ML12095A071: Difference between revisions
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{{#Wiki_filter:April 4, 2012 EN 12-014 OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT NOTIFICATION OF SIGNIFICANT ENFORCEMENT ACTION Licensee: Omaha Public Power District | {{#Wiki_filter:April 4, 2012 EN 12-014 OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT NOTIFICATION OF SIGNIFICANT ENFORCEMENT ACTION Licensee: Omaha Public Power District EA-12-023 Fort Calhoun Station Docket No. 50-285 | ||
==Subject:== | ==Subject:== | ||
ISSUANCE OF FINAL SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION AND NOTICE OF VIOLATION This is to inform the Commission that a Notice of Violations associated with a Red Significance Determination Process finding will be issued on or about April 10, 2012, to Omaha Public Power District (Licensee), as a result of an inspection at Fort Calhoun Station. This Red finding, an issue of high safety significance, involved deficient modification and maintenance of the safety-related 480 Vac electrical distribution system that resulted in a catastrophic switchgear fire caused by high-resistance connections within the switchgear. The electrical separation scheme failed to function as designed when combustion products migrated across an open bus cross-tie breaker and caused additional electrical faults that adversely affected redundant trains. After the event, six of the nine 480 Vac safety-related load center buses were de-energized due the electrical system response from the fire and the operator response per the station procedures. At the time of the event the plant was in cold shutdown for a planned refueling outage. | ISSUANCE OF FINAL SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION AND NOTICE OF VIOLATION This is to inform the Commission that a Notice of Violations associated with a Red Significance Determination Process finding will be issued on or about April 10, 2012, to Omaha Public Power District (Licensee), as a result of an inspection at Fort Calhoun Station. This Red finding, an issue of high safety significance, involved deficient modification and maintenance of the safety-related 480 Vac electrical distribution system that resulted in a catastrophic switchgear fire caused by high-resistance connections within the switchgear. The electrical separation scheme failed to function as designed when combustion products migrated across an open bus cross-tie breaker and caused additional electrical faults that adversely affected redundant trains. After the event, six of the nine 480 Vac safety-related load center buses were de-energized due the electrical system response from the fire and the operator response per the station procedures. At the time of the event the plant was in cold shutdown for a planned refueling outage. | ||
The licensee was offered the opportunity to attend a Regulatory Conference or provide a written response, but declined to do either and accepted the Red finding as characterized in the inspection report. | The licensee was offered the opportunity to attend a Regulatory Conference or provide a written response, but declined to do either and accepted the Red finding as characterized in the inspection report. | ||
Findings identified at the Fort Calhoun Station are outside of the ROP action matrix because oversight of the plant is being conducted under Inspection Manual Chapter 0350, | Findings identified at the Fort Calhoun Station are outside of the ROP action matrix because oversight of the plant is being conducted under Inspection Manual Chapter 0350, Oversight of Reactor Facilities in a Shutdown Condition Due to Significant Performance and/or Operational Concerns. In accordance with IMC 0350, the results of this finding will be provided to the oversight panel for identification of the appropriate enhanced follow-up inspection. | ||
The violations associated with this Red finding are: | The violations associated with this Red finding are: | ||
: 1. Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, | : 1. Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control associated with modifications to safety-related breakers. The licensee failed to ensure that design changes were subject to design control measures commensurate with those applied to the original design; failed to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis for those safety-related structures, systems, and components were correctly translated into drawings, procedures, and instructions; and failed to ensure that these measures assured that appropriate quality standards were specified and included in the design documents. | ||
: 2. Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, | : 2. Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action associated with inadequate electrical maintenance. The licensee failed to correct a significant condition adverse to quality and take corrective actions to preclude repetition. | ||
: 3. License Condition 3.D, | : 3. License Condition 3.D, Fire Protection Program associated with train separation. The licensee failed to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved Fire Protection Program. | ||
It should be noted that the licensee has not been specifically informed of the enforcement action. The schedule of issuance and notification is: | It should be noted that the licensee has not been specifically informed of the enforcement action. | ||
The schedule of issuance and notification is: | |||
Mailing of Final Significance Determination April 10, 2012 Telephone Notification of Licensee April 10, 2012 The state of Nebraska will be notified. | |||
Contacts: Gerry Gulla, OE, (301) 415-2872 Tison Campbell, OE, (301) 415-8579 | |||
Distribution: EN-12-014, April 4, 2012 OWFN OWFN TWFN EBB Regional Offices Chairman Jaczko EDO OCFO NMSS RI RII Comm. Svinicki DEDR OP CENTER RIII RIV Comm. Apostolakis DEDMRS FSME Comm. Magwood OE OIG MAIL Comm. Ostendorff OGC OCIO ADAMS SECY NRR RES OE staff OCA NSIR ACRS PA OI IP Electronic DISTRIBUTION: | |||
R. Zimmerman, OE N. Hilton, OE T.Campbell, OE G. Gulla, OE OE r/f EN binder X PUBLIC X NON-SENSITIVE OFFICE OE:ES OE:BC NAME G. Gulla T. Campbell DATE 4/ 2/11 4/2/11 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY}} | |||
Latest revision as of 05:25, 12 November 2019
| ML12095A071 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 04/04/2012 |
| From: | Gerald Gulla, Tison Campbell NRC/OE |
| To: | |
| Gulla G | |
| References | |
| EA-12-023, FOIA/PA-2013-0250 EN-12-014 | |
| Download: ML12095A071 (3) | |
Text
April 4, 2012 EN 12-014 OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT NOTIFICATION OF SIGNIFICANT ENFORCEMENT ACTION Licensee: Omaha Public Power District EA-12-023 Fort Calhoun Station Docket No. 50-285
Subject:
ISSUANCE OF FINAL SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION AND NOTICE OF VIOLATION This is to inform the Commission that a Notice of Violations associated with a Red Significance Determination Process finding will be issued on or about April 10, 2012, to Omaha Public Power District (Licensee), as a result of an inspection at Fort Calhoun Station. This Red finding, an issue of high safety significance, involved deficient modification and maintenance of the safety-related 480 Vac electrical distribution system that resulted in a catastrophic switchgear fire caused by high-resistance connections within the switchgear. The electrical separation scheme failed to function as designed when combustion products migrated across an open bus cross-tie breaker and caused additional electrical faults that adversely affected redundant trains. After the event, six of the nine 480 Vac safety-related load center buses were de-energized due the electrical system response from the fire and the operator response per the station procedures. At the time of the event the plant was in cold shutdown for a planned refueling outage.
The licensee was offered the opportunity to attend a Regulatory Conference or provide a written response, but declined to do either and accepted the Red finding as characterized in the inspection report.
Findings identified at the Fort Calhoun Station are outside of the ROP action matrix because oversight of the plant is being conducted under Inspection Manual Chapter 0350, Oversight of Reactor Facilities in a Shutdown Condition Due to Significant Performance and/or Operational Concerns. In accordance with IMC 0350, the results of this finding will be provided to the oversight panel for identification of the appropriate enhanced follow-up inspection.
The violations associated with this Red finding are:
- 1. Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control associated with modifications to safety-related breakers. The licensee failed to ensure that design changes were subject to design control measures commensurate with those applied to the original design; failed to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis for those safety-related structures, systems, and components were correctly translated into drawings, procedures, and instructions; and failed to ensure that these measures assured that appropriate quality standards were specified and included in the design documents.
- 2. Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action associated with inadequate electrical maintenance. The licensee failed to correct a significant condition adverse to quality and take corrective actions to preclude repetition.
- 3. License Condition 3.D, Fire Protection Program associated with train separation. The licensee failed to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved Fire Protection Program.
It should be noted that the licensee has not been specifically informed of the enforcement action.
The schedule of issuance and notification is:
Mailing of Final Significance Determination April 10, 2012 Telephone Notification of Licensee April 10, 2012 The state of Nebraska will be notified.
Contacts: Gerry Gulla, OE, (301) 415-2872 Tison Campbell, OE, (301) 415-8579
Distribution: EN-12-014, April 4, 2012 OWFN OWFN TWFN EBB Regional Offices Chairman Jaczko EDO OCFO NMSS RI RII Comm. Svinicki DEDR OP CENTER RIII RIV Comm. Apostolakis DEDMRS FSME Comm. Magwood OE OIG MAIL Comm. Ostendorff OGC OCIO ADAMS SECY NRR RES OE staff OCA NSIR ACRS PA OI IP Electronic DISTRIBUTION:
R. Zimmerman, OE N. Hilton, OE T.Campbell, OE G. Gulla, OE OE r/f EN binder X PUBLIC X NON-SENSITIVE OFFICE OE:ES OE:BC NAME G. Gulla T. Campbell DATE 4/ 2/11 4/2/11 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY