Semantic search
| Start date | Reporting criterion | Title | Event description | System | LER | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ENS 57079 | 15 February 2024 05:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21(a)(2), Interim Report for Comply or Defect in Component | Initial Part 21 Report - Potential Defect with Circuit Breaker | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: Pursuant to 10CFR 21.21 (a)(2), Paragon Energy Solutions, LLC is providing this interim notification of ongoing analysis for Part 21 reportability of a potential defect with a Schneider Electric Medium Voltage VR Type Circuit Breaker Part Number V5D4133Y000. On February 15, 2024, Paragon completed initial documentation of a potential defect with the subject circuit breaker in which Duke-Oconee had identified failure to close on demand or delayed operation to close with extended application of the remote closing signal. Since the primary safety function of the circuit breaker is to close and maintain continuity of power to downstream loads, failure to close could potentially contribute to a substantial safety hazard. This is the first reported instance of this failure mode, and Paragon suspects the issue to be related to aging of the circuit breaker's lubrication. Paragon requires more time to complete testing and analysis to confirm the failure mode and determine reportability. Date when evaluation is expected to be complete: 5/03/2024. Affected licensee: Oconee. Paragon is currently evaluating the extent of condition as it pertains to other plants and equipment that may utilize the same or similar circuit breakers.
Due to inconclusive results, the completion date of the testing is revised to 05/31/2024. Notified R2DO (Miller) and Part 21/50.55 Reactors (email).
The following is a synopsis of the updated information received: The only known affected licensee is Oconee. Paragon is evaluating if the issue pertains to other equipment or plants. Paragon has conducted additional testing with the original equipment manufacturer, Schneider Electric, but will require more time to complete their evaluation. Evaluation is expected to be complete by 6/30/2024. Other circuit breaker types that may be affected are: 5GSB2-250-1200 (uses KVR type element) 5GSB2-350-1200 (uses KVR type element) 5GSB3-350-1200 (uses KVR type element) 5GSB3-350-2000 (uses KVR type element) Paragon recommends licensees with the breaker types listed above monitor for failure to close on demand or delayed. If any improper operation is found, report it to Paragon for evaluation. Contact Information: Richard Knott Vice President Quality Assurance Paragon Energy Solutions 817-284-0077 rknott@paragones.com Notified R2DO (Franke) and Part 21/50.55 Reactors (email).
The following is a synopsis of the updated information received: Paragon Energy Solutions has provided a new expected date for completion of their evaluation: 7/28/2024. The only known affected licensee remains Oconee. Notified R2DO (Suggs) and Part 21/50.55 Reactors (email). | ||
| ENS 56653 | 3 August 2023 00:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Failure to Comply or Defect 10 CFR 21.21(a)(2), Interim Report for Comply or Defect in Component | Initial Part 21 Report - Defect with Eaton/Cutler Hammer Size 4 and 5 Freedom Series Contactors | The following information was provided by Paragon Energy Solutions, LLC via email: Pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Paragon Energy Solutions, LLC is providing this initial notification of a potential defect with Eaton/Cutler Hammer size 4 and 5 freedom series contactors that have been modified to include either a special coil and/or to improve the securing of shading coils. These contactors may have been supplied integral to a motor control center (MCC) cubicle or as spare parts. This condition, if left uncorrected, could potentially cause a substantial safety hazard. Paragon completed an initial evaluation of a failure of a size 4 freedom series contactor (PN: NLI-CN15NN3A-T16-MOD-M) supplied to Perry Nuclear Power Plant. The reported failure occurred 26 days following installation into its associated MCC Cubicle. Perry identified the screws holding the contact bar to the push bars had fallen out and were laying in the bottom of the molded base. This allowed the movable contact bar to sit on the stationary contacts and significantly degrade due to arcing and then fail in the energized position. This condition could prevent the contactor from performing its safety function to either energize or de-energize the attached load. The loose hardware is most likely a workmanship error since the contactor must be disassembled to complete the special coil and RTV modifications to the shading coils. In the fully re-assembled condition, inspection of this hardware for tightness is not possible. Affected plants: North Anna, Turkey Point, Harris, and Perry.
Paragon Energy Solutions submitted their final report in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(d)(4). Paragon reported completion of corrective actions including revising the test inspection procedure to ensure hardware tightness during contactor reassembly, identifying all projects containing the affected contactors and verifying appropriate inspections have been completed, restricted use of test inspection procedures issued prior to 8/2/2023 until a formal review is completed, and issued a technical bulletin (TB-Starter-2023-01 Rev 0) for use by affected clients. Paragon recommends affected licensees perform the steps contained in Technical Bulletin TB-Starter-2023-01 Rev 0 to verify this condition is not present as part of their next routine maintenance outage associated with the affected in use equipment, and at the earliest opportunity for stock spares. Affected plants: North Anna, Turkey Point, Harris, and Perry. Notified R2DO ( Miller), R3DO (Skokowski), and Part 21/50.55 Group via email. | ||
| ENS 56557 | 5 April 2023 04:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21(a)(2), Interim Report for Comply or Defect in Component | Part 21 - Relay Card Potential Defect | The following information summary was provided by the licensee via email: On April 5th, 2023, Duke Catawba Nuclear Station informed Paragon of a failure of a Trane External Auto/Stop and Emergency Stop relay card (Part Number: X13650728-06) in a chiller control system. Analysis of the failed relay card identified minor delamination and water intrusion of the microcontroller chip. Ongoing evaluation is expected to be completed by 7/15/23. Potential plants affected: Nine Mile Point, Catawba, River Bend, McGuire. | ||
| ENS 55162 | 30 March 2021 21:50:00 | 10 CFR 21.21(a)(2), Interim Report for Comply or Defect in Component | Part 21 - Failure of Size 1 and 2 Freedom Series Fvr Starters | The following is a summary of information received from Paragon Energy Solutions: North Anna Station has identified instances where Size 1 and 2 starters have failed to function as expected in assemblies that were originally supplied by NLI. The Mechanical Interlock exhibited binding that prevented the contactor to close when energized. The identified starters are utilized in an application of operating Motor Operated Valves. Date of Discovery: 3/29/2021 Formal notification will be submitted on or before 4/29/2021. Affected plants: North Anna Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact: Tracy Bolt Chief Nuclear Officer Paragon Energy Solutions 817-284-0077 tbolt@paragones.com | ||
| ENS 53002 | 6 October 2017 04:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21(a)(2), Interim Report for Comply or Defect in Component | Part 21 Interim Report - Switch with Unacceptable Chatter | The following information is excerpted from a report received via email: Seismic qualification testing revealed contact block (CB) chatter greater than 2 milliseconds (msec) contrary to the acceptance requirements of the seismic test procedure developed for the activity. This switch has not been provided to the customer, however, a second suspect switch with a similar configuration and parts is installed in the customer's facility. The condition is isolated to when OT2A CBs are configured in an alternating Normally Open (NO) / Normally Closed or Normally Closed (NC) / Normally Open (NO) arrangement. The CBs do not exhibit chatter when 3 or less CBs are configured this way. The chatter is not exhibited when configured in a NO/NC, NO/NC, configuration. When the fourth CB is added to the switch assembly in an alternating configuration is when the contact chatter exceeds greater than 2 msec. Paragon Engineering has requested TVA Engineering to provide a reduced spectra specific to the installed location for further evaluation. Paragon Engineering has not been able to complete this activity within the 60-day period allowed under 10 CFR 21. One suspect switch has been provided to and installed at the customer's facility. The customer's facility is TVA - Watts Bar Unit 2.
The following is an excerpt from the final Part 21 report received via email: Paragon ES (Energy Solutions) successfully completed qualification of a seismic specimen to the originally provided spectra using older vintage contact blocks. A reduced response spectra was requested from the licensee to verify that this condition did not present a substantial safety hazard for the existing installed switch. The licensee alternatively completed an evaluation of the condition and determined a substantial safety hazard did not exist. Notified R2DO (Blamey) and Part 21 Reactors Group via email. |