Semantic search
| Entered date | Event description | |
|---|---|---|
| ENS 56724 | 7 September 2023 10:01:00 | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On September 6 at 15:00 CDT, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station personnel identified a bottle of vanilla extract in a kitchen area located within the Protected Area. Ingredients were listed as 'pure vanilla extract in water and alcohol. The percentage by volume of alcohol was not specified. It was subsequently determined that the alcohol by volume was likely 35 percent. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56263 | 7 December 2022 11:02:00 | The following information was provided by the Nebraska Dept. of Health and Human Services via email: The licensee discovered two tritium exit signs were lost. The exit signs are Isolite model SLX60 containing 7.5 Ci of tritium (H-3) each. This is being reported under 10 CFR 20.2202(a)(1)(i). Nebraska Incident No.: NE220006 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pd |
| ENS 55724 | 2 February 2022 13:25:00 | The following was received via email from the Massachusetts Radiation Control Program: Atlas ATC of East Hartford, Connecticut (ATC) reported on February 2, 2022, that a Protec LPA-1 x-ray fluorescence instrument, serial number 1331, containing a cobalt-57 sealed source of up to 12 millicuries, was mistakenly transported by an employee from their East Hartford, Connecticut storage location to an asbestos work site, on February 1, 2022, located in Springfield, Massachusetts and that the instrument is missing. ATC explained that the instrument was mistakenly transported to and not used at the Springfield, Massachusetts site because the site work was for asbestos analysis and not for lead paint analysis, and however may have somehow become missing at or near the Springfield, Massachusetts site, and that they will be searching the site for the missing instrument. ATC further explained that they thought that the instrument may somehow be registered with state of Connecticut and however that they were not familiar with any general or specific license that may have been issued by U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission regarding use or storage of the instrument, containing cobalt-57, in Connecticut. The reporting requirement is a 30-day telephone report and is of 105 CMR 120.281(A)(2), stolen, lost, or missing licensed radioactive materials in aggregate quantity equal to or greater than 10 times quantity specified in 105 CMR 120.297, Appendix C. The Agency considers this event to be open. This event has been reported by the licensee as EN 55760. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| ENS 52625 | 20 March 2017 10:17:00 | On March 20, 2017 at 0813 EDT, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 operations personnel manually tripped the plant from approximately 91 percent power based on lowering steam generator levels. Prior to the plant trip, the 2A Hotwell pump tripped at 0758 EDT and the 2C Condensate Booster Pump subsequently tripped at 0802 EDT. Operations personnel commenced to lower plant power after the 2A Hotwell pump trip in an attempt to maintain steam generator levels, but were unable to recover level and manually tripped the unit. All control rods fully inserted and all automatically actuated safety related equipment operated as designed. At 0905 EDT, operations personnel exited the emergency operating instructions after the plant was stabilized. The cause of the event is under investigation. This event is reportable to the NRC within four hours under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) as a result of the actuation of the Reactor Protection System and in eight hours under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as a result of actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater system. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 51347 | 26 August 2015 13:20:00 | On 8/26/2015, it was determined that a report to the NRC under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) may have been missed. The station is making this report due to the station making a courtesy call to a State agency regarding release of radioactive waste from the site as non-radioactive material. The original event involved a release of 14 bags of debris from the Administration Building roof prior to survey results being obtained. The bags were recovered from the local landfill and a determination was made that the amount of material temporarily removed from the Protected Area was below NRC reporting limits per 10 CFR 20.2201 'Reports of theft or loss of licensed material.' On 5/29/13 a courtesy phone call was made to the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (Radiation Control Program) informing the authority of the event. There were no state notification requirements based on the low level of licensed material released (and then recovered) from the site. This is a four hour report made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) as 'Any event or situation, related to the health and safety of the public or on-site personnel, or protection of environment, for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made.' There was no overexposure to a member of the public. The NRC Resident and State of Nebraska have been informed. |
| ENS 51346 | 26 August 2015 10:08:00 | The following report was received from the State of Alabama Department of Public Health Office of Radiation Control via fax: On August 25, 2015, Sam Price, Environmental Health & Safety for Nucor Steel, Birmingham, Alabama notified the Office of Radiation Control that a load of scrap received from Covington, Georgia had set off radiation monitors and was reading 11.0 mR/hr and had been identified as Cs-137. Representatives from the Office of Radiation Control investigated the load and confirmed all measurements that were previously taken. The load was segregated and a single fixed type gauge was discovered in the load. The gauge contained only an unreadable general license label which was still attached. No other labels or markings were identified. The shutter appeared intact, but partially open. The gauge has been secured in place and is awaiting pick-up by an appropriate driver being provided by the scrap metal dealer in Covington, Georgia. The State of Georgia has been notified of the incident. As of today (August 26, 2015), 8:45 a.m. CDT, the gauge remains secure in place at Nucor Steel, Birmingham, Alabama. Alabama Incident 15-38 |
| ENS 51136 | 7 June 2015 12:03:00 | The following was received via phone and fax: On June 7, 2015, at 0735 CDT, the Unit 2 Reactor automatically tripped while operating at 100 percent power due to an automatic Turbine trip due to low bearing oil pressure. The crew entered the reactor trip emergency operating procedure and stabilized the unit in Mode 3 at normal operating pressure and temperature. All control rods fully inserted into the core following the trip. All safety functions operated as designed. The automatic Reactor trip is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The Auxiliary Feedwater System actuated to start the Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps as designed on low narrow range Steam Generator level and provided makeup flow to the Steam Generators. The Auxiliary Feedwater actuation is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). Steam Generator levels have been returned to normal. Auxiliary Feedwater has been secured. Steam Generators are being supplied by (the) 22 Main Feedwater Pump and decay heat is being removed by the condenser steam dump system. The cause of the Turbine trip remains under investigation. There was no effect on Unit 1 as a result of this trip. The health and safety of the public and site personnel were not at risk at any time during this event. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 51133 | 6 June 2015 17:22:00 | The following was received via fax and phone: This telephone notification is provided in accordance with Exelon Reportabllity manual SAF 1.1 0, 'Major Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities', and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). On June 6th 2015 at 12:13 (CDT), it was determined that the onsite Technical Support Center (TSC) Ventilation System Supply Fan belts had failed, resulting in loss of ventilation for the facility. Repairs were not completed within the time required had the TSC needed to be staffed. There is currently no emergency event in progress requiring TSC staffing. If an emergency is declared and the TSC ERO activation is required, the TSC will be staffed and activated unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperatures, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC staff becomes necessary, the Station Emergency Director will relocate the staff to an alternate TSC location in accordance with applicable site procedures. The licensee has notified the Senior Resident Inspector of the issue.
After repairs were completed, the TSC ventilation was restored to service at 2300 (EDT) on 06/06/2015. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Passehl) via email |
| ENS 51129 | 5 June 2015 18:12:00 | The following is an excerpt of communication received via fax: Summary: Engine Systems Inc. (ESI) began a 10CFR21 evaluation on 04/13/15 upon discovery that governor control panels shipped to Brunswick Nuclear Plant contained an incorrect part number relay. The evaluation was concluded on 06/05/15 and it was determined that this issue is a reportable defect as defined by 10CFR Part 21. Under certain adverse conditions, a panel with the incorrect part number relay may lose power thereby resulting in inoperability of the electronic control portion of the control system. This could prevent the emergency diesel generator set from performing its safety-related function during an emergency event. Discussion: The relay in question is the Governor Control At Setpoint (GCASP) relay installed in the governor control panel assembly P/N 8002096-PANEL. The panel provides speed control functions for the emergency diesel generator (EDG). In the original panel design the part number specified was 219XBX282NE. During the course of EMC testing, it was determined that the EMI suppression diode within in the GCASP relay must be removed in order for the EUT to comply with the requirements of (International Electrotechnical Commission) IEC 61000-4-5. When the diode was installed and the negative polarity portion of surge testing forward biased the diode, this resulted in a short circuit connection between the supply and return conductors of the control panel's power. This caused the fuses designed to protect the panel from overcurrent conditions to fail open; resulting in a loss of power to the control panel. In place of the EMI suppression diode, a (Metal Oxide Varistor) MOV (P/N V150LA10AP) was added across terminals 6 & 7 of the GCASP relay socket. The MOV provides similar EMI suppression to the removed diode and responds appropriately to either polarity of surge waveform. The MOV is external to the relay and is considered a separate component. The MOV is not affected by this notification. Removal of the internal EMI suppression diode for the GCASP relay resulted in a part number change. The relay part number that should have been installed is P/N 219XBX283NE. The part number of the relay actually installed was P/N 219XBX282NE. The difference between the two relays is that P/N 219XBX282NE contains an internal suppression diode whereas 219XBX283NE does not. Impact on Operability: During normal operating conditions, the EDG will perform its safety related function with the incorrect GCASP relay installed in the governor control panel. Both relays provide the same switching function. However, if a negative polarity surge similar to the requirements of IEC 61000-4-5 were to occur on the 125 VDC bus with the incorrect relay installed, the control panel may lose power. The 27GP relay would de-energize, alerting plant personnel of an under-voltage condition within the governor control panel. The EDG would remain operable on the mechanical governor though the electronic control portion would be inoperable. Root cause evaluation: An error by a technician in conjunction with a lapse in oversight allowed this problem to occur. Contributing to the issue was that only one digit differentiates the two part number relays and both have the same overall appearance (size, shape, case style, etc). Evaluation of previous shipments: This issue only affects one part number (qty 4) supplied on one customer purchase order. Corrective Action: The customer was advised of the situation via letter 'Notice of GCASP Relay Discrepancy - Governor Control Panel' sent on 04/15/15. The correct relays were then supplied to the customer as dedicated, safety-related replacements on ESI IWO 8002474 (Brunswick PO 00786240) for installation in the panels. There are four panels affected, each containing one of these relays. ESI supplied four replacement relays which were (Certificate of Conformance) C-of-C'd and shipped on 04/17/15. These are plug-in style relays and to replace the relay only requires pulling out the old relay and plugging in the new relay. No special tools or instructions are necessary. |
| ENS 51128 | 5 June 2015 14:19:00 | The following was received via phone call and email: This 60-day report, as allowed by 10CFR 50.73(a)(1), is being made pursuant to 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an unplanned, invalid actuation of containment isolation valves. At 1930 EDT on May 24, 2015, a loss of power to Reactor Protection System (RPS) Train B occurred. Initial investigation found the RPS Motor Generator (MG) Set B not running, with its Motor Off light illuminated caused by both Normal EPA breakers and MG Set B output breaker being tripped. Visual inspection at the distribution cabinet was inconclusive at the time and revealed no abnormalities and no abnormal odors in the area. Further investigation of the RPS MG Set B verified normal voltages on all fuse clips, and all power and control power fuses were operational. As a result of the loss of RPS B, the following containment isolation valves closures occurred: Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) Outboard Isolation valves, Torus Water Management System (TWMS) Outboard Isolation valves, Division 2 Drywell Pneumatics Inboard and Outboard Isolation valves, Primary Containment Radiation Monitoring System Inboard and Outboard Isolation valves, Reactor Recirculation Pump Seal Purge Flow Outboard Isolation valves, and Drywell Floor and Equipment Drain Sump Inboard Isolation Valves. The Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 51132 | 5 June 2015 18:47:00 | The following is an excerpt of a report that was received via email: This letter provides information concerning an evaluation performed by Thermo Gamma-Metrics LLC, a part of Thermo Fisher Scientific, regarding potential noncompliance of our dual uncompensated ion chamber power range detector. Based upon the evaluation, Thermo Gamma-Metrics has determined that a Reportable Condition under 10 CFR Part 21 exists for plant listed herein. The information contained in this document informs the NRC of the conclusions and recommendations derived from Thermo Gamma-Metrics' preliminary evaluation of this issue. An evaluation (was) performed by Thermo Gamma-Metrics LLC, a part of Thermo Fisher Scientific, regarding potential noncompliance of our dual uncompensated ion chamber power range detector. Based upon the evaluation, Thermo Gamma-Metrics has determined that a Reportable Condition under 10 CFR Part 21 exists for (Palisades). The information contained in this document informs the NRC of the conclusions and recommendations derived from Thermo Gamma-Metrics' preliminary evaluation of this issue. The detector in question is in storage at Entergy Palisades and has not yet been installed in their Power Range Systems per discussion with (the System Engineer at Palisades). A potential defect has been identified by Mirion IST. Thermo Gamma-Metrics cannot determine by itself if the potential defect would represent a substantial safety hazard to Entergy Palisades if installed in a safety related application. We supplied just one potentially defective part from (Mirion) IST to Palisades. (Mirion) IST may have supplied two other potentially defective parts to other vendors per discussions with (Mirion IST.) The immediate corrective action is for Thermo Gamma-Metrics to notify Entergy and the NRC of this potential defect. Thermo Gamma-Metrics notified Entergy Palisades on June 2, 2015. Thermo Gamma-Metrics will supply a final report on this issue by July 2, 2015 that details the plan for all corrective actions. Entergy Palisades should review the letter from Mirion IST. Thermo Gamma-Metrics will help the utility to address and remedy the situation before the power range detector is installed in the power plant.
The following is an excerpt of a report that was received via email: This letter provides information concerning an evaluation performed by Thermo Gamma-Metrics LLC, a part of Thermo Fisher Scientific, regarding noncompliance of our dual uncompensated ion chamber power range detector. Based upon the evaluation, Thermo Gamma-Metrics has determined that a Reportable Condition under 10 CFR Part 21 exists for plant listed herein. The information contained in this document informs the NRC of the conclusions and recommendations derived from Thermo Gamma-Metrics' evaluation of this issue. Report Notification Information (i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission. Robert E. Barnes Technical Service Manager (858)449-2909 cell Clark J. Artaud Global Commercial Director Jeffery S. Tuetken Senior Electrical Engineer Thermo Gamma-Metrics LLC 10010 Mesa Rim Road San Diego, CA 92121 (ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility which fails to comply or contains a defect. The detector in question is in storage at Entergy Palisades and has not yet been installed in their Power Range Systems per discussion with the System Engineer, Mr. Michael Knapp at Palisades. (iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect. Mirion IST Horseheads, New York (iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply. A potential defect has been identified by Mirion IST as described in . . . (a letter) dated March 3, 2015. Entergy Palisades has determined that the potential defect would represent a substantial safety hazard if installed in a safety related application and is returning the detector to Thermo Fisher Scientific for repair on Returned Material Authorization #950. Thermo Fisher will return the dual ion chamber to Mirion IST for repair and recertification. (v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained. March 3, 2015 (vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part. We supplied just one potentially defective part from IST to Palisades. IST may have supplied two other potentially defective parts to other vendors per discussions with Eric Brand at Mirion IST. (vii) The corrective action, which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action. The immediate corrective action is for Thermo Gamma-Metrics to notify Entergy and the NRC of this potential defect. Thermo Gamma-Metrics notified Entergy Palisades on June 2, 2015 . . . Thermo Gamma-Metrics will work with Mirion IST to verify the presence or absence of the potential defect in this dual ion chamber and repair the dual ion chamber before returning it to Entergy Palisades, as soon as repairs can be arranged and expected no later than the end of 2015. (viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees. Entergy Palisades has reviewed the letter from Mirion IST and is seeking reparations. Thermo Gamma-Metrics and Mirion IST will help the utility to address and remedy the situation before the power range detector is installed in the power plant. (ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred. Not applicable - this is not an early site permit concern. Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Rob Barnes Technical Service Manager, Thermo Gamma-Metrics LLC, at (858) 882-1356. Notified R3DO (Kozak) and PART 21/50.55 REACTORS (email). |
| ENS 50592 | 4 November 2014 10:41:00 | The following was received from the State of Texas via email: On November 3, 2014, the Agency was notified by the licensee's Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) that one of his crews was unable to retract a 34.9 curie cobalt-60 source into a QSA Global 680A exposure device. The crew was performing radiography at a field site (in Houston, TX) using a magnetic stand to support the guide tube and collimator. The stand fell on the guide tube crimping the guide tube in two places about one inch apart. The radiographer attempted to retract the source, but it would not go past the crimped section of the guide tube. The radiographer returned the source to the collimator. One of the radiographers contacted the site RSO(SRSO). A recovery team was sent to the location to retrieve the source. The team slid a steel plate below the collimator. The guide tube was pulled to free the collimator from its holder causing it to drop onto the steel plate. The collimator was approached from the shielded side and using a pair of tongs, the collimator was rolled to face the outlet port towards the steel plate. Six bags of lead shot were placed on the collimator. The dose rate at the crimped section of the guide tube was then measured at 200 millirem per hour. Additional bags of lead shot were placed on the collimator. The licensee's first attempt to remove the crimps in the guide tube using channel locks was unsuccessful. The licensee then removed the outer coating on the guide tube in the areas the tube was crimped and then used channel locks to remove the crimps. This was successful and the source was returned to the fully shielded position. The highest exposure to any individual involved in the event was seven millirem. The licensee reported no exposures were received to members of the general public due to this event. The guide tube was taken out of service. The exposure device and crankout device were inspected and returned to service. The source was leak tested, but the results have not been received. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300. Texas Incident #: I-9250 |
| ENS 49762 | 24 January 2014 10:56:00 | The following was received via fax from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania: Notifications: Licensee reported this event to the Department's (Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection) Southeast Regional Office on January 23, 2014. This is an immediate reporting event under 35.3045(a)(1)(i). Event Description: On January 22, 2014, the licensee experienced a medical event in which 76% of a yttrium-90 (Y -90) TheraSphere liver cancer therapy dose was delivered to the patient. Both the patient and referring physician were notified of the under dose. Cause of the Event: Occlusion. The remaining activity appeared to have precipitated out and remained in the catheter. Actions: Awaiting the required 15 day written report from the licensee. The Department will provide updated information as received. Media attention: None at this time. Event number: PA140005 A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient. |
| ENS 49715 | 11 January 2014 13:24:00 | On January 10, 2014, at 0919 CST, the plant voluntarily entered multiple required action statements in Technical Specifications 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System Instrumentation and 3.3.2 Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System to conduct surveillance testing of the B-train Solid State Protection System (SSPS). During testing, abnormal indications were received. As a result of the abnormal indications, the SSPS has not been returned to operable status within the required completion time of 24 hours. At 1100 CST on January 11, 2014, Unit 2 commenced a plant shutdown required by technical specifications and will be in Mode 3 by 1519. Therefore, this is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), plant shutdown required by technical specifications. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 49713 | 10 January 2014 20:11:00 | The licensee declared a Notice of an Unusual Event per EAL HU2.2 "Explosion with Protected Area Boundary" following an apparent fault and explosion on the M29 transformer (a non-safety related transformer). This resulted in a loss of one electrical bus at the ocean discharge station; however, no safety-related electrical loads were effected and both units remained at 100 percent electrical power. Station personnel reported that there was no smoke in the area of the M29 transformer and the event may have been a flashover explosion in the area of the transformer. All safety systems remain available. Licensee is investigating the cause of the explosion, and no offsite assistance was required. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector, the State of North Carolina, and other local authorities. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, NICC Watch Officer, and NuclearSSA via e-mail.
Notification of an Unusual Event is being terminated (at 2320 EST) because the condition no longer exists. The source of the apparent explosion was a failed insulator on a breaker and is known to present no danger to public health and safety. Both Units are stable and a recovery organization is in place. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector regarding the termination of the event. Notified R2DO (Hopper), NRR EO (Lubinski), IRD Manager (Gott), DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, NICC Watch Officer, and Nuclear SSA via e-mail. |
| ENS 49708 | 10 January 2014 00:27:00 | At 2234 hours EST on 01/09/2014, with the unit in Mode 1 at 100% power, an automatic reactor trip occurred. At the time of the event, Steam Generator Water level Protection Channel Testing was in progress. While testing was in progress with the 'C' Steam Generator Channel 1 Water Level Protection channel in trip for testing, a Turbine Trip occurred. The cause of the Turbine Trip is under investigation. The (Turbine Driven and Motor Driven) Auxiliary Feedwater System automatically actuated, as expected due to low steam generator water level, and provided feedwater to the steam generators. The pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs) and the Main Steam Safety Valves did not open during the event. All control rods indicated fully inserted following the reactor trip. Currently, the unit is stable in Hot Standby (Mode 3). This event is being reported as a 4 hour Non-Emergency per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) due to the valid Reactor Protection System Actuation. This event is being reported as an 8 hour Non-Emergency per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) due to the valid actuation of Auxiliary Feedwater System. At no time during this occurrence was the public or plant staff at risk as a result of this event. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. State and local authorities will be notified. Estimated restart date is 1/12/2014 |
| ENS 49707 | 9 January 2014 18:56:00 | On January 9, 2014 St. Lucie Unit 1 declared an Unusual Event based on a severe rain storm, a natural occurrence affecting the Protected Area. Specifically, visual sightings by station personnel that water levels are approaching storm drain system capacity. Countermeasures are being deployed and are currently operating satisfactorily. Both units continue to operate at full power. All safety systems remain available. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector, state, and other local authorities. Notified R2DO (Hopper), NRR EO (Lubinski) and IRD. Notified DHS SWO, DOE Ops Center, FEMA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, NICC Watch Officer, and Nuclear SSA via email.
On January 10, 2014 at 0001 EST, St. Lucie Unit 1 terminated an Unusual Event. Site storm drain system functioning as required. Severe weather has passed, site water levels have returned to normal. Notified R2DO (Hopper), NRR EO (Lubinski) and IRD. Notified DHS SWO, DOE Ops Center, FEMA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, NICC Watch Officer, and Nuclear SSA via email. |
| ENS 49705 | 9 January 2014 15:29:00 | A review of industry operating experience regarding the impact of unfused (safety-related) direct current ammeter circuits in the main control room has determined the described condition (having the ammeters installed) to be applicable to River Bend Station, resulting in a potentially unanalyzed condition with respect to 10 CFR 50 Appendix R analysis requirements. River Bend Station does have unfused ammeter leads. This normally is not a concern, since two failures are required to cause the problem described in the document referenced above; an ammeter lead must short to ground, and another lead of the opposite polarity must also short to ground. Either of these events by itself will set an alarm, but not cause equipment damage. This allows for locating and repairing the problem before the second failure occurs. However, during a fire, there is a greater chance that these two failures could happen simultaneously, or before a single failure can be repaired. This condition is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Interim compensatory measures have been implemented. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 49543 | 16 November 2013 17:53:00 | At 10:19:02 (CST) on November 16, 2013, indication was received in the Control Room that two Secondary Containment doors, in one access opening, were open simultaneously. The interlock mechanism preventing both doors from operating simultaneously did not operate as expected. A worker was staged in the interlock to operate the doors as an interim action while a modification to prevent additional failures was being developed. The worker reported that while opening the reactor building side door the Turbine Building side door opened several inches. Both doors were immediately closed and the interlock was removed from use. Secondary Containment differential pressure remained within Technical Specification required values during the short time both doors were open. This condition represents a failure to meet Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.2. As a result, entry into Technical Specification 3.6.4.1 Condition A was made momentarily due to Secondary Containment being inoperable. The doors were secured at 10:19:07 (CST) and Secondary Containment was declared Operable. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 49538 | 14 November 2013 16:03:00 | On November 14, 2013, at 1313 Eastern Standard Time, Unit 1 was manually tripped from 100% power due to indications of (four) dropped control rods. This manual reactor protection system actuation is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The cause of the dropped rods is not confirmed at this time, but may be related to maintenance in a Rod Control Power Cabinet ongoing at the time of the event. The Operations crew entered the reactor trip procedure and stabilized Unit 1 in Mode 3 at normal operating temperature and pressure. All control rods fully inserted into the core following the reactor trip and all plant systems operated as designed. The Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) system (1A and 1B motor-driven pumps) was manually started for steam generator level control following reactor trip. The start of the AFW system is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A) for a valid system actuation. Decay heat is being removed via the steam generators (via steam dumps to the main condenser). This event does not impact public health and safety. Unit 2 was not affected by this event. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
A subsequent licensee evaluation determined that there were ten dropped control rods. Notified the R1DO (Desai). |
| ENS 49536 | 14 November 2013 14:57:00 | On November 14, 2013 at 1218 EST, Unit 2 was manually tripped due to a lowering 2B Steam Generator level caused by the spurious closure of 2B Main Feedwater Isolation Valve HCV-09-2A. All CEAs (Control Element Assemblies) fully inserted into the core. All safety systems responded as expected with the 2B Train Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation System Channel 2 (AFAS 2) actuating on low 2B Steam Generator level. Decay Heat Removal is from Main Feedwater to the 2A Steam Generator and Auxiliary Feedwater to the 2B Steam Generator with Steam Bypass to the Main Condenser. This event is reportable pursuant to 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for the Reactor Trip and 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for the AFAS 2 actuation. The plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup. No safeties or relief valves lifted during this event. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified by the licensee. |
| ENS 49540 | 14 November 2013 17:49:00 | The following was received via email from the Washington Dept. of Health, Office of Radiation Protection: Tuesday, November 12, 2013, I (State of WA) received a call from the Radiation Safety Officer of the University of Washington. He informed me that his staff was unable to account for 3.3 mCi of C-14 and 7 mCi of H-3, the sum of several vials (unsealed sources used for research), when reconciling the inventory of an AUI (Authorized Investigator) after he died. The AUI had a radioactive materials authorization at the university for well over 20 years. A staff member investigated the problem and interviewed current and previous laboratory staff in an effort to find the documentation of disposition of the missing material. This is believed to be a paperwork/failure to document issue with no actual loss or release. It will be discussed at their next Radiation Safety Committee meeting which the state will attend on 26 November 2013. The licensee will provide us with a full report by then. It is the C-14 which exceeds the reporting activities. State incident number WA-13-056 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| ENS 49228 | 31 July 2013 11:40:00 | This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or the operation of the facility. At 0510 (EDT) on July 31, 2013, preplanned maintenance commenced which affects the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation and radiation monitoring systems. The scope of the maintenance is to inspect and perform functional checks on various TSC ventilation system fans and the outside air intake radiation monitor. This maintenance is scheduled to be performed and completed within approximately 20 hours. TSC functionality requires all occupied areas of the TSC be maintained between 60.8 degrees F and 82.4 degrees F. Actual TSC temperatures have been verified to be less than 78 degrees F. If an emergency should occur, the ventilation system will be restored, but potentially not within the time required for activation of the TSC. If the facility were activated with full staff, temperatures could rise above the 82.4 degree F limit. Consideration will be given to relocating the TSC to the alternate emergency facility in accordance with PEP-240. The alternate TSC has been verified to have electrical power, ventilation, and communication capability. The Technical Support Center - Site Emergency Coordinator has been notified. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Preplanned maintenance was completed at 1540 EDT on 7/31/13. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (King). |
| ENS 49224 | 30 July 2013 10:49:00 | The following report was received from the State of Colorado via fax: The Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment received notification on the evening of 7/29/13 from ThruBit LLC, Colorado License Number 1179-01, that a 1.78 Ci Cs-137 well logging source fell out of a logging tool at a well site in Colorado and was not recovered until the following morning. Details are as follows: On Sunday 7/28, the well-logging crew finished operations at the well site and removed the logging tool from the well around noon. Apparently, the Cs-137 source fell out of the logging tool while it was being returned to the logging truck. Seventeen hours later, the logging crew discovered the source was missing and returned to the well-site and retrieved the source, which was found on the ground. ThruBit's RSO and Department inspectors are on their way to the well-site to conduct an investigation and assess potential exposures. No other details are available at this time. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf Note: This device is assigned an IAEA Category 3 value based on the actual radioactivity of the source, not on the device type. (Reference IAEA RG-G-1.9) |
| ENS 49111 | 13 June 2013 16:26:00 | On June 13, 2013, the licensee notified the Agency (State of Texas) that after completing maintenance on cables on Hoppers that one of the retest was to operate shutters on all nuclear gauges. The failures were identified on June 12, 2013. Eight gauge shutters failed to operate. The shutters are on Thermo Fisher Model #5197 gauges each containing 100 mCi of Cesium-137. The licensee stated that open is the normal operating position for the shutter and the gauge does not pose an exposure risk to any individual. The sources are not accessible to the general public or workers in the area. The licensee stated that a service provider will most likely remove and possible replace the gauges. The gauges have been in operation for approximately 30 years. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA 300. Texas Incident # I-9091 |
| ENS 49104 | 11 June 2013 10:59:00 | The State of Kansas was notified by the licensee that on 6/9/2013, personnel dosimetry indicated that one assistant radiographer had received a potential overexposure, and two other assistant radiographers had received potential elevated exposure. The licensee reported that the dosimetry had been stored improperly and in close proximity to a location where a source change out had occurred. Corrective actions taken by the licensee include establishment of a controlled dosimetry storage location and additional training of personnel on the use of dosimetry. The individual with the potential overexposure was removed from radiography duties and given alternate work assignments. All three individuals were notified of the dosimetry readings. The dosimeter readings were 5.046 rem, 1.133 rem and 0.633 rem.
The following information was obtained from the State of Kansas via fax: Based on the last dosimetry report (received by the licensee), several employees have received a high dose. The reported doses are Employee 1 - 5046 mR, Employee 2 - 1133 mR, and Employee 3 - 633 mR. The three employees are radiographers assistants acting under one of the 4 licensed radiographers. The three radiographers assistants never worked together on any single job. The only common denominator between the three assistants is that their film badges were stored in the same general area. The licensed radiographers that were assigned to them received no such high dose rates. The three assistants also did not have any off-scale readings from dosimetry nor did they report any unusual incidences. All three also stated they did not believe that they could possibly have received an unusually high dose during that time period based on dosimetry, rate alarm, and survey meter readings. Upon further investigation, it was discovered that the three were leaving their film badges in their (work) uniforms in a controlled area within the shop between shifts. During this time period, radiographic operations were conducted at the shop facility. Additionally, there was a source change conducted by two radiographers in the controlled area of the shop during this time. During times these employees were not working, their (work) uniforms would have been located in the controlled area allowing their badges to be exposed during radiographic operations. In conclusion, there are two possible explanations for the substantial increases in exposure to the three assistants badges. Conclusion one would be that excessive heat and humidity played a role in the increased readings found with the badges. Conclusion two would involve film badges in close proximity to the area where radiographic operations were being conducted with the individuals assigned to those badges being absent at the time, therefore creating an erroneous reading leading to the obvious assumption that the badges alone were exposed, not the individuals associated with these badges being exposed. Corrective action taken at this time: Badges will be stored in the office, (with the proper controls in place) when not being worn. Retraining (was) conducted on the physical properties of the film badge and how badges become exposed through various means. Based on the reading of employee 1's badge, he will not be involved in radiographic operations nor be allowed in the controlled areas near radiation in the shop until a full investigation is completed. The State of Kansas is still investigating this event. Kansas Case No.: KS130005 Notified R4DO (Walker) and FSME Events Resource via email. |
| ENS 49107 | 12 June 2013 09:58:00 | The following information was received from the State of Tennessee via email: On June 11, 2013, RbM Services, LLC contacted the (Tennessee) Division of Radiological Health to report that on May 29, 2013, 6 Bracco Diagnostics Inc. Rubidium Generators (Sr-82/Sr-85 Solid Strontium Mixture) were shipped to Los Alamos National Labs in Los Alamos, NM via Common Carrier. On May 31, 2013, it was discovered that two of the shipments of generators (78.78 mCi of Sr-85 and 49.37 mCi of Sr-85) had not arrived in Los Alamos. The tracking numbers showed the 2 shipments were still in Memphis, TN. On June 3, 2013, (the) Common Carrier's tracking update via phone stated the 2 shipments were enroute to Los Alamo's zip code. On June 4th, after learning the shipment had not been delivered, RbM contacted (the) Common Carrier and Bracco, the manufacturer of the generators. As of June 5th, (the) Common Carrier informed RbM that an extensive search for the packages was being made and a trace had been placed on the shipment. On June 6th, RbM contacted (the) Common Carrier and instructed them to contact Los Alamos National Labs to see if the shipment was delivered; Los Alamos confirmed those 2 shipments had not arrived. On June 10th, (the) Common Carrier did not have any additional information and advised RbM to contact their regulatory authority (Tennessee Division of Radiological Health). Event Report ID No. TN-13-104 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |