W3P88-1213, Requests Temporary Waiver of Compliance W/Tech Spec 3.6.2.2 Re Containment Cooling Fans Which Need to Be Operable in Modes 1-4.Tech Spec Change Request Revises Tech Spec 3.6.2.2 to Allow Only Two Fans to Be Operable During Modes 1-4
| ML20197D539 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 05/31/1988 |
| From: | Burski R LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| References | |
| W3P88-1213, NUDOCS 8806070323 | |
| Download: ML20197D539 (3) | |
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POWE R & LIGHT / INTER-OFFICE CORRESPONDENCE "uMYS dYS May 31, 1988 W3P88-1213 A4.05 QA U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555
Subject:
Waterford 3 SES Docket No. 50-382 Request for Temporary Waiver of Compliance Technical Specification 3.6.2.2, Containment Cooling System
Reference:
W3P88-1211 to R.D. Martin from R.F. Burski Gentlemen:
Waterford 3 is faced with an immediate need for relief from Technical Specification 3.6.2.2, which specifies the number of Containment Cooling Fans which need be operable in modes 1 through 4.
Technical Specification 3.6.2.2 requires two independent groups of Containment Cooling Fans be operable with two fan systems in each group for modes 1, 2, 3, and 4 with Technical Specification 3.0.4 applicable.
If this condition is not satisfied, the inoperable group of cooling fans must be returned to an operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in hot standby in the next six hours and cold shutdown in the following 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br />.
The need for enforcement disci tion (as discussed in the referenced letter) became evident when plant personnel discovered that the 'C' Containment Cooling Fan was inoperable due to the failure of the fan motor windings.
At the time of discovery (May 28, 1988 at approximately 1400 hours0.0162 days <br />0.389 hours <br />0.00231 weeks <br />5.327e-4 months <br />)
Waterford 3 was in the process of entering mode 2 to perform Low Power Physics Testing following a refueling outage. Upon receiving enforcement discretion, Waterford 3 entered mode 2 to begin physics testing. Testing is ocheduled to be comp ted at approximately noon on Kay 31, 1988. At that time, Waterford 3 will have completed all of the necessary requirements to enter mode 1.
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N590016D "AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYER" 8806070323 880531 PDR ADOCK 05000382
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't Page 2 W3P88-1213 The function of the Containment Heat Removal System, as described 'in Chapter 6 of the Waterford 3 FSAR, is to assist containment spray and heat sinks in removing heat from containment atmosphere,.and thus maintain containment pressure and temperature at acceptable' levels, during a design basis accident. The most limiting condition for peak containment pressure is a Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) at 75% powcr. For long term pressure reduction considerations, a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) from 100% power is the most limiting.
A reanalysis of these limiting events using the same computer codes and models described in Chapter 6 of the FSAR was performed. The analysis assumed only one Containment Cooling Fan per train was operable and the
- initial containment pressure was the maximum allowed by Technical Specification 3.6.1.4, 1.0 psig. The reanalysis shows that for the i
limiting'75% MSLB with the failure of one Containment Cooling Train, the peak containment pressure increased by only 0.1 psig to 43.8 psig.
Similarly, for the limiting 75% power MSLB with a failure of a main steam isolation valve to closa (two containment cooling fans operate instead of all four), the peak pressure increased to 43.8 psig. This remains below the containment design pressure of 44 psig.
To asssas the affect of fewer operable cooling fans on the long term post accider.c containment pressure reduction, the limiting 100% power LOCA was reanalyzed. This analysis verified that the containment pressure can be reduced by a factor of 2 within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after the accident.
Technical Specification Change Request NPF-38-81, contained herein, will revise Technical Specification 3.6.2.2 to allow only two fans, one in each train, to be operable in modes 1 through 4.
The justification to support the proposed change is the reanalysis discussed above.
Based on the justification above, we request approval to proceed to 100%
l reactor power until such time as NPF-38-81 can be processed by the staff.
Should you have any questions, please contact me or Larry Laughlin at (504) 464-3499.
Very truly yours,
/'$2 y t./
I R.F. Burski Manager -
Nuclear Safety & Regulatory Affairs RFB:LWL:ssf 4
MS90016D
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Page 3 W3P88-1213 cc:
R.D. Martin, NRC Region IV J.A. Calvo, NRC-NRR D.L. Wigginton, NRC-NRR NRC Resident Inspectors Office E.L. Blake W.M. Stevenson bec:
J.G. Dewease, R.P. Barkhurst, T.F. Cerrets, F.J. Drummond, S. A. Alleman, N.S. Carns, D.F. Packer, P.V. Prasanku=ar, J.R. McGaha, E.J. Senac, M.J. Meisner, G.E. Wuller, R.J. Murillo, G.E. Wilson, R.W. Prados, L.W. Laughlin, C.E. DeDeaux, G.W. Muench, R.T. Lally, Jr., W.A. Cross Records Center, Administrative Support, Licensing Library, Site Licensing Support File Ebasco - J.B. Houghtaling, M.P. Horrell CE - R.P. O'Neill 4
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