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| Start date | Reporting criterion | Title | Event description | System | LER | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ENS 55126 | 6 January 2021 06:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Failure to Comply or Defect | Interim Part 21 Report - Weld Procedures Do Not Meet Asme Code | The following is a summary of the report provided by the supplier: On January 6, 2021, Crane Nuclear, Inc (CNI) received an e-mail message from a customer identifying that the weld procedures Crane summitted for use on the customer's purchase order were unacceptable, as the procedure did not meet the requirements of ASME Code Section IX. CNI immediately began research and determined the customer to be correct. CNI is currently conducting research to determine where the affected weld procedures were used. The scope of supply is Code and safety related valve and valve parts supplied by CNI since 2009. Joyce Hammam Director, Safety and Quality (678) 451-2280 Crane Nuclear, Inc. 860 Remington Blvd Bolingbrook, IL 60440
The following was received from the supplier: Update 6/3/21: Eleven procedures were identified by CNI as not having a supporting (Procedure Qualification Record) (PQR) for welding on greater than 1 inch base metal. Of those eleven, three have never been used. Those three procedures are being corrected to identify the procedure applies to base metal of up to 1 inch only. The remaining eight procedures have had a 1 inch coupon welded and tested. All coupons passed the penetrant test, the hardness tests, and macro testing, as required by table QW-453 of ASME Code Section IX. As a result, CNI is updating the affected procedures. This is a paperwork issue for Crane and not a Part 21 concern for the industry." Notified R1DO (Bicket), R2DO (Miller), R3DO (Dickson), R4DO (Groom) and PART 21/50.55 REACTORS (by email). | ||
| ENS 53246 | 17 December 2017 06:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Failure to Comply or Defect | Part 21 - Undersized Packing Glands in Certain Crane Gate Valves | On 12/17/17, Brunswick Nuclear Plant experienced a packing gland blowout on an in-service Crane Nuclear, Inc., Figure Number 83 1/2 SPL, 10 inch by 8 inch by 10 inch, Bolted Bonnet Gate Valve. Crane Nuclear determined that component drawings for the 10 inch valve as well as the 6 inch by 4 inch by 6 inch Bolted Bonnet Gate Valve were in error. That error was corrected. Crane Nuclear is recommending that affected licensees replace the packing glands of the affected valves in their possession. The affected licensees are Pilgrim Station, Cooper Nuclear Station, Browns Ferry Nuclear, and Brunswick Nuclear. Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Joyce Hamman, Director, Safety & Quality at (678) 451-2280, Burt Anderson, Site Leader, at (630) 226-4990, or Samson Kay, Engineering Manager at (630) 226-4983.
The following information was provided as an update via fax: (Crane Nuclear, Inc.) Recommends one of the following actions be taken: - The valve gland should be replaced to tighten clearances to meet MSS-SP-120 requirements. - Install a packing washer in the current configuration that complies with MSS-SP-120 clearances. Use of a packing washer will allow for load to be evenly distributed across the packing to prevent extrusion through diametral clearances. Note, that existing drawings and bills of materials should be updated to match this configuration if this option is selected. Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact me, Joyce Hamman, Director, Safety & Quality at (678) 451-2280, Burt Anderson, Site Leader, at (630) 226-4990, or Samson Kay, Engineering Manager at (630) 226-4983. Notified R1DO (McKinley), R2DO (Sandal), R4DO (Groom) and Part 21/50.55 Reactors via email. | ||
| ENS 52857 | 5 June 2017 05:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Failure to Comply or Defect | Part 21 - Defective Safety Related Valves | The following was excerpted from a letter by Crane Nuclear, Inc.: The plug valve designs provided for XOMOX model figure numbers 037AX, 067EG, and 037. These valves have been identified as used in nuclear and/or safety related applications. The stem for the Subject valve models was identified as being undersized based on allowable yield stress analysis of the stem while in torsion. The high stress condition was due to the high torque required to seat/unseat the plug when installed with a Ultra High Molecular Weight Polyethylene (UHMWPE) sleeve material. High friction factor inherent with this material causes torsional stress to exceed the upper limit of yield strength of the valve which could result in fatigue/yielding of the stem, thus preventing the valve from opening and closing while in service. Historical research performed thus far has not identified any notifications from the customer(s) regarding stem failure of the subject valves, indicating that the valves may still be in operation with no performance related or operating issues. The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be token to complete the action. Notifications letters have been sent to the affected plants advising them of the condition, and recommending that the sleeve material be replaced with a lower friction Polytetrafluorethylene (PTFE) material that would significantly reduce the required input operating torque, thereby reducing the risk of failure of the stem material. XOMOX has been advised to modify design calculations to provide a larger margin for allowable yield strength of the stem material to ensure the stem is properly sized when Ultra High Molecular Weight Polyethylene (UHMWPE) sleeve material is used. Crane will continue to review XOMOX records to determine if any other sites are impacted, which we expect to complete by August 31, 2017. Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Samson Kay, Manager of Engineering at (630) 226-4983 or Jennifer Bregovy, Manager of Quality and Safety at (630) 226-4949. The following facilities received these safety related orders: TVA Sequoyah, Pennsylvania Power & Light Susquehanna.
The following information was received via fax: Crane Nuclear (CNI) has initiate the final phase of the Part 21 research and is currently reviewing over 15,000 documents from the original XOMOX Canada historical archive to determine if any other nuclear sites were impacted by the subject Part 21. The investigation encompasses sales orders spanning from 1968 to 1992. CNI expects to complete the review by 10/30/2017. Point of Contact: Samson Kay (630-226-4983) or Jennifer Bregovy (630-226-4949) Notified the R1DO (Cook), R2DO (Lopez), and Part 21 Resources (via e-mail).
The following information was provided as an update: Crane Nuclear (CNI) has completed approximately 40% of the review of the historical archive and will not be able to complete the review by the previously requested 10/30/2017 deadline. The historical review covers the following scope: -XOMOX UK DEVON, ENGLAND - Safety-Related and N-Stamped Valves/Parts issued between 1987 - 1993 -XOMOX Canada & XOMOX A&M - Safety-Related Parts from 1979 - 1993 -XOMOX Cincinnati TUFFLINE - Safety-Related and N-Stamped Valves and Parts issued between 1970 -1993 -XOMOX Crane Nuclear - Safety-Related and N-Stamped Valves and Parts issued from 2001 until present. Note: Parts and valves were no longer supplied by XOMOX as safety-related or nuclear after 1993 until Crane Nuclear acquired XOMOX in June 29, 2001. The following sites . . . were identified as a safety-related valves effected by this letter. All sites were supplied to customer 'Delaval' which no longer exists. At the current pace of review, CNI expects to complete the review of the historical archive by 1/30/2018. Delaval supplied valves to these Original Plant Name(s); TVA (doesn't show which plant), Comanche Peak Units 1&2, Columbia, Cleveland Electric, Midland Nuclear Power Plant Units 1&2 and TVA, - Hartsville and Phipps Bend Nuclear Plants both of which were cancelled before completion. Notified R1DO (McKinley), R2DO (Ehrhardt), R3DO (Duncan), R4DO (Werner) and Part 21/50.55 Reactors via email.
The following information was provided as an update via fax: The historical research is complete. Our review of the records from 1973 through 2001 identified 25 valves that were supplied with a stem-sleeve material combination that could exceed the upper limit of yield strength of the valve, which could result in fatigue/yielding of the stem, thus preventing the valve from opening and closing while in service. Those valves were supplied to: Northeast Utilities, Millstone; Houston Lighting & Power, South Texas Project; Niagara Mohawk, Nine Mile Point; Transamerican Delavel, Oakland; Power Systems, Rocky Mount; Bechtel Energy Corp., 5 Miles West Wadsworth; Pennsylvania Power & Light, Susquehanna; NY Power Authority, Fitzpatrick; TVA, Sequoyah; Omaha Public Power, Ft. Calhoun. Notification letters have been sent to some of the affected plants advising them of the condition, and recommending that the sleeve material be replaced with a lower friction Polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE) material that would significantly reduce the required input operating torque, thereby reducing the risk of failure of the stem material. Crane will complete the notifications to the other sites no later than 2/9/18. Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact me, Joyce Hamman, Director, Safety & Quality at (678) 451-2280, Burt Anderson, Site Leader, at (630) 226-4990, or Samson Kay, Engineering Manager at (630) 226-4983. Notified R1DO (Janda), R2DO (Heisserer), R3DO (Dickson), R4DO (Deese) and Part 21/50.55 Reactors via email.
The following information was provided as an update via fax: Crane reviewed diagnostic testing of 106 XOMOX plug valves for the purpose of validating the assumed torque values specified by XOMOX guidance. From the review of the diagnostic testing, we determined that on average, the actual torque required to stroke the valve (also referred to as the 'break torque') was approximately 56%-67% lower than the calculated value based on the UHMWPE sleeve material for valves with a 150 lbs. pressure class. Statistical analysis confirmed that the test results were within a 95% confidence interval. Consequently, a conservative factor of at least 56% can be applied to the published XOMOX torque value when evaluating stem stress. Applying this factor to the valves previously identified under this Part 21 confirmed that stress limits are below the material allowable for yield strength. This conclusion is supported by operating history (e.g., no reported stem failures) in the field. Based on these findings, Crane Nuclear, confirms that a condition adverse to quality and safety does not exist and that a Part 21 no longer applies. CNI, requests this Part 21 to be retracted. Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact me, Joyce Hamman, Director, Safety & Quality at (678) 451-2280, Burt Anderson, Site Leader, at (630) 226-4990, or Samson Kay, Engineering Manager at (630) 226-4983. Notified R1DO (McKinley), R2DO (Sandal), R3DO (Duncan), R4DO (Groom) and Part 21/50.55 Reactors via email. | ||
| ENS 52204 | 3 August 2016 05:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Failure to Comply or Defect | Part 21 - Safety Related Component Welding by an Unqualified Welder | The following was excerpted from a letter by Crane Nuclear, Inc.: Shielded metal arc welding (SMAW) with F-5 filler metal was welded on safety related components by an unqualified welder. Crane Nuclear Quality Assurance Manual, 12th Edition Rev. 2, dated 8/8/16 requires that welder performance qualification shall conform to the requirements of ASME Section IX for processing ASME B&PV Section Ill and safety related valve and valve part orders. During processing of a safety related order, it was identified that one welder was missing the required qualification documentation to perform weld repairs with F-5 filler metals (as defined in ASME Section IX) using the shielded metal arc welding process (SMAW). The safety hazard which could be created by such a defect could be a potential weld failure. Crane Nuclear has completed a review of all applicable welding records based on the welder hire date of September, 2011. We identified a total of 10 orders that were supplied with welding performed by an unqualified welder. Notification has been made to the purchasers of the affected safety related orders on the same date as this notification. Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Burt Anderson, Site Leader, at (630) 226-4990, Rosalie Nava, Director of Safety and Quality at (630) 226-4940, or Jason Klein, Engineering Manager at (630) 226-4953. The following facilities received these safety related orders: Duke-McGuire, Exelon-Byron, Duke-Brunswick, Entergy-ANO, Exelon-TMI, Exelon-Quad Cities, Exelon-Dresden.
The following information was received via fax: This letter is intended to inform the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission of actions taken to complete the Part 21 evaluation on the above referenced item. All of the following actions have been completed: 1) The welder has been qualified on the SMAW process utilizing F-5 filler metal and documented in accordance with ASME Section IX requirements. 2) The affected purchasers were provided with an initial 10CFR21 notification on August 26, 2016. 3) The affected purchasers were provided with the documentation detailing the scope of the welding performed on the affected components. 4) The affected purchasers were provided an investigation summary closure letter. 5) Crane Nuclear, Inc. Corrective Action Report 16-35 generated to determine root cause and implement appropriate corrective actions to prevent recurrence was completed and closed on September 30, 2016. Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact, Rosalie Nava, Director Safety and Quality at (630) 226-4940, or Burt Anderson, Site Leader. at (630) 226-4990. Notified R1DO (Cook), R2DO (Desai), R3DO (Stone), R4DO (Groom), and the Part 21 Group (via e-mail). | ||
| ENS 51496 | 26 August 2015 05:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Failure to Comply or Defect | Part 21 Report - Pressure Seal Valve Noncompliance | The following is a summary of a submitted facsimile: Pressure Seal Valve orders may potentially have misclassified material and non-destructive examination requirements for segment ring designs. Crane Nuclear 'Classification of Valve Parts', Procedure 03-107, provides guidance for appropriate material and NDE (Non Destructive Test) requirements for processing valve and valve part orders. The procedure is based on the ASME Code Case N-62, which is ASME B&PV Section Ill, 2015 Edition, Non-Mandatory Appendix HH 'Rules for Valve Internal and External Items'. A pressure seal valve segment ring requires the material to be purchased Safety Related, ASME B&PV Section II, Part D materials, and required NDE (reference Category 3 valve items per N-62). A segment ring may have been processed to material requirements not as pressure retaining material per NX-2000 of the Code resulting in the incorrect material specification and non-destructive examination specified. Limited to (1) CNI (Crane Nuclear, INC.) SO# 069000408, Dominion, Millstone. P.O. 954282 and Purchase Req. No. N90136-01- Quantity shipped = 1, Crane, 8, Fig. 55009-12CF8M-WE, Class 900, ASME Class 1, 1986 Ed. Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Jason Klein, Engineering Manager at (630) 226-4953 or Rosalie Nava, Director of Safety and Quality at (630) 226-4940 | ||
| ENS 50336 | 1 August 2014 05:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Failure to Comply or Defect | Part 21 Report - Safety-Related Valves Assembled with Non-Safety Related Levers | Crane did not provide safety related levers, for manual type safety valves, on a recent shipment. Crane was advised by their customer that valves provided for AP1000 PV10 Scopes (VDS 101 and VDS 150) should have had safety-related levers. Crane believes the only affected valves are those that have been provided on the AP 1000 project. If you have questions please contact; Rosalie Nava, Director Safety and Quality Phone 630-226-4940 Fax 630-226-4646 Email RNAVA@cranevs.com |