ML19208B836: Difference between revisions

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{{#Wiki_filter:L lLCINC CC CV CIN I r1 CPU M I , . -lcontact stOCx:1')
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I i i i I etzAss onmT Au. nzouiaro mrDam ATiou3
  ...    *
.. . ..*1 6 NAME UCENSE NUMeEA YDS'E l Mit 10 iCl Cl 11 101 OI-I 0101010 01-10 10 l 14111111111 10131'S 14 15 25 26 30 31 32 s'k OdCXET NUMBEA EVENT OATE mEs0 Af OArc CATECCAY fY 01 CONT l 01 0 Ll iLll_ 01 S i 01 - 10 13 11.15 l l Oi 11 Il 117 17 i 10 21112 717 l 1 7 8 57 58 59 60 61 68 69 74 75 SO EVENT DESCR;PT1CN O2 lSee Attachment l7 89 60 03 ll7 89 , 80-04 ll7 89 EO O5 I I 7 89 20 gl(R0-50-315/77-05)
            .
I 7 89 80 mg CE CCMACNENT CCOE EA VCLATEN O7 l El BI LB.I I Cl Ki TIB 1Rl Kl lLlIl0101Sl[NJ 7 89 10 11 12 17 43 44 47 48 CAUSE DESCDPTION
              . l      contact stOCx:1')                 I   i     i     i     I                           etzAss onmT Au. nzouiaro mrDam ATiou3 1                             6 NAME                                       UCENSE NUMeEA                                                           YDS
[0] l See Attachment l7 89 80@l1 7 89 80 1O llST% POWER OTHEA STATUS Cr5 VERY OtSCOVERY DESCA'AfCN
    'E 'S l Mit 10 iCl Cl 11                         101 OI-I 0101010 01-10 10 l 14111111111                                               10131 14     15                                                   25   26                   30   31   32 CATECCAY          fY      s'   k               OdCXET NUMBEA                               EVENT OATE                   mEs0 Af OArc 01 CONT l 01 0                   Ll       iLl      l_ 01 S i 01 - 10 13 11.15 l                   l Oi 11 Il 117 17 i           10   21112 1717 l 7 8             57     58         59         60     61                                       68     69                     74   75                   SO EVENT DESCR;PT1CN O2 l        See Attachment                                                                                                                               l 7 89                                                                                                                                                     60 03 l                                                                                                                                                      l 7 89               ,                                                                                                                                     80-04 l                                                                                                                                                      l 7 89                                                                                                                                                     EO O5 I                                                                                                                                                       I 7 89                                                                                                                                                     20 gl                                                                                                                     (R0-50-315/77-05)                   I 7 89                                                                           mg                                                                        80 CE                 CCMACNENT CCOE                                                 EA         VCLATEN O7 l El BI LB.I 7 89 10 I Cl Ki TIB 1Rl Kl 12 lLl              Il0101Sl                [NJ 11                                       17           43           44                 47       48 CAUSE DESCDPTION
(_,H_jl Ol Ol 0l l NAl(_CJl Review of Technical Snecificatione
[0] l See Attachment                                                                                                                                       l 7 89                                                                                                                                                     80
!d 9 10 12 13 44 45 46 80-or $EUsE l NA AEo Aucuur op ACTmTv tvCATcN or aELEAsa J W NAl12 7 8 9 10 11 44 45 60 PERSONNEL EXPCSUAES NUMBER TYpf C8SCArpTICN
    @l 7 89                                                                                                                                                     80 1
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lZll NAl7 89 11 12 13 60 PERSONNEL INJUA:ES NUMBEA CESCP:pTION
(_,H_j          l Ol Ol 0l           l NA                              l   (_CJ      l Review of Technical Snecificatione                 !
[0 ] 0 l 0l lNAl14*7 89 11 12 00'PROBABEE CONSECUENCES - None.
d       9               10               12 13     -                            44     45       46                                                 80 AEo                                     Aucuur op ACTmTv                                                   tvCATcN or aELEAsa 12 7 8 J
At all times during the event, the required heat removal l loop was in operation. The health and safety of the public was not jeopardized.
9 orW$EUsE l NA                                                          NA                                                        l 10     11                                           44       45                                                         60 PERSONNEL EXPCSUAES NUMBER           TYpf         C8SCArpTICN                                                     '
l is 7 89 EO LOSS OR CAMAGE TO FAC UTY TYPE cEsca@TCN@ (J_jl NAl7 89 10 J@.80 i (.)DM OW l, 17 l NA L;7 89 ry , f 6.f ' "i'''
13- l 010l 0]               lZl        l NA                                                                                                              l 7 89                   11       12     13                                                                                                               60 PERSONNEL INJUA:ES NUMBEA             CESCP:pTION 14    [0 ] 0 l 0l           l      NA
NR910A$3!!g 1 q ja ,r 80 1 ADDITIONAL FACTCAS
* l 7 89                   11 12                                                                                                                           00' PROBABEE CONSECUENCES - None.                             At all times during the event, the required heat removal is    l loop was in operation. The health and safety of the public was not jeopardized.                                                                   l 7 89                                                                                                                                                     EO LOSS OR CAMAGE TO FAC UTY TYPE         cEsca@TCN
.@ (_See Attachment
    @ (J_j              l NA                                                                                                                                    l 7 89             10                                                                                                                                     80 J
^"!""/S9 g3 (._d I-_390082 i'db>l N ba pycus (616) 465-5901
                                                                              @           .
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.. --/. . ,.,-.*ATTACHMENT TO R0-50-315/77-05 k EVENT DESCRIPTION
7 89                                                                                                                                                     80
, On January 11, 1977, at 1037 hours, with the Reactor in Refueling Mode 6, 600 volt bus 11C was crosstied with Bus 11A and the 11C feed breaker, 11C1, was opened.
                                                                  !!g                  1 1 q ja ,r ADDITIONAL FACTCAS                                            .
At 1348 hours, 600 volt bus llB was crosstied with bus 110 and the llB feed breaker, 11B11, was opened.
ry , f 6.f""' "i'''
Both feed breakers and their supply transformers were tagged out for Doble testing of the transformers.
                                                                                ^"                            NR910A$3
-This left all 600 volt buses energized, but only buses 110 and 11A would be energized from an emergency diesel generator in case of a blackout.
    @ (_See Attachment                                                                                                                                         !
'Per Technical Specification 3.8.2.2, Refueling Mode 6 requires one 600 volt bus to be operable and aligned to an operable diesel generator.
  /     S9                                                                                                                                                 g3
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                      ' NAuE:      db>l N ba                                                                     pycus (616) 465-5901 GPQ ssI.467
 
      .. -                                                                                           -
/
                    .
    ,      . . ,
                    -
            .
* ATTACHMENT TO R0-50-315/77-05 k                 EVENT DESCRIPTION               ,
On January 11, 1977, at 1037 hours, with the Reactor in Refueling Mode 6, 600 volt bus 11C was crosstied with Bus 11A and the 11C feed breaker, 11C1, was opened. At 1348 hours, 600 volt bus llB was crosstied with bus 110 and the llB feed breaker, 11B11, was opened. Both feed breakers and their supply transformers were tagged out for Doble testing of the transformers.
                        -
This left all 600 volt buses energized, but only buses 110 and 11A would be energized from an emergency diesel generator in case of a blackout.
                              '
Per Technical Specification 3.8.2.2, Refueling Mode 6 requires one 600 volt bus to be operable and aligned to an operable diesel generator.
Per Technical Specification 3.8.2.1 one 600 volt bus is defined as 11A and 11B or 11C and 110.
Per Technical Specification 3.8.2.1 one 600 volt bus is defined as 11A and 11B or 11C and 110.
-At 1513 hours feed breaker 11A1 tripped due to overload.
                  -
This deenergized buses 11A and 11C.
At 1513 hours feed breaker 11A1 tripped due to overload. This deenergized buses 11A and 11C.
The clearance of 11C transfomer was released and bus 11C energized from it's normal source at 15f' hours.
The clearance of 11C transfomer was released and bus 11C energized from it's normal source at 15f' hours. This made 600 volt buses 11C and 110 operable.
This made 600 volt buses 11C and 110 operable.'An investigation of bus 11A found the middle horizontal bus Far burned open between bus cubicals 1 and 2.
                                                                    '
The bus bars for the other two phases in the burned open area were opened so that cut,icals 1 and 2 were
An investigation of bus 11A found the middle horizontal bus Far burned open between bus cubicals 1 and 2. The bus bars for the other two
'no longer tied together.
'
To accomplish this bus 11C was deenergized at 1758 hours due to the proximity of bus 11C to the work area for opaning the phases in bus 11A.
phases in the burned open area were opened so that cut,icals 1 and 2 were no longer tied together. To accomplish this bus 11C was deenergized at 1758 hours due to the proximity of bus 11C to the work area for opaning the phases in bus 11A. While doing this work bus 11D was the only bus aligned to an operable diesel generator, however, bus llB was energized from bus 110.
While doing this work bus 11D was the only bus aligned to an operable diesel generator, however, bus llB was energized from bus 110.
Bus 11C was energized from it's nomal source at 1917 hours.
Bus 11C was energized from it's nomal source at 1917 hours.
Bus 11A, except for cubical 1, wa energized from it's normal source at 2029 hours.
Bus 11A, except for cubical 1, wa energized from it's normal source at 2029 hours.
Cubical 1 of bus 11A was energized at 2031 hours by closing bus tie
Cubical 1 of bus 11A was energized at 2031 hours by closing bus tie     .
.breaker 11AC.
breaker 11AC. This made all feeders from bus 11A operable.
This made all feeders from bus 11A operable.
The Technical Specification requirement for leaving an operable 600 volt emergency bus aligned to an operable diesel generator was not met for a period of 2 hours and 15 minutu when the buses were crosstied for Doble testing and for a period of 1 hour and 20 minutes for the emergency repair work to the failed bus 11A. The total elapsed time from the start of the testing to completion of the temporary repair work was 5 hours and 29 minutes.
The Technical Specification requirement for leaving an operable 600 volt emergency bus aligned to an operable diesel generator was not met for a period of 2 hours and 15 minutu when the buses were crosstied for Doble testing and for a period of 1 hour and 20 minutes for the emergency repair work to the failed bus 11A.
Bus 11A and 11C were again removed from service on February 12 for the permanent repair of bus 11A. The elapsed time that both buses were deenergized was 7 hours and 48 minutes.
The total elapsed time from the start of the testing to completion of the temporary repair work was 5 hours and 29 minutes.
    /
Bus 11A and 11C were again removed from service on February 12 for the permanent repair of bus 11A.
l                 -
The elapsed time that both buses were deenergized was 7 hours and 48 minutes.
                          -
/l-390083-
390083
<" Page 2 ,..,-., ,,..CAUSE DE';CRIPTION The cause of the first event was personnel error when the original switching was made for testing of the transformers.
 
The cause of the second event was equipment failure.
    ,.
The 11A bus bar burned open at a bolted connection which either had loosened during use or had never been properly tightened during manufacture.
      <" .                                                                          Page 2
The latter reason is believed to be the most likely cause because all other bus connections that have been checked are of proper bolt tension and show no evidence of overheating.
,
            -
    .             ,
        ,,
  .     .
CAUSE DE';CRIPTION The cause of the first event was personnel error when the original switching was made for testing of the transformers.
The cause of the second event was equipment failure. The 11A bus bar burned open at a bolted connection which either had loosened during use or had never been properly tightened during manufacture. The latter reason is believed to be the most likely cause because all other bus connections that have been checked are of proper bolt tension and show no evidence of overheating.
ADDITIONAL FACTOR _S_
ADDITIONAL FACTOR _S_
The personnel ' error was due to a misinterpretation of the requirements of Technical Specification 3.8.2.2 which only specifies "1 - 600 volt
The personnel ' error was due to a misinterpretation of the requirements
_emergency bus" being required in Modes 5 and 5.
_
.The Technicel Specifications involved will be reviewed by all licensed personnel prior to March 1,1977.
of Technical Specification 3.8.2.2 which only specifies "1 - 600 volt emergency bus" being required in Modes 5 and 5.    .
, x*O=4%%k%W e 1 (.390084.,}}
The Technicel Specifications involved will be reviewed by all licensed personnel prior to March 1,1977.
                                                              ,
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Revision as of 14:13, 19 October 2019

RO 77-005:on 770111,w/reactor in Refueling Mode 6, Feedbreaker 11A1 Tripped,Due to Overload.Caused by Personnel Error & Equipment Failure.Tech Specs Involved Will Be Reviewed by All Personnel Before 770301
ML19208B836
Person / Time
Site: Cook American Electric Power icon.png
Issue date: 02/12/1977
From: Lease R
INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG
To:
Shared Package
ML19208B784 List:
References
RTR-REGGD-01.016, RTR-REGGD-1.016 NUDOCS 7909210471
Download: ML19208B836 (3)
v • d • e


Text

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. l contact stOCx:1') I i i i I etzAss onmT Au. nzouiaro mrDam ATiou3 1 6 NAME UCENSE NUMeEA YDS

'E 'S l Mit 10 iCl Cl 11 101 OI-I 0101010 01-10 10 l 14111111111 10131 14 15 25 26 30 31 32 CATECCAY fY s' k OdCXET NUMBEA EVENT OATE mEs0 Af OArc 01 CONT l 01 0 Ll iLl l_ 01 S i 01 - 10 13 11.15 l l Oi 11 Il 117 17 i 10 21112 1717 l 7 8 57 58 59 60 61 68 69 74 75 SO EVENT DESCR;PT1CN O2 l See Attachment l 7 89 60 03 l l 7 89 , 80-04 l l 7 89 EO O5 I I 7 89 20 gl (R0-50-315/77-05) I 7 89 mg 80 CE CCMACNENT CCOE EA VCLATEN O7 l El BI LB.I 7 89 10 I Cl Ki TIB 1Rl Kl 12 lLl Il0101Sl [NJ 11 17 43 44 47 48 CAUSE DESCDPTION

[0] l See Attachment l 7 89 80

@l 7 89 80 1

1O l l ST  % POWER OTHEA STATUS Cr5 VERY OtSCOVERY DESCA'AfCN

(_,H_j l Ol Ol 0l l NA l (_CJ l Review of Technical Snecificatione  !

d 9 10 12 13 - 44 45 46 80 AEo Aucuur op ACTmTv tvCATcN or aELEAsa 12 7 8 J

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  • l 7 89 11 12 00' PROBABEE CONSECUENCES - None. At all times during the event, the required heat removal is l loop was in operation. The health and safety of the public was not jeopardized. l 7 89 EO LOSS OR CAMAGE TO FAC UTY TYPE cEsca@TCN

@ (J_j l NA l 7 89 10 80 J

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.. - -

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.

, . . ,

-

.

  • ATTACHMENT TO R0-50-315/77-05 k EVENT DESCRIPTION ,

On January 11, 1977, at 1037 hours0.012 days <br />0.288 hours <br />0.00171 weeks <br />3.945785e-4 months <br />, with the Reactor in Refueling Mode 6, 600 volt bus 11C was crosstied with Bus 11A and the 11C feed breaker, 11C1, was opened. At 1348 hours0.0156 days <br />0.374 hours <br />0.00223 weeks <br />5.12914e-4 months <br />, 600 volt bus llB was crosstied with bus 110 and the llB feed breaker, 11B11, was opened. Both feed breakers and their supply transformers were tagged out for Doble testing of the transformers.

-

This left all 600 volt buses energized, but only buses 110 and 11A would be energized from an emergency diesel generator in case of a blackout.

'

Per Technical Specification 3.8.2.2, Refueling Mode 6 requires one 600 volt bus to be operable and aligned to an operable diesel generator.

Per Technical Specification 3.8.2.1 one 600 volt bus is defined as 11A and 11B or 11C and 110.

-

At 1513 hours0.0175 days <br />0.42 hours <br />0.0025 weeks <br />5.756965e-4 months <br /> feed breaker 11A1 tripped due to overload. This deenergized buses 11A and 11C.

The clearance of 11C transfomer was released and bus 11C energized from it's normal source at 15f' hours. This made 600 volt buses 11C and 110 operable.

'

An investigation of bus 11A found the middle horizontal bus Far burned open between bus cubicals 1 and 2. The bus bars for the other two

'

phases in the burned open area were opened so that cut,icals 1 and 2 were no longer tied together. To accomplish this bus 11C was deenergized at 1758 hours0.0203 days <br />0.488 hours <br />0.00291 weeks <br />6.68919e-4 months <br /> due to the proximity of bus 11C to the work area for opaning the phases in bus 11A. While doing this work bus 11D was the only bus aligned to an operable diesel generator, however, bus llB was energized from bus 110.

Bus 11C was energized from it's nomal source at 1917 hours0.0222 days <br />0.533 hours <br />0.00317 weeks <br />7.294185e-4 months <br />.

Bus 11A, except for cubical 1, wa energized from it's normal source at 2029 hours0.0235 days <br />0.564 hours <br />0.00335 weeks <br />7.720345e-4 months <br />.

Cubical 1 of bus 11A was energized at 2031 hours0.0235 days <br />0.564 hours <br />0.00336 weeks <br />7.727955e-4 months <br /> by closing bus tie .

breaker 11AC. This made all feeders from bus 11A operable.

The Technical Specification requirement for leaving an operable 600 volt emergency bus aligned to an operable diesel generator was not met for a period of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and 15 minutu when the buses were crosstied for Doble testing and for a period of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and 20 minutes for the emergency repair work to the failed bus 11A. The total elapsed time from the start of the testing to completion of the temporary repair work was 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> and 29 minutes.

Bus 11A and 11C were again removed from service on February 12 for the permanent repair of bus 11A. The elapsed time that both buses were deenergized was 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> and 48 minutes.

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CAUSE DE';CRIPTION The cause of the first event was personnel error when the original switching was made for testing of the transformers.

The cause of the second event was equipment failure. The 11A bus bar burned open at a bolted connection which either had loosened during use or had never been properly tightened during manufacture. The latter reason is believed to be the most likely cause because all other bus connections that have been checked are of proper bolt tension and show no evidence of overheating.

ADDITIONAL FACTOR _S_

The personnel ' error was due to a misinterpretation of the requirements

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of Technical Specification 3.8.2.2 which only specifies "1 - 600 volt emergency bus" being required in Modes 5 and 5. .

The Technicel Specifications involved will be reviewed by all licensed personnel prior to March 1,1977.

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