ML18312A114

Response to Request for Additional Information Concerning WCAP-14535A, Topical Report on Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheel Inspection Elimination, November 1996

ML18312A114
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	06/14/1996
From:	Jain S Duquesne Light Co
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML18312A175	List: ML18312A114 ML18312A151
References
NUDOCS 9606260013
Download: ML18312A114 (40)

Text

• • . '

SU&Hll C. JAIN OMelon Vice PrNtdent NuclNr 8ervloN Nuclear Powe, Otvlakln a..e, v* Power 8latJon P.O. Box 4 8hlpptflGPC)f1, 15077*0004 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Wahington, DC 205.SS-0001 Subj-':

Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 and No. 2 BV-1 Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 BV-2 Docket No. 50-412, License No. NPF-73 June 14 1 1996 Raponse to Request for Additional Information Concerning WCAP-14535 (412) 383-5512 Fax (412) 643-aoee Attached is the response to an NRC staff request for additional infonnation provided by letter dated May I, 1996, concerning WCAP-1453S, "Topical Report on Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheel Inspection Elimination." Beaver Valley submitted the subject report by letter dated January 24, 1996, as the industry's lead plant on this issue.

Please direct questions regarding this submittal to Mr. Roy K. Brosi at (412) 393-5210.

Sincerely,



c:

w/enclosure:

Mr. L. W. Rossbach, Sr. Resident Inspector Mr. T. T. Martin, NRC Region I Administrator Sushil C. Jain Mr. D.S. Brinkman, Sr. Project Manager - (3 copies)

Ms. Diane Jackson, Westinghouse Electric Corporation w/o enclosure:

Mr. David Haile, South Carolina Electric and Gas Co.

Mr. Pat Naughton, Virginia Power Mr. Don Gulling, Florida Power Corporation Mr. Ben Mays, TU Electric Co.

Mr. Jim Edwards, Georgia Power Co.

Mr. K. J. Voytell, Westinghouse Electric Corporation Mr. S. A. Binger, Jr., Westinghouse Electric Corporation

':H (l I) t:! A

,9606260013 960614 PDlt ADOCK 0:K>00:134 PDR OHIVfRING OUAllTY fNf,RGY

Response to NBC Reguest for Additional Information on WCAP-14535 Item I:

Section I. I Previous Flywheel Integrity Evaluations, Page /.J

• It was stated, "Since shrink fit forces would retard the growth of radial cracks in the keyway area, they were omined from the analysis of the keyway crack." Physically, the shrink fit forces can be considered as internal pressure acting on the inner bore of the reactor coolant pump ( RCP) flywheel. Thus, it would accelerate, not retard, the growth of radial cracks in the keyway area. Provide sufficient finite element modelling dettJils and results to validate your claim or revise your results by taking into account the effect due to shrink fit forces, which was shown by the Combustion Engineering Owners Group in report SIA-94-080, "Relaxation of Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheel Inspection Requirements," which was submitted to the NRC on April 4, 1995, on dockets 50-3/J and 50-368. These shrink fit forces were shown in that report to be capable of producing stresses of comparable magnitude to those produced by the centrifugal force when the flywheel was running at the normal operating speed.

Response to Item I:

1e shrink fit forces do add to the stresses at the flywheel bore, but fatigue crack growth is

...,proximately proportional to the cube of the stress range applied during a given cycle. For the flywheel, the stress range is from the rest condition (zero rpm) to nonnal operating speed. Therefore, if the shrink fit stresses had been used, the stress range would be smaller because the shrink fit stresses are significantly lower at normal operating speed than at the rest condition. Our calculations used a zero stress state at rest, which maximized the crack growth predictions. The amount of conservatism induced by this assumption is discussed below.

Westinghouse has evaluated the effect of shrink fit forces on crack growth. Due to the large number of flywheels in service, actual shrink fit values were not obtained for each pump. but typical shrink fit valur.s for flywheels which are attached directly to the RCP motor shaft are 0.5 to 1.0 mil on the flywheel bore, or 0.00025 inch to 0.0005 inch on the bore radius. For conservatism, and to be consistent with Combustion Engineering Owners Group report SIA-94-080. "Relaxation of Reactor Coolant Pump flywheel Inspection Requirements," a shrink fit of 0.0052 inch on the bore radius was imposed for evaluation purposes. This is approximately one order of magnitude higher than the typical shrink fit for flywheels which are attached directly to the RCP motor shaft. A shrink fit of 0.0125 inch was used for the spoked flywheel, as was used in the Combustion Engineering Owners Group repon.

I Hoop stresses control the growth of radially oriented cracks in the flywheel. Shrink fit hoop itresses for the flywheels at rest arc on the order of one to three times the hoop stresses produced by centrifugal forces alone, when the flywheels are running at the nonnal operating speed. However, as the flywheel rotational speed increases, the shrink fit hoop stresses decrease, due to the radial growth of the flywheel bore radius. This growth may be determined by the following equation:

where:

a b

p co E

V

=

=

=

=

=

=

1 nw2 a

Aa

• 4 3ij6. 4 E [ (3 + v) b2 + (1 - v) a]

bore radius (inches) outer radius (inches) flywheel material density (0.283 lb.Jcubic inch) flywheel angular velocity (radians per second)

Young's modulus (30 x 1()6 psi)

Poisson's ratio (0.3)

The total hoop stress may be detennined by adding the shrink fit and centrifugal force components.

• The stresses at the flywheel keyway location are shown in Figure I for Flywheel Group I, which is representative of the Beaver Valley Units I and 2 flywheels. Stress plots for the other flywheel groups are similar to Figure I.

Fatigue crack growth rate may be characterized in terms of the range of applied stress intensity factor

(&K1), and is generally of the form:

where da/dN =

n

=

Co

=

da

• C. (AK )n dN O

I crack growth rate (inches/cycle) slope of the log (da/dN) versus log (&Ka) scaling constant The fatigue crack growth behavior is affected by the R ratio (K..,'K_) and the environment.

Reference fatigue crack growth behavior of carbon and low alloy ferritic steels exposed to an air environment is provided by the above equation with n = 3.07 and Co= 1.99 x 10*10 S. S is a scaling parameter to account for the R ratio and is given by S = 25.72 (2.88 - R)"307 where OS R < 1.0.

In the WCAP-I 4535 evaluation, the maximum stress intensity factor range occurred between RCP shutdown (i.ero rpm) and the normal operating speed. Shrink fit was excluded, therefore the R ratio was zero, S was I, and C0 was 1.99 x 10- 10*

2

Including shrink fit results in an R ratio of approximately 0.9, an S of approximately 3.2, and a C0 of app, >Xirnately 6.4 x 10* 10* Therefore, the scaJing constant (C11) is approximately 3.2 times higher than not including shrink fit.

The range of applied hoop stress for excluding shrink fit was at least twice that for including shrink fit for all flywheel groups. Therefore, the relative fatigue crack growth rate for including shrink fit may be estimated by the following equation:

Rate with Shrink Fit

• (J.2) (O.s)J.01 Rate w1 thout Shrink Fit The fatigue crack growth rate for including shrink fit is at most 40% of the rate for not including shrink fit, for the assumed shrink fit values discussed above. Therefore, shrink fit retards the growth of radial cracks in the keyway area, and excluding shrink fit yields conservative fatigue crack growth results, as reported in WCAP-14535.

Item 2:

Set.*tion I. I Previous Flywheel Integrity Evaluations, Page 1-J

• The fatigue analysis is dependant,n the premise that UT equipment used for examinations of RCP flywheels at these facilities is capable of accurately detecting and sizing 0.24 inch Iond near surface flaw. Provide your basis supporting the probability of detection (POD) for the examinations performed. Provide details on how the POD values were determined, qualified, and used in concluding tht assumed size of the initial flaw.

Response to Item 2:

The initial crack length of 0.24 inch was used iu a previous evaluation of RCP flywheel integrity by Babcock and Wilcox (Report BAW-10040, December 1973, "Reactor Coolant Pump Assembly Overspeed Analysis"). This length was assumed to be the lar,:?est crack that could be missed ir nondestructive testing.

As seen in Table 4-4 of WCAP-14535, crack growth assuming extremely large initial flaw lengths (from 2.04 to 3.28 inches) was found to be insignificantly small over a 60 year extended plant life. In the crack growth evaluation. 6000 RCP stan/stop cycles were assumed, which is conservative with respect to actual operation. This evaluation suggests that very large initial flaws can be tolerated.

Such flaws are of a siu which are expected to be deLCCtable with the examination procedure of Attachment A.

An al1 emative method of evaluating this issue is to define an "allowable" flaw size based on the application of a margin to the calculated critical flaw size. The approach used here is to apply the margins of ASME Section XI. The results of this approach are provided in Table I below. In This table, crack length is measured radially from the keyway, and percentage through the flywheel is the crack length divided by the radial length from the keyway to the flywheel outer radius.

The inspection methods used for flywheels are capable of finding flaws much smaller than the smallest allowable flaw in Table I.

3

Table 1: Allowable Crack Lenpba for Flywheel Normal Speed and Ovenpeed Flywheel Allowable Crack Lenplu in Inches and " throup Flywheel Group 1200 rpm 1500 rpm RTNOT* O"f RT'"°'* JO"F RT'"°'* 6fl'f RT_.. rr RT NOT

• J0'1i' RT N1JJ

• 1iO"F I

3.0" (9%)

1.8" (5%)

1.0" (3%)

8.5 (26%)

3.8" (12%)

1.S' (4'ii 2

3.4" (10%)

1.9" (6%)

I. I" (3%)

9.4" (29%)

4.2" (13%)

1.8" (5%)

lO 3.2" (12%)

1.6" (6%)

1.0" (4%)

8.3" (31%)

3.7" (14%)

1.6" r,6%)

14 8.1" (29%)

2.8" (10%)

1.7" (6%)

15.2" (55%)

7.5" (27%) 4.1" (15%)

15 2.6" (13%)

1.1"(5%)

0.7" (3%)

5.7" (28%)

2.6" (13%)

1.3" (6%)

16 5.8" (24%)

1.8" (7%)

1.4" (6%)

12.2" (50%)

5.7" (23%)

3.0" (12%)

Over the past ten years, the examination techniques employed have improved, particularly with the use of the defocused gage hole *probe. The detectability of the gage holes at various metal paths displayed in Attachment B indicate that the inspection methods used for flywheels are capable of finding flaws much smaller than those identified in Table I.

In Attachment 8, the 1.25 inch diameter gage holes (effectively side drilled holes) were clearly identified at a metal path which is nearly twice the metal path distance involved in the inspection* of the keyway area. It should be note.cl that it is conservatively estimated that the effective reflective surface of a side drilled hole is a.30° arc. The reflective surface from a 1.25 inch gage hole would therefore be 0.33 inch. This is clearly smaller than the smallest allolwablc flew in Table I.

Item 3:

lnspect,on, Page J./ to J-6

• Provide additional information regarding whether the UT examinations at Beaver Valley Power Station, Units Nos. I and 2 were qualified relative to inspectior. of RCP flywheels. Regardless of whether a formal quoli,fication was performed, pleast include in your responst the following:

a. Any information supporting qualification of tM examinations of RCP flywMels.

b. Any information supporting qualification of tM personnel performing the txaminations of RCP flywheels.

c. Any information regarding the degree of unctnainty in UT measurements based on the procedures and personnel qualification basis.

4

Response to Item 3:

All of the plants covered by WCAP-14535, except one, have flywheels which are made of A533 Grade B Class I or A5 l 6 Grade 70 steel, which is reactor vessel quality steel. (The exception is Haddam Neck, which has flywheels made of boiler plate steel. A discussion on this plant is provided in WCAP-14535, Appendix 8. Haddam Neck has conducted a separate demonstration of their inspection capability, as documented in Docket No. 50-213 815230, dated 08/10/95).

The ultrasonic examination procedure used at Beaver Valley is included a-. Attachment A. This procedure includes qualification requirements of the personnel and equipment for the RCP flywheels.

Additional infonnation supporting requalification of the personnel perfonning the examinations of RCP flywheels is provided in Attachment 8. Attachment B also includes enhancements made to the probe design to improve examination capabilities, and an evaluation of those enhancements.

Examination personnel are qualified to SN-TC l A and are trained in the use of the UT procedure (Attachment A). Duquesne Light Company NOE Level Ill personnel perfonn the examinations.

Item 4:

Section 4.J Nonductile Failure Analysis - It was stated, "It was shown that cracks emanating from the center of the lceyway yieltled higher stress intensity factors than cracks emanating from the lceyway comer, and.... " Provitk the detailed stress plot around the lceyway area from your finite element method analysis and provide an estimation of the stress intensity factors for the case when the perturbed stress distributimi due to the uyway is used instead of the closed form solutior used,n this report.

Response to Item 4:

Finite element analyses were completed for cracks emanating from the center of the ke}*way and from the comer of the keyway. The results clearly show that a crack at the center of the key way is n,ore severe. This work was documented in an earlier submittal to the NRC in 1974-1975, and in the attached ASME technical paper (Attachment C) entitled "Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheel Overspeed Evaluation," by P. C. Riccardella and W. H. Bamford. The comparison of interest is shown in Figure 4 of the technical paper.

Note that the difference in stress intensity factor occurs only for short crack lengths, and the effect of the keyway on the stress intensity factor is only seen for cracks shorter than one inch. Results of the overall fracture evaluation show that flywheel limiting speed for small crack lengths is governed by ductile failure limits, as shown in Figure to of Attachment C. Therefore, this item is not relevant to the flywheel integrity.

5

Item 5:

Section 4.4 Excessive Deformation Analysis -

Table 4-5 listed the change in bore radius at the speed of I 500 rpm for flywheels in various flywheel groups. Provide the amount of original shrink-fit and the percentage of shrink-fit lost at I 500 rpm for the typical flywheel in each flywheel group of the table.

Respome to Item 5:

The percentage of shrink fit lost at 1500 rpm is shown in Table 2 below for the assumed worst case shrink fit values discussed in item I above. (For the typical shrink fits of 0.00025 to 0.0005 inch for flywheels which are attached directly to the RCP motor shaft, discussed in item I above, I 00% of the shrink fit would be lost at 1500 rpm for all flywheel groups). Figure 2 provides flywheel bore expansion and corresponding shrink fit for speeds of zero to 1500 rpm, for Aywheel Group 1. which is representative of the Beaver Valley Units I and 2 flywheels. Displacement plots for the other flywheel groups are similar to Figure 2.

Table 2: Shrink Flt Loa at 1500 rpm Flywheel Aywheel Aywheel Assumed Shaft Flywheel Shrink Fit Shrink Group Outer Bore Shrink Radial Bore Radial at 1500 Fit Lost Radius Radius Fit Expansion Expansion rpm at 1500 (inches)

(inches)

(inches)

(inches)

(inches)

(inches) rpm(%)

I 38.250 4.6875 0.0052 0.0000 0.0034 0.0018 65 2

37.875 4.1875 0.0052 0.0000 0.0030 0.0022 58 10 36.000 8.0625 0.0052 0.0000 0.0052 0.0000 100 14 32.SOO 4.1875 0.0052 0.0000 0.0022 0.0030 42 15 36.000 15.2500 0.0125 0.0004 0.0102 0.0027 78 16 32.SOO 6.900 0.0052 0.0000 0.0037 0.0015 71 Notes for Table 2:

I) Shrink Fit at I 500 rpm = Assumed Shrink Fit + Shaft Radial Expansion - Flywheel Bore Radial Expansion.

2) Shrink Fit Lost at 1500 rpm= (Assumed Shrink Fit - Shrink Fit at 1500 rpm)/Assumed Shrink Fit.

Based on the worst case assumed shrink fits shown in Table 2, shrink fit will exist at I SOO rpm for all flywheel groups except Flywheel Group I 0. The shrink fit stresses at I 500 rpm will reduce the critical crack lengths reported in WCAP-14535, Table 4-3. Critical crack lengths including shrink fit stresses at 1500 rpm are provided in Table 3 below. As shown, these lengths are significantly larger than the lengths which are expected to be detectable with the examination procedure of Attachrmnt A.

Str"u intensity factor as a function of critical crack length is shown in Figure 3, for Flywheel Group I, which is representative of the Beaver Valley Units I and 2 flywheels. Stress intensity factor plots for the other flywheel groups are similar to Figure 3.

6

Table 3: Cridcal Crack Lenphs lncludina Shrink Fit for Flywheel Ovenpeed of 1500 rpm Flywheel Critical Crack Length in Inches and % throup Flywheel Group RTNDT = <<r'F RT,_.DT = 30°F RTNDT = 60°F I

IS.2" <46%)

5.4" (16%)

1.3" (4%)

2 16.0" (49%)

5.6" (17%)

1.1" (3%)

IO IS. I" (56%)

7.5" (27%)

3.3" (12%)

14 18.7" (67%)

I0.9" (39%)

2.5" (9%)

15 8.2" (40%)

3.6" (18%)

1.6" (8%)

16 16.I" (66%)

9.3" (38%)

3.7" (15%)

It is important to point out that most flywheels are designed to lose their shrink fit at operating speed.

The three keyways maintain the centering of the flywheels, which assures that balance is maintained.

The imposition of a very large shrink fit would be detrimental to flywheel reliability, because of the difficulty in installation and removal of the flywheel. This would detract from the consistency

• of assembly.

A concern was raised about excessive defonnation in the Regulatory Guide. Excessive deformation was defined as "any deformation such as an enlargement of the bore that could cause separation directly or could cause an unbal,nce of the flywheel leading to structural failure or separation of the flywheel from the shaft." Therefore. the concern about excessive deformation is not related to the loss of shrink fit, but instead relates to.:he amount of defonnation which could cause unbalance or failure.

Our extensive calculations have sho,wn that the speed at which excessive deformations could occur is greater than or equal to the limiting flywheel speed for ductile failure. The flywheel would fail due to plastic instability at speeds of 3155 itO 4032 rpm, as shown in Table 4-2. page 4-5 of WCAP-14535.

Even with large flaws, the failure speed exceeds 3000 rpm, which is twice the maximum overspeed of I 500 rpm. Therefore, there is no co11Cem with excessive deformation.

7

=

RCP Flywheel Hoop Stresses 2' rr**----. -r*- --*-r T

--r. r-r** r... :* *.p '

60-20

. --L-- -----..... -......  t---+Tt -*

1 1

, ]J. (! ul) 5

• --*--*-- ---*- ---- 1 I

_......._...___,_...._..._-'""___J_ -__ J _______ -___ _J ***-

-e-- Rotational..._ Shrink Fit _.._ Total l'frwh111Group1

...... Looallon for Plot*

M8UIMCI lhrtnll 1111 (Della *> *

,.,,...... OUllr....... (b) *

Rlldlall.englha 1.1241 Inch o.oou Inch 31.211nch 4.N711nch 0.1371noh 900 1000 II 00 1200 Fi1ure I: Flywheel Group I Rotadoml and Shrink Flt Stresses 8

0 FLYWHEEL GROUP 1 FLYWHEEL BORE EXPANSION AND SHRINK FIT

\\...

. -+-*

• - +- --

) __ ? *$--*- +-

1 I

<:l lj.

I I

rµ

... f'-** -

-** -...--+---- *--**-*

. (;,-.... -. 1 I

l,*..

I

f. *

.... ____._.. _t: -"-- *--#---. :__ - $--*

--+-- ****- *** --- l

... * * *...:. ** -C--D-E F- **--.

• ----- ______ l_ ___ _;__ G-- ----*-*-- **-*-' -* -

O 100 200 lOO 400 500 600 700 100 900 1000 1100 1200 1 lOO 1400 1500 ROTATIONAL SPEED (RPM)

• • Shrink Fit at Rest

• Bore Radial Expansion

--a Shrink Fit at Speed Flpre 2: Flywheel Group I Bore E,rpaalloa and CorraponcUna Shrink Flt 9

2.50

.c

*-

200 I'll ISO 6 

 !

•  JOO I'll C

C so rJ) 0 RCP FLYWHEEL Stress Intensity Factor

........-* 117 k>i sqrt inch 79.3 k_si sqrt inch 58.5 ksi sqrt inch 0

5 JO JS 20 25 Critical Crack Lengths for Flaws Emanating from Keyway (inch)

Flywheel Group 1 Outer Radlua (b)

• Flywheel Bore (a)

• Keyway Length (d1)

• Shrink Flt (Delta a)

• 38.25 lnchn 4.8875 Inch**

0.837 lnchea 0.0018 Inch O 1500 rpm Fl1ure 3: Flywheel Group l Streu latelllity Factor lncludina Shrink Flt 10

A1TACHMENT A INFORMATION ON QUALIFICATION OF RCP FLYWHEEL EXAMINATIONS AT BEA VER VALLEY 960626001S 960614

>DR ADOCK OS000334 P

PDR

aQJESNE LIQfl' CXJG'ANY Nuclear Pawar Divisia, Quality Servi.call unit Quality Sarvicaa Inspacticn, 4inatia, Depart:mant TITI.£:

MmJal Ultruau.c Examinatiai of Raactor coolant PIJq> (R:'P) Flywhaal REVISICJI 7

QSC REVID1 Da\\TE

!ti lRf 11!-a/ft{

"\\........

I 4

,II 5

6 7

f t.11'-304 PAGE l OF 11 Q'fU:tXYE l)\\1'E Jaruary 3, 1991

 27, 1992 April 6, 1993 December 9, 1994

1. o BJRIWE AND §CX>PE Ul'-304 Raviaia, 7 1.1 To pi,:wide lllllWllllll requh IIIDBl1t:a for tha marllAl ultraaau.c straigbt ballll 8X8Jlli natia, of RCP flywheels.

1.2

'Dua procadur8 is inten:lad to maet tha ult.raaauc raquiranant.a of NRC Ragul.atory Q.dda 1.14 Rllviaim 1 (Rafetanca 6.1)

• 1.3

'Dua proolldure i.a aa,licable to BVPS Unit.a 1 am 2.

2. 0 g>>maTiqf BDJJIRQmfll

?OIE: 11wn using Ultragal II c:xq>lM,t, safety glasses or CJDIJ:Jl* are I

In:lividuals that are sensitive to datexganta aha.lld wear glCM18.

2 *. 1

&ww:e CD1tact aurfaoaa are clean ard free fran all foreign matter, pits, nicks, or dents, ate., that waild advaraely affect or limit tha exami natia,. If suc:h ccndition11 are noted, cmrect thn prior to ocn:i.1ctJ.n1 tha examinatia,.

2.2 E>aunine tha entire velum of tha ID' fl3 to tha maxima extant pouible. Attadl a drawing of art/ limit.aticnll enc:omtered to than ur EXaminatia'l Raport (Attad1mant 1.1).

2.3 Prior to beginninJ e,caminatiorw, calibrate tha ultruauc il'llltrumllnt II.Rap to npraaant a linear 40 inch laqitminal wave scud path.

'lb.is may be acxa,plishai using a au1:xl\\ ataal IIW block and tba atraigbt beam aeaR'h unit spec{fied in Para. 5.2.2.

2.4 Kayway om.r Exaadnaticm.

2. 4.1 ca.J.ibratia, A.

.Apply cauplant to aw of tha 1 irdl diamater q,qa holea (A, B, C or D for unit l; A, B, c, D, E, or F far Unit 2).

a.

Inaart the CJacJ9 hole pzd:le into tha hole ard di.net the bea toward tha fl3 oentar bore hole.

c.

>>ne.11'8 tba d.iatancla trm tha gage hole to the 081,t.er bare hole.

Adjust tha de)IY cmtrnl  to paaitian tha n:IIP)IWS at tha pi:q,er awaap poaiticn cm:teapardin; t.o tha phyllical meaalnllllnt.

o.

Cbtain tha maxi.111* rasp:ne frm tha canter bore hole and adjust tha gain to brin;J tha reapa,ae to SOI

(+/-51) fSH.

2

E.

Racot'd the insb:umant gain aetting an:l reflector awaap p::aitia'i an the Flywheel ur Exmninatian Rlp)rt.

2. 4. 2 Examination 2.5 A.

In::raue the insb:umant gain a miniJlun f 6 dB.

B.

startin;J at the tq, of the gage hc,.a, rotate the probe t'rm th8 maxi.mm, bore signal area to d:Jtain the maxi nm, respcnae ftm the Jceyway cx,mer, then back to the bore respcnae.

Oxttinla to marm.ina the tull 181'¥,Jth of the kayway by inMrting the probe in 1/2" J..ra:aanta.

c.

Examine the keyway com for irdicaticnl pzq:agat.J.rq frm th8 kayway at tely 90 dagz111 to the sa.ni path.

o.

nas-t th8 entire calibratial and exami.natian cycl*

. frm each of t:h8 ranaininJ gaga hol*,* CCllfi.min1 calibratial attar 8'b examination.

2.4.3 RlcOXdin1 A.

Racor.'d all in:licatiaw that exhibit a deviation ftm tha rm1lllll kayway geclDllt.ry niapcnaa c:ix:.al'vad fl.'all aadl gagr hole examinaticn.

2. 5.1 calibratim (Out 1 Attac:hllant 7. 2)

A.

y cxq,lant to gagr hole o.

a.

Iwt the gaga hole pima into gage bola D and d:Jtain tha mxinn niapcnaa frm rem bolt hole 5.

c.

AdjUllt th8 inat:zum1nt gain to bring th8 napc:1'1&8 to IOI (+/-51) FSH.

o.

Ratata th8 probe to obtain th8 max.inn respcnae ftm naa bolt hole 2.

E. ocnstzuct a diat:anoe-aJll)litma correctian (CW::) au:w by connectinJ the mxinm, rapalM point.a with a line.

F.

Racord th8 insb:umant gain setting, St.MIF paaiticna ard aJll)litudas en tha nywhael ur Examinaticn Rlp:>rt.

2.5.2 calil:>ratia'i (Unit 2 Attachnant 7.3)

A.

All)ly CCAJplant to gaga hole F.

3

tJr-304 Rsvisicn 7 e.

In&er:t the gaga hole probe into gage hole F am cbtain the maxi mn response frca re&JID bolt hole 4.

c.

Adjust the instnlDant gain to brin;J the" response to SOI (+/-51) Jlml.

o.

Rotate the pz:cba to obtain tha maxinln responae fran ream bolt hole 1.

E. anmuct a distance-mlplitu:la con:actiCl1 (Da'\\C) CUIV8 by mnctin;J the maxima responae point:a with a line.

F.

Ramm the inatnlnlnt gain NttinJ, IIW'llp poaitia,a, and anplitudm a, the nywhaal. ur Examinatia, Rap:>rt.

2.5.3 F.xaminaticn Increu.e the inlltzumant gain a minim.D of 6 dB.

B.

startinJ at the tq> of tha gage hole, slowly rctata the piabe 360 dagx * ** to exami na the voluma of the tlywhaal..

a.m:v. ratlactara fral tlywhaal. gn,ietric.

f*tuna.. tha prcbe ia rotated, iciantifyinJ Mal reflector IIOUl'm u it ftA)9ftra. o:ntinJa t:o exam1ne tha volU1118 by insartinJ thl prcbe in 1/2" ir.cxwta.

c.

Rapeat the examinaticn traa the z:anaininJ gage hol*

uainJ tha initial calibraticn sett:J.n;a.

D.

o:mfil'II irwtNnant caUbrati.CI\\ whm radial gaga hole eoaninatiaw are CXlll)leted uain) the stllpl a.itlinad in para. 2.5.1 or 2.5.2.

2.5.4 Rlcatd1irJ A.

Ramm all wJdertitiad reflectors ec,Vll to or greater than 50I me.

2. 6 Alripmy !Xle1naticn (Attacbnant 7. 2 ard 7. 3) 2.,.1 calil:mltic:11 A.

Qq>l.e the straight bum wrch unit to the cutaida mge of the lqMr flywhaal. plate and cbtain the MX1WD response 1'taa rem bolt hole 5.

B.

Adjust the gain to briniJ tha raapcl'l1la to IOI (+/-51) FSH ant mark the point en the act,...

4

t.7r-304 RavisiCl'l 7 c.

Q:q>l* the straight beam saardl unit to the aitai.da a:tge of the \\Bl[ flywheel plate and ciJtain the maxina raspcnM fraD nmm bolt hole 5. Mark thia point a, the &Cl'.W, o.

Q:lnst:ruct a me a.u:ve by oonnectin1 tll8 raspc1-pointa with a lina.

E.

R8cord the i.nst:rumant gain aettirq, **11" poaitiaw am IIJll)litudea m the Flywheel ur Exam1natim Raport.

2.6.2 Examtnaticn A.

Incnwule the i.nst:nmlant 9&in a mininLn of 6 dB.

e. scan the flywheel paripbuy face to include thl area frm the mge up to ard in:lurlin:J the raa bolt hcl*.

o:nmct thia exam Cl\\ bath thl UAJU' and lw plat.ea, 360 dagJ; 111, around thl peripbuy.

c.

tbm:9 (X)llllible, progiwivaly.,... the prd:,e ac:ma and along t:ha flywheel mr,a ao u t.o acan the mtire edtJa overlaA)inq Mdl pr11Vicul acan by at laut 251 of tha trand.loer d.imaatez'.

2.6.3 Aaool'dinJ A.

Racal::d all unidentified reflectar.'11 eciaal to or gnater than 50I me.

2. 7 cal.ibraticn ocntinllticn

2. 7.1 CD\\fim calibraticn at t:ha interval.a specified wit.bin Mdl 9XM1naticn catei;ior:y.

2. 7. 2 EVal.uata c:alibratia'I c:xmtirmatiat ill accoxdanoa with the following criteria:

A.

A CECm'1SE in S81Witivity of nm11 than 2d8 0 recalibraticn and re,xaminatim of all itallll 8>GIJDinad

• inca thl pravkm accaptable calil:nticn or calibraticn ca,finlaticn.

8.

An lKR'MI in..,.itivity of 1IIOl'a than 2d8 0 recalibraticn and mllJYNSiic;ptim of all in:licaticna

÷ since the pmvica.w aa::llptabl* calibraticn rø calibratim calfinaticn.

5

4.0 Ul'-304 Reviaia, 7 c.

If artt point a, tha me airva hu mavad more than 101 of tha IIWIIP divisiai

, oou:ect. the.,.IP ranae calibration ard note tha oorractia'I a, tha flá exami natia, r:ap>rt.

If i,aflect.ora watw ncordad, recalibrate ard reexamine all it.allll axaminad airol tt.

pl11Viaull aooapt:abl*

calibratiai or calibration ocnfixmaticn.

2. a Paat-E>ami natiat ClaeninJ

2. a.1 Dry-wipe tha area to rtlllCMI arrt talplruy marJci.191 ard cxq,lant.

3.1 Allcmd data apecified within each axmainatiai category a, tt.

aw:tar OXJ1ant l\\all> n 01â EMBmJ.naticn Report.

3. 2 Rlp:>rt:a are to be l'Ulblred in acoordance with OSP 9. 4.

3.3 Documantatia, ia anaidered u lifatima and txeated u such in acaordanca with QSP 17.1.

4.1 o.. to the tAldlniquaa llll)lO'jllCI ard the mu.qua natma of this a.mninaticn, all ncordad reflectora will be waluated by a ur I.avel III to detemine their origin, size, locaticll ard orimtaticll.

'lhia.valuation pta<:We will be partcmnad ard c:lccua1tecl in with GP-10!5.

5.1 Pancmlll oalificatiml

!5.1.1 Fel°IICll..l. parfominJ examinaticnl ahall aily partom tub CC11a11111Urata with their experience and level of cartifim.ticll.

A.

peracnwl are certified in acaordanca 1.

All in:IJ.viclwl* perfominJ exninaticna to DIC ur proodan(a) shall recaiw lll.lfficient traininJ ard oriantatian to rm \\.1l'ldmlt.mlir of pioodiral AC1dtWD.

6

6.0 tJr-304 Rsvisial 7

c. Ultrmuc examination perEICl'ln8l '9tlo datemine vu.ch i.ndicatiaw ar:a to be reoorded shall have auooaaafUlly CXlll)lated a qualification pr;agi:am admin.istand by tha Quality Services Inspection

& Examination oapu twnt Vlic:h daawtrat.aa proficiency in dtscriminating bablean flaw indicaticna and in:licaticna of gaanetric or mat.allurgical origin.

5.2 Eq.lipnalrt Qualificatiml

5. 2.1 ur Inatrumant -

use a pllse adlo :inatrumant capable of eatabliahmJ a minilll.a 40 ind\\ matal path in the flywheel material.

.Additicnllly the instxumant JIL18t meet tha linearity requh anants of Ul'-301.

5.2.2 Seaxdl unit(a) *-

use a 1.0 ind'l diamater, 2.2!5 IIIZ straight beam aeuch unit for initial mat:al path*

calibration and tor tha peripwry m.

For the gaga hole examt naticna, use a

• 5" x.1", 2. 25 lllz gaga hole inapecticn ward. (Magasa\\ial Cl281 1" bot9 prcbe).

5.2.3 CUJplant Use Ultragal II, SCl'IDtraOe 40 or equivalent u pendtted by the Pl'e-En;,inaamd Material List.

6.1 tBR: Ragul.atmy QJida 1.14, Aaviaion l, dated August 1975

6. 2 Dq.11.. Lic#lt o 111,eny Quality Servic:1119 Inapection Examination NIE Proonn:-..

6.3 ASMB Boiler ard PreallUJ:e VMNl Qxla, section V, 1983 &iition, 9nnner 1983 Adda'm 6.4 mo,. tllclear EnginaarinJ Mlllm'amLD 90104, dated 4-19-8!5 6.5 ISI Lettar ND3ISI:0106, dated 11-8-85 6.6

6. 7 NPD.\\P 9. 6 l!!Xpln:labl* Prcxb:ta cmtrol 6.8 OX,nma Lic#lt Qllplny Quality servioa Procedurell 9.4, "Ncn::lalltzUcw Examinations";

17.1 "o:introl of the ()lal.ity 5ervicall unit Ql AllcOrda"I 2.3 "Written Practice For Qualification and outification of NcnSllatluctiw Examtnation and Tellti.n;J Parllc:l'1nal" 6.9 mo, Quality cmtrol Al!p)tt #638, dated 3-9-93.

7

.

7.0 7.1 RCP fiywhael. t7r Examinatia, Rsp:)rt 7.2 Unit 1 Flywheel. Hole Identificatia, Drawin;J 7.3 Unit 2 fiywhael. Hole Identificatia, Drawin;J tJil-304 Rsvisia, 7 8.o QBH>IOOY or OWR1 8.1 Raviaial 7 -

Incorp:,rata safety raquiranent:s with the use of Ultr:agal II couplant, add Chrcn::>logy of Clw1gaa sectia,, made aclministrativa dlarges, am perfom two year review.

8

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F1YMJeel Hole Ideot;ificati I

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A'ITACHMENT B INFO+TION ON REQUALIFICATION OF PERSONNEL AND EVALUATION OF MEGASONICS PROilE FOR RCP FL VWHEEL EXAMINATIONS AT BEA VER VALLEY

Record of NPE ?rxedure gv,1;;.cat;;,on Proc.:adur9 ti,_ 30 '(

D initial qualiticatioo Ravisia, --'2-----

Page l of _2_

Date 3 -Ito* 3 S---requaliticatia'l 

D raqualitication not required*

(JJALIFICATiaf LOO'rATICfiS/<Dtmll'S: P,u:L'""'"" """:t.,. Qu;a. L, F-, c AT*S'::' c\\ ocu,V\\r:N'TJ ON AT,-Ae.ME:d QcR *bas.

Ac.Tua\\. gual,t.,c.&Tt(lN T9 k CClt.ldu<..'T\\J I..., c.c W,f !nc :-JC.,'"r, Q N v,., 'Th e. """Am,1... &Tf 9..,

C ATrACHMEN1'S:

0 calibratial record o test object drawinJ 0 exand naticm nam1 Ir' other QCR *63 j' AttM :JE.

3*/1.* ?,.$

Data

1!.i.

Parfi.,

By IArMl Nlf!r.

t- {,-

1.,.

tJ{b.

Wit111 s r..v.l Data Witr1211 i.w.l 1**

Data

{A Data Ptoodan cpalificaticm nauta ana accaptable and pr;ocmure ia c:puitiad within the pm,nre and aubject to tba limitaticna not.ad abc:7u9.

S..: \\.;,,.l t-*

JzE Cd1d,e OU:O III Date MII 3-di-,..J Data

• If IWl,lllificaticn is n:,t recpind, tt* EUD. i.v.l III mau.Ld writ.a a brief explanatia1 in thl a ea Metia, *

,  ...

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M.606AJ RRf D37-122153 638 S'lM'ICW __ BVfS_.Uni.._.q__.l_,_2 _____________________ _

//SYSTD( _....11Bttct* ai,._a:..s;2Pm.JJ1.1Mt-11:&.1es.asa.1n0mm*n&s1uwu&a-11,a*,L---------

f!YllYltlm ot Heraemlm IIZ ru,0221 JZ1' IRP1oet1m Pl;* te Q\\ MEdl 8, 1993, tba a1tbcr ard Ga.c9* aack, s.niar' ID b:aval.ed to t:he Electro-tflldla Diviaicn in a..widt, IL 'Iba pap:aa of the trip 1111111 to parfam an avaluatian of tba r<<llfttly pm:bwd reactor oool ant PIii) tl t7r trXlllllinatim 14cbe.

'Iha trip 111111 arnn;Jld u a aatually blnefic1eJ avaJ.uaticn of tba MlgMcnial RCP tl prcbl en an actneJ a:, fiy,,t111J

• llt". DangJM Ia n, 1 Nm l.JMtl. m, -t.t.t in NttinJ 11>> a tia 1G111 t:ba Plant,....lld have a 15*

dJ..mlllter a:, fiYl'fJrrJ available. 'Iba fipllttl be1nJ arutactund had 6 9119111 hol*

in a cizcl.e 2t* traa t:bT fl.3/'*lrrl mntarlina. 'Du.a r1rsf is *1milar to the R'::P t11at111l* at w tl\\it 2. f1ba tldt 1 flyr.tltal 11111 CWlly 4 CJ11J9 bal*.).

• 'Iba flaal prcbl di.ft.. in +!ssiCJll tzaa pl:'llriaaly UINCI 14d::iaa in that tbl 11MJXn \\Slit el at is c:urwd to *&E4811ilta fer tba CCIW. altzy ca

 to l7llka ocntact in tha t* di rte gl9a boJ.-. 'Iba d :WMitzatad l'Wt E.

of thia c:urvatm9 ill that tha ult:rMcnic a.ta ip'llld is g:c:atl.y lW'laced cua to t '1a acDllltic foc,.ainJ effect.

'lhta toar,., bllll eJJc.ua -1er idllntificatioo of NtJ.ect:ars u

• Will

• reel.,., aipl to noiM ratio frcll material

.

'!hi bam prcbl is...s to pm:tam twD apmate typaa of ur amminatirm a, a R::I' tl.

'Iha flmt typa ia thlt aaw,aticn of tba.... tbl Clll1W' bore hole am  caam:w flat t:bT 91111 bola. '1bl MlgMcnial bare pcd:le pertormld tJu.a tuk lJy, abibitinrJ far,......... tmn thl prwiclualy UNd prma, liftidl.... 1-..1 -.

'Iha wud type of...t.natim 18 a 3ao* 8Cal\\ of thl n wl\\1311 fmD eac:t1 of tba 9llfJI bal*.

In tbia eDCllllinatian, t:hl 1111J11a1ia1 bar:9 FCc::ta perfomld Y wll, pm,idinJ et?llJant n1aluticn of cl,c11ly hol* at

• iJJnifialnt llt1:*J patbl.

b attacbld P'MJ**..,., apacific calJJzaticn aoruarioa

... of Ul'-JCM,Ft(ft(lfflll 1\\11111, u.

Aa a r1ad.t of CDlllrY8tianl..,.,

-.i*al PL*..,,_ NriaiA:1111 hlMla barn 1:11C1 stt1 to fully tUII lldvantal;,a of t.bl prcbe

• ,fllhllitia.

QCR 638 Page 2 llula the cant of the fiywbM]. axaminad is aimilar to the BVPS unit 2 fi)"lhael dMiAJI', ditfc*IC!la in actual fl)"lhael CXl'lfigutatim will IW""ftllaitate pxoodll,e cpll.ificaticn en the actual fl)"lhaelC*>.

'1his (plliticatim of the rwi.Md t.71'-304 will t:aka plaal en the BVPS unit 1 tlywbMl. at a..wick durin;J April, 1993 in canjunctia'l with the t71' exami.nati.ciw. unit 2 tlywbM]. oontiguratia, will al.ao be cpalitiad in canj\\n:tJ.al with t71' examinatiaw. 'lhi.s u1p01.t will serve u a pw.lillinary pio,dma qual.ificaticn to validate tba technique and to doannent the illp"O'l8d mcamLi.natJ.cn capabilitiaa of tha Mllguani.cll foc,aad bor9 prcbe.

cc: N. A. llwiLCjiiC J. J. Glondl G. L. aack Pllctc&y ll!t!wl MII am: rile

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ATTACHMENT C ASME TECHNICAL PUBLICATION PAPER NO. 74-PVP-25 REACTOR COOLANT PUMP FLYWHEEL OVERSPEED EVALUATION

Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheel Dverspaed Evaluatitn P. C. IICCUDflLA' General Atomic CO.,

.. n Dtqo, CaUI.

• • H. IAllfOID Tiu.,.,,,.. eapabilitr of tlY """ -.l Jll/Vllwda..-°",.,..,. read4r 11""""11 eooltlftl,,...,,. 4a, 6effl ffiJJualtd tl&rou,,. G combitUd GMJ,...ta/ tJM apmflllfttal

• lurt, LifllWII,,_, of tlY p,otot,n,, fl.-,,....,. eeltvlalMI Jo, tit, dtAetU.

/ai,/,un,,....,.,., tlw principu, of &ctioft I I I of tJw A.Sil B Bou.r anti Pnuur, V,,.., C'*, flfld f* tlY briUlt /rarfur, mod,.,.,., a f'°'*"' o,tproada in.... itWtllilr f ador* tom """""""' f,o,,a fiu.....,., com,ut.,, CIMlrna, Tit, CICIC'WS' o/ tit, analrtit:al approotl,, toa1 6r a-" motlll tut,,,..,,.

I04i(:4 *......,,, tzalkftl a,t'Nmnl bettlllffl l.l'JllfflVtU m aflfllrN, f'lt, rtnll, of tlw,........ an"'""'"" in tAia pa,,.,, and tltq ill.,,,,. tJw aflCl.e of tMflf*

tMit4 ca 6,..,,..,,,ult,d  a,i,lieation o/,n,._ /IWl!dvn  t.eA-

"°"'ff, i,w:lwlirtf,u,,tieilJ, couid,ratiofle, to tJe. aolutiotl f/ AardUJaN """"'"" of rtaln,iMri,tf.

Introduction ID tbl....., of

• poaww.d - of eoo&u, aoeidlD& iD.....

,uriaad.. _. l"MCt.or plan&, it ia poaibll fo, dw a.et.or primary ooolan& pump to aebien.,... oD dw order of two to du.

wnee i&I normal delip apead. A&..... of t.bil naapilude, coo Cllffl ariw.. to dw likelihood of oompoaen&a of.... pump.

motor.... b\\r fraeturiq Md prodUGJII blsla...., miJJila lritbiA t.be CODWILIMD&. 0( Ulmaat CODCll'D iD &Ilia nrprd ie IDI l'NCCOr coolant pump lywDNI, UOI i, p II lllJ tM mclll ro t.atioaal iDert.ia in t.be plllllP-fDOlor._bly, ud &11111 I.be hipee& amouot of *'*11 a,

• liflD IINled.

Tbe W'MiD..... ooowat pump lywbael dlliln OOllllilte of two larp *-' d.iaa, 76 ill. aod 16 ia. iD diaiaaNr, Rieb an bolled topdaar in or:'dlr t.o pnmde dw D1MS11ry rola&ioul iMrtia t.o maiD&ain low ud &b*....,.., oore onrbla&iltc in t.be n*t of loa of ponr t.o &be pum... A sketcb ol tM I,,,.._

IINIDblf, abowins 1M eipileu& dNilJ uad ia pna in Fil-l. TIM lwo pla&ea.,. 7.6 in. lbick ud 6.6 ia. &hick, rapeeuftly, aad coataiD D.....,.. bola and u,,n1111 lllown.

TIie lywbeel i, fabriaaud t,om A.ua. Grade 8, ca.. l a-1 pla...

,,. purpca of.... enll&Mioa ie to... llline............,

wbicla daia lywbNI daaip beeoma eriliol& fl'OID t-.bt 1&1:.Mdpoln&

of fraetuN u.d aut.q11111& millile production. AA IIUly&ical approMli ia t.aua, 111ili1i111 the naolbocll of &etion Ill of the

• r.-t,, el Wrt1atw11 N..., $.,_,

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Ma..,_ Dt*--. Miaaa.... Fla.. Ii,*,..... IIIH. ol TH AMHll'H IKl8ff o, Mae11a,ne.u. --

w......,.,-,.... MAIM& Hm*

...-....... a. 1t1*.....,, H* 1.. rv,.11.

c:.......a e.. *n t tll uw w.... IIH ABME &ia. ud PrteaUN V_.. C.ocll for dueula failure con aiderat.iona, and ut.ili1i111 the principla l liDNI' eluuc fract.un mecbanicw (LrFM) for britC.,......,. eoaaidentiom. Due to plu&icity, the LEFM epproaob ia not Jlriet.l1 appli**,a. t.o &hie I

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lll Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheel OVerspeed Evaluation P. C. RICCARDEW1 uener111 Atomic Co..

n O,e110. C*111 W. H. BAMFORD Wes11n11house uclee, Enerll'Y yuems.

P11tsbu111t1, Pe Th* '""",d o,p,ih,li' li,,_,

• tu,,1r1JF.r,*tt 11 :;1rhrt'ia '*M"rtfll'a t,y,,.. au "'lt>ti.l'i 'flit pr(){,/T11m 1ri11,*h,tn,wn,tr,11,,,,rr,*11,,u *'i/'"n'"lll* flt'IU¥-l'ri FI1wnrri,nl aad unt.U'ISU Th.- rf'1,11 II/ '.h, l't*aJuaJ&tm II.Tl' ilf*JU'tl.'t'fi t'l 1h16 p1lpl'T.,111,J /ti,lj 1,/liutraU 1h, Jn,ui., of 'filfli}/1 tdu, h,*,in bt 1JL'comµ/1.1tvii *hm,u;h,1pp1v1llW11 of r11od,rn froctur, m,rh.rnv, tPrh rwiogy. 1'1l'ludrng pi,ua,,111,,1t1Jn<iRr1111m1,1 :o th.t wi wwn t>{ harri1.C1JTI' proliu "" IJj Tf! aJ. f ngt,wn '19 Ulit'f'tll lntroduc'Jon In the l'Vf'nt,,( a p,***,Jau"l i*lM,,f,,,.,lant <1Pnt in a pl'1!WI*

sunz.. d w11t"r rl'&l't* r -ilai.* :t 18 p1-1l,lp for *.he l'l't.<'t<,r immarv

,.,,,ant pump '" :,,n1l'V"' *pt¥,J..s,,n the,,rdPr,,( t*** tn *hrN!

'111,..,. 1 !.I! '.,.. rma, *ll':'*1.,;n,i-.1

\\ t fJN"Cb 11( t h1 ma,;n,tu*IP. con.

,..,.rn 1H1ita1 "" t.. thP 11kr11h*1,,(,,,mponPnUI.,f the pump

'll*"r _.mt,l) (ran11nr,,: and produrrng lu,:h PTII' mwulf'II

• n r,11, t bf' 1*ont.a111mer1t 'If *1un,114l,,,nr'f!rn in th111 recattl t.11 thi, rpa,*r..,r *l)o,ant p11mp tly*herL '4hce,t pc.lllMllllll'fl tbf, m... 8t,..,_

tat,,,r,Al. of'rtia 1n, hi' ;:iurup-m.,t.-,r rnhh, awl thl.111 the h1,:hl'fll a.m "rn t "' l'rtf'r,O-at a 1Vf'n Rptll!ol ThP Wf'll!t1n,:h,1*ute N11ar,t p11mp tly*h4'1'l,lfll!i,'n r*o11111J1t" "'

'".arir;I' *'.Ml 1L1k. :),n &/lll 6. 10 111 *l1am,1.n wh.wh are

,,. ",_,..j V1(t'! h11r In

,rder to prr,v,de the Ol'N'ftll&I",' rr1t.at1nnal rnPrtia vi marnut.i,, dnw &n,i I h, prevent '"'"',,v,.rh11&L1r14t.,,

'hr f'V,.r,t 1 1(: I'll!,,( pt,W,.I !,p ! hr pump!!. Blll'trh,.( tbP tlYWhN'I 1U111Prn r,1 v h,,w111g *.he *cruti,'&n t *ll'tA1la &11<1 -l1mP11111,,rui,A l(JYl'fl rn F11t I The twn plat.M 1t.r?. 7 ', 1n *h,.. 11 a,,,1 I}.',,n it11rl1 r..,.pP,**,vP1\\ "nd,-.,111.&HI 11,,m,.r.,,.lll h111f!II i..*,j k,.**n!.,. h,,wr, 111P 'l\\ whN'l :a fnr..ated fr*,m \\. *.. 1,1 'irt.<11' B, *:aa I t.M1 pi&f.#.

Thr p*1rp,llll',,f *h.ul.. vai,,a,,,,ri IJI,,, ll'!rm,,,,. *hf' l al Wt)1rr, !h!A tl, *r,N'I lf'J!1,;n *.r1,..,*r1t1raj fr**m,,,,.......,tp,,1!i!

• Jf '",..'.irP",1n,1 -.*Jr,..,...,,,,.,it

• i.*. *uiu.r pr1,-4f jl t.J*d, "t* 1.1,&,\\. t,,-a1 appr*,at:h,.1 '&lll'r.

11.lJ,z,r,,: *t,,. rr,,.,,-,,,.111,f.,., *,,,,. Ill,,I *t,,.

r,,r-,,,.,..,, * 'r 't.* p,.._, ** * *._.., W.*I f.. t,i,f,C

-. A. *I I ti !flt..al.4,,(l al*:.@ !*,......,. '*...a &A,;

,r.. 1

,r, 1M*r1,w *.' *,,-* 1t11&1 f '.cin*r r,t a,..,

• ,A*..,... :, "'.,..... ',! &JL. j*,-..*'

t 1,)14



• /'ii.....,,...

,,'ITT * \\.11*"*" '*t r.-.*al**

',fa.t,,a,,r;' 'N"W*IIJ' I\\ *--\\.4t.t-..1

• ** r.,rw.',1'.urr,. ** f'*lA' ',

'i* t* '

• \\I**.--...,..........,,,...r..*.-, '...-1a,*

A,,\\IE Hoder &nd Pr1'111l11re \\'f'Sl!lei t',ide for durtilP fa.dur" *'On-8ldl'r11t1,11'1!. 111..i,it1l1L1111{ the pnn,*1plm ol lw.. ar 1*i!i.'lt1,* (rl\\***1irl"

!llt'dlAlllr'I' 1.1.F\\! for t,nttle fraf'lW1l l'IHl.'!IdPrall'l!UI r,,,.. f*)

pilMlll<'I I\\, the LLF\\f *ppr*>&dl 11 not al.nrt!y &ppl,*.a de,,, thui

-- -+--- *-

. )

r, '.

I 0 0 0

')

l i '

1

,,, I

• • • <too*-**"' P"" ftywlleel 1eame.,,

l

}{'

w --

prob&laa, aod t.bua a..a. model tlll propam WM implemented to verify t.be,na1,... A IIIIDIDU)' of UM lywbtel naluation aad t.be 1upponi111 WI prapam ill Pftll in t.bia paper. A IDON deuilld N1pOn OD dlil work OU be fowad in (lJ,I Ductile Failure Aulpl1

"*** 11111111111 TIie *- in t.be rwtor ooolanl pump I,,,._., llilpMUDI loell lUIII ooa-tmioae 1uob u bola ud

.,..,., 01D be....... by t.be folloq eql&MioDI (21,

"*.. (a;*)__. [.. +.. -  -,. ]

,,, * ( a ; * )_..a [.. +.. + 1 - (1.:  ),. }

(l) whlN 1111 DOtAt.ioa iii dalMd ill Fis-I. Bubltiwtilll t.be

• Pl'OI riMI...-.vie...,....... eoolaat pump.,.....

(Pia. 1) iDt,,....... (I),.... IIOtilll dtu t.be....... dealil)

<,> 11..- by o..... Jlal.......... nrio* ndill dlpdla

.. bt...... M a,... fll..... ftlocitJ W (red/IN) i" t"

t.*

s I**

I. I '"..

11 1hown in Fi1. a. Note that tbe circumferential 1tre,1 <*,> ii

-nt.i&lly linear over about 90 percent of tbe ftywbeel radiua, wit.b a 1barp pealdns effect due to the 1tn11 concentration at the bore. Altbou,b the ma,nitude of the 1trt11N1 wi'! vary with IIDIU1ar velocity, the 1bape of tbe 1treu diatribuuon 1bown in Fi,. 3 will be the Mme at any epeed. The 1bape of t.be et,...

diltribution baa an import&nt effect upon the behavior of the lywbeel and muet be couidered explicitly when applyin1 1tNS1 limit, to UM calculated,.,_,

r,ullN CNII......._. U*lta.

The capacity of a 1trueture to Nllilt ductile failure wit.b 1ufflcient marsin of aafety duriq fault.Id condit.iona can be deawu1trated by meet.ins the fault.ed t'l0Ddition criwia of 8ect.in Ill of the ASME Boilff ad Pree eure Vwel Code (31 (Appendix F). The faulted condition limit.a for alaat.ie anal)'lil are u followa P. < 0.7 B.

P. + P* < 1.068.,,

(2)

• ._. B. ii tbe minimum apeeified ultimaw telllile 1treqtb of tile mat.trial, P *

• 1111 primary membrane ltrtll intenaity under faul&ld condition loadinc, and P. it the primary bendiq 1tre11 lntelllity. (Tbe llnD 1W111 int.tlllity ie defiaed here u twice tile 1'NICI& muimum __,,trw in accordance wit.b t.be 8eetio1:1 Ill definition of tbe t.erm, and aboukl DOI be oonf....t with.Iba linear alaatic fractUN meebaaia IU'IIII in&elllily factor wbicb ii Ulld...... in tbia paper.)

Sinaa tbe t.biebm direct.ion llnsa (11.) in Ille lywbtel ii

• wntd IO be IMlllilible, and tbe radial IU'tll (*,) UW&JI f..U.

blt.wllD tbe t.bicbea cliNedon lilws uad t.be ciroumftnDtial 1uw <**>, tbe muimWD,trw int.euity at aay point ill Iba ft)'Wlllel ill equal IO tbe circumf... lW..-... la ordar IO apply

\\bl,vw 1imi1, of equa&ion (2) to a oonliaear 1trtss diltribution 1ueh u t.bat abon for ** in,,., 3,

• ac&ual 1trtss diavibut.ioa mutt bt rmftd into l* IDllllbrw and beDdioa oomponeaa I'. - (I *> 1*,,,,.

"* * (I o)I 1.* 111(,. -r)4,,

(8)

WMN,. ii t.be ly,rbeel meu ndl* de6Ded * <* + &)/2. 8ub-lt.ituti1111111 cricumt.... t.ial-... wm from equadon (l) Mid 11ffYU11 out tM Ul.... iD (3) yilldl

, ** (*;*)(I"!*> (II-al) [ l -!('.:)]

, *.* (

3

, ) (I )I { 2 (

)

+ [ I - j ( ": # ) ] - alMD(l/a)

';' [ 1 + i ( 1a: $ ) ] - : (

1a: % ) }

<6>

Plully, aubtdwtioo of Illa 1PPfOPriat,1 paml'lric dale from J'la. I iato eq..._ (6),wdl

"* - o.*.,, <*>

"* - 0.21 t# (pa)

(6) 1.qualioM (2) wt (6) wU1 DOW be_,.... ID ordlr to nalu.t.e 1M.,_ a& nWa Ille lywl 111,.,_......... 8NtioD ID faa&lld ODDditioD en...._

• • L-_...__...._ _ _.._-.....1----:-"":-------:!

Vll1111 of P. 111d (P. + P.) laan a... mleuLtt.ed

• • 11,!!.,1 from tqualioD (6) ud _,.,..IO..... faulled eoodit.iot11 IVIII

............. C f-,Cllt Isa 1iai1, ot 111uaa C2> to....... t.llle limiUIII 1ynee1.,....

z Tran11ctllft1 of the AIMI

uru:ler duetile faihart cobliderat.io111. AD ult.imat.e t.enaile 1t1ensth of 80,00f' pei... UNd in computffll tbe faulted condition limit.

wbicb la tbe minimum 1peeilied value for A-u3 Grade B, ci...

1* it.NI pven in (3). Tbe lirnitinc ll)Nd bMld on tbe membrane

+ bendlns 1tn111 limit la 305 rad/aee or 3686 rpm, and tbe limit iD1 apNd hued on tbe membrane 1tn11 limit la 372 rad/18c or 3660 rpm. Tbenlore, tbe membr&DI + beadi111 limit ii pvero

iD1, In 1ummary, tbe Nlult.1 of tbe anal)'li8 performed iD tbia Ne t.ion dem0D1trate that tbe rNetor ClOOlant pump 8ywbeel can witbatand a rotational apeed of 3686 rpm, wbicb cornepond, to approximately a 290 percent overapeed coDdit.ion (Yac. 10) without. exoeedi"I tbe faulted condition criteria (Appeodia F) of Section Ill of tbe ASME Boiler and Pn..ure v.... 1 Code.

Compliance witb tbeN limit.I IIIUNII tbat tbe 8ywbeel can witbat.and tbia ovtl'lpeld coDdit.ion tritb 1u81citnt iursm from tbe at.andpoiot of ductile failure.

Brittle Fracture Evaluation CleMtt Fer* atrna lalH*t,,......,.....

AD approximate aolut.ioo for tbe 1trt11 inteD1ity fact.or for a radial crack emanat inc from tbe bore of a rotati"I d.iak bu been reported by Williama and llhenrood (fl, and i.a liven by tbe followifll expNllllion wben and wbeN tbe pometric quant.itilll e, b, &Del c an defined in rac. 2. Tbe quaotiW!l p and"' rtl* to &1111 IIIMlrial deDlity aod ancu1ar veloc:ity u btfON. Subat.itulins ud appropriate po metric data from Fie. l into equationa (I) ud (7)._. to 1tn11 inttnaity factor u a function of upLu nlocity for vario.

.. wned cracked dept.bl u ebowo by tile IO&icl eune in Fie,,.

Note tbat for tbe Cllt of a crack emana&iac from a byway, tba ktyway dtpda ii included II pan of tile total crack dlptb for conaernwm.

lupecuoo of r11.,, indicat.11 tllat tile cbed form eolutioD technique erroneo..iy Ii**

• nouero value of 1tn11 int.tblity factor for aero crack deptb.. Tbl.W it bNomtll obvioue tbat tbe

• umption of addina keyway dtpda to crack dtpda ii oqrly coU1rYativ1 for very 1bort crack dept.ba. la order to elimiu..

thil undue COI\\Nffatiem, ud to colllidtr tbe elect of tbe keyway more aceurattly, a delailtd flDit.t element naodll of tbe lywbetl witb a crack emaaatina from tbe ktyway... llt up and analysed.

,..,......... a..1yeee. Appromnat.tly 500 conatut,train trianaular finite etemen-. were UNd to model the reactor coolant pump 8ywbeel for analyail ulinc the eomput.r propam PPCNT (51. A dee.ailed llluatration of the rnodell Uled in the analy1e1 ii 1ho*n in Fi1, S Oue to ayrnmetry, only a 80-Jec aeament of Journal of Pre11u,e Ve1NI Technol09J

..: = I

!,.o I

f Ip I*,,, *,!

A-**-*-A c= : '::;.:*:

0,..,1 o---o :

;: :1*::: .

(Hatti

,.o 2.0 l O

,.o s.o

,.o CIACI D(,TN fOI fUI l..U&fl.. flOII llntAY ( tlClllll

' 0 t.be lywbetl, includinc balf of OM UJ'WIIJ, ii req\\llnd t.o model tbe comple.. lywbNI. A oumber ol dUrtnDt crack dept.bl uad loeatlona.... 1tudiad by placinc tbe.- cnoktip modal at varioua locat.iona witbin tbe be pid nipoD. ElMt.ic eolutio111

..,. obtained for all OIIII *umiac tbe loadlaa t.o bt due only to oentrifupl forc111 neul&ull from lywbNI epinnin1, Tbe et.

feet, of cont.act load1na a& tbl iDDII' ban ud bywaya....

wwned to bt Dllli&ible, and tbl lywbael ftl wwud to bt ill a 1tatt of piano,tnin. Va.11111 ol 1&nll intaaity factor,,..

• t.imated from tbe nWDlrical 1tn11 Nllult.e ill tba Yicinity of tbe cncktlp by fittinc tbe da&a to tbe em two term, ol tbe.....

apanaion for tbe enek tip 1&nll Wd aioD1 tbe plane of tbe crack pven by

'"*',...........,.....,...,,.....,......,,.... n,._..

J

K,

• ., * -= +c,

\\/:ltr, (8) where, ii the ra.:iial dia&&nce from tbe crack t.ip, Ci, an arbitrary oorNtant, and K, ii &be crackup 1tnu intelllity factor. Thia procedure ia described in detail el9ewbe,.. (6), and leada to tbe finite element 1&n111 ia&e111ity fact.or data 1bowo by tbe duhed CUl'YII,.. Fil,,.

The.. reemeot bet.WIID tbe c1oeed form and numerical n111ult1 in Fig., ii excellent f<< crack dept.ht of 1.0 in. and p-eat.er, th1.11 providi111 an indepeadlot check of one techoique.. ainat the other for thou crack deptba.

For crack depths leu than 1.0 in., however, the cloeed form solution with it.a ulLraco11.1erv..

tive byway &11u.mptioo siv* unrealistically hi&h iv.a in tenaity predictiona.

h is a.lao noteworthy that, contrary to what one would expect., the 1treu iotenaity factor for

• 0.6 in.

crack emanatinc from die keyway corner ia mailer than that for the aame crack...anati111 from the cent.er of tbe keyway.

Thia phenomenon eu be explained by tbe fact that tbe 1tnu coocentratina tff* ol &lie keyway corner ii extremely local.ind, and tbua bu DO effM at a diataoce 0.5 in. from the corner. The 1tN11 intensity factor for cracu of tbia eiu i.a s<<>Verned by t.be overall 8ywbeel,....._ diltribution rather than by loeal 1tn11 ooooeotrat.io111.

Tbe 1tnll int.ellli'7 factor data of Fie,

• will now be com*

pared to tbe material fracture t.ou,hneaa to detMmine critical 1peeda for tbe 8,..._. u a function of,..umed Cl'Mk depth.

8ued oo tbe aboq diacuaion, tbe moet meaoilllful 1tr111 in*

taD1ity factor da&& ol Fie,, ii tbe bite element cune for a crack emaoaua, fram dae eeoter of tbe byway, ud tbil cune will tberefon be UNd iD tbe NmaiDder of tbe naluauon.

,......,. T.......... Tbe frac\\un tou,bMII and other m*

cbaoi-.1 propertill al A-m Grade B, Ca.. 1,...a ban beea 1tudied aWlllinlJ __. die A.EC H*YJ Seetion Stell Teeb nolocr Pqram 17, 8-t, 101. Lower bound fracture tol.llb,nea Yer1U1 &eaapenture da&a for bo\\b die loncitudiul (RW) and trwffnl (WR) dir ttiDIII... obt.aioed in \\bi, prapam uaiq tbe equlY.a.t -.., eoneept for lo.., bound fract.un toup,,

MIi t.llWII* Tbe data..,. obtained from llffenl _.. of 1Wll, all ol wbich Md drop lllipt. nil duct.ility tn.Dliiion tanpantuna io Iba.... ol Odis W to + 10 des F. TbeNfon tbia data abould be applieable to......, ooo&ut. pump 8ywbNl material wit.la t.be...... U'lllllitioll tllllplnt.un.

'l'llt 8ywP 111 oparalion temperat.un ii +120 des r, and t11e llliDim-....w fraet.un touc...._., tbia tem perature froa 111 * *000 pli\\l(i. Tbil Yu"" ii fort.be.__

or trUIIWl'le dnelia. die loasiwdlul dineliOD tou,lma, boiDI mucla biala- 'ftUI. tbe ualyaa UIUIDIII ibe wont,-.

lible Joc.tioe wl... latiOD of uy S.WI wbieb IDAY ailt.

Ulinc dul t.oa,;n* nl111, wt lhe bit....._, da&& fOI' a ae11* urn, arMll (Ila. *>. ariti-.l.,.......... ban bNla dewmiJled M a f...... of ciraek dlpt.b. ud UI llaown UOIII wit.la t.M dlll&ill,.... limit. iD "'* 10.

........ Cr CC a1n1 8triot, appUeal,Oity of Jiwr.a..tie framn mrlsnfe ii lmiwd to liwat.iolll iD.Web tlle at.Mt.

of pl.u\\ic low ia 1M ftlirlity ol llMt cncktq, ii..U irl comperi.

IOD to 1M mull.... ud oda partiMlat. porMWic quan\\it.NI of tbe prabln Ima (1111111.....- t.bt followirll apprna

,u,tion for plaatic - 1i1e in

• plue 1tnin crack p,oblem r* * !_ ( K, )' *

(9)

.._. K, it die...... etnss illleality fact.or ud,.. ii t.be....

teria1 yiald...._ Valua al plaatie,one liM ban been eal,.

eul.at.ed aeaardiDI lo lllil..,,....,D for tbe NaCt.or coolaot pump 8ywr.J at. iDcipill:& fndUN CIC,

• K,c), ud Iba,aulla an aumauiNd irl TIIIII I.

Table I f'11WIINI plHllt:..........

Flaw aiae (d) 0.6 io 1.0 ill 2.0 in Pla!tic zouf!.,izc (,,J U.atto (,..Id) 0.5:ltu 1.06 0 52 m 0.62 o..;:.! an 0.26 The plutic aone 1i1ee liate<l i11 Table I are far too lar1e to utilfy tbe pluticity limitatio1Li of linear elutic fracture roe chanica. Nonetbeleu, the critkal sveed calculatiom of the pre vious Net.ion are expected to Lt! accurate.

In the pump 8ywbeel probleiu, tbe pluticity ia oompletely contained. That ia, due to tbe large,t..., ll'adieota (Fis. 3), the out.er peripbary of tbe 8ywbeel remair111 elutic even at the cal*

culated critical,peed levels. Contained pluticity,ucb.. tlm creat.el, in elect, a,train controlled loadina 1ituation for which experience baa 1bown (12, 131 that el*tically calculated,train diltributica are accurate well beyond the limit.a of 1trict ap plicability of the theory of eluticity. Thia concept of "1traio equivalenca" ii well accepted in low cycle fatisue applicatiom, and ite utaaioo t.o fracture problema ia 1trailhtforward.

AcoepUJII tbil at.rain equivalence arsumeot allow, ooe to st.Uy t.laia me of lioear elut.ic fracture roecbaoica for the Sy.

wheel enluation lllins Riee'1 J-iot.epal Concept 11,1. It bu been 1bon aperiaoentally (15, US) that tbe J-iot.epal ii a pa.,

runewr wbiob tak* oo a critical value (J,c) at fracture over the complnt rup from linear elut.ic to fully plaatic beu'rior. lt ii well *teblilltod that in the tlaatic range t.be J-int.epal approach ii ideotiaal to war elutic fracture mecbaniea. Howner, du.

to die priocip&a of 1tnin equivuence diacuaaed abo*e, t.be identi ty bet,,.. J and LEFM can be extended well into the eluto plutic in ltnio oontroli.d loadins lituatiou (171, Heooe, tbe,-ct.a, eoolut pump 8ywbeel naluation prt1eoted beniD ii.....u, a J-inlllfal naluatioo. ud u 1ucb ii *alid prdMII of tbe Gt!lalft plMtic IODe Ii* deftloped.

In,...._,,, tbe met.bods wed to pndict brittle frac\\ure iD the r.etor ooalut pump 8ywbell an not 1trictly applicable be cauae ol IIIRSlin plutieit.y. HOWfflr, it ii uped tbat the ftywbell it a 1tnio oootrollld loadi111 lit.ur.t.ion for wbich the metboda ad OOfflllPOnd to ao... toplaat.ic J-in&apal approach wbich ii appllcab&t.

lo order lo ooo&rm ti-, a,sumentl, a ICale model tat Pf'Oll'UD wu implemented and ii diaCUINd later ill Iii, paper.

Fl,whell lnapectlon and Quality Assurance

.........._...._ T..... Wtllt.iopow rMCtor coolant pump.,..... ue fabricat.ed from A-533 Grade B ca.. 1 It.ell plaw.... ii produced by a PfOOIII that minimi... ea.. in I.be material aad impnw* ita fracture tousb.naa propertiel (vacuwn dtpai111, ftCUWD meltial, or lilletrollac.....aua,). Supplier ciruAca&ioll report.I.,. aftilable for all pla* and t.bey demon*

1tn&e die UCIPl,ability al Iba lywbeel malarial on t.be bMia of tbe followilc NqWl'IIMDU (ti):

<*> 1'11 Dikluetility lnlllilioa tanperatun (NDTI') ii ob tliald bJ two drop...,.... wbicb m1.111t ambit. "no, lnu" pafarmuee at to dis P in accorduce with t.be nils of ASTM T*t.uts Procedure F,208 (111, n...

cllap Wlipt 111ta M1UN tlaat die NDTI' of the lywbeel

.....Wilao..... lllan +lOdlsF.

A RIWIDIIID of tbne CbarpJ V-no&cb impan..,.eim1111

.,. tat.ed at unbilrlt ( + 70 des F) t.emperatu.re ill ao

...._ wit.la A8TM apeeUIOMion E-23 (201.

Tbt a.,p, V-aotcla 1M111 iD bo\\b die penUel aod nonul OfilD&alioD wit.II NIii*' to lhe roUilll dinct.ioo of t.bt

.,..... ru&lrial..... be at !wt. 60 fl,olb.

Complian* witb tbe fonpi111 crit.eria inluna that all react.or eoolant puap 8ywr.l mawrial U1 a low enou,b NOT tom*

pent.un aad a hip enoUI,') upper abllf toucbnea eo tbat I.be Ion, boacl fncturt to-- da&a o. 191 are applicable.

Tranuctlon1 of the AIMI

0 " *****

,.._... LI r o l\\ ** O*I

/

• • 11111o11 *1 I /

... kt*

_____..__,_J

..j..._..,,*

• I ST(P aJ

• FIUL IIWIIIIII r '"*Gul OlltMCI t.l II r......

-*fftllf

"'* *..... __... n,.-r..,, *....._,,.....,.

N11ll*llrNtl* 1u..,11-. Each lywb..a plate ii 1ubjeetM to 100 percent volumet.ric ulVIMIOnic namination in accordance witb paraarapbt NB-2&32.1 ud NB-2632.2 of Section 111 of tbe

.UME Boiler and Pnaun v... Code (31 for acceptance. Alter fabrication, tbe fiaiabed machined bore ud ktpaya are au jeeted to rucneuo particle or liquid pnetnnt aurface eumiu.

tlona. Tbe finilbld ly,rbeela are allo aubjectad to

• 100 percent ultruonic examination accordias to tbt abon refenoced par papba of (3).

la addition to tba uonmentioned abop inapeeuone, tbe lly wbltla rectin eateuiH fun.ber namination II pan of tbe ra quirtd iDltrYice inapectioa PNJ111UD for rtaetor ooolant pump lywbeela (181. A aurfaee naaaina&ion aad full 100 percent ultn,.

aonic naaunation.,. performed at epproamat,I t.en-y11r inter vala. W*tinpoUM ia allo int.rodueina

• new inpeeetion t'fOCINUN (211, iD wbicb tu critical,._ of tM 8,-bNI (bon, byway, aad bolt bole Nlioaa) cu bt nutillld ultrMoDiculy by pwiDI a tranaducer tlaroup _. of tbe four 1111 Mill in tba ly,rt.l (Nt r-11. l). Tbia new procedure proYidal

• more tboroup ex amination of ta.. aitical f1llioM, lad.. bt 1.-d at mon frequnt ia...,.. um it doll aot require rancwal of tbe ly All of tbt ultrllODic ttllta ctiaeo*nd in tba forecoina.,. ealt bn..S lo provide de<<.etability ot e,.. 11 amall 11 0.25 in. io radial penetration. Tla111 ta.. on the order of O..S in. an a factor ol two sreater tMn tbe inpaeetion :i.pabiUty of tbe 1111 btinc UNd. Furtbtnnore, inapeetiona of tbe 8ywhNl &N botla nllnli** and frequent. It cu, Lbenf on, bl concluded tbat a...

of tbia ai&e will not....,. det<<tion in ftyw..._ and tbat ly*

• heela con&ainiDI auda ftawa will not bl aeeep..S for Nf'Vice.

Scale Model Tnt Program la order to nrify tbe ana,ytical procedu,. UNd in tbt pNNnt lywbeej OffnpNCi ffUuatioD, a acaie model lywheel t.llt pro-Journal of,,....,,. Y**** Technol09

.,.... - implemented. TbrN acale modal I,.... (quarter

.... ia-plw dimenaiona, full t.bick.wa)...,. fabria&ed witb laft..-, in tbe moat crit.ical IOCla&ioD ud oriutabuo.

Au.l,tical fallww pndictiona nn made llliDs tbe.... metboda 11... 1ac1 for tbe prototype 8ywbeel enlua&io&. Tbe mode.la

... &MD ttllf*i to failure aad tbe actual fl'loetul'a.,.. com-

,.,.. faYOnbly wit.b tbe analytical prtdictionl,..... leDdiDc a Wp.... of CNdibility t,o tbe pump.,.......,,. *

.....,,..,....._ Fabrication ol acall lywl 1111 witb

.,, cncu reqllinl

• relatively oompla mul.... procedure (Ne fll. I) wbicb bu btlD dmllopeJ a& Iba W *d &MW B,e.

_. IDd Defflopment Labont.orila 1221. la &IMt initial ma,,

obiails pbue (Step (), tbree 21 in. aquare bluaD 1Pitla tbick

- ol t.6 ill. nN macbined from

• la.ia-t.biok pla&I ol A.633 Gndl 8 OIIII 1 alall. Oae,quart.er ill. bola _...._ bond at p r liW dia&u* (D) from t.bt oenwpoin, al &I>> blub.

Tile 1111111.,.. alao oountabored a& tbe tap and ba&tiom 1urf ac11 11.-- ill Fil, I to aooommoda t.bt lftlllll'I.,.._ dmce lad for pncnoldac.

J'wlly, ID eleotrie an........ 1116-cbiaias (EDM) i.cbniq111 wu UNd &o p,oduee a lJl.in.,&oq alot

• • • • inc from &bl 11, in. bole. 8t.ap II ia t.bt _.. fabrica,.

tion llftMlldure ne fa&ipl preerac,kias. A.....- CJalills

• rice.d to pulaa&e pnaure in t.bt lllolla a&

• fNquency of eo cpa, IDd 11 ultneonio law det.ec&ioD..._...._ to OODtaaoUlly muDi&or and CIOllV'Ol cnak powlll... t.be,.,..

INN -,eUaa opara&ion. Muimum JIIWW9 durilc fa&ipe pa.

.......... limited... fwu,tj. ot CIiek.... ia otder to aYoid &be prob&.. WOU&id WIUl acllllift an.a1ip plMdoi'f dllftlll sncncldDI (221. In tbe ftul pbw of fabri I' e (8t.p Ill), die modlla WWI meobillld to tbeir bal db

• br re morial tbe *- peripbenl ar, aurfa. mataill

• ellon in Fil, I. TIie inDlr ban, byway Md 1, llotr from 1M _,.., to &bl 1/HI. bole..,. alao IIIMllned in t.bia.....

TIii lna1 modlla '91111 ODDWaid oompoate fflMlka of pa.

apecilld ltDSt,hl oonailtiDS of

• mMhillld a&ol,

• 1/f..ia. bole, u EDY alot, ud

• fa&ipl precraok, all etnMUII flam t.bl uy.

ways ii &bl I,.._ bona. Tbe lrnplari17 ot 1111 _,. 1wface doll M alect. &be nlidity of tbe apel'UDID, lliD* lliitupltude of..... int.elllilJ fao&or ii only...... by enc... in tbe "IIIJ - onck'1p Np>D. Noy &llo Illa& tltil lul cnck ii orieMld ha tbe tn.lllffnl or wu dinc1ioll widl fllPICII to tbe roUiaa ctirN&ion (WR). Tbe onek eiM.......... D n1 ebclllD

• 11 to yilld DOffliDN bal arack dlplba of I in., I ia., ucl 6 in.

Tbe.... 'IMIII of onek depdl could DOI bl dewmiDed until alt.er &be...., bowttw, due to flriabili'7 ill the illlltlla ot tbe f&&iata.......

111; 12111.,,,....,. TNtlll*n*,..... In order to claanew*

ile 1111 fractun t.oup-of tbe epeeile beat of material._ to flbritaal tbe acale model lyw..... lia at&Ddard COlllpe,.,I tAD aioa apeoilDMI (231... fabricat.ld from tbe w pla&,e. Tbe 111**-..,. t.akea in tile.........,.. (WR) orillllatioll wl

... 2.0 in. in tltlck._ (2TCT). T*u... performed at.Odis

,. +IO dis,. ud +70 CM1,. and ""'* of f...... IOIIPDIII

........._. from tbe apecimN lold-dll*'*- CurN1 UliDI Wi&&'1 aquinlat.--., OODOlp& for ao.. bouDd fnetun toup.

DIii..._ (IOI..................... DOI..,.. *DOUlb to bl...,,._. aeeordial to tbe A8TM wDIIDded ttlltull proalun (231, Fie, 7 aboWI tba fract.uN toupDIII daw. ob-11.iMd in tlua llllADMI', For eomparilon. tile loww bound fracture w*** cum 1111d in &bl lywb..a au&,-. (ti bM bin ia

._. to I.be model mat.trial drop ftipt NDTr ud ii ebowa in lllil lpn. - I.bat tbe aperimenlll daw..,. aipileaotly biaMr &llan tbe 1o.. bound cum, wbiob la an indicaUon of tbe OOlllff&Lilaa IIIOriat.ed witla tbat. cunt '°' I.Ilia beat. ol......

Tbl aperimlnlll data ratbtr tbaa I.be lonr bound cun1 will bl 1111d In muiDI tbt fracture pNdictioD1 for t.b!I acale model I,.._.. in order to provide

• muDiqf ul evalualion of tbt ao cwacy of tbe ualytical tecbn.iqu. 'Mid.

5

JC c,,:

110 000 160 000

.o 000 U0.000 i

200 000

> ° 000

-,,o 000 1110 000 I

, zo 000

...,oo 000

,o 000 60 000

• 0.000 Z0.000 0

DIOI' Ill illlT tltlTT 0

Ml T(W(IUUI( ("J)

• -* *u IDultO *he *ull

'Gt.l'-afU Cul1t,...

'" Ill 100

.... 7......................,.,.............,.....,.......

Aut,11111 r,...,....,......_ A.a in t.be prototYJII lywheel ov.,..,.S l'Hluation, the au model 8.,..._.. were evaluated on tbe balil of bo&b duct.Ut f aUUN &Dd britt.t. fracture con.

lldiratiolll.

Tbt melbod for duct.Ut fallun anal,- folloWI tbe forepia, deleription for tbe prototype lywbeel, except the ultimate taftlile 1trenath of tbe ma&erial (8.

• 80,000) ii Ullld in plaee of tbe Section Ill fault.ecl condition limit (0.7 S.) 1ince no u.fety marlin ii deaind wba makiq tbe failure prediction.

Sub-1titutia, t.be aeale model lywbeel dimeaaiou into equationa (')

yieldl P. - o.ma,,,. <Pli>

"*

• 0.01'.,t (pli)

(10)

For tbe lea.It model lp'MIII, 1M pnlabriat.ecl reprWDt

• aipiftout reduetioa in load bwilla...._ of tbe enebd plw.

1Wtm111 to J'la. 2, tbe ** of NdlNlld bMriJll ana eu ti.

iaeorpont.ecl into equatioaa (10) by 1M followias approaima&ioa r *

• o.cm """ <PIii>

"* - 0.01,,,,.. (pal)

(11) 2(1- *>

2(1 - *> - 4

01)

Aaumill tM& failure ota111..._ P. Gtlldl 8. or.,._

CP. + P*> aCllda I.I I..... IO 11111 followias aprmlOIII for duetal failUN apeed II a f1IDCtioD of CIIMk..

.,. - &r,;

li.iiii I.I&.

o.oaea (11) ftlN 'Ill ii tM eritiell..... bllld OD 1M........ """ ud

. *cc (,._........

"\\

I i. :,c ***

11 I C I

I

l.

I l -*-________ j I :

,...

• c.._.........,....* **'......,.,............,.

w. ii tbe critical apead baaed on the 1nembrane + bendin1 1treu.

Valuee of " and w. bave been calculated.. a function of crack depth. A. in tbe cue of tbe prototype 8ywheel, the two limitina apNda.,. very clON; bonver, t.be membrane + bendin1 limit (w.) ii pvemiag. Tbil limit ii 1bown u a eta.bed line in Fis. 8.

The method for brittle fracture analyaia of the 1cale modela alto follo,n that of tM prototype avaluation, however, the experi*

mentally meaaured matMial fracture to111hna data of Fis. 7 are UNd in place of the lower bound fracture touahn-curve.

Subetitutina the ec:ale model l,rwheel parameters into equation, (8) and (1) yielda model lywheel 1t1"11M intensity factor data which b&Ye been compand to the averap value of m... ured fracture tou,bnla of tbe model material 11t the teat temperature

( +7& des) to pnidict. critical 1peeda for britt.le fracture of tbe

..a. model 8,,,..... n.. limitina 1peeda are tbown.. tbe ao1id lint in 1'...... 8.

A third Ill of limililll lpelU ii abcnrn in Fis. 8, which ia repwtatift ol eritical apNda.. detennined in tbe prototype lywblel enluation. Tbt critical apeeda for the pump lywbeel calculated in t.be atetiom, entit.led "Ductile Failure Anal)'lia" ud "Brit.U. Fracwn !Yaluation" are not failure apeeda 1inC!e tMy.,. bMld upoD 0.1 &. for ductile failure and a lower bound fnewrt t.oupDla cum for brittle fracture. Tbe aafety marpm

......., wida tMN IDl&hoda of critical apead determination an Wuatnled la tlliD tp,e.

Tranuctlon1 of Ille AIMI

• i 1000 f

-*****.1

'*IC *-11 1000...._ ____....._ _ __._ __....... ______ ___.

00 10 10 1.0

• D

\\.D 1.0

&IINI CIICI Hmt ( IICIIII)

JOO

1;..11........ ef,..._.............,............... 11......

Tett........ Tbe three acale model 8ywbeela, fabricated aa deaeribtd aboYe, nn teated to failure in it. bip apeed turbine rotor tatinc machine at W*t.inpouae Reaearcb Laborat.oria.

Tba teeta were performed at room temperature (+71 cill) ud telt wmpwatun ud rotational,peed wue monitored con tinuoUlly tbroupout tbe test.

The 1pecimeaa fracturtd in tbe IIWWlr aboWD ill Fie, t. Tba fractun data from tbNI experiment.a an ploti.d on Fie, 8, ia

..., of fracture apeed Yll'IUI actual crack depth fflf eom,.,_a tritb aoaiyail. Tba...,_...at bttWND tM fracture pndietic,111 ud the aperimental data ia acellent, tbua Incline a hip de P'N of cndibWty to tbe analyt.ieal proced..,. 1111d ia tbe prototype flywblel nalUMion, ffeD in it. Pl'INDCII ol nlllllin plut.ic10Dtlilea.

Conclullon1 A detailed ffaluatioa bM been perfOl'IDld to detenaine tbe critical apeecl for tbe W*wa,bo\\a rNCtor coolut pump 8y wbetl deaiaa from the 1taDdpoint of fractun and 1ubleq11111t IILilai1e productioa. TIMI l'IIUltl of t.bil 1wdy.,. 1UIIUIIU'iled iD P'ia, 10.

Ductile fallen ud brit&le fnctun of tM lywblel... oon-lidad..,.,...ay wl limitlaa......... *tablilbed for eatb. TM limiuas..... oww ol Fie, 10... that tM ductile failure limit of 3'81 rpm (290 pen,eat Oftl'lpNd) la aonmiltl for cnck.,. I* tbaa 1.16 in., aad that tM brit.de fraewn limit. beOOIUI IOfl"IUDI for larpr crack*-* Since tb;s crack aiM ia ff1f7 larp ill oompuiaoa &o tlaa& wllicb ill dewetable under curnat impect,ion aad quality....... proc,edlU'III t,,r it. ly wbetl deaip, it cu be coneluded tut. 3616 rpm ii the lilnitina 1,-d for tbl dlaip.

Finally, a leale mocW lywbell tat propam... carried out &o Yffify the analytical proeecilll'II lad in tbia enluat.ioa. 1'brN tat.I IJIN performed. and the Nillulta ol all tluw... hiablJ COD ftnutory. On tbl btlia ol tbilt acale model lillt Pf'Oll'UI, it aa be concluded that tbe IDldaodl lad to predict lywbell fracture in tllia rwport an biply accurate aad, in conjwac&ioll wi&II tbe eo<<lllffatift mattriall property da&a.... abould... &o...

dude 8,,,.._ frac&IUW wader o......,_. loldilll eondilioM p,o dinc the talculattd limiUDI...... an DOI ac,eecled.

Acknowlecl91M11t Tbe autbol"I,rac,1"'1y aeknowledp tbe llli&u* of y..,.,

Journal of,re11ure VnNI Technoloff L. a..... O. O. &uau,, ud L. J. Ca tf'li in euryiaa oui

&lie aperimtlltal ponioa of &lafl........

..,..nee, l.RfoeudeUa. P. 0., and Bllnlard. W. A.. 0a.ot.or Coolut O,eJIINlld Enluat.ioD," Wad._.. Nuolw £WI)'

lylt"l; WCAP-8166, Dee. 1973.

2!DOIHDkei. 8., wl Oooclilr, J. N.. ' of Elaado ity,"...t eclition, aeOraw-llW. N.. Yon. lffl>.

a ME BoUer ud "-ant v-Code. Seotioa Ill 111\\u!

11r Ooanruotion ol Nuolw Po-Plant nenta.*1 AIDll'iwa locMty ol Necbanloal lnli,.,., N.. York, 1911 Jr.ditioo

• Adclelida.

, WWiama, J, 0., wl llbawood. D, P..1.."Ct.loulation of t.be 8'ralll-.... 41 a-. a.t.. of 0.............. by ui Ap lll'Oldmatl Mettiod." J'*""II,t IJINia AMl,n,, Vol. 3, No. l, lNL pp.17-22.

I. OabrielN, 8. B., "U** Manual for W*uae Re

_,. Oenenl Pur,oN Ploit.e Ellmni W*iilll*

boua a..reb rt 70-11'7-PONO-&l, ADril 23, 191 0.

I Omeab1, J. J., aad Lo. 0., "An EYt.luat.ioa of Floi&e F.limeit Metboda for tbe Ooamuta&ioD ol Elut.ic Stnll lntllliiJ Futon," Tau,. ABM& Val. 86. a.. B, 1013, pp. lff-116.

1. T. R., w1 Tbomu. r. 0., "BnluatioD b=

Ellllie Frie&un M.cbuiaa of Radia"'1a l>al!IAII to v...a St.Ill," Wlltinpo1111 Nuallu Ba11v 8)'lleml, WCAP*

ma.

 .J;.;_rs.. l:ti!:

EDlliY 8 WOAP-7678. 0.. lt'NL I Mia,, T. R., and Buabalet. C.. 11tal Veril calioD ot 'Lo.. Bound x,T u &be wnllnt E

n Ooneapt.," 11881'

.. ADiual Information M

No. 21, AD,. lt 10

"'* F. J,, "A Proeadua fa, Bouadbta v.a.. on FracstuN T La&--.. o.

IUdll Na&ional. OJtNL.TM o.. um.

lf lnria, O. R,, "l'rlMiurt.".._r;,:,i* Ill P.-, Vol. t.

eclitld b

. FIIIWII, 8Drint.1r-V

, 1168...PP* u1.-.

11

, 8. 8., *.,,__. 8lliil ud Low..(.,'fale l'at.ip9,"

MeOraw.JIW.

ew York. INI.

11 Lua,, B. *J. "Dllia of Pn... v...r. for Low.Cycle r)a." Taut. uME. Vo&. N..._ o. 1m.

l J, R., "A Pa&II ln ii and tlM ximatt SUiia Ooaen&ndo&

NOMMa Cracb."

'faAltl, AIME. Vol. AO, 8erill E. 1 pp. m-aat.

II a.In, J. A., ud Luda. J. D..,.,,_ J-ln........a u a PnMl&un -Ciitollion.",,,..,. 2't11** ASTM-8TP-5H, A vt-.a ao..ty for TIIIUII and Matiivtlll. Pbiladtlpbia, lffl, pp.1-21,

• 11 Laadal, J. D., and..,., J. A.. *-nae aeet of Specimen a-tn on 110" l'rodur,,..,,.._, AITM.sTP-61', Amer ilU ao..t1 for T._ wl M....W.. Ph11Nhlpbia, 11n, pp.

M-11.

17 8Jeauclllh. P. C..1.. 8..UOW, J. L.. 11A Combined oal-tal l'laCIUJ'9 SwdJ," ttd a, Sennlob Nalliaul SympoliWD on J'nclUN,,_.enim, A\\IIUI, 21-29, lDi ftllit.1.

ol Maryland, A,..,... Socillty for T*tinc ud Pbll. Pa. <to be pubtialltd}.

11 ABO tit._ 0 1',........ Coolaot Pump Fl1*

...a 10.,..;t. Oc&. 11'11.

II.AITlf 1NDG11G E40I, lt.... rd Me&llod for Oon*

duetillJI Drop Wtip, Ten 10 DNrmiM Nil-Ductility Tnnli liaa TtllDPIIUUN ii Fmitie at.la." £If JI *{.:!/;

P* II, A.aeria1D 8cMilty for TllliDI ud Mat.eriall.

Pa., 1173.1..PP*.411.

ao ASTM IHlllUl'G &-21. 1'81udarti Melboda for Notcllltd a., I T..uns ol Mttallic Mat.ariala. A&TII 8lwlna 1'7!),.,, a,, Amariou SoeitlJ_for T*tins ud Mawriala, ia, Pa., 1173. pp. ffl-211.

k. O., "Ult.niionie Prooad1111 for the Eaaminat.ion of Main Coolant Pumtt Plywbeela." W:Wi,..,._ Prooaa Speci*

.._ MUI au, 11n 1, ** am.

21 Clark. W Ott.=

c.ldalnl, L. J., "Patilue Pncnckinc ol........... T Speei-." *-,.;fltfttlal,'JIICA*11ec1, Vol. t, I..., DD, I 121.

21 A8TM' ltudud &.M, 1'1.....,. Method of TIii for

....... traua FractuN Toup-of MMelllc Mattriala," A81M

....,. Cll11)PM Ill, Americu locielf_ for T..uos aod Jiaallriall. PbJltdelpllla, Pa., lffl. pp. NO-,tTt *

......... u.a.A.

1