.5.1.3 was modified to reflect the changes in the quality level definitions (Attachment A).:
Request for additional information
]The basis forthe difference in QL-1 and QL-2 is a* graded approach to quality, by which the level of *
/analysis, documentation, and actions necessary to comply with a requirement is commensurate with the
)safety significance. The graded approach permits the implementing organization to focus resources on
/those activities that are deemed, by qualitative analysis, to reduce the associated risks and hazards. The factivities and tasks are performed in accordance with approved implementing procedures.
iThe graded approach to quality is a process by which the level of analysis, documentation, and actions ,
inecessary to comply with a requirement is commensurate with the safety significance. A graded approach;
)permits the implementing organization to focus resources on those activities that are deemed, by *
\qualitative analysis, to reduce the associated risks and hazards.
I
- Activities and tasks are performed in accordance with the quality level definitions.
l
failure or malfunction could directly result in a condition that adversely affects workers, the public,
- and/or environment, as described in 10 CFR 70.61.
!
- Quality Level 2 will be applied to safety SSCs that are non-QL-1 SSCs. Some of the required characteristics may be examined less rigorously than for QL-1 items.
Quality Level 3 items include those items that are not classified as QL-1 or QL-2. QL-3 items are controlled in accordance with standard commercial practices.
f~F3:5Sb';j'i[l~6'.:Ssf!,:~;:;;;~,p~;*~;;1;;~:~~~~~~;Jf;{f~J;firii;~:~&.J"':~~?rif¥W?li~~~fft~'ir~rll/i,;1;~Fl?~~;~*.:*\;;;:J71,
'. ._.:,*. * ,. . '. . iicftaractenstic~, bu~ one SSC.is goyemed.,by QI;_-1 and the\otherhy QE.,2, desc.rzbe,'fl,ow they W!ll tMy, *::
t~_:_~~-*_:L.~:.:~.2;~*~P!J.it!~i!Y.iJ!.iff_!f!<!.~£ CL-.C~:~;'..33~;:~;,;~ .:L:_.{~. ~~::c\, ::._.,:.L_;J:::,~-~ ~* ~*. ~.~~~~,::::_:f:,.~:~~~:::~-~.~L}:~-~~i'.D~*. J
'.Tue QA Plan will be revised to clarify the difference between QL-1 and QL-2. For two SSCs with the '
!same performance requirements, NWMI would not expect the components to be materially different.
!However, the level of analysis, documentation, and actions necessary to comply with a requirement is
- commensurate with the safety significance; therefore, a QL-2 SSC may have different verification.
\requirements.
\,..;.-.;..;......,.,-;<<.....,;,;. ..,;:;;.;~~,;..~*- *.1~-*~*,:..<<*-"i'-'.....,'."'""'""'.:--~'-.,,-.....;.c..:..-'* 11.:...~ ***,,_.* .,,-_,,,_ ** -"'*k"'-'-~:""*_,_ -.;..-.r.;;,;,,.._.,;,. * *::,...u__;,., __ ._,,-.;:.,.,;...~-~--*~~ -.-~ .** _...,......,. ____ .~*,>****.~-~ rn ..... :~ ~:;;_....,._,._, ~
... '----:"'.;,........-..*~~***.,,,.. -_;.,."""".;'*'""-""; -
- _"."..,-..,_:*., **-~*-;***' *.:...-.J 1* RAI 3.5:..:3c f!PSAR Table.3-25; .'.'System Silfe'tY cind SeisniicClassificdtion aijd:Associated Quality. Leve{ Group,{'* . .l
- f .:. '.,: , ... _.. ,
- jilists system~'tha(i:u:e N_sR_; $e}8mic~Category_I~;-:an~ pv-2, q:~;;,i~fe~s Jhat'otily ]I/SR S~ismic_fJ.ate*?,:Y'f
,; .. . . ,:JI S$Cs are QL-2. If.this is the ca~e, .stateth1s,?xpbc1tly, and ifth1s 1s not thepaseprov1de examples of..
~.:;:~.__;;,:.:::rs:~~:.~:11$Ji~1'?f!!f1EtC.~1?,~idfr~t!.:fdf:2::f~<!!:az:~-~~~~'~J~"!:!{,£~ti~~'i!.ti~:*~:~~~:~*~.;/.':-1 ~ :~..::i:':L~'--*;;j:.i~~-*~i~'..::__~~:~~,*:j iPSAR Chapter 3.0, Table 3-25, has been revised and is provided in Attachment A. The table was
- modified to match the changes in the NWMI QA Plan. A room continuous air monitor in the operating
- gallery is an example of a QL-2 item that is not Seismic Category IT. ,
r~*RP:1Ts:3d**T17~;**7Jr::Tssc8,'"~1;;;;~:r;,1z~!r:;~;hci;;;;~;;;;fd-;~~-:r;t;r;ti;~-~~~Ii-g;;;,~-;,t,~:i;;;1~~'/J~'!:;:**;;i;;;~;:*::,~
- i. * .." .* ' *,., *:~gnd quf[li.fiP,atiofi.s~ pro.cedu.i:~s,. *qss,f!sspie[Its,. jn~identinv~s,tigati;pns, 'tedJrcl~:mq/t:lzge'!l:eni, :et,~:}1r(*~. ~
- .* ** * *.*.:. .i considered QL-1 or QE-:2. Jfconsidered*QL-2;*provfde justification why they are:not Qontrolled.under i L~:~{*"*~:.~;:':;.,~iif~f'1~l£!!.!l!'!sft!-~:~~ltJYJ!/!1£~~;-g,ifti,.. ;;;.C:~:;~:~;~~1:i~':_;~~~LL:~;~;,~'.~.;~r~~:.:2_;:~::~~: 1~~~~~.i:t1i.,.L;)~&*~-~::f.!.';; :i~;;r;~~\J
!QL-1 SSCs are controlled to the full measure ofNWMI's QA Plan. The QA Plan will be revised to ,
Iclarify the difference between QL-1 and QL-2. PSAR Section 3 .5 .1.3 was modified to reflect the changes '.
iin the quality level definitions (Attachment A).
j,,~ ..... _,,,.._.._.,~,.~c-'*-<<"-."~**;,....,,_.,_,.,-<'t~,..,*,--.>."*"'"""'"'""*0.;c**"*',_~*..-.-...'-~-,,,_._,..,.,, ""*'<- * .,.,_..-,.,,,,,. -- "- * "**" "'***'* * "-*
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-::.**.*.:- NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0
- --.~;.~~:* rl0.IUHWESTM£Dtl:ALISOTOP1S
- .. ~13.s~
- ;:"id)i?EG;tf37;-P~;i})s~~ti~~-3.j7~;t~;;,; ~~4¢~",;,po;,e~t$!~".it9~f;i~hb~- c;i(e;i;;,:adi<!s7i;;p~;{
1 <*: ,*. :*,*:' *' *~ :[that the* <Ji{stgif crit~r1a:should incl1)d_e PesponseJo trqn~ientand/;9-te.ntialJicCident coMttion~ ** .**'- :: *
- arialyzedtn the..safety.pnalysis repqrt. * ~-
/; {,<* '~ :" . .',. --*~*: <<> *.~*::* .**',
Re uest for additional information
.i<\<<,:,. *~. :*:>i"~-~* '; ::*fL**' .-~ , .:i'i'.,*:,.,.'<.;_,;.:~c-: *-~ 'r~ ~F-".', . :,1 :* !,( ;"'.*" ._~ ,,-:_r,J :, *." ,' **~*(.' .' '., ~~,~<:.' ,';*;**~*>:;,'>'";
- 1 1'.NWMlPSAR Sectiori 3:5:J,$>/, "$eismk:'Classi.ficationfor'.Stfuctures; Systems, arid Compoiiehts, ~ *~
0
- istgtes that
,\, *','* <<'_,'~'
&iSn;ic. ':-~:*-
c;a(egoryJ: (C.:J/'.applt<is.to
'.'.' * * ,,:"*' * .lf,'*" ",,~('*1' *.
- r;afety-'r~late~/jscs;;*that
- 1"*) ? r',',;,*'",1 "n> '*'
Sltistnlc:.Category II(C~jfj* j*.'* *'i;
'. '**<',.p.* 1
,'""*: ", *.'"" r'."';
. *)!applies to*thqfe.NSR ~SCs;w~ose, ~trik:t1:1f,alfailute 'auring* q,Safe ;shutdown.'eJ;rtlfquaki! could*degrqd,e:*!i
. . <thefunction.ofSR SS.Cs. or iinpaptthe main c.oirt:ro/ room, and.tliatSSCs not classi.fiedG-1 or C-11 are '
r * ;*
..* l;cias;i.fiednon-'seismi!:OvS]:'.SiriceJi:tsnol~learwhatQL=-2 entompdsses ~tJieriH.an thesiate>>zent thiid
- ~ ' j *, ' .' . * ' '_ ,. - '_ * . ' - ' , * . ', . , _,
- I
.; . , * .. *. ..they'are'not controlfr:r/undeithe "fallmeasure ofNWMI's QAPI?, "clarification is needed ' *: * . i f;Rl\i*3~5~~*~9/;;R::rii!fttB~f£~i5s/.si~;;r$~Jet;*dh**;/Sif~i~:*c1~-s;Jit:;1i~h;~::i-:t*r;;;r:;t~,:J:'Q~-:i1;1y*i:x;r-cl;~~;-;;~E" ::1
- * * : .*,. ':;i'!fe,rs thpt NSIJ C:-flS,S,Cs a,1;_,e a~tornatically Qb2: P.:()_v}de:fl;e, 1:atidnalefor thatQA Classijicptipn '. .. :,
- '.J .,.. ,,::,~;:::~.**~~~j~J:z:Sf!~l~~2:2.f1~t:.~{iJ!.t!.i/J.~~£rL~ :~~:~~;;i:L~~~:;tt:::. *:~~:1;;..'1;;:~"'i.~~:;;~-/~~;_'.::~.~~£?::~*;.:;~i-;~.~-~-.*:JJ.,,**.;;.::::~;.;_,_.:Ldt.~:*.~~-~]~; . ~
- The QA Plan will be revised to clarify the difference between QL-1 and QL-2. PSAR Chapter 3.0, 1 Table 3-25, was updated to reflect the changes in the quality level defmitions (see response to
- RAI 3.5-3c).
r~~1 ":~:-~§~,~;i,~§~ijj/J{E:~?i~~:{/-II~~s~*~Ei:~l:E!.iRi£~{9~!il.:£FQffE2,;.:=*;~,*:':~*::~2::~--~}IE~~~Zi~:.~:~I~-.-::~::DJ
- .The QA Plan will be revised to clarify the difference between QL-1 and QL-2. PSAR Section 3.5.1.3 wasi revised to change the definition of nonsafety-related SSCs, and PSAR Chapter 3.0, Table 3-25, was ;
modified (see response to RAI 3.5-3c). However, nonsafety-related SSCs should not be QL-1 even ifthe ;
1 SSCs are Seismic Category II (C-11) (see Attachment A). i
{,*:!::~~-.i~~t~J~=~~ffl/::::~~i:::-~:~~;pr~~~~-;~;~~r~-~~;ri~*Q-p1:a~~cr~1z~-c~~-~;~~*;;;;~.~.~~~i!~?;;"~~~~F****;:
The QA Plan will be revised to clarify the difference between QL-1 and QL-2. PSAR Section 3 .5 .1.3 was 1
- revised to change the definitions and Table 3-25 was modified (see response to RAI 3.5-3c). The "
- differences in acceptance criteria for QL-1 and QL-2 is a graded approach to quality, by which the level
'of analysis, documentation, and actions necessary to comply with a requirement is commensurate with the safety significance. The main difference in the acceptance criteria for the Seismic Category I (C-Q .
- and C-11 classification is that C-1 has to function after an SSE, while C-11 has to maintain its integrity (see!
Attachment A). ,
~ * *~ ,..-"'.'"'. _'--*:,*:: "."" ./ 't1~ 'r~-,7:~ _;:,r,,-~-:';::i,:"""'";"'NH'f**""i'_.,,.~...,.-r'irF;r,'*" 0
'1"'*~":':.-1:-*µ-,"1.:'"."~-~.:-~~~:'7,,~~-,-:;~~.*-:~r: *7*~t,-'; .. r;r?"*"~"':'!i' ..'.'?' ;::.1 :~;t't-";t~t-~*~*'i;";"\'.":'..--i' 4 '-~"":"°t:-r'r--~~\, "'"';;tr::;-~~.-:7'~~;.:-* ~ ':'",~--~~ ~;*"*-;~;"tf,~'*;~'-:.~ ~:;;:": '7;;!,,
!, . ~I 3;5;4d .. ilSince C~ll."SSCs'n.eed onlymaintai11 stnictural integrity, 'explaif!. if the 'sfritptural integrity ai.:ceptarfixp* ;>
'I .. ' ',':L :; :,'. '.* '*::criteria/or ,c:,:.Ysscs, and C}JISSC .w.fII pe.the S,ame or dif.fe'rerit. ifdiflfjr:ent,' provide ,the baSi~ for..the ' :
.- . ..::*::~. *- * *., '.:~i/f!;f~~~:::L~:~~*~_::i:'£ti~-~>~i,L: ;_ ~::1:t~*~:,~:~t'"_:;:i;:~*:.::t::~;::...~~S:i-~:_,-SIL.~ ;::*;:~:~ . *c;L:_:: ;')~:}~~.: .* :.:~~:. -~~'.i~ *- _!:
While the structural integrity performance requirement should be the same, the acceptance criteria for C-Ii
\and C-11 SSCs will be determined by the quality level of the SSC and may have different verification requirements.
!._ . ...,.,.,., ........__,,,_., .,,,._..., ** --- ...~ ..~ "'""'~~* -*~-*--* "'"'~"'""'""""""'""'""'" -* -,.,. ...... .,.......... -.- ....... ,~-----,*---*"'*->;*, "'" ___ _,,.~ ~ *. ,... ___ ..~ **-*'"'~--...... -*~---*"*---*-~---..---~*-f t:* ~*~~<-'.'~*.,.~~;~;"~~~;~~:.*£:*-~ *-'.:1r~:r.;.,;::.::.~~*.::::::."'-:~'i,'.f- h;*,:.*~?'~ .."~f~,z;:~~~~.\,*.~ ~o::::;:~~~r~:: :':;'.;:.~~::~~'if.;:~~~-~~-7-::~~J.::~!~.:z.~:'?.'*'-:~::-iR?1'=~:.:*:~-::~;;;...'flf ~:t';:~-,:-;.r:::~::,~.:f:'?~;0~~\*:r~:.:::-:*f~:;=t~:~;r:?;~*:~~* *:~;."><;p:t~-".::tv;r:"";11
)(Applies to.:.. J;n,theJSP Augmenting NUREG-.1573, ,Parts 1*afld2,;'.(he NRC staff.stated,:* in part; that ad(fressing * 'i;
. . ' . "~ 'I ' . ; ' ~ ,, ; . * * -. I ' . .,, ' .' " .-; - " ' . - ' ,: L >' * * * ' , 'ii( * * * ' '
iRA!s3.. 5-.~ '"* ;:t/:l.E!;ba~g{~n<! r.f(!~ign, crtter!.a/1.pd (leff!_,n'se '.in deIJtlJprac,ti,ces. in JO Cf'/?. 70,. 64Js Wj.accen,(abl~ :way of- * -:i ian4'.3: 5.-6}' : *:'d~monstratingfad~quqte sdf<;iy o]~thic~li"J:ifs,' §Y:siifris?!!Yi.d)ib-;,poli~nts:tfrthe dk'iign o/d'ra_didfsoiope'. :1
.,. . ', \Rf/?c!t!.ffi£!Jf~<;Hi,Q:;,},,i~;:-~,;_~,.c,.~.i~:~:;~c,.;,.,____~.;:_;.,.~,-::.:,~:~£-i;,.,,~,__~.~-:;._;~:;,;__;,.. ~,~-".,__;~,;,.~,,_:,.,.,-.:~ . *~~.i 30 of96
.:.~*~;:. NWMI
........... NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0
..........r.;.
~ ~. !~.~?: . N:OHTHWEST MrolCAl lSOlDPlS f *~1 3.5-s :~WWW PSAR Se~tio~*is.2:~"-*"aa~si.fl{ati~n'iJfSy$/~m~and Cti11Jp~~~ntsJ/np~rta~i i9 s~f~~ 'l,*..'.\~,>r
- 1 *
. :; 'Pdiscusses SSCsthat are considered important to safeiy. The crif~riafor importmjtto.safeiydSthefive
. l,\~ritelia/or'.'Safety;r~Iaje,d sS,cspteskniedin S~ctiOn~'3.5.r'iI, ::;'Sdfeiy-Ri4a(ed SttUctlli:es, Systej,,8, * *
- :>,,.'.il~~d y,o'.ili~~~~1~~*::* crn~:an' <i~1fti~nal :~~fer!~~:*fc~a~.~t~ter:*;.*: .. :.~:;: .' .*:'*:~. <-: .)-:;;: , ::.::;:: ' .
Request for additional information
, 1{** '* P,reventdegradat1on offunc'tion andlor:performcmceofanysaJety:-rel(Jted§SC: ;- .... * **
J.:. .*. *~/ ". )lr1i.u,~~)niP~~tq1Jt.fo sdfrti ~n~o~npds~es/aJeiY,ieiritia sSgs and*othef!. $SG#~atgpuld ajfeqi i,he .:* .....*
' . * *!functionlp(!rjorm*ance pfsafeiy-related S$Cs. However, NWlvfl does not provide;_a classification for
- L. . . ~:iinporl~n(*to-safeiy'*{)S9s, ju_st the qlassifi~atii:m$ of~gfetj;-relat~d and,NSK PSAR Table, _3-25,~ .:; *;:* ....:;
\* \ .~ :;t "System $djety and Seismi'c, '(;zassificatfon arid Associated Qualiiy Level Group'?associat~d'with . . :'
i:* *:* *,, *.;' 7 ,, ** :l/%1!l'.§ef~pn;J;:$:2:~ 4~!tn~c;t~s:sy~tf!:Ji)s,thq~'fr~ ~$B,,,bufgl§?:*D:IJ/!~d ¢2~~2,~.T!Ji;;)~V!lteS;,~~::,* ** ; i'
- "'.'(
- . ':* . r' >:Section 3.5,:f;2 that NSR C.OJJSSGsare .co11sia(?red}mportr;mt t6safetY beca.ijse ofthelf;C,.JJ"* * :, , , * :\
- ' *" '*: . .* :iida~~if/:r:q~?~' :-1J?,*.?4i:l~~gn, ~FfeJe~::: "bppqrt~1~.t<?:.~itlf,iy~<(:}_ is: n_q{ u~~,cl ~;i .s~c;(ip~'$: ~.{:~:41:.'.:~~i~~~c . j
~, .*. . . . . **vCtassificatio,njorStructures, Systems, and Cqmponel}ts, wher~the C-1, C.-llandNSc~ass.ificatzons *;
L-":~~~-;._-_,,~-;=:J~[~.;ilifft::;:!,~lf,,r/;.:..,"""""***;~,.::.::.:c;..i~,~-~'.'i:;. '.'~";;_;,_,_J::.~."'-"~S~;L*'.* .~ -~.,~.i .. ::o.__,~L"~;c :i_~_;._.2::2. '__;;-'-~~-~:.cc*.:. ~:~;:s;;~*. Lj
- \'HAI 3:5-Sa: :.9zarifY ifN$R c:.11 SSCs are important to safe.iy. ' .., *. . .. , * . <_, .j. "* _:*.. : :- * *. *
- I -~r.-- --,.r,',.:*;..;,. --:.*~.-::.- -*.:-*"" ""-,7-~---*'-~'c .~---- ** """'"'-.-':' *.-.-,.~.,,...--.*-,, **-;:::'""'_""-_ _ .- .--,,..--- .-* -"--'-~*,- **** ~,-.,,.-.,--:.-**-...,, ,,..,--,--*~~~-- * ~-**-~-""~*J.,~- **-"-"'-"-'"*"""- -***~-'\:--""'.-"' _.,.,.,..,.~,..- "'""" **-"-.,....-,,"'.,._~...,-'7--.:."--""- - -* ~~:!.-.,-- ~ ~-: ..,* _,,, ___ - - - ~
I,,
\The QA Plan will be revised to clarify the difference between QL-1 and QL-2. PSAR Section 3.5.1.3 has
- Ibeen revised to change the definition of nonsafety-related SSCs, and Table 3-25 was modified (see lresponse to RAI 3.5-3c). QL-2 SSCs are safety-related items that are not QL-1 (see Attachment A).
- ' -~- -:~-;**S>:-.:.. .*;.,.*.-.""":*: ;.- .-..~*~-~ _-,,.~-. -:--;~"'.'.-j---'~.;:-..,...=.--'~.o;*.,'.. -'-;'l.>'-':.*"-*,;.;-..-_...__,-,;-.,,.,r*-*':' o;.*.>-*~~--""*°'f.,_,,,_ .. _ *..._.,;:,:;-7.'- *' *.-*** _;_,*...:-'-,.~ .,.. ~-":"*.~* ::--*...::....:,;:,..~-;--;,:...;-,;~.: .-.:,.¥-"*:;..'"!_.-,._~_.****~."-*: -.-'.'.*";~- ...~-~:,*~----,-*.*:,.:-""IS' *.-*-""u"'." ..::--r.-;- ';',7"~ _,. -'---~-- ")
t.,~~~~:~~~..~J!l,~C!..~l~..f!E1!!l!!'0,*!!!l!§!!:.!!~§..S,.c;.~.£~C1.1~.B-~<:.t!!!E£rJc;!J~!~~tlf<!.%:;*~.~:*~~1'.~,,-~~~~::: . . . :";::~'*:~:. :t:t:.~: ~,.:;._j;;._._, _ *j . :;..
lThe QA Plan will be revised to clarify the difference between QL-1 and QL-2. PSAR Section 3.5.1.3 has*
ibeen revised to change the definition of nonsafety-related SSCs, and Table 3-25 was modified (see *
\response to RAI 3.5-3c). QL-2 SSCs are safety-related items that are not QL-1 (see Attachment A). ,
r RAl3:S-~~*Ccitcif'd;'ij;ij;J11](!§ift;;;:p6f.i'illii~i';;'-;5j;°i§ssc; 'd7~"QJJ}~'t.':r~ :-*:p'."*~y7:*;~"" ~'.C:~:y~~'.'~:-*'.":'t"~:**.'.':: ?' C','"":,~Y :}
1-*..-*.::_:.----:*,<-;:"""*-*~.'"'--*c .:.,._-:,:,_.1...,._ -.i'"°"':::~,-.,*~*--~_,,,.._.,* > ,--=",.:..,.,,-.,. ,;,__ *_-*_-,,..,.,,,._-,,_~.--~-~-*"<-.~ -**,"," '**-'--**-.~ .~...--~~~_,~,--,_..,,_..;;,_.,.,--"-.:.'!:*~*-*--<-:, "'°O'.;o'"~'"----*:-~.:--*O";., .*, .:-.. : ..;.M;,-\ *.* *- t*
!The QA Plan will be revised to clarify the difference between QL-1 and QL-2. PSAR Section 3.5.1.3 has .
ibeen revised to change the definition of nonsafety-related SS Cs, and Table 3-25 has been modified (see :
1
!response to RAI 3.5-3c). QL-2 SSCs are safety-related items that are not QL-1 (see Attachment A).
- C~1..~;,~t~:JliiYl¥2~!.~~§~~TilO,Eiit}~~!ii:f!~~l§K~~?:IJ~ii~iX~i!~f?~!i~~]~:}:~~~:~:**~*.:c:=;-~:--*~:*::>:::~::z:*J
\The QA Plan will be revised to clarify the difference between QL-1 and QL-2. PSAR Section 3.5.1.3 has*
/been revised to change the definition of nonsafety-related SS Cs, and Table 3-25 has been modified (see
)response to RAI 3.5-3c). QL-2 SSCs are safety-related items that are not QL-1 (see Attachment A).
l:'"",_*e. ..1 ~*"*** -'.;f....::.."':"'*"~--.* ;;~j~ ::;.,.:.;~---.:0-w~~-**" ..~-,*~*"7* ;;;:.* ~ ~;:.n, .***- **. :--.~~"'-'*-,._-*~-f':-7*;-.:-** <~,,.*~t~ .. ::.y.--JZ.-o:-'i;,.*:~ *-"".'.!'.,.** ..;;:.;"-H:"..,--'<"'.' .. ..
,.-;.'i.::.;:::.,~;_...-, ,,,,___..,-;-..,.,.~i~;**., ,<"'-'":~"-*--': *~-...'!:*;~;.:,':"""**7,~~*.,,;:c*... i:;.;-.,(~.::.:,_.......:,,;**<:-""'* ;_ *.~"* 'j-/--; --**,']'.
'\ ** RA.I 3~5~ :j'r/'f&I{EG:-1537, Part"h Chapter 9i" :'Au+/-iliary'Systeins, "'st¢tes}:hat the app1icai1t should inelitdethe , " *1
.: " .;\design bases for eaclJ auiiliary systenz. \ ,_. ' ..*. * * * ** * ' * ... * ...... +- . -,..
- .~r- , :'. _:: °'~ . * . .:**, <*~-** '~....;_. *.. ~.*** .. *--~<~".~-: "" . .***,.,t,.~ ; ,*:~:*:*.". /*,< .. :'~." ':.,. . \" :~',
J'Jn cross-referenCing the design bases if(NWMI PSAR. Chapter 9. 0, Auxiliary Sysiems,!;'with those i1:1
- iif848.,, Ch.t;1pter, ~.:91, "~~~i~riqfSJ'if.f:~~re:i ',Sy;tef!ZS;/<1,n~ ,¢9111:Pb!:'ef!t8,. '.:;,a~. :qjJpgr:~ni dts'crepa~cy*~~s. *
.:.}:.}flentiJi,~d:t,;" *.;; .: '*: :.. ,\,, ,.:*. " .. *. *. ,,,,: . :'~ : I <~t .:;> :'."*:: :. ':: * :,._* "*,,-_. ,'\,:
'*r ,,,;
1'"" ,".: ,.[~SA'R-sec~on *3:5?:2; 11?.~<<ioi~oicJj/i::Pr6~Jcn~1YJwac~1iiy;;,i\§fofe§. th~j'.Jy~1iil§;tlnd:~~~~ib~enl~;;vi!Hi~ .
- the RPf are'presente£in [P{!AR]Secfiof! 3.4.'l; whereas FSAR SectiOIJ 3.4
- 1;. "Se1sn1if; jnput, ." .
- ' 1 i" . : .. :;1di$ci(sses seismic desiin :considerdltons: S,ince*the liighertier S~ction.PSAJ13.5.preseifrsRPf System~_;'
. . * ;'.(Ind co,mponentS: this ~tatem~ntis potentially incorrect. : *. ,, * .' : . * , ;: . : ., / * \ *. f,
~;:. *: <'. : ,... l(Providead&itiorilii. irifotmati</n. to'.expz~in ahdlp~ cdrreci~l]iiapparen1 di;ireftaffcy'ln 'i>SAJ!.;! 1 . , , .. : ;':~;
1.~~:.: . .:,,,. ~:.:P,,.LJ§c;sl_i,o_,Yf]:.~},..!hJ!!:..~tq{~~JJ:S!~!J!{H!i4;£<J/1!.f!:P,1!_r;,'l!,~.,1!J~~!':'JIJ/!J!.f.fJ!!:.~J!..C~~f!~f!,f!_!IJJ:§f!li.~/!.£~{~~~.£4.-.1) fThe cross-reference to PSAR Section 3.4.1 was a typographical error. The first sentence in PSAR '
!Section 3.5.2, which pointed to PSAR Section 3.4.1 will be changed to PSAR Section 3.5.1 (see
- Attachment A).
31 of 96
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- l. RAI 3.,9:~1_: \'.~ubparag~~ph_~o'.~~(al(lJ of{tO:C:fl: PJirt:_59~eq_uir~s t~q~*th~ ~fi_pli~antd~~c,~~oe f~~ prol!of~d <!e$ign~
~:~:
'"'°"'!i~7_"'-_
Re uest for additional information
- ":""-.;;- "*'i-'"; ...
- ':!~""" *:*---***;;*_77~---*-;-1~*.rh~*-"¢;-~;-***:;;:**f'*~- ~,r:'~~-:*-r:* "'~--
. ./~:'* :*:\'{/f/~~f;<!f!/llf, mr;f1i<J11;g,::;~*l{tppt ~1-lrl;lte,<f;{g*.t~e;P;fll{f1f/;l/':qr,~h1 tec_tµl:,a,l~q~tf;q~gllJ~fw1g~fF1t(!n,a f<JI!; ,th~.~
1:,: : :!** . '_ ;:_:;, *. .'. '.i~es1~,:;~~1;,r.1entif!r;s "!t:f!orfJ:.ftu~~,~ p~ ~~mfl:~~(!nl~'.*!f{CC!~lJc?fat7/}-~h~['!~l'l. [~!c.thef:1:0t~e:,pon p[Jhe :;; .; ;t
- -*- .-<-~rJ'""-';",__.Jt~~- ~ .. ,.~-~~~-- -;,.,
- *~;-~-- ..- '""'t' ""'"'"'"""'1'*
0 1 1~;,'~';~~~fi~~Ja~~Ji~~i~~~i~~~£WitJ~~~~~~
- ), . >+.: *_.; ;:1,:, *. ;;' i'lfesi~,'-, CO~{lfUCif:<J~, <(11Jii_'dp~tfi.fing:-£hi,lr~c!eiJ,$fjc~, Ofj(J{/, ~cifaty;f,_~lqt~?:~sl~J'n5'.li,fjtj.cqm,ponen~$*i~'{Ji.e, f
- 1
- 1 Ls';.; J::t:,1::::r&~%i"tr~~i'1'J~~~;Ji~~i';;;~li~~:;i;~4;:,!~rk:,/t!~.1:f 1
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)\ , , ;, ,,
- ,:<;{*
- ~ ,
- hctentifies 5'.ev¢rat7ROF,$ a~?J,oYSSf:s a#b,Citjted with'fhe.,ojfgas}reatm¢hi
,;*. *' , * ,, * , .._ -, , ,, * .,_. * < * * \
- 0 ( * ** (" I ; * " "'- * ' Oc * ' ~ _ , ' ,, ** , , ' *_, j
- arid.b'ujlaing'.Wnfilatioit .:;:, a
._.,_,_, * ' ' . " " ,* _j- * *- .'
~, .,, ::1, :::,;;,; .. * , em which ptax an importdritrolein protecting both :m<h worker .andptiblic health and safe'ty,;, These ii r~*:.~f~{~ff0~~!~illF!§i~l1~~!~it~i'~~J~*1 J. :*~~;; ., :;:*~ /, :i h~i t~ d)~;~oq:.ye_a~*r~~urn'perii}dj *. ;tfie1?~fige~ nof sta,tei*ift6;~:sei$1!);_'c <!l!c$fgn,[31/iteri?!. j~, al~p ,bet[ig* ~~
- *
- ~; ;*, .. ":* .;_ . *i@Jp!le,a/OiTIJPP~~arzt.ci!ppqnf!htsi}thi~ (he stfjtptu~~; 'Tll_~*staftneeds:{O u.nflersltiizri.if{h~s¢ <<:.... ,; .. t ti~~~-fliill~iJlii!R+/-~g;]j
!The same seismic design criteria for the RPF structure to withstand a design basis earthquake also applies!
- to the ventilation and offgas systems components that are accredited IROFS. These components will be !
fdesigned to perform their safety function following a design basis event (DBE), including an earthquake. !
1~~.,_-.,::;::-r.r;;_,,.~"'.*~~.:*~~-,.....,~-r,"7;~~~~~.:;....,~.;.;;,.~;...-..,_~~-~-*-~~+'"-'*i~.._:;o..-"l'*'-:~~-f~--~,,..:**r,;,._,..._...,,_,-.,,.._: ..~,w~-*-.-... "V~'°T"'"~.,,...,.....~.-;;;.-~*~;"':C:::'~**~~,.,":"":~:.:.....-."'i<\~_..:;;--.o.";:"-"""'~*"-'="'*'*-..;.;-~_,.,,._...,..,.,,,.;...*'"':'"'""-*.;;,j
~'*:';~li$i5~::;~;rs~iJp~rr/gr/ii/hl's;'di35(4;,fJ;J:o.fid:O,Q.f[R 11 .',.-,1*. ,-"<" '"*"~*: , '*.'.!'),"'" *'",=r. *J,,*:****:, ';', ,>*J, 0 *.;*v<<',I<<,_-.;
IP'<Jn/5o,'f</qlii~e~ t6.f!t1M~dppl/effJ'nt'd~sp1;z/Jf!.:ti/(lifJropq~ed.4fi~irf:,
,.,._*f-,,,,_ 0
- * * . : *. " " *"':*_-,.._~ ".~,H-~*,, ..*,,.,_(, .*.**<*~*,_*: -"°*"', *S<\.'. *':*'*' _.,_'..:~*>~ __ ,,,, l.'!*
l '*; ,,,/., -:)... :.' ]\ofth?'ja9il~ty,* !nc~ifd~ngr bu(:nd( lim~ted(o;_ thif,:prfncipalpf-~hit~¢.t~r~l{ci14lf.ilgin¢e,r.ingdi~~~it;zforJt~e,}
.j: ,:.* *\J:(r .: t~f:'.;. ,},,tinesigfj;;'.iind!has,iaenti}ilid:th'i~lhaJ'/Jf}e~iUfes:6t~coiizp,6n"Jfits"inc<irpoi:atedtfiereinlfor.the.pr6teC'itbrZ.:ofiI
!,.~.,.:,~: *.f;f~~~~~WUit~~~~,2~i;;i;s.$;J~~31l~~~~~~~i~2~J~;L:l***~
- , .* . ,.~;,,. .
- 1fhe1saine typ,<!' ofinformation.presqribed:in Section :'3,:J(l, onJhe <fesigrr; constructiori. and opet;atingt,' ., . l
- ,*;;'.
- ;
- <::*. '.'if~har~~te'Yiifl2~:,111f~li's~Jei/J.~'e1atf/J:iy~t'c;ir'isiiii'ili:brAp6it~lit~:*;iNkJ;Ffi'&;'Oi86i6pk/]}~odul:'tion(2'CitifY.*f,:)
- 1/ ** .: .,..,-..,:~, ::. , , **../-Jr-> *,:::.~;":'" *. ~s~,":~. . -.* .':-~~ ~ <i, ,~: *;**~.J - ,. *:,:-~;;:-~ ~~ ..~ ~~-~~:t. >.:~ ~,_ _, J:. : :::~\~~: . ~.,;:~: , . ; \~~:*.. , , :". t.;~':~~-~* *,,~ *,,,.,:~'.~: .;'~->" . ._, '.:.; ~-:--: -;. *-.~>v~~ *'*"'~~*-~;:;:,-'~ _* !:,~ :T. c!
I. * . ::;;1:.r.: ..*:,,, ;, *-~ ,**NWMI<PSA.RcSection:i3N.7 ./Codes andStandards;l'identifi.es.codes,'lind:standdrds.used a8gyidahce: i:
i:s:~::~~*.;~~~~W[~~~~A~~4t~~
1
)" , { *. ;< * *i~.~}5~}{bo~h the ?QO~ 1?,?rswncana:the 1!1<;,re r~qent 2.Ql 5 verswrtJ .stat~~m ~ection J3~:-Th~::: .' '~
~~~1etr~l~~:$~t~t~n '7:
t, .'. .c:J. ;*. ,; ;:: ~*:; ~;:~{lfif!t~,~<{pfi~ot, ce.~~; ~if~i{?/!}en,fJtepq/r,§~quJfl;_kf1if/i1!1f~er<!4i!.~~l'J,#.:tf1!;1~~i¥1Jph'f{fi'.' :TP:f, a,,PP}isatip~ .* *. i
~...;,. ,. ' .*' /; ,.:; . ;;ijoes:l'lo,t. diScilss'desigrzfeature's.)nteiJcJ~.d.fo /qC,ilitiJ_t~ md,~fltenq~c~Jn'fhe reiizote~C(!llS;:]!rirticular,ljlthe ~
~.):~~::.:: ~~::~~~;::x:' ?lW10:'~:4?~:c.~,~t:'.(_,.*1t{/"~~~i ;: -~~t£~i{f.~1~** :;i~t;;;;:::I:;r,~:~:~:,:1rc~t:i';,, :.1.;.~*b:::::~;~~~;: ;;>*:f~k:,; ,'.i~;.{* **t" :,*!~#~:: .r: ,:::1;~*'.:i,*~~~::s.*.si 1 I :*;:? ...... :~~'.** . *..~JDescnbehow./NWMI Has considered'mathtenance *operalions;:"particil1arljlJin '.t ... *or cells; dvhen ff'.,,* " ..'\
E~;.::.~?{;~:~~:J~~~;1fJl~i~~~fk~~1i~~~J!i1~t~;ffi~~1%t1;2~qrd?fi~Z~t:~~!!~2r~~~-::~tj!
/Each of the hot cells will have manipulators that will be used to perform maintenance within the hot
\cells. Equipment within the hot cells will also be positioned on skids for ease of removal and replacement [
!if necessary. If maintenance cannot be performed by the in-cell manipulators, the cover blocks can be I
\removed and the required equipment replaced. For the tank hot cell, a portable manipulator can be moved l Ito different locations with the tank hot cell to perform maintenance. The design philosophy that will be !
iincorporated in the FSAR as part of the Operating License Application will use remote handling for as Jmuch maintenance as possible within the hot cells. In additional, the ventilation and changes in building
!configuration will be designed to maintain zones and barriers consistent with defense-in-depth, ,
iredundancy, and independence
!. -- .,...,. .......... - - .............. ~--* **- **-- ,.,,..,, *---* .....
to protect
~ ...................
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,,.,.,.~-*---*--~*********-
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I 32 of96
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.;*:- .. ....,...:..-.,,*:~*z:...:r.**;'.:""'" ,,"i'~~-/P~;.~p- ...... -,*:.:..*+9-.*,",;..- ~,., ..~ ~' - :--;F~~"'~:--"'-'*'*.,* ' 0 ~**-"'.'-7:'~;,-'*""--:-. '-""*"-::"i~'"llf*:.. "':,. '*'~-'*!*.'*:~... -.;,_,~,.,,.:-~....-.;;;-:~:-~*"ff*'--~ ,-.;.-~-*-~!;'"*~:r:.-~"';~--;~*~ **-;:-::/"':-~°if"~* - .'***:::'; ,-"7~:rc;*c;-;-1:***-(r*:~**/.:}~- ,:*.*:;-~--- \~~.:~~:-.*>;*,.*:- ;:n*~'-"..-*"1 ,*t:~**r;:.
r**RAr3;5::.9.::'J'.The1SG'AugirienljngNpRFB-153'7, Parr!,'Sectir/f{'6b.~;* /'J{uCl~ar.Cfitii:d(itjlSa[etyln:the .>:.;'<:* *.. .'. *.;
\ . . ' : , .. ;~adiological Production* Facility,,'~ states, in part, that.the license.application must pmpose .*.: ~:
ii'. . * . *>i;equ!pJnen,t,,facilities, andprocedur¢~ to enSl{re tho/the d{!sign pro.v.id?Sforc;jticality/;onf[ql,,; * ..* . .'
i.*. * .. ,..: *,. 11irqiudi"Y:g.~_dher~n~e to iii~ '.douoi~*:.Cofitilzgeney prin~ipt~. Furthiirn/¢~e,. ~ecii(jn 6b~ ~ oftheJSQ~ -. *... "/' t
.;. " * . .:* i-(1.ugrnentingNUJ?EG-:15~7;, Part-Jstates,.in,part,.lhf:l(: * '* * , ~. :*.~ "* .* .. . , . * * *" * * * . * ~
- .;,._;*,' .~h * ~ '~ ','~. ,,' ,.," ~ ;, *,*> '"~~~;';*
- *; ~' J'.
a f *I - ; , '° * *' ,"' > ". *" ',*, I',,"*.' '*
0
- i. ,... ..**, ;; , : "The ,applic,011{ shoulrj iJescribe pro~fmi that'e,nsw:es cptJ1pli~nce w'itli' the, (/ouble1;ontirigen(JY, .. *t
- ).
- *' **. 'll* .*: pfincijJle;" wf!ere practicable.* Process'fs' iri' which"there dt'.e *no'crellib Ii!, "acc'iaent scen'Grios that leCic{\
~. : * *1\ . to 'cr,iiicalitynu:et 'the '(/ouble-conting~neyprinciple' by definition~ This prin,~iple, l1sgiven in*:: :, t
- .Jt*
- .. Amer,icaii NatJona( Stqndards.]fi§titute/Ame!icar.rl'fuclear. _SocieQ!.(A]i[SJ/A'l'{S);,&T-/998, ,f'JXtR;leat':i.
!; ' " ..,. l >>Criti<;:ality Safety in Operati6ns w~th fissionable }vfateri9ls Outsii/e Reactors, " staief ihatat least.. ;,
.' ' '.' 'i:.. <tWo*:c~anges in, pro.c.ess*condttions. must:occur. b~fore criticality is_.poss,ible.. !ft!J~re, '(Jt:e no.J),rocess J i ' ' ,-,-:.,_;'.:-:> chang<{s leading io _critzcdlitj;:iheh theprincipleds);atisfilf/i..~. ,..: t), :. : >.t* "~' ?~ :": ' ' '.;,. _; ;:
i'.Tfie !;G~u~~ie~~ng NvREG- ~*5~7, ,Pa;d,.Sect;o~, 6b.3 s~;~~~ ~h~i .i~c: 'c]~plf~~n;_;h;~[~*descri~e .J ": :._;_
1
\* : , . . ;. :
- ~pr,ogr~'!' that.en.SUres.conwlian,c~'f.Vith 'the)Jo,ubl~~cqntingency*prindf?~e. /:1.dd/tipljal rjeta~lf,oiz:!Jo,ub/7"
- i, . /J:ontingency are. provide in NUREG-15 20, which containf current industry practices OIJ qontm1l.ed' (
1* " .;/;arametet:sandacceptarice:criteriiL NUIJEG-1520, Se9tion'3.4:.3.2, *'.'~ntegn1ted,SafetyAr1alysis . . [:
' ' J;~~l11/1!aiJ.;~4*Pfj~mr~!°,fi~n;*?' f(~tes, ilJJJJIYt, ~h.~~ if:9 PfOC~~~- !s ~f'S'.!i]le.~, .~~cl~~* 1,1.?f?_fi?n~g<;.d~r.e: I
. *. .*1wpeqified, to en~re cntical mass control bydouq/e.,.batchmg;proof,dhe ma,rg1!".fro111 a smgle./;1atch to,;';
.* '.* * ***;'.the sub.criti¢a/.limit shou/ib,e*sp'¢~ified Trad,iijonalJY, the:~ingle baich.is4S% oft!Je.~bcrdicallimit. <<'i
- '.*,.::.1f!ORE/;J_~)~~q, ~;.q.~o~,.{*$; ?:{!::.~:.; ;'jf~Pl.~~[f:on at;~*{J1lPlemen{~~?r:0.(,Po~~-~l,l~d P~~~,,~~t({r.*tys::. *. '::: .::,.\
- .*>\})u,bsectjon 4c, states*thatwhen overl;iatchmgofspecwl nuclf!a~ material '(S_N!vfJcJs crf!'ij!b1~, th~ largest"'
- :;mass re~i.tltingfrom a single failure.is showl'J to be subcritical and OW!rbatcJiing_ beyond double- *
- 1 batc~ing:shoulcf. be, consiqer<!d Uf![e.ss it requir.es ~iultiple indeP,endentfailures._,'Qr, is. p~e,clude.d b;: * .~
- :. 'i!eqtiipnie!licapaCity, *awiilabiliiy'ofmate~ial,.'Qr qth~l:..consideraiions., **' ,. * * *" * " " * ... * ' . Z
.. rmf1MI ;SAR. Chbpter; l~:3,* 4, *ana**9 di;~:~.th~ .;~Sµl(s ~!p;e/i1~ii1a~~criflqa/;Q!.:sdfei;*ival~qti~ni. ..,
. '*.')(
A\andthepdssiye:.desiftn
' ' ' . ':' *-~ . /i~ _'
- eJ!ul
- es;
'il'ctivJ :engtneehhgfeamre~ttilid. adinini~traiive controls'.h~cJ'Ssaryfo~J ~,, -~'.' *", ~ ,,* l_\>~t
.*. ;;adhefen9e* to' the doufJle-cofltingencypririr,:iple. PSAµ Chapters ?and* 13.. identify double-batc:_hi11g_ as a; i* ..._ **.'-. * ',*_;_ - *. ' ,,'*. ', ' ' .* ; * .: ,,_, ' ' * " . ;'. : --- . ' {'.
.* i:bounding 'accid,(mt, Jn response ioR.1)1 3. 5.,f (ADA}y1,S Accession.No;}.?Ll 6123Al J.9)/NWMJ states '
I* t ' ' * ! ' "Jithat SSCs will Qe;'use#d:Pfevent*an iniidv.<!:r.teµ(driticaiity rfc4deiirl{11d in respOf1Se;to'fiAI 6:3~$>
- .* . * . *::µwMlcommits to 'iµaintaining a r_igoro~s nuc(ear cnticalif;tsafety program"lising the*dtn.ib!e~*. ** . :
..,Fconting?.12cy ptinqiple. The PSJ!,R dpes iw{ospf!cifica.lly, addr.~ss.[he tii{lrgin .fro!J(a, singleprocess..batch. ;
. ~ '.*)ti\to .the *~,b,¢,riticaL,X/,mtt!~Q1;,does~i~~iq~~ if ~V,erb~tc~fngof~N.tf!'i.s.~re~iljkfa1µcwl1eth~~i9.~erkat~~ing .. .(
- . *;\beyond double-batching has:beefi. cdnside;:ed iii theNWMI RFF d{!Sigh. :* *: ,'.* . '. ..,:_: * .* >., . . , ,
'l! .. *' " .: *_' .' ' ,' *1. * ""* ' ~ ','. , ' ' :, , ' ' *: . ' ' _, ' ~ :' - *. , " * ' , ', * * ' ' i ', ', ; . *; ' l ; ~ , ' *I, '
- lt!ddit~O.~ril i!JfqFnfafiofJ ~S.*~'!?fled]f!r:the:J!'f}C stq.JtJq*11n(ler~f/!.~dth,~.'.{echnif.iitdsP,eqt!ic~6f tij~, .~*:*;: * <: ::. :.
- fcritica?ity'safety evaluation*anif confirm tha( the aci
- ,eptance criteria 'bfthe IS(J.1fugmeftting N{Jf?EQ-:
- i . '.i1537 heye'been met, Spei:ijically;the NRG.staff needs to confirm tfle*marginfrom d single ba_tc_h to the,1 J,'. :; .. , , . . ~;~bcritiqal !itiJif :an,d :~h~tqe~ the1 n~a.rg/n &;:~erS,, '.~~;tr,adifiongLvc1JiJ.e., ?t,45 ~-, .'f.hff ~D:~fa.if qls.~. die.¢s.J
. *: *:.:'to: unders,tandwliethe,r overbatcf!ih'g is:crcrdib1efor:tlie NWA1l'RPF or1Sprecluijedby:equipme,nt * ':* .* ":
i '. ' ' . 'Jcapacity;.availabi?iiy o]!f/aterial; or other consideration. !tis, not,C!eqr whether the)efoimatiolj.!* : *'; j Jlpr,ovid~1'.f'f. tf?~ J?~ i(i,C~fr1pJ:t~:.f!)1(1 coliJJ?:~~/1en"ii,~~*re_gp1#J!;ig/Jif!,,,q~dlj,fttJ?i:.?!fltf~ifJ~Pb,f~.~[q!er~a{
f *, *:. *.: . * * ::i)contaffJi!dln
- --~
- ~:""::::.*.-.:-: ~.:--::.~::..:-:"-::: :::::.~:. .. _-;_-:*.-:** = ~~* :::~***~-**
th,epr~cess*~q'itipmen{;durtngnormal operatioY,.s;*:-: . :,:*.> * . * ., , .' * ._.,, * :'; '.'>*~*
.. .::.:: .:..:::.:..:-.:.::-:-~::.-.: .::!:: ;..--:,*. *...=* ..:.~;:.--:-..,::."-;:::.:.- ::...:-::~:::-:c.::_-:.: :-:...-. ;-..::::.:.;~.: .-..... _- .:::':* -*"7'.:.-~ *;.:*::-;'.; ~-~::. *-;**::::. *~'7.;.":.,;;.:;.
- --.
- >.:::..~-:."".';-;,=-:::-:~*; - .~-~:: :-::-.,**. ~- *. -
- RAI 3.5;-9a iProvide additiqniil detail.on the inargin from a Single process batch:to the S11b9ritical hmitin all. ... ...*c_\
i; . . .: * : . , . }pl'.odu'Ction ptoc'i.ss equipment aiid:provide ,ah ev.aluati.on of'overbatcf;ing o; i;t:Yeference to such :an ;' !
1
~-.-~.... :.~.,:__:.* .. ~:~~;!1!a!~?i.~-- -~ ~*~:... _*. ~. *::~_*;_ __ -~-= ~:~_. . . :* -'.:..:_~----~;~~2~ :*__*_:.: _:*. . -"'*~~i__ J ~~-~.:- _* .... * -~.~-<~~::_,,;,~:'.. ~.D
- NWMI developed several calculations (e.g., NWMI-2015-CRITCALC-006, Hot Cell Tank Pit, and jNWMI-2015-CRITCALC-002, Irradiated Target Low-Enriched Uranium Material Dissolution), that
!looked at overbatching. The hot cell pit criticality calculation, NWMI-2015-CRITCALC-006, looked at iconditions in the large. hot.., cell
.~ *"'" .... , -- -
that were well ..*above ,. .. -
double-batching .-
conditions. '
33 of 96
.. . NWMI
.:;~*~~*
.*:.**.*.~.
~ ~. ~~.~~ .~
NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0
- NOflJffW[Sl MEDlCAL IS.OTOPU Re uest for additional information
'l ~ *, *,***.*-* *; .* -*- r' _,. --* '.. - '1 * * ** * .** *. ~-.t** ,-.< ,. -, ' ~-*.; * - . , . - ' -:. . . . . . . ~; - *n,-~-~- - ... ,... :>~*.- - ~ ~*"-..-':;" "', -~.' * *""".': /.*~**** --;-*-'" ~- ""'.-,-~ - . - *:- --*~~""';r~* .. *- -**.-;--*,i**d: * ' -~, **.-~--~~- ~;- < - ;
- RAI 3.5~9b (Provide.'(J listing ofall are/1s ahdprocess. 'equipment thatare:~xpected.to contain jiss(oripble material. 1:
.*-*.::: ...,-,....,-.--'* ----~~-__,,~""- *- --: -;*"*~-"'-~* ,:..-----~ ...,~ -...:c*r.*- ;:-.-..,,.~-;-.*--""- -*..:>,.-o::.-:: .-o,--:::-;;.-,,_,. .... _.. ___..,;,,_;***~*.* *.- *"~"'"""° .*. -~ -**-"*-.~**.-..*-~. *** -,,-* ,,,~.--*-= .,-*:-: ,.,,.. ..,_.,_- _.,," -.:-:.---~*--:.'-: . . . . -::* ---~., ~"~- * ."*":" :<
'The list of all areas and process equipment that are expected to contain fissionable material is provided in j
- psAR Chapter 4.0, Sections 4.3 and 4.4 (e.g., Table 4-51, "Uranium Recovery and Recycle In-Process 1
- Special Nuclear Material Inventory"). ;
- t. *~:~~ ~~3~f~t~~r~f9~ififfi.t;~{ffi!;~~~£~i[~;f~~~~z::~a§ff~!0E~~~~t!t!:iJ.{((~~:~~§~~~'.-*J 5
- The maximum quantities or concentrations of fissionable material for all process areas or process
\equipment during normal operations are provided in PSAR Chapter 4.0, Sections 4.3 and 4.4 (e.g.,
°Table 4-51). ,
5
[Rf~~~~ :~d/{f{i~~~ik~:;~~~~?~~~~f:~~~~fj:;~f~~~~~{r~~=b~~:::~~~i~~~i~fri~r;~~-~~l7fTi~f~J
- The bases for the above maximum quantities, including numbers and types of targets or special nuclear
- material (SNM) in storage or being processed, are provided in PSAR Chapter 4.0, Sections 4.3 and 4.4 (e.g., Table 4-51).
f.~!~~*~~~-~1f:L~Wf~;s~~a;~:;~f:~J~;ft1Kf:~~~~ ~t-~~~i?~;.~~%~~ ~~:zm~!~::?Ji~~s.~~~~~t~~~f{~~e-s 6 1
'.The quantities or concentrations of fissionable material used in the criticality analyses for all areas or process equipment are provided in each individual criticality calculation or criticality safety evaluation.
iTue single process batch to subcritical limit will be presented in the FSAR as part of the Operating
- License Application.
)~ ,.~,:~~~~~~]~;;~~;~:~~-~~z{~~~~:1E~:~~~~-;;;;;;1~,:~~i~i;;i~l~;,i~d~<<"¥~~~/jE:~~~~-t~~=~~:.;:~~~-~::::~~
'The criticality safety analyses conducted for the RPF are documented in the following:
Criticality Calculations
- NWMI-2015-CRITCALC-001, Single Parameter SubcriticalLimitsfor 20 wt% Uranium-235-Uranium Metal, Uranium Oxide, and Homogenous Water Mixtures
- NWMI-2015-CRITCALC-002, Irradiated Target Low-Enriched Uranium Material Dissolution '
- NWMI-2015-CRITCALC-003, 55-GallonDrumArrays
- NWMI-2015-CRITCALC-004, Single Parameter Subcritical Limits for 20 wt% Uranium-235 -
Low-Enriched Uranium Target Material
- NWMI-2015-CRITCALC-005, Target Fabrication Tanks, Wet Processes, and Storage
- NWMI-2015-CRITCALC-006 Hot Cell Tank Pit Criticality Safety Evaluations
- NWMI-2015-CSE-OO 1, Irradiated Target Handling and Disassembly
- NWMI-2015-CSE-002, Irradiated Low-Enriched Uranium Target Dissolution
- NWMI-2015-CSE-003, Molybdenum-99 Recovery
- NWMI-2015-CSE-008, Hot Cell Uranium Purification (Recovery and Recycle)
- NWMI-2015-CSE-009, Liquid Waste Processing
- NWMI-2015-CSE-010, Solid Waste Collection, Encapsulation, and Staging
- NWMI-2015-CSE-011, Ojjgas and Ventilation
- NWMI-2015-CSE-012, Target Transport Cask and Drum Handling
- NWMl-2015-CSE-O 13, Analytical Laboratory 34 of 96
. . ~*~~:.:.* NWM I NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0
. ~ ~~.: ! ;
- NORTN\'iltst fo"i.1llltAl IS(JitlPi.S CHAPTER 5.0 - COOLANT SYSTEMS No. Request for additional information r~.*-*~~~~i-:*~4.:L~~*.**:'~::~~~~;~::;~.~j~~;~~::~~:~~;<i~~ti~~~~i~.;;~ij~t;I::~~~i~~
!i.*' RAF5~ 1;..1, ff]uf 1$CF;AugmentingNUl/.EG-)?37,: Part ,4;'. Section 5b/ "Radioisotope Production F'.li,cility Cdolirig ' :. -~
~ ' f , * ,_ , , , , *, - , . , * *. * .. , ' * * * , " -,, , , * * * * , * * ,,. * * * '. \ , ' * .* , * * , r, , I
,i . *. -*- .* : ' :* .i(Sysie~n$;, stqtef; ,i~1 part, that "the rcvie'fe(-Jl10uldascertain tl?attlwapp{i~aijophas jJrpv_ide~. m1* *-. * .... \
- * .. , .
- .: :'.adequate,_qrialysisto e!'sure_.t~a( tl]~re isnp'[L~<!dfoi:.*auxi#ary_q)qfing.,dw:ing:.flJ~ . cou1-:}eyo/anypprtof'j
- * * .* * *
- './he radioisotope production process.." TIJe JS(]-A1igmentingNU,REG-1537, Part 1, Sectfori 5b, ."- _. i
- \
- ('R,adioisotope _P_r.oductif!n, Fqci,lity (:ooling.S~ft~ms, states,,inpari'.* that. ihe, /icense ppp#catipn. ** i 0
~*. , ... }iS,hgu1a:,~~~~i~er, l~~ t:Jeca~tt~~.~ *a!lg~r,1qft~~.~t~~;<fr11,ef,tY;ra¢J~qrmf1,i_.:~f1~ ':f~9~9i;:NfR~t,;t~e,, se4~r(;i!ir~A
- * 'processprogresses~"**" .: * * -. ' * * . *'* ** ;.,.1. ~ **. *; *:,_., ... ... ,*.* * . **:, . . , .... *,,,
- _,*, 1,~; ,i~j .. ~ ,'. '. 'f,,",'.<4(
- .\" *~: -.. : ' .:.,.;', .~ ';*,Aj~* *I'.":*,.,.
.. L: ,:'.-r\:'.* >*)*~.~~ :_,~',1'~,.'.o',*,*4; ;.:::,,: * '., ,:f
- .1....
- .;:}T!f.'MIPSAR Secfion5.J.}, "Irradiated Target Basis;" Statesamiriimym/Jecdytimefor,:receip(of' . _.,;*:t
.~ .~!ia~gc!f$. bg§ed:on t!Je* 19.ca_ilori~*oftize::~ft retafive to;:thi-reac(o~.'sue~,ifl:ff1N.{r,';.M ~ P.ul.Jf.iciliz,~etllik:;::. . *. : :,J 1* . '.(f;resentatip1i on March Hf, 2016 (:ADAMS Accessioh' No. ML16153A409),, stated that the e'stini'afed * . *;
i!* * "< . Ftr.aveltime and.distance from'tlie MURR-irradiation site andthe.RJ'Fis 3o:*miijutes. and 6 niiles."~Tlie*.. !
'.L >* *. *: * * , *./;n~~(i111at~4tr~e(fi.~e bf 3Q*~;if!~tei~i :co~sfri?rabiy*~(is~' ihm:rthe mtrdh~un_i_ d~¢.ay, tiniefa~j:¢9~1pf _'*,:. ~ ::* '.
- ** .' :* * '. *:;specified iri Sedion -s: l. J.: These* targets form. the bds_is ofthe heat generation,?ate, calCl{latioiisjor
- _'.:
t* '. ,;. . ;*.~:J~~~.lua~f&f, =~1.~e~~~~~ a~f1~~?'.:~~~(i~~:::L:';::*: ;,*:; :'/~;'.,,: :. '.;-,,;,;;: ,..:. , ,:,-: :* .
" . : 1':,Additional'iriformation is ne.e,deqforNRCsi'affto U,riderstaHd the basis*ofthe.;deC.aytifn!! assumedfor' J
- ,;;;< ,;;, ,>,* *l.~
- ::,:,*. , }*~i/ ,.;". ,j i) , *, * ;iMuRR. targets and.that ihe-)Jecdy time is cdnse~ativ_efoi- e\Jaliiaiing ~he need fo( ailxi fidrj cooling..* . l
~'. ~' i, i .. _i\J?1:ovide. ad#io11aldetaii'on.the:minimum fl~cay time *il.llo~e{i'after. th~ e11d ofirradiation:'OfMf:JR/.?. , ;;J.
> < ;, ' ' , ' * * > : '}. - * ' *- , C ' * ' * - O > " oJ * ' ' -' ,. C 0 * .' , 0 < ' O ' ' ' 0* L ' ' ' *-: :.,. ' '
0 l:* ' ' 'iitargets' iifr:ti.tding 'hO:..V 'the handfirig: and trafzspor,tatiJii -tinies'fz~e been rieteniilnkd 'ahd demonstrate .. 'f
- .* * .. * .,.
- *:,; 1,\vhy (he.mf.nimu,m.:decay time for (brget.receipifron_iMURR i~co11se~~tive'for ey;aluatin,g. th~ n~~dfor * )
r:'.~,~1:~;~'.:;;;il~;,,_jE~:H!?ti}Z~l~1~:~:;:::;;'.::l:~'.;~*~~:~*. ~~:_.~3~~E*-;j'.:!iL:;:~2:.21~:~:. ;:'.'.'L~2~E..~.:::i::~:'..1:*.:1~~:.:.:,;:;~IE}~~:_:_.~;'.~r~L~*:':~;::i jSeveral material-handling steps must occur after the end of irradiation within the reactor before a cask jcontaining irradiated targets can be transported to the RPF. Examples include transfer of targets into the Jcask, removal of the loaded cask from the reactor pool, assembly of the cask lid, removal of water from
!the cask, drying the cask, performing the cask leak-check procedure, and cask decontamination and
/verification. At-reactor handling procedures are projected to require significantly longer than eight hours jfor an individual cask. Independent of the actual cask handling time required, the clock time for end of
)irradiation of a target batch becomes a datapoint recorded on transfer papers, and a cask will not be
)unloaded until the minimum decay time after end of irradiation used in safety evaluations has elapsed.
r*RA1*5:;-:2-~Jfh;'1s<§A.Ji;;~;;ti~g}.ffiRi6=t5~7:*'P;;;-2;~s;ctio-:t~5'b;,~1f;;J1bi;;!~=p;-p;~dt;;tib~F;;~1111Y'c;b/i~i*** --;,
1 . ,' i:Sys(ems,,'.' states, in part,, thatthe .reyiewer,sf:Iould as2ertain thµi the applicptiopba~pro,V.ided cm , '.*', .i
'. .*: {ctdeqtfate Qn(J!ySi~td.ensuri?~thqttfidre'.is no:11f!~dj0,kq~ilia)y (:6o!ing <Jui:ing::the.course,'.6Jahy[i"ar/of,1:
) . "jthf!,_radio~~otope'producq~mprpe,~ss:. ' * * *,**, * *'.,~". ' . * - , * . .: . f,
,I: _. ~.;/ .,.: ,: _.; ,;J~IffJM. .sect;~~//ji,:,,"!fr4~ifti.4TtJr~ifl3q~(si~~,,sta~~~:l~ J?qr,(:.!!Jqt, .':,~~/v!.~pP,~r,(ltio~,!~ *. -~:;t t' * : :, :*:* ~ * . , . *'.i'Qased on)rrad,icifing eight targets per week.;.-*.*and:'.~TherefO,re; heat loadfrom' receipt ofMURR ' , * ;,
'J. : ' . , iitargets"hafb~en zised as ~n-#pper.bouf!dfor_irradiate(I"targ~t~e.ceipts atthe RPF.::;PifJ.R * .': * - *.: 1
!. "' ,i;~ep.fiori:4,1'~*1, ."Pl;oces~.P,esignBasis,."std(e~*that,','The RPf is qe~gneq.to-f:I{zye.a rio!liinal . . ;r,/~) * )
- ,, * ', ;rope!ational pro1essing capa.bility,ofone. IJ'<!;tcfz per week;ofupto'-~21ti11
- gets from Uni~'ir1iiY:of}v{issour.i) i _ J!!J*Ffse~rc~ J?eactor.(Mo/ill/ ' . Th~,n~minal?P~r.ation_al pr,o~e~sing ~a?a~il~ty:of!2 targpsp_eY,}Ve.ff~ . .
- t
,j~.. ,.:* *: ;,:).fi'f!'t.1ldM[{1!f!,.AO:,: f{'!ted, '115.f.1~1** fi. -~ff~pl,~ .1): 3ih:l,;1f g~deafi.~er,.th.(J'!l*~:!~e: ~. !~rl,;ge~!S'.?~[}1'1-e~~fi:.W!! Ml!!fl~, ~sf:. *'!::*
.' .:: *:1 :sta,e 'in I'*o.til\. .%c'tioh* . . or eva uating t e' nee or,.auxi iary coo iY]g.. - :,:, ' ' :.. <*;: ,*~. '1*:,;.r i ,
i~- .. .*::i~4!1itionatinformkti~~
- - ***- --**-* . . . --*--~-* ~--~*--------::. -,;_~.--.-- --~-------~
- ~~~dedfo'r°NRc.,;~to ~ri.der~t~Mjh~*~PP~rboundf;~ irrbdi,a~ed
- t~fge{
- ._ *_*:*~
.'!ir~9eipt.~*at:the RE'f'asu'secitndh~ rinalysis:io-aeterm{ne:the!1ee,dfo{a,'i¢.ilia9{co.o~irig:)~-: < 5> ': *. :: i
-- --=--~~- ___. .__ _.,.., _,..,_.____ _,,._ - - - - --- .,_. ~--~C..~.r- ~- ,.,. ,.,.---!.--.,..._ - - ~!.--..-.,,-~-
- ~-..,...:_.;;~-- ..,,. ___ _,.,. ..* --
1
...,..l 35of96
NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0
- =*~;;~:.NWMI
-::.**.-.:~
.. ~~~.~~:"* NlllUffW£S:tMEmCAllSOTOPE8 lf.
l i*
0
" '*: ." **;.+:'.! ',~
- ~1 5;1-2 '.'f?.~solve
.. '-' * **--:_I* ':'}" "" * ~""""'"'<'*;:"" ::i *~*,:, * : vf' :,..-:~:* : ***:* <o**"<~*";"'l'"~[~': '"
Re uest for additional information y,* ,~. *,;:; ~?~*""'.'. *~ ~ ...,..-* *- "';!,,'.*; *.-"t'-
the fnconsi~tei'Jq betweef1 thf! numQ.er ofMUJ?.R targets.*{i.e:; *s per wee/t)'usedfot ~ssessif!g the~
- ... * <c.<?n~) ....
- Clwmal.~liaracteris,tjcs oltfie prq9e~siY1g equipment W:i4 the.nwn.~er*ofMQRR tqrgets (i,~., 12 per . * *;j .
- . :. l;\lJl.~ek}:us<!_cj)nJh{JJ:fF fqcil{tf,deS,igr(,basi.s gf!d dem,plj~t:rqte_* t1!.CJ~~8 ta.~get~ per;*'~eki~ <J,soniery)J.tive *.- j:
f .. .. .. . : 1(d~Sif5.n bdsisjor t~i_cooli~~ ~stem eyaludtio!J considering:.that, tlieJ?J!F4s designed to h~e a n6r/i.i,n~C"- t
....-*.;;;-~,~~_:-*.,-*.- _**** ~;~7;'::-t. ,,.,...,..... *~*;t ,-,' "~**;; - ,~::-."~.';""' "'."."*:!~' '\- -'-* - '<*-';::"*~~,\,;: ':J*-;** :*~, "{;~;:7**: *, *M * -*~ ,""';'
1 . " .. **;'.*: ....
- i:op,eration.at processing capability pfitp to 12MURR targets:per.Jveeli.. * : *." .* . ~*::'" ; .~ :;- :,: , 1
- e;,_~.. ~-"*,.-,"'~*~)!...,.,.~,
- ,:*~-~:,..;.~:,..,:~~;,...-.'*"'*-,l:, ::,<~)~:-!*~~~~.**.~*~,.y,j';~~~ ;,,.,.,:,.!1-~:~~~. ,.,,_,..~,,"~-":;);"'t.f:~;..~,,h':~"":C-.5:.;-;--:~:-;:.,._.--:,..>~~~ ~~\...:.:....;....~. --.~;_.f,;.,.~:r.::.,."~-~~-~~.:,,, ~~;-~0~..:,.~-;.,:~~-s.,.__.;_., ..,.,.~~~G-::.-d~~-"~:,.!;.~ ..,",.;~:~ ..~
\The target load per week described in PSAR Section 5 .1.1 will be changed to 12 MURR targets per week I
!in the FSAR as part of the Operating License Application. The modification will include update of !
)NWMI-2015-CALC-022, Maximum Vessel Heat Load, Temperature, and Pressure Estimates, with a l imore detailed analysis and revision of PSAR Section 5.1.1, Figure 5-2. The inconsistency identified is !
- not expected to modify the thermal analysis in subsequent sections of PSAR Chapter 5. 0. The thermal
- iload is characterized by radial heat transfer in a vessel and the uranium concentration of solutions held
'.within vessels throughout the RFP. Increasing the number of targets processed during a given week 1
!increases the total liquid volume contained in geometrically favorable vessels (or liquid level height), but)
~o~s not change the uranium concentration or radial thermal flux. !
36 of96
NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 CHAPTER 6.0 - ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES
~~*;,:~~~~~~~~~~~~~h:£;j,;;,~_i.~,,\l
- 1. ~1 6,3~ )!se~tfon. 6. ~:q r!ftfleJSGA'Ug,izen'ting'Af;ufiAG-: ~5,qz;* Pd¥2/statei'ih'at the appliqa~/:sh'ou(di~~zud~ *a'* !,
- ? ***< ..~
- ., :.~ i;~u_!,Jin~ary tj~s¢rif?.tjpn,of,~ dof,u.rr1f!nJ7<.4.:1;o/iew.ed,;.ef.nd,Cfpprqve.f!.w;i{idgtio1:reparf;('?Y NCSfunctt(Jn a/id \
r * *'. :* 1.. ..:.: ynaiuig~me,ntJJor~~ac_h ni~.th9~ot0gy, .t1fat;lj!Jll.~e:T.1,~~,<{to,perfqr1i ~'! N,<jSanq!ysis. *Tke.sui?p:za,17 ..
- ):* . . . * * * ':' i\descfip1iof! ofa reference milntiaforvalidation 17eport should include (h~following:fa) asµ1,1lf!l(Jry oJ;. ;.
<* l
. * : *iitfie theory ofthe meth,odology that is siljjii::ien#y detaile}lcinil Clear:to.~Mundersio'od; i~Cluding the *7 :
1
~' , . / !'.metho411seqt~ selectthe ben'Ch1!1arkexperiments; (b) .deterinir(e '.he*blai:a,n,~iincertairlfy_ i11 'fh,t~ bias;_".* i:
'i *
':and{c}determiiu~.:theiuppen subcriticalliniit:
'~j )", <> ,* *' > ~' ' ': ' * ; ' : ,** , : * ' - * ~ '
- r r
- ,* * * *;,
- ' , o
~
" r .' ' ,' ' 0 ' ' ;
1
- .. * "*~* : 1:Tabie 3 aYJdSe,ctior 5.Ll ofithe Validation Report '(Nrf1Jl{!J.:.20J4~RPT-OO~/~'MCNP°6:1~V'a]idfifions .. * * '.
~~* . * ;M!ith. Co'!tiijuousEnergy.!iNJ?F?B-T{I1_41 Cross:.Sedions(:'. ~~v. O)s~ow~.th~*niajofi"tj;,'ofb~~'c;hfl:lark *, .. '.*1
- > , j;~xpf!r.Jments tq be, .in ,the tang~ <!f 9'. 90~: to:fJ, Flvf(!:T/ whicb if. stated a~Aeins. tn, ~h,e fhen;naf: fange,~The * ~1
,1 * * . )nirii!Jlum vpliie .ofthe averageneul[on~energy cdusin~fi'ssi(Jn._(AN!JCF)Jor.qny b.enchmarz~isgfven ~s i i' ".' *~ - -: :10.00L/3Jyfel-: 'whiCh fs cqnsider'i.d signfficanilj ab9V.ejhe th~ifn(it range. - .'*~. ' : *~ :*" < ' :;*
~:,;;;:;.;:.::f;~***=:.;-"i;;.;- :- ~=i."'='lf;;!~;::; :;;.;;~';';...;::.,:;;:;:.,7~;*;~7i~'.~.;:;:/;*-: :-:.e;.-1-*::'*::',.:/f ::..~.':',c~* *J:r~~'..-.;:;.';~f;:; :;:.::;,;.:.:.. *<. F:r.'..7:<::<~.;; .:..;,_".::::::~~* ::.~~f ~:..._;;':::;-;.~-~~~!;-~~::;~*.:r;:;*"".=-::7:.~ '~*::-'* ~~*;-:::*~*~~.;:~>.,.-.2 .-:+/-.S:-.**-~?~'.-: ~:<~.:... *.~ :*;-,;_*: -:-p:;.-:"':". :-:.-**.*_: ~
c .i
{. *~1 ~.3-8.~ ::frovid,f!Jh~Y~lidafidlJ.Repqrt'(ljWlvf1470!.'f-~T:OO(j, .'.'JvfCJ"(f, .6J}(alidatiQ.flS_Jf/fh.C,01,1/t11uo,~s :* .-:. ,'.;.J L~~;.:.D~.:*_;,.,~j~~~:fl/!!!Slllf.=t~~;l~<it~!!:~~{5!~~~i*~~~:l1!~~:~~-,;_:~.;;;~:::~.:,,.,,5,~ . ".~;~;,;~L~:~~:~-*:~ .. ;.LJ[~~,;.;;, '):::_,,:~~:;~2.*~**~_;,
!NWMI-2014-RPT-006,MCNP 6.1 Validations with Continuous Energy ENDFIB-VII.1 Cross-Sections i(Rev. 0) (public version) is provided in Attachment B.
I;-,~.--:-:'...,,_ .o:.ic:,.-.:..~.-.,~:~ o:-~-*V*":---,,;u,-,: . ..;;~~<<-.**~ '-<"~;*;:.-.w.;~ * .._.,,;....... .-- ; . .'.-'-"'***-'**:.~.:t.*:: *** 1.-,_;-,,,,,,:..,.. -.;:,.:.-,.**-..;:-.;'"--*-*,. **-;...J ** -...-*~,C,.<.,;...;;;... :.._..;:.. *** w*"* -'*"-*.;,:_'; .;<..,-*:r--*-~~;.* ,.**.;;. *** ..:..*;,;~,,_.,..r_** -.::*-***-~** * - ' * - * .*r'-." *-" .,_:-.
!j_ ru\1.a:3-8b . ;Clarifji ift}Je units.on the 4,NECFvalites givejj .in.MeV aJ7.e. corfebtinthe yaljdation report..:, * .* ._.: . * .
1
,t.,-- ~--**-- .,,_..:..,._J. -:. .: . . . -.::_.:,.._ -*-~---~ *. =---~----~ . . . -*~_-,,...,...._-~...,,"-~-:.. .....;; --~ _;_ ___ ~ ~ --::/. . _,,~. . ------*-...:_'._ ..:..~,- :--**-~--- --.:~ . .-*~------~~--:..,!-.,..--.-;---,~*.**---- -'---~--------_..:_- -- -<- -~
!The units in the average neutron energy causing fission (ANECF) values given in the validation report
!(NWMI-2014-RPT-006) are in million electron volts (MeV).
- .-- ~*--~ !'".-r----."'..,-0-.*- ---.r
- *-:.:!.-}f+""'"*~.-.----.;...;~.:. "":-'"--~...------,.,- o-.:;~=-""~ .--- ,:~7*"'.-"::;.:::-*-::-.:..-"".'-':~;;~-:-*- "';*--- ~...~.:.*;;.::--..:....""~ ~:--_:.,*'.i*"-'*--~. .:.-~.'.*~------*-f-:';'"'*: -".'"'.;S~-* ~-~;-~'-*--~.4~*---.,-;;;=-- ----~~ --~:s- :~;:-,.;,::-.:..,,. . ;.,'., ._;, "'7 {--~::~,,;;; ....:. ~- "":-'- *.**"'-~,'~',"'{
- l*~ ~I 6i3'-9 tSection.;6,b:3 ofthe JSG Auginen,/ing NUREG::J 5$;7/Part*2/-state:sthafthe.'app!iqantshouldinplud,e a, * .i I,: ; ';. *; ~. i:sif.~inuiry d¢sqrfptiqn .Pfg'docu!J.zen(ed,;*rzyiewed, .anaapproyedvalid(1tion reko'rt, (6yfN,CSfni1r;:lear , 1'~' *:
- ).
- ' ;': * . , ....: .* *'.icr:frf<;qlity .safe,tyj/1Jn6fiofl andmq11age~1e.nt) for.each me,thqdof9gy that will bf} .tise<ffo[Jerforni, a,:i:N,<;,S+
. . . . *.. . ;;analys~s._Th~ ~~f!zrn,ti,Y.4escrJpti6,J ?fa'.niff!.re'!c~pia111,1q{or.va,{tefatiof1.1'.~Por~,s/Jo_~fcfi11c,lwJe.fh.e., *..:,.:.!
i . \foUowing: {a) a sµmmary ofthe;theoiy ofthe nzethpdology that.is sitfficien!fy detaile<j a1J4clerir, to'b.e,. ;
- .* *' *~* !iiihderstood;'inc1uding_the ineiha,'d usedto 'selec~ the IJ'enchfn.arlhxP,efiments1 (bJ'Betermi,n~'the bias 'and~
'i" * ,..; __ '* *A11ncertaint)!infiie'bias, and(c}determ'in'elhe.iipper,subi:riticai:uini( ....: * ; :, ';, * ;* ,:.>.. : .- * .:'
- ~*'*,,. .*u~""'~*.:*i,_'*.!. -.~,,**.~ "-"~
11
- - *.h ,,* ' * . . ,_ ',, r< *,,.' * *,'- ,',
,* !;The Validation Report. (NWMJ:..20U-RI!F006; * ~ycNP§I Validations with'Continuous:Energy .* . * ;,!'
.* * .. .<"'.]iNDF'IB:"V,IL ic'iJross.;sectiofis, ":Rc!v. *ofstates{thai the *fo'w-:~i1riched ul;anliim:"(LEU);~ndinterniediate~ ;.
, ; . *. : i'.e/1ricJ1ed;uran~~m.(JEU/ke~chf?~arl~ imly 'c~v7r tl~e r,ange of8 - J6Jrin H/J{; buUhe.:Areq of .,;.. .( . ; 11
,.;Applfcabili.lJl (I'ab~e 13) states that th_e ,.ange ~s <;:overedfro11J Q- J4.00,'. (I'he,hig#-::<mric,heduraniufn. -* *:*. *.
- .(:[HE[]} cases ~ten.Ci d9wrz fo !ff!. of3,* q~ttliey a~f! not used_ irz .f!~.t£Jrm{h!JJg tk<i upper.S!fbcrlfic(J1 li1?1i,t
, , . ;1and app{fcab'ilftY 1ias'f!ot beii1i:aen1dn'sir,ated/Since the neufro~1 spectdtrii;'is:ve,ry,sensiifve io ch,ange,s.
- I ' ' * ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '* * - '* ' ' . ' ' ., : ' "'" ' ' .,* , *, ' " ' ' ' '*,' ": "','
../*. :*.;;:* i(fr1HIX in the:lqiv HIXJiril'it; a~ditiona/. infotm#tiqrr is needei;lfor inC/itaJng the;r.angef:from 0.~ 8 fo'r, *.
. :<. *. :;enrichnients oc(.;urring.ai,thejadlitjJ;. * .*~, :*!.i:... : '., , (.,, :/ *:<:. . . * '.*.: ':" :;. *< <;,:
.*.. *. :J1Ju*tW;'irip1uau1g the"~~n;e ofWxfr~m 02"s,tn'Tdble*13:;gnEv'c~s<isa'P~:~iedin ~aking'thi;". . . *"
) ' " . ' ;:,jljsfijicatidn, demonstratetheir applica~ility t9your operation&'.' ' '* ' '. ' ' ' .' ,
~~--.--::--~- #* .-=:::..*- -,.,*=.::.!':.: ~ °"""-:. * - ~*-;::l:*~~*~>;* -,-.. ,,-'. ;;,..:.."':!'~.o::~::....:.__ .. _, ;-:;~-: **..--.":,,-:-:::-_-__ ....~_,:;...-!'-*..'..~..:.:-.........;:'~;*::*:,:~.""::' ~.' -~*;* ~--.;:- _'. .~*;-::..'l:":-;:.**J:'.":- -;-~<.:!~ *-s:; -'=":'-" *-:.~. ~o '."'!;<;*:;:---""'-~.=;'.-;,*-:::.:"~-~..::.: ~--'::!"~'"!~.~*"' ~~- ~-'--"!:~* .;!:~~ ?~- "=.,:;i
\The validation report was generated prior to any calculations being performed for the NWMI RPF ,
jprocess. The intention was to provide as broad a base of coverage within each area of applicability (AoA) 1 jparameter range as possible. The HIX range was extended below a value of 8 based on a data trending '
lanalysis performed in the validation report (NWMl-2014-RPT-006). Subsequent to publishing the
[validation report, analyses have been performed for all NWMI processes showed that the extrapolation is '
!.i:~ ~~~~~~~e~-~~~~ry~-~~~~for.~, !he -~~Afor HIX will be changed to inch1de_\'~lues from 8 to 1,400..
- 37 of96
-=***~:.NWMI
~. ~:.:~
- .* ~£DttAl NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0
- :-
- NOfl.THW£ST ISOTQP£$
Re uest for additional information f Rf\(~.3~~1 o,*:'se.9t/iJ~ 6;b;40J:iiii:'isd A~"im~~tingNVfii/1~/537.-pd,:(~:2:*;idii.i*t~ai_th~ ap/i!tcd~t,ihoJldin~!,~i; d-. >j 1
, ... : *.
- i'su.in~<l'Y de~cription of.a dof:uf!irnted, reyfcewi:fi,: and qpproV.ed w1lidation refJ9rt {bJl/fCS fum:;fion c;rnd:;.
.. : * , ** ;,managellj_ent) for each ,methoqo_lf!gy thpfwillb~ used t(J p~rjo_rm.an*NcS analysis: ,The summary '. :. '.: :*
. *.1 _. * :~<J,e'sfhption .ofarefe1;encemanu1;17'ofYalidiitioilreport.shbuld indude thefolliJwing::.(a)tl'Sitmma,Y*oj. :1
'. '; * * : . *: *; _;tthe* theory/ofiii~'*meth:Odplogp*thgt is sufficientiydetail?it/inij cliar.tb 6,e understdod,: including (he *;_*)j
~ J .: .;, (' -+::meth9.d.'~sed to :select,ilie. :b,eni:hirzqrk e°xper;fmentsjj(li);defei;mineth~hias and*1inc~rtai11ty)n~the.bfa~,*. ' .
- ... * *,_ ,}~Y1d(<;)rfeter.,m_inethe;yppe.r.sifbc;ritica/;/~1n,it.*'*'" * * ..;::. * *.:**** *-~ :_* ... * ** *
. *-~*q l * 'l*'. ,_' .:. ' , : - . ;~~* '1 :" ' ,_, - '~: * " ' ' . ', .:;,_." * ._ . o<" * ' "' , ~;" _..
\, , * :"\lhe ValidationRef!ort~{f{WMJ,.2014.--:JfRT;Q06,' ,NfCNP 6,1 J(alidations.with .(!ohfinuous.Energy .* *:'"
- ' ...... :.- . :.~ !':ElfDFIB;VJtJ Cro{is~S.ections;'~J?.ev,_ 0): iflcluqes*ap,evafitatidn ofoias_in. the~criticality evaluatj:of:ic : , ,.
\: . . :. <*.:}Morein/Qrmqtion ,isn.eederf:to d,~i:erp/ir;e the qqequacy ofthe, ev(l/uatlon.. : , . .. . } . ' *. " (
'.:.l~:~~.. ~ ~:: ~--J~:t*.',:.':?;t ~:-:;--:~:~~;* :.';_ _ _;:.: -~: !;. ;~, S.'-,:-~:. :.:~ ~=-.; ~;)- ~::*~::::-.'~ ': ~:.:.~: :;._: ._;:'.?:~":':. 7::~-::-:::~:.::-}_;:..::-l;;:.~.:: ~;,~:~r:'~~ .=.;r;,>: .*::;;:;.;-~~<;: :* E::::.-.;::...:i:.:'G;J~ *-~*~~_.~;_ ;_::;* ~"..*1:.*~::d-.-l:: ..::-:}.:.n;..":.::;:/S--:'.*:,_,~!:.:~::.rt:*;;~~":*~ :-;.::.~~;::~1 j RAI f,:3~10~11A4dr,~ss;{h_e large.~ negative ;,b,ias1or;moderqtq~s. iflclt{dh;g .hydrogen, r~j]e~to(s hm?u,.dingj1.epleJe{f1,:*:, *. *f 1
- iSection
- .~ *
- ; ~.~-r.'5.1~ .:*~~1:.~;;;:;~~.;~-~~{~:r*i~~::~:;~~t~{r.~;f of the validation report (NWMI-2014-RPT-006), including Figures 5, 6, and 7, evaluates
- rl~~:.~~~i~~:z~:~ ~1~~:~~:~::~~=:.,:~~:!;~;~~~::.?~---*~*~*:~~i
- trends in important validation parameters. The calculation methodology should have a method bias that
- has neither dependence on a characteristic nor is a smooth function of a parameter. If a trend in a parameter exists, the bias will vary as a function of that trend over the parameter range. If no trend in the
- Parameter exists, then the bias will be constant over the parameter range .
.Figure 5 groups individual experiments into sets that correspond to common moderators that include
.water, graphite, carbon fluoride (CF2), hydrogen bound in uranium trihydride (UH3), and no moderator.
'When the calculation results for these experiment sets are graphed, some of the experimental results lie
- below akeffof 1.0. Figure 5 does not represent a bias calculation; it is an evaluation to determine if a
- trend exists in the moderator parameter that would suggest the method bias (calculated in Section 5.3 of
-the validation report) has a dependence on moderation. In the Section 5.1.5 discussion of conclusions
,regarding the trending evaluation depicted in Figure 5, rather than stating the evaluation demonstrates no l
- significant bias with the various moderators, the statement should read, "the evaluation demonstrates no
- significant trend with respect to moderation that would influence the method bias."
- Similarly, for Figure 6, the intent is to determine if a trend exists in the reflector parameter that would
- suggest the method bias (calculated in Section 5 .3) has a dependence on reflection. The Section 5 .1. 6 1
discussion will be modified to "the evaluation demonstrates no significant trend with respect to reflection!
'that would influence the method bias." *
- For Figure 7, the intent is to determine if a trend exists with respect to chemical form that would suggest
'the method bias has a dependence on chemical form. Section 5.1.7 will be modified to "the evaluation
- demonstrates no significant trend with respect to chemical form that would influence the method bias."
'The method bias is developed in Section 5.3, and all of the experiment sets included in Figures 5 through!
7 are evaluated there for the method bias calculation.
- ,**. ""."", ~*;, ** - * ~~."7,.. -*....... - '1 rL;. !-*...:..*-;* -..;".~"*'"-:**--*.:. "-;.;;-"~' ..":; --~,._. *~~--- 0 **~ >~.-~,-<- *-,~-~*..~;"-'*~--~ .. *~~"';;****
- **;-:" -~**---*r-"~*:-"' *7-** ~*,.;:.,.*-***<-**,- ~-;*..-* ..,_,~~--~-:*:-*~""'~:*-"'**:1::;,.,_i".: 7*-~;-:-*""'"""',~"'-.~c-*"..-'*""t.-***:r-; *' ~--11 ,,..,..,..._,,,., ....-:-"";. -'r. *_~...,*-"1
- RJ:\I :6.. 3~.1 _0b;\[ustw tf!eir. inc/us/on Jn,tbe ,fir¢~ ofpPpli¢g!Jilitf.(f'abfe:~ 3)..wit~(Jlf( cidtfitjmj,fl~ :?nargin;):m[/.c~qrifY. . , ~
1
.<', . -! 1~hqfis ffiedhtbjlhydrog~n ff/Oderat,qr (nidbyjniscellarie~usrefleG{ors;,andforfns: '.: *. *. * * * * *: * ~- ~
- ~-~:..!.. ':_:_,........';---:.--.::~-'.~;.;....::. __::..~~-:-.;7'=' __ .~. -;_.;...,......~;-~--_;;.'~_,-i.;~-;~ =-~~!::"..::.~;.-~--,,-~-:-~~~"~,.,.:.~:;-;:,..-.~::~~!".k~**-~*~~- "":'*7~~--.7';<.~*'--~~:~-~~~---'=7~-:':.-;!::~-~;;.~ *'.::'~~.--~-'""fh!:."';;*:*~-~--;:.':'.~~-;~:-~:'::::-~--~...;,....~ ...1,
_The hydrogen referred to in Table 13 and Figure 5 of the validation report (NWMI-2014-RPT-006) is ;
'miscellaneous reflectors referred to in Table 13 and Figure 6 are contained in a subset of experiments
- using graphite, copper, and aluminum reflectors. The miscellaneous chemical forms referred to in ,
' I
- Table 13 and Figure 7 are a collection of 12 experiments using UH3, uranium carbide (UC), and uranium
1
- zirconium hydride (UZrH).
I
- As described in the response to RAJ 6.3-11, the validation AoA will be changed to include only
- [Proprietary Information] as chemical forms.
38 of 96
_;.~*~;:. NWMI NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0
"..!~.~~:* litmTHW£1TatIDtCALtSOIOPts
~The moderating materials will be changed to include no moderator and water. The reflecting materials
- will be changed to include no reflector, water, concrete, polyethylene, and paraffin, and the absorber imaterials will be changed to include aluminum, steel, stainless steel, polyethylene, and paraffin.
,.,_:. *-~:1.::. ,,.;.: .t,,.,_;_;:, *: ....
~-:r;_.;,.:.;:;;;-,,.:u: ,~, -,~,- -~.,, ,;,~*-...;:~~-.;..
Request for additional information w.:.*. ;;:-,.-. - .[',:;;_~ -~*-..;::_;,._, ;;;-...;-'J..-:*~~ "" '-. c..:.:,,";;.;:. * .:.~ ~ :~"'-.:'."- , ..::** :.;,-;.:;...;. ~'.:~--;:. *~*~=:::---:'-'-- _-; ~~ *: .;;,_:-_ "~- *:.""":c.-*:-r<,:;...;-~.;e""-:....,,:::-~¥*~~*~-,*-~ -- _;; .. ~,;;,:-::;;"*-*~,:; .;--:-*"l.: !.':: :* **-:i*--:.~"?
i RAI t>,,3 7_11 )1$ecfion :6:!X3 oftliq. ISGA uginenting Nl/REG.,.1537, 'Part 2:*sfates "fhat the applicqnt'Should inclilde .a!.*. '.'
j'"* -.',.:,
- _, . ,. <1;~utn~i(11Y .4~§crzp~o71, oj/a dodument,ed,:hivi_ewed,'~nd:a?prqved v9lidation.:repd~[{bj:)lf!S:(u1pttqn'.~~~J
- . ** *;.
- n,ianag?f11<:nt)f()Y; eacfl methodology that*l)llll be.. u~edto perforn.i?*an,NCSqnalY,s~.s;(TIJe ~umm~ry : .. \ '1:
i:. . . . !:qescrijJti.iJn bfa refer;ence.manual or validation report should inch1de lhefolloWing: :(a/a summary of ' (
R* .. : .*. :.: ,/he theory of:the methodology that is sufficiently detailed and c(ear.to be .understo'od, i11r:1ua{ni tfie, * -.*;
i) . ' :; ' ; i;me~hod used toseiect;the benchniarkf!xperifnents, (q) determlne*thebias*a11duncertainiy in the bias:., .. \
i .... :... ,;'.abcUc) detef:mine.the upper.subcriticai lirtiit * **:*
- 1
- * * *: : * ** ;. * .,... _; ... * : * ** * ** i
- f. <-i:rize:t7alida~ion.R~port*(Nwin-2b'J4_f?pr~o(j6, *:'YCNf' 6.f rla!idaii~&s.~ith Co;tfn~qus il1;1er~-.* . *. ; "
'/ . * * . :' ./1j:tNDFIB-V71J'.Cross~S~ction's; "R&. 0) ihc1i/de~ fl. disqussforl:~fmq{<;riaff in 'th?,,qrei;l ofapp~tcqbiftti i, * :. 1(i'hefa!idiiti~n*~~~luqt~dtb~. bia;fo;* ~e;tainfo;nii; ~~{Jde~9to~s:;an4.r~fl¢~tb~;,)tit ~:~tpbsorbe~s.)*:* *:.:
t . *, * .:Some qfthesf! n!aterials. ar!f .orJlypr<;~eJJf.iri C1 smal{ nl!mher 9fca~esJe:g.~ J!-ZrH and UQ;.S04fm:ms;* ..
!,* . 'graphite, c~ncrefe, U?23(andBf!O/efleqtors;.cu:qbsorbers), andmaynotbepresent*across.the .. \
r~ ,. '.. * . 'J'.neufrori energy, Sp?plr,um: Therefo:e. ad,c/itjona/ inff!rmation is needed to det[trmine whe_ther,,they-sho°µld ;
.j * ':** . ,.*:
- llbe inditd~diri.the*area, ofapplicability (AOJJ * : *,:.'.. *"* .,. * . :..... *. '** * ;.* '. '-*'.' '-. . _.,,, f
'~ 1 :*.'-:::.~..*~* .:;~~*.;,:c.~.;;:~:::.t-;~~;~.::.:. :-."~~';::>:.'. ~~;~ ;_:~_;..;;_;.~~.,, ~-3~~ ..;,;._:_.;.*..:: ;.;...:~ *-~ ;_~* :.::::'..~.. *-* 1 --:=*::~ **-:-*.; .: ~-:- ~- ~::. -:,-**:.,~-*~*":!:.'~ .:-::.-.* :;i;-_ :.;.: *-:.::~:t*.:;...:.:::~*"_:~;J..::-_:;_;. :~:::. :::::.:1---.~*..;:~~*:*- 'y,-;-=:5r:r.:: ~ ~~- :::,~:*.-.-~~*- ;.
f~I ,6.~~~:1"~i:Justijj;.1nclusion oftlie various clzemical form/}. 'arzd1fw~efrating, 'rltfle~fJng~ ,lfind'a6s9f;p~hg}na~eridls}r.i.~J t . ;*~~::::.:~ ** ~-.~~: i~~-f!:a!1~Z:!::"+. ~.;:~.:: :.::'.. .~~---~- . ~.:~~~-~::.~-~i~:.,:,. ::~~*~"'~::,.~:.~:>.~;.;..;;_~_*;:~.'.~**;-_~.L::~ -~~*..:. . ~C~.: :~: ,.J
!The validation report (NWMI-2014-RPT-006) was generated prior to any calculations being performed
!for the NWMI RPF process. The intention was to provide as broad a base of coverage within each AoA iparameter range as possible. The chemical forms and moderating, reflecting, and absorbing materials
- present in the critical experiments were placed in the AoA. Subsequent to publishing the validation ireport, analyses have been performed for all RPF processes and it can now be concluded that some of the '
jchemical forms and the moderating, reflecting, and absorbing materials listed in the AoA are not
/necessary to support the NWMI calculations. Therefore, the AoA will be changed to include only
- [Proprietary Information] as chemical forms. The moderating materials will be changed to include no
- moderator and water. The reflecting materials will be changed to include no reflector, water, concrete,
!polyethylene, and paraffin, and the absorber materials will be changed to include aluminum, steel,
!stainless steel, polyethylene, and paraffin.
<':'J<.:**""-"",~-'!-<"'--:* *~*-*..;.";....,,.__.~- __ _,,_.,...._. * ..%-~--* ....; **:..* * ...;;.....\.*, .* ~~-"--;:....""'-~**.:.---*~~.;...*,:.._.. -~~.~*= --*->--~!!-~-~ ...,-._..,;.;::.. ,......_ __ ._,.* -*
~ "'"'-"'*"*'."'*~.c ***-:* ~~o.-**.:.....-*..;;,.;.,......-_ "**-* -- _.,_*~~-:'*'-"*~-:-._~ **-;.: *"--~* * ,:...,_,'." -**""** ~--.~*.--:--.,.,.._ ***-~" -r--'"'"* _,.,'. ".' ,-..-;,...1
- .~*
!,.~I 6~3~1,1 b;'.fqr compounds,. elenl(!_nts,: and,nuc,lide~ for*whiclj_'thefe arefew b~!i~hn:arlcs'.avdilabl~ or-tli~j'dd:1wt * *.:* i
- L,.,*.* ,.~.-~.* ,
- ~.,-.:J.la"<J.~qyp,t~/x.,c:,gy<;t_t.~e_.!f!t!B.~.!11_*lE?Lq,.r.1JJifl.ffJi!!.~il1!!<ilI.£1'l~l1:1_f.~O.fJ~~/t':..i~f\.:a_<ff!~tJ-?.1J/J!JJfEtg!f!..:,.:;'.:;~: ....... :~:i
!Each calculation document includes an evaluation of the validation AoA. For systems that have icompounds, elements, or nuclides that fall outside the validation AoA, an increased margin of lsubcriticality (MoS) may be warranted, depending on the specific problem being analyzed. The analyst
- will document any extrapolation beyond the validation AoA in the calculation and justify whether an l~cre!.s.eto.th~~_oS_jS,_.~~-is_l!-?~Eeq°.~~<l.
- .. ____ ... ___ . . ... . .. . _ __ .....
- RJ\r6
- 3:12'*i';s;cti6~':B:i/3*~7o;-;1sc71;;;i~7iii~liiuRiia~T§J7.---P;;;.72,c:s~1~i?ii~!iKi:~;pii{d';fi'Xfi6kiJi:;;21rt;;*"d'.>7
- . * . .
- ;;summary description ofa docuinented; reviewed, andapprovedvalii:idtian repm1,(byNCSfunctioh a~d}
J, .* . ::manage.ment)for:eachmethodo/Ogythcitwiltbe*used.toperfo"r,m an}/CSanafysi~. Thesumn.iary * ** ..Ji
.. . " ;*descrip't;on ofa reference' manual or validation .repor( should JnC/ud_e the}ol~owihg': (Ci) 'q sUnimarfof '
~- *: . '.* '. ~it~e t.~eory ofthe niethodd,Zogy'thd~is suffi.Ciently deiailed'and"i:.tear tob'e u,nderiiqo(/;.Jhc!iir)ingthe -:-- ..
l* . .: i!t:n~thod used*~o -:Seledthe benchmark expertilients; (b) *aetefhzi~e 'the bias {ind~ri¢ePtaib"ty t~"the b-ici~;: .;
'.1 . r)mid (ctdeteniiine the upper; szibchtica/'liniit. . ., . [' " . . ,.. '.;, ' -. . . :: . :: '<- \'i *." ' ,', 0 : "'**:
1: :: . . . . i * . . .. ' . . ... ;, . " : * ** * ... .;* . *! . . .. " . " . ' **' l' ... ' .. "
1 i : .. ' * * -'~~1The Vfilldai-;on }jepOri(NVilJVji-2iJ14~JU>T-,PQq, *.*-'MCNR 6.J f!.O,lid<JtiOns,With, Cdntinu0us$nerg.Y .~
1 ENDFIB*V1L 1 Cross-Se~tioifs, "Rev: 0) in(;Judes .discussion ofphysidai par,ameters in theA..OA.' a i
" .. . ;~ddi!ional irifpr~'ation, fs ~ie~ded to. de_tern;,ii1e/f t,he,.~angf!_ ofpgfametersJq b~ modrJ~d to, s~ppor/ the_ ,,,
- 'facilitydesign*arewithin.theAOA.. * ** * *: *:, .;; , , , '.:. :* , **
.. ~***.**-*..*. 1;;,., -.~:;.,~.i.L ... ~i;_:._p,,_::.,._._;;',...~'.~'.i ,'..,~ ......,... ::.:: '. o:.,.. ~cc . ,:,.;:,.,.,::_.....;>... *...** ".~.. ",. .... *.., ...,,....,, .....~..-....~,*
39 of96
_;,:.,;~*.,NWMI NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0
-::.**.*.~*
- ** ~~.:~:. l'lG8fHW£ST MmCAl.ISOTtlPES
- Re uest for additional information
~~;~;~~~j~~1~ftf~~~~~~!tt£~~PJ~~~~r~~~~!t~~~:t;~~:f:~:1d~: '~~:~~f:~f~:~tt~1;~~:lh~~i 1
- The validation report (NWMl-2014-RPT-006) was generated prior to any criticality safety calculations
)being performed for the NWMI RPF process. The intent was to provide as broad a base of coverage l
)within each AoA parameter range as possible. The actual physical parameters associated with the facility (
/and process designs were not established at the time the validation report was originally issued (as I
[Atkins-NS-NMI-14-01, 2014). Subsequent to its issue, criticality safety calculations have been !
!performed. Each calculation documentation includes an evaluation of the validation AoA. For systems 1
I that are outside the validation AoA, an increased MoS may be warranted, depending on the specific j iproblem being analyzed. The analyst will document any extrapolation beyond the validation AoA in the j li~1i!~i&~;,~'!~~~r~~r~I
([Proprietary Information]
i I 40 of96
_. ...:-~~--- NWM I NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0
-~ :~.~~:* r.llHUHWISTUUtlCAllSOTDPlS Request for additional information 41 Of 96
.:.~..:;:. NWMI NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0
- ': ~~~~~ ;* HORJHWm Mt01at.ISOTUfES Re uest for additional information 42 of96
.:.~*~~:. NWM I NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0
- ~*
- *. *.*
- NGRTRWlST Lmll~ ISOTOPES Request for additional information 43 of 96
.:;~*~;:.*.
-:-.* ***:=*
NWMI NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0
. ";_ ~~.~?:. f.lalUHWEST M£DtCAL ISOTOPU
- Mi s.3-13~ ::E~lai-,; ~hy ihe ;'!~lysfs ~~;* /imit~dto ~'j ;;n* sl;b ~j;bi~ti-;,; 'a~1-the h~t -dellfl~-o~. - * - -*-* -' *
- i:
Re uest for additional information
- -* *:'.o ~-._*** ,.,._,;.* L~,.',,..-,...***- -.* *" .- ..~* .~.'!'~-.-'..:..,,.!;:-".f~* * )'. ,,;---;,.~**. ,._;.":"-, *;,..,, ..~....... -..,,.:,.,..,7~**....,~.:_,!.} ~*-'. **-+~*.~~~';,.;c *.'"*-A..,:_'*"':";<-~~'~"('""";_~*,,:,.,__.,.',__:::..;.,_. **:-*-:~*-.c* " ~* ";*:" *. _,.,,.,,.,,.,_._,,*.,,h~,:,....~~~-- *.:-'-.><'--< t-~ -~>;*_:_,....~--"*
.PerNWMI-2015-CRITCALC-006, the modeled maximum volume of any of the uranium containing
.vessels is [Proprietary Information]. To reach a 1 cm (0.39-in.) depth on the floor of the uranium purification hot cell floor, [Proprietary Information] would have to be spilled at the same time. This
- would be equivalent to a simultaneous spill of almost [Proprietary Information] in the hot cell. A spill of
- this magnitude should bound any spill expected to occur during operation of the facility. In addition, all
'.of the vessels in the interaction calculation were assumed to be full of fluid, even though a large portion
.of the actual fluid would be on the floor to achieve the 1 cm (0.39-in.) height, thus maximizing the
'possible interaction effects of the scenario.
- ** '"' *** "'<* ' " * " "
- _ , , __ ,,,,.,_~.*****~** *" **~""",,..,,.-,., ,.,...~,,.,.,~-,*-'l'**-~w**-**-***--***,-.._m.,,..,--,..-~*-***"-'"""'*"'"-*'*<'***"'""'"'""'"~_,,. """""~""'""""µ**'*"'"*'*~*,,-!
- :R:41*~:3~;4::s~9,ij.6:;,~6~fPlfh~~!saA.~F~~µ~~Jiuj[1fi!)f3rP.~~?~*;;ir~i"t~;?~~1~~~{iw~~~~id~titiJ"~i~~~;~~:**-::
- : . ,, * .should mclude*acc1dent analyses znvolvmg 11cens~d materrals arid an mterprefdtion ofthe sequence of' :J
- j : * ,: *;:'.ei>erits>jt is presumea'thpt dl(cnticality:cJ.ccident'analyseslvouidassuffJe high cons,equences;~:the'i;efore, :
- )h<J applicdht ~~oulq include ev~gi cr,edible eiJen(thay:oµ,l~result.!n a? uri~ont:oll~d criticqlity_ryen~.
- j
.: . ;As part ofthe <yaluation ofN~ applii,atior;. the staffrevf~ed NWMJ-20{5-:CSE-008, "NWMI ' *'
- *: * . ::Preliminary Ctiticality.SafeiyEvaluatioi1: Hot Cell Uranfuin Purificati01i, "Rel!: A. Thisdocitment .*.
- * * " , * * : * !:prov_ided iJ_n evcilu_atiofl ofqitis~litY safety.~penarios.fn th.e hof.cdlpur.ificapon unit; 4cJ4itiq1:1al ., ., ,;,
. ;'.information is needed to deterrni'ne if thi!i analysis ensures that the processfs Szjbpritical under'normq' .!
,f" * :;* , r: ,*. ;:and abnorinat Cb.fidJti(njS and adeiju4te1y:satiS.ftei the.:*do1ibl~ *COntingenfyp~inCiP1'.,_ - ~.*
7
"* ** ,.. :* * ** , }~
, ~ ~*,,,_:", ;~. ::..: , * ..; ~",:. l*;,~;'.:'"~*""* ~,'. :".~--~;'-:!:' ~.,.;."!,"*.!..~~;',<: ';,:. ;;.~~;:"'". ~--~~.w~,:--~;.:;:;..~.~ ~.. :;::.:. ,;~.**-;*,,..,;* .::::: "":*-. ~.-:*.-~ --~-:-~"'=.:.-:,.;*~.'.'....::.--:-~:* .:;:;::,.~,:'.::-.;:". *;~-~:.-** ;~ *,: ".:;.*;.~ <"*
'> ** --: *.;.:*~;:::-::.:;.._:
- 7 -**= :*.,:._;:.* :":;- ~--~ ':.:":
- RAI s
- 3.:14a ;1.JustifY' ihlli, the lneilsuresprevehiing sol~tiofz backfiow 1o '/lie fteslf'resin supply':syst~m in *Scenarib C7,. .1;
' *.
- i:are su]fic}ently.reliable*io ehsur.e*crilicalityis "highly unlikely;" specific;all.x tfu~. double Qlock-an_d-. . "
- . :,bleedyalY,e and the paddleplank. . ' * * * . - * .- *.. " * ,.
"I>~~r-NwMi~2015=-s~ETI=o*o4*:*~~~~~~P~~t~;, ~;;~;t~~~;~*P~;;~;;~{~;;~~~'i~~~e*=-*an<. .......o~-n--"**--*d,..e_._,m .......a. . n...d,._. . _~..
1 failure probability of 10*2 to 10-4
- Each of the administrative actions relied on as controls are also backed iup by a control requiring that a manager or supervisor verify correct valve alignment/presence/absence of!
the paddle blank in accordance with the activity that is being undertaken. With this required verification, 1
- either the primary or secondary contingency is unlikely to occur. These actions are determined to be
'.sufficiently independent such that for the scenario to occur, two independent, unlikely failures would be irequired, thus satisfying the double-contingency principle and rendering the occurrence of the scenario to;
- be highly unlikely. ,
- --.- ~ ** *** " * .!' * , ** -***"* * **; -~*;""* " ; -... ~ *-'*---~~ :**~- .. -;~r;; ... .:*..:.-:..*:,.. -*
.-~ ~"""'"*--*--.-..*.*-~~"*"** -v----;---. <*-; *-**'* ~'-':**"'*~*" **:*** :~':""'~- .__.,......_ * **-;*~.'""~~--* -*,*;-r*;.. - ~ ~~--"~"'- **"-"'"'.'~"';***.:,.'£'-?"**'""::; ';~ "'**"""'~~:*.,,
- ..*- .-.. ~***-*- >>-.'-'.f'- * ...... ""':"*-*.,.,.,.*:-*~~;- .*:.--;::,,_ ..... ":-;
i.RAI 6~3-14b' 1 Wherttas.b,oth ofthese,controls,are.r:,onsidered administrative, in that they rely. ori proper valve "'
- ,. ;._ '* * : * * : . *'iatignm'erit or.e~uipmeHi 1nitallation, ju~ii!Y thei/~sctin li~u' dfmDre treziliiioridlpassivi pa~/ifloW. *.. ..
' ' . *. . . '..llprevefntion.(e:g.,:overjlow draiiis, siphoribrea,ks);Jn accdrdance with !f,WMipriferreddesign . ' '
.1 <.. *--~£ __ ::~)~te:~rf~L:,*:.+.~ .:;'.'.......:~- .--.;:..: . .:~~--~;::.~,-~-: ";;~:; ::'..,~..: . ~.:~,. -.,;.....L"~.:,:. . . . . ,_*,~-. ~*- "::~. -____ .-.-~ **
- The addition of fresh resin is not a routine occurrence, and is expected to occur on an annual or semi-
.annual schedule. Fresh resin will typically be added to a water-filled column with no SNM present. Once :
- the new resin is added, the valves will be closed and the blank inserted. The operating/design conditions l
- of this equipment (column is pressurized) does not lend itself to passive features. The analyzed controls
- iare considered to be adequate.
The current design of this equipment does not include passive backflow design features, as the analyzed controls are considered to be adequate. Consideration will be given to providing passive backflow controls for this scenario and will be provided in the FSAR as part of the Operating License Application. I 44 of96
.:.~-~~*-. NWM I NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0
- .~~.~?:* NllRtHWlSTl!i.mllCAltst>FOPIS
- i_* .R.6.(6j ..1s:ttS~~tion -6. 15.3 6Jtke isa AugmeiitiJi NURj;fi15p, 'Pa~b;':Siaiei 1haia.iti~CJ/i~-q~;;id~hi~vaiu~fi~n~ * **r,
,j: : -.* . *;. * *.. *];sho1.11~i11clud~ pccident*analyse~-involving licens?dYJ1..aterials a/1q.:an: intefprf~tatjonofthe s~q~etice. of *i
\.. : *. *~i _.
{,~,'.r
- * !~fY,e17fs. It {s1pr,e,syl}led *qt all_cr;i(iC;ality accid.~!Jf an9ly$es }V_Ou!d as_swJle fiig_hco71sequenc,es; tf!ere[cge,.';
- !the applicant
',If;~' "7_*/,;', *'
should i1Jclude
,'.::~l, *;~*~. ~¥,; *.;'* *t, ',.,<~* ,:..
every~*:'.~~,
Request for additional information credible event thdt couldresult in an uncontrolled
~*;*~' .'~.;;*,'*-~;:~*-'*/r: l ,.".;;'t,'*~,/,*'/ ** \.!'~*' "*".*
criticality event.**, .1.:
",~' <, /,*,~'~'.._;*,;' .,_.,; (~* * ',
l.~.l~.* ." .. * .. \ff)sP,q(t opf:z.~._el'qluq.,f!.9.ifpff;IJVAf! qpp(ic/1t{qf!:.~1:t~ st<:ffrevl_c;wed JiTWMl-';OJ*~~CSE.:,.008; "'.N~~*-:*; .. *-'*.'. )
. ~Preli'ii1tiu;iry_ C:r~ticci}it;:, S,afdy Ifvq{~atf{)Yl;*:Ifot;Cel!/:/ra1;1tu'!!P1p*ifi~at~qn1 :,.:ge,Vis,~on,4*J'flisdpqi!J!e!~t 'j' F
\iprdvidedtiri ifV.gltiati~ri ofcnticality safety:scen,aj-ios'in t~e hot eel~ purifi~atio,n unit, AdditionaJ ,*' ,; ' *, *' ,(
1 i~nforin{Jtioh;iS.needed to aetern1ine if 'this analysis ensures thaf-theproce'Ss* is suljcritical imdeFn0,rindl !:
(. . - *: ,:, ' -_;;ani,Fabnoririal conditions andaaequptely satisfies, the double coi1tingencypribdple. - : . : . ,, ;_ .,, *1
\_:.L.. ; :=:.::...:;;:~-.:. .'..:;;:.:::.::.!~::.':....::-,S-,;:.-:: :.:::::..-:~*.::: -J:.:.~--- . -::.:.* , ~::.::;. . . -:.;_-;_;.": -:..::::::,-;;..::_;i:.::-.;:;.*..- ;:.~:;:!,'"'*.:'::. *,;:~:.:-.~=.....:-:~;..~* ~ ::*~:::-;::-.;:~::-- -... -:.:*.;.*;.~~ '.J *'?.:::..*:c;-~:,.:;;:..:.~~,;,.; ....:;f.;;;,;'~"::::;: ::;:...":"_,..~p; ~J~:::.~-~~:~:.;-:.:;.~::.:~*i:';...,,.::"'.. -<~ 1 : .. ~1
,i.RAl*6.3-1 Sa '!f;xplaif! the na_ture,fin<i operaqon oftarzkVentirigand the overloop s,eahysterij d,r,Jscribed .in Scf!ndr.io C8,' ;:
.:.:: ' ' . '.,,,, :!tncluding whether.they cire:pasSiv.'e:pra9tiye,' andjustifythattheytire 8ujJU:i'ehti)h;eiiable iO ensure ., c;, '(
1~<**'~ :.,r;,~-. ~;,:: Usr~t!£<!l£iJ!.JI.. '.'!!18~!J'.~1!,!!!iff!f.'Y.:o::~:::~:~i. ;.:~.L:::~t/:.~;;,_~i~., * *~ .~;:;.:: ~:,,_'... :: .*_'__L~~~*:{~--";~:.: ~ . :~'.':_ ,_;_.'i~!'.'.'!;S;2: ~~!:-:: jL::..: :-.. ;,_ :~!
)Scenario C8 in NWMl-2015-CSE-008 evaluates the backflow of material into the incoming air or gas
- lines I
to a vessel holding fissile material. Both the tank venting and overloop seal systems described in
!Scenario C8 are passive systems. An overloop seal system provides an overloop in the supply line for
!each gas addition stream that is of sufficient height such that even at the maximum possible pressure in
!the attached fissile-containing vessel, the fissile fluid cannot reach a sufficient height to flow through the ,
!loop and back into the nongeometric favorable parts of the gas system. Tanks are vented directly to the
- jprocess vessel ventilation system. The vent header in the hot cell is geometrically favorable and has drain ;
\lines to favorable geometry tanks or sumps. Since both systems are passive, these controls are considered
- junlikely to fail, and failure of both simultaneously is considered to be highly unlikely. .
1
) .- --"!* -'---""- * ~-- ...... ";--*""'-::<- *("""':'""~*;,-.:-;'j: * ...
- =-".0.-"'-'""~-'- ,*...c-~.o;.--_};-*~:-* ***1':"'~ ...,;,_..,._~ '"-'*,.;,~...,;.;:*..;;~ ~o'---;:...::' --*,?:"~.:.....*t ..,_,~.-;::'.;'.'{i"...i7 "*'.;"1'*f"-:-";'-:;o'"t~'~-""-"'~-* -~-'r'l~'"t--*-:0':-:if' ,,;..'~'"'."J:**-. -*~:--~:_,,..;;,.,;j"':'l.:.*-*?'~-,~ .¥.,~~":;.;,*y;~ ;."*;"':*--"-1~"' * '"\'f'*,,.:, ~,..; '?;.;, .. * . .;.;-.?
- ) RAf6.3,.15b*.1Clarifjf whether the overloop seal -'system is'passive, as stated in Sec,tioh -4, 1. 4A ofNWM!-2015~CSE.:_, ,I U~ . '.*
- __ :~**-~J:q.~~:~~~.~c~I~Et~:~~::1:11~~11!!£~8!!:;!~~e.~.?'"~i:.~:.~~~~:.~-*+:-.~L:.::,*:;L.-.:~:~. :~:. ,-.~i:,, .!L. .L;:,:i,.:. L.~,~::.[
lThe overloop seal system is a passive system. An overloop seal system provides an overloop in the
- supply line for each non-fissile utility that is of sufficient height such that even at the maximum possible
!pressure in the attached fissile containing vessel, the fissile fluid cannot reach a sufficient height to flow i1through the loop and back into the non-fissile utility vessel. No operator actions or active equipment ioperations are required for this system to perform its intended function.
r~- ., . . -i-~:-~---*- --::.:..~.:: -*1'"- *-~ --*"-*~"~- -~*;_._ --'-'-"""-~----*=* ~~- ~_,.... :*- *..,.,..,.... --*-': --~~-~_,.,__ "-:?. --:r..:.....-- ~- *":"*-:----""---'0-~,,,.-~*. . "-;... ---- -~~ *.*"~"' -* "':***r* . . , -...:: -,~ ~~: :*~:-~,.,- ,.. ,,.':""''"':~~~. ;.i;-;:- .... :...~.<C*~-~ ***-.-: "1' ~--:.>-;.-~ ,~ *'~*;;:i:----;*iM~*/*
)1*.,RA!.,6.3-16,.;!Sectiom6. b:3 ofthe'IS(JA itgmenting"'.NUREG-15,37, *Part2;. states 'fhai"cnti,cality '<iccid~nf<{v'aluati9ns (
- i";~* *',. *'. 'I
- ' !~hquld inclu_de 'acddeiit qil_q!fses !nxolv{nlj::fic~i1,s<i(lmqteri<;ili,rirf d4h, in~drpretatiOJ~ of:~he se.queiice oj ,'i
- ;* .
- l'.elJen~s. It is presumedJhq_t al{ q:itic(lli,ty,,ac,ciqent, a'?alyses lfOulq assume high cons,equence~; 't~ereforf!, '<,
r: i:fhe dppf!cr;int ~~oufd_ inplude every q:edib{e,' event {h(If CQ.ula'resu/t in, qn UnC0,1JlrOl/efi: critica,fity event , !,
- j .
,I) . ~ . ,~ . , *" *. , 1 *
,!:As part-ofthe ev{Ililation ofNWMI app#catjon the'stajf revii,Wed:NWMI-201S-CSE-'008;, '.'NWMJ
- -!,Preliminary 'CriticalitjSafetj/Eviiluatfon: Hof Cell Uraniun1 PurificatiOn, ".,Rev. A.. This:documenf- .. -,
. . . " '1, *~, ,. '* ' .,,~ , _.,.~. '* '-~ . * * . ~ *. ' ~
> ~
.. * '.providea:an.evalu~tiol1.ofcritfoaltty s~fetys~e~dfai~s i,nthe'hot*c~ttI'iffificati~n unit.Sedtio1;1.4.1'.4 -...
" '. * **: ;1s(ate;!tha~ Scehari¢-C6_ispreventedqyihejls~:,offavoI:dble-'geofnetry in(efln~Cf,idi~ ~ytaii~ i~'olaf.ed
.. **. *;; :ifron~ *~~ja\J~rO!!,te chenpc.41 Yeagcnt'.or wat~t;'supfilf systems-witfiai1: brf dci~Jfq~~vei:, Sectipn '§:/<:'."-~
.; ;. i!d~scr,~pes, CfjE-:{)8-;PDfl 2~qs.t;eq,uiri[tg c;ither a qdyt(Jnk;or tl[l *ajr'bf~a/i lnsu]fi<iiefnt,infoiwtatid1;1 i,s <_:
(;provJded:o,n.J;o,w, t~~* day iarz1~or,air.,breal_c -wiU,be:µs~d to.pr<rY.en,t cr,iti~ality.., . *:< .' **:.;_ ~ : ,
1
!clarlfy whether both day tani~ a~d Jir.bre~ks.,'wil/.b~ uscdoii these ~nfqvorab,legeometry siJpply
' " ' )*systems;:'or on,lyqn,e, o~ th~. o[her. : . *~. ' .* ' ' .* ' *' , ,.. '** .*~, ' ' - . .-
t.-.*;- --. -::.:;:.-_ **-c---~" ;_.;,J~~'.:..,._-*.~-_.;~~,_:;::_.'.~.. --,,'~::-?:-.,,"'O".~.:,... .*~..,~*~.-,.:.:*..:.-._,~ ~;'.,--_._:,.,,,.l:~.::-.- ~~*-'.;..~*"*-::*-r-_~.~..'.,,,- ~~*~---.. ~~~- .-,;-~~* ,I iAs stated in Section 4.2.4 ofNWMI-2015-CSE-008, criticality in each of these systems will be prevented
)by incorporation of safe-geometry intermediate day tanks in the liquid systems that are physically iisolated from any larger-geometry tanks with an air break, such that backflow of uranium to an unsafe
)geometry is physically impossible. The current wording of the control CSE-08-PDF12 does not reflect
\the actual design and will be revised to clarify that the control consists of a safe-geometry intermediate L~ay ~~hysically isolated from any !arger geometry tank with~~~~~~-~
45 of 96
NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 CHAPTER 7.0 - INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS No. Request for additional information J.::::i':*/. :'.?~:::.~;. 1 .::;i-=:ZL~~~~'"*-~~~~;~~l~.~~-L;~'.J~: :>*:X:;~J:~~~~~:~*
- ,* .R{-\1 ?.
- *1 ~\~ ilff.fR[!g7,t~~.7; .fcn;t, {:/.(Iesti,on -!f?;* :,:su!J!!Jl,0~/Je.scrtpf!~n;:;st~t,es; fn RP'.,~* t~q(t~e ~PJ!lfr;r;~t sho~zd
- l
(. J .. *. . * * ** , S1Jmrpan.~e the tech1)lcal,aspects, :safety,.phzlo:SQphy,,,and'ob;ectjves-of(he mstrumenta~q control (l&Q) *
' ' ' ""' ;;de$igil a~ddis~ss .su¢hfactbrs'as redundahc;f'diversity,: ancUso)d_iioh*offunction,s. 'TheJSG ;; I
., * .. ' * '.W.ugmeniingN[/REG-f537, farts Tand2;'Sec't{on7br'.'Radioi$6tope ProductioriFaCility .: t' **,, :. ,.. :.,
": . * 'illnstruinent(l~iorz af!,d Contro{Sysfems,. '.'.§~ction 7~: J,<'Sul.nmaYt Desgripfion, ~* .st.(lt,es; inpm;t, .that fhe,,:* t i !iappli?~f sh,ou'.ef P_ri.ry~~e. ~ .~~"':01JfJ:!~~cfipli9,f1*9ft~~J~S~~~tel!l;s,.~'J~!u~inl{/h<f! ~~~!~.: q~.s~~;, t~~. ,'::t
- ..{safe(Y; ,con,szdera,gqns,,a11f1 qb;e9tzv~~; q"'df~~. <;P~r{l~°._l'l,Cf! .c~(Jrapter,zs/jpsp/r~e f!ro_d,ucti?1Jfaczfi1J!.,thr;ti'
- -:, determine 1,l_;,.: t* :*'>*' <-*'*"
of liJfiit the\:o'*',J&<;
,1.~ :0
.fl... **"""
de,sign:
_.,,_,:: ...,.~ -
N.URE_Q~I 537,,;Part 2;$ecti0n 7. ],,'. ':SuiitmpryD(!$crij)tfon;;" st(ite~,\ !
- ~'.*'* ,,.~ .* ~'~.:*.--.r *,:,,,"'. 7,' ;), ._*:,, *.~<-' :. ' .>>' .** * *. _**;,:,* _*,*.: ** :">' , * *,,: ,o,., ."<',*;. ,\ ,;_ 1!
, .* ::m pr;rrt, ;that (hf acceptance ofthe sumJ:llary.de,scnptif;n:shoulrfbe* base4 on its completeness, m. ** ' *, *. * (
c ,:j!dddre$~lng'(~~[a~':ors./f~~eain Pqrt*1. ::: . :::*: :,;: ,. '::.-:*" >.* :~: ')" * :*~'-<* >.,.. ~ .... <.* . < * * ~
~* .f. lf!WMI PSJ[R Sectioht I/ "$1.tmirJary IJeschptipn, :'. disci{sies tfi~ J~e qeiign;in terms dfRPF*: . . . .. 1
~* :.:P,rricess'es diid8ysiemS.iri¢ludingBNAf prepai,atioh an.dhandfin8 processes, radioJsotqpe. *ex!ra,cJi~J1 t:11J(/Ji
- fipurijicfitiiJn~pr~~esses/prO(
- ~Sef. UtJ {ity.a~d.'f_upport'SJ'.f/l!11lS, *.srifiqa/tf)J*qcqi~e(ltq/arm., sys/~~, .f!{J1(4tfO~ ,.)
. :;' :!/'~tqJ:iftoriJ1g:*sy~~~n .fa'Wftx v,efif!{atiq'.n 'S!:~~~1!!*"Cfn'fj1f!f Rfia_[!icql 1f/f/.i~SY.,~t~,ms.J:%JR:§e.~p.()1J/-/ .~tr;tes .1;
- *: !\,'*,;-.ith,at ":thefaci~itj;JJ.r6ce'ss ponftol (FPC) iJ.17iJ:th¢.,build,ing*1f!ah'{:lgefrlent systein (13MS) 'provide'mohitorin'g '*"r'-
-~
,,.:"' **"* .., ,. '"'-:" .. * *.,--.,. . * **.**"~ "'." *"**,, .... 1
,.,,. ,,*~,,,_* ~ "'-~)***:,~1*, ."i ,,~
- .: '.:{j,17d,'controlfitn,dions: J!S!fRSection kl id~ntifies'ho~ ci'f!dwhe,~e* the.proce,sses qr systems'are'::* *.... ;- * '.
.' ' ".:r;/orittOr(!(i and'dontrot!ed However,' ii aoes not identifY a'n'ji'specific J&Ctecfmical ilspe"cts; philosopliy, f
.
- i:or objectives'oftheinstnlmeniation~.Yhe discitssion:does.not,address r,edundqncy; diversify/or.*.* * * *
- l
' ;l, , - , , , ,, , r , ,- . . , ,_ * ,
. **/:';;is,olatiof! o]ifunctions.ex~epifo"the, engine,ering sf'[~ty fe0tll1:(!5'. }V~i~fi, ¢r~;f,lCf:f7-d f.o b.e i7J.d?p~ri'!]en,t; . *; .,
- I 1
- . ji~;;~F:~;iis~:f~11c:7¥~S-.*:;;_:~~:~~~r;:.~:*~~:~~jc::e f:1e,.'.27~r *:~:;,~::!:~~;~~~?:* ... **.:;*.:{ ****:**,*. :1.
- .*. ;'(fddf!iOf!~-~lf!forilJ.~ti~~.J~ n<!,f~e,ff/0,1:.,t~~,lffp;staJt ~?, UfJ~erfCf~p lljf, 5Z~Sipn,;Q'tlsi;s;te~~~ic,~f <;'fffeCts, . '
. 1
- .: * ;1safety, phllosophy; andob;ectives ofthe-J&C design gnd confirm 'tha~'the J&C design meets tfie*
. .-:: .. ::,:.:***~* **:::.*:;;~cc~p,t~n.~e~~ri!,e1'.l~o(/l}!f:Ed.~'t~5t 1;a~~1, ~ec~o~:7*{:}.* . ':*.. -.: ;:: ";: :\t*:::*. ':.* ;.,: -'.. *.. *
- * ..*';'Provide .ad(iitfonal detaiLregarding the design, bases, technical aspects, ~dfety, 'phil(Js6phy, and
. :. . '.3 ;_;b'b)ect~ves fon *~!.f 1&;CJ.'c6mpim.'e~ts ~hat fµofliior'dn(i_ cohtrol'/1PF p~ocessh.o~ ~s{ein~:;**" .: . . . .
., "' .. -~-)~ .'..,.¥,c}f *},l;,'-'-'*-='"'-!~*;:-:~1-,;.. "I".:,-.;;-:,'. ~ ~t.:.rr..'i~:;*~'~':.,._*"* ~~*:'*..; ""'-~-,,J,r,,.~*S--.*<!"-m:t*~'.,...:.~<--;-.;:~, ~*. -->"""<*<***.~ *V.!*.."":'.~.__-,- ~,,*~..,-~;:"_,_, ,;.* ' o:~~. *~_,<;...._,,,_""",..._,,, -..~...\.~~--:'--=.:...~ :~_.,.,f,..";<",..*."-f.7-,,..-*~-";_..,,~.~,..,,'7"o**- ~~~.-;*~*-~}..
- The instrument and control (I&C) systems preliminary design was developed to ensure the sufficiency of !
- the principal design criteria, design bases, and information relative to materials of construction, general
'arrangement, and approximate dimensions sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the final design
- will conform to the design basis. In addition, preliminary design of the RPF I&C systems (e.g., details
/regarding the design bases, technical aspects, safety, philosophy, and objective for all I&C components
!that monitor and control RPF processes or systems) was not developed to constitute approval of the
- safety of any design feature or specification. Such approval is anticipated to be made following the
'.evaluation of the final design of the RPF I&C system, and described in the final safety analysis report 1
(FSAR) as part of the Operating License Application. Note that concepts like redundancy, independence, 1
- and diversity of systems are specifically identified as necessary in PSAR Sections 7.2 through 7.6. '
'considered functional and at a conceptual level. Our intent at this stage was to describe the design
- methodology and provide reasonable assurance that the final design will conform to the design bases
- wit~ ~ a~equat~_mar~in [~r safety. . . __ *- .... .
46 of 96
.:.... . . NWMI
........~:.*
NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 1 I
': ~~.:~:' flDRTIMIESTe.!!DtCAl ISQTOPCS f R.t\1 7~1-2*. {NuiiEo-153 7; -Part f
\:.
f::: .*. '
- . ;:channels designed.to monitor each parameter, qnd tfle. actuating logic: NUR,EG_:..J 537,,Part.2,,i. .
- Request for aqditional information s~cttqn 7~ 1;(*:1sit~niary b~~criptton:',; si~t~s, *iI;'part, thatthe:geherdt'desc;/ptioni
_~;qffJt;tcfl ,category ofI&C subzystems should inclu<fe<the types ofparameters monitored; *the number oft: i'
'(:"se~ti01i 7. i,'/'.Swfl~1ary J)'escrtp.fton, ;,_ si~res, tnp(lr(that the 4.¢.ceptaiice oftiie, sii/Jimary.-descr.tp#of! :' "
f :\,: . _}. \i§hould ~e;~~s~~~~~i'its c?~IJ/ft~&~~i i~aa,1re{~ii~ t~~ir~ftors ~[~te~f~/~tt./,:. . ,~:*" '" *.* ,; ~:~~_'.:: .. *,,.
- V * '* *' .*L*:NfWAf!P81f ,S~crjonz.1; .'.'~~injnqiY;I>,~~~tiptfo,n,!*' qfsc~ss~.s~~e I<ffq~~figniht,~rm~.?ffJPF~v . '.;.,
?. :*, . .' _*. ';r:oc~s~es a'?dfYste~: Sectu~n 7.1.sta'.es that, the:FP_C and the BMS proy14e ~l()f!;lton,nfJ_ an-i cqnb;:q! **-.
- ,
- * * . **. * ,*
- _ifunctfons; but it does riot discuss I&C SitbSyslems'thiit are part ofthe overall FP,G syste'n1 and BMS.
- 1. . . * !JPSAR 8ectiori'7.1 identifies.izoW, arid wher(J_ lMprocesses. or systems afe monitored and coiitrollea.
J _ *:: ,, {. ;i.~itf!o~Uf{c;~tifYilig the f)IJJ.e:S;;ofpat;l!_meferS, mcmi(orecJ, ,the number-of.chii'?tiels monftori~g;~ach. '. ~ '.~;, *f
!).'. . . "" *,;:g<.wpm~t~r,onne a;:(u?f!o~)pgi~.. ':. . : * ,:._ :/::* . :, . : ;,\.; *;' ., i" . .-::~>-.?: . *.- *. . ' , r
,., * , . fr4dc!fti()tJqlinfonJiciti.on isneedf!(ifo1: th~ NJ?;.O:st(ljftoiuru~erStand, t!ze, type~:ahdnuf!Jbets ofpariimeters * ;
v .. ,_.:.,;'.,. ;~mon!lored a1uJ,Jhe act,ua4on,:19gic anef cofijiriij*.ih<};_tt.he..fcfi:Q*design;mepts't~e-:accepta!1¢'e critel:fo of . *\
,~i :*. j I
- "*
- pNUREG-1S37;
' \ ' fj ' ' ' ~ 1 i Part 2/Section
' ',; ~ ' * '
- 7,1. *. ..
~; * " , ' ' ' * , ' ' 1
' J.
- \
\. , . ;!P_rovide additi~nal-detailfor.each c,at~gory ofI&C'subsystems that includes the types _ofparamete'rs * *:
I * *** , *
- i'ffJ..onitofed, tlie_number ofchannels designed to monitor eae,h parc1rneter, a1Jd.the.qct11,atirzg)ogiq. .* * . _,
- 1 ~;,.,
- .!~/,,.;_~ ....:.~-:-,.'...,.~*~;)~-~.:;.,.;!*c,~.~.;,.;:,. :r,:-i,~*-.'*t-/. ~..:.,.:o'.-;,'-ow* c.,,,.~ .<.~.~,_:,;.~~,._:.'..o~!". ,:._"'.'!....v::....;..:,.*.;., L.i_ ____:i:;:.;,..,:. ".::..,: ..~'.-~~ '~:-~~**-~:_.~*-.t~,_:;;,,,.*. ~:-..,....~"'*.::-*~.,*.,,'._;L'_:. .__;,_~--4.~:..~::...i~~ !.':_:!_,.: ,_.:., -~ ;_~~:,';.,._,:__ ;_.,_, *- ,,- _:_:i
\The I&C systems preliminary design was developed to ensure the sufficiency of the principal design jcriteria, design bases, and information relative to materials of construction, general arrangement, and iapproximate dimensions sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the final design will conform to
/the design basis. In addition, the preliminary design of the RPF I&C subsystems (including types of
!parameters monitored, number of channels designed to monitor each parameter, and ac~ation logic) was
- not developed to constitute approval of the safety of any design feature or specification. Such approval is
!anticipated to be made following the evaluation of the final design of the RPF I&C system, and described; Jin the FSAR as part of the Operating License Application. Section 7.2 does not address specific aspects *
/of the I&C system, although Tables 7-4 through 7-12 list the location and types of parameters anticipated.
ito be monitored.
'.For the RPF Construction Permit Application, the preliminary design of the RPF I&C systems is
!considered functional and at a conceptual level. Our intent at this stage was to describe the design (methodology and provide reasonable assurance that the final design will conform to the design bases
!with an adequate margin for safety.
r~-RA:T7;;t:.f,'.:jiuRii§.fJ537,~:*fJ'r;J't 'f'si'tii~i;* :rr*~~sti";i;t/iiry15~JC:riptiJ:;{t*;rt:Res:7izjf~ri;'"m~f'ii1~':~qh~~"dht~~"(;';.iPf'i;ril j .. .>::ofeachca(egory ofl&C ~bf;,,stems.shbu1aiilclude a*sum.mary "OJ the hunid,ncJmt;IChihe1irlteYJace' -* *' . . :* . (
- \.': j!prinqiples used in the loca_tion ofinstrumentation a17d controls. NUREG-1537,. Part 2;* Section 1.1, ,. :* /:
01
- . J"Surlinuiry pesr;rtptiq~, "stat~s,.(n part, th~i ~fie ,a9Geptanc_e.of~he summary i(escription:~sho'µIdbe* .. \
. '*. ;:bf;ised on itfcompletenessin 'addresstnithf!faqtors listed, in />artl. ,' ... ' . .. i: : '
'* **: *;;Nff/MI lsAR ~~¢fio,; 1; :;;'§~~1~a;.)'.I?~~cd.Ptt~n(;/ti§c~;~~; t1i~'1&/; ~e~~-in temis'.oJJ??F.-t -_.*;y . :. ** !:
i
.<'Proc,esses lriilSyste_'!zs.' PrAR§~{tjon 7). ~pi~s, that ffle t<:rge..t fa,pt:lca_tJpn,,P,rQ(;e:r4; t,ifrg~f ~1pe1f?l. a1Jd. *.)
' .';disassembly process, targ¢t dissolution process, 'molybdenum reco~er .'and fturifi,e'ation proce,ss,: anrj ... !,
,.>,. '.!!Ow-dose liquid waste:hand/ing will be*confro/led by opefators at foca(humari-miJch(ne' inteYfafeS, '* f'
- .,\(HMI). f SAR Section Z. J:also identifies thai: operators at local HMis will controMhe'plant alr, system:*:**:
.)gas fUpplysy_ste[lt, .pro~e$.s chilled w9ter 'chille~s,.prQcess;steanPboilers, demineralized ~ater'sjsteni,' . :.
.'.;chemicaI:supply :iystem, and standby electric power8ystem. PSAR Section* 7, l"uses several.different* : ,; \
. 'i!tefnis (i:*e.' *'/ip~;ato; fnterfac~ di;pJ/;ys,' dpefdt'o~ i~'ieiface' te~lhal;;: a~d IJiiI~> ~h~~ ~efer~jng t~ ',; , :' ' '"
. :.+qpefator~controlled equipment PSAR Section '7,. i)Joes ndt tnc#/de a ~nt~'fury ojth~ ifMipri11cpl~~>)
. ;::}used_in the locli~on ofl&C'and doesnotdefinethe d(jferent'ie'rms usedto'aescribe opeYatof;c(>)itroileq'.
' ~ :;,<eqt1ipment. . :* .* * , /.<~. * , *: .* , ".. ' *. *. :*::: ..:* f * ::~- *: * *: : : * :: * * ; _< ** ...,_ * :***. **,., ; , '.'.
- I * ; . . :!~dditional inf~r'mation, is 'f!eededjor thdstaffto understana the mriqus'JfMJs,being:disd~ssf!_d a;;ato , ,.
- .* .
- ficonfirm that
- thef&C desi.gn ll'lee,ts the w;r;:eptance. crit~ria:ofN[JRE,_G-15.37; .P,art2, Seetion 7,. J:. " .**. .i
- __.~~-_
- _-..,~... *.!~**:---*-,, -'.* ~'-~_,,..,,..*,,_.::..,**_'_;~-*..,.'~~::.: - .... ~ .. --.;.,-=-- *.,,--,;'......';'. ...,.""::~>o;' .H,._~ *--:._~ -*-,~,.- _..,-_.,~*-*,_
... .. - *** ;,_j_:._,.,,.,..~.--~~...~,: ..,.:,,._,.,. ;.-- .~~.'i..,......,.......,.,_,--~-".:~:,.~.--,.--::~.-',;..~ ,,_., "~----~,,-.,.,.-* --*'-*~--- ,...,,'.\-r.-~-~~,..,.'.~:.~J... ,f.,.~:4'~)
47 of96
.:..**~"-NWMI NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0
. : ~~.:!':
- f!ORIW.'JEST MEotCAl ISOTOPES
-i. jii\1: 1.1-3 .:*:;pf:(/vtde *9ddit~qh~l:i~fir/ii~tiq~foi ~i;fii.c~tffg~~~~/i&:~J~f;;y;j;ffis*ih*~ii~c[i;d~~ ii:F~liz4~'.bft~~*c:)
,;", ,<<?9"!~ *.~:#MI pripqiple.'!:tfse4liJ/h.t;,Jf!t;ai#9Jtofl/f:C:wz_rJ d,efin.e/h~.tiif.ferense- {nfUJJCtj?ha"fty_ µmfAesigri, * .: ._ .; *\
' . * *. *- * *:betweenoperato_r interface disp/fJYs, operaior itzterface terminals, and HMls.. ' *
- Re uest for additional information
- * -,*.: * * * * *: i
.~£~.~:.~-4~:. ,~!-~. :JL ,r..:;).~. ,. :--::...:...:.~:-.~ *.,.:* .. ~~t{,_, ~:~..~*t**;~_,.;~*~. ~~:~ ~-.~,!.'.~,;.~d.~~..,...A~.:~~'.'"*~~1,._S,,.,;:..!~~r:,*J~'--:~).:*,._4,..,.,,.:~="~'.:°'(-",6~*.i'.:-:-1~,;;.,.,. "..::. :-_;.*~--~.; f'",.;ir';,,,-!r*'.".~J!.~'.-:* --~~::;.,...b+.~-.: ;!_-...7,f--;.-r.J~1';".._,_,;.:.,f.,_.,.-*,,,;-f;,,*:*~.-t'.,..~_:..;,*;,-..~...-~
- The I&C systems preliminary design was developed to ensure the sufficiency of the principal design
,criteria, design bases, and information relative to materials of construction, general arrangement, and
\approximate dimensions sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the final design will conform to
'.the design basis. In addition, the preliminary design of the RPF I&C subsystems, including specific
- details on human-machine interface (HMI), was not developed to constitute approval of the safety of any
- design feature or specification. Such approval is anticipated to be made following evaluation of the final 1
- design of the RPF I&C system, and described in the FSAR as part of the Operating License Application.
ITo be consistent in the PS.AR, terms like "operator interface displays" and "operator interface terminals"
!will be replaced with the single term, HMI (e.g., pages 7-i, 7-iv, 7-4, 7-15, 7-17, 7-18, 7-20, and 7-21).
'I
!considered functional and at a conceptual level. Our intent at this stage was to describe the design
- methodology and provide reasonable assurance that the final design will conform to the design bases
~~~~a~~~inforsafety~~-~---~--~-~- -~~-
No. Request for additional information
.~.~'.~'.~. ;:;!;ifu~1~iZ~='.~~,t?2):(",**~,****i{4
- ~~ .Th¢ :'System d~scriptipn (n tfJe. SAR s~01jldJnclude;equip,mef,it ai]dmqjor q0 niponent.s1ds.~ell.d$; :*
' ' *fJlosjc,;zogic; afJd.~chemdpcqf qgi,ap~,:£*; .th,e:appljea,nt.,shq~~ij.Sifa1ftii/1qrajvq1:e <I.J14.soJmqre.: :; " ;'
~ ).lf!~C(r.ipJ/orz.s. ,q,hct~off}tlarfL/lbfV, 1iwftw;js£or ~ig[!ql P,9ppu_t;r ~s!<;m~.[arfd *~~.at])~~ .applicant .. '.
..'_shou*1a:desci-ilie how,the'S)lsfem operatiqnql ahd~pport,feifuiremen# will be met,' f1ow:"the.: :i .. t
,,*~*, .'"..*,i.,.1'** 1 ~.:.,;\._,,.*,,1, .,._ *.* *'**,*1 ~ .,,,.. -- ......... ,....* *' *.*,,;'., '"'. .**; ** .. *, :'; .. *f',* *--, .. ** ,_,~' *:' I(
' operator interface requjrenients wm be'met, [and} should"addresstlie.'m¢thodology"and: acceptance'*
- > ); :; " criter/Cl'Used i{J es,talilish and cqltbf*ate'l/if! triP'or dqtui:itt6n. setpoints;]'or'fnt~'r/ock functions: : ,:,:;, -~
'.flWMf ?slft?.. Section J;*i3, '::,:$y~tef!l De~cliptiohf'f'. d~s,c1ibes*tfie KPF1&(j] srstefn. basic co!hPpnents*qs ~
0
- *,. )ncludirzg th.~ 'f'P@.;'sjlste,m;' 'eng_irz,eerifli sefet;/feafureJifSF}:actuation iystems, qonl]:'(;Jl cpnsf!li;.aiid .. i
- f4isplaY-'iristrziii/enf~;. a~d:the/3MS. PSAR :S~ctipn~;'X:-f,*3:*.1,'thY,ough Z. f..},5'.fio 'fzq~i~ricl¥d<J .a:de'scription ._ . i 0
.!iqf~fl,~ F;:~F;qCiuatf?:n* 8!sf.<;11i~/9i;-.fhe,,f3J1S)fln8:t~afl:,"~~:~~gt~ops, "{;:;7:,#:hr?!'g~- i;g. ~*~R~or:,.ae"{~igh~ ~
* * . "1. iilev<ff'f.w1ctiona(qe~crrpti(J1JSiofthe FP:Csystem; ,conl[olrooinlopf!rator m,terfqc;e,fix.epJ:,oteqtiqn, system,1, ,<***}},<'\'.'_"* -'"F - '. *:,"1,-<', ."~,._,,ic,.~*h',,*'!~)";;,! .'i'. '*'*"*'* "/' *"':':* ;,< .,.;*:*'-"" *' *.' -,*~*'*'t:*-'"[;.*:*,,.'I"'_>. ~,' ,,._'* ~ ** * : ;f"acilitycomfnunication Sj;stefns,,ancl anaJytical'labora(6ry*i)lstem..PSAR.Section ?'2.:3 alsodoes*not *.:1 "' ':: *..:.'.]~ontain)lock/liJgtc;-."</r schenzalic ~fagfams'of th~se"~b'systems'n'dr do~S:it address,:the:methodology '. ~ ' . ')!ind acc,eptal1c'e criter~a.i:ised'to. estab/iSh~n{l:balibrate t,hei'tripior 'lictiiati<i11 setpoinfs; or i1fterloc.k*' '. ). ._ **i~zincti9~s.., . , * ..*-_-. * ::::;r ;, '. :. ,_:: .:'~*:*i.:~*i/':(* :~:,)*:: *;; ,. '.:{:. :* ;*.. :**;)~ .":* _:;; *: ~,: : ;.~*~* ,~',: *'.: .'.*'. *' . _* '. .*;:.;: .<*\ . *: , ,. \ *.l .)~.'fl dditiq71al"irif()nilqtion' i~ ne,ces~izryfd~ ,the Nf3C:stajft,().ttn't]ets/and* f~,<Jre!ati.()IJ:~hifi.'am'grJg afl: p}t~e,;, "*~ ""_:*~.::;.,)!ifr:L~~-~'!:~.~~'!!fl~~:2.f.~:2~::_~L,, _ .;,**:~> ~~~;~_,:,,c_:~:c:~::,L'.::: . **"'*:~E:~. :~~,-~~;:.:~.~ :L:):.*.*::~5.: ~'.L ~-c ;.~*L~~~; ~;-. ~-~-~,.;1 48 of 96
.:.:*~;:.
NWMI NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0
*': ~~.~!:.
NORrnWlST MEDICAL JSOTOPU Request for additional information
- f:-~f i,~~1a,<.;".f:~iytd? .additiim"t;i iefofl}lqno¥:ae8,~N~tfzi' trlfbftlie;~qiifp#t~nt ii&a ~~J6~~1! ~&q t~ihi{pfie~ts*{L \ '/: '. i p'. . <'*:* .,. f:.;~1:1c{fidiil~ ~*!oclc,. /oste:. afid~f1~niati~ 1ia~r<;i,t1!s.to* s~ow*i1:zi:.relati~ns!Jip b'~tW~e~:t!1~:varto~s 1.~q *;::\*:J
!~ .. *' . i'.f1lisys,te111s:. s~JPV.'!r.(flqw, d1pgra11l§f°'?:* tfJ.<; d{[J.lf(ll;c<f_mpu,ter_ ~s,felJJs,;~p. 4f!~Cl:zptig,npff!o1fl...t~r;.~sys,!,efl ;,~
- l. .
- _. .. . ~Eop~rati°"nal:an,dsupportr,equfr(!nf¢n~s, <;ojdoP.e.1:cJJor,.(Y1,t(fr.fdqe.r,~q1fireznerits,. (lt;f!~'t[leti:"°*:,::.,,~ ..*.. ,. :,; --- * ,: .,;
~~:..*. . ,..;.,,'=.v:>J~~~~~....,.~,;,.""~.,"J!""~*";:,'!,~--=,~--<:~*-~-~*~,;...;.;,.~.._...,;~~;~:~_ -::;:;;;:_~~.::;; ...,;.!,:~~,.*J.' .~~;...,~';;~.,,.;....\.~;L~-~.::_~{-...:~~~_,..;_.*L.~*-*.;.,~~.;.~:_,,.:.,.~_..;;,".:,.,_"~=*"'"';._,_,,...,~f:!-,.::::~~.f..';~~:~--~~;.:,.~..-~~J.-~-~- --~:_.:.. ~.+.z,~l""~~'r-~) jThe I&C systems preliminary design was developed to ensure the sufficiency of the principal design !criteria, design bases, and information relative to materials of construction, general arrangement, and iapproximate dimensions sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the final design will conform to !the design basis. In addition, the preliminary design of the RPF I&C systems describing all of the jequipment and major RPF I&C components (e.g., block, logic and schematic diagrams, software flow !diagram, and description of how system operational and support requirements and operator interface !requirements are met) was not developed to constitute approval of the safety of any design feature or (specification. Such approval is anticipated to be made following evaluation of the final design of the RPF\ !I&C system, and described in the FSAR as part of the Operating License Application. * !For the RPF Construction Permit Application, the preliminary design of the RPF I&C systems is !considered functional and at a conceptual level. Our intent at this stage was to describe the design !methodology and provide reasonable assurance that the final design will conform to the design bases (with an adequate margin for safety. 1~r-.-;-. y--* :::--~;""'~~ ..-..,...:!:..;_,v"'f<;:.*:i',~Y-;~-c---*.,..'.,i;;:),~."'Y":-':?".l;* °1.~~~;:':.,.'1---.~?'~.-;;"t""?:;'-~;":Pt:f'i;:'-';n--:..~1"".,:*:7*T.7;***1*~t~Y:;f;"'.;...:1~.~t-"'*f<-~...::*.,.. t.1;x-i?~*~rff*~':i~~.7t-:i~,:~.,,17~,t~;-.t~+~*~"i'.:'1'r.,:~~t-_;,.:.,,.~""**~'~"'~'.i ,.;~~=*nr::y:~ :;.-*~'..;.,1**"t*~*:.;;,;'"".:,:~,.."";--4 "*'.*~~*'t:
- ,~1: 7: :~~~ b ::P:rovt1e.:~ 1e~c~!P~O,~: dfJ~e_ .'!!e!~~if.o{~~ Cfl~*~cffp/a~s~.~{ite~fff~~~.<£ ~°.}H~??P~~:(~~//'.ii?,;C!~:~ct~f~P'!*l Lc;:~~:~~*~:~~:i:;;~~i[:~:~:::.~'l'.~~ff:~~f~:7!1~~~~q~~*:L~iLL~~":,::,~~*~<;~;,~L.,. L~:.:::i~;'.;,);~.~~~" ::~~,. ~(:~. ~::::lL:~~(.~,~~;:,;,b;~~L .C:_~,~..',;i-'.:.l?~**~
jThe I&C systems preliminary design was developed to ensure the sufficiency of the prinpipal design '
- criteria, design bases, and information relative to materials of construction, general arrangement, and japproximate dimensions sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the final design will conform to fthe design basis. In addition, the preliminary design of the RPF I&C systems describing the detailed
- methodology and acceptance criteria used to establish trip or actuation setpoints or interlock functions
!was not developed to constitute approval of the safety of any design feature or specification. Such ,*. !approval is anticipated to be made following the evaluation of the final design of the RPF I&C system, !and described in the FSAR as part of the Operating License Application. *i 1 IAs discussed briefly in PSAR Sections 7.2.4.1 and 7.2.4.2, trip or actuation setpoints for systems in ISection 7.2 will be established to indicate a warning when a given parameter is approaching a setpoint iand alann/trip when it has reached a setpoint, both at the HMI and the control station, as appropriate. iAlarm/trip setpoints will be established at levels that are protective of systems relied on for safety, as (described in the PSAR (and follow-on FSAR), particularly IROFS. This means that alarm/trip setpoints lwill be established to provide reasonable assurance that these systems will be consistent with the design !requirements and limitations established by the bounding analysis found in the PSAR and follow-on !FSAR 1 !For the RPF Construction Permit Application, the preliminary design of the RPF I&C systems is
,considered functional and at a conceptual level. Our intent at this stage was to describe the design
!methodology and provide reasonable assurance that the final design will conform to the design bases I~~~ ~-~deq~~te-~~¥.~-~°.~~~f~_!.L_____ *-~---. *- ___ "' .,,,____ __ ___ .... _.. _.. __ ---------*- . _ ,._______ . *- ... _.....J 49 of 96
.:.~*~; . . NWMI NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 * : ~~.~~:
- flORJKWtsl MEDlCAllSOTOPU
- . ~1-7.~:2 .~ ;;Iiuf{Ea~i5'.3'7, fari,1 :: ~eq!;;~ :f.~i 4; ;,sji;i~mf~if~i;i~~~~;fo~zy-;;£ ;_;:;~t~i~~.:-;~ ~~rt, *thdt t~~ ~pp1ib~~t;
.. .* . *: "* .i!shpulq cl;nduc(a p~rformgYJC(!.cinplysi~.9ft!Je PJ:Op~sed SystepJ N.e17syr_e the 'desigl) criteri{J an<:(des.fgn, '. . .: .;b~se.i ar_~ met a~d liCensing req11iremen{sfqr tije .Pe.rfolJnm:ice 6/fh(!, system afe specified. Tli'e analysis ;: .*: < :!shoulq describe the* operation oflh~!&<; sjJstein afld presentthe:analysis *afhow'the .si>item de~gn'*;. \ *!'.
Re uest for additional information
. *. ?bneeM'tHe de'iign critet:iiuthd lle~l'gn.bas.es.:: J:'. :; .,.; ... * * *< *:*!.' .* , .. * .., ~.... '~'. .:<:.. ... .: A.}' >.* ;;:fiwMJ fSAk.s~ctioir 7{2. lt/ '~ystifn, p~'r}o;inanfe~1ndlysis;* !: si~t~;:thatIR.OFS ~izl.Ee ma~agJa by i~~
7
~!FPC-:'sji:Sfem,!* P§AR Section. 7._'.2. 4}.2~stqtes t~at:th(FPCsy;>thn *Wi:lbiniiiate_:aridconirobESF actiV,dtiori :i . ' :and isolation: PSAR-Section :i:2.4.2.6 states that the FPC sy'stem will have the abilityJo'perforni a*. , *. " * , *. iimpnual ac~ivation of th,e ESE: Howevr.:r, PS!JR'See;tion i 1. ~t~tes. th_at ES,F sysi:~~s will operate* , :. *. )
- . *:irzdependen(ly from:. the FJ?(;system(Jr !}MS; will yse*hard.,.wjreij qnalogcpntfpls(interlocks, to proteet . ~
- ...**~ ;,:i:workers, the.public, :'Jn(J ewiMnine1]t; dtidESFpti,ra,fieter~ amlatdnn /unctiohs will/be lnteirliiedinio, j
... -~ . /}rifid nfoiiitOf:ei:fbYihe Pre sj/ste'fri'qf;,Bp.rs.:'Th~!dif.rere1?t:~'!,icrlptiof!s of.ihe. FfC 'sysle/nfu11ctibnality in\ . * '>.\'.aiffer.entsectionsoftheFSARapfedr.toh?'1nconsistent.'.:.*:.;. ;*; C-,~I,"~* ,~ :*" ***,* -':' : - ' '. '*. ,<' .~._* *~ '.:. .. '.-~-* *; * -~ :_;_ .:: .: ~', .*
- ~'- * .
- l
) .. : *'.\A(Jdltioiiat inforinatioY, is nece.ssaryJor.iheWRCsiafftojullywiderstahd'tlie. 6peraiion'Ofihe integ;:atefiJ -::* ');;;if??F-1&<;_ Sy_St~lh:' . . ;. ' . ' .,:** " . " ...' .** : '* . ,.. . );
/,' " *. ' . *c; . ***. :* :;:Pr6~ia; dddi~iq~al infor_,;,ation ih the!&c system aesci-ipffon_a~/J perfar,mance 'analysi;*Of the FF<;. I. )' " ' as
. ;'sj;stem if'r.e/a..fes:.toE_8_f 1f1aljagifl$; monitor_~ng)andac;tuafiOf!, .:J!tSO/Ve ffie. appqre._nt !nC:~J?Sis(enc:y i .1:
- 1. * .* '* * * . :'-i:Pf!iw'e<;_rithe,de~criptii:m in I?S;1.R:S~cti01f7_.J iJ:!a(states .'.,'.E,Sf. systew~ qrefir,ly_ monitore,i;l by"tlu~, FJ?.C/~I
.: :, ~\ . ', ;: .~* ]:{lf!d{Jig <j~s'.qripti~p~i!Jl.*11( §e9,fiqlJ~:Z*?4.2:.2,pJ:id_ _7.:2,flf t~,{:l~ ~tate, !'.'ES~f)lsfem' ~c!jvc,itjo'!,.~~~ <. '} .'. , *, * , ... Pisolation is initiated and controlled by the FPC 'and the FPCsystem; has the ability to manually.activate t L~*,'";'..:~~~ -~. ~:~~~~-;-* . . .~. . . :*;~:.~;*X .,~~-.:~.~~ :c~.-~.: . .*.~:,,~-~-* -~~----~. . . :'.~W-~:: .::~:: .::~"- _,-m.... ~.- ~ '~:-..~:-~--~~:- ~ ~ -~ *:.:.~:
*. ** ,.. ** ... :.-:1
'.The I&C systems preliminary design was developed to ensure the sufficiency of the principal design !criteria, design bases, and information relative to materials of construction, general arrangement, and 1 approximate dimensions sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the final design will conform to
- the design basis. In addition, the preliminary design of the RPF I&C systems describing the detailed
- methodology and operation of the integrated facility process control (FPC) system as it relates to
- engineered safety features (ESF) managing, monitoring, and actuation was not developed to constitute
- approval of the safety of any design feature or specification. Such approval is anticipated to be made ,
- following the evaluation of the final design of the RPF I&C system, and described in the FSAR as part of i
'the Operating License Application.
- psAR Section 7 .1 states, "Engineered safety feature (ESF) systems will operate independently from the
- FPC system or BMS." This sentence will be amended in future versions of the PSAR to say, "Engineered
- safety feature (ESF) systems will operate upon actuation of an alann setpoint reached for a specific
!monitoring instrument/device. For redundancy, this will be in addition to the FPC system or BMS ability \ actuate ESF as needed." By amending this sentence, the descriptions in PSAR Sections 7.2.4.2.2 and
- 7.2.4.2.6 will be consistent with Section 7.1. !
{'--_~*-..;..,*:---.,.:--/-:...--~---ti ,.-,,,~**--fl**.:; *.. --:-- "";';T'.:"-".t*'3~-"'-";;:;:;";""-- **.r..,.~,,...:'-....._., * *-'-r*~ ~*f-,O-: * .-;*_,,-* '..-*;**...:;~*.-' _... .--.-*.-:-;--~;**'-':*_.,.-"".~ .,.~fr*-*.'.:_,-.-""-*;:: ... -*.....,,.:-,.-*---"'"tj'-*" -~"'-.'--;--~*-'*"'---'"*--"*'- .. ,,.,,,..i"~---- :,;..-~...__...,o;;,~ *r*Y'7 .,"..:;;....-""~-*;:; \* .; ; RPil* 7~2-3<: /Jif[Jf?EG_:.. I 53-7; Part -1; ,SeCtionJX 2.5i~' '.~on'clusion,. '~.statf!_stha(the}1pp,lic,{lnt should.summarize why. the .\J,
- r . , ,, , ~. , , . , , . , '. , _, _' " ** ,, ** , r ., ,;
- o , ,
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1
** .:r i!sy~te1r1Ae~{gn .{s suffic:ie!J( af!.d sfdtf!blf!for:peefdt:lJl!ng t~~ f11nc.tj</1.~siat<;ef., in th~:<J.~si~. ba_si~*<< , ~ *_, : **1 "* 1: O , > *'"; ,'*_' , .> "' ,
- O* .'. ' ** : " ' .. > - ' ....~ ' ' - ' ~ <, <, " '. ~ * ', *i .' * * > r .' ' ' ' '** " . ' L '> * -'. ', ' "/
. .;NWMI'B.SA.R See;tion]. 2'4:3*:. "(;onclu~ion/'.' st,at,<{s~ .ffJp~rt; t~atlhe RPF:J{k..(.: syst,eins }fill me'f!tJh.? .. . ;: *,. istated design criteria. anddesign ba'sis*requirements outlined in NUREG-.1537. PSAR Table 7-2, * *~-:*. ,,:'. L' *'*/'-'_.:.) ***'* ' '* ***.**I>;,_ ~,'_ ';i_"r * .!o*".",~, ""' ""*~ *"-"\ '*""'*'*~'-*,*,'",-,<' *,:; .. ,~*." *.*, L'" *, ** . ' ' ~...,/ ' " i1."Insf[L!.1Jlentatf{;n.a11dc;or1f1:.ol Cri{eria,CJ:os8W.alfovith Pf!signBas[;ulpp{if(1bility and F_unc;tion . . . . .*. Meii11s, "presents a crosiwallf ofthe I&C':Sub~stemi, an~ atte11jpts:to gross~reference ihe differentJ&,C f
- f*:'Sufiystems to ~f;£bifi~'.desi'gf?.~t1:itefia:' ;J'Jie:table'.'ld~ks 'the 'c~tiss'"refe1;eHdf~ginf~nni:Jtiorl nec'essafjtd:' :i'.
*> :!zhcate :t6e ~JecificPSJ1I{Cljapt#r7.'~ecfion1:fhat p~ovide{a 9et~iled dJ~crfpti,qh ojhow.fhe design,ba;;s .~ .. ' '.;is_ sa'tisji,ed; :rflr{ O'mis~ion'ofth(},cross-refei!en~ing {nforrfzation.jjrey,~nts eJ.'f1lu'ating thq.t the 'sj;~t,em '. .*: .;,
- . :. *'!d.esigfl. is_ siifjicfent, _and*siJitqgle:for pe_r{qrr~i.~g[~'e fiJ."nc;i;o~s str:te~:in;the)!~~{,!Jn,p{j~f** * . * .. : . '., . , -~
i: : ., ~. \VtdditidnaOnferm?ttib11..is necessary.toifully understand the .operatfon* ofthe integrated RPF1&,.C:, :
- c. :~ ~.. ~ * .: . .'\'~8;~e,~~: ~..'.,.. ~.,.,. ., .. . . . . . . . *. . . ~*.*~*. -~. *~*---~. . "'*
so of 96
NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 I~ '{
/
Request for additional information f*R4ij7~~::J :::iltr.iJvidelciifa;ii~'r1fi{i'nf6r:Jiiiti6n ;Jif'iJ~l~'*72~.(fiaf~~qfiide~.>a~toss'-r~fete11ce, tq;jiu/sp~2[lic .'se"i:ii~n'.:ol . :'.~ c,orm *. *.*. '(fRSAR' Chapter1.thatdi~fr!.sses 'h~fi' .tJ:te systJ}n is'sui,tab'~f!,f,qr.pe,rf<J,rmfng . tfze'function$ statedJo~ each *.; L:-:. 'Ji:~~~":<:Jf~;:;1~~1~f~;~fg!!£z~~?1!:$1!::;*,;_~,~)~~~.~1:~i:_:~jt,i,:~~~::Jd!e~~~~i.~~J1;i~.:~.:;2:dI~~--~:~~iLi:*.:;::'.;;j_'i;~~;~;D'. !The I&C systems preliminary design was developed to ensure the sufficiency of the principal design jcriteria, design bases, and information relative to materials of construction, general arrangement, and iapproximate dimensions sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the final design will conform to !the design basis. In addition, the preliminary design of the RPF I&C systems describing the detailed !methodology and operation of the integrated I&C systems was not developed to constitute approval of jthe safety of any design feature or specification. Such approval is anticipated to be made following the revaluation of the final design of the RPF I&C system, and described in the FSAR as part of the Operating* !License Application. iWhen the final RPF design is complete, PSAR Chapter 7.0, Table 7-2, will be expanded to provide a icross-reference to the specific section of each I&C section and how the system is suitable for performing ; !the functions stated for each design basis applicability item. , .... - b4 ""'="""ft'".......~~"""""""'.. ~ No. Request for additional information
~:tt~t~~ttft;~;~~. ~r;#~~~;:~,;~.~~~.~~¥:~*~.~<;~*~.;;;_:5;;~-~~;~,~~f?~;-~~~:;F;r~-~-.--.-~:;*;_ *:~~~.-=~;]
RAI :7.3-1 ;;TIJelSG AugriJen,tiYfg N:V}~EG-153{, Pal'.t 2,, 'section* ~b3;' ?Process. Cqn't~o!Sys(ein~, ?A~c,:eptance _: . * {
**."* .:Vf!r~teriq; ~#.rj/es,, WJ!~r,t(. t,~~5.the ~st.~m,*w,Mu]d,,~e ;<<esign~q liJ.~{h,,~ti.f/N~ln[,con,tf,~l.,?f/~'IJ;~tiyityf.oti~lt~ *:";t *. ;;'requiredpro_ductiofz'.and_SNX{fue.l feCibnditioningpl'.()cess.'operations:' >J . ':** '°; .*'.P***_*., * . *::' ... ,, 1 * :*: *;>Vf:VMifs#?.*:$er:qJµ; 7.};,~.?f;.oc;~sf¢~11'jr9{$ysteni;,f','stat~f;.'t~ pai~JluJt the i{PfpFQ~~:si.cor/r}d,1 ~i{i} . .1'.'.ftlle~~dn1!ri.1.iier~cl.'*hiihr{fPfl'system.'arid,*JOl*Wp,eci}ic'trfihSfors.ldeni(fieqby..th'i[l)p~rqtor,1 jlieFP:e-,:.**., *:.*.t. *I . ' '.!,System :willprovid<; apermissive to."allowjor the active 'ptth1p in that Circuitto be energized on.ce*the ' .. ~ .* Jl()Pf!fator :ha8 man~allx configuredlflf! r,outing'.*Fof tJ:ai1$pq,rt;rej1uir!ng iiP,u,mjJ,'.:flj~ ,FP.t; ~siem.:}V.m* :i; 1 . :.. <. :~1cqhtrof(fiiahilifJ/pfthe*p,~n1iJ; tq b~**eh~rgi~erJ:'.For ~P..~cifi(u/ansfe':s~ .~h.'e .FPf;,'S;:_~t~mNifl p[ovi4e}: .. *J .: .,, ',. : *. .:\c,:<;mtrolledfl71idjl0Wtran'sfa~s bas<fd'OJ'! a*c{o,s.ed-/Oop,~ontrol:Jheoperq.(6r,.W,ilUnitiali4_e thetraµSfar J . . . , ::)ioffl~i1~:..:J:che *~aPifl!~~f1t.muf~ r:qn.r~{qu'!'1c~~,~~ .()f~~~t~~a~~e;,~~te,r~~l,~.f:~e-W~~~'!~f11.i*1it~Zi,_ty ?£~othi ;,A
- . ** ;. *:~;softWqre ;qn,doperatiµgproceduresto prec,ll!tle,, the:pq!J~1b1llty, dfcntzcq!tty acqzi/e1Jts,. !;-'.: * .** *, . :*c;'*f.' * . '. 1
'.," -,,,* r*~ .: .. *,;;**,.'
1 ,_~,c;,::. ,f".*"* "--... '-, ".:*_~" .'".J:;.'_ '*,~,-- ,,. ~i*:*:. *~_,*-:._:-*: 'L ,,*,<-.~-.:/ ***;_),'",. _,f
* : , ")!;lddit~on~!informrition is necessmyto u'!~erstqndhow rbe'/cegpar,ameters are*i1~011i~orea.to elistfr_e . ... ; . .. i~~Ff.equafe,.'.*9rifica/ir.co~lf,<?,l~: :: *""/ . . .* * :.::* . .: '. * . * , t\'; .... *~-~ :,,., *~.. *, ,.~,~*:£' . *: ~. ;;<<'.:.t **:.. ::~:*: . ~: .. i*
- i.Provide additional:iriformdtion regarding the adequacy of th(ffaci/ity's)nstruriientatiorrto:dete~f. * .i 1 . .* .. ,. . ,. JJeyiation~ from*no!11inq/'cgnc;eiz[raiions., dridquan~tie,§, shoulq theJ'..qccur orpf<?:Y.ide.a:.sfa/us~oft!J;e" . * ;;
t!;:;:_:,(~12i~:-~. ~Ji~ct!t~.'J52~~?~:~~~t~~~srff~~2~~::f:~r~1+/-.~~~e~f;~~tj11~-!~:~ih~!.~f:~ff:;,2~";~£::.~:-:r0~~-2,~~-'J iThe I&C systems preliminary design was developed to ensure the sufficiency of the principal design !criteria, design bases, and information relative to materials of construction, general arrangement, and !approximate dimensions sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the final design will conform to \the design basis. In addition, the preliminary design of the RPF I&C systems describing how the key \parameters are monitored to ensure adequate criticality control (e.g., instruments to detect deviations lfrom nominal concentrations and quantities, status of software development procedures) was not ideveloped to constitute approval of the safety of any design feature or specification. Such approval is ; \anticipated to be made following the evaluation of the final design of the RPF I&C system, and described\ '.in ,!!_le!:_SAR as part of~ Operating License ~J?_lication. = -~~ 51 of96
NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 No. Request for additional information . CJ: 1
,f:\:';, :('-?~' :.~2:~;;2:~~~~~~~~:1fii;':;;~:t)*~~~*9
' ru\i'"7.4-1 ::!iT/ielSG!i:uiri}entingN'!Be9.'"f5.~'k,}?aft.2;~Sectio~*.tQ,~'fl;: .'-'Engirieer~d Sajeiy)[e~tures !fctuatiop, . * * , ,::;
- ' " ~F>' * ")ls§iJtems?
- ~}itaiehi~'fJ~/.i;
- 16t1l* th;$.JJ¢tion" J.ftlie:i/Sl1R'}/Houirid.e1scrtbe:/fi~ 'abiul:tfioiz:'$)!,s'le'nls'fof':li;~y:: : :\
' **, ,.f ',' '. ,* '.~ESFs, di;c:U~;ea in'p&m* Chdpte/i ~ o~ 13. i/r;ka:j537, Pait '1, ~ettipn', 1:5;" 1Eiigin~~~~d sdfi& ' . '"]:
- . '.,;;r;ea(71r~8,!(<:~ya~()i.sY.s.t~~~t !fl~!~f,:,~n.parf.; l~ahke '.'~!'PJif£l'!t shf!itlrl<!:{sc:,tP.~fh.e E/!If.*:aft1:1g~i~h ,.* ,..~
., * : 1,S)?!ffern misufficrf!_nt,detail to:*de$~nb.~*thefun,cf1g'!s ~~qurr,ed!Jffhf! J!~f:q,n;d,the, .operatron..of't~e,;; **., . .*!
- . . ;r;;;,~~*.~~C.~~~'t*i;;'.~~bief~e~;s~~4*-~~(Yf~;.~qt~~~~~ ~;,S.~~~$". ,,*§~~~~1:*:~*1;}~..,"S~~i~;:.*: .*~,i
*1iDescriptiiiri;: **.~~*. !\states' that:'tlie'.PSAR '..Table** 7?;13, "En'girieeredSaferyPeaturi:Aduation *,tr,'.'**,,,*,,*"_**;~,.'* '.:,.~.\. **.'". ,..'- .~'./**, * ,:*~~'.***
or Moriifi;il:iitg *';"::1;
*',:~~* '.i*-'_.,*** .* .. ~ *. * :,,Systems, }psis thkESFs tf!.at will req~ire lictuq(~o1'{by:tl]e'lc'Jr,C ,,*,-.4. ;;,* 'Systen('f f;Afl 'Se¢tion 74. dqe~ not.* . *,1 '*-. "' *r'.,_""h
- r;
* :.'. *t;~~s~rtke.{#(~~tu~~~~~-8!*te.l(!~fo.~.,~~~*lfsl!f*);:} .. -'* . }f\;, : :'.*::._::,i';: : . :.: .:} <.:}:%; :..; *>i:*f .: < * <. i': ~- ' ,. .*;/ladftion(J_l'infdrntation is'netf!ssmj(to undef'stand'ihefunctioria/fty required offhe ESF.ahd opeCJ:ation. f ' , )iofihe, systein to..me.e( the acd¢ptdnce criteria:'oj;NUREG-1531/Part 2,::anathe']SG Augfn~nting ' . ' ; , *: * <* :J'!;'fi¥0~i*:P,~:.Z1 ~#11l;J.{..;;;P. }:t:* .;'o:._ * ;sJj£*'.::\;, :::;-~it~):;* :\-*::~~z*3 ;: *.-:-:tti:i_-t ::* '.: :. _.,~;:Ji1:.'.: ;., ~::;:~~¥*'. ".'.:.~:.;,";i"Z: .'*, >:*: :?;~~?:;;." *. " 1 . * ~:- . *** [ffr~via~ a'lJ4;fi~tiqt./hjO~;n~ti~~:;~.¥:.ifi~iJn/.4eta1ta~~~;.;bing 'ili,e r~~J~f.Jdf~rid(/o~s*~:,:i:j~p~rati~~*~p i ;:_~, :~:0&:':,,:~.~;l~~il!,f1~~~:~,~e~~{!fl!:T.*'.t~:ii~;~!:~£,~~iJ;~:::::~',~:~::£lro~;;.i;.:;l~~~;~;"**fa;;:~::;:,;;_:~;;~Lt:~'.,. dJ1"~*;;;";i::;J,~:. . ;:...-~.;;_;S;:~:~:}~~.~
'The I&C systems preliminary design was developed to ensure the sufficiency of the principal design
- criteria, design bases, and information relative to materials of construction, general arrangement, and
- approximate dimensions sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the final design will conform to
!the design basis. In addition, the preliminary design of the RPF l&C systems describing the functionality l
- and operation required of the ESFs was not developed to constitute approval of the safety of any design
\feature or specification. Such approval is anticipated to be made following the evaluation of the final
- design of the RPF I&C system, and described in the FSAR as part of the Operating License Application.
- The fourth column of PSAR Chapter 7.0, Table 7-13, provides some information on the anticipated
- technical means by which an ESF would be actuated; this mechanism is not described further in PSAR ISection 7.4 because the design has not been finalized. The intent was only to provide reasonable
- assurance that we recognize that specifics of the ESF actuation mechanism will need to be addressed as
~~~~in the Op~ratin~ Lice~e App~=~~-*= ~~ 52 of96
NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 CHAPTER 8.0 - ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS No. Request for additional information f3ii* :.~:*:*:.*:/:,*::~:::.~.} ::12:i*>::s_;-~:~~~~~~~-~iJC>,f~f: >~:}':: :*>_'*::*_~:;.:'!;J j .;RAI ,8.2.-1 .:':8rtctiQ!J. 5,0.;9; ,"Completehessalid'dt:curr,iij; ofinfqrmdtMn,,':'. of 10. CFRFdr/ 5p r.eq11ird,that. ,*:, ,, .;ih *: j
- !" .. ,'. ,* :**,' i :-.* !\tfiJCirrliatio~ ~u:iin'taine*(Ff)yf~e appl{canl'b.e i:o'inP/e'i'I; andaceurate'trf 'ali'nuj'te~ldf,feip~cis, .-:::*:*:' *'. ~'."' ,~- *'.:
- ji~Q-,J ~.$7, ?art 1, .sectiqJJ, s'. 2; :, 'imefg?,J?CY ff.Iec;tricfaw~~.§~si~ms, ,, it(Jt~~ th(J{th.e,de,~;'in* ~(J,S:?s(:~
i;~houldprqv~de voltage power requirements for;_emergencyelectric power, sy~tenis.~. *J
;JWUifiq~*J5~~dPd~~ 2,_~~ctiOh,~. 2, A.:~¢~fit<;iri~~;;~¢ri.t~f.ia,',:*~iat¢s, ~:iJ1~paf~~~* ., "~:*:*:_~(~.~.*, -, : c. * - * ... * " ,~* .. 'l~- ,Thejun;;J~n~l characteri;tics ofth~:em~rg~~pYp~werfy~te,Jii should b~ c<ih1;;feh;~~ate witn.iht~: . j *.
- ii:'" aeiign ;6'die:s,:::J,'hi~li ii~e d~dvedfroni finii1y};s:p;~se~t~a in dihe.r ditdpt~~s. 'Oj!lie sAiL*:~ fii~*so~;ce" i
- . . :Ji:: :, ofeJ~ctffcal.j}~er {gelierator,'.:batterie~;~e(q) sflo.uldbe, r:ap@/e: oJ:supp!ying:Fbwer}jo,:.;tf!e 'iluraiionJ
";;:~r~quiredbftheSAR,~~lYffs*'" :.:;': * :*" *__.: ":~': :.. .' ,.,'. * :" , '"' . frNJ11M.! Pf!A/?:.&c~QIJ, 8:;1. 2;. :.'pe_sign_fof,S/ife -~hutdo;'-;11, 1t(JteMlia,t t11e uiii~t.er.nl!Pta~l~j)ower SiljJP}ies\ <**.* _. *. * ~:~': ~: .:>>'.'*>*~~-: "_] *;;(UPS} wr ll be* deszgnf!d to opeJ;ate up to 90 mm?Jfes,* (!Xcept the .'f;]PS for the fir<; pr9tection sy~tem wz ll. , *
- i!o"peratefor .up to:24 ho'iirs: However; :P'sAR Section3.5:2f::9, 'iStcindHy'EZecfriCiiz Pow~r: '0:stdtes ihat .\~
. ,.*:-tith~ dJsign iJ'iisi~ v,~iue J;;r _th~ "r/PSiJs io .":._. m~[~taln_po}fe[ aydif~biluyfof*(J mlnt'in~rii. 9fi2p min_' * "!.
(Vittiin~t~sIP?s.t::~c~iderrt~?_*** _*:" .:*:,* :.. .*::;~ *.-*:*'::*:/'-.::.':.*, _'.**:'-.:.,*"*"::~:--*:** .< .:*;1'.****r._ .*'.';:'.:*'.:'"'.'.!
* 'i;l'tovide: add~tionafinfotn,~ati~tz to r,esol~~pr exJ?laiJJ t~is, appare1~t di~f~~pa~fY ihIJpw~r: avgiM1 tuOi *'. f "_;..,. ,. ** *1;ti_mes. -**:* ~--* , ..: , : .. **_,: ___ '*;;: --,~*,, .. *;-"i_ * ,' _ ;
\PSAR Se~ti~~iri-~d'..8:2"~alues we;; changed to 120 minutes to reflect th~d;ig~~i;-;;is--~*PSAR-*-- ..J
- section 3.5.2.7.9.
t~_ ... .,.~.,,..r-~ <;,:.,r.,..,-..._.':.' * "'"':*"'*'..,:.;...*.**...--- :..; *. -*"* :*..;.,_;."':i....,\,,;-....
~~* *;..__;.*.,_,..,".:"'*-*"'.;;.;.;.;.;*."---*~-~.;,~*'"*~* :7"--:-... ,.~~;'.-*':-'-'-.:::-..;.,r,.,,., ......T_...... _(~*...;.~~r""': --**'*:-*~"".'"';'- ;. ,.;.**. .,,.,-~,--..-.- .. :."!""-~~<*- ~~:*.,.;.:.*.;:t'.';:'""':7*,t.,. *". _,.;'.:~~.,..~-:~-.~*-"""' t .... _,: * .,.,~**'>i** ~-~... "'"' ;**-J ... ~*~'-
(1 :Rf\I ~:~~2 :j'.~/ecti.ofi 5,0:f!}. C~mpleJe11ess 'cinq 'accufaty 'oflnforni?ttion;'t* d): 1,D'CFlfPcjr(5.0requlfe's thgi'./: *""r;*r * *l
;, ~* '.: * * ;'infq&nati°'f!p1qi17~ained)Jy the qppftqant~<;_ CO!Jtpfete'.an(/aseurafe ill;aJ! mq~efi(Jf'.1:{!,SpC:CfS.. ,, , "'~*\' , -.:
- ! c ... ..,J*
- 1'*,(".-~... -~";". :"*'* .,., ... *.:,,,_*," '5, .<<~.~**,,<<,' \ "*-.*.1.~,; .. ;,.~-~* .. ,-. .. ,v-~,*~,'* y.:*'*.f**~::*""*t."'"r,_- .. ~ ..~ ..t~: . . *.
'i . ' {NUREGC.}53 7, 'Part 1,, Section}j, 2,:;£m?i-gencyElectric Power Systlni~, ;, siates, tliat'the dJsign 'bli~'es' ' {. '": " . -" . . *. is,l:ipulqprovide yoltag~pow_eY, requ/remen,ts for:.elnergency electfl.c powe.'r. systems; , ,* *. -'..
- l,r ", :* ;:_ ~ ~- '* ,'*:*:* '"'\.*. ,,'_*' . ' ?,l* """:*. ' , * ,.;:..,, *'. ,_,,..~' , .,* '<< . '": ** *t ,,.,' ** > ** ~
i .. * ;'NUREG-1537, Part 2,:Section 8.2,'Accep~ance Criteria, states, in part:.. * , * ,, *
~ " ", ' t: ' ,' ,,,', ' I.' ' , .> " r ~"', ~ ';"<,, f' ~~" - f r' *' :, / '>-: ~: '. '1', p ' ~' ~ , r '*', "'f~
- > ' : . :.
- Thf! functional ch~r(ic~eristics qfthe emergency power ~"stem':Sh'ould be:t:ommensurate with ihi:. *r
.1 ,.([". design _basei, '.W,hich. are detiVec/Jtom qnaly~e,.s pr<jsentedln other 'ch(lpters 'of th_r; Sf#?.. -.:,):he s91}r,ce ~-
t : j!, '.;/_ ofel~cfi:ic~l po'wer.(gefzerb~o~, ?,dtt~ries; 'et~:) sHofildbe:dapable oj~pf/l)!ingpo,wer]oi: t~~'.dil1'.qti0~*;,
;1 -( .. J . requzred*by the SAR analysis. '~ 1 . '. ..': .. , : ** :.. , 1 * * ,., :, * ,:!
'i ** " , \!Nr1ift PSAR S~c~on {2.stat~~:thdta i~oo~J~il~w~tt hew). (134ih~riep~";J~~[hpidie~~l~e1Je~~td(~i1/(: 2'
, jpio_vige ~tm:i}JbYffle.ctrical p~w,~r ~EP)~}[gw.ever,, IJ$4R~(}ction 82 2i;*, ,'.'Rq~ge~ .ot£..?11e17g~71cy, _: * :; "'. i ;;!p~ctriC'ai P'o_wer1~equited, "i#qtes; 'in pa~t, tlt~i "The ~oiq£pe'a!(SE;P ;i:equ.tr,r:.dfor fhi RP!" ifl, l ef Q;kw: '1i(l, 528hp). ::*. Purther, PSAR . Table '8:. J, , "Suinm(iry..*of~adioisptope RrorjuctiOn,F.aci/ity:a~1dAhr;il,fary, . :* <~frdici1ities)fie9irtC:1liJ~ds, ' . :ti~ts tMkPf :de~ff.icJt1oad/bna*81;ows 'thdt i'iz~ i~i~1 'sep* reqziifed is* ... **** *:WF_,,: ~:~~,(l.~~~*~pJ ..A~.~~"' c;haprrn:/~* o:*: 7tnYirp111r1~rit~1 R_er~e;r.~~~~a~ie. f:p-.~q'.: _gp:1i~Si?.,r1sf~r:: . . !Standby Emergency Diesel Generator:" cites 21600 kW as the basis/or diesel generatorem1ss10ns. : :* . ! . !t ~ ,,~ .. ' ~ -- ':.. - "' .'.,; .."."; .....*.-* ... *~ .,", '*, ':,;. ;*' ,*,., ..... --*,~:' ....' ' ' 'i "** * )IJ?rpvide, a.dditional infQfmatiol})o r#olv~. or explain thesepppa,rent discrep(/,JJcie~ in ~IfP; 1;,="C'"""'c'\~.~ 3~=~~!.':!11::.~~1:~~~-*~-C' '"<:~-~~;,, --~,;,,,,~,~~C,,,' ,,,,~:"'-~* '~'-~~-<* * ',*' ' '*. ' < * * " ' '," ,,:* , :, '
jThe column headings in Table 8-1 of PSAR Chapter 8.0 were changed from " ... power requirement" to i" ... peak power load" to be consistent with the description preceding the table. PSAR Section 8.2.2 will
!be modified to reflect the peak power of 1,178.6 kW (1,585 hp), as determined from Table 8-1. PSAR LC~~ l~.O us~?...!~g~r_!stimate_!~sur~~~ions were bounded. ~~
53 of 96
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- MEDKAl1$CtQP[S NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 CHAPTER 9.0 - AUXILIARY SYSTEMS No. Request for additional information .
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- '.(Applies to**'. rp.f!REG/;153;'/('R(Jrt~, (!,hapter* ?;*' '~U
- iliq,r.YSyf,(~";$i '.~ s.tti{1stf1atthe*iipplicant*~~-q-~l~'ir/clu'ilt['the'.~*. :*:;'
- RAJs}U'
- .l .* !*d_esign basesfor f!il,chauxiliary system.:,, . ". * : * . .. ; .* : * . . ': ,* ": * '. * . ,*; .>. * . . . : *: * :r
]thr,~ugh. :* :;wr]J?iq:1s3?. P.~Jii 1, Ch~pt</f3, "i5~ii~~:ofsif.u~iufe~, sy~e_~j~,;,J(;~";n;~~~nii;;;~'.i,[i;f~:id~~h/ ** I:
- t
~
1~? .: * : * ;{~i:ft: '.'The* basesfor. t,he"1esigJJ: <;riteria for s01pe: of/h($J1.st~m_s disc;-'ssed. i~ tfl~s c:hapte}')nay 'be * . ~-
. : ::developed ilfother chapters 'andshould be appropriately cross referenced.".*.' .'/ . .: .. " :
t
- 1:
,> ~ *,, ~- r , , , r , , ? '. , \ * " .
!: '* 1iWVRE(j}":.153{Z, . :f~ft 2f. S{:ct~on/!~, J,*;.fflfeaui:zg;.:tf¢hti!qt,~q11;':'a1Jd ;l,i~.fwu./ittohj~gi:Sy,Yte"!~:::!:Revt~li: .z.~/: :.. .~ ' .° , Proc¢aures; !s#1tes;/inpart, thqf "Tfi.e d¢iign ba~~s:shoufd.b,~ C(/niparefdwith requtrem~htsjrofn O,tfier'* ! ~, "*~- .:.J:: jl~?1~~~i~,~!::1J-.~L-~l}L.~;iL:,,~,~-*~g~~~-L:,;~iL;~:";~;~)~j:::~~;~;. ~ !.}HL~.l~L:~~;L. ~~~X~;. ,.::'t~t,:L~.::J i RAI 9.1 ~1 * :'fNWMJ PSARSectiQn 9.1~ 1, "DesigJJ::Basis, ~,stales: :'. 1 ( .' . : . *. '. : . /: . >' .*.*. . . .* .*. , " * ; .; ." >:~ . *"'. * ':ihe:~ehti1~!;~i1 ;y~?e,i, ii*~eiik~a ;fp;ovide cdhfinefiieri~ 'bjh~id;d;u;:~Ji{,iz;~;iftt~e;:~d ai~bhme *::;i
' .. . .. .ii~C!Cfio{O,'[Jic;al."flqte,tifiis.'a71,°c[.~Ql'JqiiirJ~i~g of/he R?F.~J;~irpifinen{f()l!fq~~li[Y,,f/f?Y~Q&ii,e(ahd equ)pm~J1f;; :J '.: iffCt~1~~J;;~:~;;~:~::r~;~~j!J~73:;c 0~~;*. *,. *.I.:**.*+,'~*- ** :. y: .*.:,: t;-~,:*:*r,~ : :. "-*.: :.:;,;~.(._:*:..*.: ~<:; , [*.;<: ... i: ... *PY"eventingr~i~ase dbd disp~rsdi ofdtrb~l/ie *r~dioddttv~* materi~/'s:to}Jrbtedt h~cith**~nd;;;inl',f;izel' 1 .. ,:**r ':.}~**ii** 'da~gertO'/!fa'oriJropertJ;;**'.*. *:<**;,;*". , *: t*;*:'0>:f <,,'~!"' *,*:~: ... *}f:.\F*** . *.,~;~, ~-;~'~: ( . ...' :* .Mqi,ntaining d.ose 11pfake_tfitough,ingestior1 to levels/).LARA]as1ow'as. re,asonably achi~able]'. :\
l*: *....i* ,. .* -~ ' i: :,_*.
- f?;r~vidfl:ig vefi.tilatiofz air/qnd c,,oi1(liti01:itng*(he R:PF.~tivirqnmentf:,qr wor!cersor occupa11ts* *;'.. * . j
'" * * '. * ' , \: :*~ . Providing'maf{eup air. an,dcondition.~hf! RfF e,nvirort1n~nt for. process:and, elei:tr:ic.al eq~ipmefit . . i ';;~"-r*":., '.f.-;~,,j~.~*:**: ,:;.
1 ',/,ft:. */':~/,,"'.,'~'.1'>"_-'.*~~**~'.*' :**/~.,, .*.*~*:,*i( .* *.:-(: ..,:.::-*_*,r.\!;,,,._,;._'.,;.'.;,;_ ~'.*.:* *.. ,' '.,*~-.. /.': ';;..'.,'**.~*,,;..Ji *_,1 ,/'."', 1i
.* :.tfo/zerea,s, :P,SAR Se,qtio!7~3.:5.'2:1.'J 2;* (Facility Ve._ht!fatton SyStein,';'*wh[ch"ajipec/i:~"to,iefer:to what PSAR,\ , ;:~~ctjp~.t*J.'f r;a{ls.t~e .:'.'fenti!dfl()n. $ysielj;_ ;'. str;ztes tkat ~h?; '.fapgity.Y~!l.tifa#gn s}:~tem '~ ;d.es.~gh. ~a~s_'. t * \)'Junct!p.fis.4~e.i;ls'.(olldffs:* . _. :.; ;F;r',:: ::::f::" <"i'~., "*'*'.?t,::* *, )' _'._.:::(r. .:;1,'.*,*. * .. :,_*~:~ *::.:~:.:*,: _:~~':. j
- ii, ,*: Prpyide,(:.onfiJ1ef!1?'!,tof~qzar4f!u's cf1¢mical ftiih(ffaf1~ ciir,borne f[Jc/iplg_gic:a{m<;1t~r,fdls),1n,d .,.: : * ~\
1 r* :
*' :: *cohditioning:ofRPF.envir,onmentfohJacilitypersonneland'-equipment::.: *-". ** * * * *** *Ptf!~entf,~leqse'.and'.dtsjJ~r;al *',, " , .. '. ;"'""~-,. *"*'~*~* .-*,'.*:'**"~*
ofai~bpfne rqdiogdive;inate°r.fals.(~>g.;.
- .,:*,'"*.**~-:~'f;~.,.'."-*,;*~',"* ~~~-r 1
,;iai~tain pr~S,Sllre* ;.,,*,p,,-i,-*' *"'"'*,,,._,"-,'"> '* ... e{'._ .. *(r">:.',i_"' ~ .. . *grddieri(s'(9 ensureprdperJ!Ow of air from ieast.pOteritially c01'ltamif1(1ted ateds*tomost, .* ;;Jiq~f:~'t,i,~!~,:s.9ntf!fli{1Jflfe~tq~~d~,:/op~erec(~~.a{f~;;i~4;~inl'J}~~ ~fy~e~:foiif.~. ?rRY;~P~f.1£;, *. * ... ! .' ." .. Jv!am,tain .cJ?S<:* uptakf! thrf!_ugh z,n[Jesfi.9n:tq~l~els.qs l()w qs_*~eas~naolyachzevpble (J1.'l!A/fe1J. ., . , ) ;,~ . *f-Y;<;Yic1ep1_,akelfpqir. _and cqnclitfp,n ~hf R_f{lj.~nvtr;pnf1lf!1~fof:_P,foqe~s qrif/.~/~cf:icf!A:~<fltipp1e!1t:*,, ** .. i ** *Process exhau,st jlowfroin the process yess?l ventilation system * . * :*::.: * * .. * " . *** *** ~ ,:;,.*..! P~ovi_d~;con}in?me~t ofai~bq~e rad.i.og~ii~e. m9t~ri qls by pf;ovi ~j~gfo~;the r.api d; :qt,t/oitwtif:: :, , *i'
- ' . { -' * :closure bf isoJ~tionjlarnpers.11fil/:lin. i:onfinemenf:zon~s for* va11ious:acc{dent:co1Jd,itions * : . . ~:~ "::
r 1//'fzf.ls; FSARtSectiph9.f.:1 app'e'qr.s ~i fJ¢*iii~on~isten/.:}Vf th' fSA1{$ec(ion~3. 5.2::7: 12/in thqtP/$Afi, * :.~.;, * ::J:
\' '*.,, ,,:-, '.'*:* ' ' -*~*" -'**.~.:* ..... ,* * *:*-" -*.~;*) , . ' .. *~ .".*:*~ . . *~'.--* '*"*r"*. *.'.:r~***;_, ,..,, * ***~ .., *._':*,* ,~
- ~rctiOIJ'. ,3.5.:27.12. r<!fe.rs/o th~; 'Jacil~ty ventilat{oil iY_stenfc '~:.whic,/i Is called the '.'ve.f1tila_ti()fl system'.' :in r
* );-pS,;tR:s;ectio~*9) :J: PSAJ?.Section J'5:. 2. 7J 2.:ctlsqlist~.:'!Wo/design'.b~sis funi:tiolisfor th~::j~acility *. *
- i,
'.;ventilqfion'system that dre,no{lisieJ ifz PSjfR Seclioiz:*~j r.fi?r the .:"verztilaqon sys{em, ""spedjicallji: "."} * . . :J: ;'.~ :* pf°6te;'li~1z;;z*~~tjl~~ jrd~',the~r~c;eJ/s-'ve~~~l*veJtilah~ii'sjs!e~ 1:: f ,* f;: :." * * .: :. .'i:2;; / >>.+ '.:>~ '. * ; ;/ ~.*.P.r?vidf! confine1:flent pfa_itbo0e:r.adiqaciiv.e mq!e1:~Cffi,by'providi,fzgfo1: t!Je rapid, auiorifgtic '": :* . i
- ,' '/i', *."closure 'Of iso7atio~;ilampers With iii confirfemen"t.fo'nesfor fariou's acciden~*qbhditio'f;s' :5 : : *::, ~i
' !'A.dditionally?i'SAR 1~, ,'°'*, * ;'.,. ,
- Section 3.:Li.
i~; 7.:1i listsflve"design,
,,t '"' ,'
b~~is;.val~es'" 4
,~J:r ~*, 1 that are "notincl~ded ~.,.,,*~,*,., ._:;~
a,;,oni ihe 1~*<';\
- 7 -::' .,, " * .. /1.
t<,. ';:<' :i,,", ,,.,' .. 'r
.,. 1design qases,.in_ PSAR Section*9,I. J.;:specifically,:. .. . * ** t .. , .
J1,;: ~, .M,iiin!~iri'P1:irfia1Jifi*sto~ pr,o~f!~~,bi~nifa.ljc ~~r,ing. o/1d_afte~~/1oii_(i1..opf!r,ali°.fS, ~'!..utdo.1fn. * * ,;
. _.* .:;!i'.~:--.~~;;d~~.~~:;~~ ,,::~<<*~ J':: ,
0 1{dk~r9:t~io.1',~~nfi1~~en/~b'u~;~~Yi~t\~~9f\~~~t~;!ffi~:.~.~~,i1:~~~ht~~6f** aqc14e.n.'.,analysesJkatqo'!lp~ze,s. wzt~,,~O.-CJjJ~.:~9do~'<!*11?111!S:';' , _ ,: *."; *.,,. :;~. *;:. :-;* f. * :;
,*:.*J ,* . ; ~{ 1~~~,~)~*::}f :}.~~~ 'f:J.fl:)!_!}/J.{~4.~1j8~t!@~f~~.i: ~~~:*~f.~*;(~~~~.::~:~~:;i. Lp:L~~~~~:~::_ :;~)'.~/4J~~~:~J~~~~.: ~~~-;~~:~:)::j:*di:,*.;~~~:i~~:.~:~2.:.;:;~-~-~*l.*:~~.~~;~: **~::;;t;::~: ,.H ~i-~;i'.. ~-~\-~f 54 of96
.:.:*~~*. NWM I NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 ~ :_~~.:~:. tlMTHWESTWlltCALlSOJOPl!
r *. ,.-; -. :f i: . \* Request for additional information
~:fvfaiiitain.oqropiedspac~*aj24deefees:Celsitis"('Cf (75*degrees7Fahrenheit/C!Fj) . , .. , I\ " :* 12°C (72°!) (winter), .with .aqtive ventilatiOIJl<fsupp?rt*workers an,(! equipm~nf'. '; ._; -~ * , ': . l , . . .1; *** *MaiTJtqin.qiriglfqlity. tfla(complies with- 10 C:FR 20.qose*Jimitsfof* norriJd1operations and' >>*. i 0
l >' " " : .{.i,b y;lz.utdawn* :* * * *: : , , *:,:: .::. ... *. :*: .;:". '<-" .; .*. *: *i.: * / * ** *: *.::.: *; :( ': . :: **, *:* l, (simimir) and \ 1
!. ** :~, ** *i~i i~.not.deiir ~hether'w!1atis.:callea ihitfaciltty*venttlbti/)~:'iyste~:'.* in ~SAJJ;se~ti4~*~32..~:12j(:<'. '. i t .,:, * .). <' *1 fe'xac~ly,the sank!* <JS* whqt fs cal(erft!Je '.fw!/1~/atidri. system !'JiiFSAR &'ctifo?~9.1;1, 'Or.( ift~e;te)'ml afe ~
!: . **:, .;fnot inter.chlingeabte, :*wAethe,,one ofthe'systeni.S;* or which parts.there-OJ; 'iinfpartf 'd}the ot,her &st~hl.~'.' *; u;e ~- *<<.:' *' -:. i~dditi&nai!nJ~m~atib1;"i~ flee/Je/i~o:clar~ the ofinco~sident te~~inoldgy]ol:~zysi;/J?IS.~;;¢ .: "', , ' ;
- j ' ' *** :fiubsystefns. JnconsiStent design- basisjun~iionSlvaiues make Ii diffii:uli..to' identi]fs)!steni'bpundaries :*:' !;
I; !:"- *'. - " ]iami)o'deterh1ine 'the,adequacy oftHe :desigri"ba~iS. :') ' ' :"**..' '; .: ' ,: ' ., ' .:~. \, \ ' "' "*. ; "::: :*: 1. t:' ,'.-'. :;.;t,!,:'. '-, .. -....,; ' ..-/*,,-" '_,. '(:"*,~*':: ":: '*,_i*_~*"I"* ._: ,:J* ""'-</,_ **,,'.."/,:, ','*~~*'.:,',, :. ','."',,\~ .. *-~*,*_"',_ ., ' ~-- k .'<t*, !'f:r9yi<Je'ciddmpnal znfoi:mati_on to resolv~ di:zd exj}lain /hese appCit:ent discrepancie,sin-"the :aesci:tptio~ :
,J*:\ '* .: /oj'the,.yenti~ati~n ~st~'11 . . f!i~plai~ :~.owi;NfVMI ljiill.correet the\app~renNlisc,re,p(Jfi~i~~;*: 'as n~cr~sary(/i~;:
- p. ; '. *.i*:*, :;\f!Je*f,SAJ}.. *r;i11_cf.:~xplaJ~ how NW}.:fi.,Ml{; en:.ure"the:PSAR uses con~isteJ?I termihol'oi?,ifli'~h~se: df!.d'otl?(~t
~.-e'.:,.__;~.~~~J\8!.~~f_~:_:~-;~~-~:~.'-..~~-~.~:~.~~~)~:_;_~::_;:::_: __ ::(__ ::~~~*~-~--.:~.. ~......,... ,, -----~-~;_.,.~,..:J::. -,~.:,;. __::2:;~,-~:_:*' -
'.PSAR Section 9 .1 will be modified to clarify terminology and to correct the apparent discrepancies. The !bulleted items in PSAR Section 9.1 will be deleted, and the design basis description in Section 9.1.1 will !be modified to cross-reference to PSAR Section 3.5.2.7.12 and to PSAR Chapter 6.0. References to i"ventilation system" in PSAR Section 9.1 will be amended to read "facility ventilation system."
~:~~R.i\~:~F2:Y,i[RW¥iPfAR~t~o~,9:T.f;i~~;r!~-;pd;:ts:~*.r:::r* ' *, '. '* ' '.[' ~~.:~~::~-.~-.-:,~. "'.:-,*~~,~~~:-~:":.1:,;*;~~--:,:T,;~;~::'.'l..i*;*. '
- , * ::The'ojfgas tl'eatment system will pr,ovide primary 8ystemfunctions to protec~ on.:site 'and off-site . --
* '.:.personne/from rai:liological and otl?,er}ndustrial-related ha,zqrds by: * * <* . ', * ' * * ,. , *',* ,,;.,; f * ~*.< ~, * ', '*'", . r.*;, "',_, ':.,, ~;: ',~_,' '~. i,t,' ', .:r* * ,CJ.o.lle,,cti_ng,~he, a,{[ .~t!.'-le__akafNswe.epfrPrn each o_ftf!,.C.'(!U11Jer:ous* vess<ds 9nq other, cpmponen/s in_: 0
- -::: /hf_f!lain;p~os~s.S,es. -; , * > " "-,, -.,, J \*:*'. ../ .. ..: .....: .~. "'. ;, * '.-:: *;;;:;,.,_<:
; -. :: ;;;*~* . ',§~g~~~qting~~e.r11l,1Jze~o~f;v_~ss,¢~vc.~tsifltos~b.rJf.stfm~. * . * ~- ;* <<'.:. .< '. ,, Ji .9.'.:Pi,rectirt;gf~e.;-vf!sselv~!,lt.sj.lb$J!Sff!1J! .th<:i~ may confgin;iodine, to, -cd;iatement:;equipifte1:z/to r,c.duce: :i,'- .;: , , any io_din,e '/eye!~ ih',f~f!.o.ffgas stl'eain ,' ' ' ' :,, ' " ' . " ' . ' -: ;"' '>': ' ""*' ", .; .. . .. ;: . -~ . ColleCting a special hzgh-vofyme 1Jumidve$sel ventstl'eam from t!Je waste handling system * . ., . ' ' 'i , ~ :¥ergjng'th~ collf!c{ed~v~ni 'sµ~~sten~s ,info the 1'Ja(ri fapilitY. ven,~ilati()n :8y#em ior jur_ther :,: , ::' , *,
- ). '"**<(r~CftiJl:ent o:,/!lP:<:~icm. t.o'teifwy,e e,fltrai~edr(l_di~nuClideS:. -:; *,* . * ,,*:*:*-' _ <., .**, _... .,
- _.*-, .
.*:' "ii :,** Re.,movin~.radiqnucl~d(!p9r.ti,cul~te to,cP,mply_,i.yithfa~!lity emi$si.on:limits : , : , , . '* "* * *: ,, "/
- ~ * .i . ~ .Provfding piij}()l1! anqriegatjve,pres~re to theji,y$~on prf:!rjuct;ojfgas system andtq.ven,t~la,te fil>F,.i
*.:. .:*:r: :Y<:!*s~{~:. .. ':,:..\ .. * **..... *:.,,:: "'", ;". *... ._... ':" <* ,::* :;. " ;;A.dd{tional information on the design basis is;provided in Ch.apter 3. O; .!'Design ojStructures, Systeins,
- > .. ": : c' ::,. "*\ . <*.;, ;J!*:
- ~;ti,ngf:djnponentf:., . . . :... _ ~- * . " - *'*. *' * . *:;" : .' . '*" .-* < ' <
-iIHo~ever,*.PSARSe~tion*~;5:2. 7Jli *~'Proc~ss f:'essel:Ventililiioh System;~, ap~d~rs,to.refe~ f() ~~a,t. , . ;> **.. *iiPSAR.,Seqtiori 9,'1.1 ca~lsth,e* '!oiJ};qs tl'eatnie11~;system; "'and sipte~ tliatth£; ':'jj~6,c~ss .~~s1elv~ntf!~i~?rt *
- ,*; '1\srst~?1 : : ~si~*.:~~8!~ !'fufl~ti~n~.'./~r; a~f~It~~~:* ,.T;..**; ,:'. :;. <.~*. : ,: ._;.:. ,.,** ,; .:.~:., .* . **: * .\' .*:*.~;; .\, :* '.. **. *. :*
*:!;, **. Prov(de'.primary*'sjl$fefn fi.t1?ctibns to prote~t qn'--s{(e ah_rj ojf-~ite pet;sonnel.fr,pJJrrpdiotogical anrl:-:1 *;!; . bth~rii'idusirialr~latedhOiardS' '"'/<<.' ';' .' _.. :: '. :_*';; * *; .. *: ,,*. :*: ' ': . . < -.. ~.:: ;i **~ 'Cdilect dif In-leakage ~eepfrbtn ,eaeh -~fthe nu~ie~o~S vels~l~ and bth~r'compon~nts in ~~in ' : *; * *, i) : fil'F processef a1]q maintain hydrogen con~e,ntrati~n proce;~ t~nlC§.~nd pipi,fg ~elow lo:wer... t > "' *;; :"/l~in,ilfapilityliniil :** ::.. _.,;,::;, *::::.,.'.:-. .. :. >:-.. , '.'.* .... *.:.. *.* ..~: :. <<'*: .,,._,. * .:,f on *.. , . *
- ti . *.
- Minimize reliance* admfrilstra:five or com'plex.actwe erigineering.c<Jntl'o./s tq pro'vide.(l .: ~ .; * ,:";,, :::,
* *** n**;*,.*~a'rifiii-e/neni~stem*~sstmf;1e*afidfai1::s~fea~~ea;'O~a61ypo'sst61'e'.,."** :;:. ~ . " , ~-* , .. * * .. ::.J ~,.~*H*'.:~.'*'. ::~_~*,<*'.:~'.-;*~"'*....*~*-'*'~: *"" ..j:,~<~*::'_,~>.*.~<~ 5 *:**::*-_;>*.** . **~-~\*,~. "* .*. '*:*,~>::,_f * ......._,,. , . , ~,.. ~.T,.'tr; * .uPSAR. S,eczyo~ 3,5,.2.7.11 *tfien lrsts.des1gn ~pszs.:<*values. :a$follows.'/" '*"' . , * . . : ".,_ . ."' . : >>./f ..:l *:~.. Pr~vent iruidvertenl ~ruicatitya~d mfitntainpri~a,.Y JissiiJn prqduet iioundary'liiirini:?ifia after' , ~; ~t. ;: ' riot:'nia,l op?rations; *shutdown conditi~ns; :afld PBEs *~*, ': . :* ;' ' ' , , ' :, ' ' ' ,' "*' ' i -
- i1 * ~
- 3()-yem: design life ; ,: . ,, , . . * * . *; ' .
- _ *'.'* :< ": .... * ';,-?;;~
, . *. " * ,,,Coi;tain :andsto~~no~.le gases geher~~ed i~:~~;m;Ffor,at ~e~~!.:~t*~t[:. i~~~~:~-~['i;:_,, *"_,L;~-~ ,;*~(:~
55 of 96
NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 -.*:;:
- Re uest for additional information rf Ji~,~i ~.~ '. ~~~~:~~s::;~~~r~% :*i~d~irr,f~ih.~11~°.i~~ew:~i~~:f '.,ft~?i~~*~t:~:1t1~!~:r~~;f .*;:~~~~~:~}~.
1 t:*": *t -* ~ ***, -,,,01* >~ .*1?.'eflfrs td/~he -~'proc¢sSyes~etveh_#l[Jtipnisy,~te_m;**~f:whi'e,,h i~ appi;u:ehtly.call~d;{he,: ~'pffgas,; ,_;,;,, ;; ~ '.:,:1 f ~t; :. ,;;{ :,,1;::. /': '1f .:,\ :tr~a~enf ~Si~lfv'! :_i~ 'fMB S.~b'f.i~&-*9::{ .i* *;;:: . :~:'"'.\' :~;- ,~:,_ ~' >t *;'.'? ,;*:' ~;f *'*:(,,, /*4> i;:,i :'Pf: i*-' * * **: ;~,~);:{:/ ,,~ f~i~*-<'l~ , . :,'. * * .~ :*:~Ii'*:~" 'L,is'is thfe£taesigh'.,8~si~jtiiiotioi/sforthe.pr/jc_e:SsJvess~l~ye,~tilaiidi1:'sjlstem;/:hilt ijre~1Jqt:ifste<f)n .;.:;M 1
- ~.;
- .* :.,.'". ~. * *'i'fui:i'cti9nS/vazu~s:mp.lie *1faiffJcutt'to iCientiJY !System boiiridaries'arurto iiet~rmine .tli? adeiJu~cyofthe .* . *:.L::~
~'~-~j. £~~~t;;;~~~i4!~;J~~~~~1r~~J1l~i~~~f~~~~.~~ti~M~~~is~~ l :.: :.;;, ..,;,/.:. : ':)the veiitilation,~stem.to* ojfgas system. &plairi.how NWMJ willcbrfect the ape/1r.en(discrepandies,:.as:* " ~~£~!~2~'.~~~t~s.illifit4fdi~1t!Ii~L~~i)i'.iE'.:~~L~~~i£f~Z1it:&;;It~i1;i1~~,~~~:~~~i~J,~ttt~Z~1~'..:~::1:~:,}12:~1~ii1 jPSAR Section 9 .1 will be modified to clarify terminology and to correct the apparent discrepancies. The I \bulleted items in PSAR Section 9 .1 will be deleted. The design basis description in PSAR Section 9 .1.1 l !will be modified to cross-reference to PSAR Section 3.5.2.7.11 and to PSAR Chapter 6.0. References to i"offgas treatment system" in PSAR Section 9 .1 will be amended to read "process vessel ventilation isystem. I "
- t. \.->.. :o;.* '.; '-.1('. .f' J4a~nlqt,n ~tr,g~a{~o/ ~liqt cdmpltes, lf:ith*1'Q;Gffl* 20"doselii!J,itsf((! nprihal oper;ation,~ ~nd :*,. . <!: c;' I ii::I.~1:,.:;J:.t1~:1~.:,:;;:~i~!1:;t~~!f~:.2:r:~.~1~~~:?i::t::::;'":i1u:~*=;~~fj;:~:::i~~~2~~iJs:~!;~:::1:::2~1Tit~~~. t;.:t2~~=s::1~j2_*~L;L::1 56 of96
.:;.-.;:.*. :..NWMI NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 * *. ~~.~!:
- lll:GflTKWISf flfOICAl lS1lTilP£S Request for additional information if :RJ\j'!ti*-3* ;iSifR S~cti~n* 3.5:i..7:i3'tntroduce; ~~bth~,:"sy~t~/ii-designati/Jn-(i.~~. *,-,;supply atr*sy~tem"), 'Whtch'has, *;
,l (C<?nt) *. * (!design basis-'<ifements (functions and values) ;tfiai appear to corr~spond to /wo ojthe de,sign bt:i~is ', 7
*1
- *>' . * ![elem~nts (furjctionslva/ues)
- 'ofthe vliiiti!q.tipnlfabi/it)(ven~lation ~steni,furt~e1;.de~cf'ilJ{id, iil,?$AR ~ .-.~ J
~l-' *:: . .,,11section'9:.7~2.'2;_"'Su]Jp_l/AiFSysten.i. . .'.'.'::. .,-.** .. : .. _'.) ./.*~../., * ** ,c .. *".~. ;* .*, * . : *.*. *.,:~ l .'.* ' * . *.; .::/[~Fl~~sDt.app~~is; *thdt (/i~.>iSµppfy ~;;:;~t~~£ ~:. i~ksAiis~9.tiofr>.:5:?2.:z.2$. is;{j sijb~s:ie'm'6fth~,.'tqalfi'tJd (:".. :-, *, "liventilatiori' system "*in' PSAR Section'3.5.2. 7.12, aiid:the "ventilation 'sys[em ~'.-'in PS.{fR Se~tion*9. J. J.. , * ~ fx. ;.~ .*,. : ,*, .* ... \~.~1~ti~~af _i~fof'1z!;~o'1; is~ne~~~d/~ c~a~i(j/e,{a~~nshi[!; *fi:,11:11;,elJ 't,M *~u!jfJfu.'<:zi; 'sfi(em:/asf HfY. *:* .* . > .j.
- ! ': : : "_,* *,** *.. r:Y:e;:itilatzo'! SJ!Sfe,11!'. f!'!d '!_ffntila~~n,~Sfew:. Tf:!e lJS,e; Oj)f!..COflSl.ste11t.-term~!f.Ologyfor*$J!S!ef1Sf1nd. '* **:i: :: 1
! . ' ' .. rsubs;:,stems,qrid iripons,ist'ent d<qsign_ ~asisfuncfionslvalu_es.. make, 11.diffipult to jdentifY. syste1ii bow:idqfie_si r~,;-" 1;~ ~,.:!an1,d(fi~nili~ethea~e?ua~,ofth~:de~~~n*~.a~:~~* ..:. ,,: :>:*:.**; . *:*:. ;* .
~-*~:,":;, .-:~*~y*;'. *.; ..* ...:*::~*: *;j i ,:'. *<'* *' * * ** ;:, !if~~~{~e;etJdi~~ihi49'!f1~f!!~tio~ .~~. C,la~i/Jft0? ;,elatjpflsli/p a~io~g,f~~ su~ply! a{ri fa~ility.:ve~t~l~t~°.n,. cind I i, *. *. *; .,ifr,enplai1pnsysf,<pns. EXP:Iwn-flo1A?iN_f!'Miw1Ucop;ect;thefippar_e'!t d1screJJ,t:1nc,1es,:.a,~ flf_~es~al:'J!:"1n:'the * ;*r
~~~:~):::~L;:~--~~t~~~.~~~~~*~:.*~-~~::..:~~-;~:L.;~~.~~.:.:.~::::.*:t:.:;.:.~~;~:.~~*--L:~.;::;.,.~~---:~tZ:'..~~-L;,~:~:.:. . 'i*~~,i+I~:*::t~;**z.:.i.:.'.:;~:~~*.:!:::.L:L*.:L~ (PSAR Section 9.1 will be modified to clarify terminology and to correct the apparent discrepancies. The !bulleted items in PSAR Section 9 .1 will be deleted, and the design basis description in PSAR !Section 9.1. l will be modified to cross-reference to PSAR Section 3.5.2.5.12 and to PSAR Chapter 6.0. !References to "ventilation system" in PSAR Section 9.1 will be amended to read "facility ventilation Isystem." \The supply air is a subsystem of the facility ventilation system. PSAR Section 3.5.2.7.23, "Supply Air fSystem," will be eliminated and appropriate design basis values moved to PSAR Section 3.5.2.7.12, !"Facility Ventilation." : r~';f\fJ~Wf~rr!*~Tt~*~i~r;~*=~:4;~~ t~,e~fJ~rf:1~:~:a 1
- ~
1
\': * ,. * "i;PSAR,'~e.ctiofl 9) ); ."SY.stein l)i,sqjptid,ri, '! ~ate,~.; in.:paJ!t;> '.'abqtement tech1Jol(Jgiqs, pr;i!ftartlyd?ighf ;;* *;
f(: ., ;, :::- .-. ,~, *. * )(eJft/:i~rier.R"itrtfciY.laif{~~ir: '(.Ejf;fiJ,tJJ{tr,!ifip/i(q~d.c/cijvate/J~(ifb.oni'W,iU :~e.use,d;tdJ!IJ~l!Y.e?~fiat,fir -. \ .
- i *'<'.< ,;~ . 'Jje'xh~st<;c!to:the; ci!fh9sph~t:~ mee~s f o<;FR,6,J!: :Na~o11~1.f!riiissio.n 'Stiindar,dsfo~ Hdzardd'u~!ffr,';,.. ~\:
) , : , . : , * *!;Pollu~ants::(NESHAP)randapplzcable State law.*~ *, *. * * * ' ... *;*. ' . ., \ '" . :. ':. * * .* * :: . . ':i!
J, * : ' ' ' ' 11 ' ' -. *', ' * *,, ' * .o * * * ' ' ' ** :.: ;*. .".
- o*_\ *,, ' .,,\. ' '.' ~ I ' * .: ~-* ' "1 '.}I ; ' ' '1 * "' :'., ' I ,I~, ' 'I.' 1:1
~ .. _. ' *. ** JTh~ *111:eeting of40 (:fR Pt:1~t .6f_a;:id appli~ab{e sta~e /aw ¢(Jn~tffutes a regulatory/legal requir.ement; .. ':*.1 *. * **:. * .. , * * .j!tflat sfl.o.uldfornjpgrtof tlie,.8y~tem .design basis su9h .that the*SJJSf{nr dt!csign l!'ill meeNhe, performance ..* [ * .:* . [requirements. ifqw~er, the (Jesign requireriz.eotfhat exha11st.aifl n1eelihe:s~q.ted re'gi/lati5,.Y(tegiil *> 7; *.' J
_ ::. ,. ::::;;_feq/J,ire'!1~n~s it ts/10tlist~~*<Jniorzk. thi'.dlsigiibasif~ien~-e~ts,Jn::Pf?Al§~e(;ti~n_'.9, 1.~:1!14'.ii;tzo? l!ste~~.::.,~~t
' * * < .;. ' .. * '.iam6ng the' 'design :basis fuhcfions,'or 'vrilues. in PSAE S,e~tion '3. 5. 2}. *12, ds. arg:.cet.tritli* othit. *app/icqq le *:: *, **:.:':/ :::*:):i'.ef!llato'!re7yi;~7ierit(\ '.:: :. :,*__ \"<<*;. , ."'. ~;:..';-'. :; . -: .<t.:'..:;:*_ *:: **: " .*" * ;._-' ' :.": " *:* ;~;4~.,'. .<*:,.. . :~'-:::", ~:. :. '*.:'* .* ':' ;provid_e a.dditional information tdclarifjwhether this.regulatory/legatrequireinent is a design. biJS,i~ ,
- r 1;eJ~Tneiit, jufzction (Jr va{Ue~:; JJ.sO: 'fnc{ude'._{t ln *t~e #Sts 'tn.;PSAR: $ebtibf1$*9.:i.)>*Qhd/Or:*3~5.~2. t.J~~ ~s *~-.-~ ~, ,:t ?. ..
!****'**~,~~.~-:.:;:~~*1l~er:.r~f{~~~:-L.:'.:.:::: . :. ,:,,,~*:_:~:.;,'.;.:'.L22-~. *-~-~~;~*.*~.;-~:,~L:~:~_';~"':):;z~r::.i.~,._;,~.':.~:~~.;~;~*~.' .~~;:~:~L/~:~~::~~::L:cJ:;~~;l~~~
jThe bulleted items in PSAR Section 9.1 will be deleted, and the design basis description in PSAR
!Section 9.1.1 will be modified to cross-reference to PSAR Section 3.5.2.7.12 and Chapter 6.0. Reference ,
Ito 40 CFR 61, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants" (NESHAP), is already
!~~~_lud~d- ~_!~~- ~-e~~~~U..~. !~2-.~ a_ ?~si~~ -~rut and will n?~. !Je .~epeate~ -~~~ ~_ec_?on 3 .5._2._7_.1_2._ .) .i?
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.. . NWM I .:.~*~~* .*:.**.*.~. * :~~.~!":* NOIUHW£STMEDICALISOTIJPCS NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 -i \R;L\(gj~, :'fffe;Rif;~i53 1
Re uest for additional information r,* Pd~i Ji Ch-fipt~;9}tdt~sih~ith~-difiiiddht shb-uldihcl~d~ th~.d~~iii11 bcis~~f~;:~d~iF*~* :-* : :
: )a~~iliary.S;;-rtem.. , *. *.. *:*** ... :; *" * :<: .. , ,._**:; f :. *: . :: : . _, ' . , * *: .* ; ._* ..,; : *' : .* : *: .: *~ '\~ ;iJv;UREQ".-153, 7;* Part* 1, ~ection '9: 1 *stiites tfzat al/. usf!d*sptzce~ in afacility may requir,e Hf(AC ~stems* tQ J **. ,._ ** -:~ jpr'r}vi,de, r:ffeP~~~?e.~r1vitq~~ri~1fshrp~r$q~~et'.q~d,equip1nent:,: ":~ : ; : * > : 7 _:_. :. , .. ~*.\* * *! 1 1
t** * ~: i!NU~G-!53l;*Rart i; *sectio~*Q:.Lstat~~/hqt iirer,1/s;~Jr~i~:w;~/:l~T!~d)ri.ctu(l~J~{it~'i:_es:*'b]i,h?;lfJ:l<< '.. ~
-~* - ** :.: :w~tem:that'q[fect hqbitabilityand'.theworkif1g(!11Yir;onin{!nt ifl'ther?a.c(m:facility.for p(wso&nel and**. *1 1 . !i'equ.ipiri_en~:.*. :*~:_ ,. . :,, *.;'-* :: *' :.. :,.. *.**; r. i ' '* .: -~ ;* ..** :~ ." . :"".. * .* '. *,: ',;, , ... ' . , '...' . . :.}1
- .* . ., "\!fWM1 PSAJ?... Secti on 9,L 2. 3..1,,. .!'Zon? J.ExhptJs.l$y.s,tepz,/'. .s,tates,th_at. the, *~pa¢f!/emperpture* ~r;nifro_l wi /l.~
**** * *!mot be prov~iled for* Zone Jc spaces unlf!SS thermal loads .are expected to.cause temperatures.to ,exceed, ,J ; ' . *. ' .... *j;equipm.ent operatink;.rahges without additional cooling. Bowever,)t is not e~plairzrd what *. .
1 *: ;;
! * '* * *.: * !'.~ircumstd_n'ces would.'result in temperatures'exceedjrig*opera'ting ranges. Therefore, *.aaditional 1 *,. .:~ .' ' .. * ' Jinformatjon is needed to, detemfi~e W,hetherJIVAC sys.terns dari properly J?rbvide an aqceptable .. * . *:
t* .* ,
.!feFivi~qri"!'e~t. ,;::>\; *. . ~ ::_i_ :'~.*:"":*~.: *:n:.:.>::,::'*.~:'.,-J.* * .. ;:~: :::,::**':... _: . ** * *.**~ :..... . ~;Provide gdditionaMiiformatibn td explain* when (i.e,,c-f/esign phase, ;c;,onstruction, facility!syste~ .
or
;: " ' .*. : ,'.'.testing;: op~ration)' afidhow .(e:g., 'as an opera(ional sensing,"calculatiiJn bnd confrplfunction) : ;. . * . ;}IWMI, willdeter,iiine whether HvAC sp~ce,. {rilnperature 'co~'trol in z6ne I ilill.need to be proVided: ~... .-:; -- ... 9 ... '*_,.,./_;..*~1!~ -~,.. . ,__,. - :;.~.:...:-..:..~--~ ~~~/.t:' *.; ~~~""'.::-_,._~;~---*; *"!'*~;...'~,- .. _~: :...* ,.._:..* " -~; .:.:~-~-~--- .;~-- ~:;,;-!~,,;..'"".i-_~~"":;.'..i._...._.~.---...,:*_,~2...~;,~_.....-,.,- *-~::.~....~.* "'-. ~:..~';,._" ,.L :. ~J-~.,_,.:;_:""~ *,,~*~*"".:-::..1. ;*-~-< :,'"*""..,,..~.
4 *-' The need for HVAC space temperature control in Zone I will be evaluated and determined during the ifinal design phase by performing a heat balance on the Zone I ventilation system. The maximum heat
;1oad on the ventilation system is anticipated to be dominated by heat losses from equipment in the Zone I ~
ventilated areas (rather than decay heat) when operating at the maximum uranium throughput.
- Temperature control will also be evaluated for a loss of ventilation scenario. Results of the evaluation
;(including space temperature control systems that may be identified by the heat balance) will be
!described in t?e FS~ ~.J?.~.?~!1-~_Dp~r~tillg Li~~.n~e ~pplic~ti?n. _., ,,. _ ,, _..... ____ ,.., . No. Request for additional information_ t_,'.,,,r:,.; :~;>!* J'i 's'*\ . -~?~* ~.*~-~~*~~~)um1.~: . ~
!:(Applies ~o . ;'µ(JJWG,:1537, Rar/?,'Secttqn 9.3, **'.'f!re.P,Y:oteeti011:s);sie~f*anfl f.1'.ografn,s, :' A,~ceptance Cri~eri.a,: . * 'i .1RAJs 9:3-f'..,
- 1:states,. fn par't, that <![m]e,thods to Jie~ec/, 9onfrol, ;and exti,nguis,hjire~.sf:tqljldHe stale,d iri;the plalJ. ~:, : ~
lf~~O,l~~.~;t~f~/t*.:.. : ,' *'*' \:c,2:,:L:;,;,;l ~--~;:~:~:,:~:;:L.;,~,.b~*~,:-~:,~~,:::;_,;.;;~;:':~:~.,*.~..~:c~-~*~~'.~~~:L. *~~~;~::;* -~}.;:.*.: ,;=~-~c. :~;;l, L*:~'.*;;:,. j:j i'* RAI ~.~~1*,. !NWMI PSAR Sei:;tion 93.3:J.'.l, 0
'l~ *, *; . . . /'HotCel/, W:asteHdndling: aiid'ShippingAreiis," disczisse$ the'h'dt ~I *.-.,*.***,,5 __ :.*/"** 0 ':"'.~,*, ':/~,: *./>>,.,* -,: :',.,:'*"-,,,,.,. ,*,~;;," .. ' -, * .-~ -~>>_,j .' *.
- ,. ,* * . *** . : ,. ,;fcelljirl! .areq.* Ifowe:y,¢,r, rio;info,rifiatfon:pnfir,,e ~I?Pte1SJ0,1t.'!nsid,l! l/Je;hot cell ~1.closu_re,* was prb~{ded,: \
['"' ' * ** , _ , . * * . - * , ** ' ' * ", ** '.
* ,.. *, * ;:~dd(tio11af.ihformation is neerjed on.thehotcellfire:protection .ta detrpwiin~Jfmf3fhqds to. de_tect, *. .-** 'i . ,,':,control, and ex,t~nguish fires* are adequate. * * ., " , . , .. * .; :. * *: * .' * "" * * * '. ' ~' ':.:; "" * ~, .,,' * : , '
- _, , " , , , '. "* ' * * , I
, ;*Provide iriforpiat[on on th~ type ,offir.e 'Supp1:e~sion 'sy~tem that will ~e used in iHe hot *~i,pell enclo-r._ure, 1
1
* * ' - * * ' ' ' * ' , , e - . ' ' ,.;<* * ' " ' * -' **[, . , 'l , f:.* " "' ' * ,_, "* '"' ' l ,,._,, .._~~~.:!~~~~?,'.~f!fr;i:_~f~~:.0!;~~~1!~?:~~~~E~~5t,5~s~~1~.t~~?~~~.Tiif!/I~f:!!.~:~.?£!1f,s;;~'!:*~~~~-~JJJ~:'!J::,::J
- Hot cell fire suppression systems have been commercially available for years and include product *
;designs compliant with the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) and other relevant industry ;standards. Selection of the specific hot cell enclosure fire suppression system will be finalized during the *
- final RFP design, along with commitments to design codes, standards, and other referenced documents, 1
'including any exceptions or exemptions to the identified requirements. These final designs and )commitments will be identified and provided in the FSAR as part of the Operating License Application .
.:The life safety concerns that could arise from the operation of hot cell fire suppression systems relate to ithe possible mobilization and spread of radiological contamination from the hot cell containment into ,
*other systems and facility areas, thereby posing risks of personnel exposure. The design and construction !
- of hot cell fire suppression systems include features to handle the water and/or other types of fire ,
;suppression fluids during and after the system discharge(s) in the event of a fire detected within the hot cell. j 58 of 96
.*:.***.~:.NWMI *. NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. O * *.. ~~.~~,'
- f'ORJHW£&Tl':£01CAL ISOTOPES
!Selection of the specific hot cell enclosure fire suppression system and its discharged fire suppressant ihandling subsystems will be finalized in the RPF and hot cell final detailed designs, along with icommitments to relevant design codes and standards. These final designs and commitments will be !identified and provided in the FSAR as part of the Operating License Application. Request for additional information . f,o-!:j;';:..;,..*..-; ..
-~*_;-,w':.":"'-'>"'--,~ ~~*ry*;:;~;*,,-*;.-:'..:.....;.J~ .:,..;;;::~~~;*=~-~--=:**;_;.';~~*-:* ~**-....:;~. <;. * ..,...;..,.,;;r ..;;1 * ' - ,.'+*,-~'.:'";',...:_' .*.-~:,..:-- .,.;;..,;.....~--:;~** .* *.'-.; ~ ...~:..7p*-~;*.;:,.*--;-,:""'; *;::*...:::... ::-.,'.7.~.':>*-":-~..;';-'-":_:t-,-..0~;,,.*;**-:;--_.*.p-~ .....--T"**- -*:---*~--~.;~ o-,..;:~-,.~*e".'""'~'*-"'-'*1 t ~! ~~~.~~ i!~¥ff1 f:S/J.R§ec(ipn 9,},: '..'Fir~Protedio[l Sys,tems pnqJ~~ogram§;; '!,diS,dt4s~es ffiejirei[Ji'~teqtion. '. ~: :* :;
r ,. ** ':, , ':; * ,jprijgrqmfo1:_ (~e"f.l)f,1NJfaci/ity;j13cfffdingth~jkce:'d~fection a1J~'#4ppi;eSsiO,ntijlsfenis/iis:>je/l as qlaffn,, t J. * *.: *** ' .* *.* * "TsJ!~tenls and life iiafety c'an~er~~,.liow~.ver u ~oe,s!1<J~ qddr~~~. lfh't~p .~utlqtng or;fire.r;,qf/~s.{he f°'cility . !! , . . * . . '\wil! be bujlt.to. AdditionaUnformqtion ispeeded'to tjeterm{ne ifiJ:lethods_.to* detect, cont~°"[, am{,.. " 1 , . *. [:extinguish fire.are adequate. ' ** * * " . '. : * . '. "" :. ** * . ' 1,, r_,' *'..; ** .. ' .'*,,...., 'c,. - \', *~'. ~:'r*.'.* >,J'-' ~;', f~'>*""'c';,~;,',~'~*',,_'*.' 1',"; '",'1*'*',; * *~,, ,"fJ'.', *,;:',*,'_,-.'; t~* 1 * *; * * :; , : 1 Identify tlie.buildihg:.andfir? codes that NWMI is conmiitting tofoUow:withregar,r;l~tdthefire .*, .: . 0 t~,-':;".~~~:.~~~~.:.:.1E~~£:i~7!!i:~z~~f~i:j~~h[~~:~~~~~~~:~~~:~T~!2Z~~s~:. DI1~~i~~L~:~L~~::'.*,~~.:..,*2~~;;L~'~;~:.,,:.::.:' {' !Commitments to specific building and/or fire codes (e.g., NFPA 801) will be finalized and identified in
- the RPF final detailed design, both for facility construction and for fire protection program maintenance.
iThis final detailed facility design and the relevant commitments to codes and standards will be identified !and provided in the FSAR as part of the Operating License Application. \*--'*** ...,.-,.~. *-*=;.""- ..; . .,- --~;-:..:-J.;-- -.;,./:~- -;.=~*----:--*-*-:r-'-**:."""'"'"' -~'"'"~*~- ~'*~-~:--*-*--~'""7}'"*.;.: ~ ~"'"-;" >.~;'----
........ .... ..**::-* k '1;:*---~ r-*i-'~: ......"-'-~--~1-:"':"-h:'~~:';:_ -:,;""f"'"""'*'-";i'-'t.;"";~~:+*;*"":,~-,*:,"f:*-;*,:,"~~**- 0'**.,.-r'-***-r~y "'""""~ -,.\*':->*.;..**'-"}fj~ *1-;--~~-~
- !
- RAI 9:3-3 * * ;! Tf'hi/e NWMI PSAI,?.; 'Section. !!:3, providef inforiiiatiOT!* i/h fire protectionrsyslf!nt de-Jigri, it do~s not *. ~
1; *, ' ' *, >; ' 'l;describ,e fiow~f!igh rcidiatfon"areaj;mdy' afjec( (hepeffo'rlnditce:'pftohtzaitpn qetectors; .'While.}' : ..: .J ~*: '. .,*: . ,,~ .; .,' j~~qtqeiectr_tc}l_e te.ctors: qartbe dffi{ctedbf'1f.he'pres~nc~:of~ust,~fparfi.C1,tlai~s~* 4adtttq1al *inf?Yin~it(Iii ' ( ~* .*. . . . . , *.~;;;s 1ie.ecl,e.d tq dtft~r~niru! th? fire.~d,e/<t,c.tiQn ,c.apab.ilitieS;pfth(/faci/ilJl:" :" .::,_ . * ~** , **: * <, . <". " .. *i *,*. 1 . . '* * * * * . ,;;Provtde the b~S;is for how dete~tors\vill *IJe. ch~~en; :as we/fas j9r thimaliitenan2e:p~ograni that ~ili1 .. :
*;. . -ilfie jmrin plac(! to en'sµre.t}ieir ft,ln'ctionali'ty. * .,'..* :: * *. * . * * *' * * * * * * .. '* , :- *~- * ~l,,.,,Y,._,,_:<*.=-o-*.. ~.:;,;'~-,;-. -,..*~-*rl.:-:-. *-:~.*.*:"" .:.:..,, ..-;:~~---~**-~,..~~:_.-._:.-_~* *-""-~.-_-._.'--~~*:. ::.1**; *...:.~-:_**c:**::0--"7..-*:o-*.." , ' * -.--:-* ;-~ . . . -: -::-.o* ~*or.-'...~---"'!:" ***-o,,-*'~-..,...~.. " .::.. :-_ .:_, \Fire detection systems for severe industrial environments (e.g., high radiation, high particulate concentrations) ihave been commercially available for years and include product designs compliant with NFPA and other :
(relevant industry standards. Selection of the specific fire detection technologies for a particular severe
\environment will be guided by the recommendations offered in such standards (e.g., NFPA 801 ), along /with the recommendations and requirements of the test and maintenance programs to confirm the reliable '
Jfunctionality of these systems. The fire detection systems selected for the RPF's :fire-protected areas, and *
\the corresponding test and maintenance programs, will be included in the final RPF detailed designs, '.along with commitments to design codes, standards, and other referenced documents, including any iexceptions or exemptions to the identified requirements. The final designs, test and maintenance ;programs, and standards commitments will be identified and provided in the FSAR as part of the l Operating License Application.
t~:RJ\i:"9~34 **iiN,iilfirP'siits~;;t;~~~~fi'il;'"-~Fi~~-~§;;;p;;;;~n*:~~g:y;;e~1;~;~Tts~~~~~-;;9'.3:2:'2J~!'f~;ti b~fi~~~~~~~ii
~. "* " / .. -. ](llarm:Subs;wtetfl/' s~(l~:s'.tha'..f!.F;PJ;ljilt'erplenu!!l deluge iystems ~n:dhe~~ U,ete"c,~orswil/ be u_sectto.,,:: ;
i) . * ..*., ~ .;}<Jetectarzd_~Pl?ress,fir,e~-mvol'!,111g.ff!e.HE?Afiltersystem., :~'"'.::*** 'i,* ,,, .z. , *: * . **:) i ;:; ' . . ' ". ': , 'l~ro~tde r:1 de;'crtption.'of;the iesi/~g ~{md,.niairite~a~c~bjfhese'~it~~ls,'..intlil4ilig"tnfofn{'iili"d'r~.bq~t';?;. *};
;;*_ , .., . . , :.J,!a,µy'qqtfe~.o,r#an.cidr,dsf~r,itMf.'ly.l(iscommittirigtq.': ., * '.\:: ~* * ::: . . *.?" .,, . :,: .. }
flligh~effici~~~Y~~~rtic~1;1~*;; (HEJ>A)fiite~'fi;~ I>;~;~ti~~-(i:;: 6~ili'<l~t;~11~~.,~<l *;~pp;e~;I~;). ~Y';t~~~**:
;include the means for nondestructive in situ testing and maintenance, and are designed and constructed in * !compliance with appropriate NFPA or other relevant standards. The specific HEPA filter fire protection , \system(s) selected will determine the most appropriate corresponding test and maintenance program(s) to lbe implemented. HEPA filter fire protection will be included in the final RPF detailed designs, along iwith commitments to the relevant design codes, standards, and other referenced documents, including iany exceptions or exemptions to the identified requirements. The final fire protection system designs, test fand maintenance programs, and standards commitments will be identified and provided in the FSAR as "part of tl1~_.9e_era!ing__L~ce1.18e AJ?pl~~~tion.
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NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 -f '., RA'i '9.~~ . JirUiiia-15~-i-~Pci;t I* seci;~n 9.:3, ::;,ii;~~~Pr.ote-ctibti:sy~tems*~;;J.f(oir~in;,:.;"st~ie;11i~t '(fie*:~---* *"-- ::! i;' ': ---_ ' - : :tqppliq1{ion shoulddfsciisspassiye rJesigYifeqtures;required by(hefacility d~sign 9haracterlsticsto, jn-\;
, .* ' _: * '.fl.art, '/ifllitfire qonsequences: :the fa9ility shoulrj be design~d.andp[ote,ctivf! .fjs(emssliould existtq , _ '.*; ~.'iprivenl:tHe im.co71trolled-reiease,ofradio'iictive,material,ifaflre:shouid occur. :. : ..
Re uest for additional information
* , ,- ~--- , . c,i >-, " ,' ~ f'.' ') ' I J ,>' ~~ ,' ', *' " , ,* ' ;' : ' '~ , 1 ,-; ," , , l : , ' ' ' ' '< 'J , ' ' ' ' " "* ' ' >> ' I '1 i < ' " ' .' ' * ; /1
- '.NWJV!f fSAR Section 9:3. 3: 1.. ~adiqisotope-'Production Facility Fire 'Area; "disqissesfin/ hazards . "i
,-* '/.~'.anq igttiffon SOUY~esJh~t W;'efg t:onsid~(ed fql'. flu/ '(?PF, ;bid,ifoeS_l!Ot describi,\vJziqfijireiafetJ/8y$fems*! . ,"" li~rtian(igfrf,jent ln<[cifure'i ~re'iJecessary'.[q.jfeyen} br~itiga?iffiigh ~o~, lnt~fmeCliate' coiiseqit,~~ce' '*. ' ,;; * . ,: -Jl_Ccidents,:-4dditional inforfn,ti,tion requirecj to determine ijthep/an for'.fh<fpre\Jentiowojjires 'is . ' ,:; !i is f'liP:i'ia:s* ~;;t;htthf.~'ai:!f;~~;;.,;;;p;,j!;:i":i~lni'f:e~~itr;;;;~':i~q;,m;,~rJ~;-;,'r;,,~,~J . *. ;: **i.1]intenfu~di'a:te.*cqrisequeri,~~ accide~ts 11),the'f?Plf;(i,e.;.IRpES),,.:~ ';":i;.- .:~: /; .,. .," .. : - .* *' * '" .,,...~;.'"::". ~',--J ~* ;-:; .....:-,..:,.... _~:!/.~* ....,.....,,--::~~. -,~,.~,... ~...,. ..,,,-~;;~.;.,.. * ,;_:;;' !,<,;~"""*~*':i<<7**-:-_:,;_,,.._,:~;,;* ,=,,....,_ ...;.....,...-~.'.-.-:.*.~~ ._. ..,.,..._:...:_::"'.:;~~~.,.,..A:_,.:,,,_.:;.,~.--*,/;:,...:" ~r:. -. *--~ ~;.);,..'.~~¥~~--,,,,~ ******- *"-**w---*--*- '"*=****~-
'.The fire protection system was not identified as an IROFS during preliminary design and Construction
- Permit Application stage. Design and/or operational approaches will be used to prevent and mitigate :
major RPF fires causing significant external and internal releases of energy and hazardous materials. The : 'level of consequences is typically directly related to the quantity of energy and hazardous materials !
- released during such accidents; therefore the design, construction, operation, and maintenance of the fire i
- protection systems will focus on minimizing these release quantities. Inherent process and systems :
design features such as compartmentalization, isolation, batch size limitations, and early/rapid/redundant ( .fire detection and suppression can serve to reduce the maximum possible magnitudes of energy and hazardous material releases resulting from fires. Once finalized, the detailed design of the facility and its
- systems (including the final designs for fire protection and the final list of key safety systems and
,components to address severe accidents), along with the management programs to maintain their 'reliability, will be identified and provided in the FSAR as part of the Operating License Application.
~?:Rt\1I3'!.51f.l7J~~~'fffiiiii9'.ilid'h'd-g;~;~tdi~~;;;~;7izJf;JiiF¥;;u;~:;K~!:11t;~iIJ,lie*1;~;;,:;i~6;,;~~;~7;,.*;;:i?
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- .. . .* * , ** '?i:onstructed,procitred,,,inStalled,'.aftatested'to'.ensure'.fhat:'theywill".he'avai(abte*pn¢*relialileto<. * :.* 1' i*:*. .* . . -:
*"~ *-~> ** . .*!~eifo~mtHe1r1nte'ndeajtinctionswh_en ;!L--~~~*-:,.;,,;_,h..,,,.._:.,"'_~...~ ->:**"'~"'" !'t- ~~;,.;- ,.,r~:~.,;,,.:-o<~.'"_.;.,.,.., _i-~~.,. ~i'.;. -~ ~~*"- """ .'<,z !*,,::*-i~- .--; : '!*:-*i-:~~*-
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'. The fire protection system was not identified as an IROFS during preliminary design and Construction
- Permit Application stage. Design and/or operational approaches will be used to prevent and mitigate tmajor RPF fires causing significant external and internal releases of energy and hazardous materials. The Jevel of consequences is typically directly related to the quantity of energy and hazardous materials
*released during such accidents; therefore the design, construction, operation, and maintenance of the fire 'protection systems will focus on minimizing these release quantities. Inherent process and systems
- design features such as compartmentalization, isolation, batch size limitations, and early/rapid/redundant
- fire detection and suppression can serve to reduce the maximum possible magnitudes of energy and
- hazardous material releases resulting from fires. Once finalized, the detailed design of the facility and its
- systems (including the final designs for fire protection and the final list of key safety systems and
- components to address severe accidents), along with the management programs to maintain their
',reliability, will be identified and provided in the FSAR as part of the Operating License Application.
60 of96
- .**.-.:*.*...NWMI NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0
*". ~~.:!:. rrotl.TWNESTfJ.E.DlCALIS{JlOPES L.;, ... *
- _;;pr.otec'fio11,.p~an s}10,lfi<l<!iscl!ssJhe prevenfio1.1 offini.~,:includingl(initing;th~-.types.and'quqntities*oj * *}
Request for additional information {- RA.i. 9.3~ ".
- f<.NuiiEa-153 7, *Part 2, *'sectiott9. 3, :*"Fir~ :Protedtio°r!*Sysie"iiis "f;fid.?~o'granis,:_;, ~tdtes.t1iat ili~}ire:~ *. *.. \
l* *:. :.". - . , ,_.. jlc?~Wltft~~{~ matr,rJa{S: Jfo'!!:f!.¥:.<!r.. .:th~:PPP,{iqiJf.01Ldi1.nel pr,ovf(!e any,Jnfqli_m~ti?ii iJft1<; com/J.~stiblei' *) l * .*/ .ii~n :1cf{f~~ *a,~e.a?J-1df ~~n~l._i~l.o'J!!atf~~ {f .:n*~e,.~ei(~2c- ~~te,rfii~e)fthef~c;f{it}rt,ff!Jtjz. tQ,Jil!J/t t~etyp~:s:.;. l
~'. -.. : _::'. ~- :f\?(J1J~~~1~3~:S:ff~/,l!(bu~fb~~~~at~r,!F{s;1f:~~ei~~!e: :.;o; *.: : ,~ *. ).:* >*,:;./.;:. /.>:1;:}:~'.:,_;:,:~.'.! \;,*. : * <C,:-; :.:~::. :', .--~ ;1 * °'. * *-* .r:Pr?vide additional information on* the types ofcombustibles fourid in _eachEre *area.and.how':th<? ._ .._~:;* ',
~-- ; ""' ' -.,., -~konwustii}1e.ffi~tehhls w~llbe'~01ii}:oll,ed, incli/d{hg:,i:Iiiladniintstf~ti~~ ~o~f;~i;*anJ rii4n~geril~~?: ..*.*:*;, t)The. **~-----'~';_,;*:!;_'_J':!!~~=~~-L_::._~~;~.~'""*~--:.~.~-'.~:":.~:~_.:c~:~~.~.~-~:~~.;~"-"-~* RPF's combustible loading (i.e., detailed inventory and distribution of the types and quantities of _ ,,_L...:;. :~..;;,._.:,~~---::{.,:.,~~-. {~j-~:. .:~. *.:~:~::.c,..,~:L.:.t.:.f.*
- combustibles throughout the facility, both fixed and transient), along with a commitment to an iadministrative program to control combustibles within the facility, requires the detailed specific jquantitative data that can only be derived from the final facility design. In particular, the combustible .
)quantities of various types and their distribution within facility areas depend on the detailed specification : \of process equipment and components, materials and their quantities, operating and maintenance /procedures, and material locations during the various operational states of the facility. Thus, the 1combustible loading analysis results and the administrative program to control combustibles within the lRPF will be finalized and provided along with the final detailed design information in the FSAR as part i.~~1!1;~_gp~~~~.~-!:i!~e~~-e-~{J_P~~c-~!i?_n.*..... _..... ., ... ***- .. _.. --** _ . -~------~ ... -*----- __ -* _.................... _.... _ . _..... -~-,
No. Request for additional information [..:~;:J'.*}t*~;~;':_:g{&#i::~}\~i'.:0Y;_j.j..*'/;~*,~~F*~~~lfeJ!f~.-..J*****~}.;.**.;:,*: / . :{ *. "::,..,;~; .,:;1 ;*. -~] t ~t'9:4:-t*Y.,S:~i:;1wt~~*8* '..~(PilJJ?l~.te~esiant/qcpµn:zdy_pf;iµfo."rmqfj(j.n,/\of}f) .GFJJ..Pq';(~O*r,,fqujr,es_.thiit: \-).. * . >*:l! i~' .. ,;*:.,*' ':". ' '
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by tlJ(f 'rJppli canf. b~ q_onzjJ_lete Jina qcC:Urp~e *~n /jl{ 1!'J_ai~t:ia!J:esJ;.~cf$. ;. i ': :; :*. _. :.:. .. ;,,,!;
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- !-:~~,' ~.t *, d ,c*': *;: .~-_-'.'~'", ,"h,* ,;' ;.,.~ ;;(J _:~. <:t;,'**/~*.,,.'.*,',:'.'\,"'; -~/ .)* /**,,f"* ~_~: , ,. *'.~:~ *-.\,
- . :;;NJf!Jl/fI.PSAE. S.ecfi()r{9.,4;}, _pe_stg1J.Bpsi$,: 'st{lte,~Jh_at.: , *.. ,, .....: , *. . ;,.., * :**~"
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;) * '. *: * ;'.:, " .. " . ",, : ,; ]he cominunfcations systein design ba$iS is lo provid<;! comn,iun/cations'i/iiring:n.ormaland:'.. '". ..., ;*. . . ,
- r: * . . *~fri~faenc}coddition~./Je.iw~fr[\JitalqiM/s'ohhe RPgC1ndth~Admjni~°ira#o,nf3uifdi~g. This.: *. ,; J
,; ~'. * ;. . _. cohin~uhicati oil~ iapaHi1i¥y will iriclud/th~ 'd6mi/OJoperai'Qrs '.di other,.:d~~ignated staffJMhibers to~ -:ii *.,, annqT,lnce an e"'ergeficy Iii all cir~as oftheRPF aridpro~id/~o-"wdy .4om_mu1:ztcations betWer/i{atr. :
r- "* . ... ' :li .,*.operii~~na(areart:<Jn1if}ze: coil.~61 roo;,fDe~fg_n:of 1' * **
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th~;tdec9itthiuni~ation'~s~e~1:aiso c~11l~lies'w1lfa~
'f.eleponi111i./,nicatioilsJndustryAssociaf!911,. req1;1ire,Tnents.* * " .: . **: \ '1' ,, '
- r' . ~{ddit{o1~l i,rzfern~~lj~n <?n..'. th~, .~Oln1Jiunibatio!1S sy_s,te1:z de~if511~ basis is, P'.Ol'.i de din, ,Ch_apier 3;,o.,,, . c- ">: ~
- ( < ., -*,f!fP~~vef, f'~ .C.~apt~.rJ. o:;<<pesiglJ *()f~tructu,r~~* S.Y_ste111~,-an<lo/.omponents/:,d?~s n__ot qpp~arto, :. ;*I
*: \ .. , . . , .. :.:.'f,w~;f~.,~Y_ ~1~1~?~1ci: ~nto.'Jf.~~-~~ ~?* t~<r ~omty11~w~f9'1r:.~ste11,i. . . : .... , :: . .* +:, , . . . *:'.: ,:; . ;,:*;.:;t:~ :t
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.:;*.::.NWMI -:~* *~:*
NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0
*~~~.~'!;* N!JRfHW£SfMtDICALl!OTil:P£$
No. Request for additional information t::Lr,*-~f~f~<,~~:';.:.::::.:,;;~-~~~-~~F~~~~~:-*~~,\;:,*.*./*.*.::;:,. *'.*\:. ;,;J
~: .° RAI '9:s~t:j:s~crla~~5*0.9, "Coftiplet~hesil:ana:.dc'Cuj.aey o]infqr.matid_~~.>!iofl,O* r/jFR* f f,ift5_Q requ~ifes~that ,,;.: '. . ~ *'. * ;1 }*. . **. * .* ,, '. *:*;lihformatioi(maintained /JyJh!?, applicani:.be*~coniPJf!te andacci1raie)n all hJ:atef,tial n;spe9ts.:,* .. : *. -*::: ... '.'i, * * .. ; ;
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reach.hplosiv_e, l{fj_eli, A,qdifioriqfiTJfO.trr:(i,ii?f!,on,tl:z<;,~eSjgIJ,°bahs. ofp~verjfl!_ ~?nf!ol in the ~l,os~d i: l' .. pr.irtJar;f c90/ant.system i~p1;ovidedjn Chapter). O[VeSigii ofStr.Uctilres, Systems,_ and . << .: .r:
)~. : ,, ., :,:;; ,no~:;~~J:~J~~::aJi~b~;t~ink;~a;ii~,~~,;~en~ovi;*ii~.L~~~ifu~~~i~:-~f 1/s*~Lg~*_bd~is:i~P.~* ..>,.-.~ *~!:\,c**'h~* *~*"*'*".4'*3;*,.,,.o'J! ,_ **p:*<,erA:BQ_; '.",*i~-d .~3*****5. -'i,.,2*-*.r.7.*1*7*-~tup*?.*r**~'<<*-* '*"c:**.'h-*'11',*;d'.~*'r:iT,; . *s*~~ . *,.,. -,,."'.*h.1:1'?-'h* *z'-." *~, ~i.r*h~{d'r r.:,*,;
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it:'.;_.!.... ",:: ....,:. ~*.;,, "*' .,,-*-*','~--..~;~.:.,.,_""°,-- *~:_;...,.~--* .* ;...,.,,~..;.:.:..e;**_:~,.:.._ ... -;;;:;- *.....;;...,,-~--,;'.'-_:; . *~..;...-.,,....;,... ~: -,;*~':-'-.:-.,_(_-r_~~~..0- --:-:.~*---~-.,:;...--*---.*;:;;,~-~.:::--~.,-,~*:;r=.-.:_:=.~ -..-:~~~--~.~...,..---.-~"'-:._~;:..;. ~-*-*-.<~**-.-~~*,,* lTue RPF does not have a separate cover gas system, as typically found in a reactor. There is a function
- applied to the process-chilled water system in PSAR Sections 3.5 and 9.7.1.1 to ensure that the process- '
'chill~? "'.~!er.. ~_yst~m is b~~?:V h~~oge1:.P'1.~~ility l~t~ ... _. .. _, ....*.--.. . ... .. ____,. ,,., No. Request for additional information tS :_.; _. . *.: ' ,:" I *:~ .,'1~4'.,.,,'., .*.:,**"_,' ~- :*;.~r.\t;f~~-,'~,,;~* L O! I, ,,, ' - ., .* ***~'~U,,~..,-/~~~*'-:~fl~.,~-~~~'r,"'l *,~ \";:' ~,';\; ,,-~~ '/
.***' ,., 1' ':,:,, ,c1*c*~ ~'.,,';~~ s::~.J *;: ~I* 9. 7-1:** !'.NuREG:; I1i7,'.Pcft"-J.:. Chapten.?; * .£w~Iidry.~ystems, .~(a_tes;th~t:t~~:app[icqntsfzo_u'1q/11c}ude HJe ..:* ., ,f l'. <'r" ,,. ,. ' ;deSign,bas~s!f?r.eaclfp~ix_ilid_ry; sys_tem:.> * . :),,; . ,;;- ,;;:-:, * '.;;,. " - i:. .. . ~- j: '., ,,, . *i;~,PSAR/Secttoit:.9:'.(Li"r)uiuy,syst~~i/*;[~1is;;11.:p~*ti:*;"
1 ' . . . .'- *.. '**** :l. ii. Thi'iltiiuy§yiie,;,~,'wi1f/j;ovid~-:h~cuing; :(;q~lihg;'iJrd~es's water,, c~mPY.<Js~idgaies,. tn;dw;,~nt; :. . 5
- .. ' *'* ;: , *fhbti':e force; 9rz,d ()fher funqfions ~q s_uppptt ur:anluf!l pr<}qe~si1!g, }f/asf.e hiJ.rz,cjling, dnd,veritilat/on~:. _;
.. * :: Th¢'.utflitji~yltems.w{ll ~n.clude f.hefollpw[ng-subsysi<{rf!s:, , . , , ,, . " ... . . '; , : ... - . * . ,'* ,' ;; . ' ' " . . . ;**: .. . (, .~.:'Process-steam:* .. ~*-.,. ,. ,.. ,
- ~\ i?roce;;:chtU~ii wdt~f ;:; .'. :,\ * ... '.(;
~Ji~~n~~i;~ff;/t/ih1;,r_:ilc:~ . ** ~ 'Gas-supply, l;ihich'suppli~s ' , < ..* ....* . '1~;
hiti:ogen; heliitm; hydrogen; *and-diyg~n, '*
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,>*'*_Eitri~l~e~pg_as.':.. ,::::-_ ;">.:.', *: :::., ... *,,, ~- ::.:::.*N:.*.* ...:: ,; * \*::***:'.\ * ._The PSARfurtheri.statesthe,:l;ltility sy$fems <i[.e designed to'_(!nsitre,*tfJaUmy po,te'r!tiaf m'alfunctipns . , *:do.n.ot*c;al;lse acQ_~q~nt,s-'i~ the RfF~qr.qn:unc~~trq!l</q*r~leqfe"c5fp;idiqpctivitJJ,. 'llJ1e i)J~~f!ms arl}. ,;,;, ,,: ~/_ijes!gnf4 to .f}lJs:'~e _tht:1t- in, t~f! l!fent rq,diO/icNye, 11u;zt~1t<lf:M{e/<:a_s~fl'l1ythf! o]?(!r{J,ti<JlJ 9fo)Ji,<;, .of~h~~e_!
sy~tefii.s,, pqtenti{,i/,ra<fiati_on;ejposu_res.:wquld,not*excee,cf the fimtts*ofJO:CFE 2Q .and are cpnSiste}1t i' ); *. .. ' >; : : '" l~ .. 'wl,th' tlie~~ AµIjA prr/grdif,. 'ilo1~nJiioii ~itmqlfuficti~;1*6]i6e a'uiill'dry sy'/itemi wlii)nt<;rfe~e ! 1* . ,, , 'with' or prevent safe shtiido'tfn,ofth'e,IfBF ' '.'. ,, , / , : "./* .., '* .. , . , .. ' ;;
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- Jnstritn1ent airfor'bubO'lers arid v'Ol\ieViiJiilaiton* . *.
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- f,,:*,; *:. ' ,;*.*J;: '" *,,,Yl_la~f!f,ial COllV<fYOr , : *y* .
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i; *-* , ,*' . il. \ . *. :(Jds,pip~/y,. includi~ghttrrig~n; :~e_liuT;. an(lhyprogf!n to, the ;ref!4~tio~ Jufnace,:qnd;~itroge1i; .. , ), ., .. '
- andoxygeJ:i to the*dts'solvers .* .'- * ' ... * * * * ._ .
- _ .*-**. * .*. .. * * * . (
1" .. ;,_ *:
~; *d!urge/sweepgas~s provide 'adeq1fateflow'such 'tha.fahe accumulatiOf1 :ofC()mbus{iblegases is*~~ { ' ' -below haiardous concentrations and reduces radiological hazards- due; to 'accumulation of *. ,.* !;.- .gas~ous:fis~ibnp;~Juc(s _!'. .: :-.--*: *r:: , . **;:'.*, ; .. ~:* *;** r: *. /'*... * :*: . :*;_ .~ .-r. '* _:; } -.~<'.i°4'aditjonalthfonna~oh oiJthe,uti/ity-8yf/em;~aestftn bdsi~.tspr,ovidedi~Vkhapte~.fo. ' '. '. . *:* .,;-: -( .;!P,.s'(ffi; ~ec~pn *3>. 2.::t. J.~,. ;:'~Plabt a~ci lfl;~me;tt41r sjite~i*. ' .: ~tate) th~t)l!.e,ife~tfr; b~tsf,u,iJc(tJ~s 6/ : !. !itheplantand1instninierifairsj;stefiicireasf0Uows(': .. *.*".. _* ** * * '." .. ' * *; ...* *_*.,; . :*~: Provide small, aclvibtivefl~ws-~f~t~~i~i;. )o; seJ~rdl RPFaettviti~s' (e:;.,
- i601-op~~~do~, ft~,;;~*: 't
*... p(Jwet; purge go/, ii'J tanks,. yalve iict~anont arid ~ubbier,, ta~ic leve(me_asurerfz_entF: .- *,: *"} *' . ;: .
- i
*~. P'r,ovide plmzt air receiver buffer ecrpadty :t0;mril[f! llP. aiffeteriq_e_ be&eeri:p?(ik dflrf0n<! and_.. . , .!
- s .qomprefsso'!;_capac?ty1.*:* .... *; *. **:c* :.. * *. *:*.:** * ... :; .* ;:;:*. *.~/*J*-':'.'Y ."!,':"1 ' '"': ; , . * !
'" ,, *, ,Prqvi<fe pl<jht aiffo in_slrl:f_m,en,t air;lu,bsys(ef!l.fo[; b~q,blers.;:m.d,valv,e: actu.qt_ton,: ::~"'* . :..
- _ : -. .
'* '.;: .; Provi'd~ insfrllment'i:iir re,celver buffer c;apa9ity to* make up difference be'tween peak demand and *~, . .~:*-<< )." cOnzpressQr..capGcitj;.;_ . ' * ~- ,: *"*'.-*; r. * --~*,' '.." f<,, ~\ - .,.: . " -* * ./: * -'* ' - . *' 'l ;:PS4R_ Section }§2.:Z,.14 lists.thefqllowing desigJ1, basip :values ofthe plant and tns(rument a__ir* systemf ; . *. -~:*i~as:* .:.*. . *...... _*,.- '.: -'.: _ _..* :'.*,_ -~ . '..: * .... _:,..*-. .:,* _ *. * *. * . " * .. :; :o _.3 ~::.year 'df!sigii life' with .tlie ex~epfi,011.df dirhnoffrepibceabl~ f?artS.f~-$:~'.jJuJ,ips) t, .*: ; -, . , . ',:
i ; r. ~' frovide instrµf!l:eh~:p',r df,~~4 ft:lre.g,)nl'.f fble, f!~s!~f(Ih/.b'ed~'.~?-?r 1~w:: point: oflljo ~~ea~:~ t~~l? :.,:; ; '(:
. ,:i . 40°[; (-40°F) andfiltered-.to a maximum 4Q micron (µ)particle size> * ,: * * !. ' <- 'v , ,,, * , _.;. ..irrhu;, *p.sARsecito~.'9~* 7: 1:'i appeari* ind0~stit~'nt*~~ n~icle4r1y*~~treiJi~.fiv~1h'foSJm~s~~tidh 3.°/2. 7. i~, )
- * \;i~thatl?~R*$~~tion}.5).7.lf, fis,tsth~eeck,sign:~asisfun'ctionsforthe:plaf!f;9iui,tnsfru.me_nts air. ; *:r
\lsystems thattire not'listed.among the two plant:.and-ihstrument~air.:system-relatecrdes/gn basis. ... 1:
- * .,* !ielem,ents'in:P$Afi*Septi~~l7):'.1; specifi~~lly:~ . : . *.'" * *.' :';; .* ,.::. _: : '<. , )_ * * 'i ,* ;*i" ,. .* .. -'
*. : * -;!_ '-~., J!rovt<{~_ small, adi:e~tive..f!o~s 'ofp_lant:a~~fop severa{ RPF(aciivitie~ (e,g:,* (ool OJl'f.'.P~on;*1fun1j;' * * ~l :: power,,purge gas in tan!~,_ ~alve *c;icflf:atiqri,tind /Jµbblertankley<;~.lfleasurernent) . , '. .J. ." **' .. ..- '~. 'Pr.avid<; plant dir receiv,er'.f?iiffer capqcitji io:nid~ up1liffe.renc~ *be(We~ft'peali d~in4iia'dnd: '- .
compressor.capacity... *. . * *' * *, ....... ** . *, .* " : >* " *,. * . ..;*-. *. * * -:. * * ,* * *. i
._ . ,* hovide. tnsirum~nt ~ir re~eive; beffer cdpactty to :Zake u/dWereiice be;.;een pdak de~ancfand. :
- ,~*;'.:, -c.Df1Jft:esso~:*i:'af!aPiO,'i. * . : . __ - *:"* .- , ... **:.,: ,**' *; '. .. **.: _'." . ,.
;t;Igditi.f!ril1lly;J!,$!1I?. Sp:tio_/~:_3,~:? 7,;lf,, qqe~:*~ot in,,qlt,td..e: tji,c{ oft~_e. d~s,igY!/?PS~fgi~~n ifl.*_PS!flJ.: ;-.;,:.' ,_ ...:
- secti,on '9. 7.1.1 for th'¢ plant and fnstrument ql'r ~s(ems. Also, PSAR section '3.5
- 2. 7.14 llsts ~o: desigt1
;;;b,asis .vai~e,s"fhat a'f,e n'oti~clu~~~ among the de~ign bcisis:elemenis given in'-~SAJ: :section 9: 7.1.1. ". . ;TV}lile, PSAJ!,. Section'9. 7.l:Jd6es indicate tha.t PSAR.C:hapte,r 3..0provides(ldditiipi'atinforniatioh on '*i
~ :_ ,. .1iiiie utiiify systems d~sign ba;i~; it is"'riot ~fear.how each ~fthe'd'eitgri basisfunf:_tioris'.andy(,liltes in, :-\
' i:PSAR Section- 3. 5. 2:.7:.14 suppor(s or correlates .with tlie ddsign .basis.den1ent$ in PSAR 'S,ection 9. 7_: L l; I' ' p '* 0 '. ' ' , c '* * ' I ' ;: '_ ' *" .-., ' ' ' ' ' I ,* " ' * * " ' " .:
( *. , ; : l~1df.tiqnaZt11fofJ!ZqtH:n (s.beedeq ,tr/r,cts6lve ?~cpnsf$tent qnc[iiicornplef~ i{e,silfa*ba.#i ele111ents., . :,: ; .. *_, :'~
'*~ 'i)'unetioiis, af!d valu.~s; inconsist'e17t level'ofdetdil;: unclear com~lati9h of'desigrf ba',#s fiinctions <;1nd *: j:,'f 1 ~ 0:"" '"'. :, _ ,;~yafues jf#h 'de_s,ign *bll;is,:elemdnts.' L~cki?fciaritjhn idehtifoing'whtch d~~ikn'b:-tiiJis~e1eihehts.i)elong fo';; i: )*., . *... *~ * '. );wl}ich sys,'te#, ot:'°siJbs2_1te~imq~q; it"~iJ/ic~lt (o iden_~tfaf!Yst~"!flfnctionalpd1fncfc11je,spnc{~o deferinine;' 0 J
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NORntWtsT M£D1CAL ISOTOPES Re uest for additional information . .<~ ~' 9.7~1~a ::pf_~~id~* add/thna)i~fo~,;,~tio~:t~ -;.~~~/~if oEe~pi~i~. tfu~ie71pj/d~i~'t.di;c;;e]J~~;i~s}1i:ti1~ *d_;;ig;i *b,~-;i~*~A
*~:.-:~* .*.:;~ ..i;:.:~u~/i.~,~~~=1!!.~:~::**:~.~:~:: . . ~. *.~"':.. ~~~--*-!~-~:. :.*. .~'~;._*::L:~~;~-..-~:~~~;:i;,. *-*~--:'.~~:~'.*.~~:-~.. L. :~::; . ~~-- -~~~:-~_.,_:;J
- PSAR Sections 3.5.2.7 and 9.7 will be aligned with each other to enhance clarity and resolve
'discrepancies. The design basis bullets in PSAR Section 9.7.1.1 will be deleted, and the design basis 1description in PSAR Section 9. 7 .1 will be modified to cross-reference to the appropriate subsection of
- PsAR Section 3.5.2.7. Subsequent information in PSAR Section 9.7 will focus on the description of systems and components that satisfy the design basis functions .
., RP.i~~~=~~-'.i~f!~~~-~iE?!!fa!:~qE~~~~~~:~!~~tfie-~fE~~{~!!~~~~Ei~s~~fE;~~:~~Sj!.~:,~._*~:?C~;~~~:.:~~:~::~:J iThe design basis description in PSAR Section 9. 7 .1 will be modified to cross-reference to the appropriate;
- subsection of PSAR Section 3.5. Subsequent information in PSAR Section 9.7 will focus on the *
- description of systems and components that satisfy the design basis functions. . . . .
1; * **;r-1.,~'- ****"" '**'""r "-.,,..*'I*~*-.*-<.-..:,--:'- ~.--........*:~--';ir,",,.,""*.:i*,~_,,. .: **;~'rli-*.O.-*~";--*:;¥*,;,...,- *****-;'~:"':'~';'""""""* *:-:."""";."'":~-* -i'~*-'."~":'"'."-'",...,.-;"t.<"'*:-**>>;"';."-,<;'~<;~*+-*~,?.:.:."-,.,,., *.,,':"""-""'."'*>,""':'"t~"~.,...,_.,~,::... ..r.o;:.'"":""...'"';*~;~::""~""*""'*":;,,..,,.....,."'t'.';.-;~**;fo"-'-*"-...~'Y"-"'~* 0
- i RArn.7-2: il'{,URJ!;G-J~37; . Part1, f:hapter.9, states th(lt the applfi;aiitshoi.tld i'nc/iide the* cje,signba~es fqr each * .* *
'.; *."~'.*:"; f1ilxili~ry1.&st~m:.'r'. ':' .::* < * ..: ':> : '.~:*" ~:.* _ , > '\ .* : *: :* . ,>v;, *. ,~" . . . .
- . *' * * ;;NJ'f'Ml.PSAR Section 9; 7.1,*:"Vtility'Systems,:'. stat(!s;thatthe.ytil~tysystem8: cqll!pris,e th_efollmying
'i'fUbsy~teriJs_: .. . . . .
l *:*. . / *~ i>roc~~s sieam*.* .... '.i * .::.. ~* *~:. <;".~:; *. ~t .-_ *~~.
- Proi:e~s .i:hii1Jd w~ier .~: *: .
.~ .:b~mine~alized ~atei S:; :* . ~.: 'i>fant ~nd in;h~m~ni: 'iilr. , . '* *.~ ' .(;as SuppfY, which.supp!ie~'n{troiefi, }1e'lium;. hydrog_en;~i1d 'Oxygen' . .'
- b*-~ Puri,,elswi~epg_as~ .. * .* ... , ;_ . ' :.. /,. ::** ..*... :: . . . *. . . '." .....
, : rPSARSection *f}.la,1 states, inparUhatqnepfth: zitilityS}'.sMms.designbqsesis toprovidecflilkd. ;Maieil 'to' t~rt6f1s.flr~~e:ss*eq~ipfrient'(Jt/10 g,:?ater*p1~,*1o~c"f5d0f[) "dufinilrio'r/r/af<>pelfati'olis. ",)-~* : . r.;* *.:'.psXJi'se?:ti01{3.5:2'i f:!, *~i:F'ra~~s~;Ghi/{~a*w(1t~t-:sysi~~;~!~1i;'t; ~Ii~ !Jroc~sl chillediivat~;. ;s};~t~m.t * .'!idesigri'basisfun.ctiqns'as fdllows: * * ,::,:,,. :*<" ~: * , .* ;::;*.. * * . :;:. * . ,_ . , >:\I* ~ ~:J:Ji!~~:;:~~ss :~illi~*Y?at~r {oopf~r three. s~c;°,nd~ry,l~op~.thro,ug~ pl~~e-a~~!a111:~ h~qt '*
\.:. . , ~.*&ne.'large*ieoihetrf,se'¢findary.to~p1nh6t:ci11. *.. , ... * . *t
... ' :Oii.e c'r,itic;ality-:-$/Jjig~o.fiiefiy se¢i!nd,ary}9opihl!~t c:~!l . :::'. "" :"* ,:.:.; . .. *...**:*.* *01i:e eriticaliiy~~al?i~9'Pie~'sdcb~aa"r;i}o~p*in.*t~;ietfciiific4tion:.'/ir~~* * * ),-~ .",, ~,,-~,,::*,/ ;:_,.,(</**=~ .*;~.-,',',,~,,.!. *',':,;c:~. '*:;:' .. ,;,.~**.* .** <!.\:.' :*~:*.:'i '\.". :;:\*' ?; ~-.~*' .. ,,.,:~" ...* Provide inonitoriiig*ofchil/edwater loops for .loss ofpfiinarjlccnitaininent;
- e'roytd,e cove~:gqsto*P,rev~iftJlainf;,ab(econdit{qns ~t * ,:* * * >>....
* ..'.;f$AR. Se.~tion}J,J~f. z.J;7 li~ts th~ pi:~c:ess.chll!e(f;wcitex 5y~tem, {iestgn 'bpsisyal~e,~:tis:hll~-w,s:. , , . . . ; , .
- jo-year.designlife with tfu(ex~epti~n *oj~ommon replaceqbl~ parts. (e.g.; /;umps}, : : .* ....
to.
. . 1; .* ;'." :*chilled watef :.JliriO~s prodess:e}futj)iji~ntdt ho greai~r. thifn. 1bc:c (5 0°iJ ~uring nofinal ' . *it,,* .opehation'S ';,, , , :.;.;; '"'* ;,~ :* .*' '*';*"" * ::,... <; '.~ ! ';:. ~:."* *..;~ .:,,: ..... ;,
Ii:~.s~sfio~.~-?:'7. zJ~... i~f~qfii~qh,ifI~4kqt~f.'sy~i~;;i~,"' li$,~th~fact!ity:cl1,tpe4.'~i;e(*~ite.~.*cie,~i~ .~
* ;'basisfunctioris'.asfollows: :y .,. .. *; '*., .'. "': .;" " '..*t; .. * * * *..*' " .,, * * ** * * , *. ; " *f\** ~ .Pro~l(fe ~~oti~g 'lfledia to' heiitihg;; tehHtatibri; 'and ~ir conditioniiig (HVAC) sy~tem *.1 < k;:* ..:;;upply'JIYAC.sy8f¢m'w.ith.r,:qo)ing.wqte,r,. tf;qt i~.cir°iulated throrigh lhf! ch_il/ecJ,\yaterc()ils tn air* .* . -"*: **:
- h anatmg.um
- l,s .* * * , * .. . .... * '. 1 *. .. .. * ** * . :., *** . . <.. .*,.: ,. .* . . . : . ; : . .. . * . :
.*** *;1fSAR. :s;~tio~: j}°£7.',j;{us~~!d~ili~ bkilielwa,~;/i;~i~Yi/~(!si;ti b~si:s ~q1~es:as1J1i'6~'l~ * , ** i *** !~'.'( ffroJi'd([~~oll:ni){,Jt~r* bi'ii 'ibinpeh,i/ud?/t2°:c f4s 6F) io:il1~:*wA:q qlf.:han4!i'tii~nit ib~ling **. ~ ,;* . .j('\;': i:oJ1s; J. *<~{**.:.>.* ', * .. ~~/..;;:_::_::: ::)*:*.-,r~* :".;,.:;:,:.,y;.,:::: ,;.,,,.*,~ * ., ~* * * ** * *l
[:,, :* '. 3,Q-yew,iiesign Ii.fa. with the, eiceptipn ofcqlllmon feplaceab'l~ parts (e,.g:? pitmps) \~*. '
, . i::P.s:4R s~'t:ti~fi*3.5.2; 1~i9, * '~FacilitYH~at~dwat~r Sy~tem/hi~i~f~cili'iy h~~tedwater*sy;ten(design
- '.~ . :.:;. ~*. *: . .:~i;.:{f~~is;;j~:e.:~:~~~jlr.2i!4efi:~~£;.'!1.:£~,~;-i:~:*.'.i:. . "";~ _,,.s;;~: ~:~* ~.."~e'-L. ~*. '.***
1 64 of96
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["* *.:~- - :/,:.*.-:*.-.lf}**i;~~t-~~n;~~~f{e~~wH~I(1e.};t~~t:~1~taiis~a~ft;~t~~~~~~~~~-;z~;~~t~~a~~~r:'.,~i~{s~1f::*_~-,~
- r:,, . :* .Y -~1pSJiR Se&tioh ~.5:2. 7.'19/;stsflicility, heated w(iier ,sy,stein/deSig1f basjs vdlµes}asfqllql!!,s: ;;;*';': . .*~:*:. : ,* * . {
f~--*- **'::*~-- ;:,.* j!*** ~-"fro~1aeh~~~~J.:W~r~;*at!ir~t/ip~f~tufJ o/si'6(18o;fr/i~ 'iivJi(';-~if.-lzh:;;a1i~i~~u~;at;h~ c~iis *-:; j'. . .-.!,r<-* andreh:e,qfcpif*, .. , *. :*> * .. ~ - *.***, * .*:: *~* * *_ . * >-~:::,,,.;*- :":**:*.*:--, J.- *.*:'~*": . **j ~- ... '*t'.,*'. fl ***SO-ye.fir.design life with the exceplipn'dfcoin;nio~rf!p/i:1(~eab(epqrt$le.g,;,pumps).: . ' ;,:.--. . ,,~
- '.* ]"* "*,..{"< " " " " " * , , -.. ,_, '*,rt'r.,,., . .;*.'-,';'* *.;,,,:*,f,~~*-**;*~~ '*.' 1,0'~,>*_,J**,;-*"~.*~. *"'.*,,':".'. l",*;; )*>'.* -: , '.0*"/',,l* .. ~" *<<";*,. ',')' .. ~{
1>'.." J
. ,". ;PSAP..
[~ *,' Section, 3.5'.2.7;
- "Rqdioisotope
'"'~' ~.' ,..... , : . 'fro<fuctionFaciUty .' ' . , ,... ':'".:;:I_'.':*>"
Spe¢ijiqSy~tem D<f_Sign Bqsi,~.Furzctio,hs iu}id}
...... *. "*' *.<\,,. " . )"*** ,'J.'.' ../i*.*J,-,._.,, *'.*~ ,*; ,.4,
\!~**"' ';"*_:::. ,**jjV'a/u1s; ~ 'diS,<;JJSS,es t~efa.Ci/itjJ'~hillecZfr_f!t~r-,sySt,e,m{3.5~2;, z,}8} afl~tije fcii:;ilityhept7d~wqter S)lsterii;: ', '.~ l\: . * *>:* "j/3:~:*'3-7:19/:}l_o,w~e,~,; :~7i(~~~Pf £~~se,;!)1S,{~~~sJ~;~n~fu,~e(IP!1J91J~:t~¢1{tiltfY.lf)?,S,le1!Js;./is(~(i'.fn:.f~R..;~ *, ;,~~ l*' ': . :1.,Sectipn 9, 7.J;:orfo'r Wh?c/i th~ (/eszgJJ. bqse~are $ZV,e]1.l'l f:S/if?. fjec;tio'f, ~; 7,). [; -J',J:zes,~ SJ1sf.e1}?S Gff! :;* **. i ..;, 1r:'\* *.: * . *ffiesCl:ibeq brieflyin:PSAR &ction'9:.7;J.:22/:'."Chilled Jfiater/~'}ldcfitiondl'inforn1atiori is-nee'dMN/ ., *' t t..~:: .. *lf<<'.*'*.'{':
!~deteiini',;e the.relationship:ainongthesesy_stems.' . : . * ~-- ':*,',:_:<***":, .",.,~ ", . .*.:. '*~-: *,.,_" <<',<f*;- .~( ... " ,"~"., '.-," r,.-,"r, ,i .. * , *. , ' *: . ;., .* * ~ *
- _.: ., .
L*~ ~ '*> .. '>,, ,.-: "*'. ,_'~ < '
<* :_.C~,:;*0 *;.**,) ', \;~{'
,;*:, ,_., .. * :* * *1Provide (Jdditionql inf9Jwatiqnto c9n:e,ct, (!~plain or. darifyJhis.ppp(J/:ent;discrepqn9)j. ln discussionS;*ofi, [:I.:.~~:.~. : . . .J~~:l~~!.~~-,~~!~~e?f ~t}i~::8!!.~~:T~~~I~!~:Y!~.~j~~~~;~~~=~~~~~:~:,.:,.~:1~~~~~:i~;_L;:;L2~ . ]t:::I:Lc~£:~;~:l 1 lPSAR Sections 3.5.2.7 and 9.7 will be revised to enhance clarity and resolve discrepancies. The RPF )system and subsystem designations will be used to align the utility systems. The design basis bullets in l!.-~~~~~~~~~5>2~~2~~,1=?~~~~'~!~~.:,..,=-*----=-"'""'*~--,-=~***<<***==-~~--~==,--='<*<-~-----~-~-.----~~*--~~-=--===<<=~=-~===-*-~==*~" 65 of96
. . ~*~;:.:.* NWM I NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 .. '; ~~.~~ .~. 110.RTifi\'EST MlDfCAl. ISOIOPES CHAPTER 11.0 - RADIATION PROTECTION AND WASTE MANAGEMENT No. Request f~r additional information V<f:)'~.:. *.:v;.~ .µ :::,;,_;:/.:*1,:;:.:::i~:i-.::~:.:~~~115t51~~~>:*;~* -::ii.: :.:J' ~'.,,~ji* *;:~~1~.:.;>J )(Afpfz(f~ tf}; ,>, , ;(::arc;g~aph ;~9;. l;fpl;(dJ,, ?f! 0: Cfl!f?:/!g~()VS/'a{e,~ :t~~~;a.~~J1.S(!'.(li!,~: en,, (!)rl_i~fiO_n,s ,0.(f'~~{9pc~e.1 i:.;, :!";:, t:
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~;;* _:;_;*~-.'°~~~-~ft~'f~TJJ£~~":~e:fi~1~rk~'!:f;~~!~;:':tff;~1t.f~;.~-*. -.~~:.~:."c~;"~~~-~-;~,~:~ *;_~~.;:;*~:. . ~=:- .,;~L~:;:~..~:'"."'""'L ~
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.*..RAl(1.1. ~.,1 _!;lfUIJ.F:G _153 7,, f qrt ~.§ecpon .J.l.{. 1, .:'.'IJa,rHati,Qn §o._urq~~; '~t,S{atM the appJir,;41?.t.§ho,u{d id~ntifj; .*, .. , :, , '._-_ *'. , .. ;)nodels lin,dJiisitmptions that are .lfsedfof R~~diifting t;:Jfid calci.tl(;iling:theqqse~'fatei,an'd accitiiftilatfve!' * * "" ::;ilosesfr?~*'.'efzi~h"ra~~(Jn~~liCfe§,*ris'Ariq~-:.41;- N1:lr..o$e?J.- PQ, *an_4 -~ifbor~e* t&d;q~c.:ti~epq~iic~l~t~~;in /:*;.(
3\PQt~.!i:esJru;t~.d, FPIJ.fr(){led,; Cf,IJ:,1 unr~~lr!JCf~if. qr~as. ,'J)jff l!~alisz~ ~ho,~!d. cqn,te!f!J CQ,/J.~<!,1':.atlll.e .~'r!f!l *<: .*. ~*
.'.!esti111dtes _ofthe predictedanhua(to,tal do~es tq at least the followingJn' the unf;estricted'm;eas: '(l) the\ "*:*maXimum exposed indiViaual, (2) tlie nearest permanent resi(?ence, dnd' f3) any locatirjn ofspecial: . . . . ,: *'.ltnterest.': , :: . . * .: , :, 1*.: .* * * ~: ".<*.*.. : i, . *. ,; :.<<. :<:'. '.'. . " : . ~ ."*' , , :'.*. , *. .' '" WWMI PSAR Sectidn.ll. l! 1.1.:2, '.'Release ofAirborne RadionuclideS, "provides Table JI';2, ., .: . *':':':.~*,;:. :. *:i'.'%!i~;oizI/clilie Stqi:k.R~1¢a~lsou'rc~ 't~iil/inf;ui:to:coMPif* 'iilditefm1i1eihe'cqn;fi-Ciinf*an :;ele~ser *'.. !~): ';;:fof a7r.bo,;:1e~iidi1iiuCltde,s:1oihe ~~vir~iim¢nt: ',,:~~*~:: '~i*';.;;\:}' . r* ..: ' ' '. ' . ~-/ <. *;:*!' '*, ... ' " , :,, .j'.J:'~ S~qtiofz.J.2.2, .C?_n,seqziencesfrpm ~he fJperation andpse of!he f;,acilfty, '.'.statf!s the . * "* :, * ;'anqcipated radionuClide inventory in the RPF is based on a weekly (hr&ughput of f!ight MURR. . . . * \ . :ntargr:;ts professea a sped]led *time, aft¢fena ofirradiation (EOJ)..:.Srfction:'4. J.iJ. '$fates* the RPF.is ,*: . " :,;!designed.to have.a fiopiih,p/pjJera,(iprza/ prqcessingcap,gpiifty ojone:Jif;zfc;h pe[;.;Wl!?k ofuftJo . ;* ' " ,') 2 t(u:getsfr.om MU~fof. up /o 52 w¢eksperyear,:aniapp~oXi1Jlately30 targ¢tsfrojn' thf! Oregon . ' 1,
), :"*' * . ":f!Stai~. rif11ve~sifY'*tostJftipdAJ!.?./aetof'roS]'R};oi'lNJiirdit~ive~sity,.~~49to~for'8'wf!eMper J!ili:zrp~r li i.. * ;)lf~<Ji;,tor.dt i§/nptic[ear.w/;fMher)h?;ca~u{a#9n'.qfa.iJ;bptfze rf!leasf~: of~~efi,qrJ1Jyfic4s #.f>.,bas¢g on. 8 or,,.* !: J._"';,:,:*::t,;,~"*'f ,:-:i~~2;.f:/:J!}1j~~~Sf};jtffi~:~~!".1 ;~;;,~,'.~::~~' :. ~;~i"-~~~';,~:~;~,,~~:;:~::.~~~~;. :~;;;_,:.;;,::;~;~~ "*j~~~.:,~c~7~;;~.,:*. :ef*:_~;.~~:" (
' RAI *t1.1'.,.1a *;fClarifj;jhe basiS,ofthe calculation ofairbome'release/Jfradionu.clides;.i:e. whiChtargetp'rocessin,g. 1* .* * :};:' *-*":;
_,. ___ - ~"-..,...
>** *--.-.,.,,,,J ;. Hthfoughpuhs .., _-.,., -,,'-;:.,....- ;.. --~
tlie baiis ofthe:'computatidn]or maiimum-:dose :to thepuf?lic de~crif;ed}n the:sectiqn>* ..
- "':'"*"°'*-- '.'r".-,-. ****-,.~~.,.--~ **""'1-*.* *.-r-J~:~***..,** ,..-*w*c*;;:--..-..-*-*.*-*..,~--:;~.-~~ *;--*;y--. - -:**~*-c:-;,.._;;*:-'::::C-'**"'-~",."'!:*,.--"-<"-' *..,,,-~---:=-~-~:* *;o:'~- -***,)-*-,..*-,,."°'.:->>-~ <!~"-M!
- The calculations of airborne release in PSAR Section 11.1.1.1.2, "Release of Airborne Radionuclides,"
- are based on the processing of eight targets at MURR. This section will be updated and described in the ,
,FSAR as part of the Operating License Application. The basis will be consistent with nominal operating conditions. The primary dose contributor is the xenon noble gas, and the offgas system is designed to
*retain the xenon to below release limits and bound the range of target processing. :
f:,8A1~211-.-t=ili~!VJ!fz;~~;~ri~iP,.-6i:i~;;~g,~-;PJibiit&:~i!~~li"iz?fyiR:sf!7:ti~7TT.t~~~~~~~~-;t19;~0~-~qzn~;!1~~:*~; L:.;', ,. : .;,4,,,~ ... ;~~:,'rY.r;J~et,<:;[i?!,,/J!.q;<f!!/;_uf!}}f.<!!..S!£;!'2e,!!!!9Ji9;;...:~, ..,+;,,,;,~"~~i....;..'.,"""" .,~~ ..:...,:.... ' ' . .* . *,
- PSAR Section 11.1.1.1.2 conditions were slightly more conservative than those described in PSAR
- section 4.1.2.1. PSAR Sections 4.1.2.1and11.1.1.1.2 operating conditions will be aligned in the FSAR i_as part of the Operating License Application. .
....~. *-*- -.,..;._.~ ...*-~:::-.:_.... ~.,;:. .*.;-~~.:.~'"""-~ :. :~-.+-...:~,_.~:..-=--*~:::::..:::;..~_;.-.~__,:.:_ __;:;:.: :--_:._~-~--...:.:.:;~:* <.. ***** ~*-;._-;.;.~.: -': .:~;-' *--~;- * .;:.~>-:.-~.,.:.:.,...2..,...___ .._,..:~ :,~~-:.~..:;__ .:,,...,--;;.~: *-* ~-~.:*: .*,-:.,.:o:-:--~:.:.:::...:;..~.:::..:.....:"":-!-".~-.::::.:;;;.::: ,.::;:~..:-,: -~** *1.\RAV11.1:-2 JWUREG-:-153 7, Part2, SectjQil) 1), l,; '.'Radiation Sourcei*".states (he *applicant should presel}t the* ,1
- ,_ ' .~-. ' " ' 't~be~testini.ates ofth<; maXinniffi ~~'nua(dose a~efth~' i:oli~ctfv~ doses/or ma}Or radiolog;dql acti~ities '. \
- > ; " ' '
- ' : c"(rgi/ting thefii/l.range ofnorrhpl operations]orj'dcility staffahd members'9fth.e pug/id. Th_e doses ",,. I
,~ishf:tll oe shgwn,lqbi*,wuh}71.tb~ appliqabl~(i11J#s.oJ/O~FRPart)Q;:: ..,: * * *.~::, :" , . . ~- .. _,: , . , ,,) ;i<'..,, . p ';';.~' *."'**" ".1.>'./ ' ' '* ..-~.:*.. :.-- ;L':~*~t:' :.".'* "'-'.'*:::',*, L\' ,;;-._~* ...~**.':,{ ,,,~.; ... '>:;*;; . .-~\.: ">*,~'/, *. "' - ~ ;,,NTf1¥!:I18Afi S,eptio!J 1.l:f.l, ~'R,qcJiqt[,9,n ~rplf!~ti(J~ Pr°flkt:f!,;"1! '.'. ~~(Jtf;~lff!J4:1Ya'!age,m<:,nt is.,( . , *:;, :,* *\'committeq'to protecting RRf-*workers, 'the,:public, an.d'. ~nvironmentji*om u,naccen,taole' exnosure to*' ' "i .' ~:radiatiOn*!jOUfces." 'Fjie NWMIRI:f ~dmin.i~D;qt~ve: exfto,stir~ /imvs ha\Je:*p een 'S~tbel(JW, the;limi,ts ,;' ' I * *d : * ' _.,. * . *" ** - ' * * *c . ,, . .,. *. * , , ' ' , * .' * !* ; *. . , ;;spe,cificed ill::{ f) :<;FBfcu:t10£o en,sur~: thq,t r,egula~(?'J! ~qdiqtjon;<;xposurf! .lilJ!-itS (lre. no_t ex,ceeded °:nd 1; , .'to etnphasi~e)fLARA pri.nciples.Table. lf:'5,, "Estjmated Radioisotdpe Prodiict~qn Facility * : *** * \
- ; ,,, .. * ,>'
- :'. >"'** :'[Gontrolle'da~1dResi:ric(edAiea J)p~e'./?-at<(s, !!,providesdos~ r.a.tes for, ~a,t:i~typj;work areas to . ;* : : ): a
,** . ** * ** * *, *..)iricljide tM:gc(ministrati\w space$> ilo,wf;,v~t;, *fpbasis,.~4s'no{pi!,ovid_edfqr dp§s, r4tes,;(l_e$iliiati9n-qf '; ..:' . , . *. ;'<1[dqiatifn.:a):ea;,*iznd q;~ignmeni'"Ofdosi1n~iiy:~t;hiliiiform!ziio6'.is'neeae.a ~o *aete,~rilirie "JfµRA ~ana* * :\ .! *t*<<'.'._1t~":~:;::;:.(~Lc::o.fiip@1J,C.~~lf!.t~,B.t!iE:!to/:J.tiL~-'{Q,9.Eft}f!jL'.*~:;;t.*~~3~~-;',,~:~L*:i'.1.:'.'.:~:~ .. ::jL.~i . . ~~:*s::, L.,::~i;:,~_~:~~." **~*,:f,._;L.~~J .:.
66 of 96
. . . .;:.:.NWMI NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 **.:~.~~:* tlOHTIIWESTMWfCAtl:SOIOPU Request for additional information
[~!t!}_:!J~~~~X!t~rl~e~!~~::?~l~,~~':::i~~~~~~~~:il:~t!!~~~~0~t~~!1.*iL:!:~!l~:~~8!!!:f::E~~--'..!:*:*:i~'.~.:::s:::.*:L;i:J ITue dose rates in PSAR Chapter 11.0, Table 11-5, were either based on actual shielding calculations or * !were the goals/ endpoints of the shielding analysis. This table will be updated in the FSAR as part of the ioperating License Application when the final shielding design and calculations are completed. Areas /identified as controlled access areas, restricted areas, radiation areas, and high radiation areas will be idesignated based definitions provided in 10 CFR 20, "Standards for Protection Against Radiation," and {the predicted doses rates presented by the shielding analysis. Although the Radiation Protection Plan has inot yet been developed (i.e., this plan will be supplied with the Operating License Application), idosimetry is anticipated to be required in any restricted area. '.r~-.:.;.....~,_._. . ..,:.:....;.,,_,.~ ......--:-..=-*r-~*.----:.""'!":-=.*},.,,,, ...>';,:'- . . '""-"'""..=\l:~ 7.....,_-."-"'~"*"-_,..,...,..,_,;=..,.:.-.,,,. ..-......,,... __.,.,~_~,,.,- .-';.~..=... *.""'-~-~..:.-."'~"""- .:...:--,~*-**C~..,....::::-""'"-.----.~....._, .....'-_"'""_~ ._..,_,.,,_.;.,.=-~""~-=:.;..*-~ ~,.,.--._-~.~-::..~;;;:=.~=-,~.,~-~~~~~_.._,,. .-~'~':.<"':*-~..__~_.~,...::
- . J~I;\!..11.
- 1'-2b. !;pescr}b~Jfther~ i11:e q~y areas With~n the RfF. that would.be desigriatc(d, radiatiob*areas.'or high . ';z L~~-~~.~-.:2'~,~i,~;d~~e~~f!~ftE:I,~:**~. ~:L~~i L~~ ,~:&;J** t~~c..~::r, *-~);_~__/2;::;:; :~:::~L~~J:-.:J~:,LL :::~2;_;~~::+;*~--j
!Radiation or high radiation areas are shown in PSAR Section 11.1.3.2, Figures 11-2 through 11-4, and ldiscussedfurther 1 in PSAR Section 11.1.5.5.
,-.. *'t-7'--:-,,,_';;.;,,;*-.~--".'-~*""'.'-W.** ,c...*~*"j' f-~""-~:<- .O-..><:-~*:;.-. ~..-:-~--~-'*:,..--.,_..,*-""'"'-: --'--*~.:;...-:.....-~*-.<.;:..:..,.:c*o**~ .~'*'.7--:,.7~------"<"-='i- ';..-:".'.'---*";-'i"*"~"-* .... 11':...;,._~?:--::>-s*"-".,**.* .;,:'.f"'.> ~-~~-,~'" :*:*;-~"""~~;,*;:-~ *-:'--.--... ..,,*~~ ,,.;,..~*~**'~~~;':7""_"'~~*-*, J:!'-'"--7-'."J '"<~'"c'*.~-r~
l RAI 11.1,72c ,,11De~croibe, the.NWMibqs~s for assigiiingpefsonnel dosinietrJ)Jo staff '_'. <' ' !':' . ,:, c. ' r ./ '.' S, . . ~ L""'"'*****:. .~..,.-- . . ._.:-_..,._.;.~---~""1..~:.=:,.;,...~~----~~-,.=..~.i..'....,-.,,,.~~~*-~*-~-*,~.:,...:f..*?'~-~"'~--":*-~-~-,_-:~:,"'"** ~-*-*':'.:...-;,...~::~,--_-~,___;.,,-_,~~\;_';1-....,;:.i>..:*.:....:..._J,,.., ..>;"l--..:.:~:.,,..-.~~~-~"i- ~_,._..~..,~... ~:::..,.,_ )-.~~.,,,,..:..,,;, .."*""'"'~~""~""-~',..., ..-\. !Personnel dosimetry will provide a means to measure, assess, and record personnel exposures to ionizing : \radiation from external sources. Exposure to external sources of radiation will be performed by !individual monitory devices such as thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLD), optically stimulated !luminescence (OSL), CR-39, activation foils, or direct reading pocket dosimeters. Use of personnel ~** \dosimetry will be required for all personnel entering the "restricted areas." Use of direct reading
- 1personnel dosimetry and criticality monitoring will be required for all personnel entering "high radiation
\areas" and "very high radiation areas." [~~RA't11~1:2r*;)&_p~~~.i~7i[i;';~~",;fff-1:'JbiefJF;;iii-qtiqti:1~;e1*,of5~;~i;;y;:*;~T;rs,:;cti;;;;.ypt~~~JtTie~'Ps;f(?.:*~-'"~--T'.!: fA:<l~;~ ;.-;~;tii;rti~~-1~~;1*~r~s*;irn;;;~;t(;s-;);Ye;:*(y;)-(soo~~iiii;~;'f;;~;17;5 i;'ili~*1~-;1 ~ro;~1i~~ ! . !dose equivalent (TEDE) above which would trigger an investigation by the Radiation Protection staff to ' \determine why an individual received such a dose equivalent. The routine TEDE to workers is not "*' 1anticipated to approach this level. An investigation might entail interviews with the individual and the !immediate supervisor, review ofradiation work permits (or equivalent), review of procedures, review of jALARA (as low as reasonably achievable) approaches, and providing feedback to management with irecommendations on how to proceed. itz_;:~*:,::.~;.:;=;:.~;*;~* ':'~?:;~:~;.~~.;.::~~:..-::;~,;,::_~~".:,_~:;..::-:*:.~::.~.~::-:..;1~~ .::.,:.,'--~;:-::_::~;:,;,';'~;,:;7 -~~ .-.;~_:.,;~7~:,_:M-:.,~:"~;~:~f-"_:: .:. . ~~:;;;.,7.,~~.~*-:,_~?*:~~;;:._.::~;~:.:..7.~;-:-~:,;;;,.:;;:.;.:-::..::.:--;,:::;..~. :-~;:.:i'.::;~~:~; .*.:;>*;_; .*,_. *F; : .:.-;:., ~ ~~*1:~ ;~-"-*~:-::*.* .) j .J~AI ~ 1. f:;3 .. :;~iS!!bpgragraph ~.0.. 2,00J(a)(?) ofl QC.F(?.:-'PJ1rt 20 stq.tes that one ofthe;meth<]dsJliat;al~cei~se~':sH¢ll .' f f: ,* * ':.,* ," ::~{!.~sp*~.:t~;*ofli~en.se.cJ ~ifi~fi{.il t{:d~~ay;,tfj;~~p~qg~; *** .. : : ;>\:*~** *. , .. :;::".*<*:::..: .-:~,, .y .....*. *. , ~
.( ~:- ,*.. *. . . . J!NUJ?J/X! J~J7, fart 7, $,ecfion U}.5;;;~"R{;tdiqtipnExpdsitt'e'C:ontrol and Dqsbn¢try; t!,statelfke,desigfl,, *i1
- , . :: ..: ,.* * * * :bas.es'Of~ad~~tidJ:l fb~el4ing'. :v~1tilgtiQ~i~t!~dre,'1Jqt~.h(indfing_:arzd deco~ta/1t~a{io11.equip~le~t;~h~uld f 1
) , . . " . " . )jb~pl~n7~1 ~r~f:~1~~0~.~o,~es.:ar~ 1!1f!fpt'!m<f:.fA~ ~11c{~~oult(JJe,:;l!'1fh1~,th~ r:erl~tq_r.;: 1zr1ts,i ., . ;*,1,
( *. . , " **~:Nf!'M£PS!JRSectiqlJ 4!2.1, 1,, f'.Big/og~calShiel(!F11ncfi9rz; .provicle~ a,gen~r,qf<de§cripljQfl,*ofitfl<t r,'.:. **\ id .. :.* *. . *,:biologt6d!sliieid aridthe)1;1ie~*Uof<tdu/:e"r<Jdtatfon do$e' pateS:pnq accu~1ulated do~e{t(/not ~~Y:~<f~~.j
+thJ limit's;oj JO (}FR: Pii~t;io: elf is'fi~(C!ear~qnt~e; ~~cess:~o~fr(iz~jo~ ~ii!.etitig'th~~I!JikJilAh~. :.}:/;
iiadministhitive suppbrtiirea.' ThiSinfortnati'on is need fo ensure* 'that radiation doses' arli nfaifjtai~eiJ .}
<<*{ ' - ' - ~ . . ' * : ... . . ' .., ' ' ' ., .. ' ', * . .. ' ' ;-. .,.,\~ J .' ~-* ** ,'_:.:. "~,, '! , ... . * \:ALA.RA and.within applicqblef:limi(s of 10 CFR:Part 2Q;* ...,* r ;; . . **; .. " *:, . ' >.* :' * :v\ ... ..,.~-~--~.-'..;'.:.- *'-:-."::"'-..o...:._--.:-~...,,,:.--o*,.::.,_._,_~.~::~-...,.,,....'.o;~.'..'.,. -:;-:;<*~- :-.-:d--.... ..,,--~*~7*_:--,-*~*~":;--::- ":'~**c**,~-~*-***r'":i'..,*~,**~*-'*,;::,_,,,o*,':.o,.,;__,....~----,*.-,::...-oJ .,,,.:..;.,;,.:.._~.W=-*~~...-,,~*,"'.,,,......*...;.,:..._o~.:~*:~-~----*;.;....--*""'"'-~~~-:r..--.'..,,;..~:...,.J 67 of 96
. .;~*~~:. ..*::* NWMI .*;.**.a.~.
NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0
* ':~~.~'::* UORJHWCSTMEmCAllSOTQPfS Re uest for additional information
- ;~1,, 11.1 ~a ii>escribe'the ;eq~ir~~e~i;'rd~~i;;,~t;y;*pe~;J;;4/ pr~i~~ti~ri
- eql[tpment,* ei~.T~~;i."dc;~~;;~b1t;.91s]~~ ~~;
jf; :~~:::~-------~-- -1t:~::~~~--~~~¥lf!;,~TjfZL~f1!!2~:~~<f!l~~:i!tc:I.L~~f.~*;.~. L.~~;;~L__ ,;;~~* _:*:~ .~. ,~~,":__;,_..:~::;* ,'-~-+'~~-L-~.i* )As shown in PSAR Section 11.1.5.5.2, Figure 11-5, the entire RFP is considered a "controlled area."
- PSAR Chapter 11.0, Figure 11-2, shows five doors from the outside of the RFP to entrances into the
!"restricted area." Each door will have two-credential access control (e.g., fob/PIN, fob/bio, or bio/PIN). iThe RPF Radiation Protection Program will require personnel to access assigned dosimetry and portable
- survey instrumentation (as needed based on the work authorized) from an as-yet unspecified location
- within the RPF administrative area before entering the restricted area. Portal survey monitoring will be in-place at the exit from the restricted area into the administrative area. The specifics on the type and
- instrument used will be described in the FSAR as part of the Operating License Application and will Ieither be a control that allows standing passive detection or hand and foot monitors. ,
- This corridor, which is not continuously manned, will normally have a dose rate less than 0.5 mrem.
,However, this corridor provides access to the solid waste drums in the manipulator hot cells and ,
- therefore, at times, may have a higher dose rate and require radiation controls consistent with the planned 1
- activity. _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ __ _ _ _ .
'.7RJ\i 1l1l***irs;;/}j}J/iig;,~jfit27llf~o1taJ72l'l:JTJfcmr?T/;ao;;t~7fifiia!'l!!tJi!:fi~iiz"i¢~ lTliift;;~rti*Ji:*"{1¥;;~t~?i;?;11 0 ~. ; --~- *' . ':_ ' 'ffmqdi','surveys*of afebs,' that'are reasonab/il,underthe circumstances/to evaiuate the potential. >, .,;: ;
' . .* . , ~*radio/ogicai /;zazbrds ofthe' raaiiition:Jev<f/S gndteSidu_af'radfOactivity.deteCted;* .' . '. .: .... _ , /, .:_,: * . * ...:* Jfjufilid 153 7, J>a;1,:2!. Section,] j_J. i,, :iR~diati()n Sourc~s, >* st~t~s t~~ ap;iic-~t sh~utd pre;ent,~he .* i.
r **-, . : * *-. *., . , * * 'i\best e1li'!1ate~ ojth~ m'efxim,um_.pn1Ju{l{ <josf! µiJtJ. the_'.r;orlec,ti:ve,;do~es for ipq)or, t(Jr/~9/Q_jpcaf ll_9tiy#i~f, _I
, *. : l.dur,ing ' .r.
- r?; '
the"- fit!! rqnge- of.nor_f!Jdl.oper,ati'oTJ~ for facilitj; staffu and;memb'ers i ' ' t ~ , J .. ~ , " *, ' " ' " ' , ofthf!,P?Lblic
.. The doses : ,* 'l.i ; ,, " , ~!' I ' *~y . *'-:'.:sh.all.'2._e*~h9,w,J?to,bewithi1Jfh[!qpplicab/e,liifa{ts.ojj_JO_CFRfart70,. .: * * . *. '.*." * "" .. *. 1': '"..""' '*.* .. - >'"*l\'*-+>*~',°',, ,>,. f"','o'; '/:*,**. *"*\',,1>**'l'""~i' .~*.f*!*
1
' :**O _r "*~: )':". *:*.* *-.:~* 1~*-'"*:* .'
1;'.JiWlv4Pifm.se¢tiq~ '4}~. 2,.2)( '~qdtolog~~~l Hp:.Z,qrrJ~>;;;#e~~~~~~S.*(~e :#nticip'a~elf:'.'r~4i~iJuJ1;,dJ. ': :: * *_1
- '.'.invjmtory.to be'~nagedfqllowing 'irradiated target receipt, which exd'!Jdes fr.ace and-dei:a~ed c , , \1
'1pro_{fitc{scof th,e irradiatiohproces's:. The basis'ofthls inVentcny j~ ;; weel{fY-thrOµgljput of'B*NfuRR. ' -*~ ~!tiirgets1wocesse.dat'i1specifiedtimefollowifig/nd'.ofir~lidiation:: *:. **. \._ * ,* * ,* * '.* **.t ,~: ~*r,. >>~, .:~~-:.. ,;,~'. '~~\*, ,.~*,. .~;: .1';_~: ':,": ,_{-., , '.. ><i.J/:" *~ "* ', ..{*:. **>
1
,'o IA{" {* !.,".**'.b (, ,*:;.'; .\, .i.:."I ', r **;,., .':"". :.. , ,- . '. :., ,', .: , , ; *',' "".'; * ;'.
- 7;PSAR<Se¢tion*4:3.2:2S;, ~'spetialNuclearMiiteri¢fD~si:rlptiqii/~ de,scribespro¢essing qpotentia/3 - r
*. : i:3 6-i;r.'a<l;ateq t~;gii~ p'kr ~e,ekJroiiz '.tiie (!js~'.-it i~ JJo,t:cI~a1' :h~w)hesel1dditi~n(ii;;r~aai'?tte<ftargiis *1 * *:frnipactthe'radidtiondosei*iothepubiic;*
- i..* * *.*. _.<<, , , _ _ " .: ,";' _:.*,.~
-_ *f~~pi4in~~wiih~s~ ~ddtfl~nai'~o ~rrddi9led'.tar.i~ts:im;iict;(he,~,d,e~~oJ;q~'dth,~ ~;rri~u;;, dose-i; th~~
_ _ _ .,!ipu,bUq cjescr,ibetf ii? $ectio'[i:<Jl. l:J:: !:l ofthef'$tJR:;;. , :, :* ..~ _'/ _, *' -;< ,\-..;:: ~* *;."° ~ .**~. .,. - ..!.".--:.-~ :;,~_,}_-,.. -...:c_--::~-*.':' -:; -:-o<;* .,.~ :- :.:~- --~.,:.,,..; ""' * ..'."-:;:- ....-~*,-;-;: -::;*!'::;- _*-.;::-:-=;_.,.. ~-*,;' ~< - *::-."':-"""::':** * ::--:::*. *:c'- ~-=~.;.....--~~ . *.--:-* -:i(""°:,.,~d,.- .--~;"*),.'-;_--...!*.:;; ..~- ::C*.~.L.,,.-*~c~
- At discharge from the Oregon State University TRIGA Reactor (OS1R) (or third) reactor, the 30 targets
- will have essentially the same amount of radioactivity as eight targets being discharged from MURR
'Since the OSTR targets are not going to be received for 48 hours, the total radioactivity is significantly 'less than the eight MURR targets received in 8 hours. Therefore, other than grams of uranium, the
- radiation source for the 30 OS1R targets is lower.
*-* **- - -- ~-. ~-..- ,~ ,_. ** - ___ .... - -* - - - -*"-<.. .....-_ ,_ , - --
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.:.~*~;:. ....e***!.*
NWMI NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0
-~~~-~~:* NMTH\"IUTPAfWCAllSOTOPIS Request for additional information
~(ApjJ1i~s to :. i;faarai~aph "Jo.1-1 of(~) -ojio*cF'R.*P~rlio siat~s "!iiatea;h. lic~~s~e siiJ/1 .de~elop; (J6lii~~e'hi; '~ci -~ -**:. -i
- \Mi ! 1.1-5 ., . ::#nplef!Zerit a:radiatioiz_protection program commensitratewith .the scope and ex,tent oflicensed .~ -.*-. -'.;
~~~~:",,J!:r::;~:::~::~:::::crz:::zr~:::s::.r:~:z;r~4:;,,;,,~,~~,r~~J 1: _ 'RAI 11.1,.5 :)NUREG)537,Pdr(4; *S.~ctiorJJJJ);, Radilition'S.om;c.e,:;; "$fates;ff!e app#'i;:anl:s/ioitM'idepti.fY * * * *.* ! )~. *I ; ,.*_. ' '.'*'
- i;fiio.ile ls' ah.~ ils'Sllnjptio';zs thai grefusedfo~ Q,01J~er\Jdtiv~ best estimaies 0Jt1Jg.p~~dicted'c11;mi~al.total :.;;
; dosesJot/i~n1dxini'wfae~posediri<jfyidutJ:l:_:: .* ,_ r1 s . '..' *' .
} ** ** ** ' . *' * :,.;*.,:. * ** *:* ~ *i ., * * , :* . r. , . * ,- . . , )' . ..~* . -1 , - - - " .. * ! ,1. "' i:NWMIPSl[R &ption.13.2. !* '.'Jv!axintum flypothe~cal Accident, '~ shows_ in TablesJ3': 18, .'Cable n~:. i J _ , U9, .and Zable T3-20,_ the*distam;e-depc;l}denUrthal~tion,. expoSllre, dnd total!'e~ep~otMHA_ doses, * * .;* f ., ", . ._./r~sp_ect_ively;; versus distance fr.om th_,eRPf itackjor an assumed bo.unding 2;,;hr*exjiosure.,NWllifI . 'l i-* . . *: .*:, ' jpro.yi des: the ;!EDE d,1.fe.to i~e ¥!:fA for the' mqXimqlly_~>:P,osed if1div,idua( b.u/ d~es notpro.vidMhe :_ '.: :*: 1 ( :,, .* <!/;onpjii{ted!Jose Equiy,dlerit (Cf?E).'to the thyroid; :;',.,~.i .'~* ., . . *' '.:; '\ *". *<' '. ':' * ; * .: 'l ~* ,,,* ".':\ . - ' . '~- .', l"**. '.-_:, .*.~ i -:"1 .' ** . . '"*, ,-* '*.' .:<;,. '"* .:~t!**'Jl .:' .,;,,-, *-~ - *""'*-.--~' ' : .... ;' :: ,_.' '* *J.,*: ~,,,.:. , ***~
- t :Provide~the CDEto the thyroid from the presented scenario and th(f il!lp(!_ctto the public. . * . , , , .'
0
- j. ,
~ih;~~~ti~<l<l~~~-*~~~i;~1;~1~(cn£Y!~ tI;;;1b:;;~ia;~;97 ~;~~e~t"'orili~,~~P~~~--~~:~~-;~bt~i~*~;-*'-:.__ , iMHA. The MHA is being
;"" * : *** ;;.:u.;.. --***'-"....;.~.-*-... .*** cc-,,.~-~--:"._.....,...,.,,_~_,.:;..;... __ ,_._.**--
deleted from the PSAR, consistent with the response to RAJ G-3.
~-*-.,.;;~*----~.-.,..-- .... *--..*,_,,~_ ..__ -*~--;-~.:.. ~-*-.r--* *---"-*,;.,.~=--~ -.,.::z.;;.~-<:::.-~'-!" ~-~-i;.-_.,~::.:--*--*--- ....i.~~-- '°':""'*'--....*-*'-*'"':-:'*.. *.,........ ~ ~-*'*- _._,_..,::;..:.r,::~*" -"d~~-.. ,,*~~-~*~- .... ~~u...,,-:-~:-....:.,,.::---.:. *"*-** '*j
- ~ , RAi.11:1-6 *.:wuRE,G'"1:537, ,.Part 1, Sec'il(J,n 11 :t3, *:~'ABARA Program,,"'~tates tli~ fa,eilit;l/s:AtARA program.'. *.. **;
~ *, .:: '* / ' . .'!'ihould'~equi~e theft *r~didti?n '<Jos~* re~e(vet. ljYjaci{ltY_:si<lfi}!:h,.~ (li_e P!'~f:[<a(e, i~{nNiiner]!fLAR#., ,.~.~:.{
- 1 * * ** -. ' ,, ** 'econom1cfactors liavmg* been taken.into account * *<< * . .. * " ** ~-- .,. . . : *~,. ;*
it*' , '< ;;.. r>: ""'.., ' , ' r *' r, ,: *-;' *,.' ,. ~' <.~r ,,\> *>;**:* '< .-*.';* ";: :.-.~'.,,;'.'{ s.:.'*,',L'*':--*' ,;.** -,,.l,'. "'.".}*,**µ:.~ ):* *. , . ]iWMIPSAR Se9tidn 1-t 1.2! .'!Raqi(ltion ~rote.c/io'l;i.Pt;ogra!J?,Y: states.th,eNWM! administratiye . , i
.* : "-" :< '.':(exposu're 1imits'h"ave been set below ib,e limit~ specifierJ iJJ 10 CFR, Parf 20 to ensz/ie that regulatory* .::
f'. ' Yad(atipn exposure linJils,are'rioieiseid_eqjindto efmphasi~e"/JVfRA:princ{pl(!s.,Tqb(e.11-5,. *.. *i,: :: ;
- ,. ** . j'. .fs~fnqtedRadi?isot(?p~,p~oq1;1cffo1J.f,prjilitx, C¢.ntT;olled q~ci f1estri ct~ci(lpeq,Pos~ Rates, ~:: sti:tte(f the':
*\* *'. ... ... *::dose'rdte in the adfni1iistfation. and support area.and utilityarea:willbe O:mrenl/hr,.. It is not clear. . ;.. ;
t:: /.. .. '* .:* *: (;hoiv*il~IJ!!/ wj11;ai!f!r.~~sffeO,~~ /'1.~ie_ af.(!q.~ ~U/b~;:1114intqiti~.d;*~tp. l!lr~~i11~*(u_~r~~fricte/ar~a?... ' ._.* .: ~ < j : .* . .. *-. *.' " ,.\\;;Jescribe how.' Nwlvif)viil demon;trate,. [hat'the administr_atiqn_ imd ut~lity dr~d~ are 'nc/ different thart**;:
;,,* **._**-**-*_._*_._*~*-*~**-**_.".*---.-_-_:_.\,:u_.nrestri~teda~eas.: **.' . * ,,* -. ,.; *. ;* ,/ ; *:*_._/ * .**. .; *. *: .:. **! :'.' * * *" * -;c .* _>.. * *. , * .. * - -~*- ----- _ -- *-- - - **-*"'" *A;,_.:-"'!-_,_~---*7 ,.~--""--=';.~------.:;-:-;--::.~.-"-..;_____,,p ....::-:::"'--"-'*""-""~;._--::-:.**; ~~,--1~,c-,~ . .,,-:o"r.~-z-.*,,.,r-*-.~*-****_.-.,. .* il;r-!".,.."-,.-;~--,..,..- .~..-,,.*"r-.A**.;':.:_~-,,*'-'-*'1'.'** "~;,,.,.._,.;;,.**-*r.-*
\PSAR Section 11.1.2, Table 11-5, provides estimated dose rates based on the RPF design. Although a !dose rate of zero may not be achievable in the controlled areas, this is the goal. As stated in PSAR
- Section 11.1.5 .5 .2, an area monitoring program will be established in the controlled area to demonstrate
!compliance with public exposure limits in the FSAR as part of the Operating License Application.* r"-'RJX1~1*1:1~f"JilJuRilaJfi7:~p~;ri7s~di?J~::n74;'*:fR.~a;'~{j(yT;J;j;~j'(6~i'hi'cind-s~~~yJ;;g~;~;~;~ii'fJ;'[J;~f:;d~26inJ;I;ikj L *: . ,. .:: -:.... ;1range ofradiation moriuorlng ana*samptini* ~q_uipnierii: apftropriate'to the Jai:ility, "shoum be ,* *.... *Ji
* . , , , '!employed ihn;mghouithefacility, in'cludingequipmentemployedby experimental afidoperat1oris0 * * ;; ' . ,* * - " - "' l *. . ,>support personnel, *including remote area '!jionitors:. * *, i *. *., * , * . . : , ; * :.
0
*** *' * * };~PSARSecti~n') i1.5.5:2,. :~;C6htf_q1zedA*r~d, ;. ;f1{iis ~fiqt{j;~d ,;i/1~it6rt~i-lr.U! .~e/n9;~tf.qt~,: *
- ~' '.:. * :;;co_m~lianp: with publi~ 'exp~sw:,e pni~tsJJ5r .v~fit<Jrs. :Arf i:l ~n~~<}"(i~g-e_q~iP.!!!C:Pt !s n_ot~~escribed i1!
*** .Section.Jl.1.4ofthePSAR. *,. , - . -* .. , -.. ", . ;; * ; <S
- l:.' *5-,~.' '),lo:*~,~:' ,,.,J, '..'" ,.1';1* </, *:,,: ,'. ,,:f*.-1~ .-*,,,*'~;-*, ' ::}. ,,,:-,' .~*-,'-~*r .','~
ffrovf~e;,:a t;fes~ripti<?n:ofthe. ar~.a ~'°:~itori?g_:f'.~~ipi/Jent'lf~fntend$ fo -1J~e td:dem()!!strate ': :..
\!,-
- 1. ' *" *
' . [!Compliance wzth public; exposure lmiztsfor~zsztors.,. . * * .* c * * * *.. : *. \('::'..* ~-,-*:~-- *----*-.,_,,;_--;,--*.*;,;,_._,,._:....,,,_.., ~._;..__~.~-~..,:.--.--.'*-~*.--*-....* ..,_*~----o_:.,,.,,_ . ..'.__,-_,,:: __.,.........,;..~-.--,- *,.......,---;*-""*"-:i~*-:**; -,....S---*.**.-,-~,..:-- ..~--- ._,,_.:__ -..,..,..*c-*';--::: *.._~:.--~~-*; __;*,:....,,_ .* '.".**::; _:_
- Details on the area monitoring program will be provided in the FSAR as part of the Operating License iApplication. Area monitoring is anticipated to comprise a combination of passive (e.g., TLD or OSL
!monitors changed out monthly or quarterly) and active (e.g., energy-compensated G-M detector systems iwith local and remote monitoring capability) monitoring systems located at points in the controlled area jthat would provide reasonable assurance that radiation areas are not present in the controlled area. The jselection of specific instrumentation, range of detection, and alert/alarm setpoints will be consistent with !the intent to detect radiation areas where they should not be and alert personnel to this changing !condition.
69 of 96
. . ~*~~*.. NWM I NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 ':!~.~~-** N09.fffW£STMrotCAltSOTOPES Re uest for additional information .f: - .RAI 11j-a: -,:f.tuRFXJ~J53 7, -i~rt I, sittio;1~ jj. j.: :z >f;n~ir~~~e~taTiiohif~fini, :~i-;d~;11ze*-J;i~th~ds. 'i;~d_ -'::r -~-i, .** - - ' >." ~kec~nlql!-¢S to sample arza/yt_elhe Y,adio/ogicaf:effect Ojja9i/(ty Qpe'J:afion should b,e ~omp/et~!- :: '" -.:; --:_
- 1rapplicpble( and ofsufficien(.validity tharth_e envirpnmental impac.:t cqn,be 1111ambiguo1Jsly,-'as$eSserJ. _'.i
-~/* ,; . ,;P "'. *.' ._ .- . ~", *', .:.* t . _, * ;,, *~ ',*,, *~ . . -~,-- *.* . . **, _,_. 'c'. _:,:, ,.- *,., *~ 1 .. *'-( ' - ':. ~1'fWMIPS4R-.'Section;: 4. f$:q: J;,'".Wastef-HancflingSystem'f~ocess Overview,:.~* states that a porti011 Of!
_*- : '.: :}th~ '?~~-~o/e:lf.@.td!fraRita'n ~~ -~xf;ec~ea ro *!J/t8Jtital!~ei/r ~ecyc_M to .:~e1ecterf 110.rc;ell _sJ:ste.i!i~ as_;- --:: - --~1
* ~ ':'. * . tpfocessed-wafer.-*water.:lhat 'is_noTrecyded wiltbe adjitsted,and th_erimixed witlJ an' adsorbent;:* . *,. :"\ - _ *. :;: ';,imeitiftai'in s5:;ga1i6n ;4rn~~; F'urthefi* ty'a~t~ s~elims'wt!lb~-'c6~iain~riiea,*:stiibuizew us*appr6ptiQ.te,_ l '- -.:'((aha ~hippe/.tofjsiteJor.Jre,a~eht iJYiddisposatFigu~e *1:..z3;c_~'Lvw"-Dtise~ Licj_iliq Waste Dtspqsition -. (. - . ' Jfroc~ss, "qndF'igitr</4-25,--_"Low J?oseLiquid WasteEvaporationFacility Lbcdtion; *~describe an.*_ '1:
J'.evapordfiQ_n_syste:;m andfaci?ityi ft 'is"not-Clear.how the?1J_dporiltidri effluent.is controlledfroin the' ' ' 1110-W-ilosewastew2itef'tanliS:O "*: _ .' }"::: ,*:. ?_, ".*.:r <*::. *.. .-.":>'"?. : *: *, . * ---::. : i:
.]b;;;;il;,~
7;,i;_~ ' '1' -?_; , the* i1tdf/o-;A;~~fihie11'bpbrc/tidn J/c,' !** ",:~ "~' ' ' , ' ,. *,; ,.- *~' .<: >' '),,' ',~, *, , / , < _t , < , < -;;:**
~ifl.~eilijr6'/h:1'1i:s/adiliti? alzd:~lailff ~ie*~li~r~any .: * "' ', ~~;' ,, ' ' ) "'!*'- . , , .>,' ,,;*~ , ';;,'.,* : * *., '. ' '~j ., " ;,.. ~ %,f ';, , ~'!.~ ,r.. ,, 7 ~t /, '~c: i , ; , +~aporat~
L . *- ,t:, ~ j n , _,' '.<I.': r~
-'"' ; _ *1 1wil/ .be ei:Haustedto the .environment'. Expl(Jin,: ifNWMI's intends lo exhaust to 'the environment, whdt*,' *:L":ij ~-.~~s-_&fY.k~.-~i-~JJli!~~ti~~k!!E~:~~~"!Jzfi!!!f~11le~~1::~t.t1!Y.!£~~;yi!Le~ii!!i<?d!l~t1;_?~;:~;-~:*.~~ -~-~-:.:_;-:;~___:::~-: : .*. *-*-*
1 The final facility design strategy is to route the air stream from the evaporation tanks into the Zone I 'exhaust system. The Zone I exhaust stack will have continuous monitoring. 1 ~-".-~r:~r1:9; :rwWiJJJp's;m}s~~tio~-~rf2T5Zsr~;-§p;'b1di*iiii-;ii~"kJ.:J;1~FiliFfSJib-iPiih;t;;;:;1~;;~~~;k1;;-~~~-r-~:1*:~'::~*'-:f J_,* :* . _= * * * *; - * * '; 1ship~ent.ffrom th'e'QSTP. wW*<;onsiSt'ofllVolr,ansp,oJ:t casks;*notfo'kxceid afota/Of3o:~argeis. _* .. i)
~t *_,,. .-:_; -*j"W~iklj/i;(J~k_sl-fiptne'ntsJFofittheM!JIJR~;,vii{'dbnsistofiwo tran,~portbasldlco,;_tatningfourtargets. *. d r:.: ,;** -_ *," ', ~'-PSAR Secii:On:'4.2.3'.-J;, "Jh'iiidl'Source Terln:* staies th~ photo,:; source;sirengthfor-the NWMI' - -' *\
'.*:. - '~hie/ding analysis .;,as determined bas~(;J on the activity.associal<ffl with.eightMuRR irradiated.-* - ;
- ' :. :_ *;i:tar'gets. :A~ditiona(tnjor_rilatiofl)s:required1tO, understand, the pJ:ocess of targ~t- re,ceipt.and processing!:
' ' ' ' fo'f;d the impact to the sf?ielding anl.rlysiS. " ,:., --* - < ', *. " . "' .; ' - ,* ;_ - -. ' :<< ,, - ;
~,,;:, ;i::". ~,~:~.< .p~- .': -~ '~-'- ,':::* .** -"-' r*
;, * >/' ,.,~\C{(lrif.y ),*.I' _,, ,,,, < .. , '7*-:, *\. ,. **,,*" :,. _;: - *._ ..
- 1
** :,. ' '.-' '0 *.;._,,,,,,\, .;: '... ..:., .. *** !h~;q1Jfi_d/patf!;c{tq.1:;f~t,1;;.7r?{ipt/r{~e,1M-Y qn~ e?Cpzaff!:"faol?_ihe '!Jdditi_pnql.irraaibted,:tq~f,ets*: ,-.- .- 'L-~~";;,oi,Jifti:1 {Q~!J1;ii,l.UJ.~/1L?.~'!}f1.£!~l<!~q!~~-~b.?:h:!ll:~....._;;;:~";;~:~.;:, :~2;:L.r '< ~* . j .: '. : :~ - -- * < -: ., ,, *:" -
iAt discharge from OSTR (or third) reactor, the 30 targets will have essentially the same amount of
- radioactivity as eight targets being discharged from MURR. Since the OSTR targets are not going to be
- received for 48 hours due to transportation time, their total radioactivity is significantly less than the
- eight MURR targets received in 8 hours. The OSTR targets at receipt are estimated to have only iapproximately 40 percent of the MURR targets at receipt. Therefore, other than grams of uranium, the
- radiation source for the 30 OSTR targets is lower and is not used in the shielding analysis.
v~ -~ ; _;_ *_..:_ ~'..o :.::;,'..* :;.:;~, ; :~~~ :_ .'..".~..;.-q' .:::.'..:~-*~*-:-*;....,,:,:,".'-ri-*~*0::;:.:*~, .;::~f,;::,::,:;~._::*.,;:>;;,;_,. _,....:_; ::_,,...;*-:...:;:_::... :;:;:;..,.~-;:;::~_*:f--..::'l':::;,.,::::~- ;; .: ~. ~;:;,. ,.:;;,:.*~ ;;;_;:::,;:._;T°';*;*~.:,_*..~.;..:; ,.;:~~- :.*.~;:7 ,;;~*~y:j:,~.:.,;:,.,.:;;.,;~.;~~~:.-;.:_,;:~";:;_,f*.~-~;::;:;..*~ ":'.~__;_;: ;: 1~:._ '~....::,;~'~;.._,1'.";?;:,; f~ ~'- 1:1~1 ::1O:*ffaiag~gph2_0J:/.~l(d) oflQ-iGfR P<;rt'f 0.'~tq(es;(~a~ a qm~Sl!~inl, of{._emi~S,~OIJJJ>fi',fldi<(4C{ji;_?_J,;. ,\-_ '" 'i .; - ., - i: : \;rilate,rial'shall be e~tah/is_hecJ by li{:erzse,~s,su_ch_ that-iYfdiyid.ua/me111ber_~:oj)h,e,-pu_b_/ic, li~ly_ to re,ceiV_e t1
- , * . ;, ,,- }the higlJe,'s(dosewiJl-rjot)e,.'</ipected-to rec~ive 1~ T/l[!Et,ri ex2¢;;~_ of 10 mt!/it
- e~ (TtWf!m}per year, :
.- feomthese:efnissions*. *_--,,.'.. ' '., _., ,. :. ***.:: ' * : -- ,'.-- - -_ * ' -- ., - *, , ---1, '*- :/i~UKEG"J5;,7:'.-Part*j,Sdc~~n;l j;1-:*1, 'ffR~dibtio~ *saJrces/' A~cep;~nde -~;it~ria,.:tate;;- ifi,pari, ,th~t i *:;,i ap saur,c-es._bfr~di~tio.n_'shiiu14.b'e:41sc;µss~a:bythe::appue:an{fh~s discussron s1Jou1d include the :'. - ,_,
1 i j_lphySical 'and:chemicalfor"rh;**t;pe'~(e:g:,"neutr(m;gt;imma); curifr.sh:ength orexpQsUfe.fates; energy . l
;,-;!l'iv1!;'eh~lipiiltation :(seal~d ?~).tnseci/ed),*uie;~ ~torag~ 'condi~qns'ah~loqatio/1s,' a~d planned.:',* r '1'Ipfogrd.iri'fol*_aisposaPpfaU'radioaqtive mqtet:iql subjeet to the;reactor.1icens_e. ," : . '_: * . . , _ '[ -_,,'***~~~.:!'-,.\~ {'-: .-' 'C...',~'*';,"'.,~, ?~< :,, '1' *.. ~-, :,-,_'*,'.f ,,,<' .,*:, *W _:",'" °.,'**'.:, ',~\ ,',>,>>. ;', .. _' ' ,; ,.J .* 1: . ** . '-: . qvWMIP,SflR, &ctiorL4_:4. J,:- ~'fr,oce~si_l'Jg oflrraqiqtedSpei:ia/Nucl~ar Material, "provides an , *; *l 0
_ - . .. . -,,V,;overyier/pftlzf!. 1frf;iniu,,j.1:r!.boy?1Y
* ' ';.* ** " .: * :, -< * *,, ' * *' * ,.* " ", ' '~ * ' ~stem ari{;l~ stat~s l;. ' ' . ",. ! #.*
it*is '~fr,eqto_pu}jffi_apprf(xi~ately
. *. "'* ,, -"", t- < ' *,' . '\* \ " '* ,. *~**
22 kg!W~elcfor *il\
* . .' ;' .,, t. ) ';, ' ' .* * -. : - :rirecY,cleJq)he targetfa~tfcqtion:iysterfi, Section. 4.';l. J.also sta(es the, 22 kgl'rflef!k. is based on * *
- _- t i * * ' ,,.';"
-* .:,',;iir~ces's;ng4Q~ariet~~:-*' * * {' * ':' .:'_,:*: <<:'. *,-t"-'.} .:: 'IL.-'*:_"{:*:.::}:.~-:-:~,;:":,,*.:**,;:
- _. : ' 1
\. *~;,rjcp&ffi Sed#o~'.j./,2;.2; "~'.t01ise~~er/cJ~frdli#he:/}p~~~po~ ~~iv~~~6} i6eE~ctUIJ;, ';:~tqt// thl . . . :) ." '.*::antj(:ipat~dradioriuclide.:inye!Jtqiy.~1! the;l?Y"f!isHaseqAn a W.e<Jk/y;th~aij?hpu6pfeigflt'tvfoRJ?., * *. * * -_fi
_ ;:targetsproce_ssed at a*spficified tfme ,after,.th_e, end ofirrqdiatioYJ. PSAR;S,ectiqn'4. h2.,J. states the:RPF; r ",, ,; ,* ", li1is;designe,}i t9 have' a.noliiiria('.operationaip~oce#ng capability ofo.ne bdtc_hfier_ week :ofup ~o 1~2 ' ,; ,:*. ;e' .*-. * - ,/ :jtargetsfrom_MUR]?,-for.ifp't9 5,2 }ye?_kSper,yearand dppro'xim{lte.-ly}Otcir-g<JfsJroiµ the {!STR.9r a _ * - -~ L-----~::::~~--L~:,Jtr~~t~.u..n,_~~!¥fi'i1<J~Jj_~{'!!::'.~i:,e.'fl~~-1:~r}'JEr.;/J!iE!!.f!,S,~<:?.~~-*;~~~;;:!.::;~~0~,,_:[::::__~,-,,.::~,:~,;i:i:,~~.~-:.A_-: ___;;:;::,~-'::~----l'. 70 of96
NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0
.....:;.-.~***ruwM1 ~:~.*..~~:* NOilmwt:iTWUl_ICAllSOlOPlS Request for additional information C~~~2jd?.:~ ll~:i~~~~~~i0?!~~fd~~*!~~{~§:t?~~}:*.~f~fdi1 :~,~¥+/-f§i~~~:B~:~~~~~r:;:11.°E'1~:~":~,I~~:t:'!:~:~*: *_ _!*;*~
)The SNM being recycled to target fabrication is included in PSAR Chapter 1.0, Table 1-1. The recyclable: \material is held in the U decay tanks until needed for processing into targets.
- IT': ~~~~:~7fftIJ1.;f~~~~~r:x~r2:~;~!t~:r~::7J~?~~;{j~£afff~W~~~**
1 iThe response to RAI 11.1-4 explains why the OSTR targets are not used for the radioactive source term (calculations. The basis for the maximum dose to the public is derived from NWMI-2013-CALC-011, )Source Term Calculations. As discussed in PSAR Chapter 13.0, the MHA uses 12 MURR targets to !estimate the gaseous source term. Due to batch size and receipt timing at the RPF, eight MURR targets )~~-'~o~~~ ~~~-~~~~~~~)_~.o~d ~~ ..lig\l~d accid~11ts. No. Request for additional information r;=. * .-::*:s* /<*****::.**::-."**;,~-.~~~~~~~- ,.-*:*(;.:*. **o,:r :-r::_-;/~01:\: -,)- :-~-:~::i ( . RA.I t~.2-:1 * :;JyUKffG-1 S37,.Par.tJ,_ Se.cfio,n D,2, "Radioacpye :Wa~t<{:lif_anqgef!l_eJJ-.t, ': fn_tr_oqiii:es the'qpeptqtj~fis:*!
, . ' ' : lfor the content oftfle PSAR: It includes the statement:' "The magnitude*atid ndtµre of the effort . . ' ' ..~ .~
I( ' ' 1 ~ '* ... ) ..: ,,. **, .':::ie<fuirJ~ ~k~~ir,J,{J~pef!d kpfJP the :size~~n4._ p~mpi~~itY_o[~q~h ~th~ r:ear:torfaci!it;;:~ndJt~~,'utitiz,ation;:. < i j .~. <.*.,: ,_ ,, ; . * .. :; *dJ.r~lRa'?1s:. *'[her:for~,;l~e. ':atu.re and* defa~ lsof/~e r;agzoar;~v~ ll!?ste" mp~1aff~t~n~ pr~g\~!JJ. ~holf_l.1~* .:, ( 1 ;* : .. ,. _:\ 1a(so,be:commen'Surate .wzththosejactors:;.'.Bpsedonthe (Jnnua,l,genw:at!OJJ r,a,tepjh1gh-;dos_e. .<;lass G\
- r* '* ? *.*.-: ';\vdstejires~nted inPSAR Table 11 :b',. Waste:'Prbd~c~J/;{ihe{Raciioisotiipe*P~oductionFacility.':';::'* ,:;
.. . .;:: :_ , . (dndtl:ze capacitj-,djthJ*c~ntaine?pl/Op~sedjor:Czas;~C }Vdste presentedin p'Sim* Table f-)7/ "Wa#~')
j\Contqiner__ Ge(JtnetriC pafa, '~.. t~er~ 1?!i.Z q_e*/i.ne gr'fn,o;e. CJa~s ¢. $h1p~1f!.ntsJoi-. (jiipos~l itve7 liJqek. *{*
- '.'(The complexity ofwa,s,te pr°"cessitzgisindicated.by both t/:ze nuntber ofchemical opera_tions ahd "* _-_ :,
,, .. '.".' :_ ::" </1°djus'6nen,ts:requi17/d, asdisGµssed:inP$AR 'Secti,ons.4. J.3:6, -~.'Wast~ lfmu;lling; ,; and,*9:~7.2_, :.~'<;~11troz.i; *: * ,_. *. :;;*ctn4 St6rag~.'ofRad~oac!We Waste, '.'/ind by the:number'ofpoi~JJt{al-(Jc(:ident~in~olV.ingwiiste. -:*. .*: ;:; "-: * .... * .*>1!dfJirapons;*~s-i{!?ntifl~dJn:NffiiidJ!'S.AR:'cfzapt~f)~. '.'AccidentA~aly~!s#eiho'cF9z6i.y,api> * ,"*:;: '. . , ~: ,.'TPrelin.itriaryHaiardsAn.alysis.'*~~ Given tM amountofwaste.'aiidthe.comj}lhityojwasNnidl'lagen~erz'i} ..' . '., -. . -.;:opera_tions; the '~ ..:. ndtu;e q~d details '~fthe rµdioactive'.waste' manage~1eni:progr,am.:. 1',ihour!ibe.. ' ~:f, *' ;we *; ll f!Xplamed * ,I . * ' [
- i;i;-vRi;p:? ~3J; *secti~n 1/2,. L ~'R,adi~acii~e,,.Walt~M~ndg?ment Prq'i/:a1!1~*,; ~rii;~~;e; s;~;ijr; -~. ,*
. * ., . - ,;:expec,tatiof!sfor. the, descriptiqn o.fthe/ddioacqve wast(f management p'rog1;a1J1. NUREG-153 'l;.: . * ,<'. ***, :* *: J(J?art2,.Secti611'. I{ 2. J/::'Rad(oa,cti've Wa~te'Ma1:zageme.nt Progrqin, ::.:Siates'th,atfactbrl dddr.esf!ea by. * *. \:. ,~ . ._:, .:\r,th,::aP,f.~~cfint s~oA~dhfzud~.~rgp~i;at,{o~ qfi~~'.~1-~!iaif-~!:~lff!u'!.ct.i~W,Pro¥~aifi it,a~~i a&d:fids;~;?,:,} . fic/escriptiOIJ..S,,, a11d'pr.ogram personne[, r.esp~ns1b_1 fit1es *and q71a/ifl cations *as 4zscussed m theformat * .,: *; * : * ; ."jiaJJd*conte~tguide. '. :~ * :,.<- *:: ' ."._';:.:'.""':'..:.: **,<, .* -._ '->!. .. * *:**::: ,:'.>;:_ *~: . *... \: *.. . . . ;'.PSAR Section ll.2.:J.3.2, * '~Wqste Managenzeni Leaa:" identi}ies.the individualresponstble' to the** ,,. ,,;: ,. " \1fla~t'.Managerf~r waste mdnpgeiiient activitieS,, inplu'd11ig se/f:dp}~s§t}Je.~.ts. f Sjflf <;h~pter 1,2~, ; j t '- ,**: i(<;¢~1~G.t o!Op,eriftiops/'. (Joepiot{n~flf:#~:t~epos/tli;l12* "W~~s~~ Man,age~ie,rzt:L~ad, :: no~ (s::it,qrip~~Y {;
- i. *::. .~;loftije.. mp.f!age""1entjigw:e~; RSAR.Sect~ori.*~LJ.2.1.'3,. ~'[?.aiJ.z~tiqn,Pfolec~orz_M,q,nagr~/*,"'§/~t~f.,.t!Ja!:," \;J y :* . . :, : -. ;* .. , :;tfle Radiatio_n PrQ~ection Mana~er;:o,y.il!. b~ re~ponsfb[e for.:f!_~er,S,e:~,ingfi(i1~illing' qnd, di,sposd{oj:: ..'.;,,,., }i
'; *. ' *, "* * '* _* *_ ;'.radioa¢tive wastes. This- PS!fR indonsistehey hisults'i12 uncertainty regarding the hiahdgement.j * :yq
- .. ,*." :* .* *.' ._* 'ifunqti~n,,p/:ogralii staffing andpqSitioh descrtptions,
_..,~,:.,,;,,,_ ."'""-=~.......-_,,._. ""'.----..,,.-*~ :.:-~-,,~'1'"*~*=-~~..,,-"" ....-..,:,. ...:.~,,.,~:,\~+- ...,,.,..;*...,,,.. ~-*-~- **::~~..:., _
- and prbgrdm personnel responsib[liti,eS. ) .:*: *'; :~.
... _-...,~..-.-, ,,f.,-"..-""'-l"'-,.,...~-1~"',.:.,_,_":' ,,...,,...,.,:~-"1.--,.,:, ..;. "-~-~=~- ,;~-~~~.:.<t~-:.}, ...:l..---.'.!.,** :,_ .::*.::::' ~~:_.*_,,,__ ,, ;... ___;,:;_ ,.;_:;. ;,.:*......,...'.:
71 of 96
.:.~*~~:.:- NWMI .*..*... NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 \ * ~~ ~~.:~:
- NlllUHWESTMED1tAllS.OTDP£S
- J~I fi .2
- 1~-. i~r~~id.~:a ';,,or~. ~~riipl{ii ;~~. Pb~pf~li~iz§1~~,~~~friPt~~'ii bfth{radidadn,~~ y;,,~-;ie ;;,~~~g;;,;;~~~ *:... ---~ 1
'.:** _._ - ' Jorgan[zqti9n,andre_sponsibi~itieswifhihthe_NWMfmanqgef!ie11(srru<;turf!; Re uest for additional information
*:,.,,~. ** *--*~*~*~*~--,,..,:. -.-~....,,.,,.i_"'"'" .;_~,.~:.:.':""'"'<".'~* **"'"*,-,,_,.,~-,~-~ *..-:- ......, . .-,.-:.~,;_-,.,..,,.,;;.."-* *~-, .,,._.;.""";"~*--,,..--:::~ *"o-'~":-*." **1'.00,.*"~*i<-" :::-~..,.......:,..:-:";<"" *"-*-=----*.~b"".- ~..;:-.:'."::"* ~~-""'~ ""7'"-5..,,-*~-,.----~- *.:-_~;:.,....,----.-"""'"""::_ *.,_.._.,,...~.--..'.'.. ..,,,...-~.......~ ~.~~
.The Waste Management Lead (not the Radiation Protection Manager) has responsibility for oversight,
- handling, and disposal of radioactive wastes. PSAR Section 11.1.2.1.3 will be modified to delete
- "overseeing handling and disposal of radioactive wastes;" this information will be added to PSAR
'.Section 11.2.1.3.2. \Radioactive waste management responsibilities within the NWMI management structure include: Implements waste management policy , Develops waste management procedures for the processing, packaging, and shipment of radioactive! waste from the facility Processes, packages, and ships radioactive waste from the facility Provides technical input to the design of equipment and processes
- Provides technical input to the waste management training program Establishes and maintains contractual relationships with waste disposal sites and radioactive waste earners
- Maintains working knowledge of the waste acceptance criteria, standards, guides, and codes with respect to waste disposal
- Conducts self-assessments of waste management practices and compliance with procedures in accordance with the waste management self-assessment program
'.These responsibilities will be added to PSAR Section 11.2.1.3.2. . "r * -- *"*~* *. ,.,. .. ~*:-.-.iJ .... ,.,.*J**'~ ......-,"' ..,..;,*..;...~';' ~..::;;. *"+'~"'-~... -... -~ .,,~.--.-..~-**'*-"'-<**<<*:.* *' *r,.'*'"*'*:...o.-*.-~ '-*** ,,,,,.,_,,,._, - '..;;~ .-.~ *- ,..-_,"f-<*--;--;""~ -*:..--;:-*-n,,f'..r..;,. '"""' <'.7 --~-*""."'~'"""'"""'-":.*J--..:.:~ 0 *:=*"'"'"'**..,.-*,,,,,..-~--....:.~ -=--~---""' ~*::.;....r~.--- ~-""'~-"; -*'""---e>..--*-""--,! '. RAI. 11.2'--1 b ~iClarijjrtheline of/iuth(J~ityfor,radipactJv~ ~~~t~iJi/mdg<pi!'en[. ** " * ).,;*- -~.. : . *;. ; * **__ * *,, * ** *.* *.* *' ~- ~-* vi"'""::..:;\.!.""'- *-*-"'~f*->..:*-'i!.L-..-J: "*"' "-~:.: ,,._... ,,...;.,,. .~_.,,.. __.,,.;..;_...,.;.~*, ;*'.:'~~*..,_.;--....;~---"'. ..;_.._-,::,.,---,;,~..,.,,.,_~~,.;-_..:;:...;t.-:-*..i.,..:- 4--~. ~,...,,...;>-:-.- --~*-=--"'*'~-_.,.-~;--....-~.-. . . c..c.-.--*-*6***-=**~-*.~"***--~~***'--****oo.'"-'**""-***" 'The waste management program will be coordinated with the radiation protection program, and program [ Imanagement will report to the Plant Manager. PSAR Section 11.1, "Radiation Protection," describes the
- iprogram and procedures for controlling and assessing radioactive exposures associated with radioactive :
- sources, including radioactive waste streams. The goal of the waste management program is to minimize j
- waste generation, minimize exposure of personnel, and to protect the public and environment. An official '
- charter describing the authority, duties, and responsibilities of personnel in the waste management !
'.organization will be described in the FSAR as part of the Operating License Application. ! r~-~r{t*~r:,;:~;~~~~.'~~:~,'. ;:e:};~1~ti~!;~;qti4:~~~f3~~1rx:i1~1~~;1=;;h,:f01J-~!~~:;&tt5~t:.~~1Frt::'1~~:~~tt0'.::~! 1
- * ,-. *' * ,';', ;-
- -.~ ;'1.1t~t"!ati~~n.:~f!l.~!~-~a1:~e/ by:the al)plz.can,~:~e SO!Jlpl~te: W}__aa9c;'f'.a~e}1} _al[.maf~~~gl t;espeptf., .*,:,,. ' , --, < 1
' : *,: .::wr;i?Ed~ ]_53!/,, "part) rsectioniJ.-2. 2: *"'Radipqetiv~ Jfqste '6011'/rolS,:" &t,atebh)it,.the*app/icani should:!
- ' l)identifY and discµ,ss the ,p!dnsJor,maffage~e1;tdf Ji! fohns:ojrddioactiv'¢ :W~st~. ': ' ' : ' ::- "_; . !:
t:'".,, :-; ,,:<*?Jr-~*("'.*,*', J, ~;' ~ ?, '" _':< l. <** ,::**;.,. , , :,'i!; **'..:: ;,:*,; ',;., I' ' ' *~
.fNWM{P$ARSection I L2,3) "Re(if7,!f.e ofR,qdiogq~e Was(~i-'.:--T91j}f!..U~.6,fl.re~f!f1ts,e~ti17late's ofth~ '.,* 1 '\\arinl.lar.generati¢h rate's ofspeQific waste meams/but }vithput. a4f!quate,spe¢ifiCity-to ascertr,:1in whqf .*I' -'.,: ~Nhe~~ie~fir~;/iio11}a(e$J11ei-u4e:WM wlieth~t ait.p_a~~r,itiai wqst~-*st;eaffis*'1d)le_ bee'fz considered;;* *. *
- c
- l. '. * .. *;. l:?&B*$?~fi~R'~:7.~i~;1~dte~thfiti~~~tic: iol~ti~~ tt(~Ja/a,-.Js ~;~de~~'io ,;he high~d~~ff !;quid :; * " --!
- 1~,.,,,;_ --"~' o:-,-~";,~f~:,~T;;~~'-'-=;~~~---,LL.-;,,~~'.;;: .c.;. i :~-r; :~= ~-~:_;;~~* -.~:"_-;;-~~-~_: -~-.-~~-~,_ :~ -'~~~o~:~~-,;~!-~ -.. ~*
.*,,. *+/- - .. - '. ,
-.;. RAl:1!1.2-2'a. !\Clarify if tfie 1Jqlu_effp~esp;zted ifif81f.'T9bl£f.}J-:9 rnc:Z,u!Je this addeq vbl~me ofcaustic'solutfon: . : 'j
,_~*<',:~ .."I,*.--;- '*-,.-~*,. .*-....,,,"'!'.."""-'*~~ ~ ** ~ .*,*>>f~ '*';""!"..,..-'~- .....,..*'";(c.,,__,._"'°~--~-*..-,~.--:.-...-->,c-.*.,_~.r*...,,.-* *.,-;~-'<' ,;'O:-*~;k;:;~--..;,_-;-,,._:;:: ::-- .o ....-..~~1....--;.> ~, -.~."';-::"'-~ *.,. ,.._.,,,"<,.,,::--*:~~-. .:.~.-*. ,,. ~ ** :~*.*;~._._,..,.__,.,,,, **. ~ ..,,.~_,,.._ * ~."'-.-:-"..,.- .*,:-~"':'..!'> .,~ **-.. ...,....:,_,_~""'-""*',,-. l.-...1
,Caustic soda (NaOH) is included in the waste volume estimates in PSAR Chapter 11.0, Table 11-6. : r* :*.,....,., ""'l'.\' :.~*;-** "'-'r'\' .. 'i'*""'"~'.')1;,:'"l"v-**.;-"'i' -:.:-~~"'fr\';1"-"-'*> ~-~-~----~~**o,tr~~-,-::;_ ;-*~*.*-:--~~ ,..,, ...,,._, :f*:---<-7: ***:-~*-* t'~*:-'~~ .. ..... ,......
.,~ ~--;: ~-'*-:*.-""'.'" ~-*....,:*~--~~..;,.. ---*""-"" -~-~;~. . - . ; , ; , , . *....__ , __ ,,..'--<-~*h"* .,,,.,.,.,. ..:*,-**-~~: ...... *~*:-_,~..;)."*-"**~--*-A:~-'-,t"'"'""" ',::? * * :<1 ¥ : - *. . . . .
- j'.: Rft:t; 1) 4-'l-P;:.,*tC/mj)hiz/if!;ln1x1~iiatj.pS,,oftp4ft~: lf,<iu_i<lt~sJJl{dlfl~~~P,_~-~~ent~izj:1:bf_elJ 'inclu;ded:{'!j),$A[?:**
;l[~~ f:,;~!~r.~~:~~!~~ff2<f~Ei/!.~f:_":.~:::~ff ~~~:-*~;~:.'.~:;~-:~, ~2:;~.--=~--:~'.L~~:~;,~~~,~,.;;~i,°'~~,;~~..L~~-:~,,;:~:~~,,~*-:_~~:.:~,J 1
- \; _,,_:' :, ,_,,,.:,,;,'; *
- The solidification agent content is included in the waste volume estimates in PSAR Chapter 11.0, iTable 11-6.
72 of 96
*: .~ - ..- - -.. ..,.*.~ .; . ..
NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 Request for additional information
- j RAi 11;2:26 ;iJi.5:4Rs~ction 4.4.i4, ,;;specialNu~l~ar.i.ia!~i-iaiJ:Jis;;iptiq~; "¢o~tains:r~feiekcis'to'drai~sto **. * '1 i ** : . , ... rgeometr.ically safe loca(ions. There appears*io*be*no*discussion-ofhow*the~e streams are r;:oflfrolled*~(
- .* ' . . *":. : i;after collection and whethert/:iejrn!ill"be treated as waste:: . . ,\ . .,,,,. . *..; '. .'.'; . . 'r
' * !~ , *~ . .'. ,, ,,,.~ , -, *,* . ,,, *<< **; .,,,.. "'... , ~.; ' ' *'"- *,.,.'.~ *I i'
.i* *'. . ,, .... '; .\1>~qvia~'.~4iscu,ss~o~ ~fho~Jh~se sft:~dfn;~r(? .r:ontrb!l(j(JM_ef*~~ilec4~ri. ji>~~fh'er;t~~;,~f~.fi:.~bi~~#s~ l .:'; ..liwaste,':tindifso;wh'efherthatvolume'is'incl'uded in PSAR Table 1J:::-6.::" .:. >* *'.'..: * .; * "' . ; 1:._,:-.;.... ..:!-.:**~~~1., :"°'; . . :..;,,,, :..*::.-*i.i.~...-.*~~:-~~-:~:-~,;'.,;~1+....::.~.....-."N""*~--,:_.,,..~- ,4'-~*. ,,...,_:._..{::J.*a_._S" ,.j,~--. t~:-~Ad~::_,.'J;;.;"'_~.,"l.~-~i..-S:.:!....;., -~;;:~.,~--:.~:~~-~,~-~ ._.: ~~ ::~...~.:.f..~.;-~~.~::._*~::..~-~:~~ \~~.'..~ ~~~ .,. , : .:.i~'.~.,'.:_~;:~- ,...__. ,:~ -*-~~j !Material discussed in PSAR Section 4.4.1.4 will not be considered waste. The material will be returned !to the U recovery and recycle system, purified, and reused. This material is not included in PSAR )Chapter 11.0, Table 11-6. I***---~--.: .....- .~----...::r-*-:.*~**.-.,..;:.:;..')! *.::<;".:.*.;- -*~~**'*-"""'"'"- ...-::-'"'*~-'"'.;;..~:""'~*-..:.::~-'.*~-*"-"*~-~-.. .**:~--~;- ..... --::.:...._..._,...:,;;;~~-:.-~ .* ~...,,_,.;. **.-:~~,; ~--:.":'-..---:o-'..- ~--='"- -*---: ~**'"-"*.~..:;.-..;.:. ~-;,;.- .....-."":* *~* -*;,.-,-- .'- ...... ,=-*-,~-"'~*:-**-* :.~-"*---:_;,.:;..*~ ... ....,..~. i RAI 1~"2-:~d :,:?SAR* Section 4.1 :.2. {, '.'.Process qe~ign f3asis, ":states tljat tlie 'l~rFjs desiipie'E:Zro. ~a\;~ a '!~ri}if!.O.~ .. ** .~ l * *., ,, . , "):ope..1(aµoiiql ' ~ pr'ocessing*cap(Jbi@1 ; * ' ' , * ~. " ' ". "' *
..ofonebiitchper:w'f}ek ~
oftip {o ,12 tdrgetsfaoni)MJ!IPJJor ,tf:P ti}:.~'\< : *:!
. ": ** <
- h52 lveeksperyearaiid apptoximdtely3,0 tqrgetsftofiz 'th~ OSTR or a third univer~ity re:qctorifor .~*:
if ' , *" ! f " ' ,_.,; * .. ' "* * ' ' * ,,. ' * ** I ' *,* " *.-. *, ,I , ' O ' * ' i*
- v .'
i per
'*.::: .....)**-:~iBweeks year pf!r;reacfor;*:,,,'Th~~efort(~l!;~o~~n~i op~rati91~al prb'c;e;sing capabififY::o/ih'e:RPF. f
~: ' ; . '. . . :1!i~.J:'t04 tar.gets p~r yea:r_, 'rhiS, secti~n~/sp staiesthat the ov~rall process furictioi:uil .teqtiirenze~kjor: ;i C_-_ .. . ,* ** :;;the ~an/tie *li!aste fanctionis, '~Providing the,capab{lity to hand/e*wast~ge,1i~raiefd jtom processirig,upr
- ,*, ::to 120 irr~4iqted~argets per.month. PS(IR Ta~le 1T-6,: Waste,,Produ~~d_ in~t~~- Rq<f/bfscjtqpe *~- . * ~.* t
~* * , . , :: .. *;fro,d~ctior(Facility; is ~ased Qn phq_ce,ssing o~lY,. 8 M_Uf!:R targ~ts per ~ef)<;, m: afJ0~1t ~8'}{1 of(he RRt [ .:. * *; . :" :"'.~~~mi~~1.~~~~~ti~~f1f~?s~~sin¥'c:afa~~.uu)J'.:. ~: : <: . y :.:, .:.'._;*~. _, , ,., . _. **. .-......,..I.,:. ;, . *n
.:, . *\!Given: these statements,justijjlthat, the, dqta presented iri PS(lR Table J1-:6.. wli.ii:h i~.liased/jn :.:'* *'" .::
f" **. :*. *.... f'"'T"' *!**-* ,Cc_'fl** tl:Pr~ces.~in~**o~lyBMU!p} iargets'pef:wee~ i's'~~i;S'i)h,a{Jte bqii$ior'ivas{e pi:ddii~~o~1ift~'e*~F.* ..... * \
,~~.";'\**;"';..- _.,.,,~- *.,i...=)':<')"~'-"'""~- ..-;f,-<>>*.:....~ . .,""'="* ~""':-~--,,._.';'-.-:'\).,'..(*-~.:.~~.~.-' -- 0 *-..-""r:':"-.' ~-- ~... *O-*~ .** .* *~-..,--., *:-:- .. -~.-' ... "'°"~-*.~'"CC-,,..!'-"'"'* -.**-* ;-:.__,_~ -."':. """"'-"' **:-; *-;: -~.-,......-,,- ~.*--~'!'.-,-' -~017- ~- *' - A~-~~-0...--0 -"""*~* .*~--,--* <r-.
jThere was no basis identified for the values listed in PSAR Chapter 11.0, Table 11-6. Waste volume
- projections are based on the composite values from the MURR and OSTR mass balance calculations that ,
!assume an eight-target/week MURR processing rate plus a 30-target/week OSTR processing rate and will* ibound the planned operations. J"~,"~.-':;..;........,.v ~-'-"*,."*~./!': * "i*"* ;~*~ * ,*.* <*"*"\'*--.** -~--:*~--i:':"',=~ ~~:.--***;_> ~'<.*:-:--:---"':';::;*:.;-'~" ~'-'-'.'/':/.~"*'-.if",r;it-~ ";*~*:.* ...,:;,,., ... ~:.';,*~;;t~' ->>~"i°~~~-*r~i*.<., '., ***,...,,,.~ *;l~;,C-~~*~':.o'O~;.;~~\.'~":"'r. :** ">~"';*-'.~J>-'->~---.-.*:,..~.,.,.,.;..;-... ~::.:.-..'.".:,-..;.....~ .;...,.... *-},*-1
- 1:.
i* . "* RAI 11;2~* ,.'.1Partigrafih 20:1101 (d) *oflO'CFR Part20.siates.that .ai:onstrairiton* eiliissiO'ns ofradioactive
. , ..,, ";(. ... :. *"*"**' '..' "" "* ': ... ' *' *." . : ' ......... ','.. ,*, . . * . ""*"' ' : '"' . . ~- " ,, . >.,:'. . '\:'
f *. . ,'. , . ~ ',~ ,):material§liaq be esta,blishet1:'.by liceii~ee'ssuchf~at in(iividual memb(!rs oph~ 'public /ikelyto,'.'receive*i.
) , *' . ~)the highest dose 'will riot be expected to *receive a TEDKin excess of 10 mlllirem (mrem) per year ' i *~ .. 'from these ~missions: .* * . '" " ., ' * * . * * * : ,' ,* - * * * " * - ,, .. :- ' -' :.\
J,' tl ' * *'." *,~ ,* ~. r ~;-.,.* '*: *;* ~* r .::, ,*,,~ ** *:~,/:, _" ',,.Ji' ,, ',**,* ~ ,'_ '<.. c. ,** O .:j
- ,.. , .. :!NVRE<;i-)5}7,:Part2,:Sectidn 11.2.],""'.'Radioactive WasteManagement.Program, '~statesthe . , * *,*1; "I I
~* .: ' '* )p~ogram};6buldbe d~signed to.bcldte~s.. all techriical anddaininistrativejunctioni r{ecessary:to (inilt /. !
1
- ( . ..., , " * ,** )t~d~~~~n ~f';:1s r~llJted:.to 7~1i.oe1c~v~wqst~.: * :*;~ <;: * : * ;' .* * . :. .: ,. ';,:" .<, .* .::,:~ '. ,. "\,': ~,. '.:'"" .\ ..'_.l <
* * : PSAI;?. Section 454.1/: .Process J)escriptton/' states that the bverall process*cf.niceptfor.+ll,di<iactive.'. t 1 ';( ' - ,. * .j~ , . . : ' ' . ** *, ' * . '. * . ' - ' . . ' . '* * ' *~ c. ' ~* (,\, \i, ~*noble gases ,is.to delay gas-release* so .thatdecay will reduce the raai~isotope corifeht sufficiently to' j
- c
- !allow the*decayed nob/egases to be safelydischarged to' th~* stack The',:pSAk states*tli'at a {)Q~daY.: *. -~
i: '. (period will effect tha((i1If.tY, ifriven pyXehoh'- !§3. fhft, P...sAR cloes, 7Jofqd_dri,stf h.Ow ./onger.:fived ..... !*
" ' '* * . !radioactive isotopes are limit(!i:ljo reduce,.radiat~on:frqzardF~lati!,d to rqdi<J,'(1ctive waste. . . ' '..; j " ',*,,. ( .~*,*:i".,~-, .*~', '*,-',,".~':** 'i*'"*' .. ' . ' "
- _;','l,,l~.'.~.: ~.' ... ,:"-~'~."r .-\:_'.~'-. *. *.,'*,_.,*,,, . * * -;; '--/*;,.:~.,<*),:~ :~'*, ..:c),,' '::., i": '(,
*" ,_.. : .*. *-'i\DesetipeJ10W N~1MI}n~e'tiffs~o pddf~sslon#er,"lil!~f1Pti,4~oisptoke$,,th~tgefl-.etate ~u.f{dr,~~s oy,: *: ...* <r * : . . ithousdndsofCµfieS.ofacpvity in, tf1'isprpcess, i,~eii,tifiediiJ. Ta.b)e4~33., '.;T<;irget.O#sass.~mbly Ih-<<... ,,, : .'.
(;' , '* , . !.:* iiProcess Raqio'µuqlidefriVlnt(Jry, '.':'if!ch: as: Proq1et,hiuil.1'-l'43.*an<!145,. Cesium'- i37;: Ceriuni:-144, *etc. * :i
\~-~!';,... ";o:.,-~-'.;;';;....:: ~:...--:;- __':,-;.,:.-...,-.; *__; __. ;.,"..- *~ _..,.:::,-. ...,,..;...-=:-.-~ ..:...~--~ ...,.;.- ..,,,_.,.._.;\,..,,__,.,._:.. *:-:;."\:~-~,...-.-=.--,-_.,,- 'O.~--c;;*-;-!:*~-..-.'....:::._ .-::;*'.:.-:--~;o;*:::"*?:<_,.~-.*-r- - .--*.*; * *-.:--,.,~a*"-;>:r.- - *,,-.-.~:..;~-~:.,.*.:'I-*-**...;;,......:'.~--~-*'.,_.,-_**;,.,-"'), *-f 0 ':*';,".":.:.* * ;.~
!The nongaseous long-lived radioisotopes are contained in the high-dose liquid waste stream that is jsolidified and eventually sent o:ffsite for disposal.
'f" ~-'~'**-~~-~ ... .. *.---.-,-~*.;;.::.- ~--**-~;'1~"'*:i,;...-*~,,;.*;o".': .;.;*. ~:.:~.*-;::- **----:*1--. "i- ~-... * -~:- *"".:**;.;;-;,~;'- 0 ~*. *--.~-~~--*. :~~ :. ..-,--.. *,::-"::._..,,...,,::_.._~ .. ~- ";'~;;,~;-*-'*t***--'"_Jfrf-:"":-* ; *;-"-;:'""-:;,;~*~"'- **-;F"'"""'::-~ --"'*"*"~'.fi:\"'"'.-;. .. 'r'-*-;-..;,,*:....,:*,,_,_,.... ~,-":**-i::"-'-.,*""'*",,.*
- "
- RAU1.24." *rSe(:tion I ( ' * *1* . , .
50,9_;"'.'Completeness*and i:Jcciiracyof inforn/atiori, " of10 CFR. Rar.f.60.ore.qutres tfuit , : *:~ t r ,, t ' i ',J *>'-'1 r " ~- ~* " ,. ' ;, ' <, ' ".' *
- c , _. ~* l
~ * *, * : :* *.*: ';mformapon,8ub,mitted, or infotiru;i/Jo1 rNuir:~d to bf..:1n.O.i1J.lf1.irie~by (f!.f!*app!i~0J1tbe,cpp1pl~tepnd>'. ,:
r:. ~- l * * **
'.;:*.1~1~~Ur~~~ f~{;p~m1~~r,idl reS~f!C#. . ' " !WTVMI PSAR Section ]'].2.2:1, "Waste Desighatiqn, '.'*:State.J. thatthe [U>ffwi/lg¢1Jerate:Glass:A., B,, .-~
- . *.*, ... , ..... : ,: , .~;,,,";.*>, <, >,**;'.. *;' ;,', '::'.:.**' ,:, : c' *:.::*::'_.>~< . *; ':-.,;j:
- , '* i * . ")iand<';l~w~lev~7radioac(ive1;1:aste.' Tab'!e 11-6, "WidstiProdue,ed iri the:RadiO~sotopePr~duction .... -~
- .** ,, . '.. ((Fiipif{,ty/~.id~fltifj,essiveralitenis as c14ssC:waste. High-doseand'.other types of.waste, are,identifiedl
* ', . : :'.as:Class ~ (Jnd <;1,nnual generatiolJ volumes are provide4 ," *" , ~ ,' * .* _ * ' :-::_' ":! -t_* '..._.,.,.,..__ _, ~-L~~ ~ '""" -~ -..*- -~*" -"'- :
- _._"' -*~ i/ ...._...,.,_,.. .f: .~:...,.Jr,~ ,,,_.,\ ~~., ****----',~ .::.~...._ :.J..t~' :
- _,,.. M ;f ,;,i _,. ___ ,_.__ ~..,.:::.:._,; -"--~.!. ~;.,-. _,.;-1: *- *:~:~.,:~'.:.~.,!'.>~:.*;.;~:,.,:.:,, ___,~.,.~~:'..::'..-~~~~.*::.~*~.!<_'2,~.J 73 of 96
. ~.:;:.*;..NWMI NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 * :~~.~~:* NDRrn'NESTMIDICAltSOTOPB Re uest for additional information ""Jn its Novefflber2: joj 5;:;.e:S.PonseJ(/eirVironmefi'i~7it4lWM~R.4,~[Xf)Jr¥s:A&ession~*fiumhir*w
- 1:
. *.. J?vJLi?$:2,~A,01{) NTflV!f stated that high~dbse anrjenc~psulatid waste are projectedfo be*. * ** * *. '.. .} . : * ~,ClaS,s B waste,. an.d provided botmding'annitalgeneration rates '(in kilograms per year). * *. " , J * *0*; * *;~ddi'.ion.ally,: in/he. ;e.spon~~/o,)~.fw¥_~R~i,. 1'[~1 ~t~tedth,~iyo,!~'ine're,~~~ifori~~s,t~eft:o~enti~l; ;~} *.*. ** * ;ito*chan_~e. the d1spo,sed waste;r:lqssificq.hJJ.n J!:om <Jlas~Bto,, clgss c;. ps.,,areSf!,lt:qfoptim,1:zption * .' * ** * *i ... * /* .:. *., *. 'ie<;:tiviti~s, and. results ~1dll be de_sdribed;in:the Ope;apµg PermitApJ?lic~ti9n,. b~t di<f n&tlde11tifjwnx. \ ' ;* , . : ,,sl!,ecijiq ~ene~qtion:rat~s 6fC/af's C waste./'J.dditiohal ~nform_atio_n is ner:ded*to-re.solve this apparent.(,
! : .,.., . , :1disc;:.epaflcyb,etween'Table.J1-6andNfj'NJJ'srespon.setoRA1WM.:.R-:.1: * :: * ,: ..**
* ' ' - ',- *-": ' ' . . ' ' . ' ' , ;; * -.- " , *: ~ " ' ' ' . **. '. > _;1 * '*. ,. ' ' ~ - . . *,, .1 will. -1' '_,,., ' , "
- itP1:ovide additionaMnformati~wto re~olve th~ apparent di~qrepancy df:Whethq cla~s c'wast~, be, j
, . . < 'produced, or f!uijr'pdtentially;be produqed;'f1J"TapleH;,6:0f'ldNWlvP:s response.toRAIWAf-fJ.-~. **.
- l;
<</! r*" *) "'. . ;:.. ', *:....~.,','.; * ~.:..:._ 'j *. '.'."/...~--~,;,:, * 't-,-_;,:,_:. _,,_,_,,.,....;_.,:!'..:-,- .'.,,.;,... *$- **; -...:**,:,,.~~ '*-1".":~~~**;;.':,,,l ~: ;.'~*~*' J ':~. *~.,<..,;!~~*,,~, ;,*"'\>""<,\*,-.\;~"'.-.:"f'-"t;_.,; * ..;_~~--"~;*,..'"'-'"~r.,..f~ ::..*' i,.. .*".':'l"...J..j";._.,,.4;,._."'i'~ "'~ ~. r'._':>->;*...,'~~-;:~,,-'.*"*;.,..;,,_.._. Z:- ,!*,~ **,*;...:= -'i
- Tue solidified high-dose liquid waste from the RPF will be either Class B or Class C waste. As a result of;
- reducing the waste volume and minimizing disposal costs, the liquid waste concentration endpoint may
- result in a change in the final waste classification from Class B to Class C.
1*... --~*:.;_.:.:. -~- - :..._.:_::.~;--~;-;--* :*.:*___":_~.;;__:..:;.'.~ 7 :;:..~:-'. _*:::.--_:*:.::..:~;..::_;_,_~*-*~;,~:..:::...:..:::.;.:.:..:...~:~-~.:'.~.-.:....::'.~_;::,:.:.:;i;::.~--;:.:.:.:::::'.':'"O..:;'.::'._",.:::'.:':;::*..:::.--*:._,__.~;:::-c~.-:._::;-;.:::.,:.;-:-:::::.:*....:-:*:::...~:;:.:.:::::.:.:.::;;.::.:..,;;~.:.ci;;.::;:~;:::;'t'::~.i
- i ,RAI 11.2~5;' j!Ji!UJJEG:o.Jf3 7/Part i; Sectio,h *11:22;: Radioactjve Waste-Controls, " states (haithe appM:ant shduld;
.;,:, . : .;: .* \ *. :~,:4escribe thef p1p~s:dnd/J,riicedu[esJar manpgfiig so1id r.adioactiYe. wastesg~nerai:ed dilring ' " . < . ;: " ...; . .: ,. \;oper,(l(ions, .re,seip;ch/and.71rllization;.ofthe reqc;tor:' This de,sc;rjptiO": shquld'indtide~h9}t'. so#d. , . :. *.: *b *: '. ,. ' , ' ; :iradloar;~ve, materials ar~ ~en~rat~d,.anr{"iVher'eJ~ey e~(~r:tb~ ~a~te,' co~t~o(arid.treqtmefzt'"sj;f~e'ffl.s.:, *: ~ "* *. :f'(ldqitiom;zlly, :NURE,G-.153 7.J:'ar.t};'.Se~t~on, lf .2: 3; *:'.'Rejea:;:e.. of~aqioa~fiv_~. W,aste,, ..!Ji(lt<f# 'th(l,t th,p ., i "" ' ": * .* .* ..... *<applicant sh~itld, id,ehtifY,allradiodi:tive mqterialsfor.whiqh tran;>fer:tO, o.ther paitie,sfqr,disppsa!is ~~) ..,; .: .. "*;p1ann~d}:; ~:?*~>:*.,- '..:.:.' . ~*~*~:;'J .'.*:.:.*x *... "., *. *...... '.'. :..* *: ../ ...;.;; .. :*: ." .:: ... J: ."* * * > .\-AfWMJPSAR.Table 19:.13; "So.lid: Wast<! Pr;oduced at the. Radiaisot6pe.Proq~c;ti9,n Faci/{ty," * . ':: . * . ' 1lincludes an estimate of4d,OOO L ofpotentially contaminated waste (e.g., *aecontamination:materials, .". * . \ . . .*.,.
- 1!PPE), PSAR.S~ction'11:2 does not identiJY personal protective clothing and dry ~ctive wastejrom* , !
*:~<< " . ' * ** .;;q~ciJ~ta~~'!ago~ ~~d m~inte~.~n¢e ;ict~vitie~. ~s. q wa~te lti~~ anil do~s/1ot,proy.ide infor,njatio~ ,:;*' *t ... * , , . , . *:1r.,egr:if.ding tl!e.estifll;atedamo.untqrhqhd!,iflf{ofqfy aptive wdstesgenerated atthe, RPF.!Jtis notclear.i ** *,:~:* . :.)~~he,th~rjii~s :~q~te,:. ~tr.eam/s,; in,rll~d~.ri iA P~ Tqb i~.;111~ * .~'.W#~e fro(l~~:c;</~,j* ~hf! Rqa,i~fsot?pe :. .'.J
- .,, .. * *:lRroductionFaf:ilily. P$AR C]1apte,r~ 4 arid 9,, do f!Ot e,onfqin inf(!,rmafioi;. 'r~gardin,_g thepi:,oposed " ;
, :, :., . 'collection, volume reduction; packaging or' storage of this waste steam. P.SAR.Section 9. 7.2.2.8, .. , ; * * '.'. "Waste*'staging and Storage Building, "provides the.vol~mifoj,the Waste Stagi~g 'and Shipping . ';;: ' ,' .. . ~iJJuilding but provides no* details regarding the.processes oceurring within that building. . . . ' .{ ,**::iJi;fore.info~~tio~:i~ .~~ed~d t~':pr~v~de *:r~a~o~ak1;,as~r-ahd~ tfi~t radf9~c~e*'Yv.asi'e; will ,bi/, , "' '* ." :i . "' ~!:C9n.trollec(iat illi tirnes fn d marI,ner *that pro,te'cts..t/1.e'enV,ironpent and th,~.h<!_,alth .aJJ<i.tfafet;wffhf! .*.,. 'f
- _. *~*. ;~.:(f:!itr.:~~~{~~f~~~r~f.~~:~c;*::,,~~.:;;,:,.~.-.}:~~,"~. ~. ~*,~"~~:*:"". : ~:~ . ~. :£:.~i_:;:L":"~*~**.:*=;~.:;,.~:_;,.~.*~:,~7-,::.::.~ . '.:"**"*T: ~-~.:"~
RAI 1.1.2~sa *;P~ovide' the*b,aslsfm:-the e'stimate ofthe'generatjoh, rateanddiscitss the proe,e{ises.u.s~d tO. f!linimi:z(
- i * * * * * * * :'th<Pvolume*storedpriof to disposal, andinClude th,e waste*sireqm in PSAR Table 11-6. ~* * , . * *' :
' '-* .L ._J~: .. . ,.: .,~;.._,. ~;-~L-';~ -~,- :.!.:-....._;,._ .~.-~ *.,...~'~r'-;**¥:*~--~i-"'~--i:.'"'*-'-",-..:,.-;-_.,~...,,_~~~*;._,.,,.,._,,,,;,._,';..',_.._ __.,,.1;,, .;-Z_,~~- '.-; -~;:~o:.-~."~:-..o:"'"'".:'f;.--*'.._,-:.""">O '"':"" -.J<-;..-;'1;,,;;-~**-,::~~~.,,..~.-...,.... -~<,..,!..r ~-.-;.~~----:c.**,..;,,..*.._._-;:,*::..-.-........;.. *. - .::---~,,.----~,-
- Tue estimates for the laboratory facilities or facility support waste volume projections in PSAR
- chapter 19.0, Table 19-13, have no definitive basis and will be further defined in the NWMI Operating 1License Application. The estimated facility support waste values in Table 19-13 will be added to PSAR .
- chapter 11.0, Table 11-6. Shipment will be made in a timely manner to minimize the inventory of stored !
*waste at the RPF. The Class A waste will typically be shipped monthly or when a trailer of drums has ' 'accumulated. The high-dose waste will be decayed to meet shipping cask limits and then transported to 1the disposal site. Solid waste encapsulated in cement (55-gal drums) will typically be shipped when 10 1 drums are available to fill the shipping cask. The other (low volume) waste streams will be disposed of
- shortly after. :
- --* --~- .h* *- -...,, ~* -.~ -*"" ""'.-- -1 t *'.,-..-. -'*1>..:.:- *<>,~.... -~:-'"'"'"";" "'""'"*~*---"':'-:'* .. t:r.' - *:*:*;s:;. . :.-*-"-"' "":"""'"""';"'!-*"'"~~- ...u-..
fl>."'"""-"""""'~* *;~; --:-~~**"*-":" ...,. :'>""'~ .-~*:*r* . -it :*"-.. ..
"<."'"-f,,,.~""* *::J~ii'-":-*.--,..,,,... ;.?~.;*..O.C,~ ~":::~~ ~.~-*:;;~* ~ .:T--~~r-*7'...;,...t~ -;7*-- .* ~--~~-:;-:-;~~-~ ~-.---~~t '(RAI ,1{2-.5b '\ClarifY:wliic~ .was/<fproC,essing,st~ps,.t1re accblifp~i~h~d in. ,~h.e 'l}I?F*an'P,"wNc,.~ a,re,,,dc,co,mf?lisf:i.~~)n * *J '. * * .. *' :. ifthe Waste'Stagiiig and,ShippidgBullding.'., . ' * * "' . . '* * *. , .. ' ... , . * . :. . . , . : .: \.:!,_':-.-~>* *,. ~ r;,. __ ;,,:~.-.:: ; . .:_~*,_:....;.._.._ *~1*.y,::"";,_,,..~ ~"*'**:~?"* *~--T~.::..-.;.-,,_,.~'-*.-::~\*~c*..;":_*.-.~,,...... -........;;,..,..~.-"'"~*~-~---- ~~.~;~'"'.:'..._-~~d.,.;,.,..,!:~.-i..!* ' ' ~- .._;..,*-*.<.< * <-"":."'.~-.:;(
!The Waste Staging and Shipping Building does not contain any waste processing steps. The building will!
- be used to store incoming drums (consumables) and to store and stage filled drums (Class A waste) prior j
.to shipm~~t.to an apprc:>:red di~pos_CJ1 facilit)'.. . . ,, .~ 0 74 of 96
.:.~*~;:. NWM I ........... NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 ~ . . ~~.~!:* tlOBTIMUTmtltCALISOtOffS No. Request for additional information .. . . . _. . . '.~'**;:~'..';1W.~'~f~~~"';%;*i~**:\:;,~:;:';£*s.:;C';'.:;'.;::T72J J RAI' H.J-1 l$ubpgragraph 2.0.2001 {<i)(J) ofJO*CFJ1Part20 statesthata licensee'.*shall dispost/oftfC<Jnsetjmaterfql!
'l, *. .. ,; jibywqnsfer.to~prz q1:1thoi-jzedr~cipient,:asp~ovid:ed;i~JO _¢Fµ
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*-.1,.,,. **. ~0.2~0,lJ:, .. ~'*,*'.* .,: .:.::>: *~- ,.;. *. *: ;;~* ......* .\
p ~-~- ;: -*. " - ": ': ,_ * . . ,,,, Y < , ., *.jTli¢'/SGJfiigrfae,rit;izg NUIJEG-15,3 7, }'art '2; /~ec@.n JI; 3;' ."~espii:atory Pf'.qt~9tjon 1J.rogram/' §ia(es ,, i 1 1*: : '._. ;, '. ~.' '.:;~:tl:iat the app!(carifs~a1l q~scri6e: 'Siirv~illari(£requ}tem(mts,. tnclud~ngpfel!i,ttijve,ianilcprre,cfiye ,' ; ' ; ! I . ,, : 1;'?Jlaint~~'.1nc<f an,(! peYfo/mpnc<{testinfI, tq *~nf/tre't~aUhe '.v'eiitilatl?n:' and.ck.ntain.n1en~ fY~tem~ op~~qte' :,,f .I . , ;, !;when-required and are within (he_irdesign'spei::ijications.:: * *, " *, :.:* ' ,\, :* 1 ,_ '~ *.*. j, 1 ,, i' - ,. . , ,. , , . . , - '* , . " , -* , , + ', "' " *~ * ** . ' , , , ._ ~
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- I
" * *" ;:tv~lfi(fIP~,Secti_on 4: JA.5, ?rrq,piqtei[T/i~ge/ R<{ceip(:A.r.(fa,*." ~tates tha( the ir.r,qdiated!arge/ receiptj l .*- . : . :* i!~a.Y. vj,il(.~e des~gned.,tqpper,ate, as a?one {I airsjJac~ rjuringfuel,elen~entu~iloadi~Ff procedures aYld * , *f } ** " . *, ;" . , ./l)!~erz the}Jorcell cover, bloqk* is removetifdr maJntenance,' Tab.le 't/.~5, ,~'Facility::Ar¢as pna:Respeetive '._., ~'* ,*, *. :*. , 'v*itl'1confinemeni.Zones;'i! *~*, .'.. *'~*' .. ' in:Sif* c~oiz "'.'* ") 4.;,IA:~ $ta,ies th/!.baJ)Wi/l:J..,,.;
*,".'.* ,', ., i ;"* ,,,J bftefate efS aZpiie [V afeaYA{or~' !;. *"'l*>'o'{>,,1 ~}',.,,,,_., ,;, *1 ~ *'<!'d' tnfo~n!dtio,b b;,1* *~ '. ,,*-1*
l; 1;: :*. * : :, : .. . },'-\!~~ ~~e~ed"f;~ µ~d~r~t1n1 ~~rif i'!~~f~~1?!~~f:t°'1a~r~t~f~e t~e ~afrJ~(1¢J<?f 8~~1J:rz~~:etztpn. /~~~iqt:[qti:ve \ :~;
;:"*'~'":*;;/"""-""""**' ;~fl(~r;_i;!,~~1;f;!!Jff.:~f!.!!:.~'L.<;,,~~~<J..L".'.:c_{., ,,,.,~..:'~>"~-";" 40:*.:*', ~,, .;;; ,;.,,c-::~"-: s:"-'~i.--f;;_,,,":,,;,,:_.*~" ..z,..,_,u.;;~;.be_:!:;_L,;_-~£~ {:,;~J
- RAI 11.3-1 ai
- Pefc'i'ibe how. these .iondi di.ffe~ences ar<j managed, how the changes will be evaluated; 'anapdste4 ;; ' ' ' ;
ft..-* ~ =*-_::...,...:.....,...____ .;...____,el.~w- -..:..~::r-=--.,. ,,__:_,..~~-:-** .,.;,~*--""""'..;;-,.; __.,....,.~.,.:.-.,,,,.-......;,"'*~ c-~-,;.,=---1.*'.,,;~,:.*.,,.-~,--~.---;....,,..;,..~,_,.;;!. ;..;,-:.~.,:;.i._:,.:,., .+..,,,.';,,,.,....1;,~.~,..,~~- .... ~:~.;:...b..,-_.';:.~.:;,..;-.;,..,.:;;_,::..,.... . ::._.;.:_,..;~,.-.:~.;.,.+. ..~.::-..:..:.,.. .s::.;_..,\;:;.::::;;._d..:.,J,;"'__'.};~~~;..,)) jTue preliminary design and analysis of the RPF ventilation system ensures that no uncontrolled release ofi
/airborne radioactive material to the unrestricted environment could occur during normal operational !
!states and to mitigate the consequences of design basis accidents (e.g., maintaining a series of cascading !pressure zones to draw air from cleanest area to the most contaminated area of the RFP). In addition, the )preliminary design indicates that the distribution and concentrations of any airborne radionuclides are !limited by operation of the ventilation system so that during the full range of facility operations, no !potential occupation exposures would exceed the design bases (e.g., 10 CFR 20) derived .in PSAR jChapter 11. 0. The pressure relationship between the four ventilation zones and ambient atmospheric [pressure is presented below. izone IV will be the cleanest zone and is slightly positively pressurized with respect to atmosphere. iZone IV is independent of the other three ventilation zones. Zones I, II, and III will potentially be
!contaminated areas, with Zone III being the cleanest of the potentially contaminated areas, and each !subsequent zone being more contaminated and having lower pressures, as shown below:
i Pzone I <Pzone II< Pzone III
\The Irradiated Target Receipt Area and the Irradiated Target Truck Bay are two different areas in the 1 (RPF. The truck bay is where trailers will be rinsed before entering the receipt area, where the cask will bei !removed from the trailer. The Irradiated Target Truck Bay is Zone IV, while the Irradiated Target * !Receipt Area is normally Zone III. Details of how the Irradiated Target Receipt Area will transition (between Zone II and III during operating/maintenance activities will be provided in the FSAR as part of ithe Operating License Application. ~~~'~'.!~~~~~~t:s~ifE~'~i:~~~~i~;iif~~~~~~~~~~¥~~Y.~:~~~i!KiJE~;.~~~~~~:G::{J;iI:;z1r~~;;r~r;:.=:rg~ !Tue Irradiated Target Receipt Area will be occupied by at least two workers during cask sampling and i jmovement of the cask to the cask transfer tunnel. .:~::. ~.:.:.;.;~'.." ::.:::::~:..:.:.;:::.;;,'.:'rM~ "'.........=-*~--_;;;:::~~<~::~*..:~~-::::::..:::::';;".';;:::~--:;_::~:::-:.:.:';_.,;:'.;:'::....-:=',;'.;,:;~:.:.:,::::_;.::;.-;;~-°4-'---;.::-:.-:~.:~.:'.~---::.-._-::_.~ ..;.*::-..~..::::::.:...:*~:"'.:':'_..:.~'.!-_;:--;: ..,...;'.::;.~ ";"=:::!_:;.": ;:.~-::;,. :;.~_.;. ~~:::=.:.:=~.:.:..**.::::::.:;..~
75 of 96
~~****~~:NWMI NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 . :~~-~!':
- NllRtllWEStt.!tDl:CAl ISG10P£S Re uest for additional information fRAI '.11.3~2 'j'Sectiop *2r;h9p2 o/IQ CFR .:P~iiio ~st~blish~ipo~ting ;:~q~i;e,h~~tsfor-~~di~timi~~eas; *qt~bor~~-:. *.;-
- o_,;. ". ' :'.r,adipactiviiy ai-_eai.arid r;ireas'or rqoms'in which licen~eil m{Jt~rfq/.is ufed or stored ,, ' ' '
t . - [:TIJ.e JSG Augmenting NUREG'-'-153 7,,: Part-2, S~ctio'wJl. ~. state; thatthe applicant will insta1l .. !.* , .iappr9priately'sized.ven'tilati'on and containment>>systems in'ar:.eqs of thepl,ant identified as having' '
-~:: ' , . ', :*" "fj}otefltiatairbprne :co~ceritrationi'bf~adtbnitclides that. c'ou(d ~xceed'the occupatioq~l deriv.e4 G_ir',,~ ' '
- i}conceiztr~tion,yafu~s specified jn). O_ C.FR:Piir~.20; ."St!zriiiards for Profection" agaihst Radiation/" i . '-
. ' (, <'.* ' \~pp<mdix B,. "AJnua! Lfmit~* 611'1rfrake}ALv iindDerfvedAirConceiitY:ation~ (DA C) ofRadiohucliaiis" l' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' *' . ' '"" ' ' ' " " ' ' "* '< '" ' , " """ " ' " ' ' , "" " " " , * .;ifqr Occupational Expoiure,' Effluent Concentrations; C9ncentratimis for fleteasf! tQ Se:tt:erage." , *,._,
P. * '* . * * *,, c. ** c ',
,. . . '.iNJ!1W PSAft Secti.on!J).2, ~'Sys(emDeschpti~r{"stdtes that_t~'efafilityve11tila?ioh system will .. ', ~!
- , ' , i'.f!i,aif}fain a ~e.lje~ Ofc_ascading pre{JSJ,IJ'.<f
- ~oijes_ (<>df~. arr Jjom/he ~Jeqnest a~ff!,S of~he/acf{ifJ
- fO :t/ie. :i
- r. 1 :mo~t c01;itaminatedareas. ZQ,n~ 1Vi!:ilf.bc; a,pfea'! zpf}g tha( is)n,d~p_<{iul.ent, oftfae*other yehtilqti~n * . A
- I' ~ * * .. /
- zo_nes: :Zomdll will.be' the c1~anest ofthe:poteiltially c;ontaminatefi,ai;eas, With each. SJJb~f!qu~i:lt~one, ... 1;
!" :*" * ' : .J.;beifig more'coniaminaie'f;lanq Havtng tower j;resSllres. Mo're information;is.neededdo.determim;the, : :; i* .,**. * ** :fadequaCjiofthico/:ifineinen(i:indradiOactiV.,empteriqltontaminatiofi*contr,61.: .", * .. _ *. * ' r
- \'.~= '
- -':'.:'~~--: .* -*': .: . : : - :~:. -: -:'..-_.-. ;.-: :. ;~ ;-:'_:~ -:::~ ~*::. ;_:;,:: :;'. : ;.: -:;,. : 7;' ..'.-~.~ r~:_;:."_*:;;;.'"::":*:.<~-:,..i .-:.~:..;:;: //'::.,,..::; .:i::.:.'.*-:~¥ *-.,d-;:*:: --.ft:.:~.".';t.':' .,;:;;..:'~~.::.-~;~*!-* ~~~-':,."7';~*..,~:;,;;*:;:;.;.;.;;.~.;.:::-::!:"0:-,;1 -:.:;;;.*.;;_~:::. ~"':'/.:.:..,.*;;_-,:- .~ ;:;::: :-;.' ::"'::
1RAI 11*;3-2a:Descr1b~ the process-whereby NWMI will maintain these ven'tilation ZQnes.in regards to contamination. : '.:', ,. ,., .._ * :.*" - -""'"~"~-:,..*_-....,,..~.~-.<-* t.,,.:...;, ...:,. : -,._. ,_. .,.. .,_ .._,.__ ...._~-~..,~. ;h*;*'.::*.,,.,;,...,_."-:,. ~-,~.--r!i*,,.r-t---*._...,_.,.,....:,.,..._;_-*,,~**, -~-;;..-,~*.:-:~~_..,..,,.-**. ~.,~*: . *...,,-,::-:c~~ ..!/.-..,-,~ *.,,._ - .:~-:-~.~*,~,,-:..,*,-. ~ *.: .. ---;==----,:*.-,..;*-,.~:---=- -~-,"';:'" '- .- ..,...,.,_ ~ *, The preliminary design and analysis of the RPF ventilation system ensures that no uncontrolled release of'.
- airborne radioactive material to the unrestricted environment could occur during normal operational
\states and to mitigate the consequences of design basis accidents (e.g., maintaining a series of cascading
- pressure zones to draw air from cleanest area to the most contaminated area of the RFP). In addition, the
!preliminary design indicates that the distribution and concentrations of any airborne radionuclides are
- limited by operation of the ventilation system so that during the full range of facility operations, no
- potential occupation exposures would exceed the design bases (e.g., 10 CFR 20) derived in PSAR
- Chapter 11. 0. The pressure relationship between the four ventilation zones and ambient atmospheric
'pressure is presented below. !zone IV will be the cleanest zone and is slightly positively pressurized with respect to atmosphere.
- zone IV is independent of the other three ventilation zones. Zones I, II, and III will potentially be
- contaminated areas, with Zone III being the cleanest of the potentially contaminated areas, and each
- subsequent zone being more contaminated and having lower pressures, as shown below:
Pzone I <Pzone II< Pzone III 'The RFP will maintain ventilation zones in regard to contamination and radioactive material
- contamination control. In the context of describing ventilation zones, it is common to separate zones
_commensurate with the work being performed, radioactive materials present, and the potential for 1 radioactive contamination within each zone. Details of the facility ventilation system provided in PSAR Section 9 .1.2 were intended to meet this philosophy. PSAR Section 3 .1 provides the codes and standards
- that the ventilation system will be designed to.
'The RPF preliminary design of ventilation and containment systems was developed to ensure the
- sufficiency of the principal design criteria, design bases, general arrangement, and approximate
,dimensions sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the final design will conform to the design !basis. The final facility design of the ventilation and confinement system will be described in the FSAR ',as ~at!()f the_ (?,p~~~~illg;_!':-ic~~~ ~~l?~~-ati.?~:._. __ . ____ ,, __ ~ ... _ _____ ....-,, ........ _. ~ _ .. - _--** ,, _ __ _ 76 of 96
.:;:.;:. NWMI NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 *~!~.~!:*
NQftllMUTlmltWISOTOPES Request for additional information
- ! RAi' 1-1~3-lQ1;De~c~ibe, the i':qd~ents:ofpotenliatconta,Jzlhatioh s~para~ingeackzone."** ! .>:... ' ' ~. ,:" ' .: *. '.' : ' ' \ ' ,.. t
~---.-:O,*i'".:- ,:-.~*,-..---,_'..._,,._. :-k:.-'~~_,,,,.,. ~-v*,'.:,._..., .! n.-.;"'.':"**.,,.,;-. **-'-":"<:,:-._* _,_,, :::.-~!:, ""'""*~- .... ,..:'~ _ . ,,.~.-->:: ,*, ...,- ~- ..:~ ,~ "-r;/>\"... -<<~""C:".,..~C*.;... c,,.,,-,~....&;.....r*;t~,,.;.,.., J-~:~-.:'-f'°<~ ,,,;l)r'."' -n',,,+ ,-,~.;,._,.., ,;,.,, .r:.".'f,.::,,~_,,;..,~,,]!~._,,'.;!,* : ** :~ .*,,,,.~!-.--*~-;2.,.. *"'..-!Y* ~ ~-- :: ~\~-*-" _:.'.;'.: iThe preliminary design and analysis of the RPF ventilation system ensures that no uncontrolled release of' iairbome radioactive material to the unrestricted environment could occur during normal operational '.states and to mitigate the consequences of design basis accidents (e.g., maintaining a series of cascading
- pressure zones to draw air from cleanest area to the most contaminated area of the RFP). In addition, the
\preliminary design indicates that the distribution and concentrations of any airborne radionuclides are
- limited by operation of the ventilation system so that during the full range of facility operations, no
- potential occupation exposures would exceed the design bases (e.g., 10 CFR 20) derived in PSAR
!Chapter 1 LO. The pressure relationship between the four ventilation zones and ambient atmospheric
- pressure is presented below.
iZone IV will be the cleanest zone and is slightly positively pressurized with respect to atmosphere. !Zone IV is independent of the other three ventilation zones. Zones I, Il, and ID will potentially be
;contaminated areas, with Zone Ill being the cleanest of the potentially contaminated areas, and each isubsequent zone being more contaminated and having lower pressures, as shown below:
Pzone I <PZone II< Pzone III iDetails of the facility ventilation system provided in PSAR Section 9 .1.2 were intended to meet this (philosophy. PSAR Section 3.1 provides the codes and standards that the ventilation system will be
!designed to.
I
!The RPF preliminary design of ventilation and containment systems was developed to ensure the !sufficiency of the principal design criteria, design bases, general arrangement, and approximate !dimensions sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the final design will conform to the design ;basis. The final facility design of the ventilation and confinement system will be described in the FSAR ias part of the Operating License Application. ,~----- *--*:-"**-*-, :..--., *. - **--:-{;-~ .:.* *-....:-*:..:*.~--- ;-.-**-;,--,...:;;....~.- *. :..-~-,, *- --~-'-*-"--'Y-i;.'<-" <*/.._._, *-* ~ ',-<.: __:.,.:;; <:*-*--:.:...-:.'"':.:*-~ ***~*,::._ :;...,-:.;-:*~"---. ~~::.'.'"1~F~---.;....'." .-C';'.""'"""-:-4 *~;:*;--~---r-.;~.--':,:_...,..::,-;'.':';1:-';-"".':'.~:;.---:-~~;;~----;;rr-",.:'-T.~*-;£>*" ~.--?,,***,~- )'.* RAI 11.'.3-J;*i*S'.ecqon 20.1701' ojl'O C:F'RPart 20 states thai \ , , * , * " _ * * * * * , ~
the app,lica~t .' ** *, shall'itse, to. the extent pfaci:ical, prqcess" .;l1
' ' ' ' '" , r '.
- 1
,- 1' ; " '< **
1 * **: * ** :;or.other engineering controls td*pontrolr{l.dioacµve nfat7rialin qir::: . * : *. , * .: . :* :, ._: : * *. .'*.*. :;
- ' " ;J .* '-. ". -, . ' <"',* ___ ,** *,~ *, ', *'" :*"'.*' --..:~. ;*',,\' - ',,,,?, '*;/, ....., __ '~*! -~**"'"--**' *," '.;. ,' **,**:- .,'::*~ *, *, '\, '/ ;,, *'.*
/,: ** . .liT/ieJ!;G Augineniitig lf((JWG-1537; Part,;2, :Sec;tioid J.3,. statei ~ha( the.tippliclint;~iq qes¢ribe:fhe'. , *1
- ..J. . . ... ;!criteriafor the veri~ilation ll,'nd containment~siefl:s, includi~g mi'ri~/num J!o,w 'vt?,.locitY ,a( openings in:. * , /,
. ' ' . ::these systems, maximum differential pressure. across filters, and types offilters to ~e._used .... ! ......', *, ; '* * (NWAfi.PSAR 'sec;~n .9.1, .He~ttng, V~ntilad~n, and Air; Conditiontng Systems,:" states that the 1
Iµ>; : *,1
- ~~ , . ,,, .:;4e,~ignfea(ur~s en~,ure that,qjiflow anq.rela_tive pr.e,ssure.willpreyent inadvertent diffzisfon. or:other,. ..!
r"; '. '. ':. *.
;. , , ,;HIJCCJ,fllrolledre~eas.e. ().( airbolJ:}e, rad_ioactiye;>>zatf!rial:jrorirthe RfF;:7;7ie facility.is, also desigf!ed'alid : { *;:operated to e,nsure* that no µncontrolled release ofairb01;n.e radioactive.material to tf!.e unrestricted . '. ;, . , * * * ,"/jl<!nv~r?nn~~~fp4'1 ~qcl!r. ¥0.r~* inJ_ormatiort/~ JJee~ed to de,tetminf!, th~ adequacy, ofihe 9~nfinen.1enf.and : , 1:1~radwactive .
matenal contan~mation con_tro/.
'J'.Descfike the,criteriafor,the ventilation. and.containmenf.systen1s;' including 17ltniniilmflbw velocity al ::1 ,; . ., *:-1'.opening~in these systems, n1axinium differen(ialpressurk across'jilfers; andtypes'ofjiltersio*be us~d . f !'o'i.":.:c.!.,*-**,o~*" ___;_ :.,..;t.J L*,.~~::,.,.:*" - --*":.',.- -<*~*** "":"l'~ ,*-:*.-**---. *.-:-. :**~ .:"_.,..-~...... ._r"'"1**.:.~:~ ...,,.,,,_)*..,~.* "'."t:"" ~:;; "'°'"~o**.:;*c'-.~ *l~i* *~:-:cd'O..,..,....*h.~nn-;;....,_;.,,,,\,_,.,\!,~,-,.,/~,,.,, -~-.. .,._,.;,...,l.,_ ....'...:.:.- -:..,~ .....:.+. ~ 0.~_..,.,:.'°',......~.~:... ,..~:;~,_,,l.,r;.;.,,.,'";,.... 'li--::.-"'C.:..,",_.*,'.;,.:.r'".h..;--~. ;.:;
IPSAR Section 3 .1 provides the codes and standards that the ventilation system will be designed to. The 1detailed ventilation system criteria, including minimum flow velocity at openings in each zone,
,maximum differential pressure across filters, and types of filters to be used (e.g. HEPA, high-efficiency ;gas adsorption [HEGA]), will be provided in the FSAR __as part of the Operating License Application. ' __ -"-<" ,.- -_.,,--:.. _ --- , --.- ":::" "_._,,..,_, --....<. '- **- *~.: .:<:.".*.:.. -._. *~-~*: ** *-~-.,,- ....-....._ ** ~--:.-.*.~. . .-- -='* ~-._::.-:.~*-*=*=*- <.t...c_.:.~. _<;-.... *.~=.~*"" ~*-~ ~.,, ~ "'::'*::c. .* v. ._~~*-o.~,-- --~- --- *-~~,.;!.*.* _._.,,,.._. ~"-"1"-.t:-.~- .*~....:-
77 of 96
. NWM I .-;~*~;:. ....... ~.*.*
NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0
-:_~~-~~:. Nttlltu\YESTJJmtCAl ISGTDPES CHAPTER 12.0 - CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS No. Request for additional information ~ra;.~~fr~~~~~=;;;::~~~~:;~~;~'r~1~~
- 1 *. , ,, ' * * ;JJro,g;cz,"J to,~~ ppplr ed/o /he/lr;srlfn, J.a_Qf'.l{}atro,n, ,<;()nstruction; a11d,tespng ptm'! ~t;ucture,s/ sy,stem,~
- . :*
\.:*. _ . *\'.d1cf f:~l!!p~n,erzts'o~ih¥fac(lftY:, ), .. -> , ..*;. ;. .::* -.;_ ;,;::;*\ :_*"): '.~ :'"... :,:.*. "*_..**~ -~":. .*::'.:'. :, :: :. * ::*::
- - . . '" -: ~i;Sfi:ction_70,.4 of~ Q*CJiR.l/qrt 70. d1fiires.Jl~{}F$ 'rl,~* "strucfuYt~$. S)lftelflsi eq_u'ip/h~rrti qq11ipo~errts;;.in?q <h h* ,, , * .. ~* ;'!((Jqtiyities ofjJ.ertf~'!n.~l_.tflqt fi:.~. ~e{~e.g :o?J: ~?PfeV~~fpot,~l1ti~l ar:c~°<J~IJ,;ts_qt a_(.qcH!_ty.fth~t-~9~ldJ~.xc~.lf<.f' ~" )
- ;'.. * : I': :. : ~!th,e pe:f9r,mm:zp7 fg_qup:e,11_l~nt~.:!!1 §ZQ. 6[9r..lP. 17lrt1gat,~ ,f(J,ezr P<:tef!.~191. R.011,fegpep,ces_. T!te,.[SG . , *:'.. .;. . *, ,~
. \:, * *~* .. ' ~- !itiug11_lehtingNQREp..1~37~~'Pm:t ,!, .,s,tates;t~ift.~~et~n~ ihl(P¢r£orm,i;r~ce, req~lretnl![!fs in) OX;FR ;io"'~(.{ ,:*... ., ... '.: *:Ja~efu~t~MuiY,ed,by r~~?a_~iJJJ; b:~l.fh/iY~~;fµS:r_ qf qsc{(Je~i c/J'!~eqµe11s~/!~A li~Jif1/qcJ, ~Y,i~~f,i1~.:cq.~1~:f * . ,, '<<(\ .;.*;'be~: found acceptable.by the>NRC stcif.f ; _:- -.,: . 1.: . * * ,;*', ~. *~ ~*r_ ./_.,_,.,.,°,~ .'.,: ,~,.*-,:"**.'.' ...':::* ,-'" .*".'**: ';":*.h:j *;.**.~, *r.\~*,.*1,,~* ;*~Q :*1,~** * * . * ~- -, ' *: , *~. '* "*:**. .-;.:_r_"":-"*:*"* " ** " -;*: :~~:. ~-:,* ,~ * ... l'.NWMJ.!s'(2Aprbgram dejin_es Q4 ~eve! hiteijis as inc;,luding those items in which failwe 'of mf;zlfunct,ion !~ -~ *. *'.cotildfndi~el;tly' result ifi:*a c'ofzaitionthatadVerselj affects workers, .thi p'uli.lic, and/or envirorirll,e.n(as: ! '. ' .: ~::1;~~scribeq_:in'l; O.CF_f?- *~o~?L1,The fail~r~ of:a Q4,:I;evel_2.jtefr1, .in cpiijurkn'()ri w~th ihf! fai!w:~*ofan '.'.. ,,; '*:*;< *:':a,ddi~op~lfte_m;:*coulqre~lt i~: Cf Jzigh, or- ir/ter,11Jed,iate'conseqi{e17p~.::Al( b_uil{lingcqnd.structur.e*Il!.O.F,S*., *;
- ~* ";,. * ., *associated withcredible e:iterhat*events are* (2A1Level Jo: '(2A *Bevel J items.also include those :attributes 1, 1*' * '. :!oftt~ms that' could iiiteract'.with.'IROFS due' to a seiSrri;~*"eve~t;*cind ;dsu.Jiin high gr inte,",;,e<fiate,'. , *:*i, l~
- .._.,, *rr.
.*:'i 1consf!quehc~sas'iies~ribed:inJOF~70:6C . ",. * \ ' . '"ll*'-+. - i~',,, * .. *~ .~:::>.,,}. _*"*-*-i* ,_"_** .. ';.'~,>" ..**.-.:*>~ .. ~- .. J."~,_:*****,.*,'_'>".'*'.'.- . .'*-~.'. './ >>* :: * ."" * ,c...- , _ .' . *~ ,~ * :*.:i J~ '-. . . ',. ' i?1WN£1 P,;SAR, deschptibn_ of(2A. Level/ JROf.S'.dpp?arS'.to_'C;nZ-j: incluaii'structures1Additio~ar ',/ *. ~ j , .* , * . df1forination is nee'ded, to *uhd?rstandth'e applicability ojthe.(2A pldn to othirlROF.S besides stru.ctures. ;.
- !\- ..* , * '"~r::-:* _.;* ~ *_ . _~:.: .:*:"'~" *": _~:,, -.r * .,1,.;: : :: ~--" .. "' '" ~" .. ,.;* '*:_t-' :'..-*~ -*:.i-:~; ~:*- *.* ".- :"-.:.._;: **; *., '-~ -:) **_.:. _2.s -_~.' ";~; ,: _. \~:*: '-~:~ -_ t,,j~'_,'.'_ :*_ -.... ,:_, :--,- :- .. :1
!*" : . .:"., .;: \,C,lm;ify_:_the scope 6fl_RQf!£aqqt?Sf¢ddjY.fhepppl,ic/1fl.t:s, (24,pr.~gr~m'qf1d.4e~q[il5.!! (lie,appljqpqility;of;)
- ,,*,_'.,.~_;_L.,
- l1!!!!2:_'Jf;g1sz?J: ~}~~!.~?/E~:~lf;:i~£~li:~f~t/~?./!~~F/J!l::,~~tl!f!lIJ!.ff2~;~~-'P££~~r:t~~~,rc:~[1~f2:,'.;*~~,:,,fJ 1
- Tue QA Plan will be revised to clarify the difference between QL-1 and QL-2. Section 3.5.1.3 was imodified to reflect the changes in the quality level definitions (Attachment A). The basis for the
- difference in QL-1 and QL-2 is a graded approach to quality, by which the level of analysis,
- documentation, and actions necessary to comply with a requirement is commensurate with the safety
- significance. The graded approach permits the implementing organization to focus resources on those
~activities that are deemed, by qualitative analysis, to reduce the associated risks and hazards. The (activities and tasks are performed in accordance with approved implementing procedures.
- The graded approach to quality is a process by which the level of analysis, documentation, and actions
- necessary to comply with a requirement is commensurate with the safety significance. A graded approach!
!permits the implementing organization to focus resources on those activities that are deemed, by ! 1qualitative analysis, to reduce the associated risks and hazards. Activities and tasks are performed in accordance with the quality level definitions.
- Quality Level 1 will be applied to IROFS (SSCs and activities). IROFS are QL-1 items in which ;
failure or malfunction could directly result in a condition that adversely affects workers, the public, l and/or environment, as described in 10 CFR 70.61. Quality Level 2 will be applied to safety SSCs that are non-QL-1 SSCs. Some of the required characteristics may be examined less rigorously than for QL-1 items. Quality Level 3 items include those items that are not classified as QL-1 or QL-2. QL-3 items are controlled in accordance with standard commercial practices. 78 of96
.:,;.-.;~. *.~* *:.*
NWMI NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. O
. ~ ~~.:!':. NORTHWESTUintCAlmJTOPil No. Request for additional information cd,'[,,"'.;*ic:,i~'.;*:<<*::'!'.;'f*',<;:.~~~~;.~~** .. :" . .. **.:.,,"'f',,>_*<::J
!l RAI c.2.3*-1 /~N$15. {itat~s (hat the. n~er;lfor or~the'use 'ofqJ:ilijicaiion tests sl:iallbe a~jined in *dforni~ite;ipla~ : t S J h'. . ,,, * * * :/ha.t s~ai(. -~~c;~u~~-appf~priate ~cc,ept~nfe cri,fer{a a~d sha{l ~~monstr~te: t~e a~~qu(lcy'.?fpe,tfoY;man¢e .;
- i_* * .* *.~nder CC?.~fdztwn~ that sz_mu_late _the most, adverse 4<:szgn cond1tiqn,~.. Te.st refUlts shqJI be ~ocume~ted* *. ,
!I r. *. *: .: . ~~ ~;gnd ew;ilu._iftea_*!Jyth,e r¢sponsi~le design organii,gtio,n to asSµte:th~t te,§t requ_ir.eme1tts hiiveb~_f!rii~et.: .. \ f,:, : ..* "* : . ;;1f!!¥,'s.~f!11 fi~_'!_<?tf~9~{cle.f~!Vffti5:.:~[i~)~i,9. ~!ll b,~-1~rtf~~~po.~:_it, ~~-ifi~~mo.r~tttq:9~./hf! f2,ARf.Oltrf.'11':~ l . . .
- f:jlarify whether NWMJ int<}nds'lo perform qualijicatipn testing or /he ,11eed<to d<!.ni<msr~qte. the .:.:-. * :: .: . i r
\ * .. ,
. ;;adequacy_ ofp_'erfqrmance ofsystep1s, *struc_titres_ or compo~wnts u'rJder condjtiops th gt si'!zu{ate tl:ze .mos}:.: .,. ... */;adverse rJrts!gn c~n,ditions. For .examp~e, ifit is required for a.ny type ofqualification testingfor an ' ' " );ii}enpfied IROFS atfrJQg t!Je co,~sfrl!ctionperiod,: ho"": wil! ~hi~. be s,tdtirJ in fhe. QA Pr?gfam.' ' *~ . ' I
~--;* ~~~~ ':.- '""" __ ..___ -\,.,,-,:--"'°' -r~Pk::f!..*- ;:;.,,,,,.,._.....,-,:,,,....,_,,.,,;:.,_~,._-::.. -~'-~ ..1~~;'- * .,.......,,._)._. !.,.,.'::-........,_,--.~ ,--,- 1 ~..:.~-- d.;:p,.,_,._, :_"'~"---.-'..., !......,,_,..,....,.. -~;-*, .,!-,,,,_,_ .....,..::_..~_,. ~..,;;_,.--~,!.- ~-1~.;,:--r*~ 0...-...-::-'......!.1._-. ___ _,.,..1,, *_,
- i. Qualification testing will be performed to demonstrate the adequacy of performance of SS Cs under .
!conditions that simulate the most adverse design conditions. Formal testing or analysis will be required to: !verify conformance of designated SSCs to specified requirements and demonstrate satisfactory
- iperformance for service or to collect data in support of design or fabrication. Test results will be
~documented and evaluated by a responsible authority to ensure that test requirements have been satisfied.
iComputer programs used for operational control will be tested in accordance with an approved iverification and validation plan and will demonstrate required performance over the range of operation of
/the controlled function or process. ~-.-"~-¥(' ..- ~,,;;;;;,.. lf.* t ~*-~*":'""*; ~~ r..,-r,.;,.,1;-.r.-.-*;;:, ~-,,.,**.;.*...:,_o **~".:".:.-:,;;.~-:".;.",;;..'..:<.<..'o"*:- ."'- '**".l."l-;>:"."***, ,;;_;._,._p;.:,;(,.*._;**'M"**.;::_* i*?"-';:..>"**::p" f~****-. ~:;:..*,,...¥.~--'.:-;* - --*(r-:Y.:.."*~-,,~*-*~--'- .;!*'!*"*';:.'Y'~-/~"""'-~ ~~f-'-Jt-:.....-*' ,,-*.-:.,_ -.;l--~ _,;.*<<-. 7*-'f)~/*~ ~
- f';..' - - **l
\ ~I c:~:3*2 jJAN~. 1.~* ~:stat~~ /~_a( w,~e~~ ~ ~ikJ!.ifigqnt.1es,ilJI! cha12~eJ~.rze~l!~S,<I,iJ::be_~a<<~e,, ot,~ri.f:zc~r;~£?d'rfes!$h~Jhft. \
'.: ' * . ::design pr<Jcessanqverificatzon procedurtt should.be reviewed.and modified asnec:essary. * . , * . ;
\ '., . . . )d.vJflMJ's QAprogram.does~l1otprovide details orihd'W'desfgfz change~:a~~*ba~fured, aof:umented; ~ha*) . :\li;.9r,ztto~ dtfring,th~ con.stru.c,tion,per:iod and howih~s ,:w,i/l 'ira,11sition to."tlie ope;afio,1~per{od::;*,,. ;, ::'* ' .J '.1 *.
f ~ *:. ~'.ciarlfY wheth~; Nff'A16nt'endstoprovide, th'at when~asii/-fi.fic9~id~stin/:hm1gf! Is n,ec~iefcwybeqpuse. ,_* 9 -!'* :* ) 'i\ofari ihd)frect"des(gn;':th(i ~esi#f'process and v(/fijicatioh propedu're should b(revtewed and rnqdiji'e'd: !(.: .;. . .'* . .. :*j)9s neqess~ry..Fo~;ex<Jl?!Ple'fot ~ill :~nJi.desi'grl cha'Jge b~, doc;tnie,1Jted,'ilr track¢if.~ur~ngth~: '. , '*: *.:-: .
\ *: * .<constry.tcqonpenod, _and_ho.w. will this ,b<J doc;WJl.~nt,ed (hru tf!e,,Q4 program,. .. . ~.~ ; ~ : .. )..,*:;,-~,.,.,;_* _...:~'-*.**.,';;_* \,,.,, -[.l,,_'.',,-~_.,."'.:o*-*.~>>:.:,_ :~ ,-.":".:-=:'!.~.-.";.,..;..~~\;;,:..0 -.,." **;"" * ~--,.>~;.,.- ...~_-;-:.,,..,.:*,,... . ._ :..,~'""'-'"-~.;:-J'-.-f!_.,.,.. .*_*. ~-:~"_~ .--k...;.;._-=--,~-~*- ,...<~...,..,....,.. ..*;~,.~_ ""'-~'~*~:** ...:....~~"_,....::.,._..,.,_~ *----~' ';,.,-7*'- .-."'=*- ,.,,,..,~~-c.~-~~-..~--*' .-~;_-:.~*~--
!Engineering change control procedures (NWMI-ENG-PR0-002, Engineering Change Control) have
- been developed for the RPF design and construction to ensure that modifications to safety-related SSCs, lor computer codes, will be based on a defined "as-exists" design. Changes to verified designs will be idocumented, justified, and subject to design control measures commensurate with those applied to the (original design. The control measures will include assurance that the design analyses for the SSC, or Icomputer code, are still valid. Where a significant design change is necessary because of an insufficient i.~e!i~ .~~.,~~,s_i~~J-?.r~c~~~,.~? ~~!1,!i"~~!i°.~ p~~c~d~r~.:V~~ ~ernvie':':ed. ~d ~°.~~e~.~s n~~e,~~ary.
No. Request for additional information li'ZJi:i2t~i::*.hx, ,4_:.**~i::*;c:@!;:; . *>*i'*';;,. '.~~~,~~<$~~~,:r::,<:.:,~,-** . :,;};','.~1;3,E*.-~\";*rj
*; RJl:I ~:2~ 11-1()1.JfSJ5.,8!ffates, :fl'I pµr.t, t!J(,i_t te~/i.ng,shlill incli!ile pro,totype' qualificatjon iesis;;prooftists prfor(o . ' :.f,
- r. ' . *.* *' '..-*<< litnstallatib'ii; andfunctional ieiis. ' ' ..' . ' . : . . ;' " , . , ' ' ; " :' . ., ' : , i:
. i~o/l's ~A progra~1 ~doe.s n?tpr~~ide_.the ~~tent or 'app~icabilitY,,of th~ p~grd~1 'to pr.oi~tY~°e c* ; . *:. Q4 1 ** ::testing pre*and postmstal/ation. . ": . ., .. *: .. ,::** * * .* "* * *. ' * * '*: . ;, ' I\ r ' '* ** ' ".. * * .,;, ' '. *.
- c. * *,'";.
1 ,,, ;* ;(i!qlj.fy, (he:scop~_.<;fte~ti'!~. ac~v/ti_e.s.. (e.~., pt:'q~?_typ~:<j".talificO:tion;te.st~, p~oojt~~ts:prro~ tq)i
... *. . ... ;;installation,functional tf!sfs} tf;.e applir;ant irite1~tl,s to'conduqtpnder th_e QA;pt;ogra!n., .**.,, _,_: '/-_ ~~ *......,,,:..-'-'"~--,.~*-'"'* -~. ..,,_,;.,..~._,*..\ '.. :.- *-~.,.,..-,.:]..,,., *.;.... 1~.i,;r"* .-.-:**.'.~**!':::. -:.>+ .,. .,.:. ;, .-:},.:.;.,:, . ~"'-:.:.,..&;*..,._,,..,,:.':'~'"""'~"""'" ;,.;,,;;;1~ *.--:,.,..,;:._--t;.,,,;.._.--*~-li'I, *..;_._,~~ ,,)""' * ~.~;.,..;.,__~ ,,_..,~_k,,~-**t;.*,.~;.-*.*>"' :..~.;._,.;...,~ ,,,.,_;.,.,.,-:£*,. -:-.z.~- *-".:';:~{.,...,..,. *; "'"~ , ., .;.,,, :,,',;(.,),~\ ..,,,.. """*"" '* ""'""'"°:'*
jTesting activities (e.g., prototype qualification tests, proof and :functional tests) will be completed under !the QA program of the organization that is completing the work. For example, the LEU prototypic target
!fabrication will be completed under the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, High Flux Isotope Reactor QA iprogram, and the fabrication of LEU targets for irradiation and processing at MURR will be completed t_~d~~-~-~.~~Q1,\prowan.i-: ........
79 of96
.:;. ;;:.NWMI -:9a****.*=*
NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0
* ';.~~-~!:*
NfilUM'h'ESTMEDtCALLSOTtlP£S Re uest for additional information . fr{AT 9;2.11*~2'{frW!Vfi.P.$4R:~ch.~ptdt:12!}~s#"P!! f5.iti2.*1~*,"cq~~i~~.s~fa:1-;~i. ;, ~a.ii~; iii'Pd;{/iiJ{"t~;t;c,;g *: *:,- T ,(.:. : ..... '.'shallinCll!de'yerificq(i(Jn tests;hardWdte irjtegrCitio~ tesfs, iri_1use.tests;_orpther_ tests as 8pecifi¢d by. ;. r il .. . ;/he citsfomr/r; :as approprttite. ~:,'. ' :. . .. . . ) .. *.'.' -~ {*;-' * . : 1'WwM1 '.:>,:QA pr,dgrq~;1o;~in,iJtpr¢y~de:_th~ ~p:t~~'t ar:.qppltca,bi!ity1,0f.the Qflpfog~a,11J t,r;i,,;ofaval'.~,,. * *, . t 1,:-. * *'.;appZ(ca.bi1tty an* these.tests,orthe ~i!thorttjrespolisiii1efor sucii V.!!rifi6atton. *, *. :**
- _:. * ._ >> '; .._.* * !
1
* ~c.;*::~~f;f~;~~f:;3~~~;rl~~~~idi~~~?:~~~~!i!~:'TJ~E~.j iComputer software testing will be required by all suppliers to verify and provide evidence of the quality
- of their software products. In addition, methods to control and approve supplier-generated documents
- will be established. Based on the complexity of the product and importance to safety, NWMI will
- independently verify the quality of supplier's product using source surveillances, inspections, audits, and .
!review of supplier's nonconformances, dispositions, waivers, and corrective actions. NWMI-QA-PR0-029,; 1 ,Testing, identifies the process by which computer software testing will be completed. The software requirements review will be performed at the completion of the software requirements
- documentation and will ensure that the requirements are complete, verifiable, consistent, and technically
.feasible. The review will also ensure that the requirements will result in feasible and usable code.
- During software testing, the design as implemented in code will be exercised by executing the test cases.
- Failure to successfully execute the test cases will be reviewed to determine if modifications of the
-requirements, design, implementation, and/or test plans and cases are required. The code will be .validated and verified to ensure adherence to the requirements and that the software produces correct
- results for the test cases. To evaluate technical adequacy, the software test case results can be compared lto results from alternative methods, including analysis without computer assistance, experiments and
'tests, standard problems with known solutions, or confirmed published data and correlations. ,.,,,. ,.,,, " ,> .." ' , . ,*..* *. . . ""'"'"'""'".,O.,,'>**v. ,..,,,,.. '*~'" ',_..,,,,'" ,.,,,.... ,, '>>'"***'"""'*'*' ,,,.,,,..,.,-""" '*'"*"'*'"'*'*'>'>>=-**>>*"*-""******~"'*"'" No. Request for additional information
~&:-*£_-/-:'...:.~~<-~::-~~~-~~'.?~~;~:~~:~**.*t~:****.:*E.t.-~,:. *:£2~ *;'~:-~,1,_c2~t5,;-;1;s:l:r!9,.l.~/ 1 __ :.f<fPBi;tt?~iPfDeflt,t,~~~qn,c{~of!5~m,e~tan~e,*t?f I.9-\F:~.f!~qte_:rr,~~(t~t~pa,.~apf~ies,;'.e;1;y~P,t:\ -!:' *. ' . . . :ras*~P~9(fi.cq{ly provrde,c1 ot?rr m:'f'arts,3 I; 34'.'35;:*39, yo, 60, *:~J, 6$/ 70'.'. or;P,ar,t_72 ofth!s ~IJppter, *"~
f') ;"7':'.lNfvlv/if$AJ?.,r:'ehd/;teij~,*'.~ecti~n-_cFif?'4;~"Nb>ic?~iqnfoihk{.c6liditihn/~'.~f~tei, ~1Wh~~ ~F1u.tie~-J
.:*:. l'.bY. coritraqt'or,. 'specificqtipn;Jh~nori.~cmfo1:rfi{ng.9ondilio71~*sh_all b,e; tr,alJsmi_tted,to: the, customerfor .) '*.. . . .:. i!evi1lu_ation as,d potentially tep01;taple co_iz{jitton under. IOC:FR 21. '1.._*_ .. ,: '..* . " .. . '~
}~":**.. *~ ~ ,c.'.~*""ll ~~."'J.~,:'** -~*-}-'">:""'* . : ';';_~.,,.,~~~,~* . $"'". ,.*,,'.'{_~,
*.. .:,'.._*' *,,*'~... ; ~:.,-,,..-' f ___~ . **-':;-* *~*-", , , -.'" .-~ !."'", --~ .:.-:*. *;* -,~
- RAI p2~15-1a)QlarifY the apjJ_licability of.IO CPR fart'21 tq)he app{icant. In* the sta,tement abov(from the*PSifR, r
. . "' .*. :: ,.*.;* il1t;app~ars)he *ti'pppcqbi!itJ:':of l{JCf'i{'fart21.'r~quireinen(s applji:to*anpfh~r rnttty/-* '. ......... ,,*." *, ,,.,.......,..,""~ ,...,,,~;~---2 ~.;..-~'. ~-+-!_.:,.- ..,., '* ---~~~--'"!"'*~:-:.*:"'~" ,__,..:: .:...* ~,.. _;:,:,-;--::-.;.._::.:-..:~:."'""""'.Ii.~--~--:.;,.- ._,_ .,,,_._~-"~";:...,;.;.:... .,_-£ ~-~.*-_.._;...,_,\;-<---~ <;:'. > :,.< . :: .~- *if ~-~~.J__.:.,_", ii-.;. ..,.~ --~-.r~*-'1S. i_'-,- .** .',,.:~.-. ~ _.:-.,..:.~-,*,-.......;,,.:. _..:-.~~-:--:--" .-.. ~~
- Tue requirements in 10 CFR 21, Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance," apply to NWMI as the '
responsible party for the RPF Construction Permit Application. This will also be true for the Operating 1 Permit Application. PSAR Chapter 12.0, Section C2.15.2.4, while correctly stating that NWMI will
;notify a specific vendor (as applicable), did not intend to imply that reportability requirements to the
- NRC under 10 CFR 21 would be passed to the vendor. Those reportability requirements fall under the
- responsibility ofNMWI. NWMI-QA-PR0-035, Identification and Control ofNonconforming Items,
\identifies the process by which nonconforming conditions will be identified and controlled. : ,..,rr;---**-~~-:-'""""7~~-*¥"'.'"'"'~";.,...---... -.*~7----~l""""'"'-~-e~'-"""r-:-:"'-:'""~~'f~'---**~-----;-:~7.'ll"l\"':'l""G'l'.r-"7':"f".'.'.*---"';\~-(la-C:-r,-:;';'-, ~'.;.~7~~*-f >.RA.I G2.15-1b' iiC]ari.fY*tM c:trcµmstance,s_if! whfch /O'<ZFR: farf21 ahd~0:55(e) wilfbe.applicabl'e to qnoth'er :7': * ::; !...... *:L . ,~~:_, ~ : _ . Ji~!!~L~.::. .:i~,'~'Ji~:.-~:~~:';:;,,:*__:~L :~2:.~:~ ~~<<.: .t: :_1L~: 'f. ~:t~~~{:~' *-~-~~~-*~:~'.:~~::Lt~-- _ :; :;3: *, :- . :.j ;NWMI, as the license holder of the RFP, has responsibility for reporting defects and noncompliance 'under 10 CFR 21. NWMI-QA-PR0-035 identifies the process by which nonconforming conditions will ;be identified and controlled.
80 of96
.:..*.~~-:.*:.NWM I NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 * ':.-~~-~!:' NMJH'MSl M£n!CAl.1SOTUPES No. Request for additional information
,:*,.* . .. ,, . . . . . . . ': ... , .. ~(Jll~-~ :~:~;.;*.2~FP-;:~0:;.9:;:;:3~*:s*:'.:%:. (*~EJ
- !~I *C2.17 .:1:1ANS,15. 8 stateS, that the [qua.lily] reciJrdS.sha/linclude. as a minifm,1m: inspection and. test results; :* .. :t
~. : . *... * .. *:;nesulis ofquaMiassitrance reviews, qUflliiy *qss(.q;a/iceiJrdcedt{re);,: and:engt/ieertng.'~.: : :'. *;* :* :.*.*~ ... *.*:t 1, . :.*::: ~ ~* **:i!mfMJfS,4k./:h~ple;:!2;.Secil,~n*9it7'.2;'..'.'~e4~trd.riie:~tS,, ;, *t~ies.th~t,~~hqfi~:don.~ia~/eqaq~dli~'. *: t
.f.'. , ..\ *. 1: * *~;feco,1;d. Wi{lb~;J'J,rQvided*i~ impfenz.erz~ingpro,c:_edures. BSJJR..Secti!Jf1) 2._ ~- '!Re~qrds,7* ~tC1t~~f~Clt. the, . . '.. ~:1, t!**" :. '.: ; ' . ,. :*' ;'recorrjsman,<Jgetn~ntpmgraJJl. will defi1.1e'f1rqce~s.fof'~iarfag~ng'.r..ec9raspnd will be cq,n,sistefJt;with thin'
\'- " . ' * *~' -::.. . );eq~irelh;eiJt ofappficclOle' regiJ~a'tfofJS.)t,a/so state~ ihat.fhe:id(!n'tijiqa(iqn; gefieraifofi..and . ,, f. . "'* *\ I, j :.*. * . '. * '~* *: ;1authenticat(on, *ljtaini~nance, *ana d!~Pd$.ittofi:ojrecpft:ls 11.Jilt ,be provide trr th~idfa~fdting.License. : , .. , t_~: ~ ~* .. . . . ;Application~: TIJere were no ,additional de_tails on how .the records fa~ the* cons1n1;ction, insta[latio_n and_~
- l * * , ;;other documentation are going to bi}, maintaine.d._ f'.urthermore; there is nQ c/arfjicati?n on the retention/'
s,:. i <<:. :} \;9f;periodoft'1~do_curhentsliStedabo~<P.*:;,:~*', *:: ! '*' *.,~ .. > <<*: ;, ~ :~,;;:. 1: .~- *:;.~: :: ' .. < >'.'1 t:* -~ *. : * ;* :*. . . ;;C;tqrify lftMtnlplemeniirig 'Proce(Jure~; /ii ~:.:nihim~~. '.aadr'cis; the. qbo~e 'liste_a:qa~litY .tecbrds*:~~* .:: .:* ;' i*. *'*'.* '*: ... t*-~*ti*"*u** fi., 'h. * .... *d** . ..;* ...... , ***"* .*>.:*<.,'1i**c"'" .. -,>.,_** .. ;*., . .',';::**1,_: ....'.'.' .* '.*:..:* ... ;,.. /,. L:.*~,;._,:__ '.'-*~~-.J[:::~;,e.;~fc,.'.-~~e;_:!,~.f!°,C""'*~ff~~ci::~:_'.~--;:. ...;~'.:J_~:~~--"'L~'_,_:,,:~'-':.J;,:.~~~;~'.~*;~,::,,'.~**,~:'.~~;*j_~::.. '~:";~-~-;:,,,~<<~:;~~.. '.~:;::.:'.c::~;~:;: jNWMI-QA-PR0-017 (Rev 1), Quality Records, identifies the process by which quality records are * (identified and maintained. Items identified in Section 6.1 of the procedure as quality documents are !relevant to the fmal design and construction phase. These include:
- Contracts and specifications (including any modifications)
Drawings
- Procurement records
- Test procedures
- Test reports
- Engineering reports (including calculations, and software verification and validation reports)
- Inspection reports Assessment reports
- Supplier evaluation reports
- Training records
- Project-specific Quality Assurance Plan Corporate Environmental, Safety, and Health Program Plan
;
- Corporate Quality Assurance Program Plan l
- Implementing procedures i
- Material test reports
!
- Certifications of conformance I
- I
. Personnel qualification/certification records Design review reports i
- Project-specific procedures I
!
- Calibration records i
I
- Nonconformance reports I
I
- Corrective Action reports i
I
- Stop work requests
\All quality records will be retained for the life of the RPF.
81 of96
.~;~*~;:. NWMI -::.**.*.:* NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 * : ~~.~'::
- l{ORIHWEST MEDlCA1. IS.OTOP£5
-jRAI C2.17-2l'ANS J5,8.stat(!s th;_t some records shall l.J~ maintained,by;or for the plant owrier]or thelife*ofthe** i~, : . * .* ** ~ '.'particplar item_tyhile it is ii]stqf.lec( iri the p!ant,orstor~dforfut!'~e*use. $~ch /ecor~s shal(b~ ci'assi.fiedJ
- . * ~
Re uest for additional information
;:in a,ccor.dance with the following driteri(j: (aJthose whichw_ould be ofvalue in demonstrating* * . :. * \
l ' ' . . *~ i!r:qpabilityfopafe operation;. (/J) those. whJcb w<J,~?dofvalue Jn ma~ntaintng.,:rewor!dnk/repairiijg;: ... : ']: (
- ,: '*, ;, **. .'replacing,:. or ffjOdifj;irig phoi~em~:::(c) those, which wo}1l4,og of,vali.{e iri ii~termiriing the CllUSe~ofreiults*' f i*** ..r.; -~ '.qfah acCident 'qr malfli'!ctloh 'of(i safety"relat<!cd'item~* * (d) *thos~:w,hich pro~ide .reiJ.~ired* baselin_edat~.* *'*1 r . ':.~
I,> .lfor.in-service'inspeciions; or (e/those\vhte~'wouldb(J ofyalu,ejn plqn~iflgforfacililJ,I,~: ~* <<, : ,
- decqmm~s'sioning." ., ". ", ' *, . . ., . ' : . *,. . ~ . :*. *,' *,' . '. '
*' *~ *.. . . ' . .: :~NWMTPSAR; 'Chript~r.J ~; Sectibn.C2.L7.2.2, f'Cias~fications, ":;t{i.tes'tnflah, ih~t {vhai rs ;onsid~ied t *. . *. .;tliJetime records willbe delineqted:withift implemenfingpro~editr~s. JfoweV_ei:, {t does no/s(ale ifNWMJ)1 ,: :;: . '.',. :~ill.b'efolldll!,ingfl.JV$ ~5.8~idanc,~.~egc11;c/inglifetim_~*rec?rd~. :. ,. :.. ,_. .'. ..: :. .,.- .. :: 0 , : '"\ *.* ,. ' " ,;cta,rfJY whetlier the life'tilria,ecora~,' at a ,minimum,. will b~ Classifieiin 'acdordan~e.;vil:h ANs:10.8 , .' .*~
L. .*o~.;,.,;;:~-~~}:~~;e~~c;:,;;~*~,,,'.,,,;.L,;~,.':;*":""'~*j,,-:.. .~'.~L.~: '...' . :, . '. .,. . .., , ' . . **-~~:~;,_.i;~j !Lifetime records will be classified consistent with the recommendations found in ANS 15.8, Quality !Assurance Program Requirements for Research Reactors. J- ' ' - " .,;.,. ,,_,,_.~.~*.;.' ,- -::'.;._* * *-*-** -"*'* * -~****~- .,..-.;~.o:.,.* _-;;: * ~ -~'"---'"* ~ .*..;io-..~ * ~--.-~.,,,..,,.*.*; *** '>';<.-"*~*: * "" *-*~.:; I:..: ;;.<':. -=>O .-. ~ ** <; * .,;, .. ;;-.:_..'o:'.,"*-' ~--~---~"~ -">-r -_,...;,.~* > '***.~** .'":".*.*."CC'"~--';, -.z* .,_** "-"-" '°" **;: *. o--,..'," ~ *. **'* .:~ *' No. Request for additional information (i/*'.;-..,~**,r.':_,~::;. ,: :;:r'-~/::r=;: :*;i~~~a~i~~-;;,,,,,'.}':if>2~~.gy:.~~~;;*,n1;.:./)j )RAI C2~19~1*('.ANS Ji8 stqte:S that the. QA-prdgram*sh'all providecon~ols over. the destgn;fabrtcatiori, ihitaliation,* '.'.1 ! - * .:and modification 'ofeiperirrleflta{eqiilpment to th~ extent that.these impact safety~relatediter'ns.. : I:
- I ~. ,,, ' * :1 I **; *_ - .- - ' * .. *, -; - ~ ' '- * . . . ' " ~ " ,. , - ,.,__, - *~ .- ;*
i . '.The NWlvil PSAR dqes not qppear (o staf(r wlieih~r'the'QA,prografri 'lyi1/pY,ovfde co!ltrols ove,r the *. , ; \ ' ;- , ' : .; :, )r]esign,faprication, 'instdllation, qnd modification ofexp?rimenial equipmerii io4he eitentihat these , d
- ,: * .:. ,:"'.iimpa~tsqfeiY:-relat~d:ii~ffis:,~*'r**:'* ,.',,:. ,; .. :.,,,". ,.'*, *": '. :./*: -'" * ~*<. : *:,J.:*<* 1 , '*' F:*,: ..
- i
* .. ;,: ~- .~ . *;;CI~rlfY* ~heth~f th~.}ippll~anf(~ten~st~ ;~b~id~*~oritt~#~er'~he 4esii1,'j<<b.~ich~oh~:inst~ilatj~n, ~nd: l, ,* ;.. ". :'modiflcdtio'n ofexpe'rimen,tal equipme_nt to the extent*thaf th(fS~ impqct, safetj-related_items _or Wh?re. . ,: . * :;this information.is stated in the PSAR. . " * , * , * *. -' * *.' . * :* . ' * * * *; * * '
- NWMJ*a~~;;ct
- 'ci~t;~dt;I;~~..~Y-~~p*;i;;~t;i-~;ipment; therefore, there will be no pot~ntial impacts i
- to safety-related items from such equipment. Item 19, Experimental Equipment, in Table C-1 1
- (~~~t~?~.~.!*!~.~-~. !~8!.~-~-.~~- '~~~.~l?P~~~?1 ~L1;1;?.~X.:R~~-~~.~~. .~,q~~P1?.~~!;:'.............,~..,. . ,".*~-*-**~*. *--mM ** ~ ....,, .** ,"'.~*'-"'*~,.
82 of96
.:;~*~;:.:.NWMI ........... NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 ........:4* * ~ :~.*.~ ."
- l'roRJ1rNEST fJ.[OftAl ISOTOf{S CHAPTER 13.0 - ACCIDENT ANALYSIS No. Request for additional information
,:**.***.***.\'*::,::~;}"****.**' 0,~~., .r~~~--~.->~.~~**i~~~~t:.:..:~;:**\*,*,*J
~"~I j _,, ) -; J3': . ; 1:.,2' i;Su6parqgrapN5.035. (0}{2};.o/10 CFR'Parf50.r~quires(hatfurthe°r,Jechnicql.qr'designJ~forv1ati9nJ:is . >>(i l/, , '"), . ,"l ' * " . ' . * * , * * >' . . ' , * , *'* , *! *, ~ . , , * , *l '.**' f * , , ~ *,, f ,, ' .' . .' - ',~. * * * .' < *'"' i I *f o,.
< * ,-, , ** 1,
~ . :.)*. , ) \. '::nuJybe.;required (o*comp/ete the srife.ty,analysi~ 'arid which .c"afl*bef¢ftfor~later cm:isiderat(on, will be , . **~ L*. . . ilsuppliedtn* tfie'}inal safefY:Cinaiysis *~epprt. . ::*. . . ,1, ' " .. ~ f} 0 ~ ~* J \ 1, 0 , ' , '
'<, : *.* . . > * **:
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- *" * * *~1JfwµIPS$.,:section.13.1,.page.1J-28, *;'Ura~i'itr/1Rec6v~rj!Op~h-1tein,'!-iden(ijie'StwfJ'Pdtehtial .
'.\ . : : . ;'.accid_ent sequencesfor the 'uf{fnitim reqover,y operati~fJpr~li!Jlh1azy'hqzard'analysliiems.4.2.,4.B and.'*",
- .' .. **. . .. * * )14_.'3.4_.8 (tenti;itive ac~fd¢nt sequence &RJ 4) ihat irlv(Jlves)inintcira/
- fi.~n *b.e~eef! a. Nkh'~emperqture .* :\
1 ., **; */nitric'aCid:solu,fiorz pnci tlJe ura~1iyf!1 ]?lirificptiqn iQn !~¢hai)ge)nediq~.:Tbe applicafif)n.stal<f.slhat :.. '., . ! ~ :; . , ... ..: '.;~l~ciY~.r~f! *~ehtfn~.ed to b.tH'¥.rthJ1: res1~~6,li~d:,* b~t*frnot 5{~/ar, .a,i1*the:s_pefi/)E:*~~t~Y,!;?J~~;f~:~?~fclJ.:*?~' l! }d,""'.~"LL~;:,~\'!i~~1'-t~.~~~~-!i{~~11;1~~1~f~~~,,:_;,,.':_ ~"~. *{L~~:i.;£.~. .~,,,:;~:".;;~:i<;;,:c~,,,,._,c;,;.~~*."?~;:~~;.::~~,~~;~:*~*~,:~;.::J;~.~:~"'~:bi iRA'::1r-~_~2al:f?~scNb<; wha~,a~~tf~'!qlWotkhas;?c¢ur~erl::or i1~fan.:f e.d;t°:t{nd~/~tan~*the l~~relflif?o~q~d. ppteritiql *. ;*t .1 * -: *.** .":cori~equences ofsuch an accident sequence. . * * * ..* .. . . , . .. . . , , , :. , , .. , : r:s~;~;~11~;~~~;y~~~;~*1;1;~~ci~~~~;Pi~t~~i~~d~t~~~~~~i~;;;t~~s* b~~~~*1~~**;~1~i~;~~d-;
- resin as a function of temperature. The results from these tests will help define the hazard and accident (controls if needed. The testing is planned for the first quarter of2017. .
ft'*'_;,.,:J:'.;*.....,.,.~ ,,,.,.'."'.*~c..:~,,:,*M*:'..,*e~;~* -~.' -"'f""-"-::-1*;""~*..**""~*- -.:;,.,__,,..;;. ,.:;;.* .:_. *:**....-f--*::;.. ~""~;:"' -~M"' --::--"~....~ ,;,;-'*:"";-=;.:.-r;-:- **i,;:-* ~~.., ~-;_,,.;...~,~-=~~-* 0 ~,.:;,.:.,u.,,,, """1*-*"'*'. ***~":'"*,.-!:.,...,;; :1* -*-'~* :"' . ,.:..>;,,.*_,. -i*** :..:;;...~~...,v... -:~'--,...,.,,._.,..*,_.,_:"'¥'*r'~r'f""** --'1'*';"--..,~-~"':::r /J ~I 13.1~2bj!.Q~sq[ip1,ho~* /~(! ~(!Si!tfr.C.!z an<{d,eyeloprnen.t reiylts.i!zight{njluence '.theflri'al; <jes!gn.*cofthejRPFlf/!1<! the~ }.:-~~~-"::~::~:~~.:~J~5~~~~~1:~~!:._!.~c~i~~s~:!~1P~~~~:~L~i:{:.~.L~~*~: 1;.~,-j;;~:~::.*~:::~.:~:~2~~:ZL;.:.:. ~--~~;.:J;E.LLLL~l \A uranium ion exchange column represents a closed system (for the purposes of safety evaluation) ]operating at approximately 45 pounds (lb)/square inch (in. 2) gauge to address pressure drop through the imedia bed at proposed operating flow rates. A rupture disk vent path has been included in current !equipment descriptions as the feature that mitigates a potential accident resulting in exothermic reactions 1 \within the ion exchange column. The research and development results will either: *
- 1. Confirm that a pressure relief system is feasible to design for an ion exchange column operating at approximately 45 lb/in2 gauge and the uranium separation process approach will continue, or a
- 2. Require design change to the system or implementation of additional controls/process I parameters to reduce the likelihood of a reaction or change of separation technology.
jl ,.*. .;*
.:..;*.-*.~'°'"'~"'.'"-..c;r-.,.-"."""'t...:: ..,,.~;'--<::~- * "7-,.,;.. ~*:,"'*;"'.--~*..;.. -::;" ;,.*}~-~ = >>5-:;;.**-*~r:*.~.-,.:~*,.-.: ',;:;,,:.;:~.{. ~.- ~:-:-* */- *.:t* '"< . . ,._:,;-~..., :t:-"~*, .,,..:-.;,:..ili'~_..,.;_,,..,,,~""""r, ***";-: ~-~*"""~, .... ~~.;*<;:.,,,..,,,..~,.,. M'; .y:**':~. >>-"",**~;- "..,*~ ..,.~.***:*,.- ..,,,,,L.,_~,,... r:"'* .* ".. ~:~-~,;- .....,,,--, ~~"?-:-"; .* * * -/
i ~I* 13. t~2c !;Xh~ ,staffnefldS to. 1.fn4er.eftan{i N~ 's)1ssessme,11t of(/Je potential for exotlJer,mic ;reactio.ns inY,ol(J~ng*:,
- t f
I;.,';""* *; *.'.* .**: *;;11u9:1ie-nii(<ai'extra~ta1J( in t~e 10ii r;xc,<<a~1g~'cqlur(i'!f ~eSin"aniJ'qt~efpf<Jce~~ ~qii,ifi'!1~1it'w/di;h ~1ia.f ',:']
.r" .: . * *. \Wan{ll<f th~*'r<!sfri t:n~li#t,ng th<; .<N.f7p/:J1;~tors;ihdtare~*dowrzstr~ain oph~ ion*excf?C!flg~ 0s.t7n~::'fhe/~, )
i .. * ;.;~tates;!he operating temper_ature_rgnge ofth'!_ !'rqmupi conc;f!nlrg~prs, zn,Table 4;~0, *. Uramlffl!:* :, , . - . ~
- . * * .JiRecO,very andRecy~l£; Process'Eq~ipment" (UR-Z:}2Qan4 UR-Z-520/and.the.nitricacid: *, .' .,: ,. ]'
J , ' .. * '; concen~ation'ofthefirstconcei1trator'(UR,.Z;:320)ih Section*4.'4.i.p . , ?': :: :*> :, ~,*.: *,**:.: :*/ . :*~\* 1 1(.' . ;._. "~ .:*.: !~ixpl/iin;;/J1~tfzer'.th~.~e~eat:;;,:::md:diiv~/i;phz~~t:fi1cludes,a~:bsie~s~~~i'~}tAe.1~i(~*tiatfd~:.ih~~~di:qnd")
~: ' :;:,.< ..*. *:!radiolyttcde/f.ompo'sition ofthe chemfcatexii:actaril:Which i~.'tlie' iicttve ~brnporieht ofthe:resifi:'.": ' ' :': ..* :i 1/ ;.~ .,. *. *:~; :* l!lifor1tiat/6/i in. tech~i~/i!t~~r'atur.e 'lfi~~~i~~s'f:~ih~tf,ik4e~?JipoJi~b~ t~ri.fr/~r~iul:b~. ~~;;~n~: ~rJO~c;~1 1:, * *.: . **. ' ' :;conclude tflllt the cheiJlictil <;xtractanthas, 1!.esistance* to* radiation.and nitric, acidthan tributylphosphate.* ..~
gt
':~ J*...::,:~-::"*:,,_..~.'..,, """'*~.'....,.,..-~--,. J,*.::_--.'-"o:"**'::"-.:..,_~~,r----* ~;7~=-.-c-*_,.-~.,_~-:~-'~-'C --,,,...;;..;.., ....,.,., ..("""=~,,,-.,,,....,..,..-F.:*,w>oj_><*'~.!,.-"'T=~":-.,,,.,..~,">";,..,,__.=;....,,;::'.-.,,;...;..,.;~-....,--;.'...,,.-'\'*'*,:W~,_,.,:,.:.,.L..,~. . . ..:.._,..,.~<*'.*.;,..(.;,,,. :!.,:.,'~1,":~'~_;~ '*.,.::... ~..:.;.:_~_:.;_~.1
!Release of diamylamylphosphonate (DAAP) from the ion exchange column media during operation must .
/be evaluated as part of the research and development program. Limited data described in Appendix E of lNWMl-2013-034, Uranium Recovery and Recycle Process Descriptions, PFD and P&ID, indicates that
!the media beads have the potential to swell when the adsorbed dose exceeded IOx 10 6 rad. Swollen beads lhave the potential to release DAAP from the media skeleton to other process vessels. Release ofDAAP !is considered an issue from both a thermal/radiolytic decomposition perspective (e.g., in concentrators)
- ,and represents a potential criticality issue ifDAAP were to collect as a separate phase in a non-
\geometrically favorable vessel. ." "** ,;,; :..,-***~*.t~.:.~ .~o_c...-.*"'***.~.--,. ~ *--.:~*,- *.* .* .,. - *-.---~
83 of 96
.:.;:. ; :. NWMI *::.**.e.:- :.- ,
NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0
* *. ~~-~!: . r;tlllTffW£ST UfmCAl ISOTU?CS No. Request for additional information !.:<<.:.~::.*:~:~. '.o**.'*'~~-~.-";'.*~.*~.~.'**** -~.:*. ~ *. -~~... .' .~.'"*~. ** *. *.~ ' *. ~* .. *.'**.>, 3;';'-,.,<>.1 0 .t--- ->>*.* , .*.. ~*~-~~~~~......,i;.;__;;.-<*
- o ...". '.*
- '.'RA1. 1:3d.~2.:'.i-flie'!$flAifii~ntini/v[JRJfGf !'?{z,::~afiJ;: sc;qtiofi, 1}b; 2, '.Yinq!yseiof!li:~idJntswith R~4Jdloik:at:* *.~
- .* . . . ;";*
- .* ~. \;fJcmseiJ~.~'!C.e~, ':~ ~tdt~s;th/1t t~e. ~a_efiqtiO,n :4,ose es~mat~s)>hozi!cl.ifac,li;t.de 'e~tflijqte~j,</r}he ppei*atflJg~staff) t: ; '.. , ~rthrough,out the.£Nef!t:..~nd (liir.lng reco.\fery, '.op~f,atiq[l~.qrid(j,ls() for *e m~iff!all~ expqse,d iljdivfdual ~n . i;
\ * " iithe unc-Ontr.qlied"d'reasJ.11id qttfle':ne(lfest perma!Je'nt resiqence: . ' " ' : . ' >': ' . :.:: .' ' . , ' ' ' .,:. 1 r~-.' ' - .-,:, "" '."' ' '
- j ** - O '< *:,* * **< *, '": *I> *"o ;*, <** C '0 *: ' ., "'"r",*'\ .,**~" 0 0 ,- ,
0
*,~ : * ., *,;C"* ,- '. *_,'*A" * *, ** .-_- -, ,. ,j: ,. .. * ,. */f!WMI PSifR' Secti,on ~3_}), ;}.,faxi11J~rfl f{YPC?tlietica~ A.'c;.cidf!nt/'* d~scribes the accldent:sc,enario. and, *. i 'fpre$~nts.the:ca/cu1ated.'{ED{E resu~!s i1J. P~ Table 1,3:2P, ~'Maxf1!1,itm Hypothefti~a/Accident Tota{ :. ~ . '.'Effe.ctive Dose Equivalent,,'.' and PSAR Eigi11;e '13-2,,' '.'Total Effeqtiv,~ }Jose Equivqlerit, (Inhalation p,lu$ *'[ ~ , ,
J 0 'l 1l t " I ,
. ., ;iExternal)for 2.,-1/ou'r, Gr,ourid,EeJ:el Eip,O$ztrefrom Maximum Hypothetiea!Accident/!jor. ~ f , c ~ : c /, ~ ,'J f
o '"
' J., ' <;i ;" 0 ' ~- ~ > I "' J > '~~,,,
J ' I arange of'. '\
,,)e ~ ~
1
- * 'ci,z~tq.nc(fs fro!ll.th§! acczdeY!,t rf!lease *szte
- .P$AR Table J3-2.0 identifies the maxi'!Jlum dps,e.as. 22. 6 rem.at ,;
0
- **: * , , j*' <<: ,ta-'distance of'l; IOOmfrom* tli~ acctdenN:~leai~ site,'No,;re$.ults bJ:..diSciis~pn isprovidedpertaining to
- 3;
,_ . , . . . . /;operatfng.'staffdi;se o*_dose,to th~*publfC'.at {h¢ iJ.eµt,estpe~ne1it resid~~c~, *Th.e l~caiiO~ ofthe '.. *. *: '.~ 1
. . .: ... '.;fzf!.pr~~t.P,ermanen,tr~s,idenceis.*n;(tdentified* .* . '. ,'. * *: . , :* * *.* " : ., * ,~. * '., :~ ;: ... -.: *.* . l
- . ' '*'" . . *' .)it,ro~idf i:eiu/rs:and'ffi;Jii~s~o~P.~rt~J~~;,g*tq dk~fafi~g st~ffd~;~, 'iii eluding :~ork~r.~tw tim~~)~e~£iff :: ~
~,.' .: *~ . .. *:* ':: :iithe"l?cati_O,H:oftlf,e *'neafe$t.pe171Janent.r~siaence _and proyi de._resiJ~{~;ah(J. dtfcuS,S!O,h 'p~rtaintljg *to. t~e'. :*"* l L-L'.L:,'.*~~::~:.:'J~~~~::r~~~h!§~~:1!f f.~t~~~':~f:f_~rr!~?~:2~~:Y!~7~~-~{*~:I' _ :'.J~'..,.-)~,_.:_:::~::_/; "" ;* -'., '* . , . ', :~:.
- The MHA discussion was inappropriately included in PSAR Section 13.2.1. NWMI interpreted the ISG
!augmenting NUREG-1537 as requiring an analysis consistent with both 10 CFR 70.61 and with the 'MHA approach. Additionally, NWMI combined the two in its .approach to the MHA, producing an
- analysis inconsistent with the intended requirements of an MHA analysis. As only one analysis is 1
required, the MHA discussion in PSAR Section 13.2.1 will be removed from the PSAR. 1 See response to RAI G-3 for further discussion. 1**R:i\i'.~1*3.2*.:a*:7;;;~*is.9:1~g;;~ti~i}luf?Ea--:Ff§7,I';/tisk~ii~1i-*~3b'.2:.~;;.iza"'i§~;;;:ofiJ~Tik;?'t;;;11zF.7iai~l~'ii~~t~*;:
- * < _: " * ;;_conse,quences; ':states that ihe ~adio/bgt<;a(con.sequencf!s.sholfld
' , , . __ ._, \1**-. ,' '*.',> r.*\~* ,_ *~,t* '.~", *:"-'" ",' *,,* .~ . : ". ~ ,, ' . ' - :
[Je !n termsoffEDE. ' * *
,.*)< ,,'* .'.'.'.'* ,,, '/",' *._ ,. .*'.' -"**: *1. *,~,- ,<*. l*.:f . . ** . , .'.;NFV1v!IPSAR;Eigure *13-{is titled. "Tqtal [Effec/iV¢ l)o:J~.Eqitival~n({!1Jhala(ion plus F;xterndl) for* , ~*. ,'.:
>" '.". ,/?~[fourf.J1:6lllifl_'L~v_eiExi>~re,Jf:o'Ji Jl!q:t!lfJdlit HJik~~h~f!'c~l'jl'cc,iae~?-t.Jfow~ef,. ~lie tit!~. on l~e"t6'p :,j
* * ; 6[.thf!,grap~:*s~r;~e~, '.-'Tqt~~; GE/?1!.l~0,13~~tt7~ceffecti)Je,iJose equ,iValei?.tJPQ8:e l~.e~!fsf<J~:'45ft: SJq~k, 1 *J '. "- ',-., ' ,.,, .. * ~ **?, '.. ,; * '.*. ,; ' .,, J.. ,*. ~;*,
t,
.. ". I 3; ** _ ,,.< * ,:',<;</njiljjj.ifCEI/f~.:*oy'['F;I~Eisqetuqllypr~sen,ter,Fin*FSAE'.Figzire.J~,;2.'. ': . ?'.;- '/;> * ::, .; .-.*'. ' * :1 , -- . , - . ' : '. ' ... : .. ; '-!.- ;1 , * '-' .* ,N - ** ,+.,,.- *-, <';,- .. ' **, '* :, ',' u.- ,,
1
- -2" --**.,,.,,...,~-,.,,'.~'.*"-- "~* **.:,.:.. ,q._,_..~ :~,.,. _;__'.._.~*~,;.:er*-.-',;:'".-;.... :;_';__ ,,..~...;..:,::_.:~ -.\. !.:::.;.__ ..'/,.'...._;_.:::*...~~-~...~',J.~:}-!{-_: ~~-~~~_:;'",'.!}- ~-/~,; -~~;.. :~~ ~.-.:.-:>-J.:._:,_.,_~,_~,(i!-<.'el"'- *~*,.._;..-;~.i..:->-*--<-'-: **~.,..._ ...'..,:,,-.:;,_~,..,.~';.:~~,.:~-;.:,0-r.."'f*"*rvv.--.. -'.7*"*:,;, ':
!The data in Figure 13-2 of PSAR Section 13.2.1 is in units of TEDE. The labels on the figure will be !corrected. . * . . . . . . . . .* . .*. .** '* . .* . .*. . . . .* . . . , ... 1i~~1*,1~:2*;;.::;fii;;1~q 1~~~~~~~g-Yio/ffi~~7~3.z.~r¥~t'J:.S~iti"q~nr2:1;&~~fa-:;:tifaj*"",;i{d~~ti~~-;i;;;;~~Iµf:q~~1*--*~~*1
.... , , 1*shou/~.,1nclt{de; t;stim,ates,for,the)qpe(afjng~~aff.~hrglfgflq.ut_t~e;:<tY.eflt (l.n<J:dw;1ng_f'.ecov~ry.ope1;a!wns ': .* i, ;-_,:mfd iils.g j6r[he rffaX_iinqlly;exj)(!J~~dinqiviaua_l in *the:uficontrolledareas:.aiid:dt (he izedi;est pe'ii!Janeiit. J ;.\ii~e,~*e,~c~:.* "*:*".->:~:.~*:._*}:*-~..:,,(t.':.:'.J:'~'.;/'~*)*'.~'.:<<::'.**** .?*~.;*;~:'*:.,; :\*"~"\*: *'"'*'...," ~,.,_ :.;.; '.::-i, * :*: ":NWJWPS,AR $ec;.tion_J3:*1:2,, Liqu'id.Spifls and fpraY..syvith ]l&,<Jiok/gicdl andJJr!f;calit)/Safety , ,":* * : .i . .::\\Consequenc~i, '.; de$crtbes iM ac(;tdent sce~([Y,io .ariiip~es¢n($ th~* ca}ci;.lated:TEDE-do:se: results* in' * *-* ~ .~ ..*
- _"::P/vlR Ta'l;le,13.~24; 'fSprdJ!R,.eleq.se,; c;op~e'querice.Summr;zry; :~*PSAR Tablf/.13'-24 /dentijies th_e* *. "* , * : ,f'\
* . . ' ' ' * * ' ' " ' '
- J ' ' ' ' .. ' ' ' '. ' .. ' '. ' " '
, . :* . ::.;lhaximl!#J: umn.itJ.gatedTJj;DE:dose,asJ-2.rem'tdthe.publie.. f@R $ection'._13:).2.7..~,...~'Cqnjine,'IJZ'ent :**: ;.( ..: * ;:.* *:. * ::µ.elease Cor(se<juenc<;/:',cimtai~s/a'.d./sCl{~si,~iLoftlj'e:;1Jiligate'<J. dbs,f!;cf;ns~'quenc,e"value"of 0:97, rem.to" . t l . .**'. *.- ,*; '. *~ **sith.e p~b!if)Jo/ew)ts 9;;r'l/i~(;U~s.Jcm* f~pf,d,yi?ed'pe,{t(fi~fflfJ.f();oP.e~lltin_i~ft.aJ[dqse/O,raos~ t?:.thrif)i:qfic;J LL:::C~:c::~;~~;~_Jft:_tf:;~f:a~:~t,!!!!.~~~'t~U:tP:~~f:~(!!Le.}z5~ti:~~,~!~?::,~:~::8-~~e5T~~~~~~f~:~:0~~2~~?!J~!~}if!~'!:~~.i 84 of96
- t*
NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 1 't Request for additional information
;':RP.1 ji?-4 '.\\Rt,o~ide, r~~z{s 'dh(fdi;bi;Sloii pettiiiniriltd ~P~t:atifig-~taffd~s~. *1ricli1dihi'w"(;r!C~;* ildy)ihte)<:1~.~ti!Y :.*: : ';(c<)nt) ': *:!:lifhe'lq~a'tion 'oflh.f! rieqrest pe~qf}ifnir~~ide~ce~andpr~V}(iifre/ulis an"4disb~~siqn'p~r:fainirigio)h~ *;ih~si "an;iYs~s:sho~ld:i~;l~d~ *- :.'. : . ' : . :;!accident scenarios .within' the opf!i'ating ca{egqries 1isted.jn"$~ctifm .I3. b. J,:f,and,. as a minfmulJl, .. * ; ~i/nclude ac:c~4ent~ caused° by those inifi.qting 'e_ve~ts,JistedinSeqtion .J 3'1:a.fwithin each opera'tjng Re uest for additional information .: ";/cbtefiory/' The .JSQAugmentihg NUREG:1537,*:P,art I,. Se{;tiq1J 43;b. L2, :."Api:idefit _:Jnf tiating *; . . ;:E_vents;F.sfaie~:.):should include*t~e foliowingdn,it~a(ing <ivehts[~Lqss~oJel~ctrii;al po,wer.. '.'*;,; .*: . ,..* , '*-~-n :, "._ ',_ , -~ *. *, -~*. . *: ',.,\' . ~:.:-'**,.~".__:,_*,,,;, ...:*._.'.*,: ".<'- r,-, *-**:. ~~\'*.* ,' ,, :.<. ,', .:~ ~ _', , ,_"' " ~,-* ': ,,__r '_:- " . ~.:,_ ' . . '*: ,'. :'< . ~- ., }NWMJ-P,S;ll?.; Sf!cfiori)3.2.5/ *.. f::os~ofP()wer, '~1escribe:s, theqcr;idi{nt;scetzariq.*P;SAR : "" *.. , . ';:~ectio~?13:'2~'5. 7, *'.'Evaiuatio'n~o/P<;teniial 1?'0diologihia1 (;:onseq~ences,"'*aoes *not,Pre.sent anjldo~ei: .*.. ,:cqnseq~e'ncb.esult'Sf~i ~he loss *ofpow~r 'ilcCidentsc"iindrio afldstdte_s/ in pdrt; th4t '~ detdtiled *, -. *** *::e;\:aluaiion ojp()tential '~adioldgica(consequences'wil/:bf! develbpf!dfor the Operating License**
i*: ' _,,,_~:~PP;{icfJi~~-'~' ".. :.," . y; -_.*: ~; ::: .\*,_* . r *-;:~:*:,~*-., ,(_ ; **., :.** .:.>. . : : *. _*.:-*. , .*. :.'* . _*\ . * . :.:J
~ ~: } **.,; :i:Tfi~ pu_rpi{se bf Ch,apt~r:13{ofl~~,cqristruc;.~<XrJ :appli,cq~9n ~sfopr,o~id,~ adeq~~te qc~i~<tfl(ari,aljsts,.th~{ { .- ..,;j:esults_in_idr{11/ifYing:µecessarys9fety SS[)s qncfl!j_Qfls,t<j[Jr.09,eecl, W,itft,dgsif!,ri gl1d.cp1J${fu'ctign.§if1ce *'! *t ...; ,;a,Loss;9ff!ow.er event.w~ul~h?*l!n pntjcifo{ed(n~tzt~ltke&/.~i;e.!zi/pqte,n~qlty affec4ng;opdrqtiqnrif * . * .'!, ,': , .:iprocesses in,vo/ving r:_adioactiV(!, a,ndjissi/e, Y!J.af(fi'.iq/s,~'a'f.,oss f!/ j>OW,f!r;.eVffnt:anqfyS,iS,! re~_(ts!.* tl,'?d '", ' J . :'.iefentificatjof! 'ofderiYf!ti.sajetySSCs and IROF~ are important topre_liminaYJ.: fci.c~lity.mzd pro~ess,, :. . : !,
{ ** ytes.~gn: * ... : . ;*_,,;-, * ***. * '. * *. '. * .";~; -.,:',-'..~~-::_*,**.. ~.'. .. *. ;. *.*.**.*, :.,~ '* . *:: ' ' i1>ro'V_ide an aru'1,lysi£r,eSµlis, and;discussionpertainingtolhe:pot~ntia/;'ncidiologicqlcons,eque~qesfrom: ~ {,: .:~~>;:~ ::;",:~:~~~-f?!,~~~t~~}°-~f/:!l~~!!~;~~§~~:?.L<-~~:---~~'. .",~~.:.. ~:.
. ,.:;,:L:L L~:~:'.:~;:*~_*:: L* ~ . **. *:. -. -~ -~) .~:..:..... ~; ..~:C_"'.~
- Loss of power was identified as an initiating event in numerous RPF accident sequences. NWMI
.concluded that no additional radiological accidents were present beyond what was identified in the /hazard analysis and the quantitative risk analysis. No additional IROFS were identified from loss of ipower. The summary of radiological consequences from the analysis of other accidents where loss of
- power was an initiator will be provided in the FSAR as part of the Operating License Application. ;
f~'.*1~~*-2,~~!~~I~~*1~~:1~%!~~~;~2!~~~1~~~fJ~i~{~~I:;;0~~~;ttf:J1It!~f(7Jt"~:fi:?;:i~;~~
- , * * , *: **se1sm1_r;: 'events that damage* the confinement or r;:pnt~mment) are. wzthm the *bounds dzsqussedfor other ., ~
f,, .:*, .. *.,- <ila~~(deht~in this.~~dpt~r:'"_.*:*'*** ~- ... :. ; :.
- 1 :. : '. *.:;.:':* _:_: .:::_ *~: :: **'.:.;** *.:* ;:* .. *.'. * .. *. :** * : *. ._,_:. ** :* *. <*j
' 1N1¥MIPSAR,-~SeCfion* 13.2:6, "Naturaz Phenomena Events,." states that: * , c-"
r' :~., . ,,:_;[>:* .*Th; RPFis d~~ig11ed t~ ~i~hsta~d th~. effect; ~/n~;w:a[p~~~o~~~a::V~nts. ~Consequ~tesof}1q[ur~l~
;: *. , ** ** ::_,:*~ * !(~..-1!pfz~n~menii_:acCident:sequ~ri'(;eSf!ave !Jee11 ~alt,.tilf'!(l: S~ct;jofis J'§,.2,,6~}Jh~~?fgh 13. ~.6::6prm!~({~ c: :~
- *
- *, . .-';" :i> f\: ' :event:4<fscr/ptip11sppf:lidentiJY lirJY a~di,{iQ~~alp~nfl;?~i/<fq1!~~e4, to?Prote,cU~eJ:zeplt~ qi;d:safaty, of . 1
\* :* ~'."'; *. *work<rt~/'th~ p~blic,;'and*erzv_it?Yl:menp:., .> i: .:;'"' *V", : * <:;;. ~.. '" :_ ' , :<; . * ., ;.~ :* *,; . ~
... - ~:subse,q~l!nt PSAR 1Septiqns 13.2:0.'1through.J3.2.'6.6 each*provide a Briefdiscussion ofthe qualitative* j , . ,:'aose consequence resultingjFom eqch specific h'i:itw:arphenofnena event,* but do not provide an~. "* * '.
- ' ' ;, '
- :coffiparfs'on'ofdose qonsequ~nc.es td'the Close conseijueiz.cesfrom'.the boimdingaccidentspreviously . j;
- . ;-
- .:/ .. ;~n~11e~:~n,9*~~o/!m}n~ea:.~n f4~;~~~ti01i~!f~?*2 t~~~-~~: .!,~-2:~5:~: ,*. ,'f:. :. *. :* ,*:. ::~~:* ;: *~ .*..'.* *: ~;. . . .\. *)_;* (
f' -~. . . ,~::: . . )'f}:ov{t!e. ~*~(Jmp~rj:Sq_n oflfJAJJ.;§e~lioheff3,;~:~?'.thr/!¥g~*l~i2.?.'6,;,?ftp~:Jl~sc:.c.o1S.1,~ueli~~ v/;illle~fo:;, * ,; 1*' ,.. : , * .; " :1.eac;lj i;J,ahfrpl.p_,heY!'?lJ!ena eyerz,tyer,~s/f!e: as.s.ogza(eci f?f?,t111,,d{ng;tfV.f!c1J,/dps,e. _q,~n~,<Jq1;1en,ce a1al)!!ecj lfl ~ * ,_: .* .;,
- f. : :. :'. .* ;.,. ,:P,SAR.Sectio[l~..13.2.,-4 tf:zpouglz:l'S,7:§, .Siq)pqr'ting:;}Vhy the.. nq(urqlpJ:zerzolJ'l'e~q_'~v~nf1 ;dQ.S(!. *. .. . . . , .' .;,
\ ; . .*, i;~oi:s~quences qre h<Ju~de(f b~ 'th~ ~ose,. c9nseque~c(!s of.otlz.e.r.Qf~al~te.d i:i,<:cide/i~siri)::~r*We* j 3., ._. * -: .. ~
,.._, __ ...,,. __ -~'--" .~~ --..,.,,...*_~-~- -._.,::_,,,-.-...... *..-:*,*,?----.-,. .. **---*~.,,__--?.------ ~--=-*~-<-!'..,. ,,..~,-~- *--. *-~--* ,_.._, . ~.,* ..,_--.*~---~--~-~ - ~'!;~ .... *-~ --.-k<:"-.'".,.,-*. ~*--.,.-,,..!~-"""""*'"* ,-----."<"_;~--*:c:**--*--**-------....... *_*---~---*-**--.~ :-o*-*"--.,,,.._- *"';'-* -~ -,.,..,
- Dose consequences were not determined for the RPF natural phenomena events. Using ISA methodology;
.and since the IROFS and RPF processing areas are designed to withstand DBEs (highly unlikely events), \ !off-site dose calculation were not completed for the Construction Permit Application. The worker dose i
- estimates for a seismic event during target cask unloading will be developed and provided in the FSAR a~}"~ <?f ~~Operating ~~ce~se ~J?pli~ation. . __ . __ ...
86 of96
NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. O r:~i ~ , . , ,. : ,, i'.radiological t::. .:. ;~
- 1.,*:::*
consequence~ Request for additional information
*j3.2,.:1::1rrhe:1s-G"A.uif!l~;:,ii,;i;fiUREa{i s31;?:p;1z-'"~Jfttor1.'.1fil2ftat~~, i~tip_"a:;.11 '1iV.~ilifi!~ttiz}fl~tehti~t!. :i:,.::*f using;repliStic*methods/'.: $N~M PSAR*Sd~tio~ 13.2:~. r2; ,"eoiiji,;e1!1~'!t~~le~e ~~on#eqii_e~ce, .;:;:a~;~/s~~-~~~ d~s~,~o~~eq~e,~q~.t .*j~~~!~~/o,r: the.Ziqu~(fff!W~*anll'sf?(a;:~ ;ye~t.'~~~?i~fy ~hf ~?cµfife'Yft! t~~:,ca(5uf;it~~*~°.~; $~1J~eqye~~~{" .:~.,' , :: ,. ,.*; . ,. ' : ., ,** *, .*. > ".. ,;~:,:l I
~ ...' t ;i(re~lf~,ll'(PSAR 'fqble_ 13~24. :T~e,,dzscµsswnJexf,Sf!CtiOIJ,anq Ta~!~: 1~-;24 d,empns,{ra,t~ th.at{/;{<!, :; . ,1:.. *: *. t~'.**0 ** * ** i'.untizitigated dose 'l:ohsequence'joi ihe'hdimUing everit fs*1*2*rem to ifze pllbli'c, iin'dthe 'initigmed*&oie ;:::; ,[, ~ ,;, . * : 'Jircohsequenc~ isio.'97 ;em t;i th~ j}kolic. Jrtthif same 'seclidn, *J>sAitfab'I; ]:3.:'j3:.; "R~ie'ase Conseq'*zi~rice<*l ~ ~ fj 'o ' ' ' T ~<' _,
- * ., * * * ';Evaluation RA'~CAL *C~(ie 1np~ts, "'documents thl,'a,nalysiS'lnpf;tls dntl f!isumptioris useq cq/culat~ .
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*~ ~ " * ', " ' "~ tj l* ,. * *: ,,; ;' lftfle qqse ~on1equini:esfo~*!hi~ liow:zd,i~g eve~t. :~~ ;r1~1~ 1?-23 show~. thij{ <!:te_~entor qist{iT,J,i:e o/'~*;*_ ..(.
I '. ".* _;:jiJ:.00 m i~ se/ectf!d/n, ~h_f! ~qlysis:* Th_~ *s,elepf!o'! *ofit r~ceptqr ij~st,an;c;e o,( lpQ, m.fpi'.*~h1 'afc~dent. fl[l,OIJ!si~<,
- ,'.:' .....~' *: *** .:. ,. *:*tco..~eq~ence~ ~oefµ~ntet( !n ~fSJJ.lf~~~tiqri.'J2-'~:2.*(;;~ '{~.ri9t}ijn§.!.St.,~!1!*iv~th}~'!'.~4<;rltifii;~~q1,(of:J~e :..'::,{
b '""" *"' , " * <.*mat r 'ti' t'l'JOO' '""PSAR'T(bl'13 20 dT(bl 13 26 ../ , . ,,* . , .. ' .. ,,, f;*:*:~,.:.,:*.:.\~: . -~*j;!~{~u ..,:/~~ . :~.~a..P~;f,,~1) </!!. z'! .~":;.::~:P:. ::..**"-.~-.~JJ. , _q,;,,.? ,--~.. .:. :. >:*;r;*,:-t**-x*~-,". ,,1:" P~:;_:_:,.,,1'.\..::~ :! 1, *, :: ,. * ": *.: yfr;oyi((_<t, a.efif~tio~a~ disf:?U§,si'on,_pf,y.ifry a regeptpr,,distanp~pf:l OOpi would resul~ in *the. li1!1,~fing:pl//;,lip :': .: \, ~:: ,': ~ ....: . ;:dos<;..foi: i~is ~~n(,l!'_he?j qtker eve,n(d<i,se:cori{f~qu~nce fe~i.tits in.'J!SAR. Tab1<;,J3-20,anll Tablfl3J2,6;'.; f !~ . _;. _* .: , ";,: Jf "Ta,rget I){S$Qlv,~r. Ojfgf,1_! J!.cqf~e.!'Jt T°"ta! Eif<:,.ctiye_.p.<J,se Equi~gl¢1?t;.:*: de'f.!01J§{rftlf!* _ihq~ (he l!l~il/Jl(~ **:;. f
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- ~rl-::,_,-~..",..,....... ~- }.-;...,,..,,_*..,,.~,.,.---~~,,-~~:::.--:!:' ~-~~..,,.J..n:::,.,_*.,,.,.;..~.~...-.,,--=--:.~-"°"_;;,..~~-..+,,.,.,.~.. ~'.--.-.,,_-,.,_~_.:t.,~~*,..2...~_,,,..,:~._~_...,e-..-'o1-'*,,..;:,,,-~._,.~ g,,...!
IRSAC ~been sel~cted .as the model platform for all accident release and d~se calculat~ons for the RPF. 1 1The acc1dents*descnbed m PSAR Section 13.2.2.2 have been reevaluated usmg RSAC (mstead of l lRASCAL). The maximum dose to the public occurs at a distance of 1,100 m (0.68 mi). The response to ! jRAI 13.2-4 provides additional dose information. j ~~;;.;~ ..,~,r~~,~"'"'u.'I:."~-:-r-*.,,.4~.N*,.,.~-;-:ry.;.:.>~*':-:o=~*:~~~~;..w.;..-,;:.+:;~~~~~"'*.,. "":..~-*.::.~...:.;..,-::,,.~.--*~~ ,,...~""'~;.."".'-f""-'-"-~~":,..;._-;;.-~*~~~ ~-.~~"1-:";-~~~:;;.;;:..;;... ......---;:-;T......_._;;~..,.--~-:-";;:;,-.-,_,_.-f'.~' !\<A/Jp!ie:i,t<;, :.1:§u.f?pqrag1:aph: ~0.35(a)(JJ of/O <;:FR Pg_rl ~O.r~qij_ireS, thiitth~: applicti_ntha~:*de;scribedl/ie;f!r<_>po.sed> .'\ ~~- {}.:4c:8 *'.J1efe51~ ~f{~~V,;a~#ity, !n~lu_di~g!_ b,ut _no~. l~rn/tedJ~;**t/1~pri~cijJ:af ar~~ite.C.tur~l a~d-e~~i1;~r~ngf~itef.i~:'\I, ~f~ro_µ~~-*~' .'~:-;J:f!': f~e,qe~lft.11, *fflJ_d.:,haf .1qeYf~iftl!,d1t!z~ mqJPrfi!(Jtlfr,e~ Of;C011J//O";e~tS/nc;9rP,OY(lf~djh.~~e,mfor tij.f!. ,', ::y.--,,j j13.3-1)), * ., *: 1lprotection*of,the health and,safetj; o.tthe pµblic, : "" ."<<. **,*: ;./ ".1 -..;.,; ** i,; !" ,,,, *' -.*.-
- 1~*,:. * ;, f'.>)7 *:/: 1,,.:;" :\:>.' :'-f.
~.:~~~~&;.,~~L ~J ;1:.;.~-.~:.; . .-:.-: ,-. {~~+/-.fq;. ~~~~..;=---~~~..:~.~~~ ~ ~ ~-;*;~~;}~::.,...-::~5'.2 ~;;+:.-,,~ t-~"~s~~:;i ;~~; .7:¥~~~:1~~-;[~~:~4~~-i'.~ :~:::. ~t1x.-.,;:r:*.:.1;t,~ ~:~/~ ~~;~,~-:~:;.-;J r RAI' 1'3.2;.S*~i\71ie JSG ait1fmenting NUREG~1S37,; 'Part:2, Section' 13/i.2,, 'States'that'the app_iication* 'shoitld*describe.: *. i f' ** *: "*:-.:**
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~)_ :' ,._ , *,*j\ijwi1J :f',SARj;ect{~n ~1., ~* s), .,~.P~op~~s~Q.~scrlp~on;,~~id~ntijie~ /he.to~ ex~h~ni~ r:z;t~~;al'.~n"ihi ;,*. .~ *:1J t * '" .* 'j(Y-~C<?.h,(!°:_ryJqf!_ e~cflange,.co!u'!'n (M!J..,-::1$/-22~) q.s.an tolJ,.,ftXC,harJge '.'esi,n,whic~,,~!ll~e.,,elu!e(f.w!th ni6;iq,,1
.11~* "";: :* * \ J,'.a¢i~.;*Ta.b,{g *1-14_ z_d?f!tifie._s_:t~e _iz.?tliif!l op.e,~a~n~ tempqa_!ure: p~~:*r:he pf'o.Cf!SS i:~:s. °;n c:c~ive ..q~~l~~ '~/ '.;'. ~. ," * ,,,
- 1l(Chzller MR-Z-230) to mamtam:a SI!f!Cifiid.temperature., ,, ""r. ., ." ..- .*.-:* ..,, ,..,,.., ""' , ,,,;*., "" ,_, Ji J
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~'.:.' :/.!,\1he7~. i~ e~p~rf~h~~ -~fe~~~g~tic ~~~tiq~~.w~th*q~f b~:~~~h~g{J,1r~;~hs./it:~it,.i~~~pia ~~~a:-iif9~i ofth~-:~i r~ ;i. * *:*_ ,' '. .: ,>.' noteq:th_at resm r:fegrad.afionr,atesvqry
- ¥9~cident :e~f?_e~,e_nc~
~- ,\j1 ts f<?r. nwic d~~d~c~h~~nff,a!~onihi1ther.'.t~'an_ifi.~t, P,ropo,s~<!f°:(~1,~t.if!1;'. liuf'l~ "~~_dis~! c:1 1wzth:res,m,type__; temperattfr.,e, ,qndq,czdconcen'tra,lip~: There*;.\,'}
i/ * ~* '. *.:: ';jJapp~,qrr. to:f?e*i~mfpote,~tialfor_ ani?n e_x~~apgef r~~qtio~s. ~ndefiup~~t'.c~ndi~?'nsor'oJI~~Y!"~l.* _:*: ,_:C,1:
~i*;., . *> *~,. :;. ., .)l'Cqn~i(iq_n8t:~a~,the: NJflvflfa~f_lifJ,'~':!ke.::Pt~cttc,r:t,l*ift;ideli"!fS.'.inJbm1f?-,tion'.s~eetfof'lof;c,ex9~if~g<!, Y.ff rs :";* ;'J ~:],"::_:/*t.t;:'i;1l~r1::~t;;;:t;f::~~~f:,~~sI! ~~~'°:s~:~;Ili.f.0~:~i~:5~~~,~*?t/~~~ifq:;0f4:f:'1tfi~rf:f $i~c~r..~1*?:-it f.,,1 ::< _, ~;,:. .. :J:rHe:'accideht"analysis]oftfie*molj!bdenuin')"e'cot>~ry-Sjisiliii:'/ii.TaBle~13'!..i ];' *~'JfclV~rse: Ev~ntSiimmary ";~(;
J'.: ;, :'.* *-_ *. ";*::* ~Vqr'iv[oi)lh4e~ulifR~co;e;y 'ahrJ:1ae~lif!~'.Ok</ntbJJJ.c§ta~'n{!Jfqu~hc~~Ne~'dihg'Fu(!h~f§v~z~"ri~i/.1://j/ (:d; 1
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- -jjthefWAR,if:oi!~*n.btidentiffian a,c;cident'irn7o?v_ihg over~edliiig-~rzd.reac;ti_~rz ?fffl(!;*aijiQ~_¢xc~~n~e'-,,; .;: *:'.(:
~ ,, ,>. * *~. ':;** .:Hrnater.ialand there is nq discu:tsion 'of wli)rthis ~ccideiit i~ no,t c~nsf(lered :g_iv}n }li?,pres~&r;,e'..of,,de.9df '.~'[: li,ii~:~;fiei.ia~wi4~1.~lii~~~~~~~t~~£~~~~ t'.';:*, ~* *:" *' ** *l;~a1Jdle *r,~e*,!f'.el1~ a,~io~:e~ch,r;znge. .re.~'J.. T,h.~'. rJ.~~c;~ip~orN,)w;st(! rn9riaft~fnprft;SJ;,~tems.j!ri~;Glz_¢pt!}f:4 'of;*'~* D~~~~.*. :~.L=~~;~~ ::~\~_!Z:l~t~,~~;~1f:f;~n~.r:;:~~~7;;:~~c~~i~?{:JJ:itl:~1:r11££2f~~.:.~ 0 87 of96
.:.~*~;~. NWMI *:~~.~!:* NOIUlf\'l[Slr.!£DU:AllSOTDPE5 NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0
- Re uest for additional information l RP.1,13.2;;a~ :P~scri!ie l:'U:w ~:d;s~;;-;;,e!1t~ ~ja~cideri't~ i~6i~ing-th[;;;;;0~*ixch~~ie -~;&-:i-us~J:i~:t1i~:*** ** -- *- *. - :* 1~;- ..:. _; :. ;:-~ ~;":o!!.~~~~~'!::l}1!~ii!:_:~~~~~s;;~'.r:._fri_~I~.~-',...... -~--~-- -~- :,_,_ -~.:___ ~-~. ~~~~-~--- _:. -~ : * * :_ *.;. --*>--.*~-~:: ....,.... _* __;
- The anion exchange columns in the RPF molybdenum system are very small and are single use. There is 1
.a chiller to maintain process conditions. After elution and rinsing, the column and resin are discarded as , solid waste. No additional hazards have been identified for the anion exchange columns/media. :
- iM1*;-13~2~t;;;p;~~iJfd}fiii
- ~Ji~i;;:r~J~~-yp}6(i;ti~i:&ci"de/zi;1;;~i~i;;*;i'-ihi;;"ate~r;;r:rb;'ife;; ia~~tifi~J~~~4~;i..-:.~:,*:~3
!, * : * * .' *. '.fevaluated qnd any design featftrei_ cof!sidere~ re,asdnqblli_for, manai._ingJhis*ht1Zara h_iive beerz * . . '/' *. t
.L.. ***'. ~- -~~:i~~f:~~~~:!r:~o/!.~:~;~:-~: ~~; ::,~~~:'. '.~:c-' --~-::~~:.* __ :___.. :::. -~,..-*--:~~---~ .:_;.* ~;;~-=--, ___,;_ :~:~ ..-.:"**:=_:..;:.. ~-:.~; 'The process hazard analysis (PHA) tables for the RPF molybdenum system and waste handling will be
- updated for hazards associated with the molybdenum resin as part of the ongoing ISA process and will be
'reflected in the operating licenses. Hazards/accidents will include changing temperature, flow and acid ,c~~d.~!ion~::_an~-~-~ir_i~p~ct~_o11_t~e-~i?11.re~i~*- ..... _________ ..... ........... _________ ..... ____ ................. . (R1\!--13~2-9':ifiz~'if/GA"~i;,;;-;;;;r;gw&i?i:Ci153J,'P1;;t_i:s;~1i6~*13i;:**d(sd.ii&~;1;fuYift'Jt:~ra;;ir~~~i'Y~i;/o;!ii*--cr*~:-*i. 'i,. **. : . :......* -.I,:radioisotope.prodt,jctiorifaciliiy}The
,. , , .,. Ji ,
section'states tliai:, NC/ReG::.) 510; . S~ction' 3:4, provides additfonal ;~
* ,:
- i'.criteriafor adherence to-the: safety program and-integrated*safery analysis (ISA) performance. . ' .'.;
L < **:*. "< . :'.sectjon "3:43_.'1}5/(!J) qfN[jREG~*rs20 states that process 'Hazard analysls'meth_od8"(i.e. ,- ISA Metho'ds) ;!
- i. ' ; . ' ' *.. : ... -*'.are_.acq_ep(able if the ffli,thod #dr,essef,;aihniii:le"s lfbpera(ton}jndit_dirig startup,' normal'qperatioii,' ' ~
.**** .*. . .* :);S,~¥,td~t~::.~~a,~£?nt~~~nc~:-. 1::: ,._c*-:*: .i~*: *:*_ ?:::':t~*'.,;_..*::~, **:-.~_-:': ._:*: * .*., ,. :**:._;,*~;-_ :. *.* :;. ;,_} **. :,::':_~**_.;; : *_.* f-_::: : * . ... . . .. ,,;. ;:Tl(e NWlvfJ PSAR, has analyzed p(Jtentia(, aC.ci.dentMhat,mightocr:ur. d11rtng normal process ope1:atidris' -~ . '* . ' ... ':*as,p"Ort.ofit~processfof ideniifYini'm(ljorff!a(ur;sor c6nip~ne~tsin~orpor~ted.into the d~Sign/or the ; .. *. ,protecJjofiofth,e health _an?l safety ofthepublic:**-Thesc;. mllJ,9~featur~s areiricluded in PsAj?. Tdbles'l~/'; *,: *u:-12, 6-J,,,6~2g~d,T;qb/e °4,~ll o/thec ISASwnma,.Y:.'.'{fzese. anrjlysesare disclissedin Qhapter Jj anithe : .,\. :-. :/,:(SA/}14mitylry pft~e, I:~'.,a~d cir.e./hi {J~Si~fQf1e,~irzff:,~t!f~r,~Jnti?~<riffo]Ji-~t,ect in~.IJ~tjJt~ B~(;, * , ~ *** oc.* i:~afetybfworfcers i.mq th'e,.pub~icfor tl,-es/!pote,ntfr;z/qccidentcondJflons, (e:g:; to protectffz.e plant * ,,_ . *.:;
~,< *.: .*; -~; [pf!rsopn~(duri~g)1~~1iid1 ~P~f;~ii91J~i(:e.;;,m~~!fli1~!~69psefSrclh,~{;f~u:s ~IJ,~ .~h.~:Jrf.i~~-,t4T?~)i~(6~1i). *.j ? '. ": ,,; 'iTfi{PSAR Chaftter_ 13 accident analjlsis does notaddress qther:oper_ating ~odes'."(e.i, §lartitp,, *._ f
; * '* ***
- i111}ainteizancc;, . ex_tended shutdown) that can ibtroduce different types ofhazardS. F:o.r. exqmple, .\
j; ' ' *.. : .;mainteiu:ince operations can -involve n{duced protective :bcirrlers between the hazardous materiais and *:
.; :: -'.workers. Extentjed shutdown _might create a*$itu_ation ll!he1:e radiolytic hydr9gen wou/d,b~-g~ne,rated : ._;
( .,* ;;°:ver cxtendedpe~iqds'tind,cou{daccun:t.tilat(!.'i11 u~usua_l,lobapofls.: ifxtended 'shutg~lf!z could__pl~o~ ~est11t~ {' -.. . . . ;:iii*i>rgtinic ion exchtinger,i}sitls,degradation.J!Z'aking ~!more.pron~{() t;eact <fX,9th(!r,micaf/y upon;proqe~S ' L~b~*+' . ~.-.~ ,:,,,:;~~~':!~t:i~. :L;;~~~:~:.,::,,. ::;,;i;ii~::.~~::-~:. ~~~.-L . ~~ :~_:;/1~'.':;:~:~~~~L~;. )~=;::_:d~* ;~. -~~=-~-;:~'~,~~-:-,:~ IL~. ""~";I -~;~, -~ i ~I j_3:2.~9.a;/Jefchb~Jww th~'.acc:icfei1t a~alY,Si:S e1'alu.aied rion:ro_utt~e*sii~(Jtions 'to determ!rie*ifthere are * ; -'* * .:*.. !: t *. :..:'.::.,.~~. . ;, . }9,d.ef!tjzf!gl_~f!~f!-I:~°!h!!l~~f!i:.<}_:!9.!!!!...f!S£9!fl.P?fl.q_!.c{<J.J?>L.<J.f:JifP:..i?Hl!!!~-~~~~-~~--~* . ______,_..:: .... .,.. . _~--*-*
- Tue technical specification will define modes and limiting conditions for operation (and maintenance).
!As suggested in the RAI, maintenance activities (e.g., removing a cover block to replace a piece of failed :
- equipment) could change the configuration of the facility. For these situations, limits on operations !
iactivities or acceptable inventories will be defined and implemented. Procedures will be developed to : !place equipment/plant conditions in a proper configuration for outages, including surveillance and
'monitoring activities. The radioactive inventory after a one-month shutdown is only 5 percent of the
'incoming inventory of eight MURR targets 8 hours after end of irradiation. After a long outage, a water irun/test would-* typically be performed
"""~'
to check the equipment
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.:.-. ~~"-NWMI NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 **.~~.:~;' NOIUHWiSTMmfCALISOTOPES h~A1*1 i2~9b:,:i5es~ribe ho~ NWJv.tiwW "address .ci',i e~i~rided RPF ~h~tao;vn to.ensure the P,.oteetiori ofli~alth and:;: _
b; *-*=':*.~-~-:~J~P!-~l/i'!_°l~~~!~~~f~:!'J'~Ji:~-~--.~:,~-~-:-~~--~~-~:.: __. ~ ~--*~~ :~~:.~.~L-~:~~~--::.:_~ ----*~.:-~~,-~~~ *::_:~~L:J. :~_.J: !The technical specification will define modes and limiting conditions for operation (and maintenance). , Request for additional information 1: iAs suggested in the RAJ, maintenance activities (e.g., removing a cover block to replace a piece of failed * !equipment) could change the configuration of the facility. For these situations, limits on operations * \activities or acceptable inventories will be defmed and implemented. Procedures will be developed to \place equipment/plant conditions in a proper configuration for outages, including surveillance and imonitoring activities. The radioactive inventory after a one-month shutdown is only 5 percent of the lincoming inventory of eight MURR targets 8 hours after end of irradiation. After a long outage, a water !run/test would typically be performed to check the equipment and processes. pvt;*.. .,..,,_ Ao**-:~:w.*-~~*i....o;."4J"'*)f '"""J.-*~~*..i-;: ....~ ... ,*,,_.,e,~**"i!-"-'-'~*,,:,~*"'.'*:-;~-;**"":-c.-:~~"'~*** ?~-~M ..."-;*??':-':~;*.c.., .....,,;., ;,,,,. "*:""'i"'" :*"'~' .,,._.~-~~ ~,~,:;;~:....-:,,.:.7*..,;.,:t:'"** **-:-***: - ,.;..,:,;;..~:;:,~:~*** ,~.~;;* -~ *-~:,. ***':t'iJ-*"*:,::.~ ...... -.~-,..:.--"'-.>>; ::.*.;*:* -0*,** .,_..._...,. -:;~'--- .. , * "~;<.:,.* -*1 /AAI 13.2-10\iThe1SGAtigmentingNUREG.:.H537,
- j,'*~-*lt".***_,,.**~_.:r,~1,/f'."_,*,-,-;*,,*,,'I','*1.i' .* :.':,._,,_., ',?1'~** ,*:;,.-. '*. ;;c',
.Part,2,: Se,ction *'"'.';-' }~-. 1 13b.'2,,states thattherapplicilticJh shoulddescribe,.'*.f ,~~\.*, .. ~*; *" _,'. ,-. ' '- ' * ',,_,* _ , '* ,_
1 1 i;: * **:.: .*.*.. "* Afh~ potentirjl .a_ci:ide~ts r:a.ttse¢byprocefs'deviatiqi1S._or, other eyfflt~.in!<m!f!UoJ~efa,cgity"an,4,cre,qib{e \
- ' " .. .* it external events: " . ,' . : . . ..
- . -* : *.. _!;secfto~) i3:.{ "Ni~~*AtidF~~e R~te1s~~,;*of th.e NWMJ ~~: d;s~~:fsei~i7,.;;;;};Jffi;e;rele;;e::* 1'he;: .::_;* ;!)vkG 'staffp}rformeddn indepindehi ve~ijii:f1fion' 'ojthe "Area(Lqbaiio~s ofHcfiai:dousA)mdspheres . 1* .. ;: .. ;..... ' 'icalcula~ofrs<<ind confirm's: thtJ,l t~? *scefl,ario mbd~Ir:d 'would:~':ic~~~ 'i:he *thr~~~o/~ Pf/1igh ionseqfien~~ . . ~ * * :~',:ifor *a:worke,r,,* an,dfor the pub'lic.--.'fhe-NJ?:.C. staftneeds _to.uriderstand:any designfeatures}hat 'NJf1Jvfl. ,* . *,. , :: .. /iplan~ to."rery on:t<j protect w9rke_rs 'and.the.publir:from th~s h{gh conseq'uence-'e.ven(: * *' .. .. . . }efentiJy ana describe any designfeature~ NWMI plan~ to ~e1y on t0.prevent or*~1wi~te *a nitri~ aCid' .. , , . . . .: :fume. re_lepse. -., . ;* ,.:" * * * -" * ' .... . .., . *' ,., ; -*. * -** .....
_r,,,_,,- ----.!.~-*--~-). ;..._~,,.-- -~_,,_,;__.,_ -.-*~,.__..._.~ .~-..----cO..!:.-,,-*:..:;._..,,,.,_._.,__.,, --..-..1.-.--*-.*-=-=-"- ,_...;.-:~.---.-:=*-*.~--....-~----.,.l-*~ ._. .,. . . -~.,......~'--** ..~- ;_...__ !_-:=*~*:--:;-~' --~~-"**-~-~-- --o--.,...,-*** :,; !General RPF design features intended to prevent/mitigate a nitric acid fume release include RPF building icontainment and nitric acid storage tank construction and venting. Specific features will be addressed in \the FSAR as part of the Operating License Application. I *. ,, .. ,.,., ... ,,ovo~. * -,,,,,.,.=*"***o***.~*' * ..~.* ""*'" ,,,,.,,,, ... * *. ******* -. ..
- No. Request for additional informat!on .
-~}:,.*\?;.::~*,,*~. *r4~~i;~~~%t~~~~,~~µ*:*::*.::r,>**:::,:l ii;j~t 13.~-t. :['I'fze£:jt{'f1uff{"~?!~~g.ff_vp!p~~~~7> ~ar.[ ~;,S~f:tipn '1*3~};;:stqtes t/ia(tl{~ aP_plication:sh9ul~p~ovide:*:'.* 'i ! ** . * .: , * * * ::that the appbca71t, sfa9bty, de§ign,. operati.ons, qn(l safety conl!;oJsfor,ch~mz.r;al safety pr,_oyrqe_* , *. '. [
- ,. i ., *: :i-/easpnClbl</assura'ilc(/_that they willflmctiori as: intended and en:SUre;the: safe ,handling oflicense{/ .... ' ... :!:
;.,_~: . ;_.. *"rrmatir}ql. at:the(a~ili~:* ,z, * * .:" .:~:*. 'd* , ** * :*. * * : .: <: .'?' *. ' . **:;; * .*** . * *v.-.. *.; *.** * <>*f:
- *i'.NWMJ.PSAR, Chapter4; Section 4.3A,6, "Chemiqa!Hazards,.:'.describerthe chemiCal protection. .* .
; :* .. * .* ;pfoV~$iOnsfor*ea9lt process. Forprocdsei1iaving th& potentjato]a chemiqdl-ac2id~ht, the PSAR sfdtes; i ,. *,. * . *: .. :;itha,t tfios~:feat~r,esprev_ef!tlng l:e.iease ofradi_oactive mdferiO.Uind1iniitif!g.rt:t4iati<_m exposur~ .will~lso.) ;1 _:" , , ,: : *,; ~:.\.iiJ!rot~S(lJpfl(erf a~~ (/;le pl.fbfic Jr.9111 ex]Jdsures.t<t1<wird<jus_clten~i~al[./I'hi{~tai[f!ee.;dst~* u?~<;?st~nd<_- .1; J. ., * , .. : : 1 i'.qqy 4esign ftpt~r~~thpt 1!Jf7lvf/I?Jf:!lif tq. r,e.ty_ OtJ/Qpr~te~! !V9rkeJ:SaJ?dilJepyqlu;fron~. c/;1,em1ca( *,.: * ;* '.~}:::. '.L.::-.:;."' :;~~~:a~~~2*:":':::L'° .-:~,: :.~,, . .,-!:"'.c:::. o.~~,,: /:::_..,'..,,: *":,.~:.: .:_;.",~_o:;:"..J~,.. ,,,,.~,. ',,-,'.~ .*. - -~ '-~~~ ,,;,;~. ::;'.'.'. ;~._..;_."*'~,~~~;, ~c;.~, -~; ;,;:*::*..,,.,.(,};
0, i ~1.13.3-1a;\ldenti.fY and {/escrf~e the speqific 'design feqtur?s thatNWMi,plansfo rely.oh io protect worke'rs;i:md :.*
'. * * .,. *: **:;p_ublicJrome;p&surestohazardous*chemicals.. *:~ . *.**** .-' .. * :. * * -~* *.. * ; *. .,.. *.*.*
- 1 L~.. ~_,.'..:_.~"~.,~;J,-1;1._.,.~ ..;_k,.~.:,. ~,: . . _._;~.:-*-."'"~~--. ~.,i~;.::--~.--~-,~~----~i.~.' '".~:._ --~*** ,..L~. .,,.L_.:._".:.~=-. . :.~~~:...,,._~-: .:.L.,,:~ ..:~~~:_,~:~,* ~*~ ' ' p .. "' "' , .. , t- * *"
jSpecific RPF design features relied on to protect workers and the public from hazardous chemical
!exposure are the RPF building structure (walls, roof) that provide physical barriers to chemical releases, )and the building ventilation system that uses zone-based negative differential pressures with respect to
- the RPF surroundings to prevent release of hazardous chemical vapors. Note that these design features
!.~~-~~-~~~ ~~~t:rres_ tha! P.rot.~~!.a~~~ ra_di?~<::_tive ma~~~ rel~ases~ ..
89 of 96
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- Detailed RPF accident scenarios for chemical hazards will be developed, analyzed, and documented in
- the FSAR as part of the Operating License Application. Note that the building structure and general Re uest for additional informati.on
- containment features, including the ventilation system, serve as barriers to protect workers and the public l
- against both chemical and radioactive material hazards. .
- .-- ,M-. *:.. ...,.......~~~-~- -***-:~:
1 .~*--'"':'- ~ -**.r:-..~""~-~~:-~-:f"'*-~-~~rr-;.: .- . .
-.,..~;~"'-=, ~----."-?':;" __ .. ,_,_,:--~'?""'* ~"-'*"* -r-;--;:-**y~~-;.:;.....:. .... **;~**0--"clM *:*-i .-..... **~:*'::;'_r=:"""-"-:":'>:-*:.;::--;-<i;"':="" ,.*.. *r-;-:-.. . ,.,...,,~-*l""~':;~-*- .. .... .* "':'"~,_-,.,,..,_ *.-'I*"',_~"' ----,-~,.--~c -t"--;*""!"-:;.-""-.,,,_~~:.o*i
,\*'RAI'. 13,3-~i f!1/r .JO FR;SD.:35 (g)(2);* 'f!.consU-Uc:tJonpennitwtll ~f!* !s~ued'if.tfl.e~Q°'mm{!fsi~n,JJ.11.qstliIJ:l fl!rth,,er2. * .;:::* f
; *. *.; **, .i(teqflnicql or- desfgn:inforrnatiim C,~ maY: be .pequire_f! tr cq1np_lf!te;fhe- sa!fty:pnq{YffJ. _q&ff ):V_h~c,/:l cqiz bff ; . \ *, *.* : ;):leflfm;'..(dter,consid(fratio~. wil(be"Sllpplied in {hefin'hl safety.analysisrepqr(, , ".: , ., *,.,. *: **;,,. _,) \.. . . . ' . ' '.' . " .' ',*" . *' . .* . . ' .,* ' ~ *. . ., ..,. ' **... . *" . . . ' ' ,* ... .,. -~ ~- i)1fhe. J.s.qf{lu~'!f~~tj~g!f_r!!J!W!:;-f,~r? f axt: ;s~c_tfpJ? pb,p1){(lt:s if!rt..t,b~ P?li~fif!ofz: S~(jlf~f P~?~f!e,*.. f,
- ' ,: *:_ :1that the;applzcant :sfc.tczlity design, operatwns,:and safety.'controlsjor chemical safety provide*. * .* , . .;
*; f **: :: :_~;~~sqn~~!e.*b~;~ra~J~}Jiar.tfii;i.wittfu~<;t(likatl~{eJid~hiih'tie'h~~e.~h~*s£Jehiihating*a11icblil~a *'f *11 ' .' ., * -7,~:~~fftY~~.~<!r~~\c~~f~*r:~::~-- . ;:, * /(t*:.:". ":** ?.;~<;,**.,~" .c'<:*:;;)_",.*;:;~f.:?7~* '*?.:: \'.~'.*. ~~:-.*:*t*: : . *,;:**:*;{, '.1 * ~> ... "1i .:: * ::JVWX]ff ~SAR Section 9:'. 7. 4; $(,"Qperatipnc/,l Analysis dridSdfetJ?'F.unction;<<!' c/iscusses opel'dtional *. ,*:-~ * " * '.. !1aJaiysis:arctsdje'tyfu~cti6n*"iinaiideiitijieS'tWo'.JROFSth'at wilt~.~ /fJlpl~rrzentdd CS~i8; '.'.'Backflow: / . *. t. l!Preveniive l)evice ariq .cs~19; "{)aflGeoii]~h:jl 15liy._ '[ariks :'~o ef!iure critjcality a'nd 'chem!<fql saf~ty. :*: * ~ , . *: :V; ,:*,.(I',h~ c,_he,mifql_~ri.fety foZe.rof:(lJf!~~JfJ.D'f,~\i{.YJPtd~fqriJe4 i1lS4f?./Se,stiqr'./3,3:,'f;r_f~f, ~$.A§l!.'1f.IT(lJlY*~., _..:;
tL;Jf.iJ~tRi~i!T~f1!Eit'61:~tt£gi~Eg~f£f~gJ iSpecific chemical safety accidents will be developed, analyzed, and documented in the FSAR as part of i 'ithe Operating License Application, along with identification of relevant technical specifications. IROFS
- CS-18, Backflow Prevention Device, and IROFS CS-19, Safe Geometry Day Tanks, protect against
- general classes of chemical accidents in which hazardous chemicals (and radioactive materials) could
,enter systems not designed for them, or could be released via tank overflow events or other chemical 'losses/spills. IROFS C-19 further protects against accidental nuclear criticality events that could initiate
- or exacerbate hazardous chemical releases.
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CHAPTER 14.0 - TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS No. _ Request for additional information [ZI. .:.~;~*~i~.!.'j~~;;. ~:*;,,;,,:}~:;::,J:lJ.~'.~;,:c:,~~~~~!~~~l~f~:~J~~D;@~7'~~J,j~~.~5lJ ~~I- 1~0~1 (!Pa~a¥rajJh 050:34(aJf .*'.'f?r~limll(iiry:safetjl a~i1?f!si~feport,*~ of J(J Cf~ 1.Pefrq6;'srat~~:tli'f:.t.f1cl:.. **:?~ ***.:;*_.J ~ *-: * ** **.: fapplicati?n/ora/i:onsti:uc~o~ l!:mli~ sha!l(n~lude:a py.~liiliif!drf;~afe~: 'an_qlysiSt~P_P,.rt'. ~ecti~fi .:. *:, .*., *. J (* * - -" .. h5/J.34(a)(5)'states that thewmzmum 1nfom1ation-to be* mcluded shall consist ofthe identification qnd **:* ! 1 * '.- , _;; _:justiflcationfor the selection o/those'v'ariables, conditiOn.i.or othe~ ltems*whiCh'are-determihed as ihe *;, f * ~**. ,; . ireSt;!Uofpf~liminqry:'safetj/anaJysis a,nd ev'qluation' to be-probable_
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J:.:.~; .. * ; * *. * *r!for th'efaCituy,:~wi'tfz;,spepial att¢iition given to* those items l\ihzcli)i!GY: significant!Y'Jnfl.i/~nqe ~he :fin~! ~ ~ '.
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. * .'~*(j~e8:~~1~"/.: .: *. _..:. *_ * .}:*. *i:~ . ' .L:,. *. -~ ,,;.: .*::" ,/ :; "\* :-L*:~< '~ * ,,.';:*" ._ . *"*".; *.\~'.*: 'i:.; , : -a.*:*~-~*:*'.f_ ,- , oo:*yfhe JSG/fu~~en,'ting NQREP-.1130:P(Jrt:1;p~~p,(exJ::f; . "~Tl!.c~nical Speci.fi~O,ti9n,s;:'.~- s(qte_~, -i~ part,.-' . ;;[~~~~15,i ~;,1'. Ckqpk~ub}~/10'4£;,,i,,;i;~;<>/.*a; ~~;fe~5p~;~#J. ;, ... ;: .:~:: li '* applic_a~!?.:toproyidirig;ii,fje_scriptiqn ofthei.fechn{c'tif,spi,cljicap~,nsfor';tfz~,liq~n?!li[lg ofCi'..'. :,:: .:: /}: ,{ .'< i(;i .XQq{OiSO~()pe'.J),rodu(:ti9nfqci/ity;iinda nQn,::.po}fefreacfdrfacffity: ' T{!Jien?fY_ef'thef,erm ,f~e:Ci.C~O'(,'/*,' 1 .. :. : 1\r '* -: . ff!P,eqrs;:,:ifis unc/erS[qod fq !1zf!~h :d 'non*,;pow~r r.eaptor'fa;r~ility,~':q' !rG.d,if!i~oi~p~'J?.r~dqc~o1f' ..,: Ju fac~(ity,'::.or'bO(li, as;t;ippliqable:, ,' ;._ / , .. ' '.: ';:* ... >, :. . / :' ~ ~* 1 '*/* **" ;'.; ::'~: ':t'~~~>\ *~-~*::'..*~:.;,:_~; *.' * ,* ,;, '.lNtvMiPSAR' se'Ction '.3. iJ; '!D(tsig,1 *ofStrilatres, '"Systeins, 'al1a 'Comp~ilenti, ~* it~ies *ih'd't th~ .de'iiirf:. *i ..*. *; ': .)linformationJo;"tM *cohlple~e 'r,arige:of hofn1,g~ op~rating c~n'ditil?_ns for,vliri~_lfsfa~~lity, ;ysi~in~ i~ , , 7*: * - *:-:: !proV.ided:fhliough'Out,thicon~cti_d~ perm'itapplicati6n: .cmd'.irfClildes pbtenllgl'f:om:#iion); or~o{lfP. **--
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r .'.' ' : ~'.:: t-;;:,,,., Tf/ir:: c/1~f!t~~ des~rib'~s thepmc~ss:bywnid/1' th~'North~eff:Medip~l'.I~ot6jJ~'S, '.£!,¢ MWJ:ifl), >*.*. ' .t; :':. I * , ' . j; . , *,, ** c! .. *:J .~ }?."a<fiOi$Qlope J?rodu~tion ]?acility*'.(&F)*technicpl.sp~cifk:_atiiJ]1S wi1tbe Ji(!~elqpr{d qnd;*wljtt~~,;'f-oJ:.-. ,L .*:,*:.,: *" . i
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~T 't* ***:,*re,q~iredforJechnicaf*specifications*duringRPF'bperations:'.'* ~ ..,' ' , ' ,., J ~ ',,_ *, _. ~ 'i;, * " r>; r' i Ii '1 *,' : ~', "J, '";!" ..,, 'ct "' ':! : Ji! ,' f'RI<\,." * ~. .' ):'.;~ ',r,\/i:,',~_,!
t'"* 1
* * *-,:However; PSAR Chapters'3.Q qhd 14;.0 do'notprovi~e/he *tated'd,esign in/o,r,n1qti9n., , , . : .. :. ~ ,.1. ...:. ;;.,<.I; f;'.. .,,, <)V~"ap~~rd/~n9~ iif.~ .id*clfli~~: ~4(~)(5):';td;~tif;;':~~<i!~~t/ffi;!~? s~l~ci.ti.<:n:9tilii}~.~~riqb1~4*:co',;dit{&~~; :1
!!;'i'"* .* . ' .- , . 'l nor other 1te11.1s*wh1ch are determ1f?ed as_*the:.r.eSfJ/t ofprelim(nctrysafety analxs1s ' and
.evalur;Jtio~i t,o be: . *: ;: * * . , * "'.;prqbable si~bject~ oftecf!nlCaf, spe(;ijicatf9ps for, the fa,cilityi with sjJ(fcial attention gtvenwrthose i~ems.* ;:
\ ,. :* '.- *: j!whiqh m'aysignificm~tly'tnf!.uefjce thefina~design., . ,*: ,- *" ,- , * * * *.: ," . :c", - ::. *:*~ ~' :.;' .\ ! :" ~ -" ' ~ '. . ' "- . " . ' ' ' ~ ~ *'~ .. > f * : , ' * " \: !The variables or conditions in Table 11 are probable subjects of technical specifications based on their I involvement with preventing release ofradioactive materials routinely or in the event of an accident. \Table 11 will be added to the PSAR Chapter 14.0. Technical specifications on these items are planned for! [inclusion in sections that address limiting conditions of operation and surveillance/maintenance in the ; j~~~-R a.~.P~~~ ~~ <?P~!~!~~- ~-i~ell8._~ ~pplicat~<?~*-- ...,, .. _ *- __ _ .. __ __ _ . ___., ___ i 91 of 96
NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 Table 11. Potential Technical Specifications Item or variable Reason Uranium mass limits on batches, samples, and approved j Criticality control containersa (§~?illi~~I~I*'~ ~ri1iil~sfEJ~!~n~~i5Yigr~~~il~tI:.~iti?i@£:s~~[9}:~!:~!f~1r::t:'.:f:lE~f1I:c2?E23 Floor and sump designsa l Criticality control l!I~I£~EIIgfilf§I~~i~rL~~~,,~::~~:i:G:r;l~I;~2~:}r~1~:z:m:§l'g~i,!fI~~B?&r:;:?;IG:~:r~r:c1:~;:1:::I:zJ Process tank size and spacinga l Criticality control l§§~2fii§i~s!{a4i~t.~liii~1§~l25If:'.If:r:;;E~~=:3=~c2E:~:2~t~~S!~!Yl~~~~~~:~~f~*t:E~iS:.GiI]f~32;B Criticality monitoring system ! Criticality control ffii;r@~~~~~iiKf~q!¥~:Sm~~i2E!!i;~17:JJ:~~J:~;T;:~~;:~~~:~~:r:::::::~gr,§~i'.SW.iX:£elii2!;~~(~~:::z~::=]:%~:::E~:rr:r1 Air pressure differential between zonesa l Control of airborne RAM ~~,r~~~~~~~~~~:~£~1;~~~~ Hot cell shield thickness and integritya lOccupation and general public dose reduction fg2fs~:i]~£?A~J!fYii~~~~f4£~~~ciiiG~\;;~;£:.:?;:~~~:EJ~:c:n.~¥:!f~Thl~~26ls~MMi~I2f?]Ii:I~:] Double-wall piping ! Control of liquid RAM/criticality control f"'*"f'*f'-1<1~*'*~*~.:..---r.:::-.>~""~\,...::;~***"1"!<'-*~---~"-~"'"'"---:-""°tf0,..-.-"".i'r"*~*,...i::f-~'~p.'."',;.""'.f-*""":~;i}""'.f:Jr-1' .. ;..;;~t'~~"'f:L--~--+wu~*'.~*'.~*p~H"'-o.~ .. ~f-'"-<~"7""~,'-'0i:i--,.;.n;:0'-TJ'*P'_,,-~:-..:::.~::-*~o*;"-9"~-"F;-".:::.*'"'f:*"*i'~~~."<!\~J lf:~99.~~S.~;£!9~~~;~eatm~~~a£?~9J.t~~-*i~2~s-0:..,;~'~:~~.=-;~;,;,,:,.,,~,(~,:"":'L,,.,,iLqp]!£g!.2f§£t!l~~ll<i!H~;~~l!9P51.~..,:.L~;'.;'. System backflow prevention devices i Control of liquid RAM/criticality control rn~s~i~!~L:Z~fiJE!J??~[1Zl~;~£:l:E;sr;~ '.:J:IbE1S?ID@i~¥£ffi1Jrf~~<[@Mr£.}f}:;:[:i:;J;~:EIZD Area radiation monitoring system ; Occupation and general public dose reduction a Items that will significantly influence the final design. RAM = radioactive material. i SNM special nuclear material. 92 of 96
NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 REFERENCES 10 CFR 20, "Standards for Protection Against Radiation," Code ofFederal Regulations, Office of the Federal Register, as amended. 10 CFR 21, "Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance," Code ofFederal Regulations, Office of the Federal Register, as amended. 10 CFR 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," Code ofFederal Regulations, Office of the Federal Register, as amended. 10 CFR 70, "Domestic Licensing of Special Nuclear Material," Code ofFederal Regulations, Office of the Federal Register, as amended. 10 CFR 70.61, "Performance Requirements," Code ofFederal Regulations, Office of the Federal Register, as amended. 10 CFR 70.64, "Requirements for New Facilities or New Processes at Existing Facilities," Code of Federal Regulations, Office of the Federal Register, as amended. 40 CFR 61, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants," Code ofFederal Regulations, Office of the Federal Register, as amended. ANS 15 .8, Quality Assurance Program Requirements for Research Reactors, American Nuclear Society, La Grange Park, Illinois, 1995, R2005, R2013. ANSI/ANS-2.3, Estimating Tornado, Hurricane, and Extreme Straight Line Wind Characteristics at Nuclear Facility Sites, American Nuclear Society, La Grange Park, lliinois, 2011. ASCE 4, Seismic Analysis ofSafety-Related Nuclear Structures and Commentary, Rev. 2, American Society of Civil Engineers, Reston, Virginia, 2011. ASCE 7, Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures, American Society of Civil Engineers, Reston, Virginia, 2006. ASCE 43, Seismic Design Criteria for Structures, Systems, and Componentfj in Nuclear Facilities, American Society of Civil Engineers, Reston, Virginia, 2005. ASTM Cl533, Standard Guide for General Design Considerations for Hot Cell Equipment, ASTM International, West Conshohocken, Pennsylvania, 2008. Boone County 2015, "Boone County Hazards Mitigation Plan 2015, Mid-Missouri Regional Planning Commission, July, 20, 2015. DOE-STD-3014-2006, Accident Analysis for Aircraft Crash into Hazardous Facilities, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C., 1996 (R2006). EDF-3124-0016,Analysis ofPotential Accidents at Nearby Facilities, Rev. 1, Portage, Inc., Idaho Falls, Idaho, November 2014. FEMA P-753, NEHRP Recommended Seismic Provisions for New Buildings and Other Structures, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Washington, D.C., 2009. IBC, 2009, "International Building Code," as amended, International Code Council, Inc., Washington, D.C., February 2009. IBC, 2012, "International Building Code," as amended, International Code Council, Inc., Washington, D.C., 2012. ICC-ES-AC156, Acceptance Criteria for Seismic Certification by Shake-Table Testing ofNonstructural Components, International Code Council, Washington, D.C., 2010. 93 of 96
.~.~*~;:. .NWMI -::.**.-.: NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 . -: ~~.~!':. mmmwm MfDreAl ISOTOPES MU, 2006, Missouri University Research Reactor (MURR.) Safety Analysis Report, MU Project# 000763, University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri, August 18, 2006.
NFPA 801, Standard for Fire Protection for Facilities Handling Radioactive Materials, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts, 2014. NRC, 2012, Final Interim Staff Guidance Augmenting NUREG-15 3 7, "Guidelines for Preparing and Reviewing Applications for the Licensing ofNon-Power Reactors," Parts 1 and 2, for Licensing Radioisotope Production Facilities and Aqueous Homogeneous Reactors, Docket Number: NRC-2011-0135, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., October 30, 2012. NUR.EG-0800, Standard Review Plan for the Review ofSafety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, Washington, D.C., 2016. NUREG-1520, Standard Review Plan for the Review ofa License Application for a Fuel Cycle Facility, Rev. I, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, Washington, D.C., May 2010. NUREG-1537, Guidelines for Preparing and Reviewing Applications for the Licensing ofNon-Power Reactors - Format and Content, Part 1, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Washington, D.C., February 1996. NUREG-1537, Guidelines for Preparing and Reviewing Applications for the Licensing ofNon-Power Reactors: Standard Review Plan and Acceptance Criteria, Part 2, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Washington, D.C., February 1996. NWMI-2013-021, Construction Permit Application for Radioisotope Production Facility, Rev. 0, Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC, Corvallis, Oregon, June 29, 2015. NWMI-2013-034, Uranium Recovery and Recycle Process Descriptions, PFD and P&ID, Rev. B, Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC, Corvallis, Oregon, January 2015. NWMI-2013-CALC-Ol l, Source Term Calculations, Rev. A, Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC, Corvallis, Oregon, February 2015. NWMI-2014-RPT-006,MCNP 6.1 Validations with Continuous Energy ENDFIB-VIJ.1 Cross-Sections, Rev. 0, Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC, Corvallis, Oregon, December 2014. NWMI-2015-CALC-022,Maximum Vessel Heat Load, Temperature, and Pressure Estimates, Rev. A, Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC, Corvallis, Oregon, April 2015. NWMI-2015-CRITCALC-001, Single Parameter SubcriticalLimitsfor 20 wt% Uranium 235 - Uranium Metal, Uranium Oxide, andHomogenous Water Mixtures, Rev. A, Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC, Corvallis, Oregon, 2015. NWMI-2015-CRITCALC-002, Irradiated Target Low-Enriched Uranium Material Dissolution, Rev. A, Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC, Corvallis, Oregon, 2015. NWMI-2015-CRITCALC-003, 55-Gallon Drum Arrays, Rev. A, Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC, Corvallis, Oregon, 2015. NWMI-2015-CRITCALC-004, Single Parameter Subcritical Limits for 20 wt% Uranium 235 -Low-Enriched Uranium Target Material, Rev. A, Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC, Corvallis, Oregon, 2015. NWMI-2015-CRITCALC-005, Target Fabrication Tanks, Wet Processes, and Storage, Rev. A, Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC, Corvallis, Oregon, 2015. 94 of96
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NWMI NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0
*: ~~.~!:. N"ORTHW£STMU11CALISOIOPI$
NWMI-2015-CRITCALC-006, Hot Cell Tank Pit, Rev. A, Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC, Corvallis, Oregon, 2015. NWMI-2015-CSE-001, NWM1 Preliminary Criticality Safety Evaluation: Irradiated Target Handling and Disassembly, Rev. A, Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC, Corvallis, Oregon, 2015. NWMI-2015-CSE-002, NWM1 Preliminary Criticality Safety Evaluation: Irradiated Low-Enriched Uranium Target Dissolution, Rev. A, Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC, Corvallis, Oregon, 2015. NWMI-2015-CSE-003, NWM1 Preliminary Criticality Safety Evaluation: Molybdenum-99 Recovery, Rev. A, Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC, Corvallis, Oregon, 2015. NWMI-2015-CSE-008, NWM1 Preliminary Criticality Safety Evaluation: Hot Cell Uranium Purification (Recovery and Recycle), Rev. A, Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC, Corvallis, Oregon, 2015. NWMI-2015-CSE-009, NWM1 Preliminary Criticality Safety Evaluation: Liquid Waste Processing, Rev. A, Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC, Corvallis, Oregon, 2015. NWMI-2015-CSE-010, NWM1 Preliminary Criticality Safety Evaluation: Solid Waste Collection, Encapsulation, and Staging, Rev. A, Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC, Corvallis, Oregon, 2015. NWMI-2015-CSE-011, NWM1 Preliminary Criticality Safety Evaluation: Offgas and Ventilation, Rev. A, Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC, Corvallis, Oregon, 2015. NWMI-2015-CSE-012, NWM1 Preliminary Criticality Safety Evaluation: Target Transport Cask and *\ Drum Handling, Rev. A, Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC, Corvallis, Oregon,*2015. NWMI-2015-CSE-013, NWM1 Preliminary Criticality Safety Evaluation: Analytical Laboratory, Rev. A, Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC, Corvallis, Oregon, 2015. NWMI-DRD-2013-030, NWM1 Radioisotope Production Facility Design Requirements Document, Rev. B, Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC, Corvallis, Oregon, 2015. NWMI-ENG-PR0-002, Engineering Change Control, Rev. 1, Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC, Corvallis, Oregon, 2014. NWMI-QA-PR0-017, Quality Records, Rev. 1, Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC, Corvallis, Oregon, 2014. NWMI-QA-PR0-029, Testing, Rev. 1, Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC, Corvallis, Oregon, 2014. NWMI-QA-PR0-035, Identification and Control ofNonconforming Items, Rev. 1, Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC, Corvallis, Oregon, 2014. Regulatory Guide 1.60, Design Response Spectra for Seismic Design ofNuclear Power Plants, Rev. 2, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., July 2014. Regulatory Guide 1.61, Damping Values for Seismic Design ofNuclear Power Plants, Rev. 1, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., March 2007 (R2015). Regulatory Guide 1. 76, Design-Basis Tornado and Tornado Missiles for Nuclear Power Plants, Rev. 1, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., March 2007. Regulatory Guide 1.92, Combining Modal Responses and Spatial Components in Seismic Response Analysis, Rev. 2, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., July 2006. Regulatory Guide 1.122, Development ofFloor Design Response Spectra for Seismic Design ofFloor Supported Equipment or Components, Rev. 1, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Standards Development, Washington, D.C., February 1978. 95 of 96
NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 Terracon, 20 l la, Phase I Environmental Site Assessment Discovery Ridge Lots 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18, Terracon Consultants, Inc., prepared for University of Missouri and Trabue, Hansen & Hinshaw, Inc., Terracon Project No. 09117701, March 23, 2011. Terracon, 20llb, Preliminary Geotechnical Engineering Report Discovery Ridge-Certified Site Program Lots 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18, *Terracon Consultants, Inc., prepared for University of Missouri and Trabue, Hansen & Hinshaw, Inc., Terracon Project No. 09105094.1, February 11, 2011. USGS, 2002, "Earthquakes in the Central United States 1699 -2002," pubs.usgs.gov/imap/i-2812/i-2812.jpg, U.S. Geological Survey, Reston, Virginia, June 18, 2002. USGS, 2013c, Three Centuries of Earthquakes Poster," pubs.usgs.gov/imap/i-2812/i-2812.jpg, U.S. Geological Survey, Reston, Virginia, accessed July 23, 2013. USGS, 2016, "Search Earthquake Catalog," http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/search/, U.S. Geological Survey, Reston, Virginia, accessed October 7, 2016. 96 of 96
NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 Attachment A Section 3.5, "Systems and Components" of NWMI-2013-021, Construction Permit Application for Radioisotope Production Facility A-i
NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 This page intentionally left blank A-ii
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- NORTHWESTMEDlCAl.ISOTOPES 3.5 SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS Certain systems and components of the RPF are considered important to safety because they perform safety functions during normal operations or are required to prevent or mitigate the consequences of abnormal operational transients or accidents. This section summarizes the design basis for design, construction, and operating characteristics of safety-related SSCs of the RPF.
3.5.1 General Design Basis Information 3.5.1.1 Classification of Systems and Components Important to Safety The RPF systems and components will be classified according to their importance to safety, quality levels, and seismic class. The guidance used in developing these classifications during preliminary design with the support of regulatory guidance reviews, hazards and operability analysis, accident analysis, integrated safety analysis, and national consensus code requirements is presented below. The RPF systems identified in Table 3-1 and their associated subsystems and components are discussed in the subsections that follow. 3.5.1.2 Classification Definitions The definitions used in the classification of SSCs include the following. In accordance with 10 CFR 50 .2, "Definitions," design basis refers to information that identifies the specific functions to be performed by an SSC of a facility and the specific values or ranges of values chosen for controlling parameters as reference bounds for design. These values may be:
- Restraints derived from generally accepted state-of-the-art practices for achieving functional goals
- Requirements derived from analysis (e.g., calculation, experiments) of the effects of a postulated accident for which a SSC must meet its functional goals These reference bounds are to include the bounding conditions under which SSCs must perform design basis functions and may be derived from normal operation or any accident or events for which SS Cs are required to function, including anticipated operational occurrences, design basis accidents, external events, natural phenomena, and other events specifically addressed in the regulations.
Safety-related is a classification applied to items relied on to remain functional during or following a design basis event (DBE) to ensure the:
- Integrity of the facility infrastructure
- Capability to shut down the facility and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition
- Capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in potential off-site exposures comparable to the applicable guideline exposures set forth in 10 CFR 70.61, "Performance Requirements," as applicable Design basis accident is a postulated accident that a nuclear facility must be designed and built to withstand, without loss to the SSCs necessary to ensure public health and safety.
Design basis event (DBE) is an event that is a condition of normal operation (including anticipated operational occurrences), a design basis accident, an external event, or natural phenomena for which the facility must be designed so that the safety-related functions are achievable. 3-43
.:....~*-. NWM I NWMl-2015-021, Rev. OA Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components .: !~.~!: NOflTHVJESTMEDICALISOTOPES Design basis accidents and transients are those DBEs that are accidents and transients and are postulated in the safety analyses. The design basis accidents and transients are used in the design of the facility to establish acceptable performance requirements for SSCs.
Single failure is considered a random failure and can include an initiating event (e.g., component failure, natural phenomenon, external man-made hazard) or consequential failures. Mechanical, instrumentation, and electrical systems and components required to perform their intended safety function in the event of a single failure are designed to include sufficient redundancy and independence. This type of design verifies that a single failure of any active component does not result in a loss of the capability of the system to perform its safety functions. Mechanical, instrumentation, and electrical systems and components are designed to ensure that a single failure, in conjunction with an initiating event, does not result in the loss of the RPF's ability to perform its intended safety function. Design techniques such as physical separation, functional diversity, diversity in component design, and principles of operation, will be used to the extent necessary to protect against a single failure. An initiating event is a single occurrence, including its consequential effects, that places the RPF (or some portion) in an abnormal condition. An initiating event and its resulting consequences are not considered a single failure. Active components are devices characterized by an expected significant change of state or discernible mechanical motion in response to an imposed demand on the system or operation requirements (e.g., switches, circuit breakers, relays, valves, pressure switches, motors, dampers, pumps, and analog meters). An active component failure is a failure of the component to complete its intended safety function(s) on demand. Passive components are devices characterized by an expected negligible change of state or negligible mechanical motion in response to an imposed design basis load demand on the system. Defense-in-depth is an approach to designing and operating nuclear facilities that prevents and mitigates accidents that release radiation or hazardous material through the creation of multiple independent and redundant layers of defense to compensate for potential human and mechanical failures so that no single layer, no matter how robust, is exclusively relied on. Defense-in-depth includes the use of access controls, physical barriers, redundant and diverse key safety functions, and emergency response measures. The RPF structure and system designs are based on defense-in-depth practices. The RPF design incorporates:
- Preference for engineered controls over administrative controls
- Independence to avoid common mode failures
- Other features that enhance safety by reducing challenges to safety-related components and systems Safety-related systems and components identified in this section are described in Chapters 4.0; 5.0, "Coolant Systems;" 6.0; 7.0; 8.0, Electrical Power Systems;" and 9.0, "Auxiliary Systems," as appropriate.
3.5.1.3 Nuclear Safety Classifications for Structures, Systems, and Components SSCs in the RPF are classified as safety-related and non-safety-related. The safety-related SSCs include IROFS to meet the performance requirement of 10 CFR 70.61 and other safety related SSCs to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 20. The purpose of this section is to classify SSCs according to the safety function being performed. 3-44
.. . NWMI .:~.-.;*
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- NDRnIWEST MEDICAL ISOTOPES NWMl-2015-021, Rev. OA Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components In addition, design requirements will be placed on SS Cs to ensure the proper performance of their safety function, when required.
- Safety-related IROFS - SSCs identified through accident analyses as required to meet the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61 (see Table 3-2)
- Safety-related - SSCs that provide reasonable assurance that the facility can be operated without undue risk to the health and safety of workers, the public, and environment, includes SSCs to meet 10 CFR 20 normal release or exposure limits
- Non-safety-related - SSCs related to the production and delivery of products or services that are not in the above safety classifications 3.5.1.3.1 Quality Group Classifications for Structures, Systems, and Components The assignment of safety-related classification and use of codes and standards conforms to the requirements NWMI's Quality Assurance Program Plan (QAPP) for the development of a Quality Group classification and the use of codes and standards. The classification system provides a recognizable means of identifying the extent to which SS Cs are related to safety-related and seismic requirements, including ANS nuclear safety classifications, NRC quality groups, ASME Code Section III classifications, seismic categories, and other applicable industry standards, as shown in Table 3-T.
'1 Quality assurance (QA) requirements are defined in the NWMI QAPP (Chapter 12.0, "Conduct of Operations," Appendix C). The definitions of QA Levels 1, 2, and 3 are provided below.
QA Level 1 will implement the full measure of the QAPP and will be applied to IROFS. IROFS are QA Level 1 items in which failure or malfunction could directly result in a condition that adversely affects workers, the public, and/or environment, as described in 10 CFR 70.61. Examples include:
- Items to prevent nuclear criticality accidents (e.g., preventive controls and measures to ensure that under normal and credible abnormal conditions, all nuclear processes are subcritical)
- Items credited to withstand credible design-bases external events (e.g., seismic, wind)
- Items to prevent degradation of structural integrity (e.g., failure or malfunction of facility)
QA Level 2 will be applied to non-QA Level 1 safety SSCs. The QA program is important to the acceptability and suitability of the item or service to perform as specified. Acceptance methods shall be specified (including acceptance and other applicable performance criteria), documented, and verified before use of the item or service. Some of the required characteristics may be examined less rigorously than for QA Level 1. Examples of QA Level 2 items include:
- SSCs to meet 10 CFR 20 normal release or exposure limits
- Fire protection systems
- Seismic detection systems
- Safeguards and security systems
- Material control and accountability systems QA Level 3 will include non-safety-related quality activities performed by NWMI that are deemed necessary to ensure the manufacture and delivery of highly reliable products and services to meet or exceed customer expectations and requirements. QA Level 3 items include those items that are not classified as QA Level 1 or QA Level 2. QA Level 3 items are controlled in accordance with standard commercial practices.
3-45 .
.:;. .~:. NWM. I NWMl-2015-021, Rev. OA Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components . *. :~.:!;* NDRTHWESTMEDICAlJSOTOP£S These quality activities are embodied in NWMI's QAPP and will be further specified in the Operating License Application, and when necessary.
3.5.1.3.2 Seismic Classification for Structures, Systems, and Components SSCs identified as IROFs will be designed to satisfy the general seismic criteria to withstand the effects of natural phenomena (e.g., earthquakes, tomados, hurricanes, floods) without loss of capa~ility to perform their safety functions. ASCE 7, Chapter 11, sets forth the criteria to which the plant design bases demonstrate the capability to function during and after vibratory ground-motion associated with the safe-shutdown earthquake conditions. The seismic classification methodology used for the RPF complies with the preceding criteria, and with the recommendations stated in Regulatory Guide 1.29, Seismic Design Classification. The methodology classifies SSCs into three categories: seismic Category I (C-1), seismic Category II (C-11), and non-seismic (NS). Seismic C-1 applies to both functionality and integrity, while C-11 applies only to integrity. SSCs located in the proximity ofIROFs, the failure of which during a safe-shutdown earthquake could result in loss of function of IROFs, are designated as C-11. Specifically:
- C-1 applies to IROFs. C-1 also applies to those SSCs required to support to shut down the RPF and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition.
- C-11 applies to SSCs designed to prevent collapse under the safe-shutdown earthquake. SSCs are classified as C-11 to preclude structural failure during a safe-shutdown earthquake, or where interaction with C-1 items could degrade the functioning of a safety-related SSC to an unacceptable level or could result in an incapacitating injury to occupants of the main control room.
- NS SSCs are those that are not classified seismic C-1 or C-11.
3.5.2 Radioisotope Production Facility Systems and components within the RPF are presented in Section 3 .5 .1. The RPF design basis evaluated the general design criteria from 10 CFR 70.64, "Requirements for New Facilities or New Processes at Existing Facilities." This evaluation is presented in Table 3-23. These general design criteria provide a rational basis from which to initiate design but are not mandatory. There are some cases where conformance to a particular criterion is not directly measurable. For each of the criteria, a specific assessment of the RPF design is made, and a complete list of references is included to identify where detailed design information pertinent to each criterion is treated. The Chapter 13. 0 accident sequences for credible events define the DBE. The safety-related parameter limits ensure that the associated design basis is met for the events presented in Chapter 13.0. 3-46
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.. ****~* *.* NORTHWEST MEDICAllSOllJPES Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components Table 3-23. Design Criteria Requirements (4 pages)
Design criteria and description Application and compliance j 10 CFR 70.64, "Requirements for New Facilities or New Processes at Existing Facilities" a , ( "'7-t~" ,,.,;.~;~*;~'j_=~** :;:'~~-~_..c..._.;,*;,=:,~:o*-*i)-;-:.._*, 4-;.-~*t:--:.n*.i<f*~*r, "' .r,~ ""4.:-*~-~*"'"""' "f,__..,.,_:,,_;.,.*:~*7"---<::;,.,;,a.~-;,--:r-*"-';'-:'"'"~-,;:;: ..~i"'"~,1 :--;--;-;* **~-.;--*-- ~- :;,~';*,.,.,..,;. ~ ..c;.:-;~,..-!...,.~"c:~'"' ::_...;.;~'i-' *'-~";.,.",!,"""~:--:~;.'"'.'"~; -:;:,.. ;-~*~*.-r,~'-::--'1"R"*"0* . ~-*~- i! Quality-standards ,and recordsi* *., ~ .*,* ' 1: ~
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* .' '" ... , . , * ' . * !i .,unportant,to.safefy:*:w1llbemamtained*l;>y,or.UAder.control:otJ.qWM:ffot@~lifeof'.
} ,. ,_. .. . .. *.: * *;: .,... . iJ*** :~ ~llus~: ~ ~a~fo~t~d* QAP~ ilia~ liiik~ 4~i~*~fassiriiaH6n filicl~:6~iate<l. i
'* ..*. ,;;i : , qocurnentatibn to"safety'claSsifiC~tion.,!lllcl'fo,the manufacfiiring.and <;lelivery o('.
- i. ,.0" *: ' ' .. ' ' , k: 'highly :reliable i>r9ducis and equipment, . '* * '" . :. ' >' ' ' ' ' ": . ' ,. ", '. 'ii t~.:~,:.~~;~j(~---~,:2r.::*::.*.~.~'-;_',.:~~.,~:~~~. ~~-:;_:~l:k~~i;t41t~~~~;J~ii~~~~;~1?:~~:C:~~:~J~~~:i::_;_,::~ ,': ;:j
!Natural phenomena hazards i* SSCs important to safety will be designed, fabricated, erected, tested, operated, Provide for adequate protection against j and maintained to quality standards commensurate with the importance of the natural phenomena, with consideration I safety functions to be performed. Where generally recognized codes and of the most severe documented I standards are used, they will be identified and evaluated to detennine their , historical events for the site. i applicability, adequacy, and s:ufiiciency and will be supplemented or modified as ; necessary to ensure a quality product in keeping with the required safety function.
;'
- The design basis for these SSCs will include: :
Appropriate consideration of the most severe natural phenomena that have been\ historically reported for the RPF site and surrounding area, including sufficient margin for limited accuracy, quantity, and period of time for which historical data has been accumulated Appropriate combinations of natural phenomena effects during normal and accident operating conditions i
- Importance of the safety functions to be performed J :
- Specific RPF design criteria and NRC general design criteria are discussed in l -~----~---*""-'**_. .. __ ._,~~-- ,__ ..,._.,,....,..,..._ -~----
, Sections 3.1 and 3.5, respectively. ~ ------.....,.,.._-*'*'"'**-<A-*""',.-"-*-..-----~-~~ - - - * -**--****~~w~~---*- ~---~*~_....,,_,~ *---~ ----~-***-*-*..._,-.>-*-~----*"'****"'-"--*"'"'--**-">, -** -~-*-**.-...!
1 3-47
.:;:.~:. NWM I **.:~.~~:* NORTJfW"t.STMEDICAl.ISOTOPES Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components NWMl-2015-021, Rev. OA Table 3-23. Design Criteria Requirements (4 pages)
Design criteria and description Application and compliance i\ ~re, p~ote~o~',: :;t.*:*':'(', :tfr'..; ::;~} .~4-~,'. *ss~'s*llµpo~~ *t~. ~'af~~-~1l ~* des~~~.ci:illid"'\~7~t,e<l~thibighci~tJh:e:~F~t9¥.';'/~ ~
- fProyHle.f~r ad~~~~ p~~~~ti~~ ag~ii}.st **;jj "'.. ~e;. cm~si~leti~ ~~t;h1 o_thetS?fetY,-~e~uir~~~t~
- 1fi~p~o~~R~}i1Y*:~~-~~fc!,~f: :i;
!fires.and e:iqJlos1Qns * .. ;. ,.e..... ;. : ,. *. *,<< . *;frres_ and ~'.CI>l<,>s1ons.,,. ,_ *." .: . . *. '" -. , * , " ..* ~ * ... * '.* ".' ... "\. :*; * :.l
- ".- ,. .*;,* .*. * * ;-* .. ,, '"
- .'.;, .* """ * ~-,"ii~. Noncombustible and'h~ftesistantniatenalsWillbtfosedwherever*=acticBl *. .: .J 0
I ' 1 ' ~ I * ' " ' ' - * " ~ ' '}}'::. *j ~ ' ' , ...... , * ,. ,, ",;' -- '* ' ' .. " '" 1:'~1 ' - "" ~~1~
- ,. '* * *"> ,,.'. ,; *. ,, 1 *.
- , * *** *:; ~" ~t~ .. ~1.mghoutthe~If, particularly ip. locations ~gh;as*confinement and tJi.e~coiltrol "-)
- , ;~,"'.,,i".?,.::;; ,' ,: ,*:.:: ;'.*;-.
- .:.~,* -i~, :*~(, .. :.:,,:, ~r~ip:,/ "1 ~:*:**:.: <<;: ,'f,:_' ,:._" ,;-.-.:: *: * '. ,~:H:. ~ *~~ . ;z.~'-:c,-*;;. '.<<:*" " *.;~*; --" -:-~r-* ;~*;::::f: ,**~?:~
it:'- 1 J'. :'(: :.~/, : /: , 1 r: :, :::,::,~ ::)"~.; Ti*::::* .,-r ir-.~**fiJ:e ~~.ctJ~rrand-~J?pi"f5si?r.~~~ ~fafyr?pri~t¢*~Pa¢ity an~ 9lria,qµitY ~ ~* -.-. ,** :, -*J "it ~-l"' ~"'...' :~. : ,~:,,: . ..*, {1 ., ,be.prQvided anddes1gtJ.ea to.numnnze the adverse effects ot'.frres:on*SSCs> ,;-.,-"*, 1:*h J ("' '.*,:. /" *; {::. :-t\: ;:*:: j'-~.:-":,*** *)\ ~: ., :~"~;}riiµ,pttiltl~io;_~fil'.eM';-;:*> )': ~;~-:; ~::t! ;*:* :*-,r(
~'.1 :.: ~..*. * "" ,:* ::,->:" : .~. if~ '.,.Firefig'\itirtg sySienls' will-J:if:'.*ciesignea to-en.Suie'thattheit rupture'or inadvenerif' :d ;."?~:*;1/**"*," ~r<* :~: ,>;:"**- '.: .. . <. :.<"t,
~ * . . > """'*._.*-: .:'. :' :.!.** *jl/ op~ratii?1!cide$notsiglljfic!iiit1yitllpafrthe.saf~tycapa~ility.oftljesessc~." ::._,) f~' .. .',' ... ' ' *: 1 ' £".'. ';"-: >:* '* -~i!." 'Wli'ere iie'cessary:;withln ioiied areas or~wb:ere'critiCalitY and ~c~ss are aD. .iSsue, ::! F:,*,..~*:,:.;*~* * .": ::*;* :, *.::'.:>:*'.:. *~* *,_*:: :\~t /'rc:;q~e~sySt7µi's~~-~-~~~x:~ti~te~*br9p~fittiop.~:~~-~~Vi~:?r~.\**:,.,~ .: t
~ ° )~ j'{- ""._:*r, "; :~ ;'.,? ~ ~, ;:*.~.. :* </~:~ ,: :*.:?*t ,;::}.~,fl:" "1?ete~ti9ri. ~i~*:'~; ;~*' ,"":
1 1 1
,. . , ' \ : ,
1
,~0 \:':, ~ / ,:'~t :* >,: / ~;-.~~ ~~ :, ,. {';\: f::,,/r~i ~~: :r: ~"J' '~~ ,~,~:.:~,:>11 f,:* :_.* ;..:.::!; "'. :_:* *1r* .\ * .. ',;, *:; *:.~" :: ~ ,' . / .. ,;'..ii* _;:RBF; fir~'pr~ti:cP,olf systei;it wil~ be desigued'~sl);sli. tpat af<#lure>>of any conipoperi(, ;oi t (:: *:-. : .:;< *.: .,: *. ;; ., :~. 1::..+'** ~,:-: *~ >lf:".'{>Yp.i!ot ~P~fi!e.~\jiJi!Y;!>~.s~etf~~l~~<t'~~y~~fs~~l)'.,S~~t*do~ Md:~o~afr(_;.~
f: <.:: ~ *::. *i:*:\::~,. *. "_,_* ~ ;: .>~ .L* * ;," ':; ** t;-_*. tp:e.RPF:orl1:JJ1lttlic:;.rel!!ase of ra4~?~~ti:vi~ to.J?ro".1?~ ~~~?naple ass~~ce}f!lt*,: :i
*~ *. "° ':* . ., "". " * * ** ** * ,*'. ..":., :'
- the publi9 \Yil).,be pr'?t~t:d from ra4i.ologichl l}!!~ resUI~g.fy9m RPf opef!!ti9ns., !
J ..: *... ;<.* " =:. "., : .. .,' ,.. " *. '.<~i * *RPF fire pr9!~ction system'will.be desigileqJp provide reasonable a8Sw-arice thilt '.i' F.. ; "., c ... ,-; ' : .." ' :'.. *:, ,. AL ';the public ,will,be proted:eafrom* radiological risks resmtirtg* from RPF operations I
~ **/ :, '* ~" .:~ .,::-* * *: ; .. : ,, "" * : ;*; :" :c;' ~,_~~"r,; l,>-t,?\~*~,..*~";..,*t;c ;~-:~!!: '(e.g,; failure, of kiy oomponent*Wiifnot impfilr,tlie;abillfy r,.::~,~,,, 0 \,<~'tiJ-0*' ,~ : 1 ~ *~- "4*,.,*
ofsafety':.related SSCsto*I!"f
,;r~.;'.r"'*.r*t'~'J,.
1, a " ' - , " ,'-'.,,,.,,.,, '** ;, *;;,'*' < r;_'
?' -~~_' ;:::;,*~,i: ;_;: *;:,', /!*:*'.~,:.~~;. :'_ "~/;;*; :*.'.,>- :*" :;: ~.s~~~Y.~hu~~~~*~d,~s~l~~*tf:e~~~~o~~lIIl!~~~:~~~se"'~~r~~o~.~tr,yi~~;*:,;c,\:* ;'.~>~
- t:" i. ,,, -:*,.,.,..... .,..."' *; . . ,:,.. *::, * ;*:*;l**;CJliapterS6.0and:.9.0prov1deadditional'irlfonnation~"'<<"* .. ..r*: .. "->* , .. :' .*._.. ":J,
*,:;;_ i.l>.~~~1:rJ../,1.4.J""'""-'r.;:_R;fo..;...,i;~-..**-' ,..~~~.......},':':',;i.;.r.,fr.~#.~....fd::.~J~)_.,,*.-f~~..,\:1<':4~~ ;r.*,,,,,,f,~-,--~* ..{"'-~"-~..~'hA~ ._,,,.,,.,....-...,11,.~ ~~'"'"-"~_,,J....,.,.,.~,.,.;._~,,._.,.~;:_'i~no:;~-!.iµ.,:'~:<" _,,,~~""~~-,,,.,.... ~*.!)~'..,.~,;}.4;1"="']:.;__,,,J,:;.;:; ~!
!Environmental f Provide for adequate protection from and dynamic effects f
- SSCs ~po~ to safety_ are designed to ~~commo~te effe~ts of, and to be .
1 compatible with, the envrronmental conditions associated with nonnal operation, l j environmental conditions and dynamic i maintenance, testing, and postulated accidents. Due to low temperature and I l effects_ associated with no~ 1 pr~sure RPF proc~sses, dynamic effects due to pipe rupture and discharging 1 j operations, maintenance, testing, and I flmds are not applicable to the RPF. I 1postulated accidents that could lead to ! I 1 loss of safety functions l I l Emergency capability 1* Emergency procedures will be developed and maintained for the RPF to control j !Provide for emergency capability to , SNM and hazardous chemicals produced from the SNM. ' j maintain control of: I" A preliminary Emergency Preparedness Plan is provided in Chapter 12.0, l 1 AppendixB. l
- Licensed material and hazardous !
1 chemicals produced from licensed l l l material I
- i.
- Evacuation of on-site personnel j
/
- On-site emergency facilities and i !
t.. _ ~~~~;k~;:~i!~~i.~~:~~~____J___ .,~--** _,,_________.,____ ,. ,._.__~*----. --------*. -*-*----*-"-**------~*----*J 3-48
~ ~:.NWMI NWMl-2015-021, Rev. OA Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components . *. ~ ~---~;
- NORTHWEST MEDI CA\. ISOTOPES Table 3-23. Design Criteria Requirements (4 pages)
Design criteria and description Application and compliance tutm~, seJ'Vic~' ' . . :; ' '.'.; ".: . : .~ ': '*':. ~'.* ;; ~ : 'X'h~ RPf i~ deiiigµt:d fof. Pakive; ~te sh,utdo~1i,fui.4 ~o*~eyen'fain(;onfrol,i~ ' ;; i:ProVide (or contillued operation of . *:.' ii* : :telease'of iiidioactive.niirteriatlfriormiil electric power is.iiiterrupted'o1;Jos6'. . .
- ti fessentiat tlfility. se{yices: ; : *:.: ;: .: *~ *:. .. *.~ ,*:r*; .h*~tiin4by~<liese1*i~ciitt~r*~W:{;e proy!de<l .for asset'protectj~ri ii scileGtea :RP:F **.,*~
r* ; .-* * * * :* .* .**. *.: .' .: .*: .. >;!' y,~s.tems. ,:*.':~::: '*:. : ;:*** : :: * ::~ >. *. "* ,: :L*. . 1.:** ..:.:: :* *. *,:: :~ '.. . .f
- !
- ' - ' ., . j; *. t:JnPiterrtiptable power .sypplies Will autom~titall'y prqvick power tO sy~* tha1 .* ;;
~"
- _ ' ., -* ;* . , *> i' *
- support the safety fun,ctions protecting workers and the public': . .. ; - * : _ * -- 0 *"'
- - '.. . ". ' .).* '.A combinati.on <?fUnit\tenuptable pO\\'.t)r SJfppliesanA ~ stfilidby elecfri,c~ p~w~r ' J i . .. 0
* , . : * .'. .**. * ;. * .
- Y(:. systen;i~l provide emergency electiicalpo:werto theRPFA l;OO.O;.icw .c .. *.. - ;i j"; * * ,. * *:* H\.'.(1;34Thp):diese1gen.erator~prpVide'fa9ilitYel~ctric,,p!Jwe(/' '"*:*.;'***.' "*'.: * ~*
f~~**"'** L;.:i:L.,~~:: . :.:;.;, _ ::,t::~:~):},,;.*jt:L~§lg\~-.~-~~~:::~~~.~:~~R~~-~~~M~~,,,01~0f~~~!~~~~'..:~~:* :.*-~}~C~:.~._::;.:~:~~~.:i \ Inspection, testing, and maintenance \
- The RPF is designed to provide access and controls for testing, maintenance, and
! Provide for adequate inspection, testing, I inspection of safety-related SSCs, as needed, throughout the RPF. land maintenance ofIROFS to ensure (
- Chapters 4.0, 6.0, 7.0, and 9.0 provide additional information.
- availability and reliability to perform '
- their function when needed i "
1*cs;i~~~~;*~~~~;;~::*;T;~r~~*,:~-~::,;::~r:**.:tt:~ii;kFi.~4~;;~~~;~;;ir;~~t~.ii~;;rtr~~~g~f~fi1ii!fil+/-t;~z~~&~ciirt;<ll
- (Prov1(je forcr,itjcahfy ..cor1trolj*1!1~fodiJig. ~: , ' ~ t() $e.~pra9e; .h~dljfig, and.pro9,t:~~mgp.fSNJv.l;*whif~:~fl'.~e;acc()D?-J?hs~ea;by: :/
\ i,tdherence ~o:the dou~re~coritirig~ncy * . *' '. :: * **: :--. )ndudµig<eqµipirient,;fi:tcilities; arid pfocedpres* ~o* protect \\'.ork:er*ario public:* : .*,{; j prfu.ciple * . ; . . Y< , :: . '.' *: *.
- h~*alth an~ to lniillil)jze* dang~r to life o:tprop~rty *: *.*' * * :* : : * :. ;; '.'.... : '* '\
- i.. . . . . . *' il_ . Ensinillg that the d~sign.provtdes for ¢ticWity. control;' inclu~g adher~~e to .f
!, ; . .. * , i1 .. , * ~e'do~ble.,c~ntipgepcY'.J)rinciple . . . '._,. .. * * '*:.' * .
- I . " .* *. h * :~ In.'~~wor~t.in~ ~ 994~o/. ID:onitonn~ ~d iµartn SY,stemirit(),th~ fii:~ty.desi~. t L * ; * ** ... . .. ;. ".. ~.*.\}* . :* .;compli~ce.witilthei:~qillremeilt$;<?t~riti'*lityc0Wol;.fud1~ding*i0!i~r~1\c~to*.J l*' . : :<. ':' ' ,-: :. . .'~ ': /: '. . '. ;:,*: ;, ' the.: ~ou.bl~~conting~cy'.prihciple, are'4es~!ib¢ µi <;k:f!iµin (?eyptei 65);; ': ' . '
L:::.:,...~~.:~::,.,,.;.::'":::~:~->~~;:.~:.:::.::,_:,_:~_~;:~". Jt::~:~.:~§§?~:~~~~,. :,~:.~~~-*.-:~~~*:::~-.. . :*:*" . . .,y, > . . * .. . . "*' !Instrumentation and control l
- RPF SNM processes will be enclosed predominately by hot cells and glovebox IThe design must provide for inclusion of i designs except for the target fabrication area. !
l I&C systems to monitor and control the !* The FPC system will provide monitoring and control of safety-related components i behavior of items relied on for safety. I and process systems within the RPF.
- The BMS (a subset of the FPC system) will monitor the RPF ventilation system and mechanical utility systems. :
- ESF systems will operate independently from the FPC system or BMS. Each ESF 1 safety function will use hard-wired analog controls/interlocks to protect workers,
- the public, and environment The ESF parameters and alarm functions will be integrated into and monitored by the FPC system or BMS.
- RPF designs are based on defense-in-depth practices and incorporate a preference for engineered controls over administrative controls, independence to avoid common mode failures, and incorporate other features that erihance safety by reducing challenges to safety-related components and systems.
- The FPC system will provide the capability to monitor and control the behavior of i safety-related SSCs. These systems ensure adequate safety of process and utility '
service operations in connection with their safety function. Controls are provided to maintain these variables and systems within the prescribed operating ranges under all normal conditions. I
- The FPC system is designed to fail to a safe-state or to assume a state demonstrated to be acceptable if conditions such as loss of signal, loss of energy or motive power, or adverse environments are experienced.
(
- Chapter 7.0 provides additional I&C system information. Safety-related SSCs are described in Section 3.5 and Chapters 4.0, 5.0, 6.0, 7.0, and 8.0.
3-49
. .;. . NWM. I
.*:e**.-.*
~~- .
Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components NWMl-2015-021, Rev. OA
'*-~~**.~:* NORTif'lJESTMEDlCA.LISOTOPES Table 3-23. Design Criteria Requirements (4 pages)
Design criteria and description Application and compliance )lefe~s_e4n-d~pth~< .*.:. :: .* **, :.*. "" ;;* :n~feris¢,~~A~pthjs a. 4esign philospp'hyt11at~h~s-ap~li(id*from.th~ .* ... :. i
~Base facility arid system.design and* . << _9egini:rin"rof th~'ptoject ajld will po~tiiuie'_tlyough completion bf a d~sign ~tis* . :i
- f~cili~~ l~yotit on Aefe~e~~-
- <fepth ' . 'f bas~ orq)roviding*'.S\}cc;e~si¥e}evel~ ~f Protection ~UC~ that health ~d safety are *;,
- practices
- :, The design must* mcorporate, :i ,, not.:whqlJ.y dependCI).t on any. srngle elem~nt .of tf\e design,. construction, ,
;to'theextentpractic!il?le:: ... : .. *, . . :\!_mairitenance,or:opera~on.c)fthe;J:{PF._<*. : :*;. :. :*;_.**. *.. * '***,. .*: ". - .,, * - ' " ' " .,. ** ., ., ** ' ' *- * ' : ' _* . ' ' * ' ' ' * * , ' *' .~ *+ * * ' ? ! *,, Preference for the-selection of * * .,.,".. JJ .*
- NWMI'::i ri.Skinsights,oqfaine9' through ~<>nhimce 'oftne accident analysis will ,i
- 'I
- ad.in.iniSt:rative: controls .to increase *,_,
f ;' :;
- *:. *e~gilieci~ :gc}~Jrols 9ver. ,, :'. ; -~ . *." ,. . b(\IB.e~. t~. supp~t!~~n~,th~ .friiitl oe~gn;~r: fqcu~jilg .attt;nti9~ ()~ *e pre~e~tion'kci:_f
.1; . ffiltigation,' of, the higher nsk: potential accidents:*. *,. " . . ,, * . ' , *: ..* '~
I,*.: *,~ve~allsxstemrelial;>ili~: ';.:'>. * *
- Qhapfur 6.0 iind .13_0 provide aCiditioii!ll ilifonnation.-:.
,
- Features that enhartee*.i>afetfby * ,. . ,, * ' * ** ' '
re~tfcing challenges.t9-lRQFS, , . *** , * * * * *. . :;. '" '
- 1
- 10 CFR 70.64, Requirements for New Facilities or New Processes at Existing Facilities," Code ofFederal Regulations, Office of the Federal Register, as amended.
b As used in 10 CFR 70.64, requirements for new facilities or new processes at existing facilities, defense-in-depth practices means a design philosophy, applied from the outset and through completion of the design, that is based on providing successive levels of protection such that health and safety will not be wholly dependent on any single element of the design, construction, maintenance, or operation of the facility. The net effect of incorporating defense-in-depth practices is a conservatively designed facility and system that will exhibit greater tolerance to failures and external challenges. BMS building management system. NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. CFR Code of Federal Regulations. NWMI Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC. ESF engineered safety feature. QAPP quality assurance program plan. FPC facility process control. RPF Radioisotope Production Facility. I&C instrumentation and control. SNM special nuclear material. lROFS items relied on for safety. SSC structures, systems, and components. The criteria are generic in nature and subject to a variety ofinterpretations; however, they also establish a proven basis from which to provide for and assess the safety of the RPF and develop principal design criteria. The general design criteria establish the necessary design, fabrication, construction, testing, and performance requirements for SSCs important to safety (i.e., SSCs that provide reasonable assurance that the facility can be operated without undue risk to the health and safety of workers, the public, and environment). Safety-related SSCs for the RPF will be designed, fabricated, erected, and tested as required by the NWMI QAPP, described in Chapter 12.0, Appendix C. In addition, appropriate records of the design, fabrication, erection, procurement, testing, and operations of SSCs will be maintained throughout the life of the plant. The RPF design addresses the following:
- Radiological and chemical protection
- Natural phenomena hazards
- Fire protection
- Environmental and dynamic effects
- Emergency capability (e.g., licensed material, hazardous chemicals, evacuation of on-site personnel, on-site emergency facilities/off-site emergency facilities)
- Utility services
- Inspection, testing, and maintenance
- Criticality safety
- Instrumentation and controls
- J)efense-in-depth 3-50
.:..-.~:.*.* NWM I NWMl-2015-021, Rev. OA Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components .: ~~-~! ." ,. NDRTHWESTIAEDICAltSOTDPES Safety-related systems and components will be qualified using the applicable guidance in the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standard IEEE 323, IEEE Standardfor Qualifying Class IE Equipmentfor Nuclear Power Generating Stations. The qualification of each safety-related system or component needs to demonstrate the ability perform the associated safety function:
- Under environmental and dynamic service conditions in which they are required to function
- For the length of time the function is required Additionally, non-safety-related components and systems will be qualified to withstand environmental stress caused by environmental and dynamic service conditions under which their failure could prevent satisfactory accomplishment of the safety-related functions.
- The RPF instrumentation and control (I&C) system (also known as the facility process control [FPC]
system) will provide monitoring and control of the process systems within the RPF that are significant to safety over anticipated ranges for normal operations and abnormal operations. The FPC system will perform as the overall production process controller. This system will monitor and control the process instrumented functions within the RPF, including monitoring of process fluid transfers and controlled inter-equipment pump transfers of process fluids. The FPC system will also ensure that process and utility systems operate in accordance with their safety function. Controls will be provided to maintain variables and systems within the prescribed operating ranges under all normal conditions. In addition, the FPC system is designed to fail into a safe state or to assume a state demonstrated to be acceptable if conditions such as loss of signal, loss of energy or motive power, or adverse environments are experienced. The building management system (BMS) (a subset of the FPC system) will monitor the RPF ventilation system and mechanical utility systems. The BMS primary functions will be to monitor the facility ventilation system and monitor and control (tum on and off) the mechanical utility systems. ESF systems will operate independently from the FPC system or BMS. Each ESF safety function will use hard-wired analog controls/interlocks to protect workers, the public, and environment. The ESF parameters and alarm functions will be integrated into and monitored by the FPC system or BMS. ' The fire protection system will have its own central alarm panel. The fire protection system will report the status of the fire protection equipment to the central alarm station and the RPF control room. This integrated control system will be isolated from safety-related components consistent with IEEE 2 79, Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations. In addition, the RPF is designed to meet IEEE 603, Standard Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, for separation and isolation of safety-related systems and components. Chapter 7.0 provides additional details on the integrated control system. 3-51
.:....~*- . NWMI
-::.~*.*.*.: NWMl-2015-021, Rev. DA Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components
*:~~ ~!:~ NDRTHlNmMEOICAl.ISOTOPES 3.5.2.1 System Classification Table 3-24. System Classifications The RPF is classified as a non-reactor Classification nuclear production facility per 10 CFR 50. description Classification Source In addition, a portion of the RPF will fabricate LEU targets, similar to fuel Hazard category I Intermediate rumrrd I NRC fabrication per 10 CFR 70. Due to the nature of the work performed within ~;~f::1J~~~~~
Construction type l 11-B l IBC 2012a facility, a hazardous occupancy applies: Table 3-24 provides the RPF classification for hazards occupancy, construction, risk, [fil~~~t~3~~itrJ{0a{EEiillit~~~}l:IJ\~{E11~§~z5i~~ Seismic design category j C ! ASCE 7h and seismic design categories. a IBC 2012, ~'International Building Code," as amended, 3.5.2.2 Classification of Systems and International Code Council, Inc., Washington, D.C., February 2012. h ASCE 7, Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Components Important to Structures, American Society-of Civil Engineers, Re~on, Virginia, 2013. Safety NRC = U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. RPF SSCs, including their foundations and supports, designed to remain functional in the event of a DBE are designated as C-1. SSCs designated IROFS are also classified as C-1. SSCs co-located with C-I systems are reviewed and supported in accordance with II over I criteria. This avoids any unacceptable interactions between SSCs. C-1 structures should be designed using dynamic analysis procedures, or when justified, equivalent static procedures using both horizontal and vertical input ground motions. For dynamic analyses, either response spectra or time history analyses approaches may be used. Dynamic analysis should be performed in accordance with the procedures of ASCE 4, with the exception of the damping limitations presented in Section 3 .4 .1. Table 3-25 lists the RPF SSCs and associated safety and seismic classifications and quality level group for the top-level systems. Subsystems within these systems may be identified with lower safety classifications. For example, the standby power supply (UPS) is an IROFS, while the standby diesel generator is classified as safety-related. Table 3-25. System Safety and Seismic Classification and Associated Quality Level Group (2 pages) Highest safety Seismic Quality level System name (code) classification 8 classificationb group 3-52
.:;.-.;*.. NWMI
........!.* Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components NWMl-2015-021, Rev. OA
. *, ~~.~!;. NORTJIWtSTMEDICALISOTOPES Table 3-25. System Safety and Seismic Classification and Associated Quality Level Group (2 pages)
Highest safety Seismic Quality level System name (code) classificationa classificationb group 1!~2t~~~~.Y~~!~}:_y~~P!~~~{l~~TIQ_*:~~-**Le:~c;~~-,x*~;~~JL~.~:.~L~9t§::;.:~.~-,~~;L_~-~~*~~i_5:-&2:.L"::u!;_;~,;._'.::r~.~~:~:~.-*,;~~-J Facility ventilation (FV) ] IROFS ; C-I i QL-1 f""' .,___ -- ;'**:- ..... '"'*** ---***** *::* *.-*****--:-c.-..... .......... ....,., .., -----. .. .;***:**1r .......,...... ....... 'f"*'r-* ..,,_ ...-...,............. tFireprotectioii - -1._ - -:,,-. ,.- t"~
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Plantandinstrumentair(PA) 1 NSR i C-II ! QL-2 [~~~i~!~2r&~~-i~~~iji:~~;~~L~::~::.~::,~=-~~=T,2"*.:.~_ Jt~~~;::::~2t~:~~-:~"~'.JC~:;~~~~~I=~~~2::;r::=?:l.9~t.I~~~;T~~J Gas supply (GS) ! NSR i C-II j QL-2 r~£i~~~~:'f~~~~~f;,~:~?SY2~!.:;:~:-rf. ::~:~-~:,:z::~,*::~E~0:c:T~!~:~*::z~1,;2~~::~~-:-~~~1,:;:::~~~~~1r:2::T~~§~:I~::_;*::=i Facility chilled water (FCW) i NSR l C-II QL-2 1--*~.----:-::""------~,~- ----*--.**-~,--~* ~--***"'-:'"**-,-. ***::."-*--~. . -...,. ...........-.-~---~---,~-."". Lf:ac11ity.*heat~dwater{HW) * .. , . *.*.* * * . . ..)
+"-** ~:. *--*-. -~~-----*~- . -. --;NSR .* . .{ -*: -G-IT_. * **.*)c.,.;_. QL-2 .. _ *.* * , . ~,.ir*~--. .,.,.~ . ~-**~-**:'*-:-*-* -*~-;,...--..*--*~::.~,.-*--*:.-:--.... ,,,,,~-.] .~ ~- .,....,.. ..,,.,........" -:-,* _._,_,,~*-*.:--
- r-* *~---*:;=--o-.-*~-,,,-~* ~,--.--v-....-:'-:-.*.,....,"' .* *."**.._,.._,,,....,__,,..,s~:--1*_,__,,,_....!_,-*.,,-~.*-.,,or.F'*rr....,, ..,..,....,,..*.--,,*-,....z.*.**-"'*~-,.~ .. _, . ._,,. -~.,..~-....,"'""'"-~~-;;- ,,,-,~-.,,.._.,,,,-~*-"..,,,,..-_'""'._._1,.,,,_.,.._-,....,,..""Z-..,._,.""'" ..._.,~-- ...,.. .--***~ ~. -~-.* '
Process steam (boiler) ! IROFS 1 C-II l QL-2 f£~~~g~~~i~I\i?.~~'*:~:;~,:~~=~::~r~:Ft::::~:IJD~::z~:~~flt~::ucE~*::.:.'.:I£~~~~~z:;~jJ~:IEI3~~~~::'.:~::DJ Chemical supply (CS) j NSR i C-II ! QL-2
,. ":,.._,.-.,~.*""~ **;;..r.1---. __. ~ ~~...,,"-'--~-=---. --:~-¥-0 -:. o--~-r~:~ ..--,_,.:*,~~ '""";-!""';"' -:;..c- ** ~:"':~~--- ..... -;-*~.!:":-:.:.-.~~~}T.~*y.-. .*-,.;;..., _ ..,.,;~....,_"' ~.:......~""*.:. ~-~:--*:""'{('~~""* -:-*;;~* >;.":-~*-~~-- -* *:;-~*-:*~.:rr"'* .-~'"':'[-: ~.:.<:.-'- -";**"~~;:--:*.,--r..... ~~'.:!"}"---~fl **-1 Biological
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Facility process control (FPC) l SR C-II \ QL-2 ,f.
- Safety classification accounts for highest classification in the system. Systems that are classified as safety-related may include both safety-related and non-safety-related components. Only safety-related components will be used to satisfy the safety functions of the system, whereas non-safety-related components can be used to perform non-safety functions. For example, there are non-safety-related components, such as fans, within the safety-related ventilation systems that perform non-safety-related functions.
b Seismic category may be locally revised to account for II over I design criteria and to eliminate potential system degradation due to seismic interactions. c Ventilation zone classifications vary -Ventilation Zone I and II are considered safety-related, C-I and QL-1; Ventilation Zone III and N are considered non-safety-related, C-II and QL-2. IROFS = items relied on for safety. RPF = Radioisotope Production Facility. NSR = non-safety related. SR = safety-related (not IROFS). SSCs that must maintain structural integrity post-DBE, but are not required to remain functional are C-11. All other SSCs that have no specific NRC-regulated requirements are designed to local jurisdictional requirements for structural integrity and are C-III. All C-1 SSCs are analyzed under the loading conditions of the DBE and consider margins of safety appropriate for that earthquake. The margin of safety provided for safety-class SSCs for the DBE are sufficient to ensure that their design functions are not put at risk. Table 3-26 presents the likelihood index limit guidelines and associated event frequency and risk index limits. 3-53
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*. Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components NWMl-2015-021, Rev. OA * *. ~~.~~:* NORTHWEST MEDICAL ISOTOPES Likely normal facility process condition Table 3-26. Likelihood Index Limit Guidelines r~~£~-~~~;;_;~~:~~~~1r~~iiIEriif~~~.~~~~~¥~~4):;:Jf~;~~-~2~::,::srg~~i.~~~~~?.3~~ii!Y~-~:rp~~1~r;::~~t~~tj~:] ! 4 ,
Event frequency limits Multiple events per year i > or= 0 Unlikely (infrequent facility process condition) 2 i Between 10-" and 10- per event, f -4 to 5 5
. , per year 1 r--_--* , ._., --.~ _..,-~ . . ."'---- ,-,._ ..,.,.;..=*-**-'*"'-"'-*~,.,..-* ** ..:;.....,-~..---**"+---: ~~*"**'~---:--t*: ::....__:,,,.*- *"--':'*-::* _,;....-~:-,.:- ..,*~*--.,,.., ~--';'-""'----....--'-**-'--.;;:..*/':. .-~~-~:;:._:;-,,.-.-;...:..*-~..c-:v-..~......:-"""""-f* -~"'"'~"""*~... --~-.-*-.-*'"-".- - --"',-;,- *,.:..;. ~-.;.,;;:.,~~r"~.,.-,,,._~:*::"'-"'*-'~4 IFfighly .Unlikely (limiajlg:facillfy ;pitjc~ss coridifii?n) '.;;. : ;') l ,"'. , [! -1:_,ess ~:,l 0:5 per~ve11_t,* per year -;1; * : . I .> <
3.5.2.3 Design Basis Functions, Values, and Criteria The design basis for systems and components required for safe operation and shutdown of the RPF are established in three categories, which are described below. The preliminary design basis functions and values for each major system are provided in the following subsections. Design Basis Functions
- License conditions, orders, or technical specifications
- Functions credited in the safety analysis to ensure safe shutdown of the facility is achieved and maintained, prevent potential accidents, or mitigate the potential consequences of accidents that could result in consequences greater than applicable NRC exposure guidelines Design Basis Values
- Values or ranges of values of controlling parameters established as reference bounds for RPF design to meet design basis function requirements
- Values may be established by an NRC requirement, derived from or confirmed by the safety analysis, or selected by the designer from an applicable code, standard, or guidance document Design Basis Criteria
- Code-driven requirements established for the RPF fall into seven categories, including fabrication, construction, operations, testing, inspection, performance, and quality
- Codes include national consensus codes, national standards, and national guidance documents
- Design of safety-related systems (including protection systems) is consistent with IEEE 379, Standard Application ofthe Single-Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power Generating Station Safety Systems, and Regulatory Guide 1.53, Application ofthe Single-Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power Plant Protection Systems
- Protection system is designed to provide two or three channels for each protective systems and functions and two logic train circuits:
Redundant channels and trains will be electrically isolated and physically separated in areas outside of the RPF control room Redundant design will not prevent protective action at the system level 3-54
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. ":. !~.~~:. NORTHV'JEST MEDltAl.ISOTOP!S Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components 3.5.2.4 System Functions/Safety Functions The NWMI RPF will provide protection against natural phenomena hazards for the personnel, SNM, and systems within the facility. The facility will also provide protection against operational and accident hazards to personnel and the public. Table 3-2 lists the IROFS defined by the preliminary hazards analysis.
3.5.2.5 Systems and Components 3.5.2.5.1 Mechanical RPF C-1 mechanical equipment and components (identified in Table 3-25) will be qualified for operation under the DBEQ seismic conditions by prototype testing, operating experience, or appropriate analysis. The C-1 mechanical equipment is also designed to withstand loadings due to the DBEQ, vibrational loadings transmitted through piping, and operational vibratory loading, such as floor vibration due to other operating equipment, without loss of function or fluid boundary. This analysis considers the natural frequency of the operating equipment, the floor response spectra at the equipment location, and loadings transmitted to the equipment and the equipment anchorage. The qualification documents and all supporting analysis and test reports will be maintained as part of the permanent plant record in accordance with the requirements of the NWMI QAPP. The safety-related equipment and components within the RPF will be required to function during normal operations and during and following DBEs. This equipment will be capable of functioning in the RPF environmental conditions associated with normal operations and design basis accidents. Certain systems and components used in the ESF systems will be located in a controlled environment. This controlled environment is considered an integral part of the ESF systems. 3.5.2.5.2 Instrumentation and Electrical C-1 instrumentation and electrical equipment (identified in Table 3-25) is designed to resist and withstand the effects of the postulated DBEQ without functional impairment. The equipment will remain operable during and after a DBEQ. The magnitude and frequency of the DBEQ loadings that each component experiences will be determined by its location within the RPF. In-structure response curves at various building elevations have been developed to support design. The equipment (e.g., batteries and instrument racks, control consoles) has test data, operating experience, and/or calculations to substantiate the ability of the components and systems to not suffer loss of function during or after seismic loadings due to the DBEQ. This certification of compliance with the specified seismic requirements, including compliance with the requirements of IEEE 344, is maintained as part of the permanent plant record in accordance with the NWMIQAPP. 3.5.2.6 Qualification Methods Environmental qualification of safety-related mechanical, instrumentation, and electrical systems and components is demonstrated by tests, analysis, or reliance on operating experience. Testing will be the preferred method of qualification. Qualification testing will be accomplished either by tests on the particular equipment or by type tests performed on similar equipment under environmental conditions at least as severe as the specified conditions. The equipment will be qualified for normal and accident environments. Qualification data will be maintained as part of the permanent plant record in accordance with the NWMI QAPP. 3-55
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**.! ~.:!: . NORTHWEST fmJICAL JS{IJQPES 3.5.2.7 Radioisotope Production Facility Specific System Design Basis Functions and Values The design basis functions and values for each system identified in Table 3-1 are discussed in the following subsections. Additional details for each system described below will be updated during the development of the Operating License Application.
3.5.2.7.1 Target Fabrication System An overview and detailed description of the target fabrication system are provided in Chapter 4.0, Sections 4.1.3.I and 4.4, respectively. Design Basis Functions
- Store fresh LEU, LEU target material, and new LEU targets
- Produce LEU target material from fresh and recycled LEU material
- Assemble, load, and fabricate LEU targets
- Reduce or eliminate the buildup of static electricity
- Minimize uranium losses through target fabrication
- Safety-related functions:
- Maintain subcriticality conditions within target fabrication system - Prevent flammable gas composition within target fabrication system - Limit personnel exposure to hazardous chemicals and offgases Design Basis Values
- 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., pumps)
- Maintain primary fission product boundary during and after normal operations, shutdown conditions, and DBEs 3.5.2.7.2 Target Receipt and Disassembly System An overview and detailed description of the target receipt and disassembly system are provided in Chapter 4.0, Section 4.1.3.2, and Sections 4.3.2/4.3.3, respectively.
Design Basis Functions
- Handle irradiated target shipping cask, including all opening, closing, and lifting operations
- Retrieve irradiated targets from a shipping cask
- Disassemble targets and retrieving irradiated target material from targets
- Reduce or eliminate the buildup of static electricity
- Safety-related functions:
Provide radiological shielding during receipt and disassembly activities Maintain subcriticality conditions within target receipt and disassembly system Prevent radiological materials from being released during target receipt and disassembly operations to limit the exposure of workers, the public, and environment to radioactive material Maintain positive control of radiological materials (LEU target material and radiological waste) Protect personnel and equipment from industrial hazards associated with system equipment (e.g., moving parts) 3-56
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- 30-year design life
- Maintain primary fission product boundary during and after normal operations, shutdown conditions, and DBEs
- Crane designed for anticipated load (e.g., hot cell cover block) of approximately 68 metric tons (MT) (75 ton) 3.5.2.7.3 Target Dissolution (DS)
An overview and detailed description of the target dissolution system are provided in Chapter 4.0, Sections 4.1.3.3 and 4.3.4, respectively. Design Basis Functions
- Fill the dissolver basket with the LEU target material
- Dissolve the LEU target material within dissolver basket
- Treat the offgas from the target dissolution system
- Handle and package solid waste created by normal operational activities
- Safety-related functions:
- Provide radiological shielding during target dissolution activities - Control and prevent flammable gas from reaching lower flammability limit conditions - Maintain subcriticality conditions through inherently safe design of target dissolution equipment - Maintain positive control of radiological materials (LEU target material and radiological waste)
Design Basis Values
- 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., pumps)
- Maintain primary fission product boundary during and after normal operations, shutdown conditions, and DBEs
- Prevent radiological materials from being released during target dissolution operations to limit the exposure of workers, the public, and environment to radioactive material per 10 CFR 20 3.5.2.7.4 Molybdenum Recovery and Purification (MR)
An overview and detailed description of the Mo recovery and purification system are provided in Chapter 4.0, Sections 4.1.3.4 and 4.3.5, respectively. Design Basis Functions
- Recovery of Mo product from a nitric acid solution created from dissolved irradiated uranium targets
- Purification of the recovered Mo product to reach specified purity requirements, followed by shipment of the Mo product
- Safety-related functions:
Maintain subcriticality conditions through inherently safe design of components that could handle high-uranium content fluid Prevent radiological materials from being released by containing fluids in appropriate tubing, valves, and other components
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;~**. ~;; NWM. I NWMl-2015-021, Rev. DA !~.~~: NORTHWEST MEDtCAl lSOTUPES Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components Control and prevent flammable gas from reaching lower flammability limit conditions Maintain positive control of radiological materials (99Mo product, intermediate streams, and radiological waste)
Provide appropriate containers and handling systems to protect personnel from industrial hazards such as chemical exposure (e.g., nitric acid, caustic, etc.) Design Basis Values
- Maintain primary fission product boundary during and after normal operations, shutdown conditions, and DBEs
- 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., pumps)
- Replace consumables after each batch 3.5.2.7.5 Uranium Recovery and Recycle (UR)
An overview and detailed description of the uranium recovery and recycle system are provided in Chapter 4.0, Sections 4.1.3.5 and 4.3.6, respectively. Design Basis Functions
- Receive and decay impure LEU solution
- Recover and purify impure LEU solution
- Decay and recycle LEU solution
- Transfer process waste
- Safety-related functions:
Provide radiological shielding during uranium recovery and recycle system activities Prevent radiological release during uranium recovery and recycle system activities Maintain subcriticality conditions through inherently safe design of the uranium recovery and recycle equipment Control and preventing flammable gas from reaching lower flammability limit conditions Maintain positive control of radiological materials Protect personnel and equipment from industrial hazards associated with the system equipment, such as moving parts, high temperatures, and electric shock Design Basis Values
- 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., pumps)
- Maintain primary fission product boundary during and after normal operations, shutdown conditions, and DBEs 3.5.2.7.6 Waste Handling An overview and detailed description of the waste handling system are provided in Chapter 4.0, Section 4.1.3.6 and Chapter 9.0, Section 9.7.2, respectively.
Design Basis Functions
- Receive liquid waste that is divided into high-dose source terms and low-dose source terms to lag storage
- Transfer remotely loaded drums with high-activity solid waste via a solid waste drum transit system to a waste encapsulation cell 3-58
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- Encapsulate solid waste drums
- Load drums with solidification agent and low-dose liquid waste
- Load high-integrity containers with solidification agent and high-dose liquid waste
- Handle and load a waste shipping cask with radiological waste drums/containers
- Safety-related functions:
Maintain subcriticality conditions by maintaining mass limits Prevent spread of contamination to manned areas of the facility that could result in personnel exposure to radioactive materials or toxic chemicals Provide shielding, distance, or other means to minimize personnel exposure to penetrating radiation Design Basis Values
- Maintain primary fission product boundary during and after normal operations, shutdown conditions, and DBEs
- 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., pumps) 3.5.2.7.7 Criticality Accident Alarm System Chapter 6.0, Section 6.3.3.1, and Chapter 7.0, Section 7.3.7, provide descriptions of the criticality accident alarm system.
Design Basis Functions
- Provide for continuous monitoring, indication, and recording of neutron or gamma radiation levels in areas where personnel may be present and wherever an accidental criticality event could result from operational processes.
- Provide both local and remote annunciation of a criticality excursion
- Remain operational during DBEs Design Basis Values
- 30-year design life
- Capable of detecting a criticality accident that produces an absorbed dose in soft tissue of 20 absorbed radiation dose (rad) of combined neutron or gamma radiation at an unshielded distance of 2 m from reacting material within one minute (except for events occurring in areas not normally accessed by personnel and where shielding provides protection against a criticality) 3.5.2.7.8 Continuous Air Monitoring System Chapter 7.0, Section 7.6, and Chapter 11.0, Section 11.1.4, provide detailed descriptions of the RPF continuous air monitoring system.
Design Basis Functions
- Provide real-time local and remote annunciation of airborne contamination in excess of preset limits
- Provide real-time local and remote annunciation ofradiological dose of excess of preset limits
- Provide environmental monitoring of nuclear radioactive stack releases
- Provide the capability to collect continuous samples
- Remain operational during DBEs 3-59
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- Activate when airborne radioactivity levels exceed predetermined limits
- Activate when radiological dose levels exceed predetermined limits
- Adjust volume of air sampled to ensure adequate sensitivity with minimum sampling time 3.5.2.7.9 Standby Electrical Power Chapter 8.0, Section 8.2 provides a detailed description of the RPF standby electrical power (SEP) system.
Design Basis Functions SEP includes two types of components: uninterruptible power supplies (UPS) and a standby diesel generator:
- UPS - Provides power when normal power supplies are absent
- Standby diesel generator - Provides power when normal power supplies are absent to allow continued RPF processing Design Basis Values
- 30-year design life
- Maintain power availability for a minimum of 120 min post-accident (UPS)
- Maintain power availability for 12 hr (diesel generator) 3.5.2.7.10 Normal Electrical Power Chapter 8.0, Section 8.1 provides a detailed description of the RPF normal electrical power (NEP) system.
Design Basis Functions
- Provide facility power during normal operations Design Basis Values
- 30-year design life 3.5.2. 7.11 Process Vessel Ventilation System Chapter 9. 0, Section 9 .1 provides a detailed description of the process vessel ventilation system.
Design Basis Functions
- Provide primary system functions to protect on-site and off-site personnel from radiological and other industrial related hazards
- Collect air in-leakage sweep from each of the numerous vessels and other components in main RPF processes and maintain hydrogen concentration process tanks and piping below lower flammability limit
- Minimize reliance on administrative or complex active engineering controls to provide a confinement system as simple and fail-safe as reasonably possible 3-60
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- Maintain primary fission product boundary during and after normal operations, shutdown conditions, and DBEs
- 30-year design life
- Contain and store noble gases generated in the RPF to meet I 0 CFR 20 requirements 3.5.2.7.12 Facility Ventilation System Chapter 9.0, Section 9. I provides a detailed description of the facility ventilation system.
Design Basis Functions
- Provide confinement of hazardous chemical fumes and airborne radiological materials and conditioning of RPF environment for facility personnel and equipment
- Prevent release and dispersal of airborne radioactive materials (e.g., maintain pressure gradients to ensure proper flow of air from least potentially contaminated areas to most potentially contaminated areas) to protect health and minimize danger to life or property
- Maintain dose uptake through ingestion to levels as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA)
- Provide makeup air and condition the RPF environment for process and electrical equipment
- Process exhaust flow from the process vessel ventilation system
- Provide confinement of airborne radioactive materials by providing for the rapid, automatic closure of isolation dampers within confinement zones for various accident conditions
- Provide conditioned air to ensure suitable environmental conditions for personnel and equipment inRPF Design Basis Values
- Maintain primary fission product boundary during and after normal operations, shutdown conditions, and DBEs
- Provide an integrated leak rate for confinement boundaries that meets the requirements of accident analyses that complies with I 0 CFR 20 dose limits
- Ensure that air exhausted to the atmosphere meets 40 CFR 61 (NESHAP) and applicable State law
- 30-year design life
- Maintain occupied space at 24 degrees Celsius (0 C) (75 degrees Fahrenheit [°F]) (summer) and 22°C (72°F) (winter), with active ventilation to support workers and equipment
- Maintain air quality that complies with 10 CFR 20 dose limits for normal operations and shutdown 3.5.2.7.13 Fire Protection System Chapter 9. 0, Section 9. 7. I provides a detailed description of the RPF fire protection system.
Design Basis Functions
- Provide detection and suppression of fires
- Generate alarm signals indicating presence and location of fire 3-61
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- Execute commands appropriate for the particular location of the fire (e.g., provide varying levels of notification of a fire event and transmitting notification to RPF central alarm station and RPF control room)
- Provide fire detection in RPF and initiate fire-rated damper closures
- Remain :functional during DBEs Design Basis Values
- 30-year design life
- Provide a constant flow of water to an area experiencing a fire for a minimum of 120 min based on the size of the area per International Fire Code (IFC, 2012)
- Provide sprinkler systems, when necessary, per National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 13, Standard for the Installation ofSprinkler Systems 3.5.2.7.14 Plant and Instrument Air System Chapter 9. 0, Section 9. 7 .1 provides a detailed description of the RPF plant and instrument air system.
Design Basis Functions
- Provide small, advective flows of plant air for several RPF activities (e.g., tool operation, pump power, purge gas in tanks, valve actuation, and bubbler tank level measurement)
- Provide plant air receiver buffer capacity to make up difference between peak demand and compressor capacity
- Provide plant air to instrument air subsystem for bubblers and valve actuation
- Provide instrument air receiver buffer capacity to make up difference between peak demand and compressor capacity Design Basis Values
- 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., pumps)
- Provide instrument air dried in regenerable desiccant beds to a dew point of no greater than -40°C
(-40°F) and filtered to a maximum 40 micron (µ) particle size 3.5.2.7.15 Emergency Purge Gas System Chapter 6.0, Section 6.2.1.7.5 provides a detailed description of the emergency purge gas system. Design Basis Functions
- Provide nitrogen to emergency purge gas system to the required process tanks
- Remain :functional during DBEs Design Basis Values
- 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts
- Maintain hydrogen gas (H2) concentrations less than flammability limit 3.5.2.7.16 Gas Supply System Chapter 9.0, Section 9.7.1 provides a detailed description of the gas supply system.
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- Provide helium, hydrogen, and oxygen in standard gas bottles
- Provide nitrogen from a tube truck to the chemical supply room where manifold piping will be used to distribute the gas
- Provide adequate flow to ensure that the accumulation of combustible gases is below hazardous concentrations and reduces radiological hazards due to accumulation of gaseous fission products Design Basis Values
- 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., pumps)
- Provide standard gas bottles, with capacity of approximately 8,495 L (300 cubic feet [ft3])
3.5.2.7.17 Process Chilled Water System Chapter 9.0, Section 9.7.1 provides a detailed description of the RPF chilled water system. Design Basis Functions
- Provide process chilled water loop for three secondary loops through plate-and-frame heat exchangers
- One large geometry secondary loop in hot cell - One criticality-safe geometry secondary loop in hot cell One criticality-safe geometry secondary loop in target fabrication area
- Provide monitoring of chilled water loops for loss of primary containment
- Provide cover gas to prevent flammable conditions Design Basis Values
- 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., pumps)
- Chilled water to various process equipment at no greater than 10°C (50°F) during normal operations
- The hydrogen concentration in the coolant system is maintained at less than 25 percent of the lower flammability limit of 5 percent H2 3.5.2.7.18 Facility Chilled Water System Chapter 9. 0, Section 9. 7 .1 provides a detailed description of the RPF facility chilled water system.
Design Basis Functions
- Provide cooling media to heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) system
- Supply HVAC system with cooling water that is circulated through the chilled water coils in air-handling units Design Basis Values
- Provide cooling water at a temperature of 9°C (48°F) to the HVAC air-handling unit cooling coils
- 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., pumps) 3-63
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'*. ~~-:~:. NORTHWEST MED1CAL rsOTOPES 3.5.2.7.19 Facility Heated Water System Chapter 9. 0, Section 9. 7 .1 provides a detailed description of the RPF heated water system.
Design Basis Functions
- Provide heated media to HVAC system
- Supply the HVAC system with heated water that is circulated through the heated water coils in the air-handling units Design Basis Values
- Provide heated water at a temperature of 82°C (l 80°F) to HVAC air-handling unit heating coils and reheat coil
- 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., pumps) 3.5.2.7.20 Process Steam System - Boiler Chapter 9. 0, Section 9. 7 .1 provides a detailed description of the RPF process steam system for the boiler.
Design Basis Functions
- Generate low- and medium-pressure steam using a natural gas-fired package boiler
- Provide a closed loop steam system for the hot cell secondary loops that meets criticality control requirements
- Provide monitoring of steam condensate for loss of primary containment
- Limit sludge or dissolved solids content with automatic and makeup water streams in the boiler Design Basis Values
- 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., pumps)
- Provide saturated steam at 1. 7 kg/square centimeters (cm2) (25 lb/square inch [in.2]) and 4.2 kg/cm2 (60 lb/in. 2) gauge to various process equipment 3.5.2.7.21 Demineralized Water System Chapter 9. 0, Section 9. 7 .1 provides a detailed description of the RPF demineralized water system.
Design Basis Functions
- Provide demineralized water to RPF except for administration and truck bay areas
- Remove mineral ions from municipal water through an ion exchange (IX) process and accumulate in a storage tank
- Provide regenerable IX media using a strong acid and a strong base
- Feed acids and bases from local chemical drums by toe pumps
- Design Basis Values
- 3 0-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., pumps)
- Provide the water at 4.2 kg/cm2 (60 lb/in.2) gauge 3-64
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........ ~.* NWMl-2015-021, Rev. DA
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- NORTHWIST MEDICA[ISOTDP.ES Chapter 3.0 - Design of Structures, Systems and Components 3.5.2.7.22 Chemical Supply System Chapter 9.0, Section 9.7.4 provides a detailed description of the chemical supply system.
Design Basis Functions
- Provide storage capability for nitric acid, sodium hydroxide, reductant, and nitrogen oxide absorber solutions, hydrogen peroxide, and fresh uranium IX resin
- Segregate incompatible chemicals (e.g., acids from bases)
- Provide transfer capability for chemical solutions mixed to required concentrations and used in target fabrication, target dissolution, Mo recovery and purification, and waste management systems Design Basis Values
- 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., pumps) 3.5.2.7.23 Biological Shielding System Chapter 4.0, Section 4.2, provides a detailed description of the RPF biological shielding.
Design Basis Functions
- Provide biological shielding from radiation sources in the hot cells for workers in occupied areas of theRPF '*
- Limit physical access to hot cells
- Remain functional through DBEs without loss of structural integrity Design Basis Values
- 30-year design life
- Provide dose rates consistent with ALARA goals for normally occupied areas 3.5.2.7.24 Facility Process Control System Chapter 7.0, Section 7.2.3 provides a description of the FPC system.
Design Basis Functions
- Perform as overall production process controller
- Monitor and control process instrumented functions within the RPF (e.g., process fluid transfers, controlled inter-equipment pump transfers of process fluids)
- Provide monitoring of safety-related components while BMS (a subset of the FPC system) monitors ventilation system and mechanical utility systems
- Ensure ESF systems operate independently from FPC system or BMS
- Use hard-wired analog controls/interlocks for each ESF safety function to protect workers, public, and environment
- Integrate into and monitor ESF parameters and alarm functions by FPC system or BMS
- Initiate actuation of isolation dampers for hot cell area or analytical area on receipt of signals from fire protection system Design Basis Values
- 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., controllers) 3-65
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