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=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:}}
{{#Wiki_filter:October 30, 2007
 
EA-07-256
 
Wackenhut Nuclear Services
 
ATTN: Mr. Eric Wilson, President
 
4200 Wackenhut Drive
 
Palm Beach Gardens, FL 33410
 
==SUBJECT:==
NRC OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS REPORT NO. 2-2006-013 - TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR PLANT
 
==Dear Mr. Wilson:==
 
This refers to an investigation completed by the NRC
=s Office of Investigations (OI) initiated on December 13, 2006. The purpose of the investigation was to determine if security officers employed with The Wackenhut Corporation (Wackenhut) at the Turkey Point Nuclear Plant (Turkey Point) were willfully inattentive to duty (sleeping) during 2004 - 2006. Enclosure 1
 
contains a factual summary of the OI investigation.
 
Based on the results of the OI investigation, apparent violations of NRC requirements were
 
identified, including an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.5, Deliberate Misconduct, and are being
 
considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. 
 
The apparent violations involved the actions of multiple security officers employed by
 
Wackenhut Corporation at Florida Power and Light Company's Turkey Point Nuclear Plant in
 
2004-2006. In this case, security officers were willfully inattentive to duty or served as lookouts
 
such that other security officers could be inattentive while on duty. These actions caused
 
Wackenhut to be in violation of 10 CFR 50.5, and caused the facility (Turkey Point) to be in
 
violation of 10 CFR 73.55(f)(1), because these officers were unable to maintain continuous
 
communication with an individual in each continuously manned alarm station.
 
Before the NRC makes its enforcement decision, we are providing you an opportunity to either:
 
(1) respond to the apparent violations within 30 days of the date of this letter or (2) request a
 
predecisional enforcement conference. If a conference is held, it will be closed to public
 
observation in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy because the findings are based on
 
an NRC Office of Investigations report that has not been publicly disclosed. Please contact Mr.
 
Joel T. Munday, Chief, Plant Support Branch 2, Division of Reactor Safety, at (404) 562-4560, within 10 days of the date of this letter to notify the NRC of your intended response.
Wackenhut 2
If you choose to request a predecisional enforcement conference, please be prepared to
 
discuss the corrective actions you have taken to correct these inattentiveness issues and
 
prevent recurrence.
 
If you choose to provide a written response, it should clearly be marked as a A Response to Apparent Violation EA-07-256" and should include: (1) the reason for the apparent violations, or, if contested, the basis for disputing the apparent violations; (2) the corrective steps that have
 
been taken and the results achieved; (3) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further
 
violations; and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved. In presenting your corrective
 
actions, you should be aware that the prompt ness and comprehensiveness of your corrective actions will be considered in assessing any civil penalty for the apparent violation. Your
 
response should be submitted under oath or affirmation and it may reference or include
 
previously docketed correspondence, if the correspondence adequately addresses the required
 
response. If an adequate response is not received within the time specified or an extension of
 
time has not been granted by the NRC, the NRC will proceed with its enforcement decision.
 
In lieu of a predecisional enforcement conference, you may also request Alternative Dispute
 
Resolution (ADR) with the NRC in an attempt to resolve this issue. Alternative Dispute
 
Resolution is a general term encompassing various techniques for resolving conflicts outside of
 
court using a neutral third party. The technique that the NRC has decided to employ is
 
mediation. Additional information concerning the NRC's program is described in the enclosed
 
brochure (NUREG/BR-0317) and can be obtained at http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/adr.html. The Institute on Conflict Resolution (ICR) at Cornell University has agreed to facilitate the NRC's program as a neutral third party. Please contact
 
ICR at 877-733-9415 within 10 days of the date of this letter if you are interested in pursuing resolution of this issue through ADR.
Since the NRC has not made a final determination in this matter, no Notice of Violation is being
 
issued for the investigative findings at this time.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and enclosures, and your response, will be made
 
available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRC's document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/pdr.html www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made available to the Public without redaction.
In addition, please be advised that the number and characterization of the apparent violations
 
described in this letter may change as a result of further NRC review.
 
If Safeguards Information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please provide the
 
level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21.
 
Wackenhut  3 
 
Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact me at (404)-562-4600 or Mr. Joel T. Munday at (404) 562-4560.
 
Sincerely, 
      /RA/  Joseph W. Shea, Director
 
Division of Reactor Safety
 
==Enclosures:==
: 1. Factual Summary to OI Report No. 2-2006-013
: 2. NUREG/BR-0317
 
Enclosure 1 FACTUAL
 
==SUMMARY==
 
Office of Investigations Report No. 2-2006-013
 
On March 8, 2006, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Office of Investigations (OI), initiated an investigation to determine if security officers employed with The Wackenhut
 
Corporation (Wackenhut) at the Turkey Point Nuclear Plant (Turkey Point) were willfully
 
inattentive to duty (sleeping) at times during 2004 through 2006. 
 
Five security officers admitted that, at times during 2004 through 2006, they were inattentive to
 
duty on separate occasions. Although specific dates of inattentiveness could not be
 
established, one of these five security officers was observed by other security officers to be
 
inattentive to duty on several occasions. 
 
One security officer admitted that, on at least one occasion during 2004-2006, he stood lookout
 
for two other security officers such that they could be inattentive to duties without risk of being
 
caught.
 
One security officer stated that, on at least one occasion during 2004-2006, two security guards
 
stood as lookouts for him such that he was able to be inattentive to duties without risk of being
 
caught.
 
One security officer was observed by an NRC inspector to be inattentive to duties on April 6, 2006, while standing duty on a vital area compensatory post.}}

Revision as of 18:33, 10 November 2018

NRC Office of Investigations Report No. 2-2006-013 - Turkey Point Nuclear Plant
ML073030276
Person / Time
Site: Turkey Point  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 10/30/2007
From: Shea J W
Division of Reactor Safety II
To: Elizabeth Wilson
Wackenhut Corp
References
2-2006-013, EA-07-256, NUREG/BR-0317
Download: ML073030276 (10)


Text

October 30, 2007

EA-07-256

Wackenhut Nuclear Services

ATTN: Mr. Eric Wilson, President

4200 Wackenhut Drive

Palm Beach Gardens, FL 33410

SUBJECT:

NRC OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS REPORT NO. 2-2006-013 - TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR PLANT

Dear Mr. Wilson:

This refers to an investigation completed by the NRC

=s Office of Investigations (OI) initiated on December 13, 2006. The purpose of the investigation was to determine if security officers employed with The Wackenhut Corporation (Wackenhut) at the Turkey Point Nuclear Plant (Turkey Point) were willfully inattentive to duty (sleeping) during 2004 - 2006. Enclosure 1

contains a factual summary of the OI investigation.

Based on the results of the OI investigation, apparent violations of NRC requirements were

identified, including an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.5, Deliberate Misconduct, and are being

considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy.

The apparent violations involved the actions of multiple security officers employed by

Wackenhut Corporation at Florida Power and Light Company's Turkey Point Nuclear Plant in

2004-2006. In this case, security officers were willfully inattentive to duty or served as lookouts

such that other security officers could be inattentive while on duty. These actions caused

Wackenhut to be in violation of 10 CFR 50.5, and caused the facility (Turkey Point) to be in

violation of 10 CFR 73.55(f)(1), because these officers were unable to maintain continuous

communication with an individual in each continuously manned alarm station.

Before the NRC makes its enforcement decision, we are providing you an opportunity to either:

(1) respond to the apparent violations within 30 days of the date of this letter or (2) request a

predecisional enforcement conference. If a conference is held, it will be closed to public

observation in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy because the findings are based on

an NRC Office of Investigations report that has not been publicly disclosed. Please contact Mr.

Joel T. Munday, Chief, Plant Support Branch 2, Division of Reactor Safety, at (404) 562-4560, within 10 days of the date of this letter to notify the NRC of your intended response.

Wackenhut 2

If you choose to request a predecisional enforcement conference, please be prepared to

discuss the corrective actions you have taken to correct these inattentiveness issues and

prevent recurrence.

If you choose to provide a written response, it should clearly be marked as a A Response to Apparent Violation EA-07-256" and should include: (1) the reason for the apparent violations, or, if contested, the basis for disputing the apparent violations; (2) the corrective steps that have

been taken and the results achieved; (3) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further

violations; and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved. In presenting your corrective

actions, you should be aware that the prompt ness and comprehensiveness of your corrective actions will be considered in assessing any civil penalty for the apparent violation. Your

response should be submitted under oath or affirmation and it may reference or include

previously docketed correspondence, if the correspondence adequately addresses the required

response. If an adequate response is not received within the time specified or an extension of

time has not been granted by the NRC, the NRC will proceed with its enforcement decision.

In lieu of a predecisional enforcement conference, you may also request Alternative Dispute

Resolution (ADR) with the NRC in an attempt to resolve this issue. Alternative Dispute

Resolution is a general term encompassing various techniques for resolving conflicts outside of

court using a neutral third party. The technique that the NRC has decided to employ is

mediation. Additional information concerning the NRC's program is described in the enclosed

brochure (NUREG/BR-0317) and can be obtained at http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/adr.html. The Institute on Conflict Resolution (ICR) at Cornell University has agreed to facilitate the NRC's program as a neutral third party. Please contact

ICR at 877-733-9415 within 10 days of the date of this letter if you are interested in pursuing resolution of this issue through ADR.

Since the NRC has not made a final determination in this matter, no Notice of Violation is being

issued for the investigative findings at this time.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and enclosures, and your response, will be made

available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRC's document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/pdr.html www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made available to the Public without redaction.

In addition, please be advised that the number and characterization of the apparent violations

described in this letter may change as a result of further NRC review.

If Safeguards Information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please provide the

level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21.

Wackenhut 3

Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact me at (404)-562-4600 or Mr. Joel T. Munday at (404) 562-4560.

Sincerely,

/RA/ Joseph W. Shea, Director

Division of Reactor Safety

Enclosures:

1. Factual Summary to OI Report No. 2-2006-013
2. NUREG/BR-0317

Enclosure 1 FACTUAL

SUMMARY

Office of Investigations Report No. 2-2006-013

On March 8, 2006, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Office of Investigations (OI), initiated an investigation to determine if security officers employed with The Wackenhut

Corporation (Wackenhut) at the Turkey Point Nuclear Plant (Turkey Point) were willfully

inattentive to duty (sleeping) at times during 2004 through 2006.

Five security officers admitted that, at times during 2004 through 2006, they were inattentive to

duty on separate occasions. Although specific dates of inattentiveness could not be

established, one of these five security officers was observed by other security officers to be

inattentive to duty on several occasions.

One security officer admitted that, on at least one occasion during 2004-2006, he stood lookout

for two other security officers such that they could be inattentive to duties without risk of being

caught.

One security officer stated that, on at least one occasion during 2004-2006, two security guards

stood as lookouts for him such that he was able to be inattentive to duties without risk of being

caught.

One security officer was observed by an NRC inspector to be inattentive to duties on April 6, 2006, while standing duty on a vital area compensatory post.