IR 05000331/2005301

Er 05000331-05-301(DRS); Nuclear Management Company, LLC; on 01/31/2005 - 02/07/2005; Duane Arnold Energy Center; Initial License Examination Report

ML050800493
Person / Time
Site:	Duane Arnold
Issue date:	03/18/2005
From:	Lanksbury R Division of Reactor Safety III
To:	Peifer M Nuclear Management Co
References
50-331/05-301 50-331/05-301
Download: ML050800493 (13)

Text

rch 18, 2005

SUBJECT:

DUANE ARNOLD ENERGY CENTER INITIAL LICENSE EXAMINATION REPORT 05000331/2005301(DRS)

Dear Mr. Peifer:

On February 7, 2005, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) examiners completed initial operator licensing examinations at the Duane Arnold Energy Center. The enclosed report documents the results of the examination which were discussed on February 4 and February 15, 2005, with Mr. J. Bjorseth and Mr. C. Kress, respectively, and with other members of your staff.

The NRC examiners administered an initial license examination operating test during the week of January 31 through February 4, 2005. A written examination was administered by Duane Arnold Energy Center training personnel on February 7, 2005. Four reactor operator (RO) and five senior reactor operator (SRO) applicants were administered license examinations. The results of the examinations were finalized on March 1, 2005. Each of the applicants passed all sections of their respective examinations and were issued applicable operator licenses.

Although all nine applicants performed satisfactorily and passed the NRC initial license examination, the overall submittal of the examination material by your training staff was considered outside the acceptable quality range expected by the NRC in accordance with NUREG-1021, Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors, Revision 9.

Specifically, the written test material was outside the 20 percent acceptable margin for quality in accordance with NUREG 1021. This determination was based on the observation that 3 out of 75 RO questions (4 percent) and 7 out of 25 SRO questions (28 percent) required replacement or significant modifications and were identified as unsatisfactory. The minimum requirement to determine an adequate quality range, assessed separately for each RO and SRO examination in accordance with ES-501 of NUREG-1021, was 20 percent or fewer questions identified as unsatisfactory. Furthermore, the operating test material (20 JPMs and 3 simulator scenarios),

as submitted by the licensee, was outside the 20 percent acceptable margin for quality in accordance with NUREG 1021. This determination was based on the observation that 8 JPMs and 3 scenario events out of 46 possible evaluated items (20 JPMs and 26 scenario events)

(24 percent) required replacement or significant modifications and were identified as unsatisfactory. The minimum requirement to determine an adequate quality range, assessed cumulatively for each JPM and scenario event, in accordance with ES-501 of NUREG-1021, was 20 percent or fewer items (JPM or event) identified as unsatisfactory. In accordance with 10 CFR Part 2.390 of the NRC's Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its enclosures will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

We will gladly discuss any questions you have concerning this examination.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Roger D. Lanksbury, Chief Operations Branch Division of Reactor Safety Docket No. 50-331 License No. DPR-49

Enclosures:

1. Operator Licensing Examination Report 05000331/2005301(DRS)

2. Simulation Facility Report 3. Post Examination Comments and Resolutions 4. Written Examinations and Answer Keys (RO & SRO)

REGION III==

Docket No: 50-331 License No: DPR-49 Report No: 05000331/2005301(DRS)

Licensee: Alliant, IES Utilities Inc.

Facility: Duane Arnold Energy Center Location: 3277 DAEC Road Palo, Iowa 52324-9785 Dates: January 31, 2005, through February 7, 2005 Examiners: H. Peterson, Chief Examiner N. Valos, Examiner C. Zoia, Examiner Approved by: Roger Lanksbury, Chief Operations Branch Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

ER 05000331/2005301(DRS); Nuclear Management Company, LLC; on 01/31/2005 -

02/07/2005; Duane Arnold Energy Center; Initial License Examination Report.

The announced operator licensing initial examination was conducted by NRC examiners in accordance with the guidance of NUREG-1021, Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors, Revision 9.

A. Examination Summary

• Four reactor operator (RO) and five senior reactor operator (SRO) applicants were each administered an initial license operating test and written examination.

• All nine applicants (four RO and five SRO) passed all sections of their respective examinations and were issued applicable reactor operator and senior reactor operator licenses. (Section 4OA5.1)

REPORT DETAILS

4OA5 Other

.1 Initial Licensing Examinations

a. Examination Scope

The NRC examiners conducted an announced operator licensing initial examination during January 31, 2005, through February 7, 2005. The plant's training staff used the guidance established in NUREG-1021, Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors, Revision 9, to prepare the examination outline and to develop the written examination and operating test. The NRC examiners administered the operating test from January 31 through February 4, 2005. Duane Arnold Energy Center training staff members were directed to administer the written examination on February 7, 2005.

Four reactor operator (RO) and five senior reactor operator (SRO) applicants were examined.

b. Findings

Written Examination The licensee developed the written examination. During their review, NRC examiners determined that the initially proposed 100 question written examination (75 RO questions and 25 SRO only questions), as submitted by the licensee, was outside the acceptable quality range expected by the NRC in accordance with NUREG-1021, Revision 9. This determination was based on the observation that 3 out of 75 RO questions (4 percent) and 7 out of 25 SRO questions (28 percent) required replacement or significant modifications and were identified as unsatisfactory. The minimum requirement to determine an adequate quality range, assessed separately for each RO and SRO examination in accordance with ES-501 of NUREG-1021, was 20 percent or fewer questions identified as unsatisfactory. Of the 7 SRO questions identified as unsatisfactory, the questions contained various psychometric errors including low level of difficulty (or direct look-ups), more than one (or no) correct answer, examination questions that did not match the selected outline Knowledge and Ability statements, improperly applied level of knowledge for SRO, and two or more question distractors that were not plausible. In addition, 46 questions (32 RO and 14 SRO questions)needed enhancements which were required to be completed prior to administration of the examination.

During January 6 - 7, 2005, and the week of January 10, 2005, examination changes were agreed upon between the NRC and the licensee and were made according to NUREG-1021, Revision 9. The licensee graded the examination on February 7, 2005, and conducted a review of each question to determine accuracy and validity of the examination questions. The licensee submitted one post-examination question comment.

Operating Test The licensee developed the operating test, including the Job Performance Measure (JPM)walkthrough and the dynamic simulator scenarios. During their review, NRC examiners determined that the initially proposed operating test (20 JPMs and 3 simulator scenarios),as submitted by the licensee, was outside the acceptable quality range expected by the NRC in accordance with NUREG-1021, Revision 9. This determination was based on the observation that 8 JPMs and 3 scenario events out of 46 possible evaluated items (20 JPMs and 26 scenario events) (24 percent) required replacement or significant modifications and were identified as unsatisfactory. The minimum requirement to determine an adequate quality range, assessed cumulatively for each JPM and scenario event, in accordance with ES-501 of NUREG-1021, was 20 percent or fewer items (JPM or event) identified as unsatisfactory. Of the 8 JPMs and 3 scenario events identified as unsatisfactory, the items contained various errors including low level of difficulty (direct look-ups, too much information which could be considered unnecessary prompting, or no appreciable evaluative action by the operator), missing critical steps, and incorrect task standards. In addition, 11 JPMs and 14 scenario events needed enhancements which were required to be completed prior to administration of the examination.

During the validation week of January 10, 2005, examination changes were agreed upon between the NRC and the licensee and were made according to NUREG-1021, Revision 9.

Future examination submittals and examination administration should incorporate any lessons learned from this evaluation. The licensee documented the examination review issues in their corrective action program (CAP) as CAP034872.

Examination Results Four reactor operator and five senior reactor operator applicants were administered written examinations and operating tests for initial operator licensing. Each of the applicants passed all sections of their respective examinations and were issued applicable operator licenses.

.2 Examination Security

a. Scope

The NRC examiners observed the licensees implementation of examination security and integrity measures (e.g., physical barriers, sequestering, security agreements, sampling criteria, and test item repetition) throughout the examination process.

b. Findings

The licensees implementation of examination security requirements during examination preparation and administration were acceptable and met the guidelines provided in NUREG-1021, Revision 9. However, during the facility licensees written examination development two examination security incidents occurred which had the potential to affect the integrity of the written examination.

The first incident was during the development of the written examination outline. On two separate occasions, one of the examination developers removed both electronic and hard copies of the examination outline from the examination development room to work on at home. The licensees examination security procedure did not specifically prohibit this action; however, the licensee conducted an investigation of this incident. The licensees investigation concluded that the individual adequately followed the licensees security containment requirements at home. The hard copy outline materials were maintained in the possession of the individual at all times to and from his home, and locked in his home at all other times. The electronic documents were transported using a portable hard drive and password protected. The licensee conducted a computer evaluation of the individuals home computer and ascertained that there was adequate computer security.

The second incident involved computer security during the revision of one written examination question with NRCs comments. An examination developer forgot to password protect the question on the computer. The individual identified the mistake and subsequently corrected the issue. However, this was a violation of the licensees examination security procedure which required password protection of all electronic examination material on the computer. The licensees investigation determined that adequate examination security was still maintained via the second barrier. The examination question was stored in a stand alone secure computer within the secure examination development room.

The licensee documented these incidents in the corrective action program (CAP) as CAP032682 and CAP034614, respectively. The NRC examiners were appropriately notified of the incidents. The examiners reviewed the licensees investigation and assessed the overall incident for possible violation of 10 CFR 55.49, Integrity of Examinations and Tests. The examiners determined that no actual examination compromise had occurred. The apparent violation of the licensees examination security procedure concerning password protection of the one examination question was considered minor in nature and was not subject to enforcement action in accordance with NRC enforcement policy.

4OA6 Meetings

Exit Meeting The chief examiner presented the examination team's preliminary observations and findings on February 4, 2005, and a subsequent exit meeting via teleconference on February 15, 2005, to Mr. Bjorseth and other members of the Operations and Training Department staff. No proprietary items were identified during the administration of the examination nor during the exit meetings with the licensee. The licensee acknowledged the observations and findings presented.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

Enclosure

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee

M. Peifer, Site Vice President

J. Sorensen, Vice President Training

J. Bjorseth, Site Director

D. Curtland, Plant Manager

C. Kress, Training Manager

G. Rushworth, Operations Manager

M. Davis, Emergency Planning

K. Gassman, ILC Instructor/Exam Developer

D. Gibson, Exam Developer

T. Gordon, General Supervisor Operations Training

W. Render, Operation Instructor/Exam Developer

C. Rushworh, Regulatory Affairs Engineer

G Thullen, Operation Instructor/Exam Developer

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

G. Wilson, Senior Resident Inspector

S. Caudill, Resident Inspector

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

Opened and Closed

None

Discussed

None

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

ADAMS Agency-Wide Document Access and Management System

CAP Corrective Action Program

DRS Division of Reactor Safety

JPM Job Performance Measure

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission

PARS Publicly Available Records

RO Reactor Operator

SRO Senior Reactor Operator

Attachment

SIMULATION FACILITY REPORT

Facility Licensee: Duane Arnold Energy Center

Facility Docket No.: 50-331

Operating Tests Administered: January 31, 2005, through February 4, 2005

The following documents observations made by the NRC examination team during the initial

operator license examination. These observations do not constitute audit or inspection findings

and are not, without further verification and review, indicative of non-compliance with 10 CFR 55.45(b). These observations do not affect NRC certification or approval of the simulation facility

other than to provide information which may be used in future evaluations. No licensee action is

required in response to these observations.

During the conduct of the simulator portion of the operating tests, the following items were

observed:

ITEM DESCRIPTION

During validation of simulator scenario ESG 17, event 3, performance of

STP 3.4.3-03, Manual Opening and Exercising of the ADS and LLS

Period Meter Relief Valves, the simulator experienced a 20 second period apparently

due to the pressure transient on cycling the relief valve. It was

unexpected and was not repeatable. Also, the transient was not

observed during the administration of the simulator scenario examination.

During validation of the simulator scenario ESG 18, event 1, performance

of NS 930002, Turbine Stop Valve and Combined Intermediate Valve

Turbine Stop Valve Test, the D stop valve pegged high above 100% indication. Also, the

valve experienced a step decrease to 75% position indication when it

should have gradually lowered as the valve was closed during the test.

Enclosure

Post Examination Comments and Resolutions Enclosure 3

Question RO No. 21:

Which of the following is the basis for the automatic Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) closure

when a Main Condenser High Backpressure transient occurs while operating at 93 percent

thermal power?

The MSIVs are designed to automatically close at 19 Hg Abs to prevent

a. over pressurizing the Main Condenser

b. over pressurizing the Low Pressure Turbine Exhaust Hoods

c. damaging the turbine final stages due to aerodynamic buffeting

d. High exhaust hood temperatures and moisture caused erosion of the last stage

buckets.

Answer: a

Facility Comment:

The main condenser and low pressure turbine exhaust hood are the same pressure volume. Even

though the function is titled, Condenser Backpressure - High, per Technical Specification Bases 3.3.6.1, function 1.d, the ultimate protective function is to prevent pressurization and

rupture of the diaphragms in the Low Pressure Turbine Exhaust Hoods. Recommend allowing

both answers (a) and (b) as correct.

NRC Resolution:

The Technical Specification Bases 3.3.6.1, item 1.d, Condenser Backpressure - High, states, in

part, the closure of the MSIVs is initiated to prevent the addition of steam that would lead to

additional condenser pressurization and possible rupture of the diaphragm installed to protect the

turbine exhaust hood thereby preventing a potential radiation leakage path following an accident.

Although MSIV closure possibly prevents rupture of the diaphragms in the Low Pressure Turbine

Exhaust Hoods, it is not necessarily the ultimate protective function. The technical specification

bases indicates that the protective function of the MSIV closure for high condenser backpressure

is to protect the condenser from over pressurization. However, the secondary or subsequent

effects of MSIV closure is to prevent rupture of the Low Pressure Turbine Exhaust Hood

diaphragms. Therefore, based on the technical specification information the NRC has accepted

the recommendation. The answer key was amended to accept both answers (a) and (b) as

correct answers for RO question #21.

WRITTEN EXAMINATIONS AND ANSWER KEYS (RO/SRO)

RO Initial Examination ADAMS Accession # ML050690222

SRO Initial Examination ADAMS Accession # ML050690225

Enclosure