Semantic search
| Entered date | Event description | |
|---|---|---|
| ENS 48010 | 11 June 2012 03:56:00 | On June 11, 2012, at approximately 0335 hours, the Hope Creek Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system was removed from service to perform planned maintenance to the system. The maintenance consists of a 12-year preventative maintenance overhaul of the ventilation supply fan and emergency filtration unit. The removal of ventilation potentially affects the TSC habitability during a declared emergency requiring activation. Appropriate compensatory measures are in place while ventilation is out of service. The Emergency Response Organization duty team has been notified of the maintenance and the possible need to activate the TSC in an alternate location. The ventilation system is scheduled to be out of service for approximately 60 hours. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The local township will be notified.
The planned maintenance was completed and the TSC ventilation was returned to an operable status as of 0245 EDT on June 13, 2012. The TSC was not activated during the planned maintenance. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (DeFrancisco). |
| ENS 47556 | 29 December 2011 02:00:00 | At 2209 EST on 12/28/11 following a planned station service water (SSW) pump swap, a motor operated valve (MOV) failed to close in a water treatment system for the SSW pump that was secured. This was discovered shortly after the pump was removed from service by the field operators. The control room was notified at 2230 EST of the issue and ongoing efforts to troubleshoot and correct the malfunction. The release was terminated by closing a manual isolation valve at 2240 EST. This malfunction resulted in the discharge of approximately 17 gallons of 15% sodium hypochlorite (product) to the idle SSW pump intake which communicates with the Delaware river, The idle SSW pump was restarted at 2240 EST thus withdrawing all residual product from the intake and directing it to plant treatment systems (dechlorination on the cooling tower outfall). A sample was obtained from the Delaware river just outside the intake structure and there was no detectable chlorine in the sample and there were no abnormal conditions noted on the river. Based on Environmental Licensing review, this is reportable to the state of NJDEP (New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection) within 2 hours. The report to the state was initiated at 0017 EST on 12/29/11. The HC Senior NRC Resident has been informed. Affected systems are limited to the Station Service Water (SSW) system and the Sodium Hypochlorite water treatment system. There were no actuations or initiating signals. There was no impact on plant operations and these systems remain fully operable. The failure was limited to the MOV which has been isolated via a manual valve. There was nothing unusual or not understood. All safety related equipment continues to function as required. There were no injuries or reported wildlife impact. |
| ENS 45560 | 10 December 2009 16:37:00 | A mechanical maintenance employee died this afternoon from an apparent heart attack. The individual was not actively working at the time and lost consciousness in a shop area. The individual was treated by onsite EMT's who administered CPR and AED (automatic external defibrillator). The death was not the result of any industrial safety issue and did not occur in a contaminated area. He was transported via ambulance to Salem Memorial hospital where he was pronounced dead. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and local authorities in Lower Alloway Creek Township. |
| ENS 45048 | 8 May 2009 15:26:00 | At 0817, 4 of the 5 ball valves associated with the Traversing Incore Probe (TIP) system were discovered to be open. In conjunction with explosive shear valves located on each line, these ball valves function to isolate the primary containment upon the receipt of a containment isolation signal. Further investigation revealed that the associated TIP detectors were in the drywell at the indexer. With the TIP detectors in the drywell the detector cable is passing through the ball valves and this condition renders the valves inoperable. This condition had existed for approximately 48hrs and was due to improper shutdown of the system on May 5, 2009. This is a violation of technical specification 3.6.3 and resulted in a condition which would have prevented the automatic safety function of the TIP system to control the release of radioactive material during an accident. The explosive shear valves are manually actuated per Operations abnormal procedures should a ball valve not close during accident conditions and remained operable throughout the time the ball valves were impaired. At 0937 the TIP detectors were withdrawn to their chamber shields, the ball valves closed and declared operable. This event was limited to the TIP system and its associated containment penetrations. Plant operation was not affected. Investigation is in progress and will be entered into the station's corrective action program. There was nothing unusual or not understood. All safety related equipment and systems are operable. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R1DO(Caruso). |
| ENS 45016 | 23 April 2009 16:23:00 | At 0910 during planned testing of the 10A401 vital bus, an unplanned momentary loss of power was experienced when testing the fast transfer function. A delay of approximately 1 second was experienced when forcing a fast transfer (simulating a transformer lockout via the 86 device) from the alternate to the normal 4KV bus infeeds. This condition resulted in an initiation of the 'A' channel LOP sequencer (ELS) as a direct result of bus under voltage and is considered valid ESF actuation. All other equipment operated as expected that was available for service. The bus de-energized for <1 second and restored power automatically from the bus normal infeed. No major loads were lost. The channel is currently inoperable for planned maintenance and is not required per tech specs. Prior to the transient, the reactor was shut down, in operational condition 5, with all control rods fully inserted, and the reactor cavity flooded and communicating with the spent fuel pool. All other 'A' and 'C' channel equipment, including the 'A' and 'C' emergency diesel generators are inoperable for maintenance. Decay heat is being removed by the 'B' loop of residual heat removal operating in the shutdown cooling mode. No personnel were injured. The licensee is conducting an investigation to understand the response and cause. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the township.
During a subsequent review of the event, it has been determined that this was not a valid actuation of one of the systems listed in 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B). The original report was made based on the event being an actuation of (8) Emergency AC electrical power systems, including: emergency diesel generators (EDGs); hydroelectric facilities used in lieu of EDGs at the Oconee Station; and BWR dedicated Division 3 EDGs'. The Hope Creek (HC) Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) �8.3.1.1.2 states that there are three potential power sources for the Class 1E AC power system: (a) normal power source, (b) alternate power source and (c) dedicated standby diesel generator (SDG). The HC UFSAR �8.3.1.1.3 lists the components of the 'Standby Power System' (Emergency AC Power System). The ELS is not one of the components listed. Additionally, the sequence of events did not complete the required logic to actuate a start of the EDG. Since no EDG actuation signal was generated, this was neither a valid nor invalid actuation of a system listed in 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B) and is not reportable. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R1DO (Caruso). |
| ENS 45046 | 7 May 2009 13:09:00 | This telephone notification, instead of a written LER is provided in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(1), to report an invalid actuation reportable under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). On 4/13/2009, during troubleshooting activities for a control room annunciator power supply problem, a 'D' channel LOCA Level 1 Isolation Logic relay trip occurred when the relay power supply was de-energized and then re-energized. De-energization of the relays caused the 'D' Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) to auto start, the 'B' Control Room Emergency Filtration System to auto start and the 'D' Safety Auxiliaries Cooling System pump to auto start. The other components of this logic system were properly removed from service and did not actuate. This is classified as an 'invalid' actuation reportable under 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). The logic system actuation was due to a human performance error and not the plant conditions. At the time, the plant was in Operational Condition 5 with the reactor cavity flooded and 'A' RHR system in shutdown cooling. In accordance with the existing plant conditions, all actions that should have occurred for this actuation did occur; no other initiations or actuations were noted. This event was entered into the HCGS (Hope Creek Generating Station) corrective action program. There was no radiological release associated with this event. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this report. |
| ENS 44894 | 6 March 2009 17:06:00 | At 1440 a gasoline spill occurred while filling a company vehicle from a mobile gasoline truck. The auto-fill valve failed to shut off immediately when the gas tank was full and sprayed / spilled a small quantity (< 1 gallon) of gasoline on the ground. The spill was immediately terminated. This gasoline travelled to the nearest storm drain via water from melting snow. The Operations department was notified at 1445. Initial investigation revealed that the next storm drain in line to the river from the affected storm drain had significant water flow through it from the melting snow and no sheen was observed. There was also no oil sheen visible in the Delaware River. Based on the available indications, a 15 minute report to the State of New Jersey was completed at 1458 in accordance with the Hope Creek Event Classification Guide. The National Response Center was also notified at 1600. Spill recovery actions are in progress and expected to complete before the end of the day. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. Plant operation was unaffected, no safety systems were impacted. |
| ENS 44240 | 25 May 2008 09:50:00 | At 1835 on 5/24/08 CD482 inverter main power fuse failed. This inverter powers various vital ECCS channel 'C' analog instrumentation (including 'C' channel EDG start circuitry). The inverter transferred to the alternate AC power supply as designed with no abnormal plant response or transient. The main power fuse was replaced and attempts were made to place the inverter section back in service and return the inverter to the normal power supply. Logic card checks were performed as part of the normal restoration process prior to transferring to the inverter normal output. These checks could not be completed satisfactorily and indicate that there is an abnormal condition in the inverter section. The inverter, while on alternate AC, is not operable per technical specifications (TS) due to the loss of alternate AC on a LOOP/LOCA, which would prevent the 'C' EDG from starting. Additional safety related equipment that is unavailable include the 'D' Station Service Water Pump for a scheduled maintenance window. All other safety equipment is operable and functioned as required. No personnel were injured. Unit shutdown commenced at 0930 on 5/25/08 in accordance with TS 3.8.3.1. The unit is required to be in hot shutdown by 1435. This four-hour report is bring made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee will notify a local government agency.
The inverter logic power supply has been replaced, and the inverter has been tested satisfactorily. The inverter has been declared operable, and the licensee exited the technical specification required shutdown at 1217. Power ascension is in progress. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector, and the Lower Alloways Creek Township. Notified R1DO(Gray) |
| ENS 44163 | 24 April 2008 03:15:00 | At 2340 on 4/23/08 a leak was discovered on a house heating steam boiler that was secured and cooling down. The boiler had been secured at 1930 and there was no leakage noticed at that time. The leak was estimated at 2 gallons per minute. At 2358 it was discovered that this water had reached a storm drain on site. The water contained hydrazine at a concentration of 364 ppb. A 15 minute notification to the state of New Jersey was completed at 0012 in accordance with the plant's Event Classification Guide. Maintenance personnel called to the scene stopped the leak at 0019. Samples are in progress of the sites storm drain outfalls to determine the extent of the discharge. This report is made in accordance with RAL #11.8.2.a. The licensee will notify local township. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 43922 | 21 January 2008 12:26:00 | A supplemental employee associated with the Salem Steam Generator Replacement Project died this morning from an apparent heart attack. The death was not the result of any industrial safety issue and did not occur in a contaminated area. The individual was treated by the onsite EMI's who administered CPR and AED (automatic external defibrillator). He was transported via ambulance to Salem Memorial hospital where he was pronounced dead. This is considered to be a common report for both Salem and Hope Creek Generating Stations. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 40172 | 19 September 2003 00:37:00 | Due to the effects of severe weather related to Hurricane Isabel, local power outages have resulted in an excessive number of sirens within the Salem/Hope Creek 10-mile Emergency Protection Zone (EPZ) being unavailable. At 21:11 on September 18, 2003, 29 offsite sirens were unavailable (22 in Delaware and 7 located in New Jersey). As of 22:11, some sirens have been restored, but there are still 14 unavailable in Delaware and 7 unavailable in New Jersey. It is likely that the functionality of the EPZ sirens will continue to change due to the ongoing severe weather. Sirens will be recovered when power is restored. This notification is being for both Salem Generating Station and Hope Creek Generating Station pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a major loss of emergency assessment, offsite response, or communication capability. Salem Units 1 and 2 are operating at 100% power with all safety related equipment operable. Hope Creek is operating at 94% power with all safety related equipment operable. Power is reduced due to the degraded performance of the non-safety related ventilation system that cools the Reactor Recirculation Pump Motor-Generator Sets. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
There are currently 11 unavailable sirens within the Salem/Hope Creek 10-mile Emergency Preparedness Zone (EPZ) (6 in New Jersey and 5 in Delaware). The current availability of sirens no longer constitutes a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communication capability pursuant to 10C'FR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). It is anticipated that all sirens will be rendered available as power is restored and storm recovery actions are completed. No further updates to this event report will be provided. The NRC Resident Inspector was informed. |