ML18312A151

WCAP-14535A, Topical Report on Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheel Inspection Elimination.

ML18312A151
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	11/30/1996
From:	Bamford W, Brad Bishop, Kurek D, Strauch P Westinghouse Electric Corp
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML18312A175	List: ML18312A114 ML18312A151
References
NUDOCS 9701020232, WCAP14535
Download: ML18312A151 (187)

Text

Weatlaghoue Non-Proprietary Clu, 3

+ + + + + + + +

TOPICAL REPORT ON REACTOR COOLANT PUMP FLYWHEEL INSPECTION ELIMINATION Westinghouse Energy Systems qJQl0202 96120 PC,; A,,tVj, 0';.1)1.)1);'. )4 p I I uf<

WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 WCAP-14535A TOPICAL REPORT ON REACTOR COOLANT PUMP FLYWHEEL INSPECTION ELIMINATION P. L. Strauch W. H. Bamford B. A. Bishop D.Kurek November 1996 Verified by: -PD.-. ------1----

-\¥,< -

C. Bhowmick Structural Mechanics Technology Approved by:

s . .<wamy. M ger Structural Mechanics Technology Westinghouse Electric Corporation Energy Systems Business Unit Systems and Major Projects Division P. 0. Box 355 Pittsburgh, PA 15230-0355 e 1996 Westinghouse Electric Corporation All Rights Reserved

EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

This report provides the teclu.ical basis for the elimination of inspection requirements for reactor coolant pump (RCP) motor flywheels for all operating domestic Westinghouse plants and several Babcock and Wilcox plants, including Crystal River Unit 3, Oconee Units 1, 2 and 3, Davis Besse and Three Mile Island Unit 1. This report was submitted for review by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in January 1996, and after two requests for additional information, the NRC issued a Safety Evaluation Report (SER) in September 1996. This SER accepted the technical arguments presented herein, and provided partial relief from RCP motor flywheel inspection requirements.

At the request of the NRC (see the letter in Appendix G of this report), Westinghouse Report WCAP-14535 has been revised to include the responses to the NRC requests for additional information (Appendices E and F), and the NRC safety evaluation report (Appendix G).

Additionally, the key provisions of the SER and followup clarifications are included in Appendix H. This final version of WCAP-14535 includes an "A" following the report number, which designates acceptance by the NRC. The content of this report is identical to WCAP-14535, with the exception of the additional appendices as noted.

TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION TITLE PAGE 1.0 Introduction 1-1 2.0 Design and Fabrication 2-1 3.0 Inspection 3-1 4.0 Stress and Fracture Evaluation 4-1 5.0 Risk Assessment: Effect of Inspections 5-1 6.0 Summary and Conclusions 6-1 7.0 References 7-1 Appendix A Regulatory Position A-1 Appendix B Historical Inspection Information: Haddam Neck B-1 Appendix C Sample Flywheel Inspection Procedures C-1 Appendix D Sample Flywheel Material Test Certificates D-1 Appendix E Response to First NRC Request for Additional Information E-1 Appendix F Response to Second NRC Request for Additional Information F-1 Appendix G United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Safety Evaluation Report G-1 Appendix H Key Provisions and Follow-up Clarifications H-1 m:\33S6w.wpf:lb-l I I l96

SECTION 1 INTRODUCTION An integral part of the reactor coolant system (RCS) in pressurized water reactor plants is the reactor coolant pump (RCP), a vertical, single stage, single-suction, centrifugal, shaft seal pump. The RCP ensures an adequate cooling flow rate by circulating large volumes of the primary coolant water at high temperature and pressure through the reactor coolant system.

Following an assumed loss of power to the RCP motor, the flywheel, in conjunction with the impeller and motor assembly, provide sufficient rotational inertia to assure adequate cooling flow during RCP coastdown, thus resulting in adequate core cooling.

During normal power operation, the RCP flywheel possesses sufficient kinetic energy to produce high energy missiles in the event of failure. Conditions which may result in overspeed of the RCP increase both the potential for failure and the kinetic energy of the flywheel. This led to the issuance of Regulatory Guide 1.14 in 1971 (Reference l ), which describes a range of actions to ensure flywheel integrity.

One of the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.14 (a portion of which is shown in Appendix A) is regular inservice volumetric inspection of flywheels. Operating power plants have been inspecting their flywheels for over twenty years now, and no flaws have been identified which affect flywheel integrity. Flywheel inspections are expensive, and involve irradiation exposure for personnel, so this study was commissioned to present the safety case for flywheels, and to quantify the effects of elimination of such inspections.

1.1 Previous Flywheel Integrity Evaluations Westinghouse Plants Fracture evaluations were performed in WCAP-8163 (Reference 2) for a postulated rupture of the RCP discharge piping. The RCP flywheel evaluated had an outer radius of 37.5", a bore radius of 4.7" and a keyway with a radial length of 0.9" and a width of 2.0", which are typical dimensions for RCP flywheels. The flywheel material was A533, Grade B, Class l steel plate, which is typically used in flywheel construction. The ultimate tensile stress (for ductile failure analysis) was 80,000 psi, and the fracture toughness at 120 °F in the weak or transverse direction was 220,000 psi '1inch. Detailed finite element analyses were performed to determine the stress intensity factors for cracks emanating radially from the flywheel keyway. These results were compared to closed form solutions for crack tip locations remote from the keyway, with good correlation. The conclusion of the Reference 2 evaluation was that the limiting speed for ductile failure of 3485 rpm (about 290 % of the normal operating speed) is governing for crack lengths less than 1.15 inches, and that the brittle fracture limit is m:\33S6w.wpf:lb-l11196 1-1

governing for larger crack lengths. Because the 1.15 inch crack is very large in comparison to that detectable under inspection and quality assurance procedures for the flywheel design, it was concluded that 3485 rpm wali the limiting speed for design. The failure prediction methodology was verified by scale model testing, which is discussed in detail in Reference 2.

A series of flywheel overspeed studies were carried out for postulated circumferential and longitudinal split pipe breaks. Table 1-1 summarizes the studies performed in Reference 2.

The maximum speed of 3321 rpm is less than the original design limiting speed of 3485 rpm.

Table 1-1: Summary of LOCA Speed Calculations for Westinghouse Plants Case Description Peak Speed No. (rpm)

I 4 Loop plant, double ended break, RCP trip after 30 seconds. 1248 2 Case I with instantaneous power loss. 1321 3 Case l with instantaneous power loss and break area equal to 2609 60% of double ended break area.

4 Case 3 with break area equal to 3.0 ft2* 1189 5 Case 3 with break area equal to 0.5 ft2* 1189 6 Case 3 for a 3 loop plant 2330 7 Case 2 with moment of inertia increased by 10% 3200 8 Case I with moment of inertia increased by 10% 1248 9 Case 1 with loop out of service 2965 10 Case 1 with longitudinal split break areas of 0.5 ft2, 3.0 ft2 1200 and pipe cross sectional area.

11 Case IO with instantaneous power loss 1200 Babcock and Wilcox Plants Babcock and Wilcox analyzed the RCP for a spectrum of postulated reactor coolant system breaks for a typical Babcock and Wilcox 2568 MWt, IT, fuel assembly, nuclear steam system (Reference 3). A stress analysis of the upper flywheel assembly top flywheel was conducted to determine areas of stress concentration, stress magnitude, and the most likely flawed configurations to consider in the fracture mechanics analysis. The upper assembly top flywheel was considered to be the most critical component, and was the only component m:\3356w.wpf: lb-111196 1-2

modeled for the stress analysis. This spoked flywheel had an outer radius of 36", and an inner radius of 15.2". The flywheel material was ASTM A-516-67 grade 65. The ultimate tensile stress was 76,500 psi, the yield stress was 48,500 psi, and the fracture toughness at 70 ° F and 120 ° F was 67,000 and 109,000 psi "inch. respectively. Stresses were calculated using a finite element model.

Three flawed configurations were considered in the linear elastic fracture mechanics analysis.

These configurations were through-wall radial cracks perpendicular to the faces of the flywheel, and emanating from the following locations: the inner bore, a bolt hole, and a keyway. Since shrink fit forces would retard the growth of radial cracks in the keyway area, they were omitted from the analysis of the keyway crack. The initial crack length was assumed to be the largest crack that could be missed in nondestructive testing (0.24").

Linear elastic fracture mechanics calculations were performed for flywheel temperatures of 70 ° F and l 20 °F. The results of the analysis indicated that the flywheels of the RCPs will not fail under the expected normal operating conditions and that failure conditions are not reached until 220% of the normal operating speed is attained, for the assumed initial crack of 0.24".

(The normal operating speed is 1190 rpm, rounded off to 1200 rpm for calculational purposes).

Fatigue crack growth calculations were performed to determine the size of the flaw over the life of the plant. Motor startup is the only plant transient significant to the flywheel. It was assumed that there are 500 starts over the 40 year life of the plant. The applied cycle stress was based on 125% of normal speed. Fatigue crack growth was calculated to be less than 0.0002". Therefore, it was concluded that the assumed initial crack would not grow to critical length during the design life of the flywheel.

LOCA evaluations performed in Reference 3 included eight different cold leg breaks, including the 8.55 ft2 double ended break at the RCP discharge (with and without electrical braking effects), and smaller break sizes. A summary of the results from the eight analyses are provided in Table 1-2.

m:\33S6w.wpf: lb-1111% 1-3

Table 1-2: Summary of LOCA Speed Calculations for Babcock and Wilcox Plants Case Description Pump Trip Max No. Time Speed (seconds) (rpm) 1 8.55 ft2 cold leg guillotine break (pump 0.1 3310 discharge).

2 8.55 ft2 cold leg guillotine break (pump 30.0 1700 discharge).

3 5.00 ft2 cold leg split break (pump discharge). 30.0 1210 4 3.0 ft2 cold leg split break (pump discharge). 30.0 1200 5 1.0 ft2 cold leg split break (pump discharge). 30.0 1190 6 8.55 ft 2 cold leg guillotine break with 80% 30.0 2510 voltage (pump discharge).

7 8.55 ft2 cold leg guillotine break with 90% 30.0 1750 pump and motor inertia (pump discharge).

8 8.55 ft2 cold leg guillotine break (pump I 0.1 1190 sucuon).

Notes: Maximum speed is for the pump in the broken line.

Pump trip time is seconds after the break.

1.2 Leak Before Break (LBB) Considerations Subsequent to the analyses of References 2 and 3, 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix A General Design Criterion 4 was revised to allow exclusion of dynamic effects associated with postulated pipe ruptures, including the effects of missiles, pipe whip, and discharging fluids from the design basis, when analyses reviewed and approved by the NRC demonstrate that the probability of fluid system rupture is extremely low under conditions consistent with the design basis for the piping. This is commonly referred to as leak-before-break (LBB) licensing. Since that time, all domestic Westinghouse and Babcock and Wilcox designed PWR plants have qualified for LBB exclusion of the primary loop double ended guillotine LOCA.

m:\33S6w.wpf: lb-111196 1-4

Given that a plant has LBB exclusion for the main loop LOCA. the largest break required to be postulatd under the structural design basis becomes that of the largest branch line. The largest branch Jines not covered by the LBB exclusion would be 14" schedule 140 or 160 piping (0.72 ft2 break area, maximum), typically the accumulator line in the cold leg piping. Such a break may be treated as the equivalent of a 0.72 ft2 longitudinal split break in the primary loop piping.

Westinghouse Plants As shown in Table 1-1, the smallest breaks examined were 3.0 ft and 0.5 ft2 longitudinal split breaks (Cases IO and 11). The 3.0 ft2 split break would bound the largest branch line break not covered by the LBB exclusion (0.72 ft2 ) with respect to the effect on the RCP speed. From Reference 2. it is apparent that with or without RCP power, the RCP speed will not exceed 1200 rpm for 3.0 ft2 or 0.5 ft2 longitudinal split breaks for the model 93A 6000 hp RCP described in Reference 2.

Reference 2 concluded that the increase in RCP speed due to the 3.0 ft2 area split break was less than 11 rpm over the normal operating speed of 1189 rpm, or less than I%. Given that the Reference 2 analysis shows that the RCP speed increase is less than 1% for the 3.0 ft2 longitudinal breaks area, and that the maximum credible break under LBB is less than 1/4 of that size, it is concluded that any RCP speed increase resulting from a branch line break will be well within the design RCP speed tolerance of 25%, i.e., 1.25 times the design speed of 1200 rpm, or 1500 rpm, with or without the dynamic braking effects from the RCP being energized. No known non-LOCA events which lead to RCP speedup would be more limiting than the above mentioned pipe break with respect to overspeed. (Further studies extended this conclusion to a range of RCP designs including 63A (4000 hp), 93 (6000 hp),

93A (6000 hp), 93A (7000 hp) and 100 (8000 hp). Note that RCP rotational inertia is a plant specific parameter. The above conclusion for RCP applicability is only valid for the range of pump rotational inertias from 45000 to 123000 lbm*ft2

• As shown in the next section, all Westinghouse flywheels meet this criterion. Therefore, a peak LOCA speed of 1500 rpm is used in the evaluation of Westinghouse RCP flywheel integrity in this report.

Babcock and Wilcox Plants As shown in Table 1-2, the smallest breaks examined were 5.0 ft2, 3.0 ft2, and 1.0 ft2 split breaks (Cases 3. 4 and 5). The 1.0 ft2 split break would bound the largest branch line break not covered by the LBB exclusion (0. 72 ft2 ) with respect to the effect on the RCP speed.

From Reference 3, the RCP speed will not exceed 1200 rpm for 1.0 ft2 split breaks, with the effects of electrical braking. Although calculations were not specifically performed to determine the effect of excluding electrical braking effects, the Babcock and Wilcox pumps m*\3356w wpUb-111196 1-5

are similar in design to Westinghouse pumps. where the effect of electrical braking was found to be very small on the small break sizes of interest. (As noted for typical Westinghouse pressurized water reactors. a loss of RCP drive power due to electrical faults in the 30 second time interval following a large area break LOCA is an event of extremely low probability. in the range of 3.0 x 1 o*7). Therefore. a peak LOCA speed of 1500 rpm is used in the evaluation of Babcock and Wilcox RCP flywheel integrity in this calculation.

1.3 Report Purpose The purpose of this report is to provide an engineering basis for the elimination of RCP flywheel inservice inspection requirements for all operating domestic Westinghouse plants and the following Babcock and Wilcox plants:

• Crystal River Unit 3

• Oconee Units I, 2 and 3

• Davis Besse

• Three Mile Island Unit 1 Three complimentary appro.1ches will be used to demonstrate that flywheel inspection may be safe!.* eliminated. A study of the inspection techniques and a summary of inspection results to date shows no indications have been found which affect flywheel integrity (see Section 3.)

A stress and fracture evaluation has shown that very large flaws are needed to cause a failure under maximum overspeed conditions (Section 4). Finally, a risk assessment has been completed to directly compare the flywheel failure probabilities with and without further inspections (Sectil)n 5).

m*\3356w.wpf lb-111196 1-6

SECTION 2 DESIGN AND FABRICATION Reactor coolant pump flywheels consist of one or more large steel discs which are shrunk fit either directly to the RCP motor shaft or to spokes extending from the motor shaft. In the case of two or more flywheel discs, the individual flywheels are bo'lted together to form an integral flywheel assembly. Each flywheel is keyed to the motor shaft with one or more vertical keyways.

2.1 Flywheel Geometry The flywheels which are attached directly to the motor shaft typically consist of two flywheel discs which arc bolted together and are located above tlle RCP rotor core. The top and bottom discs typically have the same outer diameter and oore dimensions but different thicknesses. The bottom disc usually has a circumferr!nti.al notch along the outside diameter bottom surface for placement of antirotation pawls. Typically, each flywheel is keyed to the motor shaft by means of three vertical keyways, positioned at 120 ° intervals. An example of this type of flywheel is shown in Figure :! 1.

The spoked flywheels consist of an upper and a lower flywheel assembly, above and below the RCP rotor core. The upper flywheel assembly consists of three discs bolted together, will, the top disc having a larger outside diameter than the middle and bottom disc. The lower flywheel consists of a single disc, of the same dimensions as ihe middle and bottom disc of the upper flywheel assembly. There are eight spokes, 2.5 inches thick, extending from and welded to the motor shaft. Each flywheel assembly is keyed to the spokes by means of one keyway. An example of this type of flywheel is shown in Figure 2-2.

For the purpose of the evaluations perfonned for this report, the larger flywheel outside diameter for a particular flywheel assembly is used, smce this is judged to be conservative with respect to stress and fracture. For the flywheel§ inves1jgated in this report, outer diameters range from 65 to 76.5 inches, bore diameter:, r.ange from 8.375 to 30.5 inches (the later being the spoked flywheel), and keyway radial lengths range from 0.39 to 1.06 inches.

Most of the flywheels covered by this report are made from A533 Grade B Class I or A508 Class 3 steel. Flywheels for the pumps at three plants are made from A5 J 6 Grade 70 steel, and those at one plant are made from boiler plate.

A summary of pertinent flywheel parameters is provided in Table 2-1. Plant alpha des:gnations used in Table 2-1 are identified in Table 2-2.

m.\J356w.wpf.lb-l l I 196 2-1

2.2 Material Information The pump motors for all the Westinghouse plants and many of the Babcock and Wilcox plants were manufactured by Westinghouse. All of the Westinghouse flywheels except Haddam Neck are made of A533 Grade B Class I steel. The Haddam Neck flywheels were made of boiler plate steel.

It has not been possible to locate each of the certified material test reports for all of the flywheels, but a sample is contained in Appendix 0. It will be helpful to examine the ordering specifications for the Westinghouse flywheel materials. The first specification is dated December 1969. and requires that the nil-ductility transition temperature from both longitudinal and transverse Charpy specimens be Jess than l0° F. This does not guarantee RTNor is less than l0 °F, but it is highly likely that this is the case.

The Westinghouse equipment specification was changed in January of 1973 to require both Charpy and drop weight tests to ensure that RTNor is no greater than 10° F.

Even though it is likely that most, if not all, of the tlywhe1tls in operation have an RTNor of I0 ° F or less. a range of RTNor values from l0°F to 60° F has been assumed in the integrity evaluations to be discussed later.

m \3356w wpf. lb-111196 2-2

Table 2-1: Summary of Westinghouse and Babcock &Wilcox Domestic Flywheel Information Keyway Pump&

Outer Radial Motor Diam. Bore Length Inertia Material Applicable Plants Group (Inches) (Inches) (Inches) (Lb.,-fr) Type (Plant Alpha Designation)

I 76.50 9.375 0.937 110.000 SA533B TGX/fHX/Spare 2 75.75 8.375 0.906 82.000 SA533B PSE4/PNJ/Spare 3 75.00 9.375 0.937 95.000 SA533B CQL; CAFJCBFJCCFJCDE 1 ;

DAP/DBP/DCP/DDP; GAF.JGBE 1 ; SAP/Spare; NEU; NAH; CGFJSpare; WAT/Spare; TBX/J'CX/Spare; SCP; VRANGB/Spare 4 75.00 9.375 0.937 83.000 SA533B TV AfrEN/Spare 5 75.00 9.375 0.937 82.000 SA5338 ALA/ APR/Spare; AEP/AMP/Spare; CWE/COM; DLW/DMW 6 75.00 9.375 0.937 80.000 SA533B NSP/NRP\ WPS3 7 75.00 8.375 0.911 82.000 SA5338 INT Spare 8 75.JO ' 8.375 0.906 82.000 SA533B IPPflNT; PGE/PEG

-

9 75.00 8.375 0.906 80.000 SA533B WEP"'/WIS 10 72.00 16.125 0.906 72.000 SA533B BOCO/Spare 11 72.00 9.375 0.937 72.700 SA53B 8DAVl 5 12 n.oo 8.375 0.906 80,000 SA533B RGE 13 72.00 8.375 0.906 70,000 SA533B CPUSpare; FPUFLA/Spare; VPANIR4 14 65.00 8.375 0.656 45,000 Boiler CYW2 Plate 15 72.00 30.50 0.390 70,540 A516 B3Mll 7 16 65.00 13.800 1.060 70.000 A516 BCRY3 Notes:

I) Spare has a keyway radial length of 0.885".

2) Haddam Neck spare has a keyway radial length of 0.618", and ma1erial is SA5338.

3) Spare has a keyway radial length of 0.883".

4) Spare has a keyway radial length of 0.911 ".

5) Spares have a keyway radial length of 0.942". one spare 1s of SA508 material.

6) Spare has a keyway radial length of 0.937".

7) Spoked flywheels.

m:\33S6* wrf lb-111196 2-3

Table 2-2: Plant Alpha Designation Listing I

i Plant Alpha Designation Plant AEP/AMP D.C. Cook Units 1 and 2 ALA/APR J.M. Farley Units I and 2 CAFJCBE Byron Units 1 and 2 CCE/CDE Braidwood Units l and 2 CGE V.C. Summer CWE/COM Zion Units l and 2 CPL H.B. Robinson Unit 2 CQL Shearon Harris CYW Haddam Neck DAP/DBP McGuire Units I and 2 DCP/DDP Catawba Units I and 2 DLW/DMW Beaver Valley Units 1 and 2 FPL/FLA Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 GAFJGBE Vogtle Units I and 2 IPP/INT Indian Point Units 2 and 3 NAH Seabrook NEU Millstone Unit 3 NSP/NRP Prairie Island Units 1 and 2 PGFJPEG Diablo Canyon Units I and 2 PSE/PNJ Salem Units I and 2 RGE Ginna SAP Wolf Creek SCP Callaway TBXITCX Comanche Peak Units I and 2 TVA/rEN Sequoyah Units 1 and 2 TGX/THX South Texas Units 1 and 2 VGBNRA North Anna Units I and 2 VPANIR Surry Units 1 and 2 WAT Watts Bar Unit I WEP/WIS Point Beach Units 1 and 2 WPS Kewaunee BCRY3 Crystal River Unit 3 BDAVI Davis Besse BOC01/BOC02/BOC03 Oconee Units I, 2 and 3 B3MI1 Three Mile Island Unit I m \.BS6w.wpflb-l I I 1% 2-4

0 0 C.I II 2.0 **or-O q I o 0 I * ,: :,

f1 I 1I

+

0 1'

, ,I 1,

1, 37.!> II HD.

I , Ii II I II. 7 IN UD.

2 1* DIA IOLT N0L£S-+j

,, 32 . fl 11 IUD .

1.2 IN DIA. GAG[ NOL[S Figure 2-1: Example of a Flywheel which is Attached Directly to the Motor Shaft m:37w.wpf:lb-01196 2-5

30.5" ID bore Bolt holes for 72" OD bolting flywheel plate:s --_.=--+-+.--..IM 8 spokes 2.5" thick. welded to teer

...-

--- shaft. One spoke is keyed to flywheel with a 3/4" thick key.

The keyway is 0.39 deep.

--Upper Flywheel assembly.

i.......--

consists of 3 plates shrunk fit onto the spokes.

Rotor Core Lower Flywheel: Consists of 1 plate shrunk fit and keyed to spokes Motor Shaft Figure 2-2: Example of a Spoked Flywheel m:\25Hw.wpf:lb-Ol 1596 2-6

SECTION 3 INSPECTION Flywheels are inspected at the plant or during motor refurbishment. Inspections are conducted under Section XI (Reference 4) standard practice for control of instrumentation and personnel qualification. The inspections are conducted by UT level II and level III examiners.

3.1 Examination Volumes Reactor Coolant pump flywheel examinations are conducted under the control of Utility ISi programs according to surveillance schedules governed by individual Plant Technical Specifications. The volumetric examinations recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.14 have been uniformly applied to the accessible surfaces of the pump flywheel after removal of the shroud cover and gauge hole plugs. The volume of flywheel is inspected generally with straight beam techniques applied laterally, checking the plate material for planar defects emanating from the bore, keyways, and around the gauge holes and ream bolt holes.

3.2 Examination Approaches Generally, three examinations are performed. The keyway comer exam is conducted by inserting specially designed ultrasonic probes into the gauge holes and directing the sound laterally through the plate material so that reflections are obtained from the center bore radius.

Normal reflections will then be seen from the comers of the keyways. These reflections are predictable in distance and rate of occurrence, with abnormalities such as cracking branching out from the keyway being detectable as an abnormal response. A second examination is performed when the sound is projected laterally towards the other remaining gauge holes, for evidence of cracking emanating from the bores of the holes and plate material between the holes. The third examination is commonly referred to as the "Periphery examination. In this test, standard contact transducers are placed on the outer edges of both upper and lower flywheel plates. The sound is directed laterally into the plate material for examination of the material between the peripheral holes and the plate outer edge.

3.3 Access and Exposure Access to the exam surfaces is made possible by permanent walkways or by erecting scaffolding. Radiation exposure depends greatly on the amount of pump motor work being conducted nearby and can range from 20-100 millirern/hour.

m*\33S6w.wpf. lb-I I I l96 3-1

3.4 Inspection History A survey was conducted of historical plant inservice inspection results, and &tl member utilities contributed. The flywheel population surveyed was a tot,d of 217. A total of 729 examination results were reported, and no indications which would affect the integrity of the flywheels were found. These results are summarized on a p.lant by plant basis in Table 3-1. A summary of recordable indications is provided in Table 3-2. It is interesting to note from Table 3-2 that a number of indicationis in the form of nicks, gashes, etc. were found at the keyway area, having been created lby the act of removing or reassembling the flywheel. These were all dispositioned as not taffecting flywheel integrity. but are clear evidence that disassembly for inspection and reassembly actually can produce damage.

Indications were found at the Haddam Ne.ck plant. in *the weHd used to join the two flywheel plates together. The indications identified were as;sociated with this seal weld and resulted in no radially oriented cracking. and no impact on the integrity of the flywheels. A detailed summary of this finding is given in Appendix B Sample flywheel inspection procedures are provided in Appendix C.

m:\33S6w.wpf lb-111196 3-2

Table J. J: Flywheel Inspection Results Total Number Total or Inspections Number or Number or Total with No Inspections Indications Number Number or Indications or with Affecting Plant Alpha or f1ywheel Nonrecordable Recordable f1ywheel Delipation Plant f1ywheels Inspections lndicaliom Indications Integrity AEP Cook I 4 14 13 I 0 AMP Cook 2 4 12 12 0 0 ALA Farley I 3 17 17 0 0 APR Farley 2 3 19 19 0 0 CAE/CBE Byron I & 2 8 20 19 I 0 CCE Braidwood 1 4 13 11 2 0 COE Braidwood 2 4 9 8 I 0 CGE Summer 4 10 10 0 0 CWE Zion I 4 lO 9 I 0 COM Zion 2 4 16 16 0 0 CPL Robinson 2 4 22 20 2 0 CQL Harris 3 17 17 0 0 CYW Haddam Neck 4 32 28 4 0 DAP McGuire 1 4 ;3 13 0 0 DBP McGuire 2 4 8 8 0 0 DCP Catawba 1 4 6 6 0 0 DDP Catawba 2 4 6 6 0 0 DLW Beaver Valley I 3 15 11 4 0 DMW Beaver Valley 2 3 5 s 0 0 FPUFLA Turkey Point 3 and 4 7 36 34 2 0 GAF.JOBE Vogtle I and 2 9 19 19 0 0 IPP Indian Point 2 5 21 21 0 0 INT Indian Point 3 5 17 17 0 0 NAH Seabrook 4 8 8 0 0 NEU Millstone 3 5 12 12 0 0 NSP Prairie Island I 2 13 12 I 0 NRP Prairie Island 2 2 11 10 I 0 m:\33S6w.i,.pflb-l 11196 3-3

Table 3-1: Flywheel Inspection Results (continued)

Total Number Total or Inspections Number or Number or Total with No Inspections Indications Number Number or Indications or with Affecting Plant Alpha or Flywheel Nonrecordable Recordable Flpvheel Dai&nation Plant Flywheels Inspections Indications Indications Intqrity PGE Diablo Canyon I 4 12 11 I 0 PEG Diablo Canyon 2 4 11 11 0 0 PSEJPNJ Salem I and 2 9 24 13 11 0 RGE Ginna 3 21 21 0 0 SAP Wolf Creek 4 13 12 I 0 SCP Callaway 4 11 11 0 0 TBX Comanche Pea!t I 4 8 8 0 0 TCX Comanche Peak 2 4 4 4 0 0 TVA/fEN Sequoyah I and 2 9 37 36 I 0 TGX South Texas I 4 12 12 0 0 THX South Texas 2 4 12 12 0 0 VGBNRA North Anna I and 2 7 37 33 4 0 VPA/VIR Surry I and 2 7 17 17 0 0 WAT Wans Bar I 4 4 2 2 0 WEP Point Beach I 2 12 12 0 0 WIS Point Beach 2 2 13 13 0 0 WPS Kewaunee 3 6 5 I 0 BCRY3 Crystal River 3 4 30 30 0 0 BDAVI Davis Besse 5 24 22 2 0 BOCCI Oconee I 4 6 6 0 0 BOC02 Oconee 2 4 2 2 0 0 BOC03 Oconee 3 4 3 3 0 0 B3MII Three Mile Island I 4 9 9 0 0 TOTALS 57 217 729 686 43 0 m:\3356w.wpf lb 111196 3-4

Table 3-2: Summary of Recordable Indications Plant Alpha Dni1nation Year Description of Recordable Indications AEP 1987 Surface examination on RCP flywheel no. 13 showed two 3/8" long recordable indications. Surface chatter removed by minor surface reconditioning.

CAFJCBE 1993 0.45" rounded indication in RCP flywheel IB keyway area (surface exam) characterized as minor tool mark.

CCE 1991 PT indications on RCP "A" flywheel were acceptable.

1994 Indications noted on RCP "B" flywheel with PT and VT- I were resurfaced and found to be acceptable.

COE 1994 Four 1/16" rounded indications noted in various areas located approximately 0.8" below top surface of RCP "C" flywheel. One linear indication noted (circ. oriented). Indications were acceptable.

CWE 1986 PT recordable indication in loop I RCP flywheel, bleed out from gouges and metal folds in keyways.

CPL 1984 PT recordable indication on RCP "C" flywheel bore was filed out and re.:xamined.

1992 Gouge on spare flywheel blended out to 3 to I taper.

DLW 1980 PT indication. unsatisfactory mechanical damage from removal of RCP "B" flywheel. Grinding repaired condition.

1987 PT recordable indication dispositioned as satisfactory for RCP "A" flywheel. Damage from handling.

1993 trr recordable indication in RCP "B" flywheel due to geometry, dispositioned as satisfactory. PT recordable indication due to handling, dispositioned as satisfactory.

1994 trr recordable indication in RCP "C" flywheel due to geometry,

. daspositioned as satisfactory.

FPUA.A 1974 Laminations midwall (UT) in motor IS-76P499 flywheel accepted as-is.

1993 Tom metal in key way (PT) on motor 2S-76P499 flywheel removed by buffing.

NSP 1994 MT of flywheel no. 11 periphery (0.4 mch) to be re-examined in January 1996 outage.

NRP 1995 MT indications in penphery of flywheel no. 21 (which were buffed in 1993) were found to be unchanged.

PGE 1995 Multiple MT linear indications (laminations) on lower periphery of RCP 1-4 flywheel, accept as-is. monitor.

PSE/PNJ 1983-1995 Eleven recorded mdicatiom, from surface examinations on seven flywheels were identified as minor chatter marks in keyway from original rough machine cuts due to the arbor tool used during manufacture.

Accept as is.

m \33S6w.wpf. lt,..I I I 196 3-5

Table 3-2: Summary of Recordable Indications (Continued)

Plant Alpha Desisnation Year Description of Recordable Indications SAP 1995 Wear marks on bottom surface of RCP 1 flywheel within seal ring (circular like spacer wear) - removed.

lVA/J'EN 1993 Recorded indtcauons ( 10 year MT) in flywheel 3S-8 l P352. Laminations in edge. dispositioned as acceptable.

VGBNRA 1983 Tool marks noted in keyway of flywheel 2S-8 I P355.

1986 Foor PT indications in the keyway of flywheel 3S-8I P3.S5 caused by incorrect installation.

1988 Six reportable indications from keyway scratches in flywecl 3S-8 I P777.

1993 Three acceptable rounded indications in the keyway of flywheel 2S-81P777.

WAT 1986 PT recorded indication in keyway area of RCP I flywheel resulted from tool chatter which occurred dunng manufacture of the flywheel. The indications were formed by the tearing and smearing of the raised metal (introduced by the tool chatter) at dtsasscmbly and reassembly of the keys.

1986 VT recorded indicauon m keyway area of RCP 4 flywheel.

WPS 1976 Visual recorded indtcallon an RCP "A" flywheel. Machine chips in five small holes m center of shaft.

BOAVI 1975 Volumetnc prescrv1ce ind1cauon in RCP 2 flywheel found to be acceptable. Surface tears m keyway removed by surface cond1t1onmg.

1988 Surface gouges an bore of RCP 4 flywheel from flywheel removal found to be acceptable.

CYW 1971 See Appendix. B.

m:\3356v.-.wpf lb-111196 3-6

SECTION 4 STRESS AND FRACTURE EVALUATION All of the Oywheels were subjected to a detailed stress and fracture evaluation, which is summarized in this section. To avoid repetition, the flywheels were grouped by geometry, and the logic for this grouping is explained in Section 4.1. There are two possible failure mechanisms. ductile and brittle, which must be considered in flywheel evaluation and these are discussed in detail in evaluations reponed earlier (References 2 and 3 ). Figure 4-1 shows the results of a typical flywheel overspeed evaluation, where the flywheel failure speed was calculated for a range of postulated crack depths. Note that the brittle failure limit governs for large flaws. The limiting speed increases for small flaws. Using brittle fracture considerations alone, the limiting speed would approach infinity for vanishingly small flaws.

For these situations, the ductile failure limit governs. a finding that has been proven by scale model tests whose results are reponed in Reference 2.

Regulatory Guide 1.14, Revision l, Section C, Subsection 2 (see Appendix A, or Reference I). provides the following regulatory position for flywheel design:

a. The flywheel assembly, including any speed-limiting and antirotation devices, the shaft, and the bearings, should be designed to withstand normal conditions.

anticipated transients. the design basis loss-of-coolant accident, and the Safe Shutdown Earthquake loads without loss of structural integrity.

b. Design speed should be at least 125% ofnormal speed but not less than the speed that could be attained during a turbine 01,*erspeed transient. Normal speed is defined as synchronous speed of the a.c. drive motor at 60 hertz.

c. An analysis should be conducted to predict the critical speed for ductile failure of the flywheel. The methods and limits of paragraph F-1323.J(b) in Section Ill ofthe ASME Code are acceptable. Ifanother method is used, justification should be provided. The analysis should be submitted to the NRC staff for evaluation.

d. An analysis should be conducted to predict the critical speed for nonductile failure ofthe flywheel. Justification should be given for the stress analysis method. the estimate of flaw size and location, which should take into account initial flaw size and flaw growth in service, and the values offracture toughness assumed for the material. The analysis should be submitted to the NRC staff for evaluation.

m:\3356w.wpf lb-111196 4-1

e. An analysis should be conducted to predict the critical speed for excessive deformation of the flywheel. The analysis should be submitted to the NRC staff for evaluation. (Excessive deformation means any deformation such as an enlargement of the bore that could cause separation directly or could cause an unbalance of the flywheel leading to structural failure or separation of the flywheel from the shaft. The calculation of deformation should employ elastic*

plastic methods unless it can be shown that stresses remain within the elastic range).

f The normal speed should be less than one*half of the lowest of the critical speeds calculated in regulatory positions C.2.c. d. and e above.

g. The predicted LOCA overspeed should be less than the lowest of the critical speeds calculated in regulatory positions C.2.c. d. and e above.

These guidelines will be reviewed in this section, for all the flywheels covered by this report, and the results tabulated.

4.1 Selection of Flywheel Groups for Evaluation From the flywheel dimensional information provided in Table 2* l of this report, six flywheel groups were selected for evaluation, which encompass the range of domestic flywheel dimensions covered by this report. These groups are as follm;.,,s:

Table 4-1: Flywheel Groups Evaluated Outer Flywheel Diameter Bore Keyway Radial Group (Inches) (Inches) Length (Inches) Comments I 76.50 9.375 0.937 Maximum flywheel OD.

2 75.7'5 8.375 0.906 Large flywheel OD. Minimum flywheel bore.

10 72.00 16.125 0.906 Large flywheel OD. Large flywheel bore.

14 65.00 8.375 0.656 Minimum flywheel OD. Minimum flywheel bore.

15 72.00 30.500 0.390 Maximum flywheel bore (spoked flywheel), Minimum keyway radial length.

16 65.00 13.800 1.060 Minimum flywheel OD. Maximum keyway radial length.

m:\33S6w wpf lb-111196 4.2

4.2 Ductile Failure Analysis The capacity of a structure to resist ductile failure with sufficient margin of safety during faulted conditions can be demonstrated by meeting the faulted condition criteria of Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. The faulted condition stress limits for elastic analysis, Pm and Pm + P11, are taken as 0.7 Su and 1.05 Su , where Su is the minimum specified ultimate tensile stress of the material. As in Reference 2. 80 ksi was used for Su , which is the minimum specified value for A-533 Grade B, Class I steel. The stresses in the RCP flywheel. neglecting local stress concentrations such as holes and keyways. can be calculated by the following equations (Reference 2):

_ (3+v) p<d , a 2 2 ( I + 3v ,]

08 -

--r- *+ a*+

386.4 tb , r2 b - -Jr*

3+v where o, = radial stress. psi Oe = circumferential, or hoop stress, psi V = Poisson's ratio, 0.3 p = flywheel material density, 0.283 lb.jinch J

0) = flywheel angular speed, radians/second b = flywheel outer radius, inches a = flywheel bore radius, inches r = flywheel radial location of interest, inches Since the stress in the thickness direction (01 ) is assumed to be negligible, and the radial stress (O,) always falls between Oz and 08 , the maximum stress intensity at any point in the flywheel is equal to the circumferential stress, 08 . It should be noted that the circumferentia 1 stress peaks at the flywheel bore and keyway locations and decreases approximately linearly thereafter in the radial direction. To apply the faulted stress limits to a nonlinear stress m \3356w.wpflb-l I I 196 4-3

distribution. the actual stress distribution must be resolved into its membrane and bending components:

P = _.2._ (<T dr m (b-a) a J' e 6

roe (rm - r) dr (b-a)2 J'*

where rm is the flywheel mean radius defined as (a+ b) / 2. Substituting the circumferential stress term shown above and carrying out the integrations yields 3 v p

m = ( *8 ] 386.4poi(b-a) (b -

3 3 8 ) [l- 2_3 ()3++ 3vV ]

p =- (3*v 6 poi b4 1*3v b3a [I- 2_ 1+3v

[ 1 b 8 J 386.4 ( b-a)2 12 3+v ( } 2

• 3 (3+v )

2b2ln(! ) - ba [t+..!..c l

• 3v)]-( 1 *3v>]

)

a 2 3 3+ V 12 3+ V

_8 As was performed in the Reference 2 evaluation. a ductile failure limiting speed was determined for each flywheel group selected for evaluation. assuming that cracks are not present and neglecting the local stress effects from holes and keyways. Limiting speeds were also calculated considering the reduced cross sectional area resulting from the keyway, and from assuming that cracks may be present. Cracks were assumed to emanate radially from the keyway. through the full thicknes of the flywheel. The results of these calculations are provided in the following table.

m \33S6w.wpf:lb-l 11l96 4-4

Table 4-2: Ductile Failure Limiting Speed (rpm)

Assuming No Cracks Crack Length (from Keyway)

Neglecting Considering Keyway Keyway Flywheel Radial Radial I" Crack Group Length Length 2" Crack S" Crack 10" Crack I 3487 3430 3378 3333 3240 3012 2 3553 3493 3435 3386 3281 3060 10 3503 3471 3443 3398 3238 2990 14 4086 4032 3961 3903 3768 3448 15 3175 3155 3105 3056 2915 2698 16 3900 3850 3815 3760 3565 3264 Per Regulatory Guide 1.14, Revision 1, Section C, item 2f, the normal speed should be less than one-half of the lowest of the critical speeds as calculated for ductile failure, nonductile failure and excessive deformation. At the minimum calculated limiting speed of 3155 rpm (assuming cracks are not present), the normal speed must be less than 1577 rpm. Since the normal operating flywheel speed is 1200 rpm, item 2f of the Regulatory Guide is satisfied for ductile failure with no cracks present. Assuming that a rather large crack of IO" depth is present, item 2f is still satisfied for ductile failure since one-half of the lowest calculated critical speed (2698 rpm) is 1349 rpm, which is higher than the normal operating flywheel speed of 1200 rpm.

Per item 2g of Section C of the Regulatory Guide, the predicted LOCA overspeed should be less than the lowest of the critical speeds calculated for ductile failure, nonductile failure and excessive deformation. Since the predicted LOCA overspeed is in all cases less han 1500 rpm, and the minimum calculated limiting velocity for ductile failure is 3155 rpm, item 2g of the Regulatory Guide is satisfied for ductile failure, assuming no cracks are present.

Assuming that a rather large crack of IO" length is present, item 2g is still satisfied for ductile failure since the lowest calculated critical speed (2698 rpm) is higher than the LOCA overspeed of 1500 rpm Therefore, the Regulatory Guide acceptance criteria for ductile failure of the flywheels are satisfied.

m\B56w.wpf:ll't-l I I 196 4-5

4.3 Nonductile Failure Analysis As provided in Reference 2, an approximate solution for the stress intensity factor for a radial full depth crack emanating from the bore of a rotating disk may be calculated by the

[ ]Ir.?

following equations (Reference 5):

C a 1t(--->

K = POT b b

, b sn 386.4 (l -v 1 )

-

I '

I b

l b ,*-

/ '3

-b b I I C

'3

- a l -

a ')

-(' ;t) Ib - b

+_

I 3

I I -

C

' J ' b, where p (I) b

=

=

=

flywheel material density (lbm per cubic inch) flywheel angular speed (radians per second) flywheel outer radius (inches) a = flywheel inner radius (inches)

C = radial location of crack tip (inches)

V = Poisson's ratio (0.3)

In the Reference 2 analysis, the keyway radial length was initially assumed to be included as part of the total crack length for conservatism. Using the closed form solution, a nonzero value of stress intensity was obtained for a zero crack length (i.e., c = a + keyway radial length), as would be expected, since the keyway itself was in essence considered to be a crack. To eliminate this undue conservatism for short crack lengths, finite element analysis was performed. It was shown that cracks emanating from the center of the keyway yielded higher stress intensity factors than cracks emanating from the keyway comer, and that a zero length crack resulted in a zero stress intensity factor. The finite element analysis results were in close agreement with the closed form solution for crack lengths larger than about 1.0 inch.

It was also shown in the Reference 2 analysis that the ductile failure mode controls for smaller crack lengths (less than 1.15 inches for the particular flywheel evaluated), and that m\33S6w.wpf:lb-l I I 196 4-6

nonductile failure controls for larger crack lengths. Therefore, the closed form solution was used for calculation of the stress intensity factors in this report, keeping in mind that it is overly conservative for small cracks. (However, small cracks are controlled by the ductile failure mode).

To envelope the range of RTNor values for the flywheel materials, an upper and lower bound value of 0°F and 60° F were used in this report. The lower bound fracture toughness for ferritic steels was calculated by the following equation (Refecence 4 ):

Kie = 33.2 + 20.734 exp[0.02 (T - RT,mr>l This resulted in fracture toughness values of 117 ksi Vinch and 58.5 ksi Vinch for RTNOT values of 0° F and 60 °F, respectively, at an ambient temperature of 70° F. The ambient temperature used for the fracture evaluation represents a much lower temperature than would be expected in the containment building during normal plant operating conditions (typically l00°F to 120° F), and is therefore conservative with respect to nonductile failure analysis.

At the maximum flywheel overspeed condition of 1500 rpm, the following critical crack lengths were calculated for cracks emanating radially from the keyway. Note that an intermediate RTNor value of 30° F (K1c = 79.3 ksi ..Jinch) is included in the table.

Table 4-3: Critical Crack Lengths for Flywheel Overspeed of 1500 rpm Critical Crack Length in Inches and % through Flywheel Flywheel Group RTNDT = 0° F RTNDT = JOO F RTNDT = 60°F I 16.6" 7.7" 3.1" (50%) (24%) (9%)

2 17.5 8.5" 3.6" (53%) (26%) (11%)

10 15. l" 7.5" 3.3" (56%) (27%) (12%)

14 20.3" 14.4" 8.3" (73%) (52%) (30%)

15 10.4" 5.3" 2.6" (51%) (26%) (12%)

16 17.2" 11.4" 6.0" (70%) (46%) (24%)

Note: Crack length is measured radially from the keyway, and percentage through flywheel is calculated as the crack length divided by the radial length from the keyway to the flywheel outer radius.

m:\3JS6w.wpf: lb-111196 4-7

As shown in the above table, the criLical crack lengths are quite large, even when considering higher values of RTNor and a lower than expected operating temperature.

4.3.1 Fatigue Crack Growth To estimate the magnitude of fatigue crack growth during plant life, an initial radial crack length of l 0% of the way through the flywheel (from the keyway to the flywheel outer radius) was conservatively assumed. The fatigue crack growth rate may be characterized in terms of the range of applied stress intensity factor, and is generally of the form (Reference 4):

da = C (&Kt O I dN where da/dN = crack growth rate (inches/cycle) n = slope of the log (da/dN) versus log (.1K1 )

Co = scaling constant The fatigue crack growth behavior is affected by the R ratio (11/.) and the environment.

Reference fatigue crack growth behavior of carbon and low alloy ferritic steels exposed to an air environment is provided by the above equation with n = 3.07 and C0 = 1.99 x 10- 10 S. (S is a scaling parameter to account for the R ratio and is given by S = 25.72 (2.88 - R)"3*07 where O R < l. Since the maximum stress intensity range occurs between RCP shutdown (zero rpm) and the normal operating speed of approximately 1200 rpm, the R ratio is zero, and S = I). The f atigue crack growth rate for the flywheels may therefore be estimated by da

= 1.99 x 10-10 (&K/01 dN Assuming 6000 cycles of RCP starts and stops for a 60 year plant life (typical for RCP design including te potential for extended plant life, and conservative for actual operation),

the estimated radial crack growth is as shown below:

m:\3356w.wpf:lb-l I 1196 4-8

Table 4-4: Fatigue Crack Growth Assuming 6000 RCP Starts and Stops CRACK KEY* LENGTH ASSUMED GRO\\TH FLY- FLY* WAY FROM INITIAL AFTER FLY* WHEEL WHEEL RADIAL KEYWAY CRACK WHEEL OD BORE LENGTH TO OD LENGTH aK, (KSI CYCLES GROUP (INCHES) (INCHES) (INCH) (INCHES) (INCHES) vlNCH) (INCH) 1 76.50 9.375 0.937 32.63 3.26 38 0.08 2 75.75 8.375 0.906 32.78 3.28 37 0.IJ6 10 72.00 16.125 0.906 27.03 2.70 35 0.07 14 65.00 8.375 0.656 27.66 2.77 25 0.02 15 72.00 30.500 0.390 20.36 2.04 33 0.05 16 65.00 13.800 1.060 24.54 2.45 28 0.03 As shown in the above table, crack growth is negligible over a 60 year life of the flywheel, even when assuming a large initial crack length.

4.4 Excessive Deformation Analysis The change in the bore radius (a) and the outer radius (b) of the flywheel at the overspeed condition may be estimated by the following equations (Reference 6):

rut = POT [(3 + v) b 2 + (I - v) a 2 1 4 386.4 E 6b = POT [() - v) b 2 + (3 + v) a 2 1 4 386.4 E where a = bore radius (inches) b = outer radius (inches) p = flywheel material density (0.283 lbJcubic inch)

(I) = flywheel angular speed (radians per second)

= Young's modulus (30 x 106 psi)

V = Poisson's ratio (0.3) m:\33S6w.wpf: lb-111196 4-9

At the flywheel overspeed condition of 1500 rpm (157.08 radians/second), the change in the bore radius and the outer radius is calculated as shown below:

Table 4-5: Flywheel Deformation at 1500 rpm CHANGE IN CHANGE IN FLYWHEEL BORE RADIUS OUTER RADIUS GROUP (INCH) (INCH)

I 0.003 0.006 2 0.003 0.006 10 0.005 0.006 14 0.002 0.004 15 0.010 0.009 16 0.004 0.004 As shown in the table a bove, a maximum flywheel deformation of only 0.010 inches is anticipated for the flywheel overspeed condition. As deformation is proportional to <.t>2, this represents an increase of 56% over the normal operating deformation. This increase would not result in any adverse conditions.

such as excessive vibrational stresses leading to crack propagation, since the flywheel assemblies are typically shrunk fit to the flywheel shaft, and the deformations are negligible.

4.5 Summary of Stress and Fracture kesults The integrity evaluations presented in this section have shown that the reactor coolant pump flywheels have a very high tolerance for the presence of flaws. The results obtained here are even better than those obtained in earlier evaluations, because the application of leak before break has demonstrated that flywheel overspeed events are limited to less than 1500 rpm.

There are no significant mechanisms for inservice degradation of the flywheels, since they are isolated from the primary coolant environment. Analyses presented in this section have shown there is no significant deformation of the flywheels even at maximum overspeed conditions. Fatigue crack growth calculations have shown that for 60 years of operation, crack growth from large postulated flaws in each of the flywheel groups is only a few mils. Therefore the flywheel inspections completed prior to service are sufficient to ensure their integrity during service. In fact, the most likely source of inservice degradation is damage to the keyway region which could occur during disassembly or reassembly for inspection.

m:l,356w wpf:lb-111196 4-10

300

-f

-- "'""

..

Q

..,.., .,,

-

"'*

0 0..

• 3000 250

....--

Q

..

w

-....z "'*

u IIIUL(

flACTUU llNIJ 200 2000 o.o 1.0 2.0 3.0 ,.o s.o ,.o CIACI 0£PTN (INCHES)

Figure 4-1: Results of a Typical Reactor Coolant Pump flywheel Overspeed Evaluation m:\2537w.wpf:ll>-01 IS96 4-11

SECTIONS RISK ASSESSMENT: EFFECT OF INSPECTIONS To investigate the effect of flywheel inspections on the risk of failure, a structural reliability ; .nd risk assessment was performed for each of the flywheel groups selected for evaluation in Sectior. 4. A 40 year plant life including the potential for an extended plant life of 60 years, and 12 mr ,Uh operating cycles were assumed for the evaluation. The following subsections describe t'.ae methodology used and the results of this assessment.

5.1 Method of Calculating Failure Probabilities The probability of failure of the RCP flywheel as a function of operating time t, Pr(t lt), is calculated directly for each set of input values using Monte-Carlo simulation with importance sampling. The Monte-Carlo simulation does not force the calculated distribution of time to failure to be of a fixed type (e.g. Weibull, Log-normal or Extreme Value). The actual failure distribution is estimated based upon the distributions of the uncenainties in the kt"y structural reliability model parameters and plant specific input parameters. lmponance sampling, as described by Witt (Reference 7), is a variance reduction technique to greatly reduce the number of trials required for calculating small failure probabilities. In this very effective technique, random values are selected from the more severe high or low regions of their distributions so as to promote failure. However, when failure is calculated, the count is corrected to account for the lowrr probability of simultaneously obtaining all of the more severe random values.

To apply this simulation method to reactor pump flywheel (RPFW) failure, the existing Westinghouse PROF (probability of failure) Software System (object library) is combined with the problem-specific structural analysis models described in Section 4.3. The PROF library provides standard input and output, including plotting, and probabilistic analysis capabilities (e.g. random number generation, imponance sampling). The result is the executable program RPFWPROF.EXE for calculation of pump flywheel failure probability with time. The failure mode being simulated by the program is an initial flaw. undetected during pre-service inspection, growing by fatigue crack growth due to pump startup and shutdown until a critical length is obtained. The critical length is that which causes the flaw stress intensity factor due to pump overspeed during the design limiting event to exceed the fracture toughness of the flywheel material.

The Westinghouse PROF Software Library, which was used to generate the RPFWPROF program, has been verified and benchmarked in a number of ways. Table 5-1 provides a comparison of probabilities from hand calculation for simple models where the only random variables are the initial and limiting crack depths. The crack growth due to two independent mechanisms is deterministic (variables are constant). As can be seen. the W-PROF calculated values agree very well (less than 4% error) for a number of different distribution,; and with the effects of imponance sampling.

m \3356w wpf lb-111196 5-1

Table S-1: Simple Verification of Results for Westinghouse PROF Methods Type of Import. Hand W-PROF Distribution on Sampling Calculated Calculated Percent Crack Depths ( l) Shift (2) Prob. (3) Probability Error Normal 0.0 0.1003 0.10004 -0.26 Normal +/- 1.0 0.1003 0.09889 -1.41 Log-Normal 0.0 0.1003 0.09880 -1.50 Log-Normal +/- 1.0 0.1003 0.09652 -3.77 Uniform 0.0 0.1003 0.10393 +3.62 Log-Unifonn 0.0 0.1003 0.10018 -0.12 Weibull 0.0 0.0950 0.0934 -1.68 (I) Same type of distribution on the random values of initial crack depth and limiting crack depth.

(2) Median value of initial depth shifted + I standard deviation and median value of limiting depth shifted -1 standard deviation when importance sampling (Reference 7) is used with less than half the number of trials.

(3) Calculated using stress-strength overlap techniques on crack depth.

The calculation of failure probability using the W-PROF methods and importance sampling was also compared to that calculated by an ahemativr. method for more complex models. The more complex model also included the uncertainties in growth rate, which were also a function of the crack depth.

The alternative method was the @RISK add-in for Lotus 1-2-3 spreadsheets (Reference 8). As seen in Figure 5-1, the comparison of calculated probabilities is excellent at the low probability values, where importance sampling is nonnally used.

In the verification of the simplified piping fracture mechanics (SPFM) structural reliability programs for risk based inspection (Reference 9). the calculated probabilities for thennal transient induced fatigue crack growth were compared with results from the pc-PRAISE program (Reference JO).

PRAISE. which was developed by Lawrence Livennore National Laboratory for the NRC. is the nuclear industry's standard for calculating the structural reliability of piping. As shown in Figure 5-2, the comparison of calculated leak probabilities with the number of operating cycles, without the effects of inspection. is excellent for both the SPFMPROF and SPFMSRRA programs. The SPFMSRRA program uses Westinghouse developed approximations to estimate the changes in probability with time due to changes in the input variables relative to a reference case. The reference case is initially calculated using the SPFMPROF Program, which is the same type of program as RPFNPROF.

When the same inservice inspection frequency and accuracy are used, Figure 5-3 shows that essentially the same failure probabilities are calculated by pc-PRAISE, SPFMPROF and SPFMSRRA.

Therefore, it is concluded that the Westinghouse methods employed in calculating probabilities with m \3)56w.wpf ll>-111196 5-2

the RPFWPROF.EXE program have been sufficiently verified and benchmarked for lhe assessment of pump flywheel failure risk and the effects of inspection.

The input parameters to the RPFWPROF program are described in Table 5-2. Variables I to 4 and 9 to 17 are the key input parameters needed for failure probability calculation, as idenlified in Section 4 3. Their usage in the program is specified as shown in the last column of Table 5-2 and schemalically in lhe tlow chart of Figure 5-4. "Initial" conditions do not change with time, "Steady State" is not needed for RPFWPROF, "Transient" calculates fatigue crack growth and "Failure" checks to see if the accumulated crack length exceeds the critical length.

Table S-2: Variables for Structural Reliability Model or RCP Flywheel Failure No. Name Description or Input Variable Usage Type I ORADIUS Outer Flywheel Radius (Inch) Initial 2 IRADIUS Inner Flywheel Radius (Inch) Initial 3 PFE-PSI Probability of Flaw Existing After Preservice Initial Inspection 4 ILENGTH Initial Radial Flaw Length (Inch) Initial 5 CYI-ISI Operating Cycle for First Inservice Inspection Inspection 6 OCY-ISI Operating Cycles Between lnservice Inspections Inspection

• -

7 POD-ISi Flaw Deteclion Probability 1,-r Inservice Inspection Inspection 8 DFP-ISI Fraction PFE Increases per lnservice Inspection Inspection 9 NOTR/CY Number of Transients per Operating Cycle Transient 10 DRPM-TR Speed Change per Transient (RPM) Transient II RATE-FCG Faligue Crack Growth Rate (Inch/fransient) Transient 12 KEXP-FCG Faligue Crack Growth Rate SIF Exponenl Transienl 13 RPM-DLE Speed for Design Limiting Event (RPM) Failure 14 TEMP-F Temperature for Design Limiting Event (F) Failure 15 RT-NDT Reference Nil Ductility Transition Temperalure (F) Failure 16 F-KIC Crack Initiation Toughness Factor Failure 17 DLENGTH Flywheel Keyway Radial Length (Inch) Failure Variables 5 to 8 are available to calculate the effects of an inservice inspection (ISi) in the RPFWPROF program. In a Monte-Carlo type simulation, the failure probability at a given time is approximated as the ratio of the number of failures at thal time to the total number of trials. For inservice inspections, this ratio is modified tc reflect the fact that only those cracks that are not m\3JS6w wpf.lb-111196 5-3

detected will remain to possibly cause failure!. That is. a component with a detected crack is assumed to be repaired or replaced, returning it to a good-as-new condition. This modified ratio for ISi is expressed by the following equation:

Pr, = Summation [ PrN0(n) F(n) J / N n = I to N Where:

Pr. = the approximate probability of failure, PrN0(n) = the ISi non-detection probability for the nth trial, F(n) = the failure weight for the mh trial (e.g. I if failure occurs and O otherwise for no imponance sampling), and N = the total number of trials (simulations).

The non-detection probability normally varies as a function of time since it depends upon the size of the crack at the tin1 the ISi is performed. That is, the larger the crack size. the lower the probability of not detecting it. This is also expressed in equation form for the Ith inservice inspection as:

PrN0(n) = Product [ PrN0(n,'1) ]

i = I to I Where:

PrN0(n.) = the probability of non-detection for the inservice inspection of weld n at time t,.

These equations, which are used in the simplified model for the effect of ISi. are consistent with those described in the pc-PRAISE Code User's Manual (Reference JO). They are somewhat optimistic since there is no correlation between successive inspections of the same material, which may systematically occur in actual practice. Tht parameters needed to describe thi= selected ISi program are the time of the first inspection. the frequency of subsequent inspections (expressed as the number of fuel or operating cycles between inspections) and the probability of non-detection as a function of crack length. For the reactor pump flywheel, the non-detection probability, which is independent of crack length, is simply one minus a constant value of detection probability, variable 7 in Table 5-2. An increase in failure probability due to pump inspection (chance of incorrect disassembly and reassembly) was included in the ISi model but not used (variable 8 set to zero).

The median input values and their uncenainties for each of the parameters of Table 5-2 are shown in Table 5-3. The median is the value at 50% probability (half above and half below this value); it i!>

also the mean (average) value for symmetric distributions, like the normal (bell-shaped curve) distribution. Uncertainties are based upon expen engineering judgement and previous structural m:\33S6w.wpf:lb-1111% 5-4

reliability modeling experience. For example. the fracture toughness for initiation as a function of the reference nil-ductility transition temperature and the uncenainties on thse parameters are based upon prior probabilistic fracture mechanics analyses of the pressure vessel (Reference 11). Also note that the stress intensity factor calculation for cral..'k growth and failure used the flywheel keyway radial length (variable 17) in addition to the calculated flaw length. This allowed the probabilistic models to be checked using the results of the conservative deterministic evaluations of Tables 4-3 and 4-4.

Table 5-J: Input Values for Structural Reliability Model of RCP Flywheel Failure No. Name Median Distribution Uncertainty*

I ORADIUS Per Flywheel Group Constant

..., IRADIUS Per Flywheel Group Constant 3 PFE-PSI I.OOOE-01 Constant 4 ILENGTH I.OOOE-01 Log-Nonna! 2.153E+OO 5 CY I-ISI 3.000E+OO Constant 6 DCY-ISI 4.000E+OO Constant 7 POD-ISi 5.000E-01 Constat 8 DFP-ISI O.OOOE+OO Con'. Jlnt 9 NOTR/CY I J)()()E+02 Normal I.OOOE+OI

o DRPM-TR 1.200E+03 Normal l .200E+02 11 RATE-FCG 9.950E-1 I Log-Nonnal J .414E+OO 12 KEXP-FCG 3.070E+OO Constant 13 RPM-DLE l.500E+03 Normal I .500E+02 14 TEMP-F 9.500E+OI Normal I.250E+OI 15 RT-NDT 3.000E+OJ Normal l .700E+OI 16 F-KIC I.OOOE+OO Normal I.OOOE-01 17 DLENGTH Per Flywheel Group Constant

• Note: Uncenainty is either the normal standard deviation, the range (median to maximum) for uniform distributions or the corresponding factor for logarithmic distributions.

Table 5-4 provides sample output from the RPFWPROF Program for the values of the input variables in Table 5-3. The first page of the output describes the input that is used for the calculations. The "SHIFT MV/SD" column indicates how many standard deviations (SD) the median value CMV) is shifted for importance sampling (Reference 7). The second page of the output provides the change in failure probability per fuel ( operating) cycle and the cumulative probability. The deviation on the m \33S6w wpf I b-111196 5.5

cumulative total that is output is the deviation due to the Monte-Carlo simulation only. Figure S-5 showc; the computer generated plot comparing the calculated reactor pump failure probabilities with and without the effects of inservice inspe"l.ion. As can he seen, the effect of ISi. even with a 50'! probability of detection, is very small. This is because the failure probability is not changing much with time; therefore, the rate of incre cannot he significantly reduced even for a perfect inspection with HX)% prohahility detection.

Table S-4: Example Output from the RPFWPROF Program S'1RIOURAL RELIABILITY' AN:> RISK (SRRA)

-INPUI'-------------*-***

W&9'l'IN:HU3E

-- ... .. ... .

PRCEABIL.rIY OF F7Uil1RE PRCXWtM RPFWPROF VAR.IABI..ES PCR CA9E M wwemee 1: REACitR CDJlANI' Pl.MP FLMmm. FAil.llRE ESBl.J-NID

?CYCLE -

N'J\TARS -

NlY".t.:ISC -

60 17 0

NF7UlS -

NlMIRC -

- 1000 4

'*

NIRIAL

• MMISI

• NlHM) -

9999 4

5 VARIABLE DISIRIBtJI'I f.H>IAN DEVIATICfi SHIFr T.S1tGE N::>. N1ME! 'IYPE Im VAWE Cl( FrI(R Mil/SD R). cruB 1 CJW)It5 - CIHmWl' - 3.60000+01 1 SET 2 IRADit5 - CIHmWl' - 8.062SD+OO 2 SET 3 PFE-PSI - CIHmWl' - 1.00000-0l 3 SET 4 IIaGIH YES 1.00000-01 2.15280+00 1.00 4 SET 5 CTl-ISI - CXNmWr - 3.00000+00 1 ISI 6 OCY*ISI - CXNmWr - 4.00000+00 2 ISI 7 PCD-ISI - CXNmWr - 5.00000-01 3 ISI 8 DFP-ISI - CIHmWl' - 0.00000+00 4 ISI 9 ?CJIR/C'i R) 1.00000+02 1.00000+01 .00 1 'IRC 10 DUM-'IR R) 1.20000+03 1.20000+02 1.00 2 'IRC 11 RA'.IE-FCG YES 9.9499D-ll 1.41420+00 1.00 3 'IRC 12 KEXP-FCG - CXNmWr - 3.07000+00 4 'IRC 13 Rl:M-DLE R) 1.50000+03 1.50000.-02 1.00 1 FM) 14 TBMP-F R) 9.50000+01 1.25000+01 -2.00 2 PM) 15 Rr-?VI' R) 3.00000+01 1.70000.-01 2.00 3 FM>

16 F-KIC R) 1.00000+00 l.OOOOD-01 -1.00 4 FM) 17 DIBCIH - CXNmWr - 9.0600D-01 5 FM>

m:\2537w.wpt:11>012Wfl 5-6

lable S-4: Example Output from the RPFWPROF Program (Cont'd.)

PRCBABll.ilTIES OF MDE: GUE CRACK CR:JfIH SIF > 'ItXGiNES.S NlM3Im mILm) - 470 NlM3ER OF '!RIALS

• 9999 EN:> OF F.A.IllJRE PRCBABILl'IY WI'IHX1I' Ari) WI'IH IN-SERVICE lNSPEX'.:11 C'iCLE FCR PERICD CIM. 'IomL Fm PERICD a.M. 'IomL 1.0 9.007770-08 9.007770-08 9.007770-08 9.007770-08 2.0 1.007130-08 1.00149D-07 1.007130-08 1.00149D-07 3.0 8.709820-11 1.002360-07 8.709820-11 1.002360-07 11.0 3.566160-11 1.002720-07 8.91540D-12 l.0024SD-07 12.0 9.402060-13 1.002730-07 1.175260-13 1.0024SD-07 13.0 2.17369D-11 1.002940-07 2.717110-12 1.002480-07 14.0 4.711790-10 1.007660-07 5.889740-11 1.003070-07 18.0 2.919390-10 1.0lOSSD-07 1.824620-11 1.0032SD-07 19.0 1.595240-09 1.026530-07 9.970240-11 1.004250-07 24.0 6.009730-12 1.02659D-07 9.39020D-14 1.004250-07 26.0 2.076670-11 1.02680D-07 3.24480D-13 1.004250-07 31.0 1.303320-09 l.039830-07 1.018220-11 1.004350-07 32.0 2.876920-11 1.040120-07 1.12380D-13 1.004350-07 34.0 1.811250-ll 1. 04030D-07 7.075210-14 1.0043SD-C,7 35.0 1.304720-10 1.04160D-07 5.0965SD-13 1.004360-07 38.0 1.123400-10 1. 042730-07 2.194140-13 1.004360-07 40.0 2.932180-11 1. 043020-07 2. 863460-14 1.004360-07 46.0 8.712640-11 1.04389D-07 4.254220-14 1.004360-07 47.0 1.122510-10 1.045010-07 5.48099D-14 1.004360-07 50.0 7.949210-11 1.045810-07 1.94(-14 1.004360-07 51.0 5.077950 12 1.045860-07 l.23S 130-15 1.004360-07 52.0 2.88193D-12 1.04589D-07 3.51798D-16 1.004360-07 54.0 4.487020-10 1.050370-07 5.477320-14 1.004360-07 55.0 1.174260-11 1.05049D-07 1.433430-15 1.004360-07 58.0 9.356000-11 1.051430-07 5.7104SD-15 1.004360-07 59.0 2.4337SD-11 1.051670-07 1.485440-15 1.004360-07 60.0 O.OOOOOD+OO 1.051670-07 0.000000+00 1.004360-07 DEV'l.ATICN Ctl aMJIATIVE 'IUmI..S

• 4.7358SD-09 4.633240-09 Note: Failure probabilities are provided in double precision formal (e.g. 4.281720-08 is 4.28172 x 10., )

m:\257w.wpf:lb-012'96 5.7

S.2 Evaluation of Risk for RCP Flywheels Evaluations were performed to detennine the effect on the probability of flywheel failure for continuing the current inservice inspections over the life of the plant and for discontinuing the inspections. Since most plants have been in operation for at least ten years. the evaluation calculated the effects of the 1m,pections being discontinued after ten years.

It is imponant to keep in mind that the probability of failure determined by these evaluations is only a calculated parameter. The reason for this is that the evaluation conservatively assumes that the probability of a flaw existing after pre,ervice inspection is 10%, and that the ISi flaw detection probability is only 50%. ln reality, most preservice and ISi flaws would be detectcJ, especially for the larger flaw depths which may lead to failure. Therefore, the calculated values are very conservative.

(The effects of some important parameters on the calculated probability of failure are discussed later in Section 5.3). The most important result of th" evaluation is the change in calculated probability of failure from continuing to discontinuing the inspections after ten years (cycles) of plant life.

As shown in Figures 5-6 through 5-1 1, the effect of inservice inspection on failure probability has littl\! effect on minimizing the potential for failure of the flywheel. The results of ,his assessment are summarized as follows for a plant life of 40 and 60 years:

Table S-S: Probability of Failure after 40 and 60 Years with and without lnservice Inspection Probability of Oywheel failure Probability of flywheel with ISi prior to failure with lI prior to 10  % Increase in failure Flywheel illld after years and without ISi after probability for eliminating Group 10 years 10 years inspections At 40 years At 60 years At 40 years At 60 Years l 2.45E-7 2.50E-7 2.5 7E-7 2 5 2 l .43E-7 l . 45E-7 l .47E-7 l 3 lO l .OOE-7 l .04E-7 l .OSE-7 4 5 14 2.98E-l0 2.98E-10 2.98E-l0 0 0 15 l. l SE-8 l .l 8E-8 l .2 2E-8 3 6 16 6.92E-9 7.0 2E-9 7.02E-9 I I It can be seL n above that continuing inspection after IO years has essentially no impact on the failure probabilities.

m \33S6w.wpf lb-111196 5-8

5.3 Sensitivity Study A sensitivity study was perfonned to detennine the effect of some important flywheel risk assessment parameters on the probability of failure. Flywheel group 10 was arbitrarily chosen for the study. The parctmeters evaluated included the probability of detectivn. the initial flaw length. and the initial flaw length uncenainty. The results of this study are summarized in the table below. Note that this study was perfonned for a flywheel design life of 40 years.

Table 5-6: Effect of Flywheel Risk Parameters on Failure Probability Probabiliay of Probability of flywheel failure flywheel failure after 40 years with after 40 years with ISi prior to 10 Description of flywheel risk ISi prior to and years and without parameter varied after 10 years ISi after 10 years Base Case I .OOE-7 l .04E-7 Probability of Detection of I0% l .03E-7 l .04E-7 Probability of Detection of 80% l .OOE-7 l .04E-7 Initial flaw length of 0.05 inches 4.57E-8 4.74E-8 Initial flaw length of 0.20 inches 2.97E-7 3.0IE-7 llength 3 Sigma Bound Factor of l 6.40E-8 6.46E-8 llength 3 Sigma Bound Factor of 20 1.94E-7 I.95E-7 The values for the base case, shown in Table 5-6 above are for ... I0% probability of a flaw existing after preservice inspection. an initial flaw length of 0.10 inch ( 1.006 inch with keyway). an initial flaw length (llength) 3-sigma bound factor of 10. an initial inservice inspection at three years of plant life and subsequent inspections at four year intervals. and a probability of detection of 50% per inservice inspection (see Table 5-5. flywheel group 10).

The flaw detection probability was varied from 50% to IO'k and 80%. Failure probability increased approximately 3% for a decrease in flaw detection probability from 50% to 1O'k. Failure probability did not change for an increase in flaw detection probability from 50% to 80%. Therefore, flaw detection probability. which is a measure of how well the mspections are performed, has essentially no effect on flywheel failure probability.

The initial flaw length was varied from O.IO inch to 0.05 inch and 0.20 inches. Failure probability decreased by 54% for a decrease in initial flaw length from 0.10 inch to .J.05 inch. Failure probability tripled k1 an increase in initial flaw length from 0.10 inch to 0.20 inhes. Therefore, initial flaw length does affect flywheel failure probability. but the failure r.1robability is small, even for larger m \.H11o wpf lb-1111% 5-9

initial flaw lengths. Moreover. the probability of the larger ,law being missed during preservice inspetion would be even smaller than the assumed IO percent.

The initial flaw length 3-sigma bound factor was varied from l O to 3 and 20. Failure probability decreased about 38% for a decrease in the 3-sigma bound factor from IO to 3. Failure probability increased about 90% for an increase in the factor from l fl to 20. Therefore. the uncenainty in the deviation factor does affect flywheel failure pro*ability, but fai,tue probability is still small. even for a higher 3-sigma bound factor of 20.

5.4 Risk Ament Conclusions An evaluation of flywheel structur,tl reliability was performed for each of the flywheel groups selected for evaluation in Section 4, using methods which have been sufficiently verified and benchmarked.

Using conservative input values for preservice flaw existence. initial flaw length, inservice flaw detection capability and RCP start/stop transients, it was shown that flywheel inspections beyond ten years of plant life have no significant benefit on the risk of flywheel failure. The reasons for this are that most flaws which could lead to failure would be detected during preservice inspection or at worst early in the plant life. and crack growth is negligible over the plant life. It should be noted that the effect on potential flywheel failure from damage through disassembly and reassembly for inspection has not been evaluated. It is believed that this effect could demonstrate that the risk of failure by continuing flywheel inspections is the same as )r greater than the risk by eliminating the inspections.

Sensitivity studit.::; showed that improved flaw detection capability and more inspections result in a small relati\e change in calculated fail1

• t probability. Failure probability was most affected by the initial flaw length and its uncenainty. These parameters are determined by the accuracy of the preservice inspection. The uncenainty could be reduced using the results from the first inservice inspection but would probably not change much during subsequent inspections.

m:\3)S6w.wpf-lb-l I 1196 5-IO

• 80 t::.

u 70 ..

60

-

t-

-

_J CD 50 ..

a:

CD a 0 a::: 40 .. @RISK Est I mate Cl.

w a::: (5000 TRIALS) 30 ,_

a: 0 W-PROF WITH u.. 20 ..

/

t::. IMP. SAMPLING C 1 000 TRI AL S )

10 6/

t::.

/

6. --

0 t::..-== t::..-

30 35 40 45 50 55 60 TIME IN YEARS Figure S-1: Importance Sampling Check of Westinghouse PROF Methods m:\2537w.wpf:lb-OI IS96 5-11

SMALL LEAK PROBABILITY. NO ISI C c PC-PRAISE 6 6 SPFMPROF

......... 10 I SPFMSRRR 0

.

'-'

>--

-

.-,

....J C

CD CD 0

J 10 20 JO 40 NUMBER OF CYCLES Figure S-2: Comparison of Leak Probabilities without Inspection m:37w.wpf:lt,-Ol l596 5-12

.

.

.

-

SMALL LEAK PROBABILITY WITH ISI 20 0

C PC-PRAISE 6 6 SPFMPROF

,.... 10""

I SPFMSRRA

-""'.

C 0 I""\ -

6

- -

Ll L.l

....

>- A A L.l

-

_J CD i A

o.

CD 1 1 J 0 10 20 30 40 NUMBER OF CYCLES

.

.

. Figure S-3: Comparison of Leak Probabilities with lnservice Inspection

.

m:\25J7w.wpf:lt>-OI IS96 5-13

READ IN INITIALIZE STEADY*STATE UNCERTAINTIES {) PARAMETERS {> CHANGES l<J L

'v TRANSI ENT CHANGES

'v CHECK IF NO NEXT FAILURE {> TIME OCCURS? STEP YES YES

'\J '\J NO PRINT OUT NEXT CALCULATE EFFECTS OF PROBABILITY WITH TIME kl RANDOM TRIAL?

FAILURE PROBABILITY l<J ISi OR MOlilTORING Method for Component Probabilistic SRRA Analysis Figure 5-4: Westinghouse PROF Program Flow Chart for Calculating Failure Probability m:\2S37w.wpf:lb,.()11S% 5-14

&RRA PAe>'t:-.

-Z}.*...

Neatlnghou ESIU - NTD NulMIA Prollala&llty of 8,115ZE-86 l *.. ******* ...... .

• -

J ............. : ............... .

'g 1.1 * * * * * .. * *

• I Current C.* 1 X 1.8 I I

• No ISi

] 8,1..._............_...__.....&......_.................._..............__..___...._...._................

D D D

• Nlth ISl I.I 25 SIi 75 111

• -e>-t e>r N- TA WN 1

Title:

IEAClllRaDMT....., nVNHEEL FAIWRE Figure S-5: Computer SRRA Plot for RCP flywheel Failure Probability m:\2537w.wpf:lb-012J% 5-15

0.3 0.29

"'Ul 0.28

..........

0.27

<

..

...... ....

(.I..

(.I.. "' 0.26 0 ,s 0.25

.,... ............... _  : *

==-

• i *

• f I:

i

• t I f * *H *

• I

• t **

• J * -*:J t I

...J 0.24 0.23

"'c..

0.22 0.21 0.2 0 IO 20 30 40 50 60 70 YEARS

• W/0 ISi . . W/ISI Figure 5-6: Probability of Failure for Flywheel Evaluation Group I 0.2 0.19 a:: 0.18

...J 0.17

<

-- .......... ..**... ...... ....

(.I. "' 0.16 0

>

,.

0.15

=-=<

• l * * *H* * -f. t -t:

* * *

• I *

• f- i * *

• 0.14 0.13 a::

c..

0.12 0.11 0.1 0 IO 20 30 40 50 60 70 YEARS

• W/0 ISi ,- W/ISI Figure 5-7: Probability of Failure for Flywheel Evaluation Group 2 m:\2.'IJ7w.wpf:lb-0123% 5-16

0.15

• 0.05 0

0 10 20 30 40 so 60 70 YEARS

• W/0 ISi - W/ ISi Fi1ure S-8: Probability of Failure for Flywheel Evaluation Group 10 0.0003

• oi:: 0.00029

u. Ill 0.00028 0 ii 1

== :i

..J 0.00027 0

oi:: 0.00026 C.

0.00025 0 JO 20 30 40 50 60 70 YEARS

• W/0 ISi __ W/ ISi Fi1ure S-9: Probability or Failure for Flywheel Evaluation Group 14 m:\2537w.wpf:ltH>l2396 5-17

0.015 UJ 0.014 D'

...l

<

u..

..

0.013

• *

...

-=

- ***

...l :I 0.012

=

< ---* * .. i . ' ,:

O.ot I a.

0.01 50 60 70 20 30 40 0 lO YEARS

• W/0 ISi .. W/ ISi IS for Flywheel Evaluation Group Figllff 5.10: Probability of Failun O.ot UJ 0.009

-<

l

...l L.I,..

L.I,.. "' 0.008 0 -6

! ---*

-=

0.007 .. . -. f .

.. ... 't-l

=

<

0

!: 0.006 50 60 70 0.005 20 30 40 10 0 YEARS

• W/0 ISi * . W/ ISi 16 e for Flywheel Evaluation Group Fiptt 5.11: Probability of Failur m:\2517w.wpf:lb-Ol2396 5-18

SECTION 6

SUMMARY

AND CONCLUSIONS Reactor coolant pump flywheel inspections were implemented as a result of United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulatory Guide 1.14. which was published in 1971 and revised in 1975.

• Flywheels are carefully designed and manufactured from excellent quality steel, which has a high fracture toughness.

• Flywheel overspeed is the critical loading, but leak-before-break has limited the maximum speed to less than 1500 rpm.

• Flywheel inspections have been perfonned for 20 years, with no indications of service induced flaws.

• Flywheel integrity evaluations show a very high flaw tolerctnce for the flywheels.

• Crack extension over a 60 year service life is negligible.

• Structural reliability studies have shown that eliminating inspections after IO years of plant life will not significantly change the probability of failure.

• Inspections result i11 man-rem exposure and the potential for flywheel damage during assembly and reassembly.

Based on the above conclusions. continued inspections of reactor coolant pump flywheels are not necessary. Furthermore. overall plant safety could be increased by eliminating these inspections, because man rem doses would be lowered, and the potential for flywheel damage during disassembly and reassembly for inspection would oe eliminated.

m\.HS6v. wpflb-111196 6-1

SECTION 7 REFERENCES I) United Stales Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Office of Standards Development. Regulatory Guide 1.14. "Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheel Integrity," 1971; Revision I. August 1975.

2) Westinghouse repon WCAP-8163. "Topical Repon Reactor Coolant Pump Integrity in LOCA."

September : 973, WNES Class 3.

3) Babcock and Wilcox Power Generation Group, Nuclear Power Generation Division Topical Repon BAW-10040. December 1973, "Reactor Coolant Pump Assembly Overspeed Analysis."

4) ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI. 1995 Edition.

5) J. G. Williams and D. P. Isherwood, "Calculation of the Strain-Energy Release Rates of Cracked Plates by an Approximate Method," Journal of Strain Analysis, Vol. 3, No. I, 17-22 (1968).

l) Formulas for Stress and Strain, Fifth Edition, R. J. Roark and W. C. Young, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1975.

7) "Development and Applications of Probabilistic Fracture Mechanics for Critical Nuclear Reactor Components," pp 55-70, Advances in Probabilistic Fracture Mechanics, ASME PVP-Vol. 92, F. J. Win. 1984

8) @RISK, Risk Analysis and Simulation add-In for Lotus 1-2-3, Version 2.01 Users Guide, Palisade Corporation, Newfield. NY, February 6, 1992

9) Final Repon Documenting the Development of Piping Simplified Probabilistic Fracture Mechanics (SPFM) Models for EG&G Idaho, Inc., B. A. Bishop, October 1993, transmitted by Westinghouse Letter FDRT/SRPL0-027(94 ), February 17. 1994

10) NUREG/CR-5864, Theoretical and User's Manual for pc-PRAISE, A Probabilistic Fracture Mechanics Computer Code for Piping Reliability Analysis, Harris and Dedhia, July 1992

11) EPRI TR I05001, Documentation of Probabilistic Fracturt Mechanics Codes Used for Reactor Pressure Vessels Subjected to Pressurized Thermal Shock Loading, K. R. Balkey and F. J. Witt (Part 1) and B. A. Bishop (Pan 2), June 1995 m*\3356w.wpf lb-111196 7-1

APPENDIX A REGULATOR\' POSITION The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Regulatory Guide 1.14, (Reference l) to describe acceptable methods to ensure RCP flywheel integrity. Under Section C ot the regulatory guide, the NRC Regulatory position is defined. This ponion of the regulatory guide is provided below.

I. Matrri1/ and Fabrication

a. The flywheel material should be of closely controlled quality. Plates should conform to ASTM A20 and should be produced by the vacuum-melting and degassing process or the electroslag remelting process. Plate material should be cross-rolled to a rato of at least I to 3.

b. Fracture toughness and tensile propenies of each plate of a flywheel material should be check. l bv tests that yield results suitable to confirm the applicability to that flywheel of the r"r,,enies used in the fracture analyser. called for in regulatory positions C.2.c, d, ande.

c. All flame-cut surfaces should be removed by machining to a depth of at least 12 mm (112. inch) below the flame cut surface.

d. Welding. including tack welding and repair welding. should not be permitred in the finished flywheel unless the welds are inspectable and considered as potential sources of flaws in thtt fracturtt analysis.

2. De.fign

a. The flywheel assembly. including any spud-limiting and antirotation devices, tht' shaft, and the bearings, should btt designed to withstand normal conditions, anticipated transients, the design basis loss-of-coolant accident, and the Safe Shutdown Eanhquoke loads without loss of structural integrity.

b. Design speed should be at least 125% of normal speed but not less than the speed that could btt attained during a turbine overspeed transient. Normal speed is dttfined as synchronous speed of the a.c. drit1e motor at 60 henz.

c. An analysis should be conducted to predict the critical speed for ductile failure of the flywheel. Th<' methods and limits of paragraph F-1323. l(b) in Section Ill of the ASME Code are acceptable. If another method is used, justification should be provided. The analysis should be submitted to the Np r staff for evaluation.

m:\33 ... w.wpf:lb-111196 A-1

d. An analysis should be conducted to predict the critical speed for nonductile failure of the flywheel. Justification should be given for the stress analysis method. the estimate of flaw size and location, which should take imo account initial flaw size and flaw growth in service, and the values of fracture toughness assumed for the material. The analysis should be submitted to the NRC staff for evaluation.

e. An analysis should be conducted to predict the critical speed for excessive deformation of the flywheel. The analysis should be submitted to the NRC staff for evaluation. (Excessive deformation means an)' deformation such as an enlargement of the bore that could cause separation directly or could cause an unbalance of the flywheel leading to structural failure or separation of the flywheel from the shaft. The calculation of deformation should employ elastic-plastic methods unless it can be shown that stresses remain within the elastic range).

f The normal speed should be less than one-half of the lowest of the critical speeds calculated in regulatory positions C.2.c, d. and e above.

g. The predicted LOCA overspeed should be less than the lowest of the critical speeds calculated in regulatory positions C.2.c, d, and e above.

3. Testing Each flywheel assembly should be spin tested at the design speed of the flywheel.

4. Inspection

a. Following the spin test described in regulatory position C.3, each finished flywheel should receive a check of critical dimensions and a nondestructive examination as follows:

(I) Areas of higher stress concentrations, e.g. bores. uyways, splines, and drilled holes, and surfaces adjacent to these areas on the finished flywheel should be examined for su,fau defects in accordance with paragraph NB-2545 or NB-2546 of Section Ill of the ASME Code using the procedures of paragraph NB-2540. No linear indications more than 1.6 mm (///6 inch) long, other than laminations, should be permi1ted.

( 2) Each finished flywheel should be subjected to a I 00% volumetric examination by ultrasonic methods using procedures and acceptance criteria specified in paragraph NB-2530 (/or plates) or paragraph NB-2540 (for forgings) of Section Ill of the ASME Code.

m:\3356w.wpf lb-111196 A-2

b. lnservice inspection should be performed for each flywheel as follows:

(I) An in-place ultrasonic volumetric examination of the areas of higher stress concentration at the bore and keyway at approximately 3 year intervals during the refueling or maintenance shutdown coinciding with the inservice inspection schedule as required by Section XI of the ASME Code.

(2) A surface examination of all exposed surfaces and complete ultrasonic volumetric examination at approximately JO year intervals, during the plant shutdown coinciding with the inservice inspection schedule as required by Section XI of the ASME Code.

(3) Examination procedures should be in accordance with the requirements of Subanicle /WA-2200 of Section XI of the ASME Code.

(4) Acceptance criteria should conform to the recommendations of regulatory position C.2.f (5) If the examination and evaluation indicate an increase in flaw size or growth rate greater than predicted for the service life of the flywheel, the results of the examination and evaluation should be submitted to the staff for evaluation.

m:\3356w wpf:lb-111196 A-3

APPENDIX B HISTORICAL INSPECTION INFORMATION: HADDAM NECK The following chronological listing shows the results of reactor coolant pump flywheel inspections at the Haddam Neck Plant:

1970 - Prior to the April 1970 refueling outage, Westinghouse and the AEC, became concerned about the possibility of cracks being initiated at or propagating from the interior comers of the keyway areas in RCP flywheels. Ultrasonic examinations were performed during the refueling outage on all four RCP flywheels and revealed a <5% amplitude indication on RCP flywheel #4 in the bore keyway area and it was not recordable. The indication was recorded by Westinghouse personnel purely for future reference purposes.

RCP flywheel #I was liquid penetrant inspected in the bore area after it had been removed from the shaft and no indications were observed.

Total radiation exposure for these first inspections was 1.038 Person REM and included examination technicians, and engineering and maintenance personnel. This amount of personnel radiation exposure has continued to be expended to complete these inspections when they were required during the last 25 years.

1971 - In April 1971, the Inservice Inspection Program Requirements of ASME Section XI, were put into the Plant Technical Specifications. Requirements were additionally added for RCP flywheels, outside of Section XI Requirements, based on AEC request.

Technical Specification Requirement - One different flywheel shall be examined visually and I 00% volumetrically at every other refueling shutdown.

The AEC requested that all four flywheels be examined at the next refueling outage before this inspection sampling program could be put into effect.

During the May 1971 refueling outage, all four flywheels were inspected. The bore seal weld area of RCP flywheel #4 was found to be cracked. The cracks were identified in the bore seal weld and it's associated heat affected zone. Cracked areas were removed by grinding and weld repaired.

Review of the inspection data shows that these cracks may have been identified by the ultrasonic examination indication reported in 1970, but the data is not conclusive. One point that does stand out is that the material of the RCP flywheel #4 is Grade T-1 Boiler Plate and is different than the other three flywheels which were fabricated to a Westinghouse specification.

m:\33Sbw.wpf:lb-111196 8-1

1973 - During the 1973 refueling outage, the inspection sampling program now required by Plant Technical Specifications began. RCP flywheels #1 and #4 were examined. Both flywheels were removed from their shafts. Cracks were discovered in the RCP flywheel

1. 4 bore seal weld area emanating from the weld repairs and in the existing seal weld areas.

Westinghouse was contacted and recommended that the bore seal weld and associated heat affected zone oe removed by grindiJ!&. Ultrasonic and liquid penetrant examinations were perfonned following the grinding repair and no indications were identified. Additionally, liquid penetrant examinations were perfonned in the bore pawl areas of both RCP flywheels. Liquid penetrant indications were identified in RCP ftywheel #1 at two bore pawl areas. These indications were detennined to be from mechanical sunace marks and were dispositioned as acceptable.

1980 - During this time frame inspections continued under the sampling program provided in to 1986 Plant Technical Specifications with continuing effons by CY APCO to meet a request by the NRC to comply with the inspection requirements specified in Regulatory Guide 1.14.

No further flaws/cracks were identified in any of the flywheels. In 1980, one of the flywheels had liquid penetrant indications in the bore keyway areas, but were once again detennined to be from mechanical surface marks and dispositioned as acceptable.

1986 - Plant Technical Specifications were c hanged under Amendment No. 87 !!! specifically include reference to Regulatory Guide 1.14 inspection requirements.

!987 - During this refueling outage all four of the RCP flywheels were completely removed from the motors and sent to Westinghouse for a 10-year refurbishment. RCP flywheel

1. I and #2 were examined to the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.14 and magnetic panicle lndlcatlons were found in the seal baffle surface fillet weld area of RCP nvwheel #2. These indications/flaws/cracks were removed by grinding, weld repaired and reinspected until no indications were found. RCP flywheel #3 was not required to be inspected per Regulatory Guide J .14 requirements. The RCP ftywheel #4 bore seal weld area that had been ground out in 1973 was machined smooth. liquid penetrant inspected, and no indications were observed.

1988 :o cracks have been identified on any of the RCP flywheels in the critical areas of the bore and keyways since 1973.

Present No cracks have exceeded the critical naw size needed to cause a catastrophic failure of our flywheels in a nonnal operating overspeed condition.

All of the 1973 RCP ftywheel #4 cracks were of a limited depth approximately 1/2" deep and the bore seal weld and heat affected zone is now totally removed.

Note: Additional details are available in Docket No. 50-213, B15320, dated August 10, 1995.

m:\3356w.wpf:lb-l I I 196 B-2

APPENDIX C SAMPLE FLYWHEEL INSPECTION PROCEDURES m:\.1356w.wpf:lb-111196 C-1

NORTHEAST UTILITIES NUCLEAR QUALITY-RELATED NONDESTRUCTIVE EXAMINATION PROCEDURES NU-UT-24 Ultrasonic Examination Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheel Connecticut Yankee Issue NUSCO Level III Director QSD Auth. Insp. Agency Rev Date Approval/Date Approval/Date Approval/Date 5

6 7

Always verify with the procedure Status Log before using this procedure.

Ck0204XIC.07'

ULTRASONIC EXAMINATION RE.ACTOR COOLANT PUMP FLYWHEEL CONNECTICUT YANKEE

1. SCOPE 1.1 INJ£N'J' This procedure shall be used in conjunction with Procedure NU-UT-1 unless otherwise specified. NU-UT-1 contains all the general requirements applicable to this examination procedure. This pro cedure contains all the specific application requirements for the examination of areas specified in paragraph 1.2.

1.2 AREAS OF EXAMINATION This document covers the ultrasonic examination procedure for the bore and keyway areas and the remaining volume of the Connecticut Yankee reactor coolant pump (RCP) flywheels.

1.3 TYPE Of EXAMINATION

1. Volumetric examindtion shall be performed using ultrasonic pulse echo o* and 3* beam technique applied to the gage holes in the flywheel.

2. The examinations shall be performed manually using contact search units.

2. REFERENCES

1. NU-UT-1 Ultrasonic Examination General Requirements.

2. Calibration block CYW-47.

3. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Guide 1.14.

4. ASME Section XI Code - IWA 2240.

3. PROCEDURE CERTIFICATION The examination procedure described in this document is in conjunction with Procedure NU-UT-1 and complies with Section XI of the ASHE Boiler and Pressure Code, 1983 Edition, Summer of 1983 Addenda, except where examina*

tion coverage is limited by part geometry or access.

4. PERSONNEL CERTIFICATION

1. Each person performing ultrasonic examination governed by this proce dure shall be certified in arcordance with Procedure NU-UT-1.

Rev.:

Procedure NU-UT-24 Page: l of 5

5. EXAMINATION REQUIREMENTS 5.1 E,XAMINATIQN FREOUENCY The nominal examination frequency shall be 5 MHz. Other frequencies may be used if such variables as materials, attenuation, grain struc ture, etc., necessitates their use to achieve penetration or resolu tion.

S.2 EXAMINATION ANGLES AND COVERAGE

l. The bore and keyways and the remaining accessible volume of the RCP flywheel shall be examined using special design o* and 3*

azimuth probes. Coverage will be limited to those areas of the flywheel that can be canned from the four gage hole probes in each flywheel.

2. Other angles and techniques may be used if required for aid in evaluating indications.

6. EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS 6.1 EXAMINATION EOUlPMENI The following test equipment or its equivalent shall be provided for examinations specified in this procedure.

l. Special design azimuth probes

2. Couplant

7. EXAMINATION SYSTEM CALIBRATION 7.l Calibration using the .920* diameter azimuth probe shall be performed as follows:

l. Fully insert the . 920" diar.,eter transducer and set the o* on the azimuth to coincide with the axial centerline and facing the bore of the flywheel calibration block.

2. Inject couplant and establish acoustic contact.

3. Set te amplitude of the reflection from the bore to 100% full screen height.

4. Rotate transducer counterclockwise, CC. through 90* and locate the* diameter through drilled hole. Adjust gain if necessary.

5. Using the sweep control, establish a 20" sweep on the display by placing the signal from the sidewall at 5.75" along the time*

base. Return to the bore signal and place this at 10" on the timebase.

Rev.: 7 Procedure NU*UT-24 Page: 2 of 5

Through the use of the sweep control and delay control, repeat the above procedure until the display is as described above.

6. Sensitivity: Rotate the transducer to locate the signal from the number one ft diameter thru hole, see Figure 1, and adjust signal amplitude from this reflector to 80% FSH. Rotate transducer to locate signal from the number two- diameter thru hole and record% FSH. Draw DAC curve between two points obtained from holes #1 and #2. Rotae transducer to notch in flywheel keyway and record X FSH. If the CRT is saturated, record the dB difference to bring notch signal to 80% FSH.

7. Attenuation: Locate the signal from the bore of the CYW-47 and adjust the amplitude to 80% FSH and note the gain setting.

Locate the signal from the bore of the flywheel and set the signal to 80% FSH and record the gain setting. The difference between the gain setting on the calibration block and flywheel must be added or subtracted to the instrument settings for calibration to account for any attenuation differences between the calibration block and the flywheel.

8. Repeat the above calibration steps for the .721- diameter and J* aziumth probe.

9. Upon completion of the calibration, ensure that all data and instrument settings are recorded on the appropriate calibration data sheet (NU-UT-1, Figure 6).

7.2 CALIBRATION CHECKS Calibration checks shall be performed in accordance with Procedure NU-UT-1.

8. EXAMINATION PROCEDURES

1. Insert .920" diameter azimuth probe into gage holes on the RCP fly wheel and examine bore and keyway to maximum extent possible.

2. Insert .72l w diameter azimuth probe into gage holes on the RCP fly wheel and examine bore and keyway to the maximum extent possible.

3. Insert the 3* angle beam azimuth probe so that the transducer just clears the threaded portion of the gage hole. Examine the bore and keyway to maxium extent possible.

9. RECORDING CRITERIA

1. All indications with a signal amplitude >lOOX DAC at reference level shall be recorded and investigated to ensure proper evaluation.

2. The reference point for recording all indications shall be as follows: Looking down at the top surface of the flywheel, locate all indications clockwise, C\J, from the gage hole in line with the largest keyway in the flywheel. All radial and angular aeasurements to recordable indications shall be taken from the exit point of the Rev.: 7 Procedure NU-UT-24 Page: 3 of 5

probe. A sketch of all recordable indications shall be attached to he RCP flY"'heel data sheet.

Rev.: 7 Procedure NU-UT-24 Page: 4 of 5

FIGURE 1 CALIBRATION BLOCK CYW-47

.92fORILL 2.00"0 REAM TO 125 RMS FINISH

_ - - .719 DRILL REAtv1 1

---

{(:"- TO 12 5 P.MS FINJSH ELO<. SLOT THRU Hcx.£*1 .250" l"DPx 136WIDE 6218'*

2 DRILLED THRU 100" *

'---------:\4.78':.:..* ------,

. 2 so** ORILLE D ----+------"!"",, r. n.,

HOLE*2

......i.....-...., .,., "',,

THRU o' o"f00" Lt.!' I!' -...l'*

I I I I II I I 11 I I I 1* -

' I I 2 I I 50.,

.ll' .,.- +::-

3 1

1 I I 11 ,

t I

- - ----,.I t I I I 1I T

_ORILLED AND TA I 1,1 .J1 PPE 7.87"----, I FOR..1: EYE BOLT

&----------15.78"------ 2 Rev.: 7 Cl d 2DI.Ol9 Procedure NU*UT-24 Page: 5 of 5

REVISION/CHANCE ATTACHMENT SHEET Revision Seccion chanu 5 All Major Rewrite 6 All Major r.ewrite 7 P&ra. 2.2 Char.ge Blocks to Read "Block" Para. 7 .1.6 Correct Typo Para. 7 .1. 7 Reword 1st Sentence Para. 7.1. 8 Change 7.6.l to Read "7.2.1" Procedure t{U-UT-24

SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPA."IY INSPECTION AND TESTING SERVICES MANUAL ULTRASONIC EXAMINATION OF REACTOR COOLANT PUMP MOTOR FLYWHEELS tIT-V-417 REVISION 3 SUPERVISOR. NDE PROJECTS APPROVAL

• J ',

NDE LEVEL III! APPROVAL  ? TTsiPPROVAL PL.ANT VOGTLE *- AP t*/r *.*

I 1 ,'i I l,.j, DATE .

'JT-V-4 l *;

ev. 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION TITLE PAGE 1.0 Purpose 1 2.0 Scope l 3.0 Applicable Documents 1 4.0 Responsibilities 1 5.0 Qualification of Ultrasonic 2 Examination Personnel 6.0 Ultrasonic Equipment 2 7.0 Surface Preparation 3 8.0 Equipment Calibration 3 9.0 Examination Procedure 5 10.0 Investigation of Indications 6 11.0 Recording of Indications 6 12.0 Reporting of Indications 7

• U':'-V-4: "'.'

Rev. ::

.0 PURPOSE This procedure provides te ultrason examination requirements for reactor coolant pump flywheel :n accordance with the applicable American Society of Mechar* l Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.

2.0 SCOPE This procedure defines the method for ultrasonic examination reactor coolant pump flywheel to facilitate preservice and inservice inspection all high-stress regions (bore, keyways and bolt hole regions) with or without the removal of the flywheel frvm its shaft.

Note: Applications in this procedure are not covered in Section XI and are based on special techniques as allowed in IWA-2240.

3.0 APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS This procedure is written to comply with the requirements of the following documents to the extent specified within this procedure.

3.1 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI, 1983 Edition with Addenda through Summer 19e3, "Rules for Inservice Inspection of Nuclear Power Plant Components."

3.2 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section V, 1983 Edition with Addenda through Summer 1983, "Nondestructive Examination."

3.3 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulatory Guide 1.14 "Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheel Integrity" Revision l dated August 1975.

4.0 RESPONSIBILITIES 4.1 The Manager- :nspection and Tes**1ng Services shell be responsible for the approval and control of thi procedure.

4.2 An ITS NOE Level III individual certified in ultrason examinaticn is responsible for having ultrasonic procedures and techr.:ques developed, approved, and for assuring that this procedure, when correcty followed, will detect discontinult1es which do not meet the applicable acceptance standards.

1 of 9

,

'uT-V-4:-: \

Rev. 3 5.0 QUALIFICATION OF ULTRASONIC EXAMINATION PERSONNEL 5.1 All personel perforing ultrasonic examinations in accordance 1th this procedure shall be qualified and certified t8 the requ:rements of a procedure (written practice) written and approved by ITS in accordance with the "American S:iciety of Nondestructive Testing" (ASME)

SNT-TC-lA.

5.2 The ultrasonic examination may be performed by a Level I Examiner under the direct supervision of a certified Level II or Level III individual in ultrasonic examination; however, all interpretation of the results shall be performed by a Level II or Level III examiner certified in ultrasonic examination.

6.0 ULTRASONIC EQUIPMENT 6.1 The Ultrasonic :nstr'..!It\ent 6.1.1 A pulse-echo type ultrasonic instrument with an A-Scan presentation and operating frequencies of one to ten MHz shall be used to perform examination in accordnce with this procedure.

6.2 The Ultrascnic Transducer Search Unit 6.2.1 Search units with a nominal frequency of 2.25 MHz shall be used for examination in accordance with this procedure.

6.2.2 Seach unit size for the "periphery" scan shall be

.750" to 1.00" diameter straight beam.

6.2.3 Search unit size and configuration for "radial gauge hole" and "keyway corner" examinat.:..on will be a special desgn internal probe from :he gauge hole.

6.2.4 Upon ITS NDE Level III concurrence, other frequencies and sizes of search units may be used if product grain structure precludes achieving the necessary peneLration or sensitivity required.

6.3 Couplant

'Any commer::ally available ultrasonic couplant may be used and shall =e cert:!:ed for total sulfur and halogen content in accorda:e wit te American Society for Testing and Materials STM) :-129 3nd DOBOS. The :otal residual amour.t of sulfur ad halcge shall not exceed one percent by weight.

2 of 9

UT-V-417 Rev. 3 6.4 Reference Block Reference blocks (e.g., IIW, ROMPAS, DSC) if used, shall be of the same material as the component to be examined.

6.5 Calibration Block The flywheel to be examined shall be used for calibration.

6.6 CABLES Coaxial type cables shall be used and may be of any convenient length not to exceed 50 feet (unless permittd by qualification). The type and length shall be recorded on the Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheel Report, (Figure 417-1), or equivalent form.

i.0 SURFACE PREPARATION The finished contact surface shall be free from any roughness that would interfere with free movement of the search unit. This examination and calibration may be performed through tightly adhered paint.

8.0 EQUIPMENT CALIBRATic>>t 8.1 A daily linearity, as a minimum, shall be performed to verify the instrument to linearity requirements of Procedure UT-V-455.

8.2 The reject control shall be placed and remain in the "0" (off or minimum) position during calibration and examination.

8.3 Temperature of the flywheel shall be recorded on the Data Report.

8.4 The equipment calibration shall be performed in accordance with the following and the results documented on the Reactor Coolant Pump Flywhel Report, (Figure 417-1), or equivalent form.

8.4.l Keyway Corner Examination 8.4.1.1 Reflections from the bore of the flywheel shall be used for calibration.

8.4.1.2 From the gauge hole, obtain the maximum reflection from the bore of the flywheel using the special gauge hole probe.

3 of 9

• .;r-V-41 7 Rev. 3 8.4.l.3 Establish a horizontal screen range by setting the response from the flywheel bore at a maximum of 60 percent of the instruments screen range.

8.4.1.4 Bring the bore reflection to 80% FSH.

This shall be the primary reference level.

8.4.2 Radial Gauae Hole Examinations 8.4.2.1 Reflections from any two holes shall be used for calibration. The hole selected for the longest metal path shall be a maximum of 25 inches.

8.4.2.2 From the hole, obtain the maximum response from the nearer of the two holes. Set this response at 80% FSH.

8.4.2.3 Without changing the gain setting, obtain the maximum response from the remaining hole.

8.4.2.4 Mark these amplitudes on the CRT. Connect (

the two points with a smooth line. Extend the DAC to cover the maximum calibrated screen width. This shall be the primary reference level.

8. 4. 3 Periphery Examination 8.4.3.1 From the edge of the t:ywheel, obtain the maximum response from any two holes with a minimum of 10 inches metal path separation.

8.4.3.2 Etablish the horizontal screen range to coincide with the hole location from the edge of the plate. The response obtained from the hole with the greatest metal path shall be set between 50-80 percent of screen range.

8.4.3.3 Construct a DAC curve by setting the maximum response from the hole with the shortest metal path at 801 FSH.

8.4.3.4 Without changing the gain setting, obtain the maximum response f=om the hole with the greatest metal path. Mark these points on the CRT and connect them with a smooth line to cover the examination area.

This shall be the primary reference level.

4 of 9

UT-V-417 Rev. 3 a.s Calibraton Checks 8.5.l A calibratio check shall be per!rmed at the beginning and end of each examina:icn or every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, whichever is less.

8.5.2 If, in the opinion of the examiner, the validity of the calibration is in doubt, a calibration check shall be perfc:med.

8.5.3 If any point of the calibration check has moved on the sweep line by more than 10 percent of the sweep division reading, correct the sweep range calibration and note the correction on the applicable calibration sheet. If recordable indications are noted, the examination is voided, and a new calibration Section 8.0) shall be recorded and the voided examination shall be reexamined.

8.5.4 If any point of the calibration check has decreased 20 percent or 2 dB of its amplitude, all data and/or calibration sheets since the last calibration or calibration check shall be recorded and the voided examinations shall be reexamined.

8.5.5 If any points of the calibration check was increased more than 20 percent or 2 dB of its amplitude, all recordea indications since the last valid calibration or calibration check may be reexamined with the currected calibration and their value shall be recorded on the applicable calibration and data sheet.

9.0 EXAMINATION PROCEDURE 9.1 Keyway Corner Examination 9.1.1 Scanning of the keyway corners shall be accomplished starting at the top of the gauge hole and rolling the sound be from the bore over to examine the keyway and back. Insert the probe with a minimum of 251 overlap and repeat until the entire length of the keyway has been examined.

9.1.2 ach gauge hole shall be used to examine the keyway corners for indications propagating from the keyway.

9.2 Radial Gauge Hole Examination 9.2.1 Scanning shall be accomplished by inserting and retracting the probe the full length of the gauge hole and overlapping a minimum of 251 for each insertion.

5 of 9

UT-V-417 Rev. 3 9.2.2 Sach gauge hole shall be usect to scan the complete available port:on of the flywheel cross-section.

9.3 ?eriphery Examination 9.3.1 Scanning from the edge shall include the area from the edge up to and including the gauge holes.

9.3.2 The transducer shall be moved across and along the flywheel edge so as to scan the entire edge overlapping each scan by a minimum of 25% of the transducer diamecer.

9.4 Scanning speed shall not exceed six inches/second.

9.5 Scanning shall be performed at a minimum gain setting of two times the primary reference level sensitivity (6 dB).

NOTE:

If conditions such as material properties produce noise levels which preclude a meaningful examination, then scanning shall be performed at the highest possible sensitivity level above the primary reference level. The examiner shall note the dB and the reason on th applicable data sheet and notify the site NDE coordinator to proceed per the applicable ITS PM Procedure 2-1.

9.6 Upon completion of the ultrasonic examination, the couplant shall be removed from the area of examination to the extent practical.

10.0 INVESTIGATION OF INDICATIONS 10.1 All indications shall be investigated to the extent that the examiner can determine the size, identify and location of the reflectors.

• 10.2 Previous data, when applicable, shall be made available o the technicians to provide revious examination information.

11.0 RECORDING OF INDICATIONS 11.1 For the keyway corner examination, all indication which exceed 10% of the primary reference level shall be recorded.

11.2 For the radial gauge hole or periphery aminations, all indications which exceed 50% DAC shall be recorded.

UT-V-417 Rev. 3 NOTE:

Geometric reflectors in the flywheel shall be verified by physical measurements and need not be recorded.

12.0 REPORTING INDICATIONS 12.l It shall be the responsibility of the Level II or level III individual certified in ultrasonic examination re review, evaluate the disposition all recordable indications to determine their reportability requirements. Previous data shall be made available to the reviewer/evaluator for appropriate indication disposition.

12.2 Reportable indications or other indications determined to be significant by the ITS Level II or level III individual shall be reported to the operating company in accordance with ITS PM Proceure 3-4 .

• 7 of 9

UT-V-4:

Rev. 2 VOGTLE t::.ECTRIC GENERA.7:;;G PLANT Southern Nuclear Operating Company Reactor Coolant Pump Fl--"'heel Report UT-V-Form 015 Plant/Unit: RCP Flywheel No:

Isometric Drawing No: Procedure/Revision/Deviation:

Couplant Batch No: Sheet No:

Transducer Periphery Exam Gauge Hole & Keyway Exam Serial No:

Size:

Freq-..iency:

Equipmer.t Instrument: Frequency: Damping:

(

Serial No: Rep. Rate: Reject:

Cable Type: Cable Length:

Calibration/Examination Kerway Corner Screen Range:  % FSH

- NRI - RI -

dB:

Screen Div: NI Bolt Hole Region Screen Range:

- NRI - RI -

dB:

Screen Div: NI Periphery Screen Range:

- RI -

dB:

Screen Div: NI NRI Remarks:

Examiner/SN! Level: Examiner/ sr* Level:

Technical Review: Non Technical Review:

Figure 417-1 o ,.. a

UT-V-4:i Rev. 3 Vogtle Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheel 0

0 0

0

• 0

• 0 *

• 0

-

0 0

• 0 0

0 0

0

-

3/4" X 3-3/4" l-3/8" X 5"

• l-1/2" X 3-3/4"

• l" X 10" CJ 2" x l-7/8 H 0 3" X 10 .. Figure 417-2 9 of 9

,i. *** _.._. -'1 i , I , ; * * , - , * ** , "" * - * , -

Bi!]Nuclear GPU NUCLEAR Number ISi/NOE MANUAL

• 5361-NOE-7209.24.

Thi* *'_' C * ,* . Revision No.

ULTRASONIC EXAMINATION Of REACTOR COOLANT PUMP FLYWHEELS 0 Applicebili1Y/Soape Responsible Office This orocedure is applicable a, ,v site 5361 This document 1s within CA Pl*n Scope ...lL Yes _ No Effective Date SafetY Reviews Reau,red -1L Yes_ No 08-1 S-95 List of Effective Pages Revision

, .o I

0 E1 -1 0 1 Tl'l-\1- I 2.0 0 E2*1 0 3.0 0 EJ-1 0 4.0 0 E4-1 0 5.0 0 ES*1 0 13.0 0 E6* 1 0 7.0 0 E7*1 0 8.0 0 9.0 0

,o.o G P *.i .._,

0

'\

.

11.0 0 12.0 0 - .. :. '

13.0 0

(;0,', ..*

COPY_-!.-1.o..

• '

This procedure replacn 61000AP-7209.24.

• - .

. Si.cnature Concumno Oroanizational Element Date Originator 71,t... _I -

• L' 1 NOE/ISi Specialist -Z*.J 'r-av Concurred

-

/' .;,tf' £1)

-

Level Ill

'7. ;.B- 'JS I

/

L-4,/ .

/I#

Approved / .,,.),?I' r --..r..1r, Chem,strv/Materials Otrector xlf /SJ r.r;

• w -l/

/

-

Sv ,

1.0

Number GP'U NUCLEAR ISIIWOE MANUAL 5361-NOE*7209 .24 TI1h1 Revision No.

Ultrasonic E.ic:,manation of Ructo, Coolant Pump Avwheels 0 DOCUMENT HISTORY Bfviston Summm of ChfORe 1ml 0 Orig.net ReYiaion. This procedure replaces 6 t OO*QAP- 08-15.95 7209. 24.

. -

l2Ji!] Nuclear GPU NUCLEAR Number 1Sl.1NDE NIANUAL 5361 *NOE-7209.24

.

- Revision Nci.

• Ultrasonic Examination of Reactor Coolant Pump Rywheels 0 TABLE OF CONTENTS Cover Page ............. ..... ....... .......................... 1 .O Document History 2.0 Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . ..... . .. . .. . . ..... . . . .. . . . . . . . . ..... 3.0

...

, .0 PURPOSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . * . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4. 0 2.0 APPUCA81UTYtSCOPE . . . . . . . . . ... .. . . ...... . .... .. . . . . . ...... . . 4.0 3.0 PEFINITIONS . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . .. . . . .. . . .... . . . ... . . . . . . 4.0 4.0 PRQCEOURE * * * , * * * , * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * .. , , , , ................... 4.0 4.1 Personnel Certific.i1on/Oualification ... . . . . . . . . .... . . ... ... . .... 4.0 4.2 Material/Eauipment . . . ... . . . .... . . .. .... .. . . . . . . . .. .. ..... 4.0 4.3 PrereQu1sites ...*.......*................................ 6.0 4.4 Calibration .............................................. 6.0

4. 5 Exam1na1ion . . . .. . . . . .. . . . .... . .. . . ... ... ... . . .. . .... . .. . 9 .0 4.6 Reporting . . . . . ... . .. . . .... . . . . . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . 11 .O 4.7 QA Records . . . ... . . . ... .. . . . . .. . .. ... . . . * ... . .... . . . . . . 11.0 5.0 RESPONSIBILJTIES . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . ... . . . . .... . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. 1 2.0

6.0 REFERENCES

........... * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * . ....... . ... ... . . ' . 12.0 7 .o EXHIBITS ....... . .... . . .. . . ... .... . . . . . ... . . .. ... . . .. . . . . . . . 1 3 .o 3.0

Nuclear GPU NUCLEAR Numb.,

ISIMDE MANUAL 5361 *NDE-7209.24 Revision No.

Ultr11sonic bam,nation of R eactor Coolant Pump Flywheels 0 1.0 PURPOSE 1 .1 The purpose of this procedure is to describe the techniques for manual ultrasonic examination of TMl-1 Reactor Coolant r,ump motor assembly flywheels.

2 .0 APPLICABILITY/SCOPE

2. 1 This procedure is applictble to all cenified GPUN tnd contractor persOtlnel assigned bv GPUN to perform manual ultrasonic exam,nation of reactor coolant pump flywheels.

2.2 The requirements of ttus procedure delineate the manual ultrasonic techn1Ques to detect.

locate and dimension indicatioM in the reactor coolant pump motor assembly flywheels in accordance with Reference 6.2 3.0 OfFINITIONS 3.1 None.

4.0 PROCEDURE

4. 1 Personnel Oualrfication and Certification 4.1.1 GPUN personnel performing examinations to this procedure ahalf bt certified in accordance with Reterence 6 .3.

4. 1 .2 Contractor personnel performing examinations to tnis procedure shall be qualified and certified in accordance with the Contractor's written practice which has been approved by GPUN or they may be certified 1n accordance with Reference 6.3.

.1.3 At lust one member of tht: exam.nation crew shall be certified Level II UT inspector or higher.

4.1.4 The examination crew should demonstrate oract,cal proficiency in applying the technical requirements of this standard to a GPUN UT Level Ill.

4 .2 Material/Equipment 4.2.1 Flaw detector 4.2. 1 .1 A pulse echo uttrasonic flaw detection instrument capable of generet.ina irequencies from 1 .0 to 5.0 MHZ shall be utilized. The instrument shall contain a stepped gain control. calibrated in units of 2db or less. and shall be accurate over its useful range to % O % of the nominal amplitude ranio wh,ch will allow comparison of

• indications beyond the viewable e>ortion of the CRT.

4.2.2 Search units 4.2.2.1 Angle beam and straight beam search units shall be single element with a nominal treauency of 2.25 MHZ. Other freQuenc1es mav be 4.0

Bi!]Nuclear GPU NUCLEAR Number ISI/NDE MANUAL-_ 536\-NOE-7209.24. ___

Trtll Revision No.

Ultrasonic Examinwon of Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheels 0 used to overcome variablH caused by material properties and for purposes of evaluation of Indications. Use of other freauencles shell be approved by a GPUN UT Level Ill and recorded on exh1b1t 1.

4.2.2.2 Examinations shall be performed utilizing a 450 beam angle for flywheels 111 and 14 from the top and bottom surfaces respectively.

4.2.3 Angle beam exit po,nt/angle verification 4.2.3.1 Prior to perlormance of examinations the exit point of the search unit wedQe (angle beaml shall be verifiea utilizing a standard IIW block or mini-llW block. This verification shall be performed daily prior to any examinations being performed.

4.2.3.2 Prior to performance of examinations. the actual beam angle shall be determined utilizing a carbon steel IIW block or m1ni*IIW block. This shall be done to verify that the t>eam angle ,s w1th1n the required range of :: ,., of the nominal angle of the search un,t wedge. This verification shall be performed daily prior to any examrnations being performed. The acwal angle and nominal angle of the search unit wedge shall be recorded on Exhibit 1

• 4.2.4 Coaxial cables 4.2.4.1 Coaxial cable assembly shall be of any convenient length n ot to eceed 50 feet.

4.2.5 Couplant 4.2.5.1 Any GPUN approved couplant, such as Ultraget II, which provides intimate contact required tor the transmission of high freQuencv ultrasound shall be acceptable for use. Use of couplant shall be as required by reference 6.8.

4.2.5.2 The minimum amount of c ouplant should be utilized t o prevent damage to the motor windings.

4.2.5.3 Couplant shall be removed from the flywheels after completion of the examinat,ons.

4.2.6 Calibration standard 4.2.6. 1 The pump motor assembly flywheels have calibration holes as shown in E,ch1bits 3 and 4. These holes may be utilized for the 1n1tial calibration if directed by a GPUN UT Level Ill. Flywheel Calibration Standards TMI 370 (Aywheel 11) and TMI 371 (Flywheel #41 s hall be used to establish the sweep range of the instrument and OAC curve. To establish the primarv sensitivity level for examination. the transfer method, which is outlined 1n paragraoh 4.4.3.6. shall be performed when using calibration standards.

5.0

EiEl Nuclear GPU NUCLEAR ISi/NOE MANUAL Number 5361-NOE-7209.24 Trtl1 Revision No.

Ultrasonic E,c11mlnation of Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheels 0 4 .3 Prereauisites 4.3. 1 Surface preparation 4.3. ,., Surfaces to be examined shall be clean and free of foreign material which could interfere with the performance of the ex.mination o r conduction of sound energy into the pan.

- ..

NOTE Precautions shall be taken to prevent loose parts from falling into motor flywheel assemblies wtnever access is gained to the 1=---===-....-==:=====-=====*=*-========--==

flywheels.

4.3.2 Examination recol'ds 4.3.2.1 Baseline and subsequent examination records should be available for review.

4.3.3 Maintenance and Operation Prepal'ation 4.3.3.1 Operation of the flywheel motor lift pumps shall be coordinated with the control room. The motor lift pumps must be energized before the flywheels can be rotated.

4.3.3.2 The oil drip pan should be removed for access to the lower flywheel.

4.4 Calibration

4. 4 .1 Instrument calibration 4.4.1.1 Instrument calibration for screen height, horizontal and amplitude control linearity shall be in accordance with References 6.4.

4.4.1.2 For instruments and search units, maintenance, calibration and performance characteristics shall be as required by reference 6.9.

4.4.2 Svstem calibration 4.4.2.l Calibration shall include the complete uttrasonic examination system Any change in search units. shoes, couplants. cables, ultrasonic instruments. recording devices or any pan of the examination system shall be cause for I ealibr1tion check. The calibration shall be performed on flywheel calibration standards and the transfer method identified in paragraph 4.4.3.6 shall be performed.

4.4.2.2 The maximum reflector response, during ealibratjon, shall be obtained with the sound beam oriented essentially perpendicular to the axis of the calibration reflector. The centerline of the search unit 6.0

-,

Bi!] Nuclear GPU NUCLEAR Number ISi/NOE MANUAL 5361-NDE-7209.]4 Title Revision No.

Ultrasonic Examination of Reactor Coolant Pumr, Flywheels 0 shall be a minin*.1.1m of 3;4- from thr. nearest edoc of the calibration standard. Rotation of th sound beam into' a corner formed by the reflector and the side of the block may produce a higher amplitude signal at a longer be11m path; this beam pat!: tnnll not be used for calibration.

4.4.2.3 The temperature difference between component to be examined and the basic calibration block shall not exceed 25oF.

4.4.2.4 The transfer method ,s described elsewhere in U*i. procedure may be omitted by a GPUN Level Ill if there 1s rP.r1r,011 to Question the reliability of the results or if und,rninable.

4.4.3 450 angle beem calibration 4.4.3.1 Calibration shall be performed on Calibration Standard TMl-370 for flywheel #1 and TMl-371 for flywheel 14. Side drilled holes (SDH) are present 1n e ach flywheel as identified in E,chitlits 3 and 4, however, only the 1 /2T SDHs shall be utilized for the transfer method.

NOTt Calibration m ay be performed directly on the flywheel but only as directed by a GPUN UT Level Ill.

4.4.3.2 To determine the 450 angle beam sweep calibration on flywheel #1, utilize Calibration Standard TMl-370 and pl ace the bonom notch at the 4.2 screen pasition and the tap notch at 8.4. The instrument sweep is now calibrated to represent 1 o* of metal path.

4.4.3.3 On Calibration Standard TMl-370 ior Flywheel #1, *establish a DAC curve bv adjusting the gain to set the bottom notch signal at 80%

% FSH at screen position 4.2. Without changing gain, peak the top notch signal at screen position 8.4 and mark the location on the screen. Plot a OAC curve by connecting the peak signal locauons (marked on the CRT screen) with a straight line and extrapolate through the full examination range. Note the gain sening (db) on Exhibit 1.

4.4.3.4 On Calibration Standard TMl-370. locate the 1 t2T SDH ana establish a signal between 50% and 80% FSH and note the signal height and gain setting (dbl on Exhibit 1 .

4.4.3.5 On flywheel #1, locate the l /2T SDH by scanning adjacent to the edge of the flywheel (i.e. 1 to 3 inches) as the flywheel ,s be1nt:

slowtv rotated or by visually locating the holes between the f1vwheel face and the motor housing or both.

7.0

Eii!) Nuclear GPU NUCLEAR Number ISi/NOE MANUAL 53n 1-f\!OE* 7209 .24 Revision No.

Ultrasonic Examination of Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheels 0 4.4.3.6 The transfer method shall be used to note the differcnc:r. in gain Cdb) between the response received from the 1 /2T signal in the calibretion standard and the 1 /2T signal in the flywheel and add or subtract the difference to the reference levtl es1a1blished by the bottom notch. This level shall be primary reference level and the difference shall be noted on Exhibit 1 .

i;:::,a-ac:::=========---======--==:.:* **- ........ ====lllllil, - .

NOTE Other transfer methods may be utihzed such as the two search unit tEichniQues with the sound opposing eacn other. but only a directed and approved bv GPUN l1T Level Ill.

4.4.3.7 To determine the 450 angle beam sweep calibration on Flywheel #4, utilize Calibration Standard TMl-371 and place the i /2T signal at screen division 3, the 3/4T it 4.5 the bottom notch at 6 and the 1 1 /4T at 7 .5. The instrumP.m S\*,,;;,e,p 1s now calibratcc to reprt1sent 20" of metal p,th.

4.4.3.8 On calibration Standard TMl-371 for t,ywheel 114, etabhsh a DAC curve by adjusting the ga,o to set the 1 /2T signal at 80 % +/- 5 % FSH it 6Creen position 3 and mark its position on the CRT. Maximize the response from the 3/4T and 1 1 f4T SOHs ano m.1rk their positions on the CRT. Note the gain setting (dbl on Exhibit 1 , since this reference level will be utilized for the transfer method on the flywheel. Connect the marks with a straight Cine and extrapolate through the thiekness being examined.

4.4.3.9 Locate the bottom notch signal on Calibration Standard TMl-371 at screen division 6. Increase or decrease the gain to set the peak of this signal to the OAC curve line. Note this gain setting (db) on Exhibit 1.

4.4 .3.10 On flywheel #4, locate the 1 /2T SOH as ,dentrfied in paragraph

4. 4 .3.5 for flywheel #1. With the gain sening and signal height trom the 1 /2T SOH m paragraph 4.4.3.8, utilize tne transfer method as outlined in paragraph 4 .4.3.6 to determine the db difterencc betwHn the 1 /2T SOH in flywheel #4 and the , .'27 SDH respon:.;c on Calibratioo Standard TM1*371.

4.4.3.11 Add or subtract the db difference established in paraoraph 4.4.3.10 to the gain setting established in paragraph 4.4 .3 !. This oain sening shall be primary reference level.

8.0

,,.... 14!1 u' JNuclear GPU NUCLEAR ISi/NOE MANUAL Number 5361*NOE*7209.24 Tf11e Revision No.

lJ!rrasonic Examin11tion of Reactor Coolant Pump Flywhr.et:-* 0 4.4.4 System calibration confirmation 4.4.4.1 The sweep range and primary DAC curve r.hall be checked and verified:

At the beginning of each day of cxnmination.

At least every four (41 hours4.74537e-4 days <br />0.0114 hours <br />6.779101e-5 weeks <br />1.56005e-5 months <br /> during performance of examinations.

If any component of the test system is changed (i.e ..

instrument, transducer, coaxiI cable, etc.).

After any change in peronnr.l.

At the completion of me examination to wt11ch th calibration applies.

It the operator suspects any mnlfunc:1011 of the UT systm.

In the event of a power toss.

4.4.S Calibration changes 4.4.5. 1 If any point on the OAC curve na decreased 20% of its amplitude, all data sheets since the last calibration check shall be marked void.

A new calibration shall be performed and recorded and the voided examination area(s) shall be rxamined.

4.4.5.2 If any point on the OAC curve has increased mor than 20% of its amplitude, recordable indications taken since the last valid calibration or calibration check may be re-examined with the current calibration and their values changed en the data sheets.

4.4.5.3 If any point on the OAC curve has moved on the sweep line more man 10% of the sweep division reading, cormct the sweep range calibration and note the correction on the aopropriate data sheets. If recordable indications are noted on the data sheets, those data sheets shall be voided and a new calibration shall he recorded and the examination areas shall be re*examined.

4.5 Examination procedures 4.5.1 Examination of base material tor laminar tvpe reflectors.

4.5. 1.1 Base material adjacent to the inner bore region on flywheels 111 and 114 and the bolt holes on flywheel #1 shall be scanned with a longitudinal (0 degree} search unit to detect discontinuities which may interfere vmh the transmission of shear waves during angle beam examination. (See Exhibit 7) 9.0

Ei11]Nuclear GPU NUCLEAR Number ISi/NOE MANUAL 5361 *NOE* 7209 .24 Trdc Rr,vision No.

Ultrasonic E)Camination of Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheels 0 NOTE The requirements of paragraph 4.5.1.1 apply only when there is a reason to Question sound penetration such as excusive loss of back reflection or existence o1 abnormal geometric reflccora which dampen.

4.5.2 General reQuirements 4.5.2.1 All angle beam examinations shall be performed at a scanning se,lsitivitv level at 2x ( + 6 dbt greater than ti ,e catcoratcd reference sensitivity level.

4.5.2.2 Scan speeds shall not exceed six (6) ,nches per second. Scan the exposed areas wrthin each access Port prior t o moving the flywheel to the next adjacent area for each system calibration.

4.5.2.3 All angle beam examinations shall be performed ,n two directions (i.e. beam directed essentially clockwise and coumer clockwise around the flywheel bore regions and bolt holes <1:-. dr.picted on ExhibitS 5 and 6).

4.5.2.4 Beam angles other than 450 may be utih2ed as directed and approved by a GPUN UT Level Ill.

4.5.3 450 Angle Beam Exam,nat,on 4.5.3.1 On ftvwheel It, the top surface ,s accessible through access pons i through 3. The area of *nterest for the top flywheel is the inside bore region which includes the kevwav and all accessible areas surrounding the four (41 bott holes (Reference Exhibits 5 .ind 61.

4.5.3.2 On flywheel #4, the bonom surface 1s occessible through one access port. The area ot imerest for the bonom flywheel is the inside bore region which includes the kevwav.

4.5.3.3 For both Flywheels #1 and .t4, the examination reQu1rcments for the in.side bore region and keyway are identified on Exhibit 5. 8chibit 6 delineates the requirements on flywheel # l 1 or examination of the areas surrounding each bott hole.

4.5.3.4 For the inside bore region, Keyway and the areas stJrrounding the bolt holes, scanning shall be performed on a tangential line or on a line perpendteular to the flywheel and bolt hole radii. Tne scan width (wJ shall be as identified in Exhibits 5 and 6. The minimum overlap of the search unit shall be 25% of the search unit width.

The SP.arch unit shall be oscillated a minimum of 1 So in each direction for each parallel path.

10.0

j Number G,uNUCLEAR ISi/NOE MANUAL 5361 *NOE-7209.24 Revision No.

Ultrasonic Examination of Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheels 0

-=---=-=--======-------SCll---.:... -=-

NOTE Due to access restrictions and surface area limitations. the scann,ng distancea and panerns will be a be.st effort activity.

Limitations and restrictions shall be documented on the UT Examination Data Shett, Elthibit 2. or I Umited Examination Sheet.

4.5.3.5 _450 1ngle beam examination ot flywheel!- * ; ,1nJ #3 i& not possible unless the flywheels are disassembled.

4. 5 .4 Evaluation/Interpretation 4.5.4. 1 Indications showing a signal amplitude response equal to or greater than 20% of the reference respanse shall be investigated to determine their origin (geometric or non-geometric). If an indication is determined geometric. it ner.d not be recorded.

4.5.4.2 Evaluation of indicanons shall be made at the reference sensitivitv level and an accordance with the reQuirements cf the Referenc 6.6.

4.5.4.3 Non-geometric indications showing a signal amplitude response equal to or greater than 50% of the reference sensiti\firy level shall be recorded on the data sheet.

4.5.4.4 Each recorded indication shall be identified on the data sheet as to depth. length, signal amplitude and location.

4.5.4.5 In order ro determine depth and length of a flaw, Oaw sizing techniques, as delineated in Reterence 6.7; may be reQuired.

4.5.4.6 Calibration and examination resuits shaU bt! d-,cumcrned on the applicable data sheets Exhibits 1 and 2.

4 .6 Reporting 4.6.1 The distribution of NOE/ISi data shall be pr.rtcr:-:-:ad in accordJncc with Reference 6.5.

4. 7 0A Records 4.7.1 All calibration and examination results shall be recorded on Exhibits 1 and 2. as applicable, and are considered permanent QA Records.

4.7.2 All forms muSt be totally filled out as applicable, then sioned and dated for the day the examination was performed. There shall be no blank. spaces on anv tom, after completion. If there 1s no information a\failabte for a particular soace. the space shall be filled in w,th "N/A*.

11.0

Eli!) Nuclear GPU NUCLEAR ISIINDE MANUAL 5361 *NOE-7209.24 Revision No.

Ultrasonic Examination of Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheels 0 4.7.3 Errors on data forms shall not be covered or eradicated witt, whim-out lliau1d paper). Any error which may occur shall be crossed out with a hne, initialed and .

dated by the person mak,ng the change. All forms sc111 be filled Olr. with black ink.

4.7.4 Record retentin and transmittal shall be ,n accordance witt, ;::, it:e:1ce 6.5.

5.0 BESPONSIBJLmES S. 1 Responsibilities are as defined earlier m this procedure.

6. l ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.Section V, Non-destructive Examination, Article 5, 1986 Edition. No addenda 6.2 TMl-1 Technical Sific.tions Section 4.2.4 6.3 GPUN Procedure 5361-AOM-7230.01. Qualification and Cenification of UDE Exam,nation Personnel 6.4 GPUN Procedure 5361-NDE-7209. 17. Ultrasonic Instrument Linearity 6.S GPUN Procedure 5361-ADM-3272.03, Control and Processing of NOE Oatci 6.6 GPUN Procedure 5361-SPC-7230.26. Evaluation of Recordable Indications

6. 7 GPUN Proced ure 5361 *NDE-7209.10, Uh:rasonic Sizing of Planar Flaws 6.8 TMI Adm1niS1rative Procedure 1104-280. Mixed Low Level Radioactive Waste Control Program 6.9 GPUN Procedure 5361-NOE-7209.18, Calibration and Maintenance of Nonde-sructive Examination *Equipment

6. 10 TMl Administrative Procedure 1068 - Controlled Consumable Materi;ib 12.0

. _ ..... --

Bi!] Nuclear GPU NUCLEAR Number ISIINDE MANUAL 5361*NOE*7209.24 T"cde Revision No.

Ultrasonic Examination of Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheels 0 7 .0 EXHIBITS

7. 1 Exhibtt 1

• UT Calibration Data Sheet (Typical).

7 .2 Exhibit 2 - UT Examination Data Sheet (Typical).

7 .3 Exhibit 3

• Configuration of Flywheel #1.

7 .4 Exhibit 4 - Configuration of Ftywheet #4.

7 .5 Exhibit 5 - Scanning ReQuirements for flywheel 11 and 4 1ns1de bore region and keywav 7.fi Exhibit 6 - Scanning ReQuirements for flywheel #1 bolt hole region

7. 7 Exhibit 7

• StraiOht beam scan requirements tor laminar reflectors 13.0

Eli!] Nuclear GPU NUCLEAR lSI/NDE MANUAL 5361 -NDE-7209.24 Revision No.

Utuuonic Examination of Reactor Coolant Pump Ftywheels 0 EXHl81T 1 UT CALIBRATION DATA SHEET

• TYPICAL*

0il?)Nuclear Calibration Sheet

- ---*=*;,.. ____

c:.-.-anu b....-t:

---

........ -*-;-------------------...!**

,__. i 5"vnature.

I . *

--*---:=Ji.-  ?-*:. -}-:----=-,-::M :.

,SSN* \.e¥11.

=--*

E...--e* s..nacur* lt:

""1nlffllM ....... - . F9" .-*-OAc___...,.....__ S-- UNI C-.

I .......... ......,---;::.-+--.'-+*-.*-+-'

__,,

. J T "" ---- l.e'IOltl - -

=Off On_-= l :- .

10 N1,1m * - -

.... .......

_ .:-'.° l (Mill,

___:.

1  :.._-+*--- / ;--+-1l--+--...-*,, ---' No ... Int*. Ctor, --- __

1 C C 3 fl

:::1:::1:1:1:1::::

_

I IIMctl I

.. iI.:1.

• 1 .. .

. ---l

'f'

• .

- I , .. - T Thaou SM: CalO...

=

1c.1---

'°'

L---

n-*Y I I ic.,s........

.,':JA.s.iO._

VOltagll . . r.111 111,lllfillll llf1 llllll1111 lt11l 1*11 ,HII;

• -

OOH 00n_..

• 1 2 ., *** 1 ** "

5-C:.aat

---

1 n...

1 So*- Sdt. _. C"J Cin:. 0.......

---1 tone Haun ...,.

-1' Ranee G 0 RF Adeca,r Amollldl

s......o.-

Dt&av QM,ittt+I 0 Kalt 1-1

,. ot r.iH 5/S cs 0 EJIJI ,._,,

T.... 'F ' ::J An9f,II * /. 2

\lelocff) D FIIIWI 2 3 * .....------+-----.----......i Scrff" Diep$ *--* I I

D oa- ----- .._-----+---------' ._. Unit I.I).'------------

I 1¥119-------- Sen-1111.... Mtf2 lvt(/Je MON -

i

....

__________________

.......... :

.....___ ____ __"'.:----------

...._

I

_._

1adWlitcal

!! A* PY------------

u,,.., c,.

• E1-1

,...,..,,_k 1 J.1j Ji> I* I-**** * , __. .._ _. , _

8i!)Nuclear GPU NUCLEAR ISIINDE MANUAL 5361*NOE-7209.24 Rovtsion No.

Ultrason,c Examination of Reactor Coolant P1Jmp F1vwt,eets 0 EXHIBIT 2 UT EXAMINATION CATA SHEET

• TYPICAL-P991_ol_

I

m.a., Data 5'INC No.

T... Oelc:npeon* Tlllt!No.:

Cotl9. o..c:.: I eoo.-sc,.c..

- No.m.w ..

T* Slll'facllt.

PMt ' '° j lMIII:

Ezruo* 15'palure: 10 llMIII:

S-*** DwecUon: 0 CA.11111 l...-.d Sce,i: CY* ONo Cit SIINt Cell S.... I C-11 :

W.td Joa,t Weld ProMe I AfWlir. Mgle: Angle:

t: -

-Tlffle - ---- -.- - -------+-------....... ---1

---

i Weld __ w.cs S&at: ...,., r

.... scan  :

_ Wielltl : _ __ Hra. T"lffle

- ---

Slatl:

---

.....----------.,..----,-----4--------*----*---*+----

---

"Fw -=- T'""--Slol,: --.-----+-rwne-Sft>o: - --.---..,, -:

-.+l-,...,.--54CID

..._

I T wo I I lJ>' Suttaol One TeMO,... F j 1'e,np.; F fMII).: F WO: 1M He. Wad a. Hu. Ml 0-.: DIie: Dair.

1 * ..... ....

."'

A TS 8 D M'-

I w L Fo-dlld lladlw*4 &tdl. Enill. RIA f'D

, * , I*

IO n

• u W I & ---------................. c Two ---....... Two--+-.... ' cw_...,.....,...*c,...2c * * *, 1 *

..,."'....c,...

I ......

wPll s , o 'r: I D c w D w D

• *

• II g

ffl C ft ffl

"' WC WC WC akl AP N

• I

(

A C p w p p W WI e * *

' 0 p "

I

"

I

"

I n e , n

• Dill fll"lll:#I

...... ----------

I,:

0.:

CISI OPSI CAecm.Mtla ONoAeuoiMI ONcww*,.,.

NDEI:

E2*1

[.*. -1 ::.:-1 'l_ld 11'11  ! II"' t;.l.1 ,-,-,_,.IC.*.,;, .-

EiiI!] Nuclear GPU NUCLEAR Number ISIINDE MANUAL 5361 *NC>E* 7209.24 Revision No.

Ultrasonic Examination of Reactor Cool*nt Pump Flvwheels 0

..

EXHIBIT 3 CONFIGURATION OF FLVWHEEL 11

-h..A

• • ..............

.

\

' *.

.1::\

\

• \

I I I i

' I I

,, .....

..... ..,..... _. ...... ....... """' .....

• I *-- ..... ,,-....

,,.. c- ..... .., ..

---...2

---

.--:&2--_.----r.;-:

-,-y---- -* *r. -----

.,_.DIA ......

p ...

I 1

---

E3*1

'l *

• i ,,....

BiEl Nuclear GPU NUCLEAR Number ISi/NOE MANUAL 5361-NOE-7209.24 Revi:lion No.

Ultrasonic Examination of Raae1or Coolant Pump Flywheels 0 EXHIBIT 4 CONFIGURATION OF R,,YWHEEL 14 I

.... *. '

...

1t'

I

-*

-** I I/

• 1

,I'

..*,....., Vr.;..,.

---

___, ___ ._..,1,_____

\l- -----

_____

\

.........

U' ***,,

• .;j-

'*

\ \.\  ;'

I

\ -.;.:,.... *-

/ /,

,... '

\ '

I

.

\

.nr...,u-_.

,-.- .....

_____.. ...._ _ __,,,

...._

FLYWHEEL #4

.......

,., .... _

• E4*1

BiEl Nuclear GPU NUCLEAR Numb*r ISIINDE MANUAL 5361 *NDE- 7209 .24 Thi* Rovi,ion No, Ultrasonic Examination of Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheels 0 EXHl8rt 5 SCANNING REQUIREMENTS FOR F\.YWMEEL ,, ANO 14 INSIDE BORE REGION ANO KEYWA Y S,olr.*

(l o! I l forevar,/laclr.vard Scaa Sc** D1*c*n* wi,ch(V)

C:) Fl1"b.. 1 ll J.,"(1/Z'f) co 1"(!\ill 'V') 1 .,

2> Fl,wt... l .. 0.. (Surface> to 8.1."(l/lV) 1" JtO* CV 6, CCV ES*l

CEC :t*. l .: .:.::i ., *I 11 il J. Ir- t:.l 1_1 r-*-*.*C.*-, :.* . ...... -

EIE N1.clear GPU NUCLEAR Numbet 1$1/NDE MANUAL 5:'.>51*NDE*7209.24 Ti1'e Revision No.

Uttrason, Exam,nat,on ot Reactor Coolant Pump Ftvwheels 0 EXHIBIT 6 SC/'NN!NG REQUIREMENTS FOR FLYWHEEL 1'1 BOLT HOLE REGION

--

Sect1oc A*A 7

s. t:.

(2) s.a.

1. (1)

T

!....-* *

"'

T Forevard/lackv& Sun Scae Sol: !to le Scar: :li.stanc* la"rltll<U) :ltnctiol'I

} 3.5" 41.a. ). S(1*ii.*> ti) 7"(F11U . ". ) \ . l')O ,:.* " cc-.:

-.

'

' ' l.H" di.a. ).5"(!/;:\') to 7"(hll *v* > ,., Jf,t\O C\; (a cc-.:

E6*1

L , ** r , - *' - * -

0i!J Nuclear GPU NUCLEAR Number ISi/NOE MANUAL 5361 *NOE* 7209 .24 Tfde Revision No.

Ultrasonic Examination of Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheels 0 EXHIBIT 7 STRAIGHT BEAM SCAN,,BEOUIBEMENTS FOR LAMINAR REFLECTORS St raight Beam for Laminar Reflectors (aJI procedure reQu1rement6 apply el(cept when 1uperseded bv this ex hibit).

1 .1 Calibrate the screen range on the calibrat,on standard or other similar metal unc1ard.

1 .2 Select a airect rea1.. screen range which will produce a back reflection of greater than 40%

but less than 100% full screen swnp from the maximum anticip ated exam1nat,on thickness.

i .3 Couple the search unit to the calibration standard and calibrate the screen r anQe by use of the sweep and delay controls.

, .4 Couple the ear::;h unit to the pan being em1ned and adjust the ,nitial back reflection to 80% FSH Ad1ustment of the gain control is permmed during examination in order to maintain tt .e back reflection response.

2.0 RECORDING

2. 1 Record all areas giving 1nd1cations equal to or greater than the remaining back reflection.

2.2 Recording of straight beam laminar tvi:>e reflectors requires recording the locations of all four sides of a rectangle which would contain the ind1catJon extr emities at the required recording level.

2-3 Record all lam,na, indications which produce a reaponse equal to or greater than the remaining back reflection. These dimensions and locations will be used to determ,ne areas of interference wrth the ang beam exam,nation.

2.4 Record all laminar indications where a continuous loH C'f back reflection exits along .ch a continuous indication 1n the same plane. These dimensions and locations wil: be used to determine acceptability of the component tor cominued service.

3.0 SCAN SENSITIVITY 3 1 Ad1ustment to the scan sensrtlVtty may be necessary and shall be considered when recordable laminar reflectors are noted in order to maintain an acceptable back reflection.

E7-1 TCITHL F'. 22

APPENDIX D SAMPLE FLYWHEEL MATERIAL TEST CERTIFICATES m*\33S6w.wpf1b-l I I l96 D-1

.

..

--

IDMJIITIUCTIYI TIST llflOIT IUAUTY CCINHOI.

,.,, n:15z*"L

---

..TSPI IN ......,. ILE: IMO" OR01!9'.a0"'-'i.-al.:...;-.::1-------

ZYGLO

• __.., MAGNAFLUI s ;..

.

c.c.: H,.., :a l c. y,.*w::i n ..ts. "-;;_=*

c.c. : __.M.,...__:,"...;;..__. .;:.t...:::;._' ..... "'-------

c.c.: Mt: G,c\ a.an c.c.=-----------------

.: ,o f'J ., ... °'

PIHICNAI* 0 ... 110. ,u,.,.L.tr.11

c. ,, ..n..

HCTION Oi.AWING NO, MIAT NO.

L,' ,< e*,"' s

, *OtNG NO.

J

,of\16* 4410 l'..'i.,... , 2.. ,1 l

==D=A MO=. =======!'=,1== ..1

---

* ---- f

!lc:a

---

------- -------

• cQ.=/!===).

.. .

o-*=\=

/=-=7="l=-=

.,.

.

.. \

I ., . . . ------ -----------*-----*

..

---

*---.._....._.__..

.. . .. ..

• lUKENS STEEL COMPANY NON-D(STIUCIIVE TESTING IEPOlf INSPECTION - - -* -

DEPARTMENT

• .* -, n,c,*ott ,;6*. *--* - * * *1 *,v;. ,n,

.I,I .

I

.. *.:J**

ssn iiI

• .i..-s7JJ.ri-l --****- *M **

--Tlf...A-5'69!.

• CUUOMII NO

. 8.. Q. l., t:U&dii l ..lll" IC.ui,a.,,(Nt USlt' AU. J. -. JIPf&yC. Ii-= t

c * *. l1N,N-- *1'N-* .. - - --1 llilMtl lht 71 1-J./J; LI. 2.25 A.is,

,-,i-*-- '.

COVf\ANf SUP

• WATD

..s,ac INC, l ... l 2. 2;, .ala- 1 ANll'(U(,I

-aw,.,

. . - . *-- ' --- " A6 i'

, rut;sw:,

• c;.1,c, ,, , I TY'I o, suana t , .... ,, u ""(""::>>t'l-...ut! 100 I S.t> .

. - .. . ... - A:ar---...l.-----tJdtl ............ :.-0-----t m

. .. . ..

II \, ;C.,\ N&A.I( & ,\JA,.,tOt,i 1:t Ol, l

/.*(.

2 tI MiS >al/ 1/ ..... - .. 4

-- ... -- - .. -* --- --c44,6-2A

/

---* -* ----- - ..._It......___1--

6!.L . . .

• ,.. nMUf., .,<J" allfU &SL&I

-- ---*

. -*- .L--.. I

- -- --*- -

---

.

• • . ---,I

• - ------ --H*-

. .

- *-- I  ! I I

---

-- *- *---* -**-- -------...---------------......

1 i

---

+-*- I

- - _...__........ - ----

,.__ --- --+- ---.-----------*-- ..... --**- *- -*-

I

. t .. --r--** ---*

'

'

I

;.

--* ---*-_,.p __ ---t""-** - - -- --y-----* ....

- -- .. --;I  :

I I I

• I

---

I I i

- ... _ - -----+-

. t *---* - -

-

--

I

..

I

.

I* I

• - **t l

, I

' -*-* -- ; -*** --,----- -f ----4-- -

l

_____._______.....___.

I

• - - --

I

. I C r *

• -* . -. . . . ---.-- ... ;. .......

i :I I w

v->

r I

-

a.,o., re, f*tl

• -* ... --* -- . ._. __ -* . . J.. ***- ."",_

L -* _.____.....__-..L.___,

....

.

• r* o..* ,.,..

• *-1* ldlt'* : .... : '"' IS(Ollli(f .,.,

...... ,.o.-u.:-t . _) ,.

BPIC. [----

(* .:.,,(,.tll(f.

"

. . .. -

. .

• '

---

' --**---- -

t

., _______ ..:__.._...:_ .....

/ l; LUKENS STIii. COMPANY CO&lllftll. 1'111 OAft. J.a*3l*n N

.

H08"7-G7.J..

..

• we1IJD1b<<Na* DIIO. Col>>* nst a1nF1CATE c.

J 1M ,... tept.

• • a.** 11epp MIUOIOU NO. cuswo-u,o .S. ** 1144, rvA ,

,. 1.ftlll1*rp, ,a. 15111 '7808-1 10-ff1""°' -371

/11,.,.. 11 ti* . BI /J JS-.;J - .Z ar.

• Claaa 1 .,.. '7 lalaa Grder O.Z.

• N(l.*.oe:r,..."" ,*

C-I , I s  ! Cu I St '

C H I M I C A L A N A L Y-S I S

., r,

-1 M.. I N,

• I Ct J,*

• 20 11.32 I 010 1 020 I I 21/ i ,1 ;.-' a.- v.1.,. 11ee1

I **

....-p

• ,.

SU.I HO

'tlflO r\l Jta I "..._...

...

...

• >oc-I ..

°' IA ...

PHYSICAL PIOPIITIIS DfS(IIPTION I I I 28 11' If 67 I 71 1-5* 8-lA JD

"

I I ff I

& 65*1/2 CID 179

.&

27 I'>,.

11,: I I 179* L 81 11' I 19 I I \c:*

I I I I I 0/

I I 1 - 1ftf!ll C'

/

be

...,.. uao I

• • • rbiu I

'llaabUI '° I I

..., , lla1i 1 11r c*

vJ.*

• I w;

' .. I I

I I

G" :*

I I . ,*

\¥e het.a,.; the fiaurn are coned

• contoi..t in the recGrch of et:. COIIIOOff'I.

.-..*,1,

"*

\

i "":.,.....* ,--...,

...

....,.

.\

11,oir.. .* ;

• . *

.. i LUKENS STEEL COMPANY NON-DESJIUCTIY,. TESTING INSPECTION DEPARTMENT CUSIOMII . - MILL OIDU HO. IYPl JUI OAII I,,,.

r, 1 1'1J!>. Alt_. _flOC. S-CUSJOMll HO. IQUf'MINI USID i> .n .t 1Q..I V-"40

• S1-i1.q l1l ?I f 31 CONIIGN&D 10 SlAICNUNll .wl\JNOI COUMNf 1-1/a DL\ e 2e ,S I'll& tGAP t Ml Tat S,ACINO AMPIIAGI lllffllQO JIANSDUCII SfE,UJ G*D Ill. 10C:j Sll JWIO, ..AQ 1"\11 o, PIODS ,.,

INSIICTOIS *WAL* SID WlfNISSID I 2JNI: 61/2 OD I t-1,,. IA> I ...

.. Ll&IIH X 5 IIMK I

c,119-3 rt. 1 t

,-- ... ,

\

• I I I I I I . I I t

, 1 I I I I I I I I I I I

,..

,, **,*I I ' -

t'. I I I .I I I I I I I I I\ I I I I I I I I

- I ;

• - I

,r.

-;**

i.r.

I .I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I

- I ....., (llfft nw M .IS COIIICJ TO,....s, l

- .r, ,. ,, . '

-* . .,,,.... . . *: ... ...... . *-**- .. *- .. - -..--** **-* ,. -* *-

• • -.

• • -:-**-- .:.;:.;:

. ,,

'*.

.., . * - . -

. .,,;...

,.

.. .

1. *

.

. . I., ***

. .....

,

... ..

.:

.. . *':,

.

,It I

• • • ITIUCffll CGNfllOL TIST RIPOIT ii,aa?.T

• 111 I I II ,_ *** ILK: .. OM>>R'9 81 P352 ll.J, ,-. * *

-:

...*: TDT1 UL'TIIAIONIC ZYCLO IIACNAFLUI NANDNIII

• ,* t *, M fU a<<: k¥ ,t\ HE *t > s p, ...**

r-c.c.s

. *{

C.Cd

-**:.* -

-: *. *cC:.* NC, *c.,...l ,.o a c.c.s _________________

...:*t!.r*

hKNAH ......*110. 1Ufi,ii1.tCII

1'

• t.t:*-'* .,,.,.,,,.,., o

{;*ION.,.,.,,.

J.;:i

• M alllAL

. . L uet\S IMC-t.. '$S"D i)8';-

..:.' .,

...:.:

_

+J. yw1tee,

r J

'..f:::

• I A sS'-f, t ;_._,

.T ,1 J..c. '"'"k. *1 9.!ia1§:_d1a. h.rc. ... ,.J ., J.... luc. *t

,

I - IMIS .

.**. ,

• I t DANO.

.....__...la_..._____________________________.___________

12i*.12t2 ----- - E ii'ii

• ---2

---

c

. ::"'

........ *-** .... . *-.:--i;

. *..*;,:,,..*,...* *. \.. ...

12..-.*-. .=.1...:};

. ..

l....*\,.;*:µ WKEHSstaC0:.1PA."ff

..;=.:.....

. ..- ..

. ,

.'

. * ....

co*aa*

.

CIMlffllUC. M. 1tn1 s... u J4 ,

(..

, . lrc:-t1nc,tM,uao a.a. Corp.

r ,,..,*.,.

.:*. :- *:;.

TEST c:ar.RCATE

• 1;. * .e:. a. ** *atea

• MIil OIOI NO.

10-.,.._.,-71

.0.

122371

...

• DP .,*.;. /4. ,,,a.-,, , * * . . .:

.. ... } 4:

i- / f 1 .;l. **1***:,, .

... ""- ar.,B C1aaa 1 l,l by Sales C:-du T>I>

-*-

• • .. :a* '! .

. * .;t I. - '-

• ..rl* A* L* -

. .,...- i. -- I C .H E*- t.\ a, §- ......A_ l.--I A

- -*

- .. -

- ----I , s I. .. I. .. _ Pfl=CC

-* - QI t:'...t

"'

S I I I I - *-

Mllf;z:- I MN I -I Ce, I St - 5!

Nt I -* I .._ f I f - I I I .).ti

., 5 .,_

• 7.

C m n 4' >

21 li. l010 "'I I. I 21

• • I *,'!.

'

c.20 53 I I 54 .o. V.%.Jt. l tael.

'.* ..

• iMILINO' MM NO,

...*-.. .......*-"" . "

"' 2

• PHYSICAL. PIOP!ITIIS

• I.A. ... *-c:h +10

• 01 SCIIPTION

• li362 1&. 25-' 12i I.. ill5 .; 35/ iI "-5 8

z 8-lA m: 65* CD ....

-:;,

1£'1I1 L 301I 3' ' : Jl5

!;:-

1 / *.:,

28 I I

• c-I I

. .z I I

I I

oolr

• ild.n. a:..."111: ta

m. p,r. --.

C  ::at:J je:ited to

'° u*.nr

,co*:,** tbcn a1r coled

' 7co*;., tid l.12p0*i* JJ..

1

'DC!": !neh

• • , b014 1

C

. \I,)

c*,-. teatL .'. ** cvad 1' he:i 1ng o 11.J>*p** ol4 ,.....

vJ.

• ,

I ,. =-

i9 60o*i',

f..*.:*. .

• ,

• • .

I I

I.

I

,

.' .

• ,... ,., . ,,. : ' .

. ** J1* .

..

• LUKENS STEEL COMPANY

. . .

• . .

ctlY . TIShNG ... on

. ' .. .

.::j /

'

NON-Dlfl

. , INSPECTION DEPARTMENT

.*,. * *. ' liii... t:*. *:! ..

---

* - -. .- . WU --- - ..

- . - . ** . ' . ;;; * .

-- --

• • ,'.,

.

.r,,_.- -.. Pl/I

.

• • *ac.-,..'IA C"JllliltI

---

I 'l-t"9,. *

.*

. . .

• *

• l&ll'rlr .. * .. .

ASTA ,-.sJ-£91 ,a. a a... 1 con CJgt 1,1!!-1.. 1,.-:-.1 -r-o CUlfq,.11 NO.

• IQUIIMIN1 USID

,.0 *. 10-PY-17'171 . SNM'I lll1 715, :1 ... .

MioNii'ifrQOl ----------,-iillfiMCO NiiN1--:-:---:-:*--:--1hAM11iwi.iu1UD1l iiiS -............c:........._ICCiili:;a------1 ***.. i

-Y'! ?'t:..

UNll.

• \

• S,ACINO 2 ......UGI

• MlftlCO Ql f: VAtR

.

• .

. - - * -.. . - - . *.

• IUNSDUCIC SfUJl.r G* llf.

100* $1 l't'fl 0, --- **

OIi NODS

.

yy,a - A.l!I - .. -- ..

- -

...SIICIOIS N.-1 &QUA&. SIZI

• -7.(.{..,;c.. If' 4 11.d< & -11:J. a11 r *-, /, 1'h Jf r.

• WITNISSID ft'/ *'

• MILi &SLM MAllt

• i .'

.

• c,,,2.. u

• xr:. 1 * ;

. . .. . r. -- :.

'*t *r* O

. 1

• I *

-..---+--..---t* *.

'l

• • .-

• I

* *l,.

I

.* 1.' <

. . **,*.. .

. .

--+---t---+---,t----t---o!---t----t--+--....

. .

CL. * **

, *

• r,l: I

..,._....__J-_.....__..__ ....__

.

..

.* .:

'

.. . . ..

,*

.

.. . . . ... . I. .

. .

. .

.. '

• I

. ..

• *. ...

-

.*

.

• I

.* . . ,. . C,

.._;:;__._ ____.___....___________.___________.__....._____.____.___......___.__.a..__.a.__...__...,,! . -

0,MY----* .....---*-* --*-*

., "

fii*"!*

-* r. *-

,. ,.:...

c- ...

.:.::.'-* '1.. v, . -* t*. /

. * \. . --. . . .. - .. -:- . *.* r

.-

(\ ..... *....,.. ..

• *

• cul,!\L"C't c i: ... -..."':- ,-: . .: * ,. : -:; :f.;

1

LUl{;NS s:rti;L cor.Ar.µ .

. .r.7_.: -.. .- :. .. -

. .* . . . ...

• 11.1i..;a- .. - .

• ,. *k'c!. t.1nRbt,use Uec. Corp. coaww,a,c. ..

TEST anTirlCATE lfl2I '. :

z

. *.

co *-* . ..

LU fur. Dept.

r ,,.. . ... , : 1-*.

• U* ,., ,*

I -----

Mr. c. E. Stepp I'- -.L OIIWI NO.-J-C,: iij CU5T*>WI t.O. -.,.

.-* .

E. 1'1ttEburgh. Pa. 15112 5710'1-l

"

10*PV- 7l70  : 15

,.,_

.

- DB -*nt, /A.

• 1

'*J°,

• . . . {'

.JI J to-------------------------

UllC,fft. * .

/1

. ....

-. A-533-f9A Gr. B CL 1 .od. by sale* Order *, ....,,.. 1iftll

_,11,1 ':_ * ....

. , . '

':'/:

I ca K ..,,\:., - m"u-- --=........,.,,.

CHEM !£.AL AN ALYSIS--, ----.,-,-..-:,..,=1---APvi GODO I w erA.Sw.w.:.ac

_ *---

iCeir:nie ,._ -

.!!ll..L'Q:_ 1 c;  ! s c.. {;-  ;;.- 5;MO

.,,

1

"'

MIi * ,

. .,,,,

22 f 1.30 'J'J7 !

.

• 57 ;

r.o.,.

.'

Cl5 22 53

• Stiel Electrlc 1*

• I I

! i *

.  :  : i ; t i I I t - . l : *j ---.; ____j_____! ... --*--

• --*--------

I PliYSICAl PIOtEITIES I -------'---*

i  ! -------.__.__.__ .I ..

• r--* .:.*,..._. r- *-ir: *--,-----=.-**..b*----,------1

'. ___:__;_**:>_ *7" .!:.f, : * -- 2.-lltt., -* !."-Jlgtb +f-"E* I

• • *Ml,tN')

DISC 11

• t Io N rt:*

f 17 I 'J' 1 52 J :4 * ! :ia*, I

.

/; '7'*::{L ...s1' f.. , ?!?

.., l ,#.

.... , * ,

• lo7 .

. *""" , J , .

2-B* x 8-1/11 I!> x 75-1/2 OD

,  ?;: lit ;6 I P.3

• 192 .1 I I I p

• J...

1 rL 1,:, 96 25 *i 192 , L 1 1 '6 I

• I 7'l I I

1,

" '

I 20 i:, G:J er.£ l: 2 1s1I I

..r 3S , ! . -t 45 1-I I 2- *

, ,u;c,5t* ')5 *i c 183 I I i  :< 7341* 9 . 24 , 187 I I*

I tL 115, '.11151 \' 192 I L 92 ; E . : 11)2 .

2111it and Lsts eated 165)-17) to J:,*r * .,rthen te:!,pcrpd t.1,:*p., helb

,

L, helb l t. per*tnch kin. aPd water q enched l h

• pertcch mln. anti air CCNl d.

. . ,,

,.. , .@ I I

I

' I

! 1cr

'

Rine! a.r.d E!::tt: stressrel1e;,e,j byJ heati to 11oo*r., he!Ld I

I I

.

I

. t t:1n. and .fuI"nae:' i: :.cle to (P. ' '. I W hertlr/ cerrify ft, bo,e -&II conta,necl the R(O!- I* *.. , * . .., .. --g-* _?_.,_-_. _____

.

....'

.,

.

..* .

....:...*.i ., "":"

',,I*

t .

.. .---

. . '*(

• I *, ; -:

..

....,

• I

.. ..,.7:'.,..,. . ., '

. -:: - *

...

'. L--_. - ..

L.-- - - --+---+---t---,_;,.

..

- -- ..... . - .

-

.

.,. .

• • • .

Ii f

• I II . . ...

I ... *:,;

..

.. .

,,.**

.

.

1,*

• .w.,. *

.:.*,

.. . *

....". .

. .*

., t. *

. .

..... *

,., .

.*. . :,  :.*;..,.....

. ..

... .

...

.*.,

• .:;.

,

'* .*

. ""

., ...

'. . .

;.i. * .*.

.

,*

..**e..,* ,*

I

• .* I . I

' . **

.* ** * **** ,.

, :*: *r:T .*-.* *

. j **  :.- **

,, .t.. . ,., . . .

• • -* *t.;!.*.**:** . ) .**"'

.\

- ..... * . .

..** ** * '. * * ...

• lf..: .....

.

-'.

• • !!: .., , i j .... .*,-.;.*,*

.. >'.:'

t: i-* .. .'. *

',.... ......*J. t..

• i: lli

• a;::.°'JI* ,,.;.4:-t ./'" .*,:,,

• .

• r1,.

t:"\,  :}* .*t.

...:,,* ' **

J ... - .... t . *...,,** .*** **

• 1* , .. *

-.i

' ,., ..

A* .......

. *

.lit **

• It*.,

-' o<<,r,. " ,f ,.*** . , .,,I

,":1,111!. *.

• *. I " t * .... *

'

.*

. *

• a 11.'* ***,

<<;, ..... . .**.t l, . *.  :..a.:

. ..,. .I

1. . * .

. . . .. !

-.

..... , ....

• .

. .

.

e *,

' .

IDl-lftUCTIYI TIST IIPOIT 8I .as z ... et

. ; GUAUff CIINTIIOL

!,:--** I JUN,WNI* PIL*: ..OP 011Da11 ENETl;;i) '*'

' ..**. "* ...*J*' .

IIAGMAFWI NAIDNIIS c.c.:_M ( -z, , 4 S /'.

• • .

• If

• • , 11 M::Z r:: , -- -

• r-.. *

. . ... */.*j

.,*.. /

• .-.:

1 s *, , , ,ftrrff , s r: -, c.c.*----------------------------- I

• *..-::,Iii MPPLtall

• 1.., vKlu.S Jlllf*l-l*;So7)8S ,,;,z UC\'IOII

.:tA

'

. t:.f_./4 P.G.a. .. '

.

. i.

• i '

A-r-*H** ....

-i-,-*:f-:1 .,.' *

.

• w c: ..

......

._.

• .::--*:* ........ ,_. *...- ..... .:...-'!.. ..... .. :..*** ...... ..

• ,, **.* "!.. '*: -;-s, ... . ,.:*:.1, , ..,...... . *-- _.'--- ;- **,.

.* .* *

. lllltib.C"f.::.u \!i :* * *

• 1v-*1. .: .*

.# "** *

• !'..;:* . ** -: **

• - w:cs.:s s:raa:*co:.?:Jft * * * *: * *.* .* .. i*:1i1i*:* -- *:..:OS5e10

=

f ,yu. ..... *

• MIia. ,: .* ... * . * . * .. * - , - ... ** ... - ** ..,. **

t :! **. *lfes t1nsbouse nee. Corp.

a.: COA'IIIYal& N. WIii  ;.;

TEST QRTIFICAfl * * :* * : * **

.$... u ' '.,. 7... . VA: . -* . . . ..

CONIIOr.

L. ' LRA fur. Dept ... MIil OIOII NO. * **

.* Mr. o. E. Stepp a,sro, II ,.o. * .

E. P1tti:burgh. Pae 15112 57101-1

10-n..JJ7470

. 5 . ..

1 _. a **.;.*"

. . ..

.,,11. . ' ..

r i_-- -_:..J________JL-- 7

. .

.

- *. ...1..:*---:-. ..::-

-"11* i < :;, >: .. ...

.:

• • 73 * ..

-

SIICJflCATIOt6..

• **

A-53-69A or. B CL l )'.od. by salea* Order 1

.

f.4.

g.___oJ!

/

-

no.""'C'Cl'-1: ... 'h! -

1*

__MtltWO.--p , i (11 CHEMICAL ....

lflll ANALYSIS C* .-MO I V 22 / I 1.30'

./ ./

-;* 4'i6

,/ I IV.I * .-.

1

'l'l7 015 22 Electrl1 If' . ,

57 :

5

..

I I . ...

• • .

.. it

• ...

• 1 3* I

.

. ,,

....?

..!:. -:._

• !).. :',;,.*..:."'..... . :*,.... I .. -*.:. . . ': . :I 1* . i'

• I .

.L,;f;?  !

• i * . ,* .

. 1

,, *

. . *' ..

) **)

..1-----------_,__....,______

• , ...,A ** *,,;.

-**- *-J-----* -- ---

• \*  ; ;.*J'I-

• . ....

.

!' ...._- '

......___

• '

• I ..

,:::.-l.!--2...:_ffl...t* f.!!. L' . V-Xot,ch....

"',..c.T--*-,

PHYSICAL PROPERTIES

--- J -' ! . * --,JA;h-* ---=,

KAI

. ---,---------

,

--.....;.

DIS.CI IP TIO N * * .' ,.

SJI .

I ;t}!)*!*

• I '

i f

i

I  :

=-

17 ". !; .1 1 17 s ..

A  :._: c g; '1  : 52 I 4 I I* 2-8* X 8-1/h I!> X 7-5*1/2 I I L 6 r Ol

• 1 le7 I I  ;

!-'X !4! 96., I ?.3 . ' 192 .

t>L 7')f ( 9::6 1 /! 25 192 L I 1'6 ./ Ii 70 ,* I 7'l  ! .

"  :

' 2-a , -c.; cr.f. : 2 I' 191

' I I c

• a T I :8 *; !3 . 1 I I

.r:s 1

2- *

-,r* '-.. -'

EL 115i ;5 * ,

r. ""..

c:< 73rt, t;::tJ i ?.Lt

• 101 ,

I 'J. ,.I°:'-,_:)* ,;l .1? ,. ,...

,l,I . -J J 192 I

a I

I t

92

• 9 I

'I 102 in J et  :

tctcd,l'l-71 i, * '"ii, hcl l h*.

I er' !nch

!

in.

I

&hd water o enched l

c d.

--.

• • 1, ::.. ,:;J l,.,i then e:,per,J !l;:7."F., hl: helr 1

• pcrl.nch :.r.. anjl air

• .*.: *'iliJI  ;{;. )  :. I= 1.' -=-

i r-c.,

1

• i i

'. .. !-incf ::rd pet i  !  !

tretsl 1*elie'l'L by heaifli t.

; 11oo*r., ?u

}, d l h I

'

I

• per 1nc

*... ,.. _r. *":"".: !urn:ice', i: :>cltl to !O-'l *. t * *

• *-* ' I

• I

• fi; '4

,.

....

t fi

.,

fl'

.**' ..

':

• ,

... ..

!

... -:

fr; * ..**

• - -*..-*. *-*' ..*-"= -* .* -., **. I

,. ... '

..'*l)

.. ....

, . .t(;

• ,

'* .

. -.,.,_

• • ...

..

.

1:;r-.*.1-:---41---1---+---+---t u,:.......

..

• "

a Ia C' / **;*'."*

....,. .. .

... I! 'I; ,..... ',,**.

<,.

'

• • • 'it *

..

. '

. , .*

...

,; i .*...

,*

.*' .. .....

.

M . , ... .,. t----tt-----*---4----+---+----1----1----1

\**: :,,..*t*.:': :.*.

• .

. ...;

..

'

... -

I&: i: . .,.

g ' '. ** ::::-*..

"

.,

,_

I

..: . . . ( .

......

• .,

t--11--.-.---+-_..--1---1--""---I t; wa it\;'

! ...

"'

( _;-.

• _j

.**::

t---t----1----+---+---.J..---1---.a..JI----I.. os*.-':'i: ,-!

.*"\"*

t----+---1----+---1----1------"---I i *;.:t

.*_... ': .... .

. ...

".. .. ..,. *

-.

)*.

l

• ....

...'.'}

'**=-*

.. *

1. ..!,

.---.. ..r.:,

_:

• . .,_.,......*

u :.a

..... r,*;.}ii*

It -

,... .*....:. --+----+---.. Ii * . .v.

'* lt *!.:-.:::*:

.*r..

.

,*

.* * * * .-i.*.... .

. ..'

• I.*

! I -:f.

.. iv* . *

.....

1i'Is :_:).:t,*

,.

.. { .::,*. .*-',;:.. J.. .

_.

, I. .

.. *...:.* _

....

...  !;

i?

,* t

• .... ..

- *_*:1 _; i. _:*t;-

• _;* -::*- :*__,-- _ i_-:._ _: - ::....-*: *_: *_*:::_*_*_*_*_*:;*:_*_*_*_*::.....* ::::

• *

....----...a.--"--'---....1---1

• ..... .

..... ,*.-. ** *: :'"-tC.7'£41".;:TI!:{l***

... . r.*;;,*.*

• -- ...... .

1. . --;:-...: ./,'..

• . -. **/.,*.. *. .-4 , : '!><...*-;*...-.*",.*-*

,:

.:.'* ::. - -

. * :-...r*

.*. i r.* . . ._ ..,

-

.,.,, .....

-..... . . ..::. .*.*! .... -* .. *"* ..

i .- -:;; .,

. ,.

• -.-

..... .

--*---..*t;... . i.,*..*,.' ::- . '(;

11 ** ,,._

• *

..

.._

' .;

I ;JI,! " * '*. . *

. ,.

• -0*1*-'* * .,..* *.. ,*'* .*:*

• *** . *c .* . *

.

*-*.*:e!- " .

"""'

1

• '

....

,t

..

,:..*.-1::

• '. ....

.;,

*

..:.: ,: ; **

....

..

...,_ . *'

.......

.

.. *.  ;;y S/AI .

. "" *t .. .. . . ... . .*... .

j,]lf*t *

. . ..;it:** JP '* ' ,.-!. .

• -* - *:r,.: ' .. .....* *

..

,*.-* . * . : ,..:.& * {I f*t*: .. , * */NCM,OIS I.! ., .. *

• f/Ip3 S-el :.,,a/* ..

TaUCTIYI T!ST RlT o,aun canltfA

&.:* *. WSfl T t N *-*** -- FILE: SltOP OIIOEfl

_,c:_

ULTIASOHIC ZTGLO DY! rENETRANT MAGNA FLUX HAION!SS

, /1,,: s J k-.K<<" n c.c., f1/t,,l -c._,, sIP J I er 1 ,,...,, , ..,. - -- -- ,. ____ c.c.=-----------------------------

fi'(! *$

Mll.111:. SECTIOlt DIIA...G IIO. NEAT NO. P'O*GUtGIIO.

c:;3(:.,i 111

/. V HF*- 1/.r, r.r,. c..

MIUI.TS  !?t::+/-{ !:!

• * **

r:K c,.f: 9*.Y*IA l,,,n::e. ='--LJ. -fae vL..<<l*, *

• P1 c: Ule;.,c =

r*-* * .

..,-

DA TE DANO.

. i

• . ..  :.,

... <

-

. ..

• --

*,* . . .

..

.

-*

. _.,_ ........,.

• ).;*"

1D1 ftJTIIUCffll TEST l!PoaT * >J ..

-::

• -, * *.aun catTltOI. Bl ..3 5-2-tf L

.

,* 'I l'ILE: SHOP OADE" 1 ***.*

..... : c.c.s t'.t; C-,

./ I TES

---*- HARDNESS

.. :--;;.

, --

ZYCLO 111.TIIASONIC

__,

• IIACNAFLUX

.. . . M t * *.l,

.....

. \;

1:' I c.c.1 *:,..> c. \f,,*;at n ('\. : * *1..

t c.c.:

..

.E'

I. :*: t:-\ :.o n ic.... c.c.=----------------------

z.. =, *, '* J

,._. ._,IICNAS& OIIO .. 110- - *11UPl'LIC* HCTIOII DltAWtlllG NO. HUIT NO. OIIGING NO.

":t

• **.. ,ofi,,,..c, * ., '"

L"' e*,

., ,'-SF r, i) r.; *- C. 'i-ll'C

- l *. Ic "'1 lit 7-, 1 D C ri '1'f' 2."

_, 14

• r* .....

• • .:

i -.:*

"IAH*A&. P.D,S.

FL.'/... U:l i-f E £ L... A s:.'i

• TI oP d-, c. cbc-c,k, ,,.fl fl.438 dh} b,*,r<. ii *tfJ,a_l.C. Sl,,t.u;

• .;-t .-

• ho In J1ce:

• c> .;\ s c G. P,tiv:i,. J.. .2 - 'l. 1

• 1 i--

--j.** 1.31s- b"rc:: ,tui,a Va,, ,.... :;b,*,1c. ,u.:....1.!1.J,*-tl.,;..,.,. .eu/?.}..,.-1z._

. .

!

i

-. ..*!

. DAT&

. DA NC. :l-:>- 7'"2-

.._ .........___ .;.._____________________________ - --- *----- *-----

.

• . C

'W

..

\,J

- p

-. .. ' . .  : ' .,.,*

... ;'*

..

. .-4

• ....*

.

• .

,.

• *

• 1

. .

. ,. .

• 4t

• **

....

,,, . STIIUCffYI TEST ae,on

.

... **

• .

'

CUAU, Y CGNTIIOI..

WUT1N ***nw*1* *ILt:: SMOP ORDl:fl 8r p 35'2.tlJ.. '- '1" *

.;

!

• TUT, UL'TRASOIIIC

. r:

%1'CLO E::-PENETR MACMAFLUX HARDNESS i; . C.<<=A .. M C)S :r kSO tl c.c.:_M.E -z, l ti S (:>,

=,,

• 1 Cadson I .l *. . *

-,,.; c.c.:* NC,

• ,"'f *.

c.c.:......................_..._..._..........................................................._.

i NIICNAH o*** *o. - * -**-- *-- ,o........

1,**

MCflOII (CNIA*tNG NO.

Lul(es 2/l t.1, 1,ss-o i>B> 1A

-t:::* +J. ywittJ

. t ** , liiHJIIAI.

t

• I . . * :a*v"! nu ,.,., g.n,,cs1o1vn > , v J.QMM& *o-, -*14-

• f ---,, z* .,,., -*w: sa,* w.,: <<v ,., ...... , cz:>s- e1 :rvlN' ,,_. ,, w

"*. . ...

r.

i . .

• -" **

,£C.

DANO. --1 -=-==

"'* -

j' _ -

1 b-J 2

-"!Wi.,,* *11* , **... ,.. r-. .-.. * .* * .. . . :.:.*i ..-. . . ;- ... *i *. *, **-.**\':---*.;. . . . . .,,

........

. - .

. .. : *. .*.:.*.f*.t:;. *

>

. ..

.

... ":

t *. * . *

. \._,.a.'1'1 I

. . ' . .. ., . . . .

• j- * *' ... ' * ., *

• .  :,I t * * #' * *

.. .

.

. . .. ,., . .. *.t. .,. ,:. .

. ...... .. . .. . . .

..

. *

.

• . * " * ......

,*

. *-

• • • ,

.'

, ***. ¥'**

. ' .

.*.***

.

... ,*

.

• • . ,, ...... , .......'!.- ............

.

....,._.,. -----...... ! .

U33

"\

• . . . '

. * ** .... . *... . ... .*' . .  : .....

... *

. .

? f'q<r ***":

• '* . f ._

" "'

i'__ *...

..

C

I\I \J

• . - *

• . I I

I i I

• .. 1,-a

..

• u

..

' D Ill

...

• ..

.t 0

!

tI ---l i.... Q *.*.

. .

' .....

..*.*.*.. .**..... ... *..

ft *

• i.. . :* -

.. .l*

' ... .....

• t

• I

.- ...... ,

v,-,

• toE roR FIJWHEELS Shop 0rder_..... B:6i..i.P--""9.....Z'---

Pr per B4350U.) or plate pr.lor to assembly.

P.o. eav-J.>7 Ht. No._j)S)tJl-4 Inap .&Date___ -....:,..-.k....;r,Q1r.J.,"'.....;;;.,j-_-__-_"l.:r.,8__

z;__. .....a PT per 84)5C or plate prior to asaembl,J.

P.O. l'dt/2. -,238 Ht.No. R/717-4 Insp.&Jate r . c(_..g1Ji -/f-7$

PT per '34)50UJ srter first machining.

1n11p. &Jae r. (;,, cl,.,., iy s*=-,:, Vi a .. o1 L -; -p PT per Sl..350UJ art.er \ceyway.

Insp. & Jate t2 JI.£. I£. -I;__;..;/ e:..--"'"'Z&....____________

trr per 84.)SlWL or finished f]¥wheel.

In8J. & Date f fet1a 4 J L /?.*c- 1,/-t - 78

• Original documents are on file at UlAi> East Pittabur-gh, Penn11. 15112

,*

11-11-78 WESTINGHOUSE ELEC. CORP.

1 -------4, IDATt, LUKINS STIR COMPANY N08587-07-5 QUAL. ASSURANCE OEPT.-2,A PUICHARI, Fill

3. CIOAYIIW&I, PA. ttHI EAST PITTSBURGH, PA. 1112 ITEST CERilFICA-...-

COHSIONII, TE 5173-1 P092-23A 1HP DD Mill OIDfl NO. CIJST:)Mfl ,o.

2/10 4778 a ........ *tN _,...au;;-IIND flt'III N 11(:COIOINCI .... 011119 -. IIICW'IC*

WST PD!-10310CR REV. N 77 A-53 GR. 8 CL. 1 IIND TISI MILT NO. t *--

HOMOOf,.ITY TIST

• • -****-- ANALYSIS ..--

• I '* t:. L

• -..-. -,_..,,r..._.

"""v --...._.....__, ,r

• VIP STEEL Z l **

"*" , t' ,.

• twof'-411 ELEC 81717 I 11.33 1.011 I

• 20 1.002 . 25 .68 I

I I

!

PHY.SJ.CAL PIOPEITll,\ IU!

.....,.... ACftJ

_J__

I "r. .,. a.A. jxn,c iv-NJTCH '.APPEARANcd DESCRIPTION

-,

I -

SlAI.

I I "::;"'

""'ACH I I MflT NO. I

+70°F.

1 c . 'l56 160 1C6 NO I I lO ..

• J-1/2 ID X OD 81717 23 .L 0  ;-:; 12-LATER L i7719 EX t ANSIO IN lCHES I I

Ji :925 5" 6C 1 26 j

!9611

.096 :.09a

I  :*o,s 1 L 1172 :166 1SO 99-9-99

. ' '

L ATEtt L Ex ANS 1or* IN 1tacHES 1 I * '

1 l 096 : . 099 :

• 1

!  :  :

I . os e I

I I

! UOT IS + 0°. OR QEL0-4

rRASJ OROP,WEIGH TEST PER 08 SIZE '3) J 0 ° F. EXHIBIT O BREAK i I  :  :

RINGS ANO lrt.STS HEATE lci?5 1675 ° * , HE O 1/ HR. PER ueH HIN. AtlO I I WATER QUE CHED, THEN EMPER D 12G dF., ELD 112 HR! PER jllCH HjN. AND WATER QUE CHEO.

• 1

• 1 .

• RELEASED BY RIN S ANolrEsrs STRES RELi VED e HEAT NG rq 11001100F., HEo ! HR.

I I I tN. A. o FUR ACE c OLEO o Eoo F.

I '

PER INCH TOSEC. v O,, , .

MATEJrvu.:HDATE"

,

I l

--*

l INSP.N.

--

'certify the cbove i11formation ii correct.

I

• *

,

• * :.t.<<-< __

(:1'---

• f/* ....

w ........ . ..f=.c. r:

- .

• • • • • • ..... iOfl** ** *'***

LUKENf STEEL COMPANY NON-DESTRUCTIVE TESTING Ill I

lSION EARTE! ___ __ _ ___ _ _ _ __ __ _ _____ r-.:,i - -.

us*o..-u - --

• -* - -- .

- - - *- *C:. Mill OIDll ...

• • • - ***---- - - -0

£..ff Z:

, r;-o '. .?

1,YP(1Uf

//). '"' ,, .

. 7t,,G c:..- _..{.:.;:.c * '"' .

, 'I  : St_

' -;,,,iJ;,- -<-7 A£ #. : s,icd.;:7.f' . . //5'. "7'7 . ---- .. -- .  :,

-'-*t

' I

• ,.*

y-,.rw.7,.. j Z' 4, c. / n ..,,* , - ,i., - - - - *. --

J

///1>,

,* < .  ?./ .JJ d r:r. OUl'MfN?US

),..*

..

4',N-'

t/.1L'/_.J"

'l"-f(

--LY'-----* --- - - --*---**-**--?______ - -- -------- -

- -----*

Jlc.

..4

.. r

'l,,,: .._ - _.,

, . CU!lf flt NO ,,,, - D .

-:._

, .. .Jd,."U-tf,A

(;. -.

./-

/$//.2

---

I--*-- --- ---- -- *..*. ISPACING f y,,i,*.

.!_ ____ /y_ __ - . . . 14/C.tl __

---

ji.t ,I ',y'

_____ --::____ -- COUll4j4b,...,., ;***

,'_-.:7.- 4£:A CSIG.fl)\--- . U Df I

,--===_ t*-

. .

I I

_

["" V" *" ,,?

..,...,_,, ..- ,-

AIIAG(

.r. /I I -- - I MITH(',.ZU. <..t:/' ..

IIAN"iiiin .r:;.* u_ ;r

'7";,,)1- ., ? c.aoo ,., I

,,7(,tt) ,t' ,JZ[1' I. * / /'/ J.,? $///,;,'>-

)u2!,/,I(, :t/1 */

%__ _ ':'iifc ....,__.,, - --- .

-"<_/"*

. . .. TY'f Of ---

A_

• .=:. /AJ,e/ut UAY..

. ,,

IN N

• * **"*!CIAI

-- --,-w,ott1

,....,, I llNGJI* .,, D

, ;

d.

,f .":'*:

fi-.:J/djr-.'f,( ,if//,< soi . *""'_ . -  ; ___ o

,d/pZ_- --- : :N -

+/-' 1--,

_

!; - r--r-* *- ,

I -- --*--:--r--- ---,- ---*- -- -

- , --,,it --

-- l

-

• -:---1

,

• • -:,

-

'

- -

. : . .:

• ,

-,

1 1

I 1 t- ; -t_;

• +-. - -+-I -- I* -l----r*- .

.

...___ --+- *---+.----:-*-* -- - -

• I

• -iI --------+ ----*, -- '

---L-L---L i __ 1 ____1_J *--t-----

I i I

I i I I

---

+- j_ '

1 I I

1 I I I t- --

I I . . ' . .

j- ... -t, -- - - - - ---+---.

1 r ----1

+---'L_--t-__ r*-*tJ-

,

1_ -+- - ___

I I , 1 . . . ,

I

--t--* **!:

1  : 1

,

I

---

i-j -- _ -t-*--- _ -L __ li ___ ,

.J

--,f---1-1 I __

, ..

,-UW YTHA-,-,-H(-t0Vf-!S19iifCJ NOWUDGI AND IUl(F. Y./. /

' "-"'

'- ),--.l/

Jh tl..J/L ,

. L

()_ .

1 A A Jt' JI. J . . . *-.

,...,.

'.. ...

,

. 11...atARI, lUK!tlS STEEL COMPANY DATL 2-211-78 ,111 N08587-07-99 3

• W£STINCt1t-**SE ELEC. CORP. COATISVIIU. PA. lfnt CONSO'II.

QUAL. ASSURANCE DEPT.-2GA EAST PITTSBURGH, PENNA. Mill OIOH NO.

TEST CERTIFICATE

• "** - ,.o. ['i f'"'"1l I

15112 tjl :*.J-:)1 523ll5-l MP 22378 WH  ::,,

i._ .... _.

2

= 2/2q -

I

- ... Ill- .. ACCC,1*¥1C1 - WIIAII c.alll ,-ca* *111 - 91C'W'IC WEST P0S-103l0CR REV. N 77 A-533 GR. 8 CL. 1 IIND ftST HOMOOINflff 11ST CHIMICAL ANALYSIS

-*T C ..... p s r.. Sa NI (. I ""° V T, To AA.A clA!, I"- rl(U\,;t.::,;,

D5301 .18 1.30 .013 .005 .22 .6 5 I .55 VIP s* t;!L ELEC.

- "

"'

• .\Rf NO. SlAI.

NO.

..

• **

...._"'. :r. .. I.A. ...

PHYSICAL PIOPIITIES IMPACTS V+70°F.

I . h,- I APPEARANCI

\I,..._

DESCIIPTION I ' ' \ SHEAR D!,30 "fc.j 707 350

,25 24 25 I T 1i.2:1113 L 1111 :iso a111

iiws 9S-99-99

}9-99-99 1- 7.5" X 6.5 10 X 73 00 LATEI L EX-ANSION IN Ir CHE I T.090:.oee :.0B9 L.090 !I

• 093 :I

• 091 '

'

TRANS DROP I EIGHT TESTS PER f; oscs ZE P-j) 9 +0 ° F.,

I EXHIDIT NC I BREAK.

N.D. T IS 10 ° F. *:oR eet:ow.

. '

RINGS AND TESTS HEATEC 1G2sJ 1675 o 1 WATER QUEt CHJD, THEN 1 EMPER O 12Jil Of*, t IELD /2 HR,' PER 1NCH M N. AUD

• I HEI D 1/ HR. ER IN H H If. AtJO

---

* ---* -*--

WATER QUE CHED. .*

o

I r!ELE11,SED BY Q.C.

RINGS ANO TE!:TS STRES 4 REL JI YEO B' HEAT tG TC 11001150° 1., HEI D 1 HR. TO SEC .. x,;./

.

• I. '

PER ;,CH f IN. Af D FURt ACE C< OLEO 0 GO')C F. -, .;

I INSP. N. DATE::)

I I

... , 'J .,

MATEJEVICH

.

I I I I

'

I

- -- **-*** c.:- : .

I I

We:*,

.. ,:ir . .;. ..

... .

nrtlfr

. .

the

. obow

.

lnfomlotion h comd.

. I .....IIIINI

• *- " ' *'  ;

.

I

. .

- ;, . -JI. * -<.. .

. -- :f::. i*

• lUKENS_t;O?M'ANY. .. :; - --*-. NONDEs1uc,,v e** 1s110 atPb1

"'

--..--... .,,..,. **.,:... .. *:*'" ** *-f. - *

<.. . ..... >

. * .. .__,. ..... , ....

i - ::_: _:;::., \{-:.. ::** ;::: ... * *- .. .::-./ _. ::  :-: 5- lNSPECTION:PEPARTMENT* *:

MU aeon NO. DAU

• d , :t..1Y- I ¥4:-)

d_n. r , //.f7?

• '-" A., 7._

SPlClf lCA tlON ,

-

i IOUIPMINI !JSID 4/c!tR f 8

.,.

¢r I

,i AIN'\ITUDI ...

1'

MlTHOO

,4,_/7/1, /1*.*K -- _,.,

t

" OI SOIJA(l

/

c.,-,r1 : .... * . -t d:. /./i.,£J u<<"< 7..J o.v

.

UNGfH

\.

• ..

l):jfyj!Jc,:r",(/f ,.;:

MUI' SI.AIW MARI( NO.

JtJ I - IT(M NO.

• t.:_ . __ ,_______

i t' I

• i I ..

• i I

!

• i I I I

.

• j I ,-l

+'

.*** 1

.

" . . I rv l

I! I -f

. ' I

-

l" i

. ; !

. 'I H

tt

..-l--  ! ' ,-!  :

I I

..

"

l I

• --------+----

-

--+--t----+--

-- '

I

--1----- --- 1---

I

1. *

• * ._____---L-_.._--L-1-- - ..- ',!' i(

l 1 ---- --

-.*;.::-- O, ..YaNOWUDOIANOKLIU.ouk

• I ....., CU'llfY 1HA11- ._..... "'

n .. 1' ' r o - . f l 'r Jl.l

. **:**-*

• i*.. ***. t* .

f:. . . .... * - "*'-A.J>,.

. .. 1* * *.,...,,.. uwa *.,.,.,,...,

-,.**--.....: .* . ';'.' -.-

'-* . ,. -

I-

. . ..<t.. .;; > \1

/.*

.

. ,,. **

.

• .* *,..... ,*.:*: ..

"..;_-(l/f,:,tll. * **

.

l/V73

,.,...;,*.

Shop Ordv__ ,:_1...e_9,_(_.'/___

PT pv 843SOUJ or plate prior to uNllb]J.

P.o. /Z4- 9Z!f_ Ht. Ro. ,47f1)J * / Inap."-t* :Z:::/;0 Js I; ll*>J-'8'0 z;:(',,,/e,.14 11-17-ro Pl' per !43SOUD ot plat* J)l"iar to u-1.,J.,.

P.o.l7?-9r Ht.No. A?r()J-/ Inap.:Wate

,-LJ PT pv 84JSOUi> art.er first aacb.ininc.

lD*P* t&Date z:" '4a', J: II, a 40 4 /-:l PT per 84JSOUD artr k.

1n.,,. * :>ate L. "I ci,i :,-r-o UT per 8i.JSl\lL ot tin.labed tJ.y\Geel.

Inap. Is Date 7:{},,o <<14, ' ,/.;?t-,,-7 :f:,).C--r:J Origtnal docue1ente m-e on file at* UUD F.ast Pittsburgh, PeMa. 15112

.33

.

. . .

' '

.

- . '

'

D,A1a, 9-10-80 ELEC. CORP. CDAIIIWlll._lfflll ca*rara ASSURANCE DEPT. TEST CEITl1CATE 39'137-1 HP 9,,80 VS MIU OIIIII NQ. CUIJOllll!I P.O.

Pl79*980 L9880 J/6 IND -WMII Galll llO* Jll"'I -

P 78 A-33 GR. B CL. l ASHE CODE SECT. Ill SUB NCA N-1160 8/-/81 tlOMOGfNlnY ftSf %9P9h9 I UWIVUA I r I ........ I I I i I  ;.... -i*i.:**.- .. ,::*, .... ;.:,-*u:*r u t ,.. I .&1 I XK I I fSA51C f*ttOC1

.57 VIP STEEL fltC.

MELT-;:

/:...':

$IA&.

NO.

....*....- -*-

"'  :.-r.

PH

.. ..A.

I

... I CAl ,10,11,11 V +70° ,:"° I

• I s

I

• II I I APPEARANCt I I i DESCIIPTION I

A't503 -1 2ll

,

950 I 1-I 757 86  : 86  : 70

\

T 110-10-70 8" 7 6,;. 7!,

'

X ID X o- o-eo

@

72lf 921J 21J 130 :115 :111

• • I I L

LATE AL EXfANSIO IN I CHES l

f T .056: .061: .062

• 08!1 :

• 089 :

• 090

• TRANS. ROP W IGHT ESTS ER E2 8 (SI E P- ) FR011 TOP I -

'

• BOTT H OF RIN +20 ° F. EXHIBIT NO ORLAr..

.\

• I *.

I I r

I t AL 1 ru,c r.iaiL.1 l I :u tl:

_*  :  : *' . ,. *r.-.*,

• t I

'-:.'

RINGS ANO TE s TS HE ATE 1625 167 5 * ' HE D 1/ HR. f ER rnCH HIN ANJ\1At l (*

-p,  :* ,*,, ,,

° QUENC.HED, THEN EMPER D 122 °F., ELD 1 2 HR PER JNCH MJN. AN WATER QUENCHED.  :  : ***-*

RINGS ANO TESTS STRES RELl VED B HEAT NG T 11ooi115 0 ** HE D l HR. RELEASE-PER INCH rIN. Aro FURfIACE CfOLEO fO 800t F. r  :  :

I TO SEC.  :._ ---

• : iI INSP. N. MAT[JtVICfl DATtcZJ.*.f)

,I

...... .. .,...

--.... r-.-. .. ,::,. . .

-.F.***

....,._..,...,

,, "'1!

• -. .. .* ,'1'1*7?.:---*...

, '**

lUICENS Stm. COMPANY. NON-DESTIUCTIVE TESTING 11,ollr INSPECTION DEPARTMENT

/1"

,,_

.__ &)

• WIOIH 1=-;f.,i.

L a:;;: Uc:ir:&c:C..------b;:_ _ _ '

I MIU & SlAI I

I A

I I I I I I I  ! I I I I I I I I -t I I I I I I I I I I I t I I I I I I .. . I - ---*-* . -- --** ---* -

I

• I '., I **1 I I I I I I I I I I I I --t--t----** -* ....

(-. I I  :

I '. .. I I I I I I I I I I I I *---1r--

• -+--+---l-- ------,-- -1 t

I

\:

I. .. . I f I I I I I I I - - . . . - I -- ** - . -*

' .

t H(IUY CUTIFY 1HAT IHI AIO"I t,S  ;,JC}P; '1 _J , , , 1 1 f;;e 1,.. .. L.-__.._. ____ _

u* t*

d.LL...-L/ * .,-* I---.

OfMYICN0WUOGIAND11lllf. * / '/ (,

.. \,:

\.

,r- -

.*'\ . * .._L. __ . ,',/ '*-

.1 ....

-

I:.)"- ....-,_-*.-*.*:,.._,:...._._.,-..*- . ,.,.., !-*-.!-.1 :.;1

*_- *. *'

!T

• ELEC. CORP.

WklNS sna ma.,....M....

COM.-ANY

• DA.. ,10-ao" ... NQ.sss1-01-11

¥.l eot*l:NL

• .-.AL. ASSURANCE DEPT. TESTalTIFICATI

.,: * "' MS& OIDfl NQ. I CUIIOll8 *o.

• 391138*1 Pl79-979 I "' 9,ao vs L9880 3/7 0 ---

• -;;;

  -;-78

  ;;T,;:-;-E cooE sEcT * * -NCAN-ii6o e/;01)

.., ft1l HOMOGfNf1ff TIST - - g_q pq'1 q --

,._lT NO

.

C MH ,. s c:u CHEMICAL ANALYSIS(\.\..

SI I NI I Ct I ND 9... ,-.._ _'Tt,. AL"* .4"'

DI;>> I \o rv... i;.;>>

A7503 .19 I 1.31 I .0111 I .008

• 27 I . 67 .57 VIP StEEL l::'.LEC.

i--

I ,,, ;** I I/, .._. *i.

I

,*

• THO. ..

' .1,

• SIM I HQ. I

....*-.. *-

1':,

.. T.' ""u.

P H Y.SJ C A i. P I O P I I I I I J_ .. --* *-_

V +70 °F

• IW'ACfl - r""- 'vn.

DESCIIPTION I

I I

I

.

A7.503 1 757 950 24 T 86  : 86  : 70 70-70-70 1- 8 11 X 7 ID X 76.5 00 P"\

f 724 924 24 L 130 : 115 : 117 80-80-80

!

\' .* I LATEAL EXPANSION IN I CHES

'* I T

• 056 :

• 061 :

• 062 L

• 0811 I:

• 089 :I

• 090 I I TRAHS .. .,ER E2b8 (SlE P-b> FROt-1 t OF EXHIBIT uo l>ROP Wl;IGHT rrEsTs

.

TOP OOTTPH RINGj@ +20°F. BHlA.

1ffERl"L I I

[t)c\*1:1,jl')"!t jit!*i:\:

I RINGS AH TEST HEATE 16211675 ° ., HE D 1/ HR. rER INtH HIN AND queNcHeo, THEN EHPE *D 12 °F., ELD 1 2 HR. PER :1NcH N. ANP wATf;ftll\ A T '" iJ?al.t 1

---

** .. *-------

11::.:.:..**-'

QUENCHED.  :  : I RELEASED O'l Q.C.

R INS AND INCH HIN.I AND P'ESTS TRESS RELIE,/ED BY RNACE COOLEP TO 8 G TO 1100-150 ° F, HELf.> 1 HR. PEft TO SEC. J_:____ _

A,;-'

,

INSP.N. "'"uJv,cu oAn

---

..

'* .....,, certify the obow. information is correct.

--

I..

• I

l' -!(. -**

..

. .* : .-*:....

• LUKENS STfEl COMPANY

'.* .....,

...

,1' ..

NON-DISTIUCTIVE TESTING IIPOlf INSPECTION DEPARTMENT 1-wr;;_.& ':7{;(,.9 - , ft(rt*

MIU moll HQ. IYN t1Sf

• I

,t,4/ ,,.,/" -:, /. l l ./,_ / * -v .. ,

--

• J"l'A""tt""iL- --" /

J *

• r" / ,.r* b./,./ - /. -,. ..... .,, ,

VI u 7, - ,

r

---

* <<>,,z..,,,....

IQUIPMINf USID 7,.,: , .,. ,,, .. .,... ' . **

I ,;.,t../"'l'J1;;

CQNSIGNID 10 *

,**-;J /...

r:,:CING

, ...7>>.a,,rEf"{:rc; /:/:;,!4*,..._

m'UOI ceutG;f * .. , _:_ -.; * *

• _ .

.,

I iaAJ'siioairff, -7' 7 4"' ,S'--1 AMHIACf

'?: . .- : ---i G11> au.. y c*./ . / ..I J im o, suucl .

. JC ...v../.2,.tr/ n ,c,.

MltHOn .* * -.: < .. *

--*--

1-...... ,....... ...""._,.....

.;;..

.. .. . * -- _;...;; __-__....

....

..SN,....,.,..._,.,,..,-IA,_l----1-,,GAUGI

_ ........-.l....

-

I /7-* t

.

0-")Jj;-, * .... 'W101H ____ J

,_ . * , . .. ... *. ,

• -*u-*-. . 1 *u,*

-3 _ I*---- *--**1.. } "° * - *----

MUI a SlAI

---

/) ___7_.J_ _O

/

.' _ NO / --

l -

,* ,:.:'

. . * .* -

,. '* -

--

:

.

"'

-* t * .. .. I I '

' ('...

_1

--- C't-)

J

.

-*--*- .. - -- - ****--*

...

I

---*- -* ______ J

-- --- -- . . - *---*-

• ---- ---**- --*-- - ***-* - --*-- . -* --*- ---- *-* -* --**--

.

..

C

..i

-* '":_-_.-- :-::-::: .:. ........ .,- -00 ..- .... *-- - -- - - \I'

{J. / I t * . - I. .........j ...... .

APPENDIX E RESPONSE TO FIRST NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION m:\33S6w .wpf: I b-111196 E-1

PO Box*

Shippingport. 1S077*0<ICM SUSHIL C JAIN t412) 3113*5512 OMllon Vice Prffldenl Fu (412) 643*10611 NuclMr 5etYICet NuclMr Power OlvlalOn Jun 14, 1996 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Docwnent Control Desk Washington, DC 20SSS-0001

Subject:

Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 and No. 2 BV-1 Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 BV-2 Docket No. 50-412, License No. NPF-73 Response to Request for Additional Information Concerning WCAP-14535 Attached is the response to an NRC staff request for additional infonnation provided by letter dated May 1, 1996, concerning WCAP-l4S3S, "Topical Report on Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheel Inspection Elimination." Beaver Valley submitted the subject report by letter dated January 24, 1996, as the industry's lead plant on this issue.

Please direct questions regarding this submittal to Mr. Roy K. Brosi at (412) 393-S210.

Sincerely, Sushil C. Jain c: w/enclosure:

Mr. L. W. Rossbach, Sr. Resident Inspector Mr. T. T. M NRC Region I Administrator Mr. D. S. Brinkman, Sr. Project Manager* (3 copies)

Ms. Diane Jackson, Westinghouse Electric Corporation w/o enclosure:

Mr. David Haile, South Carolina Electric and Gas Co.

Mr. Pat Naughton, Virginia Power Mr. Don Gulling, Florida Power Corporation Mr. Ben Mays, TU Electric Co.

Mr. Jim Edwards, Georgia Power Co. DHIVE ING Mr*. K. J. Voytell, Westinghouse Electric Corporation QUALITY Mr. S. A. Binger, Jr., Westinghouse Electric Corporation I E NE R G Y

Westinpouse Eneru Systems Box 35 Electric Corporation PlffSDulfl Pennsylvania , 523C C35 ESBU/WOG-96-212 June 17, 1996 To: Dennis Wr.:..iklaad, Duquesne Ugbt Company David Haile, South Carolina Eleclric & Gas Pat Naup'°' Virginia Power Lorreua C.ecilia. Florida Power Corporation Ben Mays. 1lJ Electric Company Jim Edwards, Soulbern Nucle;ar Operatin1 Company

Subject:

Westinghouse Owners Group Respon* 1o NRC Bequest for Acld1t1ona11,ronn1Uo1 n WCAP-14535.Toplgl Repon op Bmtec Coolant Pun,p tlY!!b** *a*P!Slto* Elilnlnatiop * {MUHP-5042)

Reference:

WOO Letter ESBU/WOG-96-173 daled 5/17/96

Subject:

NRC Request for Additional Information OD WCAP-14535 "Topical Report on Reactor Coolant Pump Flywbecl Inspection Elimination* (MUHP-5042)

'lbe original submiual on this subject wu made on bebalf of the WOO by Duquesne Ugbt Company for Beaver Valley Station oa January 24, 1996. A similar submittal wa made by Ealal)' for Arkansas Nuclear Oae on behalf of the Combustion Eapaeerina Owners Group. 'lbe NRC 1w perfonned a preliminary review of the Bava Valley submittal, and has delermilled that additional information ii required to complete the review. A letter dated May 1, 1996 requatina additional information (RAI) wu transmitted to Mr. J. E. Cross of Duquesne Light Company from Mr. Donald S. Brinkman of lhe NRC.

'lbe NRC bas requcsacd that Duquesne Light Company provide a respoDH 10 lhe RAJ within 45 days of RCCipt of the letla'.

The purpose of this leUer is 10 provide input 10 Duquesne Light Company for input to their NRC letter responding to the RAI.

The NRC plans to resolve this issue by tbe md of this summer. We will keep you informed of any new developments on Ibis subject.

Please con&act Warren Bamford al (412) 374-6515 with additional questions or comments.

Regards, 5.-li S.A. Binger, Jr /'-__

Project Engineer Westinghouse Owners Group SAB/yp

Response to NRC Request for Additional Information on WCAP-14535 Item 1:

Section J .1 Prevwus Flywhffl lgrity Evaluations, Page 1 It was s1111ed, "Since shrink fu forces would re111rd the growth of radial crada in the -,way area, llwy rt omuied from tM analysis o/ tJa, k,yway crack. " Physically, the shrink fil forces can 1- consiMrtd a iniernal pressure acting on tJw inMr bore of the reactor coollw pump (RCP) flywlwl. Thus, ii would accelerale, not re111rd, tJw growth of radial cracks in tJa, uyway area. Provilk su./ficiat fini# elelllffll moMlling tk111ils and resuJ, ,o validaie your cw,,, or nvi.N your rtAllts by taking into accotlllt dw q/ect ""6 to shrin/c /ii /ortts, * 'iicl1 was shown by tM Combustiolt Engin<<ring Ownns Group in report S/A-9".()80, "Relllmtioll of React.or Coolant PIIIIIP Flywlwel l,upectiolt Requim,wnts," wluch was submitted to tM NRC on April 4, 1995, on docuts 50-313 and 50-368. 'TMse shrwc /ii forces rt shown in that report to 1- capal,k of producing strtssa of comparable magnilUM to those produced by tM centrifugal forct wlwn tM flywlwel was rwaning at tJae normal operating speed.

Respoase to Item l:

The shrink fit r, ,rces do add 10 the stresses at the Oywbeel bore, but fatigue crack growth is approximately proportional th the cube of &be sueu ranae applied durina a given cycle. For the Oywbecl, &be sll'eu ruge ii from the rat condition (zero rpm) to normal operat.ina speed. Therefore, if tbe shrink fit streuea bad been used, the streu ranae would be smaller because lbe shrink fit sll'eua are sipifacandy lower at nonnal operating speed tban at tbe rat condition. Our calculations used a zero stresa slate at rest, wbicb maximized tbe crack growth predictions. The amount of conservatism induced by tbis assumption is discussed below.

Westinghouse bas evaluated tbe effect of sbrint fit forces on crack growdl. Due to tbe large number of flywheels in service, IC1llll shrink fit values were not obtained for eac:b pump, but typical sbrint fit values for Oywbeels which are attacbed direcdy ID the RCP motor shaft arc 0.5 to 1.0 mil on tbe flywheel bore, or 0.00025 incb to 0.0005 inch OD tbe bore radiu. For consavatism, and to be consistent with Combustion Eagineerina Owners Group report SIA-94-080, *ReJuation of Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheel Inspection Requirements,* a shrink fit of 0.0052 incb on tbe bore radius wu imposed for evaluation purposes. This ii approximately one order of mapitude bigber than tbe typical shrink fit for flywheels wbicb are attached clirecdy la die RC- molar abaft. A shrink fit of 0.0125 incb wu used for the spoked Oywbeel, u wu med iD the Combustion En1iDecrin1 Ownen Group report.

Hoop streua control tbc powtb of radially oriented cracks in tbe flywheel. Shrink fit boop stresses for the Oywbeell at ,cs& ue OD the order of one to three times tbe boop strases pl'O'tuced by centrifugal forces alon wben tbe Oywbecls arc ruuina at die normal operatina speed. However, u tbe Oywbeel rotational speed increases, tbe shrink fit boop s&rases decrease, due to the radial powtb of the flywheel bore radius.

'Ibis growdl may be determined by tbe following equation:

1

a....

• _! ew* a [ (3

• v) .J 2 * (1 - v) a J J

, 3 86 , , "i where: a

• bore radius (inches) b

• ou&er ndius (inches) p

• Oywbeel ma&erial density (0.283 lb.fcubic inch)

(I)

• flywheel angular velocity (radians per sea>nd)

E

• Youna's modulus (lO x 10' psi)

V

• Poisloll's ratio (0.3)

The total boop streaa may be delenniaed by addina die &brink fit and centrifugal force components. The streuca a& the Oywbed keyway localioa are sbowa in fipre l for Flywheel Group l, wbicb is rcprcscntative of the Beaver Valley Unill 1 and 2 OywbeelL SlrCu plots for &be olber Oywheel poups are similar to figure 1.

fatiauc crack powtb nte may be cbaradaiz.cd in terms of tbe ranae of applied s1rm intensity factor (AK.), and is aencrally of tbe form:

where da/dN

• cnct poWlh raae (iacbalcycle)

D

• slope of dae loa (dl/dN) venus loa (AK.)

C.

• scalina mu&IDt The fatigue crack powtb behavior ii aflecled by tbe R ratio (K..JK-) and tbe eavironmenL Reference fatipe crack powtb behavior of Cllboll aad low alloy fcrritic saeds exposed ID an air environment is provided by die above equatioa willa a* 3.07 and C.

• t.99 x 1()'11 S. S ii a scaling parameter IO account for dae R ratio and ii &ivaa by S

• 25.n (2.88

• R)..,., wbere O

• R < 1.0.

la the WCAP-14535 evaluatioa. die maximum 11re11 intensity factor raa1c occurred between RCP shuldown (zero rpm) and die normal operatina apeed. Sbriak fit wu excluded, therefore the R ratio wu zero, 5 WU 1, ud C, WII 1.99 X 1()"11*

lncludin1 sbriat fat raulu ia a R ratio of 11pp10xima1Cly 0.9, u S of approximately 3.2, and a C. of appsoximately 6.4 x ur**. Tbcrcfon, Ille scalia1 co1111&11 (c:.> is approximately 3.2 limcs higher than not includin1 sbriDk fiL The ranae of applied hoop 1trr.11 for excluding shrink fit wu at leu& twice that for including shrink fit for all Oywbeel poups. Therefore, &be relalive fatipc aack pow1ll rate for including sbrink fit may be estimated by the followina equa&ioll:

Rate w.1 eh Shr .1nJc l'i. e

• c 3

• 2 > c O * ..* l ,

• o, Rate wlehout ShrlnJc i,le The fatigue aack ar<>Wlb rate for including shrink fit is at most 40% er me rate for not including shrink fit, for tbe assumed shrink fit values discussed above. Therefore, &brink fit rewds tbe growth of radial aacks in tbe keyway area. and excluding shrink fit yields conservative fatigue crack growth resulas, as reported in WCAP-14535.

Item 2:

Section 1.1 Prnious Flywlanl /nug,ity Evaluations, Pap 1 TM fatigw analysis is tkpendant on 1M premiu that en equip,,wnt uud for uaminations of RCP fl1WMels at wse facilities is capable of accurauly utecting and sizing 0.24 inch long ,war slllfa<< flaw. ProfliM your basis supporting tlw probability of tktection (POD) for 1M uaminations perfomuut ProviM deu,ils on how 1M POD values Hre tkln'lniMd, qualifwd, and ,,,., in concluding tJw ass111Md sia of w initial flaw.

Respoa* to Item 2:

The initial crack length of 0.24 inch wu used in a previous evaluation of RCP flywheel integrity by Babcock and Wilcox (Repon BAW-10040, December 1973, *Reactor C.oolant Pump Assembly Overspeed Analysis"). This length wu assumed to be tbe largest crack that could be missed in nondesuuctive ICSting.

As seen in Table 4-1 of WCAP-14535, crack growth assuming extremely large initial flaw lengths (from 2.04 to 3.28 incbes) wu found ID be insipifantly small over a 60 year extended plant life. In the aack growth evaluation, 6000 RCP Slart/s&op cycles were US11med, wbicb is consavative wilb respect to actual operation. This evaluation suge111 that very wae initial Oaws can be tolerated. Such Daws are of a size wbicb arc expeciCQ ID be delectable wilb the examination procedure of Attachment A.

An alternative method of evaluating this iaue is ID derme an "allowable" flaw size based on the application of a margin to the calculated aitical Oaw size. lbe approach used here is lo apply lbe margins of ASME Section XI. Tbe ra11U1 of this approach are pn,vided in Table 1 below. In &his tabl crack length is measured radially from lbe keyway, and percentage through the flywheel is the crack lenglb divided by the radial len1th from &be keyway IO &he Oywbecl outer radius.

Tbe inspectic .. medlodl used for Oywbeels are capable of fmdin1 Oaws mucb smaller lban lbe smallest allowable Daw aa Table 1.

Table 1: Allowable Cnck Leaplas ror Flywlleel Nonaal Speed aacl Ovenpeed Flywlaeel Group -- Allowable Cnck Leaatlu la baclla aad ., dlroup Flywlleel 1200 ,,. 1500 ..,.

RT., * .., I .,..., * .., I .,..., * .., .,..., . .., I RT.., * ..,. I rr., .wr 3

1 3.0* (K) 1.8* (541>) 1.0* (341>) s.s* (2641>) J.s* (1241>) 1.s* (4) 3.4* (104*>) 1.9* (641>) 1.r (341>) 9.4* (29'1,) ,.2* (1341>) 1.s* (5) 2 3.2* (1241>) 1.6* (641>) 1.0* (441>) 8.3* (3141>) 3.7* (14) 1.6* (6) 10 14 8.1* (2941>) 2.s* (10'11) 1.7* (6'11) 15.2* (55'11) 7.5* (27'11) 4.1* (15'11) 2.6* (13'11) 1.1* (5..) 0 .7" (3.,) 5 .7* {28.,) 2.6* (13.,) 1.3* (6'11) 15 5.s* (24'11) 1.s* (741>) 1.4" (6..) 12.2* {SO.. ) 5.7* (23'11) 3.o* c12'li) 16 Over the put ten year5, &be examination ledmiqua anployed bave improved, particularly wi&b &be use or &be defocused p1e bole probe. The delec&ability of &be p1e bola at various melll pa&bs displayed in Atlacbmeat 8 indicate &bat &be impeclion methods Uled wr Dywlaecls are capable of finding Daws mucb smaller &ban &bole idenlified in Table 1.

ID Attachment 8, the 1.25 iDcb diameter p1c bola (effec:Uvdy aide drilled bola) were clearly identified at a metal padl wbicla is nearly twice the mew patb dil&uce involved in &be inlpection of the keyway area. II should be aoled &bat it is mnsc:rvativcly es&imated that die effective rcOective surface of a aide drilled bole is a 3<r arc. The reOectivc surface from a 1..25 iDcb pae bole would therefore be 0.33 incll.

This is clearly smaller than the smallest allowable Oaw in Table 1.

Item 3:

l,up<<iion, Pap 3-1 to 3-6

• PrtwiM ""'1iliDuJ iltfom,luiatt n1ardilt1 wlwtMr dw en UOIJUIIOtiolU

"' &owr Valky PatWr Sllllial, u,.;,, No,. l a,d 2 WIN quali/i,,tl nlluiw to inlpectioll ofRCP/1,,..,,..ls.

Reprt&a of wlwdwr " fonul fllllli{,clllilM ...., ,-,fon,wtl, J*IIM iltcl>>tll ilt yow ns,,o,u. 11w followilt1:

a. A11y iltfonnaUDII -,poni,11 fllllli{,ctUiala of 1M of RCP Jlywl,ff&.

b. A11y in/Offlllltion npporti,lf qw,li/icatitM of dw JlffSOIIIWI pafonnila111N aaminatiolu ofRCP flywl,ffu.

c. A11y iltfomuuio,t nprdinf

• Ul'ff of un<<nauuy in en masurffltlna #Nwd °" tJw p,om,,G 111111 ,.. 30IIMI qualifia,tiotl bGm.

R..,..*lellnl3:

All or &be pla.all covered by WCAP-14535, except one, bavc Oywbedl wbicb arc made or A5 33 Grade 8 Clw 1 or A516 Grade 70 lleCl, wlaic:la is reactor vcucl quality lleel. (11ae accplioa is Haddam Neck, wbicb bu Oywbecll made of boiler plaae saeel. A dilcusion on Ibis plant ii provided ill WCAP-14535, Appendix 8. Haddam Neck lau c:oadueled a separate clemou&ntioll of &bcir impeclioa capability, as documented in Docket No. 50-213 815230, daled 08/10195).

4

The uluasonic eumiulion procedure used at Beaver Valley is included u Allacbment A. This procedure includes qualification requiranen&s of die penoanel and equipment for die RCP Oywba,cls. Additional informalion supportina requalifacation of die penonnd performing tbe examinations of RCP Oywbeels is provided iD AUlclunent B. AtLICbment B allO includes enbancanenta made to the probe design to improve examination capabilities., and an evaluation of those eabaac:cmen&s.

Enmination penonnd arc qualified to SN-TClA ll arc trained in die use of the UT procedure (Auacbment A). Duqueme Lipt Company NDE Level DI penouel perform the examinations.

Item*=

Section 4.3 Nonductw Fauun Analysis

• It wa sun.ti, *it wa MDMI duu cracks e1JU111ating from tJw centff' of tM uywoy yIMd luglllr stras i,w,uity factors tna11 cracla e1J11UUJting from w klyway corner, antl ....

• ProviM dw utllikd srras plot orOlllld tJw kqway are11 fro,,, yow{utiu ei.1111111 med,od analysis aNl proviM "" estilnlltioll of dw stnss intffl.sity factors for tM ca. w11111 tM pe,1111'bcd stress distribution dw to tJw uyway i.s MUii instead of 1M cloud fonn solMUOII ,-d in dw nport.

Respoa* to Item 4:

Finite dement analyses were completed for cracks emanating from tbe cen&cr of tbe keyway and from tbe comer of the keyway. The resul&s clearly show that a crack at tbe center of die keyway is more severe.

This work was documented iD an earlier submit&al to &be NRC iD 1974-1975, and ill lhe atl.lcbed ASME tedmical paper (AUICbment C) entitled *Reactor Coolut Pump Flywheel Ovcnpeed EvaJuauon,* by P.

C. Riccuddla and W. H. Bamford. The comparisoa of inlerell is shown iD Figure 4 of &be technical paper.

Nole that the differeace ia 11re11 inlelllity fldar occws only for sbort c:ract lcnstbs, aad die effect of tbc kcyway OD die IUell ialelllity factor ii Ollly .. for cncb mor1cr cbaa ODC inch. RCIIIIIS of tbe overall fracture cvaluatioll lbow tlaat Oywbecl limitina apeed for 1111111 c:na leqtbs is pvcrned by ductile failure limits. u shown in Fipre 10 of Allacbmcat C. 11acrefon:, tbil itcm is not relevant to the Oywbecl intep'ity.

Item 5:

Section 4.4 bcusiw lkfon,,,tui,o,a Aulysis

• Tab/14-$ listed 1M clump in bore radius at 11w speH of 1500 'P"' fM flywlwcu in WU10l&S flywlwcl 6'0fl/l£ ProviM dw tuno11111 of original sltrilllc*{U and dw paunlllp of *-*/ii lost Ill 1$00 rp,,, for 1M typil:t,l flywl,ftl in eoclt flywl,ftl group of llw llllu.

a..,_. a. 11n1 5:

1bc pcrcentqe of lbriak fit lost at 1500 rpm is shown ill Table 2 below (or tbc usumed worst case sbrink fit values discuuod in item l above. (For die typical shrink fits of 0.00u25 IO 0.0005 incb for Oywbeels wbicb are auacbed directly to tbe RCP motor shaft, dilcu.ucd ia item 1 above, 100111 of the shrink fit would be lost at 1500 rpm for all Oywbecl poup1). figure 2 provida Oywbeel bore expansion ud corrcspondma lbrink fit for speeds of zao to 1500 rpm. for Flywbecl Group 1, wbicb ii represanalivc of lhe Beaver Valley Units 1 and 2 OywlPeds. Displacement plots for lbc olher Oywbecl grou"5 are similar IO Fipre 2.

5

Table 2: Sutak Flt l...ea at 1500 rpa Flywheel flywboel Flywllecl Allumed Shaft flywlaeel Shrink Fit Sbrint Group ouacr Bore Sbriak Radial Bore Radial at 1.500 Fit Los&

Radius Radius Fit Expan1ioll Expaa1ioa rpm at 1.500 (incba) (incb*) (iachea) (iacha) (iDcb*) (incba) rpm (Cli) 1 38.250 4.6875 0.0052 0.0000 0.003' 0.0018 65 2 37.875 4.1875 0.0052 0.0000 0.0030 0.0022 58 10 36.000 8.0625 0.0052 0.0000 0.0052 0.0000 100 14 32.500 4.1875 0.0052 0.0000 0.0022 0.0030 42 15 36.000 15.2500 0.0125 0.0004 0.0102 0.0027 78 16 32.500 6.900 0.0052 0.0000 0.0037 0.0015 71 Notes for Table 2:

1) Sbrink Fit at 1500 rpm

• Allumed Sbrink Fit + Shaft Radial Ezpalllioa

• Flywheel Bore Radial Expaa1ioa.

2) Sbrink Fit Lost ll 1500 rpm* (Assumed Sbrink Fil* Sbrillk Fit It 1500 rpm)/A.uumed Shrink FiL Sued oa lbc wont caae IIIUIDed lbriDk fill llaowD ill Table 2, llariak fat will exist al 1500 rpm for all Oywbeel poapa acept Flywheel Group 10. The lbriDk fit llreuea al 1500 rpm will reduce lbe critical cract lmstu reponed ill WCAP-14535, Table 4-3. Oitic:al cnct lenstu includiaa lbriDk fit 11reuea al 1500 rpm are provided ia Table 3 below. Aa lbowa, aeae !eqtbl are lipifandy larpr dau lbe la,tlaa factor

• a fuctioa o1 critical c:nct **atla wlaa are eJplded ao be dcleclable widl dac eumiu&ioa p,oredure of Al&acbmcat A. Slrell in&wity ii 11rowa ii Fiprc 3, for Flywlleel Group 1, w1aa ii repraeatativc of die Baver Vallt:y Uaill 1 and 2 flywheels. Slrell ialenlity factor plols for dae odler Oywbeel groups are aimilar to Figure 3.

Table 3: CrUlcal Cnck Leqdal ladad... artak FIi fer flywlleel 0¥en,-I .r 1500 rpa FlywllNI Clilk:al Crack Leastll la IIICMI _. tlaneap Flyw..a Group RT-,*ff RTNDI'

• 30'F RT...,..

• WF 1 15.2* (4615) s.,. (1615) 1.3* (411,)

2 16.0* (49'6) 5.6* (1715) 1.19 (311,)

10 u.r (56'6) 7.5* (2715) 3.3* (1211,)

14 11.1* (6715) 10.9* (39'6) 2.5* (K) 15 1.2* (4011,) 3.6* (1815) 1.6* (815) 16 16.t* (6615) 9.3* (3815) J.r c1s11,)

6

It ii imponant to point out lbat most Oywbecls are designed to lose their shrink fit at operating speed.

TIie tbrec teyways mailnain the cenlerin1 of the Oywbeels. wbic:b usura that balance is main&ained. Tbe imposition of a very lqe lhrink fit would be detrimen&al to Oywbecl reliability, because of the difficulty in inslallalion and removal of tbe Oywbeel. 11lil would in &cm detrlct from tbe consistency of assembly.

A conc:crn wa,; raised about aceuive deformation in tbe Replaaory Guide. Exc:euive deformation was dcftned u *any deformation IIICb u an enlaraemcnt of the bore that could cause separation directly or covJd cause an unbalance of the Oywbecl leadiaa to ltnlCtllrll failure or separation of the Oywbeel from the lbafl.

• Therefore, tbe concern about eKCeUive deformation ii not rclaled ID the loll of shrink fit. but ins&cad relates so the amount of deformation wbicb could cause unbalance or failure.

Our extensive calculations have sbowD dial the speed at wbic:b exceuive deformations could occur is paler 1baD or equal to the limitina Oywbeel speed for ductile failure. The Dywbeel would fail due to plastic ins&ability at speeds of 3155 to 4032 rpm, u lbown ill Table ,.2, page 4.5 of WCAP-14535. Even with IIIJe Daws, the failure speed exceeds 3000 rpm. which is twice the maximum ovcnpeed of 1500 rpm. Therefore, there ii no concern widl aceuive dcformatioa.

7

RCP Flywheel Hoop SlreSlel

' J 2.5 I I

'

20 I I j - -,- - -i-*

-- -'-

1 ,

I

• 1

- 15 I i I I l

-+l-:-5-1 I i  : i I . . -

5 ========== --+----+'_.:.:?1_-+--i o ll..L.J-JJ:t::IL_LJ__J__l' _J'I' 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 IOO 900 1000 1100 1200 Rotational Speed (rpm)

_.. Rotational _... Shrink Fit ..... Total

..,.......... 1 111111111.Aalllon for Plol

• Awlll'NNI ..-** Ill (Della a)*

........

o.aoa 1na11 P1vwt11II 0... Radhll (It)*

..,.. *** - Rall111 (a)*

Kt.t.., _,,, Langill *

......,.

31.111Mb

.....

CLIITlnlll Flpn l: Flywbeel GrOllp l Jlotatk.-9' wl Sluiak Flt S&null a

FLYWHEEL GROUP 1 FLYWHEEL BORE EXPANSION AND SHRINK FIT 6--------------------------

. .

=  !

::*:*::*::* :*::,:*:::==s;::::: . :::::: :::::::::::

-s._

--- --s--

UJ 13 iuj I -----------------------..--*---

'S. ...

2 0.. '

I

Q I  ;.;::.a-0 * * * * *lldll**!:! *--*----*

-..._................

0 D

- -

D G - B

---

D U I ID ID ROTATIONAL SPEED (RPM)

...,._ Shrink Fit al Rest -.- Ben Radial Expansion -e- Shrink Fit at Speed Fipn 2: Flywhwl Group 1 Bon Expeesfos ud Col1*polldl91 Shrink Flt 9

RCPStress FLYWHEEL Intensity Factor 2SO -* --- - * -

• - 200

.. .....

• *

• • *

• • *

- .-

150 -*

. . . . . ********* 117 ksi sqn inch

-

- -------** -----

100 -

so .....- ***. .- - * * * **** 79 .3 ksi sqn inch 58.5 ksi sqn ig<;:]1_

0 - -*-*----- -----

0 5 10 15 20 25 Critical Crack Lengths for flaws Emanating from Keyway (inch)

FlywhNI Group 1 Outer Radlua (b)

• 31.21 lnchN Fl)wt11al Boni (a)

• 4.1171 Inch*

K8yway Length (d1)

• 0.1371nchN Shrink Flt (Delta a)

• 0.0018 Inch O 1500 rpm Fipre 3: Flywk11I Group 1 Slnll latr dty Factor ladudlaa Sllriak Flt 10

A1TACHMENT A INFORMATION ON QUALIFICATION OF RCP FLYWHEEL EXAMINATIONS AT BEAVER VALLEY

ruJJESN! UGffl' CXMPANY NUclear Pt:Jwiax' Divisia, Quality Scvicaa unit

()ality scvicaa Inspecticn, Examinaticn Dapartmllnt TITI.E: 'CJ'l'-304 Maralal. Ult:rasalic Exam1naticn of Raactor OX>lant P\mp (ICP) Flywhael REV'ISI 7 PJQ l OF 11 m,vtsIClf 4 Jara.w:y 3, 1991 5 NcNllld::let' 27, 1992 6 April. 6, 1993 7 December 9, 1994

tJr-304 Ravisicn 7

1. o mmg;g NiP sa>PE 1.1 'n:) prc,vida miniJzama ntq1Ji C wrta for the mmJal ultrasauc straight beam enauninaticn of RCP fiywhaels.

1.2 'Dlis pro'Jriire is int:arDld to mat the ultrasauc raqui.rementa of NE RlgUJ.atmy Q1ida 1.14 Ravisicn 1 (Rllfm:m 6.1)

• 1.3 'Ih1s ptooe:law is aA)licabla to BVPS unit.a 1 and 2.

2.0 EQMINP4'ICtf Rm1IRQ1WI'S

?OrE: Wbln uain;J Ult:J:agal. II ca.1plant, safaty gla*** or gcggl* are requind. Individual* that are sensitiw to dat:ergenta ahculd W1111r glOWIS.

2.1 DIIU1:9 ccntact surfaoaa are clean and free fram all foreign matter, pits, nickll, or dllnta, ate., that waud advarsely affect ar limit tba examfraticm. If IRlCb ccn:liticnl are natad, OJita::t tha prior to CXl'dJctin; tba enauni naticn.

2.2 Fxamina t:ba entJ.m vol\.ltla of the RCP fl to the naxinm mctent poaibla. Attach a drawing of art/ limitaticnl anccuntatwd to the n ur Enminaticn Rapatt (At:tadmnt 1.1)

• 2.3 Prior to bagimin;r examinaticnll, calibrate the ultnscni.c

.inlltrumant **IP to 1apr*11Jt a linNr 40 inch lcn;ritudinal wave IICIUnd path. 1bi.s my be aoc-111.J.iahal:t using a c:ubcn st:aal I1W block am thll at:raigbt i:... Narch unit apecified in Eva. s.2.2.

2.4 JC'ayWay Qmaar Examinat.i.ml.

2.4.1 C'alilJraticn A. .ARll,y CCJJplant to c:r1e of t:ba 1 inc:n diamatar gaga bola (A, B, C or D far Qut 1, A, B, c, D, E, ar F fer UU.t 2).

B. Il1lllrt tba gage hale pm:,a into the bole an:t dinct tbll balm taward tba fl Cll'ltaz' bat9 bole.

c. Menm tba distance trm the gaga hale to the Oll1t.c' bare hcl.e. Adjuat thl O,J ay * !

• 1tgp1 to poaiticn tba napcma at tba piq:,er swap p:aiticn

<<1 lfCt'di.ng to the pJySic:al 1DM11U1eant.

o. ct,tain thra mxinm 1'IIIIIPCX"IN frm the centc' bare hale ant adjuat tba gain to brini;i thl n** to IOI

(+/-51) fSH.

2

UT-304 Rwisicn 7 E. Racont tha insb:umant gain sett.in; and reflector s.*ap poeiticn a, the Flywheel ur Exam1 naticn Repart.

2. 4. 2 ExaJDjnaticn A. Increue tha insb:umant gain a minim.ml of 6 dB.

B. starting at tha tcp of tha gaga hole, rotate tba pza.

frm the :maxinnn mra signal area to obtain the maxinnn raapc:nae frm tba >cayway cxmwr, than back to tba bare l'll8pCX"lle. OX1tirua to exzmd na tha full lan:Jth of tba kayway 17/ .i.naarting the pzcbe in 1/2" ir.::z:llblllrt:a.

c. Examirw tba kayway cmu1ra for in:licatiaw prcpagatin;J trail thl kayway at 4144<>>rlmataly 90 dllgr11n to tba scan! path.

o. Rapeat tba entire calibraticn and exam1 naticz cycl*

trm aadl of tha mmaininJ gaga hal*, ccnfim.irlJ calibratica, aft.er am examinatian.

2.4.3 Racal:di.nJ A. Raa:ml all in:llcatiaw that exhil)it a daviatia, trm tba nonaJ kayway gamet:ty rMpa- cmuvad trm eadl gage hole exninaticn.

2.5 A. Apply cxq,lant to gaga hole D.

s. Ina.rt tba gaga bole prcbe into gaga hole D ard obtain tba mxina r1spcw frc:111111111 bolt hole 5.

c. Adjuat tha irwt:Nllnt gain to brinJ thD nmp:nae to IOI (+/-51) FSH.

D. a:>>blt.a tha p&.ctae to cbtain the mexinn reapawe frm n1111 bolt hole 2.

E. o:nst:zuct a d.istance-mll>litma correcticn (OM:) aJr\19 b'f connactin;J tlw mxin* rapa* points with a lina.

F. llacat'd tha mstzumlnt gain Nt:ti.n1, &WIap pcaitiaw and aq,lit,Jdv en tbl nywhael ur EAminaticl\ bp)rt..

2. !5. 2 caJ.ibraticn (Unit 2 Attachmlnt 7. 3)

A. Apply ca.1p1ant to gaga hole r.

3

tn'-304 a.vision 7

a. InNrt tlw gage hole probe into gage hole F and c:tJtain tha maxima X1ISpQl"ae fran ream bolt hale 4.

c. ldjuat tlw insb:umant gain to bring the' respa.. to SOI (+/-51) FSH.

o. Rctata the prcLe to cbtain the maxima nispcnse O:m ream bolt hole 1.

E. o::mtruct a clist:ance-mlplitim correctia, (Drte) anve by ccnwctin; the nmdma mlpCl1N p:,ints with a line.

F. Racard the insb:umant gain sett:ing, avap pcaiticns, am aJll)litnd* Cl\ then ur Examinat.icn i:.port.

2.5.3 Exmninaticn A. Incr:eue t.ha insb:umant gain a miniaun of 6 dB.

a. st:art1niJ at the tcp of tha gaga hole, slowly rotata the ptd:,e 360 dagt ** to examine the voluma of the

n. a.cw renectats trm flY"hMl grnwtric taat:ur1ia u the pxcm 1a =tat.ad, idl1lntityinJ MCh z.flectar IICIU1'm u it appe1ra. a:intin.111 to examina the vol\.11111 by 1mertirr;J tha ptcbe in 1/2" iraa.anta.

c. Raput the exwi natiat frCII the ramaininJ gage hol*

uaili; the initial calilzaticn 118ttu'9.

o. Ox'atim .uwtzumlnt calilratic::11 whm racUal gaga bola exam1 natiaw are CXllplated uain; the atapa Qltlinad in para. 2.5.1 ar 2.5.2.

2.5.4 RaoardinJ A. Rac.atd all unideJtifitd reflectara er,v,l to or great£ than 50I me.

2. 6 Exllllinaticn (Attadalnt 7. 2 and 7. 3) 2.,.1 calibtaticn A. OCq,la the straJ.c#1t D11111 w.l'dl unit to tba autaim mga of tha lgwar flY"hMl plata and cbtain th8 Mx1nw Rapa- trca rMII bolt bola 5.

8. Adjust tha gain t.o brin;J the nispcnse t.o IOI {!51) !'SH ard 1lmk tha point a'l tha IICt: ....

4

c. CcLtple thll straight bum saarc:h unit to tha cut.side aJ1 of tha HPPE fiywhlal. plate an:l a:,tam tha max:fnnn nspcr:ra frclll rMm bolt hole s. Mark this point an tha scr a an.

D. Ocnltruct a Da\C c:urva by cx:mactinJ the respa,se points with a lina.

E. R8cmtt the insb:umllnt gain setting, -...ap psitions am aq>J.it,xw en tm nywhlal. ur E>mminatian Raport.

2.6.2 Examination A. Ira:eue the insb:umllnt gain a miniDum of 6 dB.

a. Scan tha fiywhaal. periphuy face to incl.ma the area trm tha DJI to an:l in::l.udin; the l'9lllll bolt bol*. o:muct tb.ia exam Cl'l botb the upper and lawar platall, 360 dagz I Tl, arcund the periphuy.

c. Wher8 poasible, pu:gzwivaly JDCMt the pra. acrou am alcn; the flywhlal. ec1ga ., u to acan tha anti.re e::t;,e CW9rlapping -.:h pwvia.111 acan by at leut 251 of t:ha tranaducllr diamllt:ar.

2.6.3 Recx:m:linJ A. Ricard all unidllntifiad l'9fl.ectar8 eqaJ to ar gnatar than 50I me.

2. 7 Ot.libratiCl'l o:llfimatian

2. 7.1 o:llfim calibraticn at tba intcYala specified within each mcam1natian c:atagoty.

2. 7. 2 Evaluate c:al.ibraticn ccnfimaticfl ip acc:mdance with t:ba following criteria:

A. A IBJDa in Ml'lllitivity of m than 2dB recaJ ibrat.t.cn and rwrzm1 mt;ia) of all ittllll axmninTd

• incll tbl pwvia.111 accaptabl* calil:ntian er cal1 brat.im cantirmatic:n.

B. An n<<:REASE in ...itivity of m than 2d8 ncalibratiCl'l and r,kr,,wtiqat;iA) of all indicatiaw rc:m:dld *inca tha pwvicua accaptable calibratian er calibz:atian ccnfimatian.

5

t!r-304 Revisia, 7 C. It aey point at the Di\C aJtW hu JDCN8d 1D01:9 than 101 of the &tia"llp divisia, read.inq, cxn:tect the sweep range calibratiat and nate tha CXJU.-..""tia, at the tlywhM.l axam1 natim report. It retlect.ora ware recoxded, recalibrate and reexamine all itaza axamina:! since tha prwioua accapt:abl* calibratia, or calibratiCX\

cxrafilmtiat.

2.a Poat-Exazninaticn Cleanin;J

2. 8 .1 Dr:y-wipa tha area to NIIDl7M any taq,crm:y markings and C'Dlplant.

3.1 Rlcozd data specified witJun ead'l axaminat1c:I\ category at tha Rllactm' Q)Olant P\111> fiywhM.l Ultnacnic E)Qm1nation bplrt.

3.2 ant to bl l'Uli:mw1 in acr:::x::u:dan: with QSP 9. 4.

3. 3 Documentatia, ia cx:nsidand U lifat:.ima ard treated u such in acxx>rdama with QSP 17 .1.

4. o AQ t=PJNA STANQNQ 4.1 ca. to tha technicpa aq,lc,yad ard tha un1p nature of tlwl exmntnaticn, all ncotdlld will be aval.uatlld by a U'l' IAIMll III to dabmlim thair arigin, size, locatiat and oriantaticn. 'Ihia evaluation p:goeee will be pertotmrld and dcaJmlntad in acxx>rdama with GP-105.

5.1 5.1.1 ---*-1 parfaming emm1naticnl llhall cnly partam taslat CDDlll1ll.lrata with their and lawl of cmtificaticn.

A. D.q,,.,,. Light. panlCl1nll. are cert.itied in accordanca with QSP 2.3.

a. All inlivtdtaJ* parfaming ecaeinatiana to m.c t11' 14oodaraC*> llhall 190lliw lllfticiant training and orlent:aticn to rm underlltandin; of pro..,edsaral rec,Ji

• wa.

6

tJr-304 Rsvisia'l 7

c. Ultruadc exmni.natia'l perllCl1n8l who dat:amine which in:licatiaw are to be recoJ:dad shall have &IVXNatully c:x:mplated a qualificaticm pt0¢DI adm.ini.sterad by tha Quality SeJ:vicaa Inspecticm , Examinaticm Oepu tn-nt which dtmcl*tratea proficiency in di scriminatin;J mt:t.*an flaw indicatic:nl am indic:at.icns of gaamtric or matallw:gical origin.

s.2 F4,li.pnant ()lalificaticns s.2.1 t7r Inst.1:Ullllnt - U* a pulM ec:ha instl:umant capable of establilrhing a miniJwm 40 inch metal path in the flyweal material. Adtliticnu.ly tba iJ1sb:umant DUSt meet the linearity nqd I IIDIUt:a Of t7r-301.

s.2.2 SMJ:ch unit(*> - U* a 1.0 inch diamat:ar, 2.2s  !§lz sb:aight bellll aem:dl unit for initial metal path calil:Jratia, and for tba pariphary 11Ca111. Far tba gaga hole exmninatiaia, UM a .5" x .1", 2.25 !IIZ gaga hcle inspactia, wand. (Mlga.scruc:a Cl.281 1" box'a pxti>e).

5.2.3 Q:Juplant - Use Ultr:agal. II, SCl'1CJtraca 40 or equivalent u pemit:tad by the Pre-FnJinaarwd Material List.

6.0 6.1 t&R: RlgU].atory Qude 1.14, i.v1s1.at 1, dated August 1915 6.2 OX,waw Light Oii\MY Quality SC'Vicaa Inspection EkmnJnatia, NIE Pl* eedlina 6.3 ASHE Boiler and P.t"esaUre Vessel O:XS., sectia, v, 1983 Fditia"I, Sl:amwr 1983 A,1,1-,, da 6.4 DLQ). MV::lMr !nJi,nNring Mllmc:r:r:ardum 90104, dated 4-19-85 6.5 ISI r..ttaz' NIXJISI:0106, datad 11-8-85 6.6 rtlllpX"8a tDUf-86-512, dated 2-19-86 6.7 NPtl\P 9.6

• PrcdJcta a:aatwl 6.8 0q.,.. Light O+ipu,y Olality SCVicaa. PlIZ'IIII 9.4, "Nardastructiva F>am1naticna": 17.1 "Oxttrol of tha Quality SC'Vicaa unit Racm:da": 2.3 "Writtan Practice Far Qualif1caticn and Olr'..ificatian of Nc:n:s.tzuctiw Exmninaticm and Teating Paraa1nal ..

6.9 DI.Q:, Qual.ity o.a1tto1 Rlipaa:t t638, dated 3-9-93.

7

Ul'-304 Ravisia, 7 7.0 A'1"l'ACH1Qfl' 1.1 RCP nywbeel ur Exam1natia, Report

7. 2 unit 1 FlywhNJ. Hole Idt""tificatia, OrawinJ 7.3 Unit 2 FlywhNJ. Hole I& .fic::atiCl'l OrawinJ

a. o QBH>I,CX;Y Of SlW!'iffi 8.1 Revisia\ 7 - Incxn:parata safaty rec,11 c -it.a with the use of Ultz:agel II m.1plant, add O'lra1ologv of Qlal'lgllll sectia,, mama administrative dian;JeS, am parfom two yaar reviaw.

8

tn'-304 Revisia'l 7 Attad1mant 7. l

'!llustrative only

'

i i  ;

-

I Ji I* J I I

I I

!.

I ,

'1 ' 'Gi

... '-

I I

! '!1-

• I C '

., I .I f C I

!

f

! ;li ii I!

1 I -=

i I

i e ...! I - i

!

I I II

i i

LI I  ! i f

I I** I I** Ii I i ii ' ii i I  !

I I

• i I

,, I I

-

I

"'> i J

. i J

Q

=..

!. u i*

dI

.. i I

C II

a:

i I

I I I i cS I 0... I ti 11I I I..

• i 1 . a i Ill Ir sI !a , !a I*, sI 1c i

-

0

• i i I s;!*I

• II II f I

• II I

!..

l I I I CJ I -

I II I

5 a *I ils

• sI i*:s .I II I-

! I II ,

CJ

.1

.. - 5 i 0 I

11

• c.,

""'- I "I I I .. I

" c* I

! -1.1 I !Cl II C

I I

u1* ,si

• a: I

• Ii I I -

C

'

t: ' d I is

• 9

t7r-304 RaVisia, 7 Attac:hmant 7.2 Fl\'MllftJ Hole Ideotitieat Drawirg (Unit 1)

.

6 75 ...L

_l I t .... I I I ....

• * *I I ,.so*

• .so* I I T

I I I I I I 1

,- ts.oo*

10

Ul'-304 RaVisicn 7 Attac:hmllnt. 7.3 IT""'.

nvwtmJ

• Hole Id@ntific;atig, orawllJJ \\o/6-t 2)

• 11"

.... .l J_ I f .... I

• I I

• I I ,.so*

T I I I 4.so* I I I I T

I I I I I I I* ,s.oo* *I 11

ATTACHMENT B INFORMATION ON REQUALIFICATION OF PERSONNEL AND EVALUATION OF MEGASONICS PROBE FOR RCP FLYWHEEL EXAMINATIONS AT BEAVER VALLEY

FCRI 037-122153 IJQJESN! LI<21' CXMPANY Quality Scvioa unit a:mK>L REKR1' 638 STATI--BVPS--Uni----1__,_2______________________

en Mllt'ttl a, 1993, t.ha authar and Gmtga Ju:::k, Slln1ar ND! Exmlinlr:' t:z:avalad to tbe Electro-Mlc::bani Diviaicll in a..wic:k, PL 'Dia pw:p:w of tha trip wu to pcfcma an eval.uaticn of t.ha nc111tly pircbued naactar coolant PlDI>

tlywhM]. t11' exam:i natia'l pr:aA.

'Iha trip 'WU arran;illd u a JIUt:Ually blnatic:t*J evaluaticn of thl MlgUCnica RCP tlywhM]. pr:dA en an act:ual Ja>> fly,tml. Mr. D:n1lu IMen, NIE t....i III, mist.ad in aettin;J a tia IDlll tbl a..wic:k Plant wcu1.d haY9 a 75" diamlltc R:P fly.me.1 aY1J i 1 able. 'Iba fl.y,-ribs1l min; had 6 gaga holes in a c:izd.e 29* t.tm tha fly,ma1l Cll'ltarlina. 'DWI 1ssicJn ia *:im:il*r to the RCP n at BYPS tllit 2. rn- mu.t 1 tl*stnsl hlMI cmy , g111911 hal*.)

n. fiyq,jlaal p:cma dittta:'11 in <hsign t.tm pnwicull.y mad pr.aw in that t:ba IIMrdl unit tile at ia c:urwd to

• ee,**te fer t.ba a:nvwx mt:ry aurtaca raqJ.ired to maka cantact in tha 1* di.allatAlr' bol*. 'Dia dislllcratcated nat effect of this cmvature ia that tha ultnaanic bellll 44,ll?d ia giwrtly J:Wtx:wd dua to the acciustic toc:1*in; affect. '1hia foalrs bellll *llOWII -1.ar idlntificatia\ of raflect:ara enccuntared u wall u reclrwd llipl. to noiN ratio trcm *terial c::::haractaris.

'Iba bra p.dA ia Ulllld to pm:fam two aaparat.a typa of t71' amninaticns cm a JD) tly.me.1. 'Dia tint type ill thl --.inaticln of tbll area aum::udin; tha Oll'ltar bot9 hole and Jalyllllly c:.aa.,. tt"all tbl ca-JI bcalall. 'n. Ms;IIIIClnica bra pr.d:A pertotmld thi.9 tuk 1 11Jy, ecbtbltinJ far 1w baa iipt-.S than thl pmvicul).y UMd pxc:iJe, wh.icb 'WU UMd fer Cl'lllpria:lft.

'nw wcad type ot GIIIIIW1&ticn ia a 360* acan of tha t1y,m11l vol.\11111 tram Md\

of t:ba (JllrJII b:il.M. In this --.inaticln, tha Ms;IIIIClnica bra pr.cu. parformad ampticnllly Wllll, prrc,viclinJ exne11 ent naol.utJ.cn of clc:ael.y iplCwd hol* at significant mat.al pat:ba. 'Iba at.tldllld rea:* llbaw ar,w:ific ca1.im'aticn mrioa w ot Ul'-304 pt* cetzral l'Wfd

• at.a. All a xl?IUl.t of ci:1311a:Yaticsw mada, nvm:al pr:oc,nlN bllV9 beln to Mly taka adYantaga of the prc:iJe cap,t,Uitias.

Page l of 7 Revision ---------- oat.a 3 -1 <c- 9 '3 D initial qualification B' requal.iticaticn

• D requalification not raquind*

(JlALIFICA'.I'I IJMITATI/a:HmnS:

.. PR.t:L,"""'""' "":t "" Qua L, , c A'T,cw c\ cc...: ,v,r: N.,.t:J ON f\i'T"'TAe.ME:d Qc.R. bee . Ac.'Tya\,. 9u"'1.,c.,c.TION "To \:.k CClMdlJc..,.sJ

, ...., c.c w .i- ':t :-,.1 "T , 9 N

c. 1...... , 'T"h e, "" A m , N &Ti o w ATrACHmm;:

0 calibratia, racortl o test object drawin1 0 e.vami natia, recx)rd (J other QcR. *t,3 f

,1£. J-/1.* 9,.4 3 *li?..q Data Data Witzwsa Nlt!. ,.. t,. t,,

Data I,,..

Witrw p.J I.!- #J{b.

x..v.l tJ/.A Date Laval P.toc,adure qaal ific::aticn ZWIUlta an accapt.abl* am pt* ced,D"8 ia qualified within tha prcadD"8 .,:pa an:S subject to tha limit.aticlw not.ad-

\a;.J CI.Co m ,-**

Data

,.... e ANII 3-di-,..3 Data

• It reqn*Jific::aticn 1a not . thl DE.Co. I.av9l m abcuJ.d writ.a a brier mq,lanatia, in tha O HIEIW &ta sectia'\.

, ' ,I I **t **, ** - - ... - , ...

Nu.le tJw ccinfiguratia, of the flywheel. aaminld is similar to the BVPS Unit 2 flywheel. dMirJI', ditfer*ACM in actual fl cxinfigu:ratim will naoesaitata

• p:'ClCW'tira qu*J 1ficaticl\ a, the actual fl(s). 'lhia qualific:aticn of the revi.Md trr-304 will taJca placa en the BVPS unit 1 fl at a..wick durin; April, .

1993 in CXlrjunctia'l with the ur exmn1 naticna. unit 2 flywheel. ocntiguratiat will alJlo be qualitad in canjuncticn with t11' examinaticna. 'Jhis 1..pxtt will serv. u a pt9l.iminuy pro,at,ra cpuificaUcn to val: *ata tba tacbnique and tc doanent tha iqrcMd e>aDD1naticn capabiliti* of tho Miga.a,. ii.ca tOCUNd bor9 probe.

a:: M. A. :AIIU,a&

J. J. Gia Oldi G. L. Ba Factary llitUll MII QSD rile

,

HUE SUl'PI.EMENJAHY IIEPOllf P..,..'9 .,..

...... ffll* <o'38 Uf*

m,ag,...,c s Quf\l1 F-, ic.. *'T*N C.1:sw u:. ?./a/q

--... ..............

D.QuallB Wit.;w-a\..01.1'>>r: '- 6oL"t 1s*'""'lt:R.. flyw"ll:l S,N\tll'lt Tea 8V r u,., ,,. "l 1111L1aua1at11E1**

.-*...... "*

...........

a,.m ..,.

.

........... * ...._,-

• • • r: -*:: -,1***-r: **-1: -r1 ****r1 *--:1***** lRIL IFF

..........

...a...*.:.--1. 1-L-.1.....J..**.

1 1 : -r-i--r-:-*-*1*-**

1 1 : 1 NLMIIY *

• f .. f I -H-t-t--!*-

--**-r-*:-*-*1*

.....-..--1. -t--**-.................. *

-- *

...... flLll

• f*-i-f -J-+ *-f--+-*1-***

--'-****'* ..a.....,

....i.. **---}- *l-l**-r' -l****l-* - ....

• -*-**'-

r*** * *--

I I

• rf--*

e r *** i I

• • • • 1 I

-t

... 11 ...

• f **11* *.* * ,.,_ri IB'LIL ....

xa a -

17.C;° ,,-t. '"'"

9\*i YC 4

RAcl,"L '" s, "ol.l f-,cf\rnua "TI o tJ "F

fAo\.ra IN 11"9 '"'°ll R£,LM:r10II f A*- R1:a. Bol..t "°L*

. '\

., *

.,

7S

..... -*-

..aS

....... llll*

NOE SllftEUENTARY REPORT l!\\9ACU,I.\C,;. fly"""t:l b.Qbt e,tiJu Ilk. f,,c;._,., Q .J fND.

Qc.R '138 w-.1io,..a9\,.o.;.. ._ C\J.""u:.k -/fi,/q-s Uf lluaulB18 lJllj Q"'"'

-... .......

\IJKT1N9hot.1S. , BolT (s,M,L8'fl ,<> su,' u..,,T '1.)

NSS1JE&I BIIIDEIM.a

....,,... ..

• *

-..

• • .u1 ww a.ne. *

....

.......... -

• • ** ** ** ** -r*-t****-:

• • • • • • -**r**'""T-,-r-r-

.... ______ .

• __.__._..

• • ** **-*

.. .. .. ..

• *

• _* __

• __ *____

UWL

...

I/IF ll .... * '

...--*- ...

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 : .

.... **-t-+**-t-t-f--i***+***i--*** *

.... ***-s--t--t-t--*t**-"t*****

....

.... fl ...

MIPUW PIUI

. - d

. ... *-**1********-***-***-***********-1***** ,_ I.DIii

. . . . . ****!*****t****1--*t****t*****1***t****-t*****.

t I I I I I I I

_,

r

.... ***.1-****&,****-1-.a.---***** ... &, .......... .

.... 1 . *-1 -** 1 **** 1 - 1 **- 1 **-*

1 r 1 1 r *-,1 ****,1 **** *. S" ---

-UL xa a: ..- ..

.... :. . ..... :..-..:_...i_ 1 *- ...:..... .:.....

-* n...

I I I  : :

t

• a 11* n.*

• I I I uf"'t'fll """"

c,,, *\.k e)) i *-* - ,. (*a

(111**fftt,,.L ""

"° * '- ---0-- /

RAtliAL 6J\91:. -- - **----

lf. E k"'N ...1011 rflO ... 111'9 I:. "° Lf: II f

..

L -

Ai fLkT .... J**" f\l::AM Nll "*lt *

• *

"

7S

,

NOE stnUMENfAllY IIEPORT M) s-....... ***-

.... llll*

QCR b3 Of Duauea*l.Qj \...tu._i C '°'1:-s ,ck.. "\[9 /'j_}

--..*... .,............

W*sT,Ngout.: b \>1LT

'"

,s d1"'*'°l1t. Flvw"f:tL 'lo 6V P N:....&BIE1mt11E1Ma

...-*........"..,..............

_. 1.n111 *

• ,---- - I I -- I *

• * - -**r: ****:1 ****11*****r1 ****11 *****r1 *-*r1 ****11*****

... ..

l.aR IFF

..........

• • • -****....: ******** ***-***-***-*--********* *****

• • • • • f"-**t: **1-*t--t*-

: : t": ****t: ****1:*****

8 e I e I I I I

.

... ....l.... f --*-t**-l*****t-******-****.

.... .... ***** ......................................

.....

..........

n. ** ...._,

an

• I * * * * ...... PIUI

..\.

• • l***I **l***+-+***l**+***l * ..

I

.

.. :.....: ...,.-,........... ,..... , .....:....

. r........:

---*-*-***-*..

• • -** : -* 1 1 : *****: **** : **** : *****

• :* ,.-r-1 * *

• r* ***************

:

• 1 : :

• 1*

,.....

+ _L._ ....

• *

"II.

aa m -

0 IZ 8' Mlt*\

• au1* ***

Rf\d1Al <."** "oU: t.1tfttrn1t.1a,.*0N PAa\.l 111 aA** "-oll "f *.

Rlfll:C.TIIM Fa.a 9ftCJI: "*ll

..l"'

• 11"

,

IND.

NOE SlJJPLEMENJAIIY REPORT Qc. G38 p ....... * ,..

J Rlll' Of rn.1"fto ... ,c flywh1:,l r,to!;.

Pf\i lu,, N"R w -s."l, out.. <.:"sv..,c. "&/&l "'S)

DuaueSI. Lill1

.....-**. *"..,..

Wl!t'l' "'",g ".01.1t. , boLi" ""15 .. d 11:>om.1."tt

.,.,......DtDEt.. 8" PS IJ ... T 'Z FlYWl (L St flt\. l ft. .,. 0

...... *

..

....... ,, .............

111M' a.ua.

... ... .. __.. ..

1 1 1 1 r*-*r

1 -r- 1 1--*

1 LRliL IFF

--:-- r--i- ,*-*

........ ......_,

.....*.

I

_ I

_..._

I I

__ I ____....

e

• _ I ___

1 t- 1 -t-1 : **- : *-*t****t****

: :****

-***-t--t-**--t-**+*-**t *******-**

• -**t***- t t 1 *

.,. n ...

• +* *l* **--*--* * ****-i-****i *

• l* *

......,.

.....i. *******--f*-** **-*****-i*-*** **** --** ...... flltl

...

.

IILIECI IFf 1 -*r*-*r*-*1*****

.......-. -*..

.... *****--*l---1*-'**** ........-., .....*..... ... 11W

• T1 *-,--,--r-1 1 1

• I l l

.... .!l.l.*-f****1-***1 ... *********!-*** *!*****

-"11:. *

• 1 * * * ** n ....

+

1.1** ... , .. l ...........

... LIL .....

• *

---

*

llAd,"l *. *-

9,.9 "*lf: f=,c.., .... O."'TI ...

---

*

I ,, '

P1tobf! ,... ca a"QI: "c,lt., F 11 Rlfli.C:llaN fRa,A l'lt: 1-tllf d

• 1s"

A1TACIIMENT C ASME TECHNICAL PUBLICATION PAPER NO. 74-,vp.25 REACTOR COOLANT PUMP FLYWHEEL OVERSPEED EVALVATION

Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheel OVerspeed Evaluation ru **.,.. """"*'" o/ tAe """*"ft,...,,._., .. ,.,,...,......,.""....,

P. C. IIICCIIDE 141

............. ca..

IN.,...._C11Ht. -- ,....,. - .... --- .... COM6i** ...... ...,, a,,,i...,.,.,

,,.,,. Ltailiflf ......., ,.. ,,..... ft,-,.1..,.. ......,.,. ,,,, I.A, adil,

• • H. IAllfDID Jalvn _. .._, tAI ,riflt:i,,,., o/ S-... Ill o/ lM ASII ..,. w Prufttt v... c...

• I* I.A, 6riUI, ,,.,,. ..... ...., * ,,.,,,,,. ........ .,,,...

VI ...... ,..,, ..........i.... ,,..,.. ..........,..... ...,,.,,

n. ....... .,

• aalWC- .,,,,...... ., ... ..., ,. ,,.,,...

--' ......... -"'1u .,......., ..,_ aplnWIIIU... ........ fA, r,11111,

,, ,., ......... ,,,...., Ml tAi, ,.,,., - "" ill-- "' .... cf,..,.

................

IIWci\ ca

• _,,__ ....... tqlJJliotsiMI ., ..... ,,.,,,.. _._.. c..

..... _..,., ,,..., ....,........ ,. ....... ., ..... ,,...... o/

Introduction ADii llailar 111d ..... \'11111 Collt ,_ cl...u. ,..... ..,

....._ wl utjlin* dll pricMipla ti llwr .&utic fnc&uN ID t.bl eftDI of a paa&ulMed a of IOOIMI Nddal ia a .... ms+aie {LEPII) for briUII ,,..... ........... Dua lo llllriNd waw IWIW plut.. ii ii ...... f* dll ....... primalJ plulici*J, &Ill

..., paap to .......... - dll ..... of 1W ....

LUK .....11* ii_.....,. APPli*** IO Ima t.imfll ill nonul daip ...... Al ..... of 11111 wpi--. -.

.,. .,...

• to

• JikeUhood of ....,**** ., dll .....

IIDIOt dOabw fl'UIUl'Utl wl ........ Mp -., llliloilll willliA &a. ..w*ans. Of U111a11 ***** ia dill np,d II dll t

rwtor ooolaal pump lrrt 111, ..,. ii pm dll aGII

• I

&alioaal iMrlia la &Ill ptftp IIIOIII' I I bly, wl llull dll liabll& aaouald....,. a&* liffll.,....

TIie Weld..,... eoolaa& ,_, lywl ol ...... 111a111 of t.w ..... 11'811 dWa, 76 ia. Md II ia. ia clt*a1... .W. an 0

a., ** ..*0

"'

bolled t.Ol'daar ia Oldlr IO .-,W. dll Ill 11 r, rot11iaeal iWlia to maialaia .._ 111d t.lull ,,...s m 01wk*IUII ill

• ,*,

Ill

• 0

&111..-&ollaaol .......... ,...,.. ..... ., **,.k,11 t

It

-bl)', .... 1111 Bl iftul .... 111d dia1111iN1 II I

..-illf'II. I, ,,_ .......... 1.alL&MakllldUla.diiek. 0 IIIIPNlifllr , - -** ..... 1aa111111d _,..,. * ..._

TIii Im* Iii ,..._... r.... Onde 8, a- I 1tell

.......

• • dait a,.._. clll3ip beea**

TIii ,.,... of tllil ......... lo ...............

aililal fl'OII t.11e 1

,,., ......

ii

., fl'MIIIN ud .......... IIUllill ......... All ualytical 1111pra1tlll IAlrla. 111iliaiac die 3lllllodl ol S.C- ID ol die

.. , ......

• r--,.11war **n.....,....,.,_,

............... << . I I _ .... ,,..,_.

.. ......

CIMRNtall II, 1111t l'w ._. _. .... DM11a ,- ----

..... .._.. v_. _. ..._. Cwl _ _..N....,rs* .__.

......... Dt..... ........ n... ..........,,.. "T* AWlcAII J ti t1a .LI aeu1--it-ft

.... ................. ,.,............,

8IC9" * ........... llr-** N °".......,*ADI& ......

--.11811*11. lfft. ._.H., 76offP... 1.H 111,a. r,. .al+

C..-* .. *nllt11U111 ...... m..

1

... * *t 9' I l'lft

• .. .... -: ... _ *- .,.: .. --- ... p ! . - - * - .J . *

• C"' ...... . - .J - * - * *"'-I

111 1 t ' f 1 1 I I l!s N

.....,,_ .... , ....,. ,....,.,

1, i ti l I

1UH

. . .. . . . . .. . . . I° a*41° J

• * !9 * * * * * * * -

i; I I

• I*

11 s 1* ..__, '-" .. a 1i-lf ,..

l t::---1

,r** ,_!_,,: ,_!_,,: lll[ _r r-1l*

. , , ,

• I * * * *

• I' e J >l 1 TlT *:*:

tr*i f lj .f I i I l*!1 l I

'i

=-

! ..I ,1If ,+, ,, f I s t I & I J- 1 , 1.!j-,_ - t' I U{, .. iI I;+, * ,r1 r:rs f,r2 rI 0

I !--

!UU .:..!

!t(f f 1** ..J

1J I

>tl

• !f<<li s ti ll*l

'1 l(fl{ t i'I- 1

• 11 I l'l.. i l(Sf.lf I t i I ii e:If' l .. f t.',f !1 i fC =f"1 ** 1t

• . f I rf(1-r.1-:t t

.a1.t

• r ,--, .. ,, + ,..._..,.... ,..._.., .* w*f I.. 1.*

t -' 1 E:.- - IA, ie:

..

Iii tr 1 ..+,_ - +/-

Es

.

I

w

-

e\ I! 1;(  ;- i-I I . .

ii I c* II 5.. i' er as- f.ff 1*1 sl; *Et 1-ala.

!t ,, 1

.. 3 lHH t i'i ii! th r f iU1 nrih ,;

st;- Ji" : if  ;::_ i!, l\ h II* r1 s!Jlf!* r-1 lH J i 1 r*

l 1 s 1 Ho i s = .. e 1 i g*I i 1 r*

i'J' n H 1* 11 !Jfi u 1 r

i I

I

!,

&

if 1 lJ G;'"

11 t .:..! :F st1,:-, :-,f!:11Jt .-lis- a-!

!!: 1- 1-s  : 1+ l1'1 1. t iif lti 1l 1fth l ffr.J r, fitSJ a t, !l fl1a tf fih ii" t BI 1 I i ...

I 1* i -<"* l :...' & .-! * .* ,I J-Ii

_!

e. r

! \

l Ii ll l [

l ..,- I l ! ;- . t ..-;:*

i .. , ,t" r its I h I

1

. I

11L '--' * .. - -

!

..... J !. i If-

' ..__,

, g i ! 1

• Ir I

I CT

• l r f ..r 1 1 I

'<  :,

e.2:

2.

.. I 1

• t 1- t5- at I- l f, [ . I.,* s* 1 1 r 1* - 1 1 1 i , - t

-+ 1.

t .. l * ]: :,. 8 I I l i

! ,

fi l I ..__, ,

e:s:f I

.. *1; 0

e- + t

'<

. .,,(A,j :2.*; g. .-

2.

• " .... i.l t g l i i s* 11 i t .;i :i l 1 sIi!. ,_ - 1 I r5. J r s*I th al ii I e 2.

'3[ f'.I .. 9 1 -<

,.. *rUui! tUh .. t1 fHls 11 hi.t;h

• -<

..__, ::;,.

.__. H a

of 90,000 pli ... lad ill OOIIIPUIUII U. fault.ed oonclitioD limita wllicb ii t.be minimWD -,.c:i6ed YMUI for A.433 Onde 8, ca..

l ,.,..

+

Ii** in (31. Tbe linaiciac apeed bMld OD tbl meabrue beDdinc 1tn11 lim.it ii 315 nd/w or 3616 'PIii, and tbl limit.-

• inc apeed bMICI OD tbe IDtllDbnne ltnll li.mit ii 372 nd/NC or I;_*

ls

+

....

rpm. Tbenfore, t.be lDlmbrua Jo IWDIDAl'Y, tbe NINI* of tbt uw,-

beDdial limit ii .......

Pllformed ill daia ...

2.0

&ion denlomtrat.e tut tM ract.or eoo&ut pump lywbNI au ¥ witbat.and a rotational apeed of 3d6 rpm, wbicia oomapoDda to i approxim&t.ely A 290 percent OwenipNd coDdit.ioD (F'II, 10) wiUIOut uCINdins tbe fault.eel collditioo eriteria (Appndia F)

I I ...... ................ ,, ..

---

I

of Sect.ion III of \be ASME Doilar ud Prwun V-1 Code.

Compliaooa with tbat li.miw *ura that tbl lywbeel au i .......

6--.-..- :;:; !'ti:;,:*:

'P ,..... ,

, ,

wit.bet.and Ulil offlSpeed condition tritb 1115eieal IUl'li,D from  : 1.0 o---o .....* li..laflf 1111

.....

tbl ,w.ndpoiJlt of ductile f&ilun.  :

[(11(1 *' .......

I*

,.

• Brittle Fracture Evaluation ClelN *- .............., ..... 11111111H All approximat,e

=.. ,!

!

ec>lu&ioa for tbe ,u.a int.euity fador for a radial crack emuat.-

iq from tbl boN of a rot.alins diak laM bNa report-1 by Williaml

,.................... ....

0.00--......--.....----------"""'---'

uul laberwood (41, and ii IPffD by tbl followinl apnaioD o.o , .o t.o 1.0 ,.o ,.o 1.0 , .o

............................

Cl&U l(PT11 ,. ft.a .....fl. ** IIMt ( 1.a.11 (t)

......

tJae lywbeel, iJadudiDI bait of OIIII UJ'ft1, ii required to modal tbl complete 8ywbeel. A Dumber of dil--1 cnck dopt.111 ud toeauoae wwe nudiad bJ plMinc tbl epec:ill cnckUp modal a&

Yuioul loealioae wit.biD dill ... pid l'llpOG. E1eaio eoluuom

... obtaiMd fo, all ... ,.....;.. tbt loadinc to be d111 oalJ to omllifupl ,._ raaltias from l)*lliiiiliil apinn;n1 Tbe fl.

,.., of _.._ Joadins a& tJae inMr ban ud aywa11 wn wUIDld to be ......... wl tJae .,.....,. ... aeeumed to be ia

• 1taY of plAM nraia. Val._ of .._ iat.eaa&y fadOr .....

enimalld from tbl alllDlriCIIII atra neulw ia tbl Yiaillity of Ille cncktip bJ 6Uins tJae dala to die Im 11"> WIIIII o4 tba Nrile apecri,:,a for lbie cnck tip atra llld UOIII tbl plw ol tJae cneksiffD bJ ud ... tbl ,-...tric quatnila a, l, ud c are ..... ia

...... 2. Tbt qUADliUII J aDd .. ""* to U. ma&lrial deali&y ud aacwar ffioeitr .. bafora. aut:.ututilll .... appropriat,e .-.

met.ric da&a from F"11, l iDto -.ua&ioal (t) ud (T) ._. to llnll iot.enaity fac.or M

• fl&DCllioll of Ullu&ar 911oaitJ fo, Tuioal Mlwned cracud .,..... ...... bJ ........ eun9 ia Fie, *.

Noc. tba& for t.be - of a eraek e*vciac froa

• urn1, tliie keywaJ deptb it iMluded M pan of tJae tot.el crack dlplla for COIINl"Ya&mll.

Iupectioo ol F'11,

• iDdi** \Ml tJae c:laallCl form eolulioa tecba.ique erroneolaly pYa

• nouen, nl* of au.. illlellei&y factor for aero crack dlplla. Tba it beaam* obYioa tbal tliie M1ump\ioa of addiDc u,wa:, dlptb to crack deptb ii OTWly coDWYa'"9 for fff)' 1borl crack dlpllae. la order IO elimina..

tbil uDd* COftlll"YabllD, ud to ooaaidlr U. IIICI of tbl kt:,wa:,

......

lllOl'9 ucura&ely,

• dfteilld bi.. .._, model of tbl lywllNI with* cnck emau&inc from LIii urnJ ftlM up ud ualyNd.

,.... ..........,.. App,nuu&el1 aoo ooanu, .vua pump lywbael for ual,-

UiaDp&ar 6Dit.e MIDIDla ..,. ...a to moclel dal NeC10r coolul IIIUII t.be oonapuw Pf'OIIUD PPCNT (51. A delailld iUuatra&ioD ol t.be mocWa lad in tM anal,- it ahowD in F"ac. 3. Due IO IJIIUDtVJ, ollly a eo.dls Nlffl*DI of .... I ,._. *11*111 ..... el....., ......, ,-alt ll,wll11I Journal of Pressure Y***I Technolotr 3

.. *n u HHJ ,

i} f 1 t f I:: I l a

[ ll!l l i:1 t t ' ! 1 !I llli. * ' *lJ.[llti l.l!il !! !:!li,i r-1 It ia*j 1 a I l 1 1 1

- !'*. . g.

.,

a

• X 1*in..

e_

-11£ I[

a.

, fi. 'It.

111,a _

I -0 - f:' a £!' . . !:I r;: £!' D" 9  !!1 .!I ,I o " a ... e. c D

=sis f1.t,h 1* l t s

• 11 ,. t t f _. i i- t ' f f . .. f s J 1.* I*J iflt.ta*t- f1_ , !Jhf.i.1'i1Hth !ti!

f i!ttalr

!. I I t f s ;*

. lfflf  ! .. !h1 1 !q pan 1t:! 1

.n uHi1 II!' ihh!i! '"

l s .. ru ,.  ; ff- i "' il f

. - - . [ s ihtl1 :

I[*[!

IH

,!rf i

l!11

!

lH! Ui!UH lJHHtdH f h!!lfni lrt[lhf!H Jf.ilg.r !luheh 1 rth 'Pt iHH!Hi:t:tq !Hi s I e. , ,-1. 1 l 1 r l1 l t I i l I 1 Jl l i 1, t ,*J i I I t i l 1 1 - ! ;; t i I I t,.s rn i ,.

s ,*

fl la J!i lf Ii  !HU I '1 &"H l

'1 1H U lih HU IHH :Hh I I,

.JPf Ptt!u .f1 !i t1rt=-.. 1. H f .. Uto t . .

i r g

- "' U _

' i s I **1 I .a

• f ! 1-.a 2.',., J 1 s

.I _1(-, i>>! a sle 1:: ssal- tlHlHr ** 1 t.f t!!iJ!tl g

t; I ( i

.

f

..

f I, 5  ; " I l& > . !. J . P . s isl.!!i:i" t -I f Cl I

&"!-.f(IEii

• ':< g - . f* *

• I.

,. . 1t \"ti I f ::ISL

• 1 I I

l. : I I l f t i i ; r* s* i* i i i ... g: f* ! f l i i _f f *

... - 1  !. II 5 a: '

r

.. a g: $.. _

r ,.r I1 t;* t= 1( . ! t tt r ;*t 1:, 1*,, t, t*,. i *. t1 r -rf i f. =!* i =s-a:==.f. f., l'"!- li,, s1

11. n ..

ii Ir p O

• p C . '<

• C  ;;*

r o,11 l

i. a, "

I tf t ,

ii:

• I. s*

[1 t,t ijt;:,: *. g.  ;

!I * :: :i

1. g J

. .

=:I

'- *

• =- ..

i .._2.1 [ Jj-, ....

• l.:i :S I r

• I r1. . J s ..a. -*I -1... l ( s I I -J e:s. r.. . s J s l'

-a ;" ..

2. a.o 4 E.1--

t l t ._ .1 , =-. F i- -a i-1 ;" I l* t- t( s- -,

i_ f I

t 9. S r- -- : -.. --1 .

11 * .. ,. oh ;; 1 h l

[I

• l

!!.

lit .

It a!

!

r

• tU! ... n, - ..

!I. , E: ii r ll

. J *

• J

• ,.

'Jil '. tir . I !t*,.tH ... )

< 1 -* e. pa . l!. L!.-,

J 1 ... * ..

t *J1 *i I l I ! .. l *

• f t 1- rt I

- fr 1

• a.

• 1

• 1 I: 1 c a 1 1 ;

I . !J . l S?,

• l ' 1* 1 i i f i

j

.2

l

&*

l

-

l a. l (Pl

( r I *. oe* s * * *

• 1 s I:i. I  ;*S 1- Iil . - ;* , 1 - --

11 "dUl:-i ,1,iJ.f sH1:, ll -.h.I '

n1,;nnP nt 1 ,

1 i';

r*

!!

1 1 t u uu1 J Hti1i

..... I *tf t I ;1hl!r i 1*ti h d! nthUlh 1! st II La .... ! ..,,.'Jl;..b r 5 f I l 1

4

!Hn1 1 n'JHFIHfll* 1 '! 1 iin H 1 i.t '" 1r i[ .ltl!i tH a ....J!l*1 lh 1 t .. tl!HtU :h dhir, 1 UI f

,

j a. tllf1ls

• f: ltJ a. lfrJs* *i fJ a.

l & l f ! I r t *, i-J .t l J s fl F f .. f f.1.f s 1 st.tall f[J fi fif( f J. lls I

f. f i .ts l 1 s a. t f 1, a* I Ji fit, f I !:

• f J J* l f t

.. Jt Jij I I:JU,J! Ji*I. iJJt 8

I ..I-! ai , l f ihI 1.I i -

! z ";'" i s SS St i i l I

! ! ! ! ! !  !  !

-;' { ;'a<

J f

f

9. t'lf&

sll

• af lB l ... f ! r 1* I. !.

i

-*

.i r

-

t a

.,.1 UlfH :il I 0

It: I ..

,

l

, ;w 1.f  :, ;w

',,  ;

[f i 11-f I __

I I I

• t

=a ,.

J

. !Fl. JJ .. fst :j!

I I

p R [

I I

-?Jl '

r I ',)

o p . R p it.ff !

o 1 t- s ie 0

i*

(I ti I I tl *1 " " ( fi*f 5

l It I !

• II Ui

',

1.11'11

.. ,. ..

I 11 - 1lf I Ii ll ti i iiJ l I.* " o, I - 6

] g I

- - -Jf l I [*.. t t.- r I i ..,, ', ,o f:rt ;

s 1ti

• !i!

J ** i ! iI I t 1

!i!

o

Il  ; =

=

1

- . s

._,

t,!f'1:J

.a Er

1. IJ* ti[ I h I i '------'

I*

E11g* 1*1>ll1if.S1f!lJi*

f" Jtla.1. I J' (Jif a..- fll

&

1 ls* s.f 5( !f * }l

• Ii1 (I!f r;a --I! s_ !s I f 'r si fr:. II ::t' 2.

• J I! J

,-1

u"i**

**"*11,J,"Mi i *

-r ,I - , - , l'

'

,

,--T-II ,\' l !;r ff a! Jhf' J .. h 1 Ja. rif&st

.w1: 1l1 'll !1:r, fl " =

/

I !

• -,,*i't !111 Ill t

-tf 1ff .. f (

I* I ,,

iii **. rt* Hhh!hhi !1 *.

I t t

/

i;. II ;

• t I t: r Ht ;

l s *1 ! ta i;* 1-, fr J" l;-I !; ?( I t I i.'

&

t l i i 1 ;1 ,/ I

. I .. t II  !" : r Cg ..

lt rfss:..;tfi si!li.i, t!" !;  ; i ..

• ii e 1 5 l.tB  ; ! i s* a t a J 1:- r r- i' I t;2. S ' g 1Difl .

f

= *; :::

>i!!' "'sa "'a* l:lgft

• r os2-*0 I

S 1* iI r !!. E.  ! J i:ta1

.

s.a - r::t :,

C E: i '

'<C

- je

0111 a i I .. i. a ;

D I

5 1* la) [1 s* ff! i & i l ( !ID !-i Q-. fI '.: *

.... ----------------, L. a. ..... a. o. 8u.ur, w1 L. ,. ca ti*' iD OUT)ilac 011,

..

.......&al por1ioD ol lllil ........

• i

!COO no*

Ii

!

_ ...... . if

-

i a:

. *.

• • IC *-41

'

1000---------------

...

............................................,..

0 0

• 0 J O IO aa-, CIICI Nm f:IIC1QI It I.I

....

1,1 Teet........ Tbe tbree lcale model lywt Nit, fabricat.s M cleacribed aboft, ...,.. t.ac.d to lailun in U11 bip 1PNC1 &urbiae rotor tatiac madune a& W*tin,bou. Rwrcb Labontoria Tbe t.a\l..,. performed M room taapln&UN (+75 d'I) ud ta\ talpe,MIIN Md rolalional ... _.. IDOlailand ooa

\iouolllly daroupou& tbe tat.

Tbe apec:imem fne\UNcl iD \be 1UDD1r abon ill J'la. t. Tba fracture dala from \MN aperimenla are plo&t.ed OD rac. I, ill t.1r1111 of fracture apNd ftftlll actual crack dlpdl for OOlllpU'ilDo with aulysil. Tba J<<l'IIIDiil' be&""° U11 fracun pndielioal Md tbe aperimeatal daca ii aoeUui. IIDdias

• laip

• I"" ol cndibili&y IO \be aul,Ucal prooadlll'II lalCI ia dliil proto&ype lywa.a ...taalioa,..,.. ill CM,,_. of allaift plaltic IOM Ilia&

Conduslon1 A dnailed tnlaalioD luia belll performed IO ......_ dlil critical 1,-d for die WtlliDpowe raacw ooo&aa, puap 1,.

• bell dllip from die d&Ddpoi11& of frMWN ud ..........,

IIUllilt productioL Tbe l'llulll ol dlia 8'Udy 11'1 allmlDAl'illd ia rac. 10.

Dueu. fail.. ud briUAe fnc&un of die 1)**111 ... ooa,.

lidencl -,.n&lly wl -- ..... ... *oblilllld ,.

4*L Tba limit.iac ....... Cllfflt ol I'll- 10 ..... dla& lllfl dude failUN Umil ol MU rpm (2IO ,...., U'I'*...,..&) ii pl'll'8illa for c:rMk 1i111 a.. I.Mil I.IS ia., ud 1M1 1111 bril&II met.1119 limi, beooa.a P"ftliaal for ..,._ crack lilll. 8iw Ulil cnck

.. ii 91r7 larp ill ....... to \Ml .... ii .............

Clln'IDI i...... ud quall&J ........ procedlUW for lllit lJ*

wbNI daip, i& .. be IDUludld tM& NU lplD ii die Uait.ias epeed for lbl dllip.

Finally, a ecale IIIOdll l)w..... 111& ...... WM carriad OU& IO Ylrify tbt aaalf1NIII proeedlll'II 1111d ill &Ilia ffalualioa. 'nine llllla WIN ,-formed, ud tM 1'1111111 of all tlant ftl'l laiply c,oo.

ftrmatorJ. 011 1M bllil ol t.w. -- model Ill& r,copua, i& ..

be eolldlld.d tba& tDI IDldaoda 111N IO pndic& l:,whNI frac&IIN i11 tbia nport an biply aceunta ud. ill OODj,v.ac1ioD wi&la dlil eoQllff&U'l'e maWia propll'ty da&a .... abou1cl to ...

dude l)'WMII fnctun UDdar o,.,, IId loldilll eoadiUOIII ,..

Tidiac tbt c:alculat.ed limidai ... an DOI a....a.

Acknowledgment TIie aut.bon p-a&lfully aclmowledp tbl Mli&aaee al M-.

......... v.....

Joum1I of l'rel1ure YnMI Technoloff 7

Duquesne lJd1t Co111JanY 8Mver Power Slatton P.O. Box 4 Stwlngpon, M 15077.0004 SUSHIL C. JAIN (4121393*5512 OM.ion Vice Preetdenl Fu (412) 643-804!9 Nuclear S.MCH Nuclear Power Dtvlalon U.S. Nucleu Regulatory Commission June 21, 1996 Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001

Subject:

Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 and No. 2 BV-1 Docket No. S0-334, License No. DPR-66 BV-2 Docket No. 50-412, License No. NPF-73 Response to Request for Additional Information Concemin1 WCAP-14535; Revised Item 2 Response Attache6 is a revised response to Item 2 to an NRC staff request for additional information provided by letter dated May l, 1996, concerning WCAP-14535, "Topical Report on Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheel Inspection Elimination." Beaver Valley submitted the subject report by letter dated January 24, 1996, as the industry's lead plant oo this issue, and submitted a response to the request for additional information on June 14, 1996. On June 18, 1996, a teleconference between the NRC staff reviewers, Westinghouse Electric Corporation staff: and members of the Beaver Valley staff discussed the June 14, 1996, submittal, in particular Item 2.

This revised response to Item 2 is intended to cluify the interaction and impact of adding the stresses associated with a conservative shrink fit and flaw sizing conservatism associated typically with Section XI acceptance criteria of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. The response to Item 2 and Table 1 has been revised to reflect additional conservatism in the allowable crack lengths for reactor coolant pump flywheels.

Please direct questions reguding this submittal to Mr. Roy K. Brosi at (412) 393-5210.

Sincerely,

-

DELIVERING

---

- --

Sushil C. Jain

--

QUALITY ENfRGY

Response to NRC Request for Additional Information on WCAP-14535 (Revised Response to Item 2)

Item 2:

Section I. I Previous Flywheel lnteg,*ity Evaluations. Page J -J - The fatigue analysis is dependant on the premise that UI' equipment usedfor examinations of RCP flywheels at these facilities is capable I f accurately detecting and sizing 0. 24 inch long near surface flaw. Provide your basis supporting the probability of detection (POD) for the examinations performed. Provide details on how the POD values were determined. qualified. and used in concluding the assumed size of the initial flaw.

Respoase to Item 2:

The initial crack length of 0.24 inch was used in a previous evaluation of RCP flywheel integrity by Babcock and Wilcox (Report BAW-10040, December 1973. "Reactor Coolant Pump Assembly Overspeed Analysis"). This length was assumed to be the lar&est crack that could be missed in nondestructive testing.

As seen in Table 4-4 of WCAP-14535, crack growth assumina extremely large initial flaw lengths (from 2.04 to 3.28 inches) was found to be insignificantly small over a 60 year extended plant life. In the crack growth evaluation. 6000 RCP start/stop cycles were assumed, which is conservative with respect to actual operation. Shrink fit was not included in the WCAP-14535 evaluation. This is conservative. since shrink fit retards crark growth. as discussed in the Response to Item l , above.

This evaluation suggests that very large initial flaws can be sttucturally tolerated, from a crack growth perspective. AJ noted later in this discussion, the reflective reference area used for calibration of the inspection procedure is nearly an order of magnitude smaller than these structurally stable flaws.

An alternative method of evaluating this issue is to define an "allowable" flaw size based on the application of IIUIIJins to the calculated critical flaw size and the calculated stress intensity factor.

The approach used here is to apply the Code pressure boundary IIUIIJins of ASME Section XI to the flywheel, which is a non-pressure boundary, non-Code component. This application is considered to be extremely conservative. The Section XI criteria are as follows:

Criteria based on flaw size: 8allow 0.1 8crtti"1 (Normal, Upset and Test Conditions) 8allow O.S lcriti"1 (Emergency and Faulted Conditions)

Criteria based on stress intensity factor: K1 Toughness/ 10 (Normal, Upset and Test Conditions)

K1 Toughness/ 2 (Emergency and Faulted Conditions)

The nonnal condition for the flywheel is the nonnal operating speed of 1200 rpm. The faulted condition for the flywheel is the overspeed of l SOO rpm.

The results of this approach are provided in Table l below. Shrink fit is included in these results, since shrink fit increases the magnitude of the hoop stresses {as shown in Figure 1) and consequently, the stress intensity factor. In Table l, crack length is measured radially from the keyway, and percentage through the flywheel is the crack length divided by the radial length from the keyway to the flywheel outer radius.

I acIu din2 th e Effiect or Sh rn **

Table 1: Allowable Crack Leaetlls for Flywlleels i k Fit d SectiOD XI Criteria Flywheel Allowable Crack Lengths in Inches and % through Flywheel Group 1200 rpm (Normal Speed) 1500 rpm (Overspeed)

RTNDr* RTNDr* RTNor

• RTNDr* RTNDr* RTNDr*

0°F 30°F 60° F 0°F 30°F 60°F l 2.3" (7o/o) 1.4" (4%) 0.4" (1%) 7.6" (23%) 2.7" (8%) 0.6" (2%)

2 2.3" (7%) 1.5" (4%) 0.4" (1%) 8.0" (24%) 2.8" (8%) 0.5 (2o/,)

10 l .9" (7%) l .3" (5%) 0.6" (2%) 8.3" (3lo/o) 3.7" (14%) 1.6" (6%)

14 2.2" (8%) 1.8" (7%) l.1"(4%) 12.0" (43%) S.4" (200/o) 1.2" (4%)

15 1.0" (5%) 0.5" (2%) 0.2" (1%) 4.3" (21°/o) 1.9" (9%) 0.9" (4o/,)

16 1.9" (8%) l .4" (6%) 0.7" (3%) 10.2" (42%) 4.6" (19%) 1.8" (7%)

It is imponant to note that several conservative .,ssumptions were included in the detennination of the allowable crack lengths provided in Table I. These are discussed as follows:

a) The closed fonn solution for the stress intensity factor was used. This solution assumes that the keyway radial length is included in the crack length, which is conservative for smaller crack lengths.

This conservatism is evident in Figure 3 for Flywheel Group 1, which indicates that a zero length crack has a stress intensity factor of about 42 ksi vinch, since a crack of 0.937 inches (the keyway length) is assumed. As shown in Figure 4 of the attached ASME ,echnical paper (Attachment C), finite element analysis shows that the stress intensity factor for cracks less than about one inch long is significantly less than the closed fonn solution would predict. Therefore, there is significant conservatism in the smaller allowable crack lengths ( I inch and smaller) provided in Table 1 above.

b) A conservative shrink fit was assumed, as discussed in the Response to Item 1.

c) A lower bound fracture toughness for ferritic steels was used, as discussed in Section 4.3, page 4-7 of WCAP-14535.

d) The very conservative criteria of Section XI were used. These criteria apply margins of ten (10) to normal, upset and test conditions, and two (2) to emergency and faulted conditions. These margins account for uncertainties in flaw sizing and loading. It should be noted that the loadings associated with the flywheel (centrifugal forces and shrink fit) are well defined and were conservatively applied in this evaluation.

e) The ambient temperature used for the fracture evaluation (700F) represents a much lower temperature than would be expected in the containment building during nomw plant operating conditions (typically lOOOF to 1200f).

f) The stress intensity factor is calculated using the methods of linear elastic fracture mechanics. This method usumes rapid crack extension in a liner elastic material (i.e., material propenies below RTNOr),

The flywheel material would remain highly ductile since the operating temperature is well above the RTNDT of the material. The conservatism usin this method is therefore inherent.

Over the past ten years, the examination techniques employed have improved, particularly with the use of the defocused gage hole probe. The detectability of the gage holes at various metal paths displayed in Attachment B indicate that the inspection methods used for flywheels are capable of finding flaws of the sizes identified in Table l.

In Attachment B, the 1.25 inch diameter gage holes (effectively side drilled holes) were clearly identified at a metal path which is nearly twice the metal path distance involved in the insption of the keyway area. It should be noted that it is conservatively estimated that the effective reflective surface of a side drilled bole is a 300 arc. The reflective surface from a 1.25 inch gage hole would therefore be 0.33 inch.

This length is smaller than all but the smallest of the allowable crack lengths in Table l (0.2 inch, Flywheel Group 15, RTNDr of 600f, 1200 rpm). As discussed above, a significant amount of conservatism is inherent in the smaller allowable crack lengths ( 1 inch and smaller) provided in Table I.

In addition, Flywheel Group 15 includes only one plant, Three Mile Island Unit 1. Per Babcock a.'ld Wilcox Power Generation Group, Nuclear Power Generation Division Topical Report BAW-10040, December 1973, "Reactor Coolant Pump Assembly Overspeed Analysis," the RTNDr value of the flywheel material is estimated to be -1o° F. Therefore, a crack length of greater than one inch would be allowtd, which is larger than the 0.33 inch reflective surface from a 1.25 inch gage hole discussed above.

Therefore, the inspection methods used for flywheels are capable of finding the flaw sizes shown in Table l.

APPENDIX F RESPONSE TO SECOND NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION m:\3356w.wpf: lb-111196 F-1

Duquesne Usf1t Company a.aver V..., Power Slallon P.O. Box 4 Stllppll'IGJ)Ort, 15077*0004 SUSHIL C JAIN (412) 393*5512 OfVlliOn vice PrHidenl Fu (412) 643*1069 Nuclear Service, Nuclear Power Olvlalon August 2, 1996 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Docwnent Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001

Subject:

Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 and No. 2 BV-1 Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 BV-2 Docket No. 50-412, License No. NPF-73 Response to Request ror Additional Information Concerning WCAP-14535; RAI Dated July 24, 1996 Attached is our response to an NRC staff request for additional information provided by letter dated July 24, 1996, following a meeting between Duquesne Light Company and NRC staff on July 17, 1996. This response concerns the maintenance history and frequency of pump motor ovrhauls for the types of pumps proposed to be covered by WCAP-14535, "Topical Report on Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheel Inspection Elimination."

Currently a reactor coolant pump flywheel inspection would be required dwing the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 2 sixth refueling outage scheduled to begin on August 30, 1996. Therefore, NRC approval is requested by this date.

Please direct questions regarding this submittal to Mr. Roy K. Brosi at (412) 393-5210.

Sincerely,

---

'd- * --

.

Sushil C. Jain c: w/enclosure:

Mr. L. W. Rossbach, Sr. Resident Inspector Mr. H. J. Miller, NRC Rgion I Administrator Mr. D.S. Brinkman, Sr. Project Manager (3 copies)

Ms. Diane Jackson, Westinghouse Electric Corporation DELIVERING QUALITY

--*----

E N E R G Y

Response to NRC Request for Additional Information on WCAP-14535 RAI Dated July 24, 1996 On July 17, 1996, a meeting with the NRC staff was held to provide information concerning the costs of reactor coolant pump (RCP) motor flywheel inspections, and the frequency of RCP motor disassembly for maintenance. Duquesne Light Company (DLC) personnel discussed actions performed at the Beaver Valley Power Station. The applicability of the responses to the industry as a whole could not be addressed; accordingly, a survey of the flywheel group was conducted.

The results of this survey are discussed below along with an alternative flywheel inspection.

Survey responses were received for 35 of the 57 plants which are covered by WCAP-14535. The results show a wide range of responses to the question of how often RCP motors are disassembled for maintenance, but most are disassembled on an average frequency of about every 8 years. The other two questions concerned the cost and exposure involved with flywheel inspections now being done per Regulatory Guide 1.14 (dollars and man-rem). For inspections with the flywheel in place (not removed from the motor shaft), the average cost and exposure are SS,300 and 0.34 man-rem, respectively. For the flywheel removed from the motor shaft, the average cost and exposure are $28,100 and 0.88 man-rem, respectively.

WCAP-14535 presents a strong technical case for the elimination of RCP flywheel inspections.

This elimination would not affect the frequency of RCP motor maintenance, but would significantly reduce the risk of RCP motor flywheel failure, since the only credible mechanism for flywheel damage is from removal, handling and reassembly, as discussed in WCAP-14535. This potential for damage during handling was also discussed at the meeting, and in response to the concerns raised by the staff concerning flywheel integrity following RCP motor maintenance, the following is proposed.

An alternative inspection patterned after Code Case N48 l for RCP casings which integrates inspections into normal maintenance activities is recommended. Inspections using visual, liquid penetrant or ultrasonic techniques would be performed on the bore and kcyway region whenever the flywheel is removed from the shaft for RCP maintenance. This is in concert with the conclusion of the technical assessment that only the bore and keyway n:gious need to be inspected, not lOOo/o of the flywheel volume, as presently required by the regulatory guide.

Therefore, the following will be incorporated in DLC's maintenance program:

Upon disassembly (removal of the flywheel from the shaft of the RCP motor) for nonnal maintenance activities, the bore and keyway region of the RCP motor flywheel shall be inspected by visual, surface or ultrasonic techniques.

APPENDIX G UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT m:\3356w.wpf: lb-111196 G-1

.

• • oc,,_ ..

ar Saiety Dept *

'It,,

.:;C. ,>,

uN1r10 srAr11 N uc le

• ...

..

C C,

0 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

0 WAIHINQTON, D.C. 10111 OOl1 S£P ._ *

....... '

'IP 816

., *****

. *" 1 2 1-

---

..---*

Mr. Sushil C. Jain, Division Vice President Nuclear Power Division ......,,......

Duquesne Light Coapany Beaver Valley Power Station P.O. Box 4 Shippingport, Pennsylvania 15077-0004

SUBJECT:

ACCEPTANCE FOR REFERENCING OF TOPICAL REPORT WCAP-14535, "TOPICAL REPORT OH REACTOR COOLANT PUMP FLYWHEEL INSPECTION ELIMINATION*

Dear Mr. Jain:

We have coapleted our review of the subject topical report submitted by Duquesne Light Coapany (OLC) for Beaver Valley 1 l 2 as the two leading plants by letter dated January 24, 1996. We find the report to be acceptable for referencing in license applications to the extent specified and under the li*itations delineated in the report and the associated NRC safety evaluation (SE), which ts enclosed. The evaluation defines the basis for acceptance of the report as li*fted by an inspection period acceptale to the staff.

We do not intend to repeat our review of the aatters described in the report when the report appears as a reference fn license applications, except to ensure that the Material presented ts applicable to the specific plant involved as indicated tn the conclusion section of the SE. Our acceptance applies only to the Matters described in the report.

In *accordance with procedures established in NUREG-0390, it ts requested that OLC coordinate with the Westinghouse OWners Group and publish thts report within three aonths of receipt of this letter. The final version shall incorporate this letter, the enclosed evaluation, and DLC's responses to the NRC RAI dated June 14 (without .attachaents) and June 21, 1996, between the title page and the abstract. The final version shall include an -A (designating accepted) following the report identification syabol.

Licensees having Group-IS flywheels need to d1110nstrate that aaterial properties of their A516 aater1al ts equivalent to SA 533 B aaterial, and its reference teaperature, RT..,. ts less than 3o*F. Licensees with Group-10 flywhe*ls nte4 to conftr11 1n the near t1r11 that thetr flywheels have an adequate shrift* ftt to preclude loss of shrink ftt of the flywheel at maxillUII overspeld or to provide an evaluation deaonstrating that no detriaental effects would occur if the shrink fit was lost at aaxtllUII overspeed.

Sincerely, 6"'.* w.

Brian W. Sheron, Director Division of Engineering

Enclosure:

As st1ted Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

. * ** *-- -*- .. _. _ . ___.ATTACIIIDa. SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION TOPICAL BEPQRJ ON REACTOR COOLANT PVMP FLYWHEEL INSPECTION ELIMINATION BEAVER VALLEY I & 2 MATERIALS AND CHEMICAL ENGINEERING BRANCH DIVISION r* ENGINEERING 1.0 INTROQUCJIQU On January 24, 1996, Duquesne Light Company (DLC), the licensee for Beaver Villey 1 & 2) submitted a Westinghouse report, WCAP-14535 [1], *Topical Report on Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheel Inspection Elimination,* for NRC review.

This report, which provides an engineering analysis based on fracture mechanics, is intended to eliminate reactor coolant pump (RCP) flywheel 1nserv1ce inspection (ISi) requirements for all operating Westinghouse plants and soae Babcock and Wilcox Plants. Presently, Beaver Valley's RCP flywheel inspection is performed in accordance with its licensing c011111it..nt to Regalatory Guide (RG) 1.14 [2], which provides guidelines on conduct .g surface and ultrasonic volumetric exaainations of RCP flywheels coinciding with each individual plant's ISi schedule as required by Section XI of the Allerican Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code.

2.0 BACKGROUND

The function of the RCP in the reactor coolant system (RCS) of a pressurized water reactor plant is to maintain an adequate cooling flow rate by circulating a large volu.. of primary coolant water at high temperature and pressure through the RCS. A concern over overspeed of the RCP and its potential for failure led to the issuance of RG 1.14 in 1971. The regulatory position of RG 1.14 concerning ISi calls for an in-place ultrasonic volumetric exaainatton of the areas of higher stress concentration at the bore and keyway at approxiaately 3-year intervals and a surface exaainatton of all exposed surfaces and coaplete ultrasonic voluaetric exaainatton at approxiaately 10-year intervals. The flywheel inspection schedule is to coincide wit the individual plant's ISi schedule as requtrtd by Section XI of the ASME Code.

Operating power plants have been inspecting their flywheels for over twenty years, and no flaws have been identified which affect flywheel integrity.

This inspection record, plus the licensee's concern over inspection costs and personnel radtatton exposure, proapted it to subllit this topical report to deaonstrate through fracture ..chanics analysis that flywheel inspections can be eliainated without impairing plant safety.

J.o EVALUATION AND VERIFICATION The primary regulatory position of RG 1.14 regarding flywheel design concerns three critical speeds: (1) the critical speed for ductile fracture, (b) the critical speed for nonductile fracture, and (c) the critical speed for

2 excessive defonaation of the flywheel. This regulatory position specifies, as a design criterion, that the normal speed of the flywheel should be less than one-half of the lowest of these three critical speeds, and the LOCA overspeed should be less than the lowest of these three critical speeds.

3.1 MATERIAL INFORMATION As shown in Table 2-1 of WCAP-14535, all flywheels have been classified into 16 groups according to their material and ge01111trtc information. Except for flywheels in Groups 14 to 16, all flywheels were made of reactor pressure vessel plate steel, SA 533 Grade B (SA 533 B). The analytical results presented in this report are for SA 533 B material. To cover a wide range of flywheels, the results were 1,resented for three reference teeratures, that is, RT T

• 0°F, 30°F, and 60 F. A reference temperature of 60°F is a reason:Yle bounding value for material SA 533 8, and has been used in the subsequent evaluation.

3.2 ANALYSIS FOR CRITICAL SPEED BASED ON DUCTILE FRACTURE RG 1.14 per111its the use of. elastic stress analysts Mtthods and the acceptance criteria of Section III of the ASME Code to predict the critical speed based_

on ductile fracture of the flywheel. The ASME Code requires that the stress limits for the general priaary naellbrane stress intensity P, and the primary membrane plus priaary bending stress intensity PL+ Pb be u.7S"'- and l.OSSu for the raulted loading cOllbination, where S ts the atnillUII spectritd ultimate tens1le stress of the 111terial. The top1cal report used these 11a.tts and eaployed the ainillUII specified S value of 80 ksi for flywheel material SA-533 B to arrive at the critical spees for six groups of flywheels under ductile fracture conditions shown in Table 4-2. These six groups were selected from a total of 16 groups so that they cover all flywheel dtaens1ons. Table 4-2 indicates that the lowest calculated critical spttd ts 2698 rpa (Group 15 flywheels), and the non11l speed of 1200 rpa ts clearly less than one-half of that value. The type of analysts perforllld above satisfies RG 1.14. However, since RG 1.14 was published tn 1975, aort appropriate elastic-plastic fracture mechanics (EPFM) ..thodology has been developed to predict ductilt fracture.

Perfor111ng an EPFM analysts ts not necessary because the linear elastic fracture atchantcs (LEFN) analysis in Section 3.3 ts the appropriate analysis 111thod for the thick section of the flywheel and t111Perature regi...of operation.

3.3 ANALYSIS EPB CRITICAL $PEED BASED QN NQNQUCJILE FRACTURE The topical report provided a linear elastic fracture 111chanics analysis to 0

ddress the prtdtctton of critical speed for nonducttlt fracture of the rlywheel spectf11d in lea 2.d of RG 1.14.

The analysts used the closed-fora solution for a radial full-depth crack eaanating froa the bore of a rotating disk to calculate the app11ed stress intensity factor (appltld K). The fracture resistance for the SA-533 B plate was obtained froa the lower bound K1c curve of Section XI of the ASME Code.

Use of K was suggested by RG 1.14. The loads used in calculating the aeplted° rwere froa an overspeed of 1500 rpa. Further, three values of RT..,t ,

o F, J0 F, and ao*f, were used tn calculating the K,c* The resulting critical

3 crack lengths for the six groups of flywheels were sunnarized in Table 4-3.

It showed that the smallest critical crack length is 2.6 inches for Graup-15 flywheels having an assumed RT.., , value of 60°F.

The flaw evaluation including fatigue analysis in the original submittal did not detenn;ne a cr;tical speed based on an assumed initial flaw size as requested by RG 1.14, or show that the acceptance criteria of IWB-3610 of Section XI of the ASME Code were satisfied. In response to this, t licensee 0

applied in Reference 3 the margins of IWB-3610 of Section XI of the sME Code and expanded Table 4-3 of the topical report to include critical crack lengths at the normal speed for the six groups of flywheels. The new table was called Table 1. The staff also determined that the applied K due to shrink-fit stresses were not considered in the initial response. In the second response to the staff's RAI [4], the licensee revised Table 1 one more ti.. to nclude the shrink-fit effect. This table indicates that normal/upset conditions are controlling for the flywheels. The allowable crack lengths, with IWB-3610 margins applied, are 0.2 inch for Group 15 and 0.4 inch for the r..aining groups of flywheels. In Attachment B to Reference 3, the 1.25 inch dtanaeter gage holes were identified at a metal path which is about twice the metal path distance involved in the inspection of the keyway area. The reflective surface fro** 1.25 inch gage hole would therefore be 0.33 inch. Since the ASME IWB-3610 minilllUII allowable crack length, 0.4 inch, for all groups except for Group 15 is greater than the 0.33 inch that was d1110nstr1ted to be detected, all flywheels except those in Group 15 satisfy the nonductile fracture criterion. For licensees having Group-15 flywheels, they need to demonstrate that the reference teinperature,

° RT,ia,, for their SA 533 B material or its equivalent is less than 30 F because TaDle 1 of Reference 4 indicates that the allowable crack length for this RT., value is greater than 0.4 inch.

Further, it should be noted that the atntaua initial crack length, considering shrink fit but not the ASME margin, is 1.0 inches at the noraal speed of 1200 rpm for all groups. Based on expertence with the inspection of ferrttic components with short metal paths, the staff considers that it is unlikely that any defect that could challenge flywheel integrity would be *issed by the inspection. In addition, the staff agrees that other conservatis*s that are identified in keference 4 were not accounted for in the analysts.

RG 1.14 requires the nor111l speed of the flywheel be one half the critical speed. Meeting the 111rg1ns based on applied K of IWB-3610 of Section XI of the ASHE Code is ,cceptable to the staff for satisfying this criterion. When this is translted into the concept of factor of safety on applied stress, it is equivalent to a factor of 4. Since the toughness used 1s K 1 .in the ASHE Code (for the ltaiting nonaal condition) and K,.c in RG 1.14, and K1c;,. i1s 2 larger than K 1 ., the RG aargin w111 be very close to tne ASME 11argtn of ( 1u) ' after having applied the ratio of K 1

• to K,c*

Fatigue crack growth was determined fro* the rate formula in Appendix A of Section XI. For the flywheel in each group, an initial crack length of IOI of the distance fro* the keyway to the flywheel outer radius was assu..d (ranging fro* 2.04 inches to 3.28 inches). As to the loading, 6000 cycles of RCP starts and stops were assumed for a 60-year pl1nt ltfe. The crack growth after 6000 cycles are tabulated tn Table 4-4 of WCAP-14535 for the six groups of flywheels. The largest growth is for cracks in Groups 1 and 2 flywheels, for which a value of 0.08 inch is reported.

4 The fatigue crack growth calculation did not include the stresses due to shrink fit. However, tn Reference 3 tt was de1110nstr1ted that excluding the shrtnk-ftt stresses ts conservative in the crack growth calculation. This is because the key paraaeter now is AK instead of K. The explanation provided in Reference 3 ts acceptable and the staff agrees that th* crack growth calculation ts conservative. The staff concludes that after 10 years the maxiaua fatigue growth would be expected to be about 0.013 inch. If it is assulllld th,t a crack of 0.33 inches were *1ssed and the maximum expected fatigue crack growth were applied, tht end of cycle crack size would be 0.343 inch. Therefore, the ASHE aargtns would be 111tnt1tned during the service period and a 10-year inspection period appears reasonable.

3.4 COMPLIANCE WITH THE EXCESSIVE DEFORMATION FAILURE CRITERION The analyses in the report used standard closed-fora formulas for rotating disks to calculate the change of flywheel inner and outer radt1 at 1500 rpm.

The results are tabulated in Table 4-5 for the six groups of flywheels. The largest value is 0.010 inch for the change tn the inner radius. Without referrii,g to any criterion, this report stated that these increases would not result in any adverse conditions.

The pri.. ry concern of RG 1.14 over excessive deforaatton ts the enlargement of the bore that could cause a separation of the flywheel froa the shaft or could cause an unbalance of the flywheel leading to structural failure. The staff believes that the concern here ts the loss of shr1nk-f1t at high speed.

Once tt hAppens, the keys on the flywheels aay not be able to prevent the slight relative dtsplaceaent Latween the wheel and t* shaft froa happening.

Consequently, the balance of the flywheel ai9ht bt altered. The staff concludes that 110st flywhttls satisfy the excessive deforaatton failure criterion based on loss of shrtnk-ftt. However, it apcears that using the generic initial shrink-fit assUllld 1n the topical reprt, the shrink fit may be lost for Group-10 flywhttls at a speed of 1500 rpa. Licensees having these flywheels need to use the plant-spec1f1c shr1nk-f1t value to check the loss of shr1nk-f1t of the flywh..1 at thts speed.

3.5 COMPLIANCE WITH THE LQCA QYERSPEEQ CRITERION RG 1.14 requires that the LOCA overspeed should bt less than the lowest of the three critical speeds ....ttoned in Section 3.0. Since the predicted LOCA overspeed reported tn the submittal ts in 111 cases less than 1500 rpa, which happens to bl the lowest critical speed discussed above, the LOCA overspeed criterion ts s1ttsfted.

3.6 RISK ASSESSNENJ The staff relied solely on d1t1rainistic ..thodology to review this submittal.

The risk 1ss1ss..nt in Section 5, which used* Monte-Carlo stmulatton with i111Portance saapling for assessing the effect of inspections, concluded that flywheel inspections beyond ten years of plant life have no significant benefit on reducing the risk of flywheel failure. Stnce the risk assessment was not reviewed, acceptance of this report shall not bt interpreted as the staff accepting the probabilistic ..thodology in Section 5.

5 4.o CONCLUSIONS The Materials and Chemical Engineering Branch has completed its review of the licensee's sublltttals and has determined that the evaluation methodology in the reports ts appropriate and the criteria are in accordance with the design criteria of Rg 1.14.

For the RG criteria on the three critical speeds, the staff.concluded that(1) all flywheels satisfy the ductile fracture criterion of RG 1.14; (2) except for Group-IS flywheels, all flywheels satisfy the nonducttle fracture criteria of Section XI of the ASHE Code because their allowable crack length( 0.4 inch) is greater than the mtnilllUID flaw size that would bl found by periodic inspections used for flywheels describes in Attachment 8 to Reference 3; and (3) all flywheels except those in Group 10 satisfy the excessive defon1ation criterion of RG 1.14.

This report requests complete flywheel inspection elimination. The staff believes that even for flywheels meeting all the design criteria of RG 1.14, as modified tn this SER, inspections should not.be collll)letely elt*1natd.

Inspections are performed tn part to protect against events or degradation that 1s not anticipated and has not been considered in the analysts. This philosophy ts consistent with the requir...nts in the ASME Coda for successive inspections.for flaws evaluated to the Section XI acceptance criteria.

Therefore, the staff will not accept elimination of flywheel inspection.

However, conducting flywhee, inspection when RCP motor maintenance ts required (about every 8 years from a limited survey [SJ), the staff finds the following acceptable:

(1) Licensees who plan to subllit a plant-specific application of this topical report for flywheels made of SA 533 8 aaterial need to conftr11 that their flywheels art made of SA 533 B material. Further, licensees having Group-IS flywheels need to dt110nstrat1 that material properties of their A516 mteri1l is equivalent to SA 533 B a1t1rial, and its rtftrence teaperaure, RT.,, is less thin 30°F.

(2) Licensees who plan to subllit a plant-specific application of this topical report for their flywheels not aadt of SA 533 B or A516 aaterial need to eiter deaonstrate that their flywheel material properties ire bounded by those of SA 533 8 aatertal, or provide the atntaua specified ulttaate tensile stress, Su, tht fracture toughness, K c, and the reference teaperature, RT.,,

for that aatertal. For the litter, t* licensees should eaploy these aaterial properties, and use the ..thodology in the topical report, as extended in the two responses to the staff's RAI, to provide an assess..nt to Justify a change in insectton schedule for their plants.

(3) Licensees meeting either(1) or(2) above should either conduct 1 qu1lifted in-place UT ex1111natton over the volu.. frOII the inner bore of the flywheel to the circle of one-half the outer radius or conduct a surface exaatnation(MT and/or PT) of exposed sufacts defined by the voluae of the disasslllbled flywheels once every 10 years. Tht staff considers this 10-year inspection requtreaent not burdensoa.e when the flywheel inspection is conducted during scheduled ISi inspection or RCP 110tor maintenance. This

6 . **- *--*-*- .. - * - *-----*** ** - ** - .. . . *- _ ...... .. . .

would provide an appropriate level of defence in depth.

Licensees with Grc p-10 flywheels need to confirm tn the near ter111 that their flywheels have an adequate shrink fit to preclude loss of shr1nk fit of the flywheel at maximu* overspeed or to provide an evaluation demonstrating that no detrimental effects would occur if the shrink fit was lost at maximum overspeed.

Since this topical report and all related documents were submitted by OLC, no demonstration of plant-specific applicability ts required from DLC.

s.o REFERENCES 1.0 Duquesne Light Co., letter froa George S. Thomas (DLC) to USNRC Document Control Desk with enclosed report, WCAP-14535, *Topical Report on Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheel Inspection Elimination,* January 24, 1996.

2.0 USNRC, Regulatory Guide 1.14, *Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheel Integrity,*

1971; Revision 1, August 1975.

3.0 Duquesne Light Co., letter froa George Sushtl C. Jain (DLC) to USNRC *-

Document Control Desk, *Response to Request for Additional Inforaatton Concerning WCAP-14535,* June 14, 1996.

4.0 Duquesne Light Co., letter froa George Sushil C. Jain (DLC) to USNRC Document Control Desk, *Response to Request for Additional Information Concerning WCAP-14535; Revised It1t1 2 Response* Jun-. 21, 1996.

5.0 Duquesne Light Co., letter froa George Sushtl C. Jain (DLC) to USNRC Docu..nt Control Desk, *Response to Request for Additional Infonllltion Concerning WCAP-14535; RAI Dated July 24, 199&* August, 2, 1996.

APPENDIX H KEY PROVISIONS AND FOLLOWUP CLARIFICATIONS m:\.1356w.wpf: lb-111196 H-1

Safety Evaluation Report on RC Pump Flywheel Inspection The NRC staff has completed their review of the topical report submitted by Duquesne Light Company on your behalf, and has issued a Safety Evaluation Report, which is attached. The report is dated September 12, 19%, but was not received by Duquesne Light until September 19. Our review of the SER has revealed severdl mistakes, and a number of areas where the wording is not clear. We have obtained clarifications through several phone calls with the NRC staff, and these are discussed below. First, a brief summary of the key provisions of the SER.

Key Provisions

1. Inspections need only be done on a ten year interval, instead of 40 months.

2. Acceptable inspection methods are either UT or surface exams (magnetic particle or liquid penetrant).

3. UT inspection coverage is required only on the inner half of the flywheel radius.

4. Surface examination coverage is the exposed surfaces of the flywheel when the pump is disassembled for maintenance.

5. All licensees can reference this SER in license applications, and detailed technical reviews of the submittals will not be required, unless new technical information is presented.

Follow-up Clarifications I. The new inspections are meant to be a relief from those contained in Regulatory Guide 1.14.

2. The term "qualified" as applied to the UT has no hidden meaning. The inspections under this SER should be qualified in the same way the inspections under RG 1.14 were qualified.

Specifically, the staff said that Appendix Vlll of Section XI does not apply.

3. Referring to item (3) on page 5, the area to be examined by surface examination is stated as the "exposed surfaces defined by the volume of the disassembled flywheels". This was clarified to mean the "exposed surfaces of the disassembled flywheels".

4. The questions about the toughness of the Group 15 flywheels and the shrink fit for Group l 0 flywheels have been answered earlier in response to the staff request for additional information, but for some reason were missed by the ,;taff when they issued the SER. The staff suggested that this information be included in the submittals of the affected utilities, with a note mentioning the earlier submittal.

m \33S6w.wpf lb-111196 H-2

Follow-up Actions The 01 iginal WCAP-14535 will be republished, along with the two requests for additional information and the responses, and the SER. The information needed by Group 15 and Group IO owners will be clearly laid out. This: port will be numbered WCAP-14535A.

Conclusions The SER provides some relief, but the extent of relief was somewhat disappointing. The NRC staff said that technically the basis for further minimizing flywheel inspections has been established, but they felt they could go no funher at the present time. This leaves the door open for future actions on this subject.

m:\3356w.wpf: lb-111196 H-3