TXX-6014, Forwards Changes Scheduled for Future FSAR Amend,Resulting from Analysis to Justify Cable Slices in Raceways,Per 860804 Commitments
| ML20211B627 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 10/03/1986 |
| From: | Counsil W TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC CO. (TU ELECTRIC) |
| To: | Noonan V NRC - COMANCHE PEAK PROJECT (TECHNICAL REVIEW TEAM) |
| References | |
| EA-86-009, EA-86-9, TXX-6014, NUDOCS 8610170301 | |
| Download: ML20211B627 (26) | |
Text
/.
Log # TXX-6014 File # 10010 10118 TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING COMPANY SKYWAY TOWER. 400 NORT38 OEJVE FrMEET. I.B. 31. DALLAS. TEXAS 78301 October 3, 1986 ffj^7Aff.f.7.*A Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention: Mr. V. S. Noonan, Director Comanche Peak Project Division of Licensing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
SUBJECT:
COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION (CPSES)
DOCKET NOS. 50-445 AND 50-446 FSAR AMENDMENT
REFERENCES:
1.
W. G. Counsil (TUGCO) letter to V. S. Noonan (NRR)
" Cable Splices in Raceways" dated June 6,1986.
2.
W. G. Counsil (TUGCO) letter to J. M. Taylor (I&E)
"EA No. 86-09" dated August 4, 1986.
Dear Mr. Noonan:
Enclosed is an advance copy of FSAR. changes scheduled for a future FSAR amendment. These changes result from an analysis performed to justify cable splices in raceways in compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.75, Revision 1, Regulatory Position C.9.
The analysis to justify cable splices in raceways was previously submitted to your office by Reference 1.
We understand that the review of this material by your office is not yet complete, however, in Reference 2,'TUGC0 committed to
. submit this analysis as an FSAR amendment by September 30, 1986 (Appendix B Item I.B.1.d,-TUEC Response item (5)). Since Amendment 60 (originally scheduled for this date) has been delayed, this advance copy of the FSAR changes ~ associated with the cable splice analysis is being submitted to j
satisfy the above commitment.
Mr. Tom Westerman of NRC Region IV was notified on October 1,1986, via telephone by Mr. W. Joe Harnden of TUGC0 that our completion of EA No. 86-09 Appendix B Item I.B.I.d would be delayed and that this advance copy of the FSAR changes associated with the cable splice analysis would be provided to NRR and Region IV.
8610170301 861003 PDR ADOCK 05000445 A
PDR A suvssion or rxxAs urunses exzcs,nsc courAur ib
TXX-6014 October 3, 1986 Page 2 The FSAR changes consist of changes to FSAR Appendix 1A(B), changes to FSAR Section 8.3, changes to the appropriate index pages and the creation of Appendix 8A. All new changes, except for Appendix 8A, are identified by an amendment bar with "Rev." printed adjacent to it.
Past changes will have an amendment number adjacent to the amendment bar.
Since Appendix 8A is new, it has no amendment bars.
Very truly yours, 17 W. G. Counsil WJH/amb Enclosure c - J. M. Taylor T. F. Westerman e
w.
n
-,mw
_,y,.
~ - -,
,,-w y
4 Enclosure to TXX-6014 1
a i
I t
f i
}
l' f
CPSES/FSAR VOLUME TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
Section I1111 Volume 8.2 0FFSITE POWER SYSTEM VIII 8.
2.1 DESCRIPTION
VIII 8.2.2 ANALYSIS VIII 8.3 ONSITE POWER SYSTEM IX 8.3.1 AC POWER SYSTEMS IX 8.3.2 DC POWER SYSTEMS IX 8.3.3 FIRE PROTECTION FOR CABLE SYSTEMS IX 8A ANALYSIS TO JUSTIFY CABLE SPLICES IX Rev.
IN RACEWAYS 9.0 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS t
9.1 F'JEL STORAGE AND HANDLING IX 9.1.1 NEW FUEL STORAGE IX 9.1.2 SPENT FUEL STORAGE IX 9.1.3 SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING AND CLEANUP SYSTEM IX 9.1.4 FUEL HANDLING SYSTEM IX 9.2 WATER SYSTEMS IX 9.2.1 STATION SERVICE WATER SYSTEM IX 9.2.2 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM IX 9.2.3 DEMINERALIZED AND REACTOR MAKEUP WATER IX SYSTEM 9.2.4 POTABLE AND SANITARY WATER SYSTEM IX 9.2.5 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK IX 9.2.6 CONDENSATE STORAGE FACILITITES IX 9.2.7 SURFACE WATER PRE-TREATMENT SYSTEM IX xviii
CPSES/FSAR TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
Section lillt Page 8.3.1.1.12 Class IE Equipment Design Criteria 8.3-25 8.3.1.1.13 118-V Uninterruptible AC Power 8.3-27 8.3.1.1.14 Physical Arrangement of Class IE Power 8.3-29 Systems Equipment 8.3.1.2 Analysis 8.3-32 8.3.1.2.1 Compliance 8.3-33 8.3.1.2.2 Analysis of Uninterruptible Power Systems 8.3-42a 8.3.1.2.3 Failure Mode Analysis 8.3-43 8.3.1.2.4 Class IE Equipment in a Hostile Environment 8.3-43 8.3.1.3 Physical Identification of Class IE Power 8.3-47 Systems Eouioment
~
8.3.1.4 Indeoendence of Redundant Systa=<
8.3-50 8.3.1.5 Vital suonortina Systems 8.3-56b 8.3.2 DC POWER SYSTEMS 8.3-57 8.3.2.1 Descriotion 8.3-57 8.3.2.2 Analysis 8.3-62 8.3.3 FIRE PROTECTION FOR CA8LE SYSTEMS 8.3-64 8.3.3.1 Cable Deratina and Cable Trav Fill 8.3-65 8.3.3.2 Fire Detection and Protection Devices 8.3-67 8.3.3.3 Fire Barriers and Trav Senaration 8.3-67 4
l 8.3.3.4 Fire Stoos 8.3-67 REFERENCES 8.3-67 I
8A ANALYSIS TO JUSTIFY CABLE SPLICES 8A-1 Rev.
IN RACEWAYS 8-111
CPSES/FSAR Discussion Safety-related motor operated valves inside Containment comply with the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.73, dated January 1974, with the exception that stem mounted limit switches are tested separately to the requirements of IEEE Standard 382-1972.
For details see Section 3.118.
Also refer to Appendix 1A(N).
.Reculatory Guide 1.74 Quality Assurance Terms and Definitions Discussion This guide is not applicable to CPSES design and construction. The quality assurance provisions for operating phase activities are in 8
accordance with the guidance of ANSI N45.2.10 - 1973, as endorsed by Q421.19 this regulatory guide dated February 1974.
Also refer to Section 17.2.
Reaulatory Guide 1.75 i
Physical Independence of Electric Systems Discussion CPSES design complies with the intent of Revision 1 (1/75) of this regulatory guide with the following comments:
Rev.
I IA(B)-31 i
1
CPSES/FSAR Regulatory Position C.1 - The CPSES design of the perimeter security lighting system (non-Class IE) relies on the provisions of IEEE Standard 384-1974 relative to overcurrent devices to prevent malfunction in the perimeter security lighting system from causing unacceptable influences on Class 1E loads.
Regulatory Position C.9 - Splice type connections have been used to terminate field routed cables at equipment where the equipment is provided with pigtail cables. Where an enclosure has been provided and space exists, the splices are located within the equipment enclosure, e.g., field cables for motor leads. Where this is not the case, the splices are located in raceways nearby.
Such splices are
. utilized in CPSES design for cable terminations at:
Rev.
a.
Electric penetration assemblies (EPAs) b.
Solenoid valves, limit switches, level swtiches, etc. (local mounted devices - LMOs) c.
Connection of LMDs to Electric Conductor Seal Assembly (ECSA)
- pigtails, d.
Equipment which can only accept smaller (than field cable) size cable.
An analysis to justify cable splices in raceways is provided in Appendix 8A.
l For details see Section 8.3.
,l Also refer to Appendix 1A(N).
1A(B)- 32
CPSES/FSAR Reaulatory Guide 1.76 Design Basis Tornado for Nuclear Power Plants Discussion G
The CPSES is designed to conform to the requirements of this regulatory guide, dated April 1974, except that it is designed to withstand the effects of a Design Basis Tornado having a maximum wind speed of 360 mph which is made up of a rotational speed of 300 mph and a translational speed of 60 mph. A simultaneous pressure drop of 3.0 psi at the rate of 1.0 psi per second is considered.
The Design Basis Tornado for CPSES was determined prior to the 10 i
issuance of this Regulatory Guide and was approved for use by the Q327.2 Atomic Energy Commission's Safety Evaluation Report Dated September 3, 1974.
Also refer to Section-3.3.
Reaulatory Guide 1.77 Assumptions Used for Evaluating a Control Rod Ejection Accident for Pressurized Water Reactors Discussion The analysis of the radiological consequences of a control rod ejection accident presented in Section 15.4.8 complies with the requirements of the Appendix B assumptions of this regulatory guide, dated May 1974, except only gamma radiation contribution is taken into account in the determination of whole body exposures.
I 1A(B)- 32a
~
CPSES/FSAR b aulatory Guide 1.78 Assumptions for Evaluating the Habitability of a Nuclear Power Plant Control Room During a Postulated Hazardous Chemical Release Discussion The CPSES design meets the intent of this regulatory guide, dated June 1974, as discussed in Sections 2.2 and 6.4.
i Re1ulatory Guide 1.79 Preoperational Testing of Emergency Core Cooling Systems for Pressurized Water Reactors Discussion The Initial Test Program, as described in Section 14.2, is in compliance with the provisions of Revision 1 (9/75) of this regulatory guide with the following exception.
1.
Regulatory Position C.1.b(2)
Recirculation Test - Cold Conditions A satisfactory in-plant test of the containment sump to demonstrate vortex control and acceptable pressure drops across 11 screening and suction lines and valves is not practical.
j However, a full scale model of the Containment Recirc sumps, screens and surrounding area will be used to demonstrate that unacceptable vortex formation in the sump area is precluded while simulating operation under various flow and pump combinations.
1 In addition, the inlet loss coefficient across the sump screens and sump intake piping configuration will be evaluated for comparison to analytically detemined values and to verify the adequacy of new positive suction head at the pumps.
1A(B) 33 i
i f
.. -, -. _ _ _ - _ _ - - - _. _ _ _.. _ _ _ _ _,. _ _ _ _ _ ~. - _ _ _ _.
CPSES/FSAR The capability to realign valves and injection pumps to recirculate coolant from the containment floor will be demonstrated. The full flow test will be performed with the RHR pumps taking suction from the Refueling Water. Storage Tank (RWST) and delivering to the RCS. The net positive suction head can be Q423 32 determined from the level in the RWST and in the containment sump Q400.3 and shown to be greater than the required net positive suction head for the pump.
The lines from the containment sump to the RHR pumps will be flushed ar.d inspected to ensure that they are free from obstruction.
l Reaulatory Guide 1.80 Preoperational Testing of Instrument Air Systems Discussion 59 423.ff The Instrument Air System is not nuclear safety related and this regulatory guide is not applicable.
(Also see Q423.12 and Q423.26).
Reaulatory Guide 1.81 f
Shared Emergency and Shutdown Electric Systems for Multi-Unit Nuclear Power Plants IA(B)-34
CPSES/FSAR.
u.
Emergency Evacuation System Warning Lights -
56 Q040.69 Primary and backup protection are provided by means of fuse and circuit breaker respectively. See figure 8.3-45.
It can be seen from the time current. curves (see Figure 8.3'18 thru 8.3-45) for the primary and backup overcurrent protective devices and penetration conductors that the fault current-versus 52 Q040.69 time conditions for which the penetrations are designed and qualified will not be exceeded.
Time - current curves for protective devices and penetration conductors have been reproduced exactly as shown on manufacturers characteristic 56 curves. The time-current curves for primary and backup Q040.69 protective devices shown in Figures 8.3-18 through 8.3-45 depict the worst case protection scheme for applicable circuit type.
4 7.
Compliance With NRC Regulatory Guide 1.75 [15] and IEEE 384 [31]
4 The CPSES design complies with the intent of NRC Regulatory Rev.
Guide 1.75 and IEEE 384 (Refer to Appendix 1A(B)).
Physical separation of redundant safety-related equipment and wiring is achieved by location in separate rooms or by providing barriers.
Isolation devices are provided to preclude interaction between l
Class IE and associated circuits and non-Class IE circuits, as described in the following paragraphs.
d I.
I i
4 8.3-40
CPSES/FSAR 4
For devices A, B and C, see Figure 7.2-1 sheet 16.
For devices
.6 D, see Figure 7.2-1 sheet 15.
2.
Criteria and Basis for Installation of Cables for Class IE Systems
~
Separation between Class IE cables is provided to preserve the redundancy and independence of redundant electrical circuits.
The criteria for cable installation are derived from the basis stated previously and are in compliance with the intent of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.75 [15] and IEEE 384 [31]. Compliance with NRC Regulatory Guide 1.75 [15] is discussed in Subsection 8.3.1.2.1, Appendix 1A(B) and Appendix 8A.
- Rey, 3.
Cable Routing Cables are routed in separate raceway systems according to
~
voltage and function as follows:
a.
6.9-kV power i
b.
Low-voltage power (less than 600 VAC) and 125 VDC power c.
AC and DC control (may contain 125-VDC or 120-VAC power cables provided the current they normally carry does not 47 exceed the minimum ampacity of control conductors in the raceway system),
d.
Instrumentation cables In a vertical stack of trays, except for short distances at 4l vertical to horizontal transitions, the highest voltage level is i
on top, with lower trays descending in order of voltage level, control trays and finally instrumentation trays at the lowest level.
8.3-51
+
r i
COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT APPENDIX 8A ANALYSIS TO JUSTIFY CABLE SPLICES IN RACEWAYS 4
1 September 30, 1986 4
i
CPSES/FSAR APPENDIX _8A i
TABLE OF CONTENTS Section lillg Eggg 1.0 Purnose 8A-1 2.0 1GARR 8A-1 3.0 Reaulatory Position Reauirement 8A-2 4.0 Determination of Acceptability of Cable 8A-3 Solices in Raceways 4.1 Independence of Redundant Trains 8A-3 4.2 Assessment of Fire Hazard Due to Cable 8A-5 Splices in Raceways 4.2.1 Approach 8A-5 i
4.2.2 Review of Attributes and Their Effects 8A-6 5.0 Singsary and Conclusion 8A-10 i
September 30, 1986 i
2 i
.,,_,.m__m__.,,._,_ _ _ _ _ _,, _, _. _, _, _ _,, _ _, _ _ _,..
,_,m-,,_,,.,_-.
CPSES/FSAR
-APPENDIX 8A 4
ANALYSIS T0' JUSTIFY' CABLE SPLICES ~IN' RACEWAYS
.1.0 Purnose The purpose of this analysis is to show that the limited use of splices in raceways, incorporated in CPSES design for cable termination purposes, does not degrade the Class IE circuits and does not pose any undue hazard of a fire. This analysis is developed to satisfy the requirements of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.75, Rev.1, Regulatory Position C.9.
l 2.0 1 sang This analysis covers all cable splices in raceways utilized in the CPSES plant design. The term " raceways" shall mean to include open or enclosed trays, rigid or flexible steel conduits and condulets and site installed junction boxes in raceway runs. This analysis does not include splices inside an equipment enclosure, splices in junction / terminal boxes furnished as an integral part of an equipment and vendor furnished splices not in raceways. Where an enclosure has been provided and space exists, the splices are located within the equipment enclosure, e.g., field cables for motor leads. Where this is not the case, the splices are located in raceways nearby.
l In CPSES cable splices which are made in raceways can be categorized l
in the following four groups:
I a.
Groun 1 - Field routed power, control and instrumentation cables which are connected to Electric Penetration Assembly (EPA) pigtail cables by means of in-line splices located in trays.
The details of this category of splices are shown in " Details 33 and 32A through 32G" on drawing 2323-El-1702-01, Rev. 8.
}
l 8A-1 l
._,-,_ _,__,.,c., -.m
.m.__.
,,-..-7r_-_,-.-.
~
CPSES/FSAR b.
Groun 2 - Pigtail. cables from local mounted devices (LMOs -
solenoid valves, limit switches, level switches, etc.) which ~are j
connected to field routed control and instrument grade cables by means of parallel or in-line butt splices located in flexible conduit or condulets. The details of this category of splices are shown in " Detail 18, 188 and 18C" on drawing 2323-El-1701, Rev. 11.
c.
Groun 3 - Pigtail cables from' local mounted devices which are i
connected to the pigtail-conductors of the Electric Conductor Seal Assembly (ECSA) by means of in-line butt splices located in j
the flexible conduit of the ESCA. The details of this category j
of splices are shown in " Details IA and IB" on drawing 2323-El-j 0500-01, Rev. 28.
d.
Groun 4 - Field routed power cables which are spliced inside junction boxes (splices made within an equipment enclosure are outside the scope of this analysis) to a smaller size cable in order to accomodate equipment connection provisions (i.e., the equipment can only accept a cable size smaller than the field cable). The details of this category of splices are shown in
" Detail 13" on drawing 2323-El-1701, Rev. 11.
3.0 Reaulatory Position Reauirement The CPSES FSAR commits to IEEE Std. 384-1974 and NRC Regulatory Guide 1.75, Revision I dated January 1975. Section 5.1.1.3 of IEEE Standard 384, with the Regulatory Guide 1.75, Regulatory Position C.9 supplement, reads as follows:
"5.1.1.3 The minimum separation distances specified in Section 5.1.3 and 5.1.4 are based on open ventilated cable trays of l
either the ladder or trough type as defined in NEMA vel-1971, Cable Tray Systems. Where these distances are used to provide
{
adequate physical separation:
i 8A-2 l
1
CPSES/FSAR
-)
(1)
Cables and raceways involved shall be flame retardant (2)
The design basis shall be that the cable trays will not be filled above the side rails
~
(3)
Hazards shall be limited to failures or faults internal to 3
j the electric equipment or cables l
l (4)
Cable splices in raceways should be prohibited.
If lesser separation distances are used they shall be established as in Section 5.1.1.2."
In plant areas where hazards are limited to failures or faults internal to the electric equipment or cables, CPSES design permits the minimum separation distances specified in Sections 5.1.3 and 5.1.4 of the IEEE Standard 384 to ac'hieve independence between redundant l
trains. Use of these specified separation distances in plant design therefore requires compliance with all of the above conditions unless justified by analysis.
l Per requirement 3 above, hazards are limited to failures or faults l
internal to the electric equipment or cables.
For the subject analysis then, the only hazard of concern would be an electrically generated fire inside the raceway.
Regulatory Position C.9 prohibits splices in raceways even though separation distance is adequate to prevent a fire in the raceways of one train from affecting cables in a redundant train. However, it also states under the " Basis" of this position (paragraph C.9) that
" Splices are not, by themselves, unacceptable.
If they exist, the i
resulting design should be j'Jstified by analyses." Use of splices in raceways must therefore be justified.
For this analysis, it will be shown that (1) the minimum separation distances utilized in the plant 1
i 8A-3
=.
CPSES/FSAR design is adequate to maintain independence between redundant trains for a postulated fire originating at a cable splice and (2) cable 1
splices in raceways do not pose 1.ny undue hazard of initiating a fire.
4.0 Determination of Accentability of Cable Solices In Raceways i
4.1 Indeoendence of Redundant Trains Minimum separation distances utilized in CPSES design to achieve I
' ndependence between redundant trains meet the requirements of i
l Sections 5.1.3 and 5.1.4 of IEEE Standard 384.
Per the requirements of IEEE Standard 384, as modified by Regulatory Guide 1.75, these minimum separation distances are adequate provided (1) cable and
{
raceway materials involved are flame retardant, (2) cable trays are I
not filled above their side rails, (3) hazards are limited to fire originating in the raceway and (4) there should be no cable splices in
{
raceways.
I Since the design may not comply with the fourth requirement, the j
question would be whether the specified minimum separation distances i
are adequate for providing independence between redundant trains in
]
case of a fire electrically generated at a cable splice, i
4 i
Where there are no splices, the specified separation distances per the Standard are adequate to satisfy this objective for the case of an j
electrically generated cable fire.
If the fire generated at a cable spilce is no worse than a cable fire, the specified minimum
)
separation distances would be adequate.
We will show that the degree of potential damage from a cable splice fire is no more than
)
the degree of potential damage from a fire in a cable without splices.
I All cable splices within the scope of this analysis are made of l
essentially two types of material: one is the metallic connector part for conducting current and the second is the non-metallic insulation part. The metallic part is non-combustible like the copper conductor i
8A-4 i
~
CPSES/FSAR in a cable. The insulation materials applied at the splice are of a non-fire propagating type similar to the insulation and jacket material of a cable.
i 1
The insulation and jacket materials of CPSES cables in raceways
[
consist of EPR, XLPE, CPE, ETFE and CSPE. The materials, in their constructed configurations, do not propagate fire and are self extinguishing. This has been shown by documented tests performed by the cable vendors in order to qualify their cables per Section 2.5 l
test requiremants of IEEE Standard 383-1974. The oxygen index of these cable insulating materials ranges from 22 to 34. The higher the oxygen index, the quicker the fire extinguishes.
For cable splices, the insulation materials involved are furnished by two vendors,namely AMP Special Industries and Raychem Corporation. Groups I through 4 j
uninsulated splices (see scope) employ Raychem heat-shrink type insulating material. For some group 2 splices, AMP has furnished pre-2 insulated in-line butt type connecturs, with PVF2 (Kynar) insulation material. The materials involved in the Raychem splices consist of l
WCSF for sleeves, -52 for molded parts and 5119 used as a sealant and j
adhesive.
Except for the S119, the other three materials are flame retardant and meet the flame test requirements of IEEE Standard 383.
The S119 adhesive / sealant, although not flame retardant as a material, has passed the flame test requirement of the IEEE 383 Standard in the j
installed configuration.
In the installed configuration, the major portion of the S119 material does not have access to air. Access to air is esential for a burning process to continue. The oxygen index l
of the remaining three products ranges from 28-44, which is higher l
than the minimum oxygen index of the cable insulation and jacket l
materials. Therefore, it can be seen that all cable splices, as j
installed, are flame retardant, non-propagating and self-extinguishing to a degree equal to or greater than the cable insulating material l
itself.
Based on the above, it is concluded that the degree of potential l
damage due to a fire at a cable splice is no more than that from a 8A-5 l
CPSES/FSAR fire in a cable. Therefore, use of the minimum required separation distances specified in Sections 5.1.3 and 5.1.4 of IEEE Standard 384-1974 is justified for the splices utilized in the CPSES design.
4.2 Assessment of Fire Hazard Due to Cable Solices in Raceways 4.2.1 Anoroach In Section 4.1 of this anlaysis we have shown that the consequences of-a postulated fire originating at a cable splice are acceptable.
In this Section we will show that the likelihood of such a postulated i
fire in a splice is no greater that that in a cable itself.
l A fire can originate in the insulating materials of a cable splice due j
to (1) excessive heating of the internal current-carrying metallic i
parts and (2) breakdown of the dielectric property of the insulating j
material.
In order to assess the probability of such a fire, we need j
to evaluate the control of splices which have been used in raceways l
and those attributes which can cause such heating and dielectric l
breakdown.
i, l
.The purpose of this analysis is not to prove that a cable splice would j
not generate a fire under any circumstances. The attributes which j
have the potential of starting a fire in a cable (e.g., failure of a l
circuit protective device to interrupt a fault current) may also start
)
a fire at a cable splice. What will be shown is that introduction of a good quality cable splice in a continuous cable run does not create i
a weak link; that is, it is at least as reliable as the continuous j
cable run. We will therefore analyze all the attributes of a splice which are essential to ensure that consistently good quality splices l
are provided in the CPSES design and construction.
}
l 8A-6 1
____m CPSES/FSAR 4.2.2 Review of Attributes and Their Effects a.
Attribute:
Limited and controlled use of splices.
Discussion:
Electrical Erection Specification, 2323-ES-100, Rev. 2, in paragraph 4.2.3.1 states that " Cables shall be installed without splices unless splices are specifically called for on the drawings, cable and raceway schedule, or when approved by the Engineer." All splices in CPSES are made per the electrical physical construction drawings. These drawings show typical details for each group (see scope, section 2.0) of splices. The details identify the materials to be used to make field splices.
Per project procedures, the Engineer's approval of design changes is recorded via Design Change Authorizations.
This procedure ensures application of quality control for site performed splices.
b.
Attribute: Quality assurance and quality control.
Discussion: All materials involved in the splice connections are procured under the quality assurance program in compliance with the applicable ANSI N45.2 series of standards. Splices are made only by trained craft personnel as per the installation Procedure No. EEI-8. This procedure ensures adherence to splice manufacturer's recommended methods for installation and all construction drawings and specifications.
Use of the proper compression tool is assured since all AMP tools are matched by design to specific connectors. The tools are serialized and periodically checked for calibration by the on-site calibration laboratory. The tools are of the ratchet type and each crimp is brought to a full compression before the tool can be released. This ensures compliance with manufacturer's crimping requirement and excludes any possibility of an under or over crimp condition. The tools are logged in 8A-7
CPSES/FSAR and out of a tool room each day and are checked with a "go/no go" gage at the end of each day. The craftsman records on the tool card the use made of the tool on each occasion. Tools that do not pass the "go/no go" test are taken out of service and th'e connectors installed with them that day are removed.
1 All Class IE splices are inspected in accordance with the quality control procedure delineated in Procedure No. QI-QP-11.3-28 and each splice inspection is documented by an inspection report. QC inspects all physial attributes that make up the splice, e.g., selection of proper connector and crimping tool, proper stripping of cable insulation and jacket, proper insertion of conductor into the connector barrel, adequacy of crimp, etc.
If a bolted connection is being made, QC verifies correct bolting materials and witnesses torquing.
For splices which are insulated at site by installation.of heat shrink tubing, QC verifies proper cleaning of cable, proper selection of heat shrink material and proper installation. All these steps ensure that the splices are made per manufacturers' installation procedures and thereby produce qualified high quality splices. The QC inspection reports and the cable connection sign-off cards are maintained as a permanent QA record.
t The above shows that adquate quality assurance and control measures are implemented to ensure a good quality splice.
A. tribute:
Effect of temperature on splice materials.
t c.
Discussion: All CPSES splices utilize uninsulated type connectors except for some splices which are covered by Detail 18 (see scope). On smaller size wire's, up to #12AWG, Detail 18 permits use af Nuclear Preinsulated (Kynar insulated)
Environmental Sealed splices. All uninsulated connectors are of "so11 strand" or "ampower" type and furnished by AMP. All connectors of uninsulated or preinsulated splices are made of 8A-8
CPSES/FSAR fine grade high conductivity copper and have tin plating to resist corrosion. The connectors are crimped on the cahla conductors by using calibrated AMP compression tools which give positive indication of completion of compression. The compression tooling has features to prevent under or over crimping and provides dot or wire size coding for quality control. verification.
All wire connectors utilized in CPSES are UL 486A Listed and all splicing wire connectors are UL 486C Listed. As part of the UL Listing requirements, the connectors must pass the static heating test.
The maximum acceptable temperature rise when tested with UL specified currents is 50 deg. C.
Table A below shows the UL specified test current and maximum design limit currents utilized in CPSES design for different conductor sizes.
TABLE A UL Static Heating CPSES Maximum Specified Test Design Current-Amp Limit Conductor Size UL 486A UL 486C Current-Amo
- 12 AWG 35~
35 24.6
- 10 AWG 50 50 29.6
- 8 AWG 70 70 41.9 i
- 6 AWG 95 95 55.5
- 4 AWG 125 73.2
- 2 AWG 170 104.6
- 2/0AWG 265 164.2 223.7
CPSES/FSAR From Table A above, it can be seen that the UL specified test currents which can produce a maximum 50 deg. C connector temperature rise are 132 to 171 percent higher than the maximum CPSES design limit currents. The IEEE 323 qualification test for AMP preinsulated splice connectors has shown a maximum temperature rise of 37.7 deg. C during the post-radiation and LOCA static heating test with UL specified test currents.
Therefore the connector temperature rise for CPSES will be much less than 40 deg. C., which is th'e design limit temperature rise for CPSES cables.
All insulating materials applied at the splices (i.e., Raychem WCSF and -52, and AMP Kynar materials) have a demonstrated 40
~
year qualified life at 90 deg. C operating temperature, which is minimum rated insulation temperature of CPSES cables.
Therefore, ~1t is concluded that the conducting material of the splices, which operate at a lower temperature than the conductor, are not hot spots which can degrade the insulating materials.
d.
Attribute: Aging of splice insulating materials.
Discussion: The insulation materials utilized for uninsulated connectors arz Rhychen WCSF or -52 material. The AMP l
preinsulated splice connectors have PVF2 Kynar insulation. All splices are made using material manufacturers' procedures.
The manufacturers have qualified the splice configurations (recommended in their procedures) per requirements of IEEE Standard 323, 383 and Gibbs & Hill procurement specification (2323-ES-100). The splices were thermally aged to simulate a 40 year installed life' using Arrhenius methodology. The DBE testings included vibration and LOCA exposure. The qualification tests have demonstrated that all splices are 8A-10
CPSES/FSAR capable of performing their required functions throughout their 40 year qualified life and during Design Basis Events of seismic, radiation exposure, LOCA and post-LOCA conditions.
Therefore, aging of the splices will not create a weak link in the cable run.
l e.
Attribute: Mechanical integrity.
Discussion:
Splicing wire connectors (in-line butt type or parallel connectors)- or wire connectors (bolted back to back solid tongue (with hole (s)) type lugs) are used for making splice connections. The connectors are crimped on the cable conductors by using manufacturer's certified compression tools.
Bolted joints are torqued to the values specified in Constructor's Procedure No. EEI-8. The splicing wire connections are capable of withstanding the UL 486C pull-out test requirements and the wire connections (bolted tongue connections) are capable of withstanding the UL 486A pull-out test requirements. Additionally, splices at terminations can only be made after the cables are pulled. Thus, pulling stresses which have potential to degrade the splices are eliminated. Hence, mechanical integrity of CPSES splices will not be degraded during or after installation.
5.0 Su-ary and Conclusion It has been shown that the splice materials, tools, qualification, drawings, training and installation procedures used at CPSES are designed to ensure that all splices made will be of high quality.
Limited use of. splices in raceways in the CPSES design does not compromise independence of redundant Class IE trains nor significantly increase the likelihood of fire. As such, splices, as applied, do not pose any undue hazard nor do they introduce weak links in the cable i
f I
CPSES/FSAR run and they can be expected to function at least as good as the continuous cable in which they are installed. Therefore, CPSES design meets the intent of the Regulatory Guide 1.75, Regulatory Position C.9.
._.