Semantic search
Start date | Reporting criterion | Title | Event description | System | LER | |
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ENS 49544 | 17 November 2013 20:17:00 | Other Unspec Reqmnt 10 CFR 76.120(a)(4) | Alert Due to Storm Damage on Site | On 11/17/13, at 1417 CST, an alert was declared at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant due to an apparent tornado strike/severe weather event. Multiple facilities were damaged with no injuries and no hazardous material released. No damage to the security fence was observed and the protected area remained secured during the event. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 76.120(a)(4) where an emergency condition has been declared an Alert. NRC Branch Chief has been notified. PGDP has no NRC Resident Inspector. PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2013-08. Notified DHS, FEMA, USDA, HHS, DOE, NICC, EPA, and Nuclear SSA via email.
On 11 /17/13, at 1638 CST, the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant decided to issue press releases describing the Alert issued by the plant that afternoon. The Alert was declared due to an apparent tornado strike/severe weather event on 11/17/13 at 1417 CST. This event is reportable under Criteria P in Appendix D of USEC procedure CP2-RA-RE 1 030 as any event or situation, related to the health and safety of the public or on-site personnel, or protection of the environment, for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made. NRC Branch Chief has been notified. PGDP has no resident inspector. PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2013-08. Notified RA (McCree), NMSS EO (Damon), R2DO (Desai), IRD (Gott), NMSS (Haney), DHS, FEMA, USDA, HHS, DOE, NICC, EPA, and Nuclear SSA via email.
The Alert was terminated at 1806 CST on 11/17/13 after a complete security check of the site perimeter and a compilation of the damages sustained by the site. There were no personnel injuries and no releases (HAZMAT or radiological). Notified RA (McCree), NMSS EO (Damon), R2DO (Desai), IRD (Gott), NMSS (Haney), DHS, FEMA, USDA, HHS, DOE, NICC, EPA, and Nuclear SSA via email. | ||
ENS 49233 | 2 August 2013 14:32:00 | 10 CFR 76.120(c)(1) | Contamination Found in Process Building | While Health Physics (HP) technicians were checking radiological control wrapping in the Uncomplicated Handling (UH) waste storage area on the ground floor of the C-337 Process Building, contamination was discovered on the floor around some valve subassemblies. A Contamination Area (CA) was set up to establish contamination boundaries. Due to the contamination spread, access requirements for the area will be increased for more than 24 hours. Decontamination efforts are underway but will not be completed within 24 hours from the time that radiological controls were increased. This event is reportable as a 24 hour event in accordance with 10 CFR 76.120(c)(1)(i) 'An unplanned contamination event that: requires access to the contaminated area, by workers or the public, to be restricted for more than 24 hours by imposing additional radiological controls or by prohibiting entry into the area'. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. PGDP Problem Report No. ATRC-13-1667: PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2013-06. | ||
ENS 49165 | 28 June 2013 19:09:00 | 10 CFR 76.120(c)(1) | Unplanned Contamination Event That Restricted Access for Greater than 24 Hours | At 1409 hours (CDT) on 6/28/2013, the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified of an unplanned contamination event that occurred in the C-710 Laboratory building. The controller program for the sample cylinder wash system in room #21 failed, causing supply water to flow out of the system. The water leaked through the floor into room B-23, which is located in the basement, and spread contamination onto the floor and a table. The area of the known water leak was immediately posted as a contamination area. Chemical Operations decontaminated the area that was initially contaminated by the water leak at 1730 hours on 6/28/2013. During follow-up investigative surveys conducted by Health Physics, additional contamination was discovered in other areas of the room causing the entire room to be posted as a contamination area (CA). It was initially thought that the additional contamination which was found was legacy contamination unrelated to the water leak; however, based on further investigation and HP survey results (on 7/1/13), it appears that contamination found elsewhere in the room also came from the water leak event. All contamination related to this event was not cleaned up within 24 hours and the room remains restricted at this time. This event is reportable as a 24 hour event in accordance with 10 CFR 76.120(c)(1)(i), 'An unplanned contamination event that: Requires access to the contaminated area, by workers or the public, to be restricted for more than 24 hours by imposing additional radiological controls or by prohibiting entry into the area'. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. Room B-23 remained locked over the weekend and was not accessed by plant personnel so the possibility of spreading contamination was minimized. PGDP Problem Report No. ATRC-13-1468: PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2013-05.
Calculations were performed by the Health Physics group of the estimated quantity of material in the release. The estimate was based on: (1) An isotopic analysis of the contamination revealed three predominant isotopes, all Uranium daughters, Pa-234, Thorium-231, and Thorium-234; (2) the estimated water volume 'released' of 8.0 liters; and (3) that the isotopic concentration in the 8.0 liters of water was homogeneous. Based on the calculations, the summation of the mixture of isotopes was 4.52E2 microcuries and is approximately 30 percent of 5 ALI (annual limit on intake) for the most restrictive isotope, Th-234 (1.5E3 microcuries). Therefore part (ii) of 10 CFR 76.120(c)(1) was not met and reporting is not required. Based on the above information the subject notification should be retracted. This retraction has been discussed with the NRC Senior Resident Inspector. R2DO (Nease) and NMSS EO (Benner) notified. | ||
ENS 48990 | 30 April 2013 18:20:00 | 10 CFR 76.120(c)(1) | Area Access Restricted for More than 24 Hours Due to Increased Radiological Controls | On 04/30/13, while changing the feed from Position 3 East to Position 3 West autoclaves, Operators noticed a pressure spike on the 3 East cylinder to approximately 47 psia. After disconnecting the cylinder in Position 3 East with Health Physics (HP) assistance, HP found a contamination spread on the cylinder, on the grating within the autoclave, and on the autoclave locking ring. Due to the contamination spread, access requirements to the area will be increased for more than 24 hours. Decontamination efforts are underway but will not be completed within 24 hours from the time that radiological controls were increased. This event is reportable as a 24 hour event in accordance with 10 CFR 76.120(c)(1)(i) 'An unplanned contamination event that: Requires access to the contaminated area, by workers or the public, to be restricted for more than 24 hours by imposing additional radiological controls or by prohibiting entry into the area.' The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. | ||
ENS 48680 | 23 December 2012 05:20:00 | Other Unspec Reqmnt | Minor Incidental Uranium Hexafluoride Release | Note this is a late report (1/17/2013). During December 2012, the C-360 Toll Transfer and Sample building experienced three incidents where the Laboratory Process Gas Leak Detection (PGLD) system was actuated. No visible smoke was ever seen. Subsequent bioassay samples of personnel in the area confirmed that minor exposures did occur, although no work restrictions were required. The exposures confirm that the PGLD actuations were due to actual minor incidental uranium hexafluoride releases. Investigation and testing found that the first two incidents were caused by a small pinhole leak in instrument tubing and the third incident was caused by slight leakage around the stem of a small instrument valve. These three events were evaluated for reportability at the time they occurred, but it was determined they did not meet our reporting criteria. However, after further evaluation and discussion with NRC staff, USEC is conservatively reporting the incidents. The actuations occurred on December 22, 23, and 29, 2012. Upon each actuation, the system automatically closed the appropriate valves as designed. Response to each leak consisted of atmospheric sampling for HF and radiological swipes per procedure along with precautionary bioassay samples. The atmospheric sampling and radiological swipes on the first release were negative and the system was returned to service. The second incident the next day was similar to the first and again the immediate samples were negative. Bioassay results were then obtained from the previous night and showed a detectable exposure. With confirmation of a small leak, helium leak detection was utilized to find the small pinhole leak. The third incident was due to slight leakage around a valve stem that was discovered by soap testing the valve and evidence of some visible oxides on the valve stem. These types of releases are incidental and do not have the potential for impact on the health and safety of personnel or the public. These incidents are being conservatively reported as a 24-hour event based on SAR 6.9 Table 1, J.2 as an Unplanned Actuation of a Q Safety System." An automatic or manual actuation of a Q safety system that results from an event or condition that has the potential for significant impact on the health or safety of personnel. Events having the potential for significant Impact are those events where actual plant conditions existed that the system was designed to protect against. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. | ||
ENS 47307 | 30 September 2011 13:10:00 | Other Unspec Reqmnt | Hydraulic Leak Contained on Site- State Officials Notified | |||
ENS 47111 | 31 July 2011 15:30:00 | 10 CFR 76.120(c)(1) | Unplanned Contamination Area | |||
ENS 47099 | 27 July 2011 09:15:00 | Other Unspec Reqmnt 10 CFR 76.120(a)(4) | Alert Declared Due to Onsite Release of Fluorine/Chlorinated Fluorine Gas Mixture | At 0415 CDT while changing out a cylinder of Fluorine/CL3 gas mixture in the C350 building, apparently a gasket failure occurred and an uncontrolled release of the gas mixture began. The licensee estimates that at the time the release began, there was approximately 160 lbs. of material in the cylinder. The release continues at this time. The C350 building was evacuated. There were no personnel injuries as a result of this event. No offsite assistance is being requested by the licensee. The local emergency squad is responding. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The licensee believes, but has not verified at this time, that the gas leak has been stopped. A 'shelter in place' order has been issued for the following buildings: C337, C337a, C360, C335, C635 and C631. Samples exterior to building C350 are negative. Samples interior to building C350 still show residue and fog in the building. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The licensee has verified that the leak has been stopped.
At 0615 CDT, an employee that was involved with the cylinder change-out and response to the event was transported to the onsite medical facility. He was complaining of a burning sensation to his right arm. At 0625 CDT, samples obtained both inside and outside of building C350 were negative. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
At 0631 CDT, the licensee has terminated the Alert. The licensee is controlling access to building C350 for investigation. The licensee has setup a recovery team. As a precautionary measure, a second individual that was involved in the cylinder change-out was also transported to the onsite medical facility. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Blamey), NMSS EO (Habighorst), IRD MOC (Marshall), DHS (Arnold), FEMA (Hollis), DOE (Connally), EPA (Brett), USDA, and HHS (Jones).
On 7/27/11 at 0710 (CDT), the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant decided to issue a press release describing the Alert issued by the plant earlier in the morning. The Alert issued on a chlorine trifluoride (CIF3) release in the C-350 facility was declared on 07/27/11 at 0415 (CDT) and terminated on 07/27/11 at 0631 (CDT). . This event is reportable under Criteria P in Appendix D of USEC procedure UE2-RA-RE1030 as any event or situation, related to the health and safety of the public or on-site personnel, or protection of the environment, for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. Notified R2DO (Blamey), NMSS EO (Habighorst) and PAO (Harrington). | ||
ENS 46487 | 17 December 2010 15:37:00 | Other Unspec Reqmnt | Diesel Fuel Oil Spill Contained on Site - Federal and State Officials Notified | At 0937 CST, 12/17/2010, the Kentucky Emergency Response Team (Report Number 2321984), the Kentucky Department for Environmental Protection, and the National Response Center (Report Number 962502) were notified of the following issue: a diesel fuel oil leak occurred from a pressure indicating line from storage tank located at (Bldg) C-600. The amount of diesel fuel that leaked from the storage tank is greater than the reportable quantity of 75 gallons. The secondary containment drain valve leaked which allowed the diesel fuel to reach the oil containment underflow dam at outfall 008. The diesel fuel is currently contained in the oil containment underflow dam. The effluent from outfall 008 has been tested and does not contain any detectable diesel fuel. Additionally, no visible sheen was observed from the effluent from outfall 008. Cleanup of the diesel fuel is in progress. This event is reportable as 'USEC shall notify NRC of any event or situation, related to the health and safety of the public or on-site personnel, or protection of the environment, for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made. Such an event may include an on-site fatality or inadvertent release of radioactively contaminated materials.' The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2010-13. | Secondary containment | |
ENS 45413 | 4 October 2009 20:00:00 | 10 CFR 76.120(c)(1) | Unplanned Contamination During Startup | On 10/04/2009 at 1500 C-331 unit 2 cell 2 was being charged and placed on stream and had just gone above atmospheric pressure when a Maintenance Mechanic observed smoke coming from the cell instrument cubicle and determined it to be UF6 outleakage from cell process instrumentation. To stop the release the cell was immediately taken back below atmospheric pressure. Investigation revealed that a UF6 release had occurred inside the instrument cubicle. The amount of material released has not yet been determined. Decontamination is underway but has not been completed inside the cabinet. The area outside the cabinet has been decontaminated. No injuries or personnel exposure occurred as a result of this event. This is being reported based on 10 CFR 76.120(c)(1)(i) (unplanned contamination event). PGDP Problem Report Nos. ATRC-09-2435; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2009-016. Responsible Division: Operations PGDP Assessment and Tracking Report No. ATR-09-2435; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2009-16; Worksheet No. Responsible Division: Operations The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. Decontamination is expected to be completed on 10/6/2009.
After further review, it was determined that the amount of contamination was significantly less than five times the lowest annual limit on intake specified in Appendix B to Section 20.1001-20.2402 of 10CFR20 for the material. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Guthrie) and NMSS (Whaley). | ||
ENS 44776 | 15 January 2009 02:39:00 | Other Unspec Reqmnt | Ongoing Recirculating Cooling Water Leak at C337A Facility | The site staffed their Emergency Operations Center to troubleshoot an ongoing recirculating cooling water leak under the concrete floor of the C337A autoclave facility. The process in that facility automatically shutdown and is in a stable condition. Overall impact to the plant is minimal and processes continue to operate in the cascade facility. Offsite assistance has been requested. DOE, Massac County, Illinois and McCracken and Ballard Counties in Kentucky have been notified. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The event was terminated at 0220. The leak is not isolated but has been localized. Notified the R2DO (Rudisail) and NMSS (Davis). | ||
ENS 44744 | 28 December 2008 10:45:00 | Other Unspec Reqmnt | 24 Hour Report - Actuation of Leak Detection System Due to Minor Process Gas Leak | On 12/28/2008 at 0445 the C-337 unit 5 cell 3 PGLD (process gas leak detection) head located on stage 8 actuated. Operators responded to the alarm and performed sampling in the area. The sample result indicated 3 ppm of HF at the stage 8 compressor. To stop the release the cell was taken off-stream and the pressure was reduced to below atmosphere. Investigation indicated that a UF6 release had occurred. The amount of material released has not been determined. The actuated PGLD head is Q safety system component. At the time of the incident the cell was operating in a mode which required the system to be operable. This is being reported based on SAR 6.9 Table 1, J.2 as an Unplanned Actuation of a Q Safety System. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. The licensee states that a compressor seal appears to have failed. The amount of material released is characterized as on the order of a few grams. Material release was only in the vicinity of the compressor. There was nothing unusual or not understood and all systems functioned as required. There was no offsite release or personnel contamination resulted from this event.
A subsequent review by USEC Regulatory Affairs concluded that the UF6 Release Detection System detectors installed 'above the `B' seals on the axial flow compressors' (SAR 3.3.5.9.5), and the detectors for the instrument cubicles do not 'prevent or mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents that could result in a member of the general public located offsite being exposed to EG (Evaluation Guidelines)-1 or EG-2 guideline values' (SAR 4.2.2). Therefore, they do not meet the criteria to be classified as 'Q' (SAR 4.2.2). The safety equipment actuation reporting criteria (SAR 6.9-1 J.2) requires NRC to be notified of actuations of "Q" systems resulting from events that have the potential for significant impact on the health and safety of personnel, which are defined in the criteria as those events where actual plant conditions existed that the system was designed to protect against. Since the referenced UF6 Release Detection System detectors do not meet the criteria to be classified as "Q" and do not protect against a postulated accident that could result in a member of the general public being exposed to EG-1 or EG-2 guideline values, the actuations would not be reportable under this criteria. Summary: - the B-end seal PGLD (Process Head Leak Detector) head is not required to be 'Q' - the postulated release from the B-end seal cavity does not have significant impact on personnel. - A release from the B-end seal cavity is not a condition that the PGLD system is designed to protect against. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event retraction. Notified R2DO (Rudisail) and NMSS (Kotzalas). | ||
ENS 44604 | 27 October 2008 07:39:00 | Other Unspec Reqmnt | Concurrent Notification to Nrc of Pcb Spill | At 1400, on 10/27/2008 CDT, the Plant Shift Superintendent was informed that EPA Region IV and the Kentucky Department of Environmental Protection had been notified of a PCB spill which occurred within the C-333 process building. This event is reportable as 'USEC shall notify NRC of any event or situation, related to the health and safety of the public or on-site personnel, or protection of the environment, for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made. Such an event may include an on-site fatality or inadvertent release of radioactively contaminated materials.' The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. PGDP Problem Report No. ATRC�08�3077: PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2008-032 | ||
ENS 44448 | 28 August 2008 16:43:00 | 10 CFR 76.120(c)(2) Other Unspec Reqmnt | Leak in High Pressure Fire Water System | At 1143, on 8/28/08, the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified of a large water leak on High Pressure Fire Water system (HPFW) A-12 in building C-333 due to a piping rupture. The HPFW system provides water for fire suppression to the plant's process buildings. A-12 is 1 of 66 HPFW systems in this process building. Leak analysis indicates the HPFW system A-12 would not have been able to perform its intended safety function while the leak was occurring. The leak was determined to be between the process building and the post indicating valve (PIV). The PIV for this system was closed which isolated the leak. Required TSR LCO actions have been and are being performed. This is being reported as an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed when the equipment is required by a TSR to be available and operable and either should have been operating or should have operated on demand, and no redundant equipment is available. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.
On 8/29/08, the Kentucky Department of Water (KDOW) was notified that approximately 30,000 gallons of recirculating water (RCW) from the HPFW system containing 4 ppm phosphorus residual was discharged through Outfall 9. RCW discharge to Outfall 9 is reportable to KDOW as a bypass of a treatment system that causes an exceedance of a permit limit per 401 KAR 5:065 Section 1(12)(f). The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. Notified R2DO (Nease) and NMSS EO (Mamish). | ||
ENS 44310 | 21 June 2008 04:25:00 | Other Unspec Reqmnt Part 70 App A (C) | Notification to Kentucky Ert Due to Exceeding Permit Limits at Outfall | At 1750, 6/21/2008 CDT, the Kentucky Emergency Response Team (Report Number 2008-2125) was notified of the following issue. The C-637 RCW (Recirculating Water) 'H' Supply loop was being repaired and a residual RCW leak from the valve vault was being pumped back to the pump house basin when the portable pump shutdown causing an overflow condition at a Commonwealth of Kentucky permitted outfall 002. The Commonwealth of Kentucky's permit limit for the outfall is 1 mg/L for total phosphorus and the chlorine level is to be below detectable limits. Contrary to this, the total phosphorus level was slightly above 1 mg/L and residual chlorine was approximately 0.1to 0.3 mg/L. Control of the RCW leak in the valve vault was re-established. This event is reportable as 'USEC shall notify NRC of any event or situation, related to the health and safety of the public or on-site personnel, or protection of the environment, for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made. Such an event may include an on-site fatality or inadvertent release of radioactively contaminated materials.' The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. PGDP Problem Report No. ATRC-08-1840: PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2008-20: | ||
ENS 43864 | 23 December 2007 09:58:00 | Other Unspec Reqmnt 10 CFR 76.120(c)(1) | Small Uf6 Process Leak | On 12/23/2007 at 0358 the C-333 unit 3 cell 1 PGLD (process gas leak detection) head (YE-5) at stage 5 actuated. Along with the PGLD actuation a seal alarm and a vibration alarm on stage 7 were received. A nearby operator on the cell floor responded to the alarm and observed a small UF6 release from the stage 7A seal cavity. To stop the release the cell was immediately shut down from the ACR which lowered the cell's pressure to below atmospheric pressure. The exact amount of material released has not been determined. Checks by health physics personnel found the actual amount of UF6 released was not significant and resulted in a relatively small area of contamination on the end of the compressor near the seal that failed and on the floor immediately around the end of the compressor. The actuated PGLD head is a Q safety system component. At the time of the incident the cell was operating in a mode which required the system to be operational. This is being reported based on SAR 6.9 Table 1, J2 (unplanned actuation of a Q safety system) and 10 CFR 76.120(c)(1)(i) (unplanned contamination event). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. PGLD Problem Report Nos. ATRC-07-3433; PGLD Event Report No. PAD-2007-022; NRC Event Number 43864 | ||
ENS 43829 | 7 December 2007 02:44:00 | Other Unspec Reqmnt 10 CFR 76.120(c)(1) | Unplanned Safety System Actuation and Contamination Event | On 12/06/2007 at 2042 (CST) C-337 unit 5 cell 5 was being charged and placed on stream and had just gone above atmospheric pressure. At 2044 hours two PGLD (process gas leak detection) heads in the C-337 unit 5 cell 5 actuated and would not clear indicating a potential UF6 release. To stop the release the cell was immediately taken back below atmospheric pressure. Investigation revealed that a UF6 release had occurred causing the PGLD actuation. The amount of material released has not yet been determined. The PGLD heads are Q safety system components. At the time of the incident the cell was operating in a mode which required the system to be operational. This is being reported based on SAR 6.9 Table 1, J2 (unplanned actuation of a Q safety system) and 10 CFR 76.120 (c) (1) (i) (unplanned contamination event). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. There was no release to the environment and no personnel contaminations reported. | ||
ENS 43828 | 6 December 2007 21:50:00 | Other Unspec Reqmnt 10 CFR 76.120(c)(1) | Unplanned Safety System Actuation and Contamination Event | On 12/06/2007 at 1550 (CST) the C-337 unit 5 cell 3 PGLD (process gas leak detection) head in the C-337 unit 5 cell 3 housing actuated and would not clear. Response to the alarm by operators revealed a haze above the cell indicating a UF6 release inside the cell housing. While the operators were responding to the unit 5 Cell 3 alarm, two other PGLD heads actuated in C-337 unit 5 cell 5. To stop the release both cells 3 and 5 were taken below atmospheric pressure. Investigation indicated that a UF6 release had occurred. The amount of material released has not been determined. The actuated PGLD heads are Q safety system components. At the time of the incident the cell was operating in a mode which required the system to be operational. This is being reported based on SAR 6.9 Table 1, J2 (unplanned actuation of a Q safety system) and 10 CFR 76.120 (c) (1) (i) (unplanned contamination event). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. There was no release to the environment and no personnel contaminations reported. | ||
ENS 43787 | 15 November 2007 15:15:00 | Other Unspec Reqmnt | Safety System Actuation Due to Incidental Uf6 Release | On 11/15/2007 at 0915 instrument mechanics were performing a cell datum calibration in the C-333 Unit 4 Cell 2 cell panel when a strong odor assumed to be HF was noticed after the stage 1 high side pressure valve was opened. The 1/4" valve is on a manifold which accesses pressure taps in various locations in the cell. When the odor was detected a UF6 leak detection head located in the cell panel ducting also actuated. The mechanic opening the valve, immediately closed the valve when the odor was detected and they immediately left the area. HF samples taken a few minutes later in the area around the cell panel were all negative. Precautionary urine samples have been taken from the individuals involved and analysis are being run on the samples. It is believed a small incidental UF6 release occurred when the small high side valve was momentarily opened and actuated the UF6 detection system head which is a Q safety system component. At the time of the incident the cell was in operation in a mode which required the system to be operational. This is being reported based on SAR 6.9 Table 1, J2. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. | ||
ENS 43662 | 25 September 2007 05:05:00 | Other Unspec Reqmnt | Leaking Sulfuric Acid Tank | At 2356 CDT, 9/24/2007, the National Response Center was notified (Report Number 849830) of a leaking sulfuric acid tank located at the C-616 facility. At 0005, 9/25/2007 CDT, the Kentucky Emergency Response Team (Report Number 2007-3170) was notified of this same issue. The tank has developed a leak on the bottom and contains approximately 420 gallons of sulfuric acid which is leaking into a concrete containment dike. This containment dike can be valved to a neutralization pit. The amount of the sulfuric acid which has leaked exceeds the reportable quantity. This event is reportable as 'USEC shall notify NRC of any event or situation, related to the health and safety of the public or on-site personnel, or protection of the environment, for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made. Such an event may include an on-site fatality or inadvertent release of radioactively contaminated materials.' The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. PGDP Problem Report No. ATRC-07-2542: PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2007-12 | ||
ENS 43385 | 24 May 2007 13:15:00 | Other Unspec Reqmnt | Offsite Notification Made to Another Government Agency | A required 24-hour notification was made by Paducah Regulatory Affairs to EPA Region IV in Atlanta, GA at 0815, 5-24-2007. The notification was made concerning a PCB spill of greater than the agreed upon action level of 10 pounds of PCBs confined within a building. The approximate 3 gallon PCB oil spill was from an electrical capacitor located inside the C-333 Process Building. The oil spilled onto a concrete floor and was contained to the immediate area. The area was flagged and posted as a PCB spill area and clean up is in progress. This event is reportable as a 4 hour event as required by the NRC NUREG 1022, a specific report made to a government agency. PGDP Assessment and Tracking Report No. ATR-07-1362; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2007-06; Worksheet No. 43385. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. | ||
ENS 42144 | 15 November 2005 19:30:00 | Other Unspec Reqmnt | Reportable Incident Due to Deviation from Technical Specification Requirements | At 1216 CST, on 11-15-05 the C-333, Unit 4, Cell 8, Process Gas Leak Detection (PGLD) system was declared inoperable by the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) in order to perform maintenance. Due to the inoperability of the system, a (Technical Specification Requirement) TSR required continuous smoke watch was put into place according to LCO 2.4.4.1. At 1330 CST a Tornado Warning was issued by the National Weather Service (NWS) for the area affecting the plant and surrounding area that remained in affect until 1400 CST. Based on the NWS warning, radar indications, and visual observations from on-site spotters, the PSS ordered the activation of the plants Take Cover Signal and (Public Address) PA announcements were made instructing the plant population to shelter in their designated 'take cover areas'. Upon activation of the Take Cover Signal, the individual performing the TSR required smoke watch at C-333, Unit 4, Cell 8, discontinued the smoke watch and reported to the 'take cover area' as required by plant emergency procedures. At this time, the PSS entered TSR 1.6.4, 'Conditions Outside TSR' due to discontinuing the TSR required smoke watch. TSR 1.6.4 requires that in an emergency, if a situation develops that is not addressed by the TSR, operations personnel should use their training and expertise to take actions to correct or mitigate the situation. In compliance with the TSR, the PSS instructed the Cascade Coordinator to reduce the operating pressure in the area affected by the Unit 4, Cell 8, PGLD outage, which would place the equipment in a non-applicable TSR mode of operation. Operating pressures were being reduced when the National Weather Service lifted the Tornado Warning at 1400 CST. At this time, the PSS lifted the Take Cover order and the TSR required smoke watch was put back into place at Unit 4, Cell 8 at 1405 CST. At this time the plant came into compliance with TSR LCO 2.4.4.1 and exited TSR 1.6.4. This event is being reported under the requirements of TSR 1.6.4, 'If emergency action is taken, both a verbal and written notification shall be made in accordance with 10 CFR 76.120'. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. | ||
ENS 41465 | 6 March 2005 17:40:00 | Other Unspec Reqmnt | Small Hydrogen Fluoride Leak | The following information was obtained from the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant via facsimile (text in quotes); At 1140, on 03-6-05, the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified that the C-360 Toll and Transfer Facility Zone 1 PGLD (Process Gas Leak Detection) system (Q Safety System) on # 4 Sample Cabinet actuated. The operators evacuated to the proper assembly point. The emergency Squad entered the building and sampled for Hydrogen Fluoride and sample results were positive. The autoclave and sample cabinet UF6 lines were evacuated and purged. Operators gave bioassay sample and the results indicated an uptake of Uranium. Event investigation is ongoing. This event is reportable as a 24 hour event in accordance with the plant procedure UE2-RA-RE1030, Nuclear Regulatory Event Reporting (no 10 CFR section is referenced). An automatic or manual actuation of a Q safety system that results from an event or condition that has the potential for significant impact on the health or safety of personnel. Event having the potential for significant impact are those events where actual plant conditions existed that the system was designed to protect against. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. PGDP Problem Report No. ATRC-05-0892; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2005-07; Worksheet Responsible Division: Operations Atmospheric leak was on line between the autoclave and the sample cabinet. C-360 Toll and Transfer Facility is a stand alone facility. Operations were secured and two individuals had uptakes (Minimal risk): One had an uptake of 7.3 mg/ liter uranium and the other individual had an uptake level of 5.2 mg/ liter uranium. The limit is 5.0 mg/ liter uranium. There was no smoke (very small leak) and a slight smell of Hydrogen Fluoride caused by the leak.
This report is being retracted based on the following information received from the regulatee via fax: This report is being retracted. Subsequent analysis of the actuation determined that the PGLD head actuation occurred from a minor incidental release of UF6 from a valve packing that is not considered a breach of the pressure boundary. Reporting is required if the safety system actuates in response to a condition that the system is designed against and that could result in significant impact on the safety and health of personnel. The PGLD systems safety function, described in the PGDP accident analysis, is to mitigate pigtail/line failures outside of the autoclave that could cause offsite consequences. This incidental UF6 leak did not have the potential for significant impact on personnel or offsite consequences and is not what the safety system is designed to protect against. Thus, the reporting criteria were not met in this case. (The) resident inspector has been notified of this retraction. Notified R2DO (Ayres) and NMSS (Essig). |