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| | issue date = 08/04/2015 | | | issue date = 08/04/2015 |
| | title = TSTF-505: August 4, 2015 Public Meeting | | | title = TSTF-505: August 4, 2015 Public Meeting |
| | author name = Carte N N | | | author name = Carte N |
| | author affiliation = NRC/NRR/DE/EICB | | | author affiliation = NRC/NRR/DE/EICB |
| | addressee name = | | | addressee name = |
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| {{#Wiki_filter:TSTF-505 TSTF-505 Norbert Carte (NRC/NRR)August42015 August 4 , 2015 Concerns Concerns*MethodologytodeterminewhenalossoffunctionMethodology to determine when a loss of function has occurred is not described. | | {{#Wiki_filter:TSTF-505 Norbert Carte (NRC/NRR) |
| *OperatorswillneedtomakethisdeterminationOperators will need to make this determination within one hour after the components are declared inoperable. | | August 4 4, 2015 |
| *Some regulatory requirements may not be explicitly modeled or addressed in the PRA. | | |
| *Reductions in redundancy and/or coincidence may introduce new events to be protected against. | | Concerns |
| 2 When can a RICT be used? | | * Methodology to determine when a loss of function has occurred is not described. |
| *NEI 06-09 does not allow a RICT for a total loss of function, but does not have detailed guidance on what constitutes a total loss of g function*TSTF-505 allows two or more channels to be inoperable | | * Operators will need to make this determination within one hour after the components are declared inoperable. |
| *When Components are shared between protection and control systems, how many need to be PRA Functional or Operable in order fortherenottobeatotallossoffunction?for there not to be a total loss of function?*Two Types of FunctionsIdentifiedinTSTablesforRTS&ESFAS | | * Some regulatory requirements may not be explicitly modeled or addressed in the PRA. |
| -Identified in TS Tables for RTS & ESFAS-Specific functions identified in regulatory requirements | | * Reductions in redundancy and/or coincidence may introduce new events to be protected against. |
| *IEEE 279-1971 3 | | 2 |
| Functional Requirements (StifPttidCtl)(Separa tion o f P ro t ec tion an d C on t ro l)*GDCs 21 & 24 | | |
| *Effectively increases redundancy requirementsIEEE279 1971*IEEE 279-1971-Explicit Requirement to protect against | | When can a RICT be used? |
| *Single Failures of shared equipment (extra redundancy) | | * NEI 06-09 does not allow a RICT for a total loss of function, but does not have detailed gguidance on what constitutes a total loss of function |
| *Events (alternate channels) -Not discussed below | | * TSTF-505 allows two or more channels to be inoperable |
| *IEEE 603-1991SiiltIEEE279 1971-Si m il ar t o IEEE 279-1971 4 GDC 21-Protectionsystemreliability | | * When Components are shared between protection and control systems, how many need to be PRA Functional or Operable in order for there not to be a total loss of function? |
| -GDC 21Protection system reliability
| | * Two Types of Functions |
| -"The protection system shall be designed for high functionalreliabilityRedundancyandindependence functional reliability
| | - Identified in TS Tables for RTS & ESFAS |
| -Redundancy and independencedesigned into the protection system shall be sufficient to assure that (1) no sin gle failure results in loss of the ()gprotection function -"Typical Configurations:
| | - Specific functions identified in regulatory requirements |
| *1 out of 2 | | * IEEE 279-1971 3 |
| *2 out of 3 | | |
| *2 out of 4 | | Functional Requirements (S |
| *1 out of 2 taken twice 5 | | (Separation ti off P Protection t ti and dC Control) t l) |
| GDC 24 -Se paration of protection and control p p"The protection system shall be separated from control systemstotheextentthatfailureofanysinglecontrolsystemsystems to the extent that failure of any single control system component or channel, or failure or removal from service of any single protection system component or channel which is commontothecontrolandprotectionsystemsleavesintactacommon to the control and protection systems leaves intact a system satisfying all reliability, redundancy, and independence requirements of the protection system | | * GDCs 21 & 24 |
| ."Typical Configurations:
| | * Effectively increases redundancy requirements |
| *1outof2 1 out of 2*2 out of 3 vs 1 out of 3 | | * IEEE 279 279-1971 1971 |
| *2 out of 4 | | - Explicit Requirement to protect against |
| *1 out of 2 taken twice 6 | | * Single Failures of shared equipment (extra redundancy) |
| IEEE 279-19714.7, "Control and Protection System Interaction "Clause 4.7.3, "Single Random Failure," states:"Where a single random failure can cause a control system action thatresultsinageneratingstationconditionrequiringprotectivethat results in a generating station condition requiring protective action and can also prevent proper action of a protection system channel designed to protect against the condition, the remaining redundantprotectionchannelsshallbecapableofprovidingtheredundant protection channels shall be capable of providing the protective action even when degraded by a second random failure | | * Events (alternate channels) - Not discussed below |
| .Provisions shall be included so that this requirement can still be met ifachannelisbypassedorremovedfromservicefortestor if a channel is bypassed or removed from service for test or maintenance purposes.Acceptable provisions include reducing the required coincidence, defeating the control signals taken from the redundant channels
| | * IEEE 603-1991 |
| , or initiatin g a protective action from the ,gpbypassed channel." | | - Similar Si il tto IEEE 279279-1971 1971 4 |
| 7 IEEE 279-1971Clause 4.11, "Channel Bypass or Removal from Operation,"states:"The s ystem shall be desi gned to p ermit an y one channel to be ygpymaintained, and when required, tested or calibrated during power operation without initiating a protective action at the systems level. | | |
| During such operation the active parts of the system shall of themselves continue to meet the single failure criterion | | GDC 21 21-Protection Protection system reliability The protection system shall be designed for high functional reliabilityRedundancy reliability Redundancy and independence designed into the protection system shall be sufficient to assure that ((1)) no single g failure results in loss of the protection function Typical Configurations: |
| .Exception: "One-out-of-two" systems are permitted to violate the single failure criteria during channel bypass provided that acceptable reliability of operation can be otherwise demonstrated.
| | * 1 out of 2 |
| For example, the bypass time interval required for a test, calibration, or maintenance operation could be shown to be short thtthbbilitffilfthtihlldb th a t the pro b a bilit y o f f a ilure o f th e ac tive c h anne l wou ld b e commensurate with the probability of failure of the "one-out-of-two" system during its normal interval between tests." | | * 2 out of 3 |
| 8 IEEE279to603Mapping IEEE 279 to 603 MappingIEEE279-1971IEEE603-1991 IEEE 279 1971 IEEE 603 1991Clause 3Clause 4 ClCl0 Clause 4.1 Clause 5.0Clause 4.2Clause 5.1Clause 4.7.1Clause 5.6.3.1(1)Clause472Clause5631(2) | | * 2 out of 4 |
| Clause 4.7.2 Clause 5.6.3.1(2)Clause 4.7.3Clause 5.6.3.3Cl474Cl63 Cl ause 4.7.4 Cl ause 6.3 9}} | | * 1 out of 2 taken twice 5 |
| | |
| | GDC 24 - Separation p of p protection and control The protection system shall be separated from control systems to the extent that failure of any single control system component or channel, or failure or removal from service of any single protection system component or channel which is common to the control and protection systems leaves intact a system satisfying all reliability, redundancy, and independence requirements of the protection system. |
| | Typical Configurations: |
| | * 1 out of 2 |
| | * 2 out of 3 vs 1 out of 3 |
| | * 2 out of 4 |
| | * 1 out of 2 taken twice 6 |
| | |
| | IEEE 279-1971 4.7, Control and Protection System Interaction Clause 4.7.3, Single Random Failure, states: |
| | Where a single random failure can cause a control system action that results in a generating station condition requiring protective action and can also prevent proper action of a protection system channel designed to protect against the condition, the remaining redundant protection channels shall be capable of providing the protective action even when degraded by a second random failure. |
| | Provisions shall be included so that this requirement can still be met if a channel is bypassed or removed from service for test or maintenance purposes. Acceptable provisions include reducing the required coincidence, defeating the control signals taken from the redundant channels,, or initiatingg a protective p action from the bypassed channel. |
| | 7 |
| | |
| | IEEE 279-1971 Clause 4.11, Channel Bypass or Removal from Operation, states: |
| | The system y shall be designed g to permit p anyy one channel to be maintained, and when required, tested or calibrated during power operation without initiating a protective action at the systems level. |
| | During such operation the active parts of the system shall of themselves continue to meet the single failure criterion. |
| | Exception: One-out-of-two systems are permitted to violate the single failure criteria during channel bypass provided that acceptable reliability of operation can be otherwise demonstrated. |
| | For example, the bypass time interval required for a test, calibration, or maintenance operation could be shown to be short th t th that the probability b bilit off ffailure il off th the active ti channel h l would ld b be commensurate with the probability of failure of the one-out-of-two system during its normal interval between tests. |
| | 8 |
| | |
| | IEEE 279 to 603 Mapping IEEE 279-1971 279 1971 IEEE 603-1991 603 1991 Clause 3 Clause 4 Cl Clause 4.1 Cl Clause 5.0 0 |
| | Clause 4.2 Clause 5.1 Clause 4.7.1 Clause 5.6.3.1(1) |
| | Clause 4 4.7.2 72 Clause 5 5.6.3.1(2) 6 3 1(2) |
| | Clause 4.7.3 Clause 5.6.3.3 Cl Clause 4 4.7.4 74 Cl Clause 6 6.3 3 |
| | 9}} |
Letter Sequence Meeting |
|---|
TAC:MF3240, Provide RISK-INFORMED Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4B (Open) |
|
MONTHYEARDCL-13-106, License Amendment Request 13-02 - Revision to Technical Specifications to Adopt Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505. Revision 1. Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times-RITSTF Initiative 482013-11-25025 November 2013
License Amendment Request 13-02 - Revision to Technical Specifications to Adopt Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505. Revision 1. Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times-RITSTF Initiative 48
Project stage: Request
ML14059A1592014-02-28028 February 2014
NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review e-mail for MF3240 and MF3241 - Revision to TS to Adopt Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505. Rev. 1
Project stage: Acceptance Review
ML14319A0062014-11-13013 November 2014
NRR E-mail Capture - Diablo Canyon Proposed Amendment Using TSTF-505, Rev. 1
Project stage: Other
DCL-14-110, One-Hundred-Twenty-Day Response to NRC Request for Additional Information - National Fire Protection Association Standard 805, Part 1 of 22014-11-26026 November 2014
One-Hundred-Twenty-Day Response to NRC Request for Additional Information - National Fire Protection Association Standard 805, Part 1 of 2
Project stage: Response to RAI
ML14339A6292014-12-0505 December 2014
NRR E-mail Capture - Target Date for Response to the RAI Re. Proposed Amendment Using TSTF-505, Rev. 1
Project stage: RAI
ML15050A1952015-02-18018 February 2015
NRR E-mail Capture - Diablo Canyon - RAI on Instrumentation and Controls for the Proposed TSTF-505 Amendment
Project stage: RAI
ML15180A3882015-06-29029 June 2015
NRR E-mail Capture - Diablo Canyon 1 and 2 - RAIs for LAR Associated with TSTF-505, Rev. 1
Project stage: RAI
ML15232A0102015-08-0404 August 2015
Diablo Canyon Power Plant - Risk-Informed Technical Specification Completion Times (TSTF-505) License Amendment Request: August 4, 2015
Project stage: Request
ML15216A4112015-08-0404 August 2015
TSTF-505: August 4, 2015 Public Meeting
Project stage: Meeting
ML15233A0052015-09-0909 September 2015
Summary of Meeting with Pacific Gas and Electric to Discuss Diablo Canyon, Units 1 & 2 License Amendment Request to Adopt Risk-Informed Completion Times, TSTF-505, Revision 1, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times-RITSTF. Initiati
Project stage: Meeting
2014-02-28
[Table View] |
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Category:Meeting Briefing Package/Handouts
MONTHYEARML24036A3382024-02-0505 February 2024
Environmental Scoping Meeting for the Diablo Canyon License Renewal Application - February 8 Meeting Slides
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Environmental Scoping Meeting for the Diablo Canyon License Renewal Application - February 1 Meeting Slides
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License Renewal Application Pre-Application Meeting: September 13, 2023
ML23255A0012023-09-13013 September 2023
PG&E Slides for 9/13 Public Meeting Related to Diablo Canyon License Renewal
ML23174A0562023-06-26026 June 2023
Slides for TSTF-505 Pre-Submittal Public Teleconference 6-26-2023
ML23143A0882023-05-24024 May 2023
May 24, 2023, Public Meeting Slides Related to Diablo Canyon License Renewal
ML23118A0902023-05-0303 May 2023
May 3, 2023, Diablo Public Meeting Slides
ML23143A0952023-05-0303 May 2023
May 3, 2023, Diablo Public Meeting Slides for PG&E Presentation
ML23079A0452023-03-16016 March 2023
RIC 2023 Slides - Maureen Zawalick TH19
ML22339A1022022-12-0505 December 2022
Pg_E Presentation for NRC Public Meeting
ML22200A0712022-07-21021 July 2022
Post-Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report Public Meeting Slides - July 21, 2022
ML22200A0722022-07-21021 July 2022
PG&E Slides for Post-Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report Public Meeting, Site-Specific Decommissioning Cost Estimate, and Irradiated Fuel Management Plan - July 21, 2022
ML21223A0842021-08-11011 August 2021
Slides for Post Shutdown EP pre-submittal Public Teleconference 8-30-2021
ML21060B1872020-01-26026 January 2020
Enclosure 3 - 1-26-21 Diablo Canyon Renewal pre-app Meeting Slides
ML19165A0092019-06-14014 June 2019
Pre-Submittal Meeting - Presentation Slides
ML18333A1092018-11-28028 November 2018
Presentation Slides for Diablo Public Meeting to Discuss Proposed Exemption Request for Decommissioning Funds
ML17296A2222017-08-29029 August 2017
Presentation on Reactor Decommissioning for the August 29, 2017 at Congressman Salud Carbajal'S Public Meeting at San Luis Obispo Near Diablo Canyon
ML15232A0102015-08-0404 August 2015
Diablo Canyon Power Plant - Risk-Informed Technical Specification Completion Times (TSTF-505) License Amendment Request: August 4, 2015
ML15216A4112015-08-0404 August 2015
TSTF-505: August 4, 2015 Public Meeting
ML15216A4082015-08-0404 August 2015
Diablo Canyon Power Plant - Risk-Informed Technical Specification Completion Times (TSTF-505) License Amendment Request: August 4, 2015
ML15209A9442015-07-28028 July 2015
June 24, 2015, Summary of Annual Assessment Meeting with Pacific Gas and Electric and Public Open House Regarding Diablo Canyon Power Plant 2014 Performance
ML15202A0982015-07-21021 July 2015
Slides for the August 5, 2015 Diablo Canyon Power Plant License Renewal Application Public Scoping Meeting
ML15117A0692015-04-28028 April 2015
Pacific Gas and Electric Co. April 28, 2015, Public Meeting Slides for Diablo Canyon Seismic Hazard Reevaluation
ML15117A2262015-04-28028 April 2015
Nuclear Regulatory Commission April 28, 2015, Public Meeting Slides for Diablo Canyon Seismic Hazard Reevaluation
ML15035A0062015-02-0404 February 2015
Meeting Presentation, Diablo Canyon Power Plant Process Protection System Replacement Lessons Learned Using ISG 6 NRC Meeting on Digital I&C.
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Slides Regulatory Conference - January 14, 2015
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14-07-08 ISG-06 Experience Presentation July 8 2014 Digital IC Meeting
ML14155A3742014-06-0404 June 2014
May 22, 2014, Summary of Annual Assessment Meeting with Pacific Gas and Electric Regarding Diablo Canyon Power Plant 2013 Performance
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Transcript of the 612th ACRS Meeting, March 6, 2014 (Open) Pages 1-317
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1978 - Rhrp Cavitation
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License Slides, 10/2/13 Pre-Application Meeting with Pacific Gas and Electric Company to Discuss Upcoming Structural Weld Overlay Relief Request to Use an Alternative to Disposition Detected Laminar Indications at Diablo Canyon, Unit 2 (TAC
ML13269A0052013-09-26026 September 2013
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ML13268A0022013-09-25025 September 2013
Slide Presentation for 9/25/13 Preapplication Meeting - Use of Leak-before-break for Fuel Structural Analyses and Coolable Geometry
ML13268A0052013-09-24024 September 2013
Slide Presentation for 9/24/13 Pre-application Meeting, Diesel Generator License Amendment Request
ML13159A0092013-06-0404 June 2013
Notable Failures in Nondustructive Testing - June 4, 2013 Public Meeting
ML13066A7402013-03-0707 March 2013
Licensee Slides from 3/7/13 Pre-Application Meeting with Pacific Gas and Electric Company(Tac MF0687 & MF0688)
ML13044A7352013-02-12012 February 2013
Licensee Slides from 2/12/13 Public Meeting to Discuss License Amendment Requests for Degraded Voltage Protection and Control Room Dose Analysis of Record at Diablo Canyon, Units 1 and 2
ML13024A4052013-01-24024 January 2013
Licensee Slides from 1/24/13 Meeting to Discuss Offsite Power
ML13018A1342013-01-15015 January 2013
Pacific Gas and Electric Handouts from January 15, 2013 Meeting Regarding Pending License Amendment Request Related to Diesel Generator Technical Specifications
ML12355A1612012-12-18018 December 2012
PG&E Handouts from the December 18, 2012, Meeting with the NRC Related to Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluations (TAC Nos. MF0313 and MF0315)
ML12347A3102012-12-12012 December 2012
Summary of Meeting with Public on Diablo Canyon Power Plant
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Part 26 Public Meeting NEI Presentation Slides
ML12226A2552012-08-0707 August 2012
License Slides from 8/7/12 Meeting with Pacific Gas and Electric Regarding Future License Amendment Associated with Diesel Generator Technical Specifications
ML12193A1412012-07-25025 July 2012
6/28/2012 Summary of Meeting with Pacific Gas and Electric to Discuss Digital Replacement of Process Protection System at Diablo Canyon, Units 1 and 2 and Presubmittal of TSTF-493 Option B License Amendment Request (TAC ME7522-ME7523, ME851
ML12157A2722012-06-11011 June 2012
5/31/2012 Summary of Telephone Conference with Licensees Regarding Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 Seismic Reevaluations - Diablo Canyon, 1 and 2, San Onofre, Units 2 and 3, Columbia Generating Station, and Palo Verde, Units 1, 2, a
ML1202500572012-01-18018 January 2012
Meeting Slides Process Protection System Replacement LAR Acceptance Review Meeting Presentation
ML1202500792012-01-18018 January 2012
Project Plan for Diablo Canyon Digital Upgrade of Process Protection System LAR Review
ML1117205702011-06-20020 June 2011
Licensee Slides from 6/20/11 Pre-Licensing Meeting on Seismic License Amendment Request
ML1116405342011-06-0707 June 2011
Slides from Meeting with Pacific Gas and Electric Company Regarding Diablo Canyon Process Protection System Replacement
2024-02-05
[Table view]
Category:Slides and Viewgraphs
MONTHYEARML24036A3382024-02-0505 February 2024
Environmental Scoping Meeting for the Diablo Canyon License Renewal Application - February 8 Meeting Slides
ML24030A4672024-01-30030 January 2024
Environmental Scoping Meeting for the Diablo Canyon License Renewal Application - February 1 Meeting Slides
ML23255A0012023-09-13013 September 2023
PG&E Slides for 9/13 Public Meeting Related to Diablo Canyon License Renewal
ML23249A1592023-09-13013 September 2023
License Renewal Application Pre-Application Meeting: September 13, 2023
ML23174A0562023-06-26026 June 2023
Slides for TSTF-505 Pre-Submittal Public Teleconference 6-26-2023
ML23143A0882023-05-24024 May 2023
May 24, 2023, Public Meeting Slides Related to Diablo Canyon License Renewal
ML23118A0902023-05-0303 May 2023
May 3, 2023, Diablo Public Meeting Slides
ML23143A0952023-05-0303 May 2023
May 3, 2023, Diablo Public Meeting Slides for PG&E Presentation
ML23079A0452023-03-16016 March 2023
RIC 2023 Slides - Maureen Zawalick TH19
ML22339A1022022-12-0505 December 2022
Pg_E Presentation for NRC Public Meeting
ML22236A5472022-08-24024 August 2022
NRC Slides for Decommissioning Engagement Panel 8-24-2022 Meeting
ML22200A0712022-07-21021 July 2022
Post-Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report Public Meeting Slides - July 21, 2022
ML22200A0722022-07-21021 July 2022
PG&E Slides for Post-Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report Public Meeting, Site-Specific Decommissioning Cost Estimate, and Irradiated Fuel Management Plan - July 21, 2022
ML21223A0842021-08-11011 August 2021
Slides for Post Shutdown EP pre-submittal Public Teleconference 8-30-2021
ML20310A2792020-11-0505 November 2020
Slides for Defueled TS Pre-Submittal Public Teleconference November 24, 2020 (L-2020-LRM-0101)
ML21060B1872020-01-26026 January 2020
Enclosure 3 - 1-26-21 Diablo Canyon Renewal pre-app Meeting Slides
ML19233A0722019-08-27027 August 2019
NEIMA Meeting Slides Public
ML18295A0732018-10-24024 October 2018
Final Diablo Canyon Decommissioning Engagement Panel Meeting Oct 24 2018
ML17296A2222017-08-29029 August 2017
Presentation on Reactor Decommissioning for the August 29, 2017 at Congressman Salud Carbajal'S Public Meeting at San Luis Obispo Near Diablo Canyon
ML16335A4392016-11-30030 November 2016
PG&E Reg Conference Presentation - NRC-11152016
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Diablo Canyon Power Plant - Risk-Informed Technical Specification Completion Times (TSTF-505) License Amendment Request: August 4, 2015
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Diablo Canyon Power Plant - Risk-Informed Technical Specification Completion Times (TSTF-505) License Amendment Request: August 4, 2015
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ML15202A0982015-07-21021 July 2015
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ML15117A2262015-04-28028 April 2015
Nuclear Regulatory Commission April 28, 2015, Public Meeting Slides for Diablo Canyon Seismic Hazard Reevaluation
ML15117A0692015-04-28028 April 2015
Pacific Gas and Electric Co. April 28, 2015, Public Meeting Slides for Diablo Canyon Seismic Hazard Reevaluation
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May 22, 2014, Summary of Annual Assessment Meeting with Pacific Gas and Electric Regarding Diablo Canyon Power Plant 2013 Performance
ML14077A2872014-03-18018 March 2014
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ML13269A0052013-09-26026 September 2013
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ML13268A0022013-09-25025 September 2013
Slide Presentation for 9/25/13 Preapplication Meeting - Use of Leak-before-break for Fuel Structural Analyses and Coolable Geometry
ML13268A0052013-09-24024 September 2013
Slide Presentation for 9/24/13 Pre-application Meeting, Diesel Generator License Amendment Request
ML13159A0092013-06-0404 June 2013
Notable Failures in Nondustructive Testing - June 4, 2013 Public Meeting
ML13066A7402013-03-0707 March 2013
Licensee Slides from 3/7/13 Pre-Application Meeting with Pacific Gas and Electric Company(Tac MF0687 & MF0688)
ML13044A7352013-02-12012 February 2013
Licensee Slides from 2/12/13 Public Meeting to Discuss License Amendment Requests for Degraded Voltage Protection and Control Room Dose Analysis of Record at Diablo Canyon, Units 1 and 2
ML13024A4052013-01-24024 January 2013
Licensee Slides from 1/24/13 Meeting to Discuss Offsite Power
ML13018A1342013-01-15015 January 2013
Pacific Gas and Electric Handouts from January 15, 2013 Meeting Regarding Pending License Amendment Request Related to Diesel Generator Technical Specifications
ML12355A1612012-12-18018 December 2012
PG&E Handouts from the December 18, 2012, Meeting with the NRC Related to Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluations (TAC Nos. MF0313 and MF0315)
ML12311A0492012-09-18018 September 2012
Part 26 Public Meeting NEI Presentation Slides
ML12226A2552012-08-0707 August 2012
License Slides from 8/7/12 Meeting with Pacific Gas and Electric Regarding Future License Amendment Associated with Diesel Generator Technical Specifications
ML12193A1412012-07-25025 July 2012
6/28/2012 Summary of Meeting with Pacific Gas and Electric to Discuss Digital Replacement of Process Protection System at Diablo Canyon, Units 1 and 2 and Presubmittal of TSTF-493 Option B License Amendment Request (TAC ME7522-ME7523, ME851
ML12157A2722012-06-11011 June 2012
5/31/2012 Summary of Telephone Conference with Licensees Regarding Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 Seismic Reevaluations - Diablo Canyon, 1 and 2, San Onofre, Units 2 and 3, Columbia Generating Station, and Palo Verde, Units 1, 2, a
2024-02-05
[Table view] |
Text
TSTF-505 Norbert Carte (NRC/NRR)
August 4 4, 2015
Concerns
- Methodology to determine when a loss of function has occurred is not described.
- Operators will need to make this determination within one hour after the components are declared inoperable.
- Some regulatory requirements may not be explicitly modeled or addressed in the PRA.
- Reductions in redundancy and/or coincidence may introduce new events to be protected against.
2
When can a RICT be used?
- NEI 06-09 does not allow a RICT for a total loss of function, but does not have detailed gguidance on what constitutes a total loss of function
- When Components are shared between protection and control systems, how many need to be PRA Functional or Operable in order for there not to be a total loss of function?
- Identified in TS Tables for RTS & ESFAS
- Specific functions identified in regulatory requirements
Functional Requirements (S
(Separation ti off P Protection t ti and dC Control) t l)
- Effectively increases redundancy requirements
- Explicit Requirement to protect against
- Single Failures of shared equipment (extra redundancy)
- Events (alternate channels) - Not discussed below
- Similar Si il tto IEEE 279279-1971 1971 4
GDC 21 21-Protection Protection system reliability The protection system shall be designed for high functional reliabilityRedundancy reliability Redundancy and independence designed into the protection system shall be sufficient to assure that ((1)) no single g failure results in loss of the protection function Typical Configurations:
GDC 24 - Separation p of p protection and control The protection system shall be separated from control systems to the extent that failure of any single control system component or channel, or failure or removal from service of any single protection system component or channel which is common to the control and protection systems leaves intact a system satisfying all reliability, redundancy, and independence requirements of the protection system.
Typical Configurations:
IEEE 279-1971 4.7, Control and Protection System Interaction Clause 4.7.3, Single Random Failure, states:
Where a single random failure can cause a control system action that results in a generating station condition requiring protective action and can also prevent proper action of a protection system channel designed to protect against the condition, the remaining redundant protection channels shall be capable of providing the protective action even when degraded by a second random failure.
Provisions shall be included so that this requirement can still be met if a channel is bypassed or removed from service for test or maintenance purposes. Acceptable provisions include reducing the required coincidence, defeating the control signals taken from the redundant channels,, or initiatingg a protective p action from the bypassed channel.
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IEEE 279-1971 Clause 4.11, Channel Bypass or Removal from Operation, states:
The system y shall be designed g to permit p anyy one channel to be maintained, and when required, tested or calibrated during power operation without initiating a protective action at the systems level.
During such operation the active parts of the system shall of themselves continue to meet the single failure criterion.
Exception: One-out-of-two systems are permitted to violate the single failure criteria during channel bypass provided that acceptable reliability of operation can be otherwise demonstrated.
For example, the bypass time interval required for a test, calibration, or maintenance operation could be shown to be short th t th that the probability b bilit off ffailure il off th the active ti channel h l would ld b be commensurate with the probability of failure of the one-out-of-two system during its normal interval between tests.
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IEEE 279 to 603 Mapping IEEE 279-1971 279 1971 IEEE 603-1991 603 1991 Clause 3 Clause 4 Cl Clause 4.1 Cl Clause 5.0 0
Clause 4.2 Clause 5.1 Clause 4.7.1 Clause 5.6.3.1(1)
Clause 4 4.7.2 72 Clause 5 5.6.3.1(2) 6 3 1(2)
Clause 4.7.3 Clause 5.6.3.3 Cl Clause 4 4.7.4 74 Cl Clause 6 6.3 3
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