ENS 45016
ENS Event | |
|---|---|
13:10 Apr 23, 2009 | |
| Title | Actuation of Auto Load Sequencer During Fast Bus Transfer Testing |
| Event Description | {{#Wiki_filter:At 0910 during planned testing of the 10A401 vital bus, an unplanned momentary loss of power was experienced when testing the fast transfer function. A delay of approximately 1 second was experienced when forcing a fast transfer (simulating a transformer lockout via the 86 device) from the alternate to the normal 4KV bus infeeds. This condition resulted in an initiation of the 'A' channel LOP sequencer (ELS) as a direct result of bus under voltage and is considered valid ESF actuation. All other equipment operated as expected that was available for service.
The bus de-energized for <1 second and restored power automatically from the bus normal infeed. No major loads were lost. The channel is currently inoperable for planned maintenance and is not required per tech specs. Prior to the transient, the reactor was shut down, in operational condition 5, with all control rods fully inserted, and the reactor cavity flooded and communicating with the spent fuel pool. All other 'A' and 'C' channel equipment, including the 'A' and 'C' emergency diesel generators are inoperable for maintenance. Decay heat is being removed by the 'B' loop of residual heat removal operating in the shutdown cooling mode. No personnel were injured. The licensee is conducting an investigation to understand the response and cause. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the township.
During a subsequent review of the event, it has been determined that this was not a valid actuation of one of the systems listed in 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B). The original report was made based on the event being an actuation of (8) Emergency AC electrical power systems, including: emergency diesel generators (EDGs); hydroelectric facilities used in lieu of EDGs at the Oconee Station; and BWR dedicated Division 3 EDGs'. The Hope Creek (HC) Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) �8.3.1.1.2 states that there are three potential power sources for the Class 1E AC power system: (a) normal power source, (b) alternate power source and (c) dedicated standby diesel generator (SDG). The HC UFSAR �8.3.1.1.3 lists the components of the 'Standby Power System' (Emergency AC Power System). The ELS is not one of the components listed. Additionally, the sequence of events did not complete the required logic to actuate a start of the EDG. Since no EDG actuation signal was generated, this was neither a valid nor invalid actuation of a system listed in 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B) and is not reportable. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R1DO (Caruso). }} |
| Where | |
|---|---|
Hope Creek  New Jersey (NRC Region 1) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+3.22 h0.134 days <br />0.0192 weeks <br />0.00441 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Tom Fowler 16:23 Apr 23, 2009 |
| NRC Officer: | Karl Diederich |
| Last Updated: | May 7, 2009 |
| 45016 - NRC Website
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WEEKMONTHYEARENS 541982019-08-03T23:47:0003 August 2019 23:47:00
[Table view]10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation Manual Reactor Trip and Manual Actuation of Reactor Core Isolation Cooling ENS 523472016-11-05T08:04:0005 November 2016 08:04:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation Valid Actuation of Rps While Reactor Shutdown ENS 496082013-12-05T08:25:0005 December 2013 08:25:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation Automatic Reactor Scram Following Turbine Trip on High Moisture Separator Level ENS 491082013-06-12T17:33:00012 June 2013 17:33:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation Circulating Water Pump Trip Leads to Reactor Scram ENS 450162009-04-23T13:10:00023 April 2009 13:10:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation Actuation of Auto Load Sequencer During Fast Bus Transfer Testing ENS 437532007-10-29T02:03:00029 October 2007 02:03:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation Refuel Floor Exhaust Hi-Hi Radiation Alarms During Reactor Reassembly ENS 433952007-05-29T12:35:00029 May 2007 12:35:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation - ECCS Discharge Manual Reactor Scram Due to Loss of Feed Pumps After Electrical Transient ENS 411102004-10-11T01:53:00011 October 2004 01:53:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation a Rps Actuation Signal Occurred Due to Low Reactor Water Level While in Mode 3 ENS 411092004-10-10T22:14:00010 October 2004 22:14:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation - ECCS Discharge Manual Reactor Scram Due to a Steam Leak in the Turbine Building ENS 410942004-10-05T17:34:0005 October 2004 17:34:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation Inadvertent Undervoltage Condition Initated Diesel Load Sequencer, Etc. Diesel Did Not Start. ENS 403782003-12-06T04:49:0006 December 2003 04:49:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation a Level 3 Low Reactor Water Level Was Reached During a Reactor Water Level Transient 2019-08-03T23:47:00 | |