ULNRC-03628, Application for Amend to License NPF-30,revising Feedwater Isolation ESFAS Functions in TS Tables 3.3-3,3.3-4 & 4.3-2 as Listed
| ML20198F365 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Callaway  |
| Issue date: | 08/08/1997 |
| From: | Passwater A UNION ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20198F372 | List: |
| References | |
| ULNRC-03628, ULNRC-3628, NUDOCS 9708130025 | |
| Download: ML20198F365 (33) | |
Text
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E U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk hiall Station PI-137 Washington, DC 20555 ULNRC 03628 Gentlemen:
DOCKET NUhfBER 50-483 CALLAWAY PLANT FEEDWATER ISOLATION CllANGES
References:
1)
NUREG-0830, Callaway SER Supplement 3, Section 10.4.7, hiny 1984 2)
ULNRC 3578 dated htay 15,1997 3)
OL Amendment No. 43 dated April 14,1989 4)
ULNRC 03625 dated August 8,1 47 Union Electric Company herewith transmits an application for amendment to Facility Operating License No. NPF 30 for the Callaway Plant.
This amendment application would revise feedwater isolation ESFAS functions in Technical Specification Tables 3.3 3,3.3 4 and 4.3 2 as follows:
(1) The Applicable h! ODES for Functional Units 5.a.1), Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays (SSPS), and 5.a.2),
Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays (htSFIS), in Tables 3.3 3 and 4.3 2 would be revised to add h10DB 3. This change is consistent with the Applicabliity for the main feedwater isolation valves (htFIVs) and auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system.
ACTION Statements 27 and 27a are replaced with ACTION
\\
Statements 34 and 34a, respectively. Reference 4 is a license amendment request that would delete ACTION Statement 34a, resulting in the retention ~of only ACTION Statement 34.
\\
j )
(2) A new Functional Unit 5.d, Steam Generator Water Level Ixw-yp/
Low (for feedwater isolation only), would be added to Tables 3.3 3, 4
3.3-4, and 4.3-2. This Functional Unit would serve to assure feedwater isolation consistent with several accident analyses that l
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PDR ADOCK 05000483
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 depend on AFW delivery to the steam generators. Since this function is initiated by SG water level low low, its fonnat must be similar to that used for the reactor trip and AIM start functions.
The need for this Functional Unit can be traced to the pre-licensing design change to move the feedwater line check valves inside containment, as discussed in Reference 1.
(3) In conjunction with the change discussed under item (2), the Applicable hiODES in Table 3.3 3 for AFW SG Water Level lew.
law Functional Units 6.d.1).c), Stan hiotor Driven Pmnps Vessel AT (Power 1, Power 2), and 6 d.2).c). Stan Turbine Driven Pump Vessel AT (Power 1, Power 2), would be revised to delete h10DE
- 3. Functional Unit 6 d.3) in Table 4.3 2 would also be revised to delete h10DB 3. As discussed in Reference 2, this change is l
j appropriate since the function is meaningless in h10DE 3 when there is no temperature change across the reactor vessel. As discussed in Reference 3, this function is used to change the trip time delays for power levels corresponding to h! ODE 1 operation.
(4) The Bases for Functional Unit ll.b, Reactor Trip P-4, in Table 3.3 3 would be revised to add a note allowing the feedwater isolation function on P-4 coincident with low T, to be blocked n
I since this function is not required. A design modification would add a bypass switch to acconunodate this block which would serve to decrease unnecessary cycling of the hiFIVs and AFW system.
The Callaway Plant Onsite Review Committee and the Nuclear Safety Review Board have n: viewed this amendment application. Attachments I thmugh 3 provide the Significant llazards Evaluation, Environmental Consideration, and proposed Technical Specification revisions, respectively, in suppon of this amendment request, in addition, Attachments 4 and 5 provide changes to Attachments 19 and 20 of the license amendment application submitted in Reference 2. It has been detennined that this amendment application involves an unreviewed safety question, as detennined per 10CFR50.59, with regard to the proposed P-4/ low T, feedwater isolation u
bypass switch creating the possibility of a different type of equipment malfunction. However, it has been concluded that this application does not involve a signincant hazard considemtion as detennined per 10CFR50.92.
Pursuant to 10CFR51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.
U.S. Nuclear Rcgulatory Commission Page 3 If you have any questions on this amendment application, please contact us.
Very inity yours,
/
R: o fit);u l
Alan C. Passwater Manager-Licensing and Fuels GGY/Jdg Attachments: 1 Significant llazards Evaluation 2 - Envimnmental Consideration 3 - Proposed Technical Specification Revisions 4 - Changes to ULNRC 3578 Attaciunent 19 5 - Changes to ULNRC-3578 Attaclunent 20
i STATE OF MISSOURI )
)
Alan C.
Passwater, of lawful ago, being first duly sworn upon oath says that he is Manager, Licensing and Fuels (Nuclear) for Union Electric Company; that he has read the foregoing document and knows the content thereof; that he has executed the same for and on behalf of said company with full power and authority to do so; and that the facts therein stated are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information and belief.
By Alan C.
Passwater Manager, Licensing and Fuels Nuclear SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this day of
&4 1997.
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\\ TARy PATMCIA L REYNOLDS NOIMY PU000-4 TATE OFiseg0ung 8T. Louis 000Nfy Hf M EXP N S DE,St.N W l
1
cet M. H. Fletcher Professional Nuclear Consulting, Inc.
19041 Raines Drive i
Derwood, MD 20055-2432 Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region IV 611 Ryan Plaza Drive Suite 400 Arlington, TX 76011-8064 Senior Resident Inspector Callaway Resident Office "U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 8201 NRC Road Steedman, MO 65077 Barry C. Westreich (2)
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1 White Flint, North, Mail Stop 13E16 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20052-2738 Manager, Electric Department Missouri Public Service Commission P.O. Box 360 Jef ferson City, MO 65102 Ron Kucera Department of Natural Resources P.O. Box 176 Jefferson City, MO 65102 Don Woodlan TU Electric P.O. Box 1002 Glen Rose, TX 76043 Pat Nugent Pacific Gas & Electric Regulatory Services P.O. Box 56 Avila Beach, CA 93424
ULNHC 03628 A'ITACIIMFA'T ON10 SIGNIFICANT IIAZARDS EVALUATION
Attaciunent 1 Page1of8 SLGNIFICANT ll AZARDS EVALUATION i
INTRODUCTIOB l
This amendment application would revise feedwater isolation ESFAS functions in Technical Specincation Tables 3.3-3,3.3-4 and 4.3 2 as follows:
l (1)
The Applicable htODES for Functional Units 5.a.1), Automatic Actuation logic and Actuation Relays (SSPS), and 5.a.2), Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays (htSFIS), in Tables 3.3 3 and 4.3-2 would be revised to add htODE 3. This change is consistent with the Applicability for the main feedwater isolation valves (h1FIVs) and auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system. ACTION Statements 27 and 27a are replaced with ACTION Statements 34 and 34a, respectively.
(2)
A new Functional Unit 5.d, Ste:un Genemtor Water Level Low-Ixw (for feedwater isolation only), would be added to Tables 3.3 3, 3.3-4, and 4.3 2. This Functional Unit would serve to assure feedwater isolation consistent with several accident analyses that depend on AFW delivery to the stetun generators. Since this function is initiated by SG water level low low, its fonnat must be similar to that used for the reactor trip and AFW stan functions. The need for this Functional Unit can be traced to the pre-licensing design change to move the feedwater line check valves inside containment, as discussed in Reference 1.
(3)
In conjunction with the change discussed under item (2), the Applicable h! ODES in Table 3.3-3 for AFW SG Water Level low-Low Functional Units 6.d.1).c), Start hiotor Driven Pumps Vessel AT (Power-1, Power-2), and 6.d.2).c), Stan Turbine Driven Pump Vessel AT (Power-1, Power-2), would be revised to delete htODE 3. Functional Unit 6.d.3) in Table 4.3-2 would also be revised to delete htODE 3. As discussed in Reference 2, this change is appropriate since the function is meaningless in htODE 3 when there is no temperature change acmss the reactor vessel. As discussed in Reference 3, this function is used to change the trip time delays depending on the equivalent power level. At less than or equal to 10% RTP, the maximum trip time delay (1TD) is enabled. At greater than 10% RTP but less than or equal to 20% RTP, an intennediate TTD is enabled. At greater than 20% RTP, there is no intentional 1TD (timers are bypassed).
n
Page 2 of 8 (4)
The Bases for Functional Unit i1.b, Reactor Trip P 4, in Table 3.3 3 would be revised to add a note allowing the feedwater isolation funellon on P-4 coincident with low T,y to be blocked since this function is not required. A design modification would add a bypass switch to accommodate this block which woukt serve to decrease unnecessary l
cycilr;; of the h1FIVs and AINV system.
DIK1!SSION Attuatiottlo& Applicability The addition of hlODE 3 to the Applicability for the Functional Unit 5.a SSPS and htSFIS automatic actuation logic and actuation relays is a more restrictive change and is consistent ' ith the Applicability of other Technical Specification LCOs dealing with w
decay heat removal by the AFW system, in htODE 3, decay heat is removed by the main feedwater or AFW systems via the RCS SGs and the ste:un dumps (atmospheric or condenser). The RilR system is nonnally engaged in h10DB 4 and decay heat removal is accomplished via the RilR system and/or the RCS SGs. In htODE S the last RCP is secured and the RilR system is miled upon for decay heat removal. In I
order to ensum the delivery of AFW flow to at least two intact stetun generators under accident conditions, and the removal of decay heat above the plant conditions at which the RitR system is engaged, LCOs 3.7.1.2 (AFW System),3.7.1.3 (CST, the preferred AFW supply), 3.7.1.6 (h1FIVs),3.7.1.7 (SG atmospheric ste4un dump valves), and 3.7.4 (ESW System, backup AFW supply) define the heat sink requirements applicable for htODE 3. The automatic actuation logic for feedwater isolation must also be available in AfDDE 3 to automatically close the h1FIVs and establish a pressum boundary preventing diversion of AFW flow. The Applicability-change also requires the deletion of ACTION Statements 27 and 27a, replacing them with ACTION Statements 34 and 34a so that the end point of the ACTION is IlOT SilUTDOWN. The Applicability for Functional Unit 5.b, Steam Genemtor Water Ixvel lligh liigh, is unchanged from its current hlODES I and 2 since this function is credited only in the analysis of the Excessive Feedwater Flow at full power event in FSAR Section 15,1,2 (results of the hot zero power case for this event do not model any trips), where delivery of AFW flow is a moot issue (i.e., for that event the success criteria relate to overfill prevention not to a loss of heat sink).
New SG Water Level low Iow Functional Unit.
The addition of new Functional Unit 5.d is also a mere restrictive change. Prior to plant licensing in 1984, the design of the main feedwater system included check valves in the main feedwater system piping just downst. ram of the htFIVs and upstream of the AFW system connection to the main feedwater piping. This design would produce excessive check valve slam as a result of high differential pressure across the check
Attaclunent 1 Page 3 of 8 valve following AFW pump stan. Therefore, the check valve in each line was inoved to inside containment close to the steain genenitor. Although this resolved the check valve slam problent, tmder certain pipe break conditions AIAV flow would be fed back through the main feedwater system instead of to the steam generators because the check valves would no longer prevent backflow upstream of the AFW connection. To resolve this new concern, isolation signals derived from low low level in any steam genenitor were provided to isolate the main feedwater system by closing the htFIVs. This isolation capability provides a pressure boundary for the AFW system where it connects to the main feedwater system, thereby ensuring flow toward the steam genenitors.
Credit has been taken for the feedwater isolation signal on 80 water level low low in the analyses of the less of Non Emergency AC Power (FSAR Section 15.2.6), less of Nonnal Feedwater (FSAR Section 15.2.7), and Feedwater System Pipe Break (FSAR Section 15.2.8) events, all of which are analyzed at 102% RTP. The original Technical Specifications did not include this Functional Unit because they were based on the Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications (STS). Neither the STS of that time, NUREG-0452, nor the STS today, NUREG 1431, include this Functional Unit under feedwater isolation. Although not included in the Technical Specifications, the SG water level low low input to feedwater isolation has always been surveilled with the other SSPS tests applicable in h10 DES 1-3.
TfD Applicability In conjunction with the addition of new Functional Unit 5 d, the Applicable h10 DES for the AFW SG Water Level Ixw-lew Vessel AT (Power 1, Power-2) Functional Units would be revised to delete h10DE 3. This change is less restrictive; however, it is appropriate since the function is meaningless in htODE 3 when there is no temperature change across the reactor vessel. This function is used to change the inp time delays depending on the equivalent power level. At less than or equal to 10%
RTP, the maximum trip time delay is enabled. The maximum trip time delay should always be enabled in h10DE 3, for stanup and shutdown evolutions that affect SG level via shrink / swell phenomena. When the EAhtNTD modification was implemented after issuance of Reference 3, containment environment-dependent low-low water level trip setpoints and power-dependent trip time delays were implemented for all functions provided by SG water level low low, including feedwater isolation being added to the Technical Specifications above.
Feedwater Isolat]on on P-4/Imw T Eypass Switch 3
With the P-4 interlock enabled (reactor trip and bypass breakers open), feedwater isolation will occur if T,y is s564*F. This function provides back-up protection (not in primary success path, as discussed below) against excessive cooldown events while the main feedwater system is operating. In order to maintain SG water levels after feedwater isolation, the AFW pumps may be needed until the feedwater isolation signal can be reset and the FWlVs can be reopened and restored to OPERABLE status, Page 4 of 8 Restoration of the FWlVs to OPERABLE status requires the repressuritation of the hydnmlic accumulators necessary for the htFIVs to satisfy their fast closure stmke time requirement of 5 seconds, an evolution that takes 20-30 minutes. A design modification would add a bypass switch in the SSPS output relay cabinets in both trains to allow blocking the feedwater isolation function on P-4 coinciden /ith low T,,,.
This would sette to decrease unnecessary cycling of the MFIVs and AFW system and permit more orderly shute.9wns and stanups.
Feedwater isolation via this Ometion is not modeled in any FSAR Chapter 15 analyses, nor is it credited in the sensitivity studies presented in WCAP 9230 (referenced in FSAR Section 15.2.8 for the feedwater system pipe break accident). In order to satisfy the licensing basis accident analyses, feedwater isolation capability must be provided whenever the main feedwater system is in service and automatic valve closure must be provided after initiation signals from safety injection, SG water level high high, and SG water level low low. These events are analyzed with the plant at hot zero power, full power, or at pan-power conditions. Feedwater isolation would be actuated by a safety injection signal for the large and small break LOCA and steamline break accidents. As stated above, feedwater isolation upon SG water level high high is credited only in the analysis of the Excessive Feedwater Flow at full power event in FSAR Section 15.1.2.
Credit has been taken for the feedwater isolation signal on 50 water level low low in the analyses of the Loss of Non-Emergency AC Power (FSAR Section 15.2.6), Loss of Nonnal Feedwater (FSAR Section 15.2.7), and Feedwater System Pipe Break (FSAR Section 15.2.8) events, all of which are anaiped at 102% RTP, Therefore, this bypass switch design change will have no impact on any accidents previously evaluated in the FSAR since the signal to be bypassed is not credited.
The design of the bypass switch will meet the design standards applicable to all safety system bypasses at Callaway, as clarified below. Section 4.12 of IEEE 2791971 requires that an operating bypass of a protective function be automatically removed whenever pennissive conditions are not met, in this case, the feedwater isolation function on P 4 coincident with low T.,, would have to be automatically restored when either the reactor trip breakers are closed or T,y, exceeds 564 F. This should not be required for the proposed bypass switch since:
1.
As discussed above, the subject circuitry does not provide a protective function, it is not assumed or credited in any safety analysis.
Att:clunent 1 Page 5 of 8 2.
This bypass switch will be used during startup and shutdown evolutions with T,y s564F Just prior to opening the reactor trip breakers. Plant conditions that would call for the restoration of the feedwater isolation function cannnot occur without operator action to close the reactor trip breakers. The administrative controls governing startups will also ensure that this bypass is manually defeated and the isolation function restored after completion of md drop testing, prior to closing the reactor trip j
breakers during power ascension.
In addition, automatie indication of the bypass is not required since the subject circuitry l
l does not provide a required safety function. Section 4.13 ofIEEE 2791971 and RO 1.47, Position C.3 allow the proposed use of an adminstratively controlled, manual bypass indication for an infrequently used bypass such as the one proposed.
50.92 EVALUATIONS The pmposed changes to the Technical Specifications do not involve a significant hazards consideration as discussed below.
Actuation Imgic Apolicability and New SG Water level Low Low Funtdepal Unit 1.
Does the change involve a signl0 cant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
The proposed changes impose more stringent requirements and have been reviewed to ensure no previously evaluated accident has been adversely affected. The more stringent requirements are imposed to ensure the plant's operation and testing are consistent with the safety analysis and licensing basis.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
2.
Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
The proposed changes do not involve a physical alteration of the plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed other than the bypass switch addressed in a separate 50.92 evaluation below) or changes in controlling parameters. The proposed changes do impose diffen:nt requirements; however, these changes are consistent with assumptions made in the safety analysis and licensing basis. Actuation logic applicability is extended to MODE 3 and the SSPS slave relays that implement feedwater isolation on SG water level low-low will continue to be surveilled quarterly as they have always been tested. Thus,
Attoclunent i Page 6 of 8 the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of i
accident from any accident previously evaluated.
3.
Does this change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
The imposition of more stringent requirements does not reduce the margin of safety. The margin of safety would be increased since the scope of the l
Technical Specifications has been increased to include additional plant equipment and add additional Applicability requirements. The changes are consistent with the safety analysis and licensing basis. Therrfore, the pmiosed changes do not involve a reduction in a margin of safety.
'ITD Appikaldlhy 1.
Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Ovemil protection system perfonnance will remain within the bounds of the l
previously perfonned accident analyses since no hardware changes are proposed. The proposed change adds a relaxation to the Applicability for the SG Water Ixvel Ixw Low Vessel AT channels. The proposed change in the Applicability will not affect any of the analysis assumptions for any of the accidents previously evaluated. The proposed change will not affect the probability of any event initiators nor will the pmposed change affect the ability of any safety-related equipment to perfonn its intended function. A Vessel AT channel shouhl only be tripped if it is inoperable and the reactor is operating, when the need to restrict trip time delays is applicable. There will be no degradation in the perfonnance of nor an increase in the number of challenges imposed on safety-related equipment assumed to function during an accident situation. Accident analyses have been performed with the maximum trip time delays enabled at power levels up to 19% RTP (10% RTP plus uncenainty).
Therefore, operation in h! ODE 3 with the maximum trip time delays is enveloped. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
2.
Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
There are no hardware changes nor are there any changes in the method by which any safety related plant system perfonns its safety function. The change in Applicability will not impact the nonnal method of plant operation. The maximum trip time delay should be enabled in htODE 3 to preclude an unnecessary feedwater isolation or auxiliary feedwater actuation from occurring prior to the expiration of the trip time delay previously analyzed for h10DE 1
Page 7 of 8 operation. No new accident scenarios, transient precursors, failure inechanisms, or limiting single failures are introduced as a itsult of this change.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.
3.
Does this change involve a signincant reduction in a margin of safety?
The proposed change does not affect the acceptance criteria for any analyzed l
event. There will be no effect on the manner in which safety limits or ihniting safety system settings are detennined nor will there be any effect on those plant systems necessary to assure the accomplishment of prutection functions. There will be no impact on any margin of safety.
Feedwater Isolation on P-4/Irw T3 }ypass Switch J
1.
Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Overall protection system perfonnance will remain within the bounds of the previously perfonned accident analyses. The P 4/1xw T,y Bypass Switch design change will not impact any accidents previously evaluated in the FSAR since feedwater isolation upon reaching this function was never credited.
The ESFAS will continue to function in a manner consistent with the accident analysis assumptions and the plant design basis. As such, there will be no degradation in the perfonnance of nor an increase in the number of challenges to equipment assumed to function during an accident situation.
This Technical Specification change does not affect the probability of any event initiators. There will be no change to nonnal plant operating panuneters or accident mitigation capabilities. Therefore, there will be no increase in the probability or consequences of any accident occurring due to this change.
2.
Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evahiated?
There are no changes in the method by which any safety-related plant system perfonus its safety function and the nonnat manner of plant operation is unaffected, other than the proposed allowance to bypass feedwater isolation on P-4 coincident with low T,y. This bypass switch modification will be perfonned under the design standards applicable to all safety system bypasses at Callaway, except for Section 4.12 of
Attaciuncnt i Fage 8 of 8 i
IEEE 275 971. Section 4.12 ofIEEE 2791971 rvquires that an operating bypass of a protective function be automatically removed whenever pennissive conditions are not met, llowever, the subject circuitry does not provide a protective function. It is not assumed or credited in any safety analysis. In addition, plant conditions that would call for the restoration of the feedwater isolation function cannot occur without operator action to close the reactor trip breakers. Administrative controls will govern the proper use of and restoration from the proposed bypass. Although the addition of the bypass switch introduces the potential for an equipment l
malfunction of a different type fmm any previously evaluated in the FSAR, I
the possibility of a new or different type of accident is not created. The swhch functions only to allow a manual bypass of feedwater isolation. The failure of the switch or its improper use will not be an event initiator for i
the previously analyred Loss of Nonnal Feedwater event in FSAR Section i
15.2.7 since it cannot fall in such a manner as to cause feedwater isolation.
No new accident scenarios, tnmslent precursors, failure mechanisms, or limiting single failures are introduced as a result of this change. There will be no adverse effect or challenges imposed on any safety related system as a result of this change. Therefore, the possibility of a new or different type of accident is not created.
3.
Does this change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
There will be no effect on the manner in which safety thnits or limiting safety system settings are detennined nor will there be any effect on those plant systems necessary to assure the accomplislunent of protection functions. There will be no impact on DNBR limits, Fn, F-delta II, LOCA FCT, peak local power density, or any other margin of safety.
CONCI USION t
Based upon the preceding infonnation, it has been detennined that the proposed changes to the Technical Specifications do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated, create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated, or involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. Therefore, it is concluded that the proposed changes meet the requirements of 10CFR50.92(c) and do not involve a significant hazards consideration.
ULNRC.03628 ATTACllMENT TWO ENVIRONMENTAI, CONSIDERATION i
Page 1 of 2 i
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION This ainendinent application would revise feedwater isolation ESPAS functions in l
Technical Specification Tables 3.3 3,3.3-4 and 4.3 2 as follows:
(1) The Applicable htODES for Functional Units 5.a.1), Automatic Actuation Ixgic and Actuation Relays (SSPS), and 5.a.2), Automatic Actuation 1xgic and Actuation Relays (htSFIS), in Tables 3.3 3 and 4.3 2 would be revised to add h10DB 3. This change is consistent with the Applicability for the main feedwater isolation valves (h1FIVs) and auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system. ACTION Statements 27 and 27a are replaced with ACTION Statements 34 and 34a, respectively.
(2) A new Functional Unit 5 d, Steam Generator Water Level Low Low (for feedwater isolation only), would be added to Tables 3.3 3,3.3-4, and 4.3 2. This Functional Unit would serve to assure feedwater isolation consistent with several accident analyses that depend on AIAV delivery to the steam generators. Since this function is initiaied by SG water level low low, its format must be similar to that used for the tractor trip and AIAV stan functions. The need for this Functional Unit can be traced to the pre licensing design change to move the feedwater line check valves inside containment.
(3) In conjunction with the change discussed under item (2), the Applicable htODES in Table 3.3-3 for AFW SG Water Level Low law Functional Units 6.d.1).c), Stan hiotor-Driven Pumps Vessel AT (Power-1, Power 2),
and 6.d.2),c), Stan Turbine Driven Pump Vessel AT (Power 1, Power-2),
would be revised to delete h10DE 3. Functional Unit 6.d.3) in Table 4.3-2 would also be revised to delete htODE 3. This change is appropriate since the function is meaningless in h10DE 3 when there is no temperature change across tbc reactor vessel. This function is used to change the trip time delays depending on the ecluivalent power level.
(4) The Bases for Functional Unit i1.b, Reactor Trip P 4, in Table 3.3 3 would be revised to add a note allowing the feedwater isolation function on P-4 coincident with low T,y to be blocked since this function is not recluired. A design nxxlification would add a bypass switch to accomnuxlate this block which would serve to decrease unnecessary cycling of the h1FIVs and AFW system.
1
Attachnient 2 Page 2 of 2 The prolmsed amendnient involves changes with respect to the use of facility coinponents located within the restricted area, as defined in 10CFR20. Union Electric has detennined that the proposed amendment does not involve:
- 1) A significant harards consideration, as discussed in AttacInnent I of this amendment application;
- 2) A significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any efnuents that inay le released offsite;
- 3) A significant increase in Individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.
Accordingly, the proposed amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10CFR51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10CFR51.22(b), no environinental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.
UlSRC.03628 A'ITACIIMFMT TilREE l'ROl'OSED TECilNICAL SI'ECIFICATION REVISIONS
TABLE 3 3.(Continued)
(%a ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE % TION SYSTER INSTRUENTATION 9P MINIMUM E
TOTAL NO.
CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICA8tE 5
FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHAMELS TO TRIP OPERABLE f0 DES ACTION i
5.
Fecdwater Isolation & Turbine Trip g
M a.
I) Automatic Actuation 2
I 2
1, Z 3
-+F 7+
l; j
Logic and Actuation 4
Relays (SSPS)
L j
- 2) Automatic Actuation 3/SSPS Train 2/SSPS Train 2/SSPS Train I, Z 7 fPe-7 6 J' j
t:
Logic and Actuation A
v
/
Relays (MSFIS) b.
Steam Generator Water 4/sta. gen.
2/sta. gen.
3/sta. gen.
I, 2 33*
i level High-High in any in each operating operating i
j sim. gen.
sim. gen.
1 c.
Safety Injection See Item I. above for all Safety injection lattiating functions 4'.rNSEW 3/f 3-/7
'"d * **'"*'"l'~
O 6.
a.
Manual Initiation 3(1/ pump)
I/ pump I/ pump I, 2. 3 24
)
{
b.
Automatic Actuation 2
I 2
1, 2, 3 34 Logic and Actuation Relays (SSPS) c.
Automatic Actuation 2
I 2
I, 2, 3 21 F
Logic and Actuation i
3 d.
Steam Generator Water Level Low-Low E
(
I) Start Motor-Driven Pumps tJ h
a) Steam Generator 4/sta. gen.
2/sta. gen.
3/sta. gen.
I, 2, 3 33*, 35 l
?
Water Level Low-in any in each
~~
tow (Adverse operating operating Containment sim. gen.
stm. gen.
Environment)
INSERT 3/4 3-17 hilNIhtUht TOTAL NO.
CilANNELS CllANFELS APPLICABLE IIINCTIONAL UNII OF CllANNELS 10 TRIP DPERABLE hiODJ15 ACIJQN
$ d Steam Generator Water level Low Low
- l I) Steam Generator 4/stm. gen.
2/stm. gen.
3/stm. gen.
1, 2, 3 33',35 l
Water Level Low Low in any in each l
(Adverse Containment operat ng operating Environment) sim. gen.
sim. gen.
- 2) Steam Generator 4/stm. gen.
2/stm. gen.
3/stm. gen.
I, 2, 3 35,36*
Water I cycl Low low in any in each (Normal Containment operating operating Emironment) stm. gen.
stm. gen.
- 3) Vessel AT (Power 1, 4
2 3
1, 2 37' Power.2)
- 4) Containment Pressure.
4 2
3 1, 2, 3 37*
Emironmental Allowance hiodifier
I i
w
%s JABLE 3.3-3 (Continued) h ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUE NTATION E4 MINIMUM TOTAL NO.
CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE e
FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION
~
6.
Auxiliary Feedwater (Continued) d.
Steam Generator Water level Low-tow (Continued)
- 1) Start Motor-Driven Pumps (Continued) b) Steam Generator Water 4/sta. gen.
2/sta. gen.
3/sta. gen.
1, 2, 3 35, 36*
Level Low-low in any in each (Normal Containment,
operating operating Environment) l.
stm. gen.
sim. gen.
c) Vessel,AT (Power-1, 4
2 3
1, 2 +
37*
w g
Power-2) d) Con}.alnmentPressure-4 2
3 1, 2, 3 37*
Environmental Allowance Modifier
- 2) Start Turbine-Driven Pump k
a) Steam Generator Water 4/sta. gen.
2/sta. gen.
3/sta. gen.
I, 2, 3 33*, 35 Level low-tow in any 2 in each g
2 (Adverse Containment operating operating Environment) stm. gen.
sim. gen.
E b) ~ Steam Generator Water 4/sta. gen.
2/sta. gen.
3/sta. gen.
1, 2, 3 35, 36*
Level Low-low in.any 2 in each g
(Normal Containment; operating operating p
Environment) sim. gen.-
sim. gen.
b c) Vessel AT (Power-1, 4
2.
3 1, 2 +
37*
g Power-2)
TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued) i-TABLE NOTATION Trip function may be blocked in this MODE below the P-ll (Pressurizer Pressure e
Interlock) Setpoint.
- Trip function-automatically blocked above P-ll and may be blocked below P-ll
- when Safety Injection on low steam line pressure is not blocked.
f H Trip function may be blocked just before shutdown of the last operating main feedwater pump and restored just after the first main feedwater pump is put into service (following its startup trip test).
The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
One in Separation Group l'and one in Separation Group 4.
- The de-energization of one train of BOP ESFAS actuation logic and actuation relays. renders two of the four channels inoperable, Action Statement 21 applies to o' oth functional Units 6.c and 6.g in this case.
- The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable in Modes 5 and 6.
Only the shutdown portion of one sequencer is ree.uired to be OPERABLE in Modes
+
5 and 6 which carresponds to the OPERABLE Emergency Diesel Generator.
J(3 (++
Operability is only required for associated OPERABLE bus in Modes-5 and 6.
i a) Fea,(m+ar inM4n on/
kTIONSTATEMENTS l
l ACTION 14 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1, provided the other channel is OPERABLE.
ACTION 15 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed until performance of the next required ANANLOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within I hour.
ACTION 16 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed provided the inoperable channel is placed in the bypass condition and the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met. One additional channel may be bypassed for up to-4 hours for surveillance testir.g per Specification 4.3.2.1 ACTION 17 - With less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, operation may continue provided the containment purge supply and exhaust valves are maintained closed.
~
CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 3-20 Amendment No. 26,64,69,85 Correction letter of 1/6/94
TABLE 3.3-3 (continued) s ACTION STATEMENTS (continued)
\\
ACTION 25 With the number of OPERABLE channels one less *hsn the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, declare the r,'(
'ed diesel generator and off-site power source inoperab:s M take the ACTION required by Specification 3.8.1.1 or 3.4.1.2.
ACTION 26 With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or initiate and maintain operation of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation system.
ACTION 27 Sith th,: nurb:r Of OPE"_*"_LE :h:nn:1,: ::: 1:::.th:n tM ni;;;
L_
...u......,. m.m.P m.. P ___.2.
w
_A m.
..... o._
..y.
os,
.m
...... nv.
. M r.
withi- !? 5:ur:; her:::r, ::: h:nn:1 ::y 5: byp::.::d f:r up i:
4 M ars fer surveilla?.:-
MIN,testingper. Spec'fic;h)e
' i e-4. 3. ;:. ;
h fd
..... u, w. 2.=u.
b,i I
s L--
--hh 7w -
s1w w = inw s I
IJ V F b MW b b.
ACTION 27a "ith th: trb:r ;f OPEL*"LE :h:nn:1: ::: 1::: th:n th; T;t;l
-Ne,..k r ef Chenr.els, ;p;reti n ::y prc:::d.
The in:;;r:bl:
ch:r.n:1 f:il: t: : :r, tripp:d :;nditier..
With th; n;;M r ;f a h-h a ht P
_L ____i. ___ i___
AL._
AL.
ka l 2..-
PL-__-1.
MM P M a b.l P VT b MW h.b blius ts tW 5 3 wits 5#3 b,ruft b uis
,aavsi. - -
wiv w e ev e w 4 e vi tu rnw t.
_.2
-__A L.
2_
A i_-.&
UMT PT A klMBU.2&L2m 1 83 L..-.
M__
s w q w a v wvvww ri b, ww sse ab wuab e rw a e a mww i vr i b ri i ri a e.
s evw wi s s treir.i;.ey k pieced ir. test fer up t; 4 heur-fer 2;rveillen ;
-t:: ting per S;::ift::ti:n 1.3.2.1 previd:d the :th:r tr:t-i:
AR.P M a h l P.
beje.l-e},
-,..~
9t (NOTE:
ACTION STATEMENTS 28 THROUGH 31 ARE LOCATED ON OTHER TABLES.)
k
)
CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 3-21 Amendment No. 6 % 66,117
w!
.a TABLE 3.3-4 (Continued) h ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUNENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS E5 TOTAL SENSOR TRIP ALLOWABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT ALLOWANCE (TA)
Z_
ERROR (5)
SETPOINT VALUE y
5.
Fee &ater Isolation (Continued) b.
Steam Generator Water Level-High-High 5.0 2.18 2.0 5 78% of
$ 79.8% of narrow range narrow range instrument instr a nt span span
[Nsegr gjg yjection c.
Safgty In See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values.
as 6.
Manuel Initiation M.A.
N.A.
M.A.
M.A.
N.A.
w4 b.
Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays (55PS)
N.A.
M.A.
N.A.
N..*
M.A.
c.
Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays (80P ESFAS)
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
M.A.
N.A.
d.
Steam Generator Water Level-Low-Low m
a.
O.
?
l lu.
INSERT 3/4 3-25 (page 1 of 3)
TOTAL SENSOR TRIP ALLOWABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT ALLOWANCE fTA)
ERROR (S)
SETPOINT VALUE 5 d Steam Generator Water Level Low-Low'"
- 1) Vessel AT Equivalent 6.0 2.72 1.65 5 Vessel AT
$ Vessel AT 510% RTP Equivalent to Equivalent to Vessel AT(Power 1) 10% RTP 13.9% RTP Coincident with i
20.2 17.58 2.0 2 20.2% of 218.4% of Water Level Low Low narrow range narrow range (Adverse Containment instrument span instrument span Emironment) and Containment Pressure-2.8 0.71 2.0
$ 1,5 psig 5 2.0 psig Emironmental Allowance Modifier OR Steam Generator 14.8 12.18 2.0 214.8% of 213.0% of Water Level Low-Low narrow range narrow range (Normal Containment instrument span instrument span Environment)
With a Time Delay,(t) 5 232 seconds 5 240 seconds
INSERT 3/4 3-25. (page 2 of 3)-
TOTAL SENSOR TRIP ALLOWABLE -
FUNCTIONAL UNIT ALLOWANCE (TA)
EBRQiL(S).
SETPOINT:-
VALUE 5.d Steam Generator Water Level Low Low"*
- 2) 10% RTP <
6.0 2.72 1.65
< Vessel AT - 5 Vcssel AT Vessel ATEquivalent Equivalent to Equivalent to 5 20% RTP 20% RTP 23.9% RTP Vessel AT(Power 2)
Coincident with Steam Generator 20.2 17.58 2.0 2 20.2% of 218.4% of Water Level Low Low narrow range narrow range -
(Adverse Containment instrument span instrument span Emironment) and Containment Pressure-2.8 0.71 2.0 51.5 psig 5 2.0 psig -
Emironmental Allowance Modifict OR Steam Generator 14.8 12.18 2.0 t 14.8% of 213.0% of Water Level Low-Low narrow range narrow range (Normal Containment
- instrument span instrument span Emironment) -
' With a Time Delay,(t)
$ 122 seconds -. 5130 seconds I
=
q
- INSERT 3/4 3-25 (page 3 of 3)
TOTAL SENSOR TRIP
- ALLOWABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT ALLOWANCE (TA)
Z ERROR (S)
SETPOINT VALUE 5 <t Steam Ocncrator Water Level Lc,v Low ***
- 3) Vessel ATEquivalent
>20% RTP
[
Coincident with Steam Generator 20.2 17.58 2.0 120.2% of 218.4% of Water Level Low Low narrow range narrow range (Adverse Containment instrument span instrument span Environment) and Containment Pressure-2.8 0.71 2.0 51.5 psig 52.0psig Environmental Allowance l
Modifier OR Steam Generator 14.8 12.18 2.0 214.8% of.
213.0% of Water Level Low-Low narrow range. narrow range
- (Normal Containment instrument span instrument span Environment)
NEYlS/0N is 3
TABLE 3.3-4 (Continued)
TABLE NOTATIONS
- Time constants utili:ed in the lead-lag controller for Steam Pressure-Low are t i t 50 seconds and t 1 5 seconds.
CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall ensure that these time constants are adjusted to these values.
- The time constant utilized in the rate-lag controller for Steam Line Pressure-Negative Rate-High is greater than or equal to 50 seconds.
CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall ensure that this time constant is adjusted to this value.
- * * [<< / w d e-ra /4 A,,,/g
~...
~~'
1 j
CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 3-28
TABLE 4.3-2.2 Continued)
W w
ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES AETUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION
'I SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS n>
E TRIP g
ANALOG ACTUATING MODES CHANNEL DEVICE MASTER SLAVE FOR tellCH CHANNEL CilANNEL OPERATIONAL OPERATIONAL ACTUATION RELAY RELAY SURVEILLANCE
_E FUNCTIONAL UNIT CilECK CAllBRATION YEST TEST LOGIC J I TEST TEST. 15 REQUIRED __
a.
Steam Line Isolation
~
a.
Manual Initiation N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
R N.A.
M.A.
N.A.
I, 2, 3 b.
- 1) Automatic Actuation N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
M(1)
M(1)
Q 1, 2, 3 Logic and Actuation Relays (SSPS)
- 2) Automatic Actuation N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
M.A.
N.A.
Q 1, 2, 3 Logic and Actuation Relays (MSFIS) c.
Containment Pressure-S R
Q N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
1, 2, 3 g
High-2
[
d.
Steam Line Pressure-Low S
R Q
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
1, 2, 3 e.
Steam Line Pressure-S R
Q N.A.
M.A.
N.A.
N.A.
3 Negative Rate-High S.
Feedwater Isolation & Turbine Trip a.
- 1) Automatic Actuation N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
M(1)
M(1)
Q(3) 1,23 g
j Logic and Actuation Relays (SSPS)
- 2) Automatic Actuation N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
Q(3) 1,23 j
Logic and Actuation
^
a
[
Relays (MSflS)
Po b.
Steam Generator Water S
R' Q
N.A.
N.A.
M.A.
ti, A.
1, 2 Level-liigh-High o
See item 1. above for all Safety injection Surveillance Requirements.
1*
a.
Manual inttIation N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
R N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
1, 2, 3 b.
Automatic Actuation N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
M(1)
M(I)
Q I, 2' 3 Logic and Actuation Relays (SSPS) i___... - -.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~
INSERT 3/4 3-35 TRIP ANALOG ACTUATLNG MODES CIIANNEL DEVICE MASTER SLAVE FOR WHICH :
CHANNEL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL OPERATIONAL ACIUATION ' RELAY RELAY SURVEILLANCE FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST 1EST LOGICTE_ST TEST TEST IS REOUIRED :
5.d Steam Generator Water Level Low-Id*
- 1) Steam Generator S
R Q
N.A.
NA N.A.
NA 1, 2, 3 Water Level Low-Low (Adverse Containment Emironment)
- 2) Steam Generator S
R Q
NA NA NA
- NA 1, 2, 3 Water Level Low-Low (Normal Containment Emironment)
- 3) Vessel oT(Power-1, S
R Q
NA N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
1,2 Power-2)
- 4) Containment Pressure-S R
Q NA N.A.
NA N.A.
1, 2, 3 Emironmental Allowance Modifier i
6 f
~
w g
j TABLE _4.3-2(Continued)
>G EllGillEERED SAFETY TEATURES ACTUATI0ff SYSTEM INSTRUMErl?ATION
?"
SURVEILLAftCE REQUIREMENTS IRIP g
AfiALOG ACTUATINr.
MODES g
CllANNEL DEVICE HA5flR SLAVE TOR WillCll CIIArtit[L CifANNEL OPERAilOriAL OPERAll0NAL ACTUATION R[I AY RELAY SURVEllt AflCl IUNCil0NAL UNIT _
ClllCK CAL IBRAil0ft
. ILST TEST LOGIC TEST TEST i[Si 15 REQUIRill 6.
Auxiliary f eedwater (Continued) c.
Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays (BOP ESTAS) fl. A.
ff. A.
N.A.
N.A.
M(1)(2)
N.A.
ft. A.
1, 2, 3 w2 d.
Steam Generator Water level Low-low
- 1) Steam Generator m
Water Level Low-Low Environment) 5 R
9 N.A.
fl. A.
N.A.
N.A.
1, 2, 3 0
( Adverse Containment I
- 2) Steam Generator Water Level Low-low k
Environment) 5 R
9 N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
I, 2, 3
[
(flonnal Containment S
(Power-1, Power-2) 5 R
Q H.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
I [
g
- 3) Vessel AT
?.
z
?
- 4) Containment Pressure -
M Hodifier 5
R Q
fl. A.
fl. A.
N.A.
N.A.
I, 2, 3
{-
Environmental Allowance See item I above for all Safety injection Surveillance Requirements.
c.
Safety injection O
1ABLE 4. W fContinued)
- J' ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS E
TRIP n*
ANALOG ACTUATING MODES CHANNEL DEVICE MASTER SLAVE FOR WHICH CHANNEL CHANNEL
.0PERATIONAL OPERATIONAL ACTUATION RELAY RELAY SURVEILLANCE FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CAllBRATION TEST
' TEST LOGIC TEST TEST TEST _ IS REQUIRED 9.
Control Room Isolation a.
Manual Initiation N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
R N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
All b.
Automatic Actuation N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
M(1)
M(1) Q(3) 1, 2, 3. 4 Logic and Actuation Relays (SSPS) c.
Automatic Actuation N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N(1)(2)
N.A.
M.A.
All Logic and Actuation R,
Relays (B0P ESFAS) e
{
d.
Phase "A" Isolation See item 3.a. above for all Phase "A" Isciation Surveillance Requirements.
- 10. Load Shedder Emergency N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
M(1)(2)
N.A.
M. A. -
1, 2, 3, 4, 5+, 6+
load Sequencer
- 11. Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Interlocks a.
Pressurizer Pressure,
'N.A.
.R
.Q N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
'1, 2, 3 P-Il b.
Reactor Trip,.P-4 N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
R N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
1, 2, 3 TABLE NOTATIONS
'5 k
- 1) Each train shall be tested at least every 62 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS.
- 2) Continuity check may be excluded from the ACTUATION LOGIC TEST.Except Relays K602, K62 a
E
- 3) during refueling and during each COLD SHUTDOWN exceeding 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> unless they have been tested within the-previous 90 days.
l E
(4) Tie Breakers 52 NG0ll6 and 52 NG0216 shall be verified open.The specified 18 month frequency ma restart following the first refueling outage or June 1,1986, whichever occurs first. The provisions of Specification 4.0.2 are reset from performance of this surveillance.
Only the shutdown portion of one sequencer is required to be OPERABl.E in Modes 5 and 6 which corresponds to the
+
OPERABLE Emergency Diesel Generator.
++ Operability is only renuired for actoriated OPrRARIF hus in Modes 5 and 6.
(a) Sc/wadve-Unl*$% anll.
L
t INSTRUMENTATION
(
/c mem/
//,che/.rrnee//7, BASES funcNonir nof r egated J Na y
nSystemIntflocks
.rn fe suf ter) f Enaineered Safety Features Actuatio The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System interlocks perform l
the following functions:
P-4 Reactor tripped - Actuates T Jrbine trip, closes sain feedwater valves on T below setpoint, prevents the opening of the main feedwater vaTves which were closed by a Safety Injection er High Steam Generator Water Level signal, allows Safety Injection block so that components can be reset or tripped.
Reactor not tripped - prevents manual block of Safety Injection.
P-11 On increasing pressure P-Il automatically reinstates Safety injection actuation on low pressurizer pressure and low steam line pressure and automatically blocks steam line isolation on negative steam line pressure rate. On decreasing pressure, P-11 allows the manual block of Safety Injection on low pressurizer pressure and low steam line pressure and allows steam line isolation on negative steam line pressure rate to become active upon manual block of low steam line pressure SI.
3/4.3.3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.3.1 RADIATION MONITORING FOR PLANT OPERATIONS The OPERABILITY of the radiation monitoring instrumentation for plant operations ensures that: (1) the associated action will be initiated when the radiation level monitored by each channel or combination thereof reaches its setpoint, (2) the specified coincidence logic is maintained, and (3) sufficient redundancy is saintained to permit a channel to be out of service for testing or maintenance.
The radiation monitors for plant operations senses radiation levels in selected plant systems and locations and determines whether or not predetermined limits are being exceeded.
If they are, the signals are combined into logic matrices sensitive to combinations indicative of various accidents and abnormal conditions.
Once the required logic combination is completed, the system sends actuation signals to initiate alarms or automatic isolation action and actuation of Emergency Exhaust or Control Room Emergency Ventilation Systems.
CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-3 Amendment No.103
_