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Start date | Title | Description | Topic | |
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ENS 56829 | 2 November 2023 12:15:00 | False Negative and Positive on Blind Performance Sample | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On November 2, 2023, at 0715 CDT, it was discovered that the results of a blind performance specimen provided to a Health & Human Services (HHS)-certified testing facility were not as expected. The blind specimen results indicated a false negative for MDA/MDMA and a false positive for amphetamines. Investigation is ongoing to determine if the results are accurate. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 26.719(c)(2) and 10 CFR 26.719(c)(3). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified by the licensee."
Follow-up investigation by an independent Health and Human Services laboratory confirmed that the blind specimen in question was analyzed correctly. The error is thought to have occurred during the preparation of the blind specimen, prior to delivery to the site. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified by the licensee. Notified R3DO (Orlikowski) and FFD Group (email). | Blind Performance Test |
ENS 50396 | 24 August 2014 05:00:00 | Technical Specification Required Shutdown Due to Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Out of Service | At 0039 (CDT) on 8/19/14, Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 identified that 2TE-451A and 2TE-451C Cold Leg Temperature RTDs were out of service. Technical Specification 3.3.3, Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation, Action Condition C for one or more functions with two required channels inoperable was entered. Action Condition C requires one channel to be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. If completion time in Action Condition C cannot be met, Action Condition D will be entered, which requires entry into Action Condition E. Action Condition E would require Unit 2 to be in Mode 3 in 6 hours and Mode 4 in 12 hours thereafter. Unit 2 is being shut down to effect repairs within the 7 day required action completion time for Action Condition C. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), Plant Shutdown Required by Technical Specifications. The Resident Inspector has been informed.
Point Beach is retracting EN# 50396 made on August 24, 2014 at 0323 EDT. Technical Specification 3.3.3. Post-Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation, Action Condition C for one or more functions with two required channels inoperable was entered. Action Condition C requires one channel to be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. The Unit 2 TE-451A and TE-451C Cold Leg Temperature RTDs inoperable condition was corrected and the plant returned to power before expiration of the 7 day period specified in Condition C of Technical Specification 3.3.3. Reference example (3) Failure that was or could have been corrected before shutdown was required, of Section 3.2.1, Plant Shutdown Required by Technical Specifications of NUREG-1022, Rev. 3, Event Report Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (McCraw). | Post Accident Monitoring |
ENS 50262 | 8 July 2014 05:24:00 | Unit 2 Spray Addition Declared Inoperable Due to Tank Indication Greater than 67% | At 0024 CDT on 7/8/2014, Unit 2 Spray Addition was declared inoperable and LCO 3.6.7 (Spray Additive System) not being met, which resulted in a condition reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The inoperability was caused by Unit 2 Sodium Hydroxide Tank level indication greater than 67%, at 67.5%. This exceeds a current Prompt Operability Determination compensatory action requirement stating 'level shall be maintained no higher than 67%.' At 0104 CDT on 7/8/2014, Unit 2 Sodium Hydroxide Tank level was restored to an acceptable level, less than 67%. TSAC 3.6.7B was exited and LCO 3.6.7 met. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
Point Beach is retracting EN# 50262 made on July 8, 2014 at 0628 CDT. The Operability Determination for this condition has been revised based upon engineering analysis. The event notification is being retracted based upon the subsequent Operability Determination revision that shows the NaOH Injection System was capable of performing its safety function at an observed Spray Additive Tank level of no higher than 77.2 percent. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Lipa). | Operability Determination |
ENS 48402 | 12 October 2012 09:20:00 | Reactor Power Exceeded Fsar Analyzed Value | On 10/12/12 at 0420 CDT the Unit 2 Steam Generator B Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve (ADV) spuriously opened while in automatic control. This resulted in indicated reactor power exceeding the FSAR analyzed value of 1810.8 MWt. Prompt operator action was taken and reactor power was restored to within limits in approximately four minutes. The operators placed the Atmospheric Steam Dump Controller to manual and closed the ADV successfully. This event is being reported under the criteria in 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(B). All other plant systems responded as expected. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
This notification is being made to retract Event Notification EN #48402 which reported power exceeding the FSAR analyzed value of 1810.8 MWt due to a spurious opening of an Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve. While 1810.8 MWt is the normal PBNP (Point Beach Nuclear Plant) full power value without consideration to uncertainties, subsequent reviews show that the peak power level reached during the event was bounded by FSAR analyzed events. Additionally, the opening of the valve is an Anticipated Operational Occurrence, described and analyzed in the FSAR. The power excursion during the event was below excursions evaluated in the FSAR. The event was analyzed and plant safety was not significantly degraded. Therefore, the event does not meet the criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3) and NextEra Energy Point Beach retracts Event Notification EN #48402. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R3DO (Pelke). | Anticipated operational occurrence |
ENS 47863 | 26 April 2012 02:06:00 | Alert Declared Due to Toxic Gas Build Up Following an Emergency Diesel Generator Test Run | On April 25, 2012 at 2106 CDT, Point Beach Nuclear Plant declared an Alert under EAL HA3.1 due to toxic gas in a vital area. During a maintenance run on the plant's emergency diesel generator, diesel exhaust caused the concentration of carbon monoxide in an adjacent vital area room (Plant Instrument Air Compressor Room) to exceed OSHA IDLH (Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health) levels. The diesel was immediately secured and the room was ventilated. There were no personnel injuries and no public health and safety issues associated with this event. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA, USDA, DOE, DHS NICC, HHS AND EPA.
The Alert at Point Beach was terminated at 2314 CDT on 04/25/12. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Lara), NRR EO (Lubinski), IRD (Scott via email only). Notified DHS SWO, FEMA, USDA, DOE, DHS NICC, HHS, EPA, and Nuclear SSA (email only).
On April 25, 2012, at 2106 CDT, Point Beach Nuclear Plant declared an Alert under EAL HA3.1 (EN #47863) due to toxic gas in a vital area. During a maintenance run on the plant's emergency diesel generator, diesel exhaust caused the concentration of carbon monoxide in an adjacent vital area room (Plant Instrument Air Compressor Room) to exceed OSHA IDLH (Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health) levels. The diesel was immediately secured and the room was ventilated. There were no personnel injuries and no public health and safety issues associated with this event. This retraction is based on the fact that station personnel incorrectly used an Alert trigger value for toxic gas concentration that was well below the actual value which would pose an immediate danger to life and health. In a subsequent evaluation, NextEra concluded that the station used the carbon monoxide (CO) OSHA limits (OSHA Permissible Exposure Limit 8-hour time weighted average of 50 ppm to 200 ppm short term exposure limit) that are normally monitored for confined spaces. The recommended CO limit value of 1200 ppm was determined to be the correct IDLH for the plant air compressor room, the actual reading in the room was 124 ppm. The plant air compressor room is not a confined space, and is not required to be monitored to the same limits as a confined space. Therefore, the Emergency Notification made on April 25, 2012, documenting an Alert due to toxic gas in a vital area is retracted. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R3DO (Kunowski). | |
ENS 43040 | 9 December 2006 00:12:00 | Crefs System Inoperable | Control Room Emergency Filtration System (CREFS) was declared inoperable at 1812 on 12/8/06 because the W-14A, F-16 Control Room Charcoal Filter Fan tripped during performance of the monthly technical specification surveillance test, TS-9. This fan is required to be operable for operability of the CREFS System. This condition is covered by TS 3.7.9, Control Room Emergency Filtration System and both units have entered action condition A, 'CREFS Inoperable' with a required action to 'Restore CREFS to OPERABLE Status' with a completion time of 7 days. CREFS is a single train system. Based on the guidance in NUREG-1022 for single train systems that perform safety functions, this condition was determined to be reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v), 'Event or Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function'.
On December 8, 2006, at 22.42 EST, EN 43040 was made by the Point Beach Nuclear Plant in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of a system function that is needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Control Room Emergency Filtration System (CREFS) fan W-1 4A, F-16 Control Room Charcoal Filter Fan tripped during performance of the monthly Technical Specification surveillance test. CREFS was declared inoperable. After further evaluation, it was determined that the safety function of CREFS was not lost. Redundant fan W-14B was operable for the duration of the time fan W-14A was out of service. Single train portions of the system were not affected by the W-1 4A fan trip. Accordingly, this event is not reportable. EN 43040 is, therefore, retracted. Notified R2DO (Burgess) | Time of Discovery |
ENS 42109 | 2 November 2005 05:00:00 | Tech Spec Required Shutdown Due to Degradation of Containment Coatings | On November 2, 2005 at approximately 00:00 Central Standard Time (CST), Point Beach Nuclear Plant (PBNP) Unit 2 commenced a reactor shutdown required by Technical Specification 3.0.3. During a review of the containment coatings in both Unit 1 & 2 containments, it was discovered that the containments have not been maintained with the analysis of record performed by Sergeant and Lundy (S&L). The S&L analysis performed for Unit 2 was based on the known condition of coatings when the analysis was performed. There was no explicit margin for further degradation. Subsequent discoveries of degraded or unqualified coatings cannot be accommodated by the existing analysis as written. An Operability Recommendation (OPR) was performed for Unit 2 and approved on 10/30/05 at 2000. Following this OPR, a further review of containment coatings in the Unit 2 containment was performed and showed a potential for approximately 11 square feet of unqualified coatings (in) the Zone of Influence (ZOI) for the containment sump. The OPR allowed for a maximum of 5.68 square feet of loose material in the ZOI. A Unit 2 containment walk-down was performed on the evening of November 1, 2005. This revealed that the unqualified coatings in the ZOI were approximately 11 square feet. This information placed Unit 2 in an unanalyzed condition, which lead the operators to enter Technical Specification 3.0.3 at 2300 on November 1 due to both trains of Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) being declared inoperable for sump recirculation capability. Actions are currently underway to remove enough unqualified coatings to be within the assumptions made in the OPR and restore Containment Sump recirculation capability. When this is completed, the technical specification shutdown will be terminated, and Unit 2 will make preparations to return to full power. Unit 1 is currently in Mode 5 and ECCS is not required. However, the condition is also applicable to Unit 1 containment. Actions have been underway since the identification of the original issue to remove unqualified containment coatings. The Plant Manager has placed a hold on entering Mode 4 on Unit 1 pending completion of corrective actions. Presently there are 2 workers and a Radiation Protection technician inside containment. The licensee said that workers will go inside containment and remove the degraded coating. This will take approximately 45 minutes and have a total exposure to personnel of 85 millirem. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
At 01:06 CST the licensee exited from Technical Specification 3.0.3. requirements and plans to hold power on Unit 2 at 97% power pending further assessment and evaluation. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R3DO (Kozak).
On November 2, 2005, at 01:13 (ET) PBNP submitted Emergency Notification #42109, to report a TS required shutdown due to potential of an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety and an event or condition that potentially could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. The condition related to the discovery of degraded containment coatings in the zone of influence (ZOI) for the containment sump. A subsequent evaluation concluded that the degraded coatings would not have significantly affected sump recirculation flow capability. Additionally, the zone of influence was identified to be approximately one-third that assumed for the design-basis calculation. Based on the conservatism in the sump blockage analysis, the degraded coatings in the Unit 2 containment within the original ZOI did not affect the conclusion that equipment needed for accident mitigation would have operated as designed. Therefore, the Emergency Notification made on November 2, 2005, documenting that this condition created the potential of an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety, and potentially could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function, is retracted. The Technical Specification required shutdown is also retracted. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (H. Peterson). | Unanalyzed Condition Coatings |