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A planned modification at Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant will remove the Spent Fuel Pool Area Radiation Monitoring system from service. The planned out of service window is expected to be 7 weeks, beginning 11/02/15 and ending 12/18/2015. During this time portable radiation monitors will be installed as compensatory measures to monitor and support timely and accurate EAL declarations. Affected Emergency Response Organization personnel have been made aware of the compensatory measures. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to a planned event that affects Emergency Preparedness Assessment Capability for greater than 72 hours. An update will be provided once the Spent Fuel Pool Area Radiation Monitoring system is restored to normal operation. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

• * * UPDATE AT 1616 EST ON 12/18/2015 FROM BRIAN HAYDEN TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

This is concerning the planned modification to Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Spent Fuel Area Radiation Monitoring System. The modification window is extended to January 8, 2016. Compensatory measures that were put in place on November 2, 2015 will continue to be in effect until the completion of the modification testing and the new equipment is fully in service. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Ferdas).

• * * UPDATE FROM TIM HUBER TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1547 EST ON 01/08/2016 * * *

This is concerning the planned modification to Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Spent Fuel Area Radiation Monitoring System. The modification window was originally extended to January 8, 2016 as updated on December 18, 2015. Based on field equipment issues during the installation process, the modification window has been extended to February 12, 2016. Compensatory measures that were put in place on November 2, 2015 will continue to be in effect until the completion of the modification testing and the new equipment is fully in service. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Dimitriadis).

At 0750 EDT on October 1, 2014, the Shift Manager was notified that site Information Technology (IT) personnel were being mobilized to investigate a potential voice and network loss at the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) and Joint Information Center (JIC). Site IT personnel were notified by offsite IT resources at 0727 EDT on October 1, 2014 of the issue that was first identified by IT monitoring software at 0124 on October 1, 2014. The site IT personnel that responded to the EOF and JIC reported to site Control Room and Emergency Preparedness (EP) personnel at 0845 that connectivity to the Exelon network and the internet was unavailable at both the EOF and the JIC. This loss of connectivity would prevent the ability of the EOF Emergency Response Organization (ERO) personnel to directly monitor key plant parameters via the site's Plant Process Computer (including the Site Parameter Display System) and other network-based plant parameter display systems. Site IT and EP personnel determined that the following communications equipment was not impacted by the connectivity issue: - Dedicated Offsite Agency Phones (primary method for contacting state and local agencies) - Commercial Phones and dedicated bridge line (primary method for contacting other site Emergency Response Facilities) - FTS-2001 Phones (e.g., ENS and HPN lines) - ERDS Additionally, EP personnel verified with Dose Assessment Office personnel that dose assessment and dose monitoring functions from the EOF could still be performed without delay. Site IT personnel reported to the Control Room at 1135 that connectivity to the Exelon network and the internet had been restored to a fully functional status. While site and fleet IT personnel continue to address and verify all appropriate corrective actions have been taken to prevent recurrence of the connectivity issue, the site has employed appropriate compensatory measures to ensure that the verbal transmission of key plant parameters from the site (Technical Support Center or Control Room) to the EOF is recognized and maintained. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

• * * RETRACTION FROM TIM HUBER TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1208 EDT ON 10/27/2014 * * *

This update retracts Event Report #50502, which reported that a loss of connectivity to the Exelon network and internet at the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) and Joint Information Center (JIC) had impacted the ability of staff in these facilities to directly monitor key plant parameters via the site's Plant Process Computer and other network-based plant parameter display systems. Subsequent to the identification of this event, further investigation by site and fleet staff determined that adequate direction was included in applicable Emergency Response Organization (ERO) procedures to respond to data display system failures of this type. Specifically, the checklist (procedure) for the Operations Communicator in the EOF provided adequate direction for this ERO member to obtain required plant data from the Operations Communicator located in the Control Room via alternate methods (e.g., over the phone - phone lines remained functional throughout the time that the loss of computer connectivity condition existed). Therefore, this event did not result in a major loss of emergency assessment capability and was not reportable to the NRC under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R1DO (Bickett) and Cyber Assessment Team via email.

This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant will perform planned maintenance on the Unit 2 Plant Process Computer (PPC) and associated network infrastructure on February 06, 2013. The maintenance will remove the Unit 2 PPC for a planned duration of 12 hours and will render the Unit 2 SPDS out of service for this timeframe. Once the maintenance starts, the effected equipment and functions, including SPDS, can be returned to service within five minutes, if required. Should an emergency be declared during this period, the control room will continue to have the capability to retrieve plant data inputs to assess plant conditions and perform core damage assessment at all times. Control room emergency response personnel will use emergency response procedures to disseminate plant parameter data points to the affected Emergency Response Facilities until the U-2 PPC is restored. MIDAS (Meteorological Data) and Unit 2 ERDS (Emergency Response Data System) data transmission will remain functional during the maintenance window. All work associated with this plant data network software installation will be performed in an expeditious manner consistent with the goal of minimizing unavailability of the systems listed above. Back-out criteria has been identified as part of the work package. A test of all systems will be performed at the completion of the upgrade. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

• * * UPDATE AT 1713 EST ON 2/6/2013 FROM AMY CORDNER TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The plant process computer was returned to service at 1700 EST. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R1DO (Powell).

This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the planned loss of an Emergency Response Facility (ERF). Calvert Cliffs will be implementing a scheduled modification to renovate the site's common Technical Support Center (TSC) which will temporarily remove it from service. The planned maintenance window is expected to be three weeks beginning on 10/3/12 and concluding on 10/26/12. Should an emergency be declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the procedurally identified alternate TSC will be staffed and activated (CCNPP Simulator). All TSC responders and other key ERO personnel have been briefed on this activity and the applicable contingency actions that will be required to be taken in their specific emergency response procedures. This condition has no adverse impact to the health and safety of the public. An update will be provided once the TSC has been restored to normal operation. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

• * * UPDATE FROM TOM JONES TO DONG PARK AT 1302 EDT ON 10/26/12 * * *

The TSC has been restored to normal operation. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Caruso).

Calvert Cliffs will be performing planned maintenance to the U-1 Plant Process Computer to install isolation transformers. This maintenance window was expected to start at 2100 (EST) today, 2/26/2012, but the U-1 Plant Process Computer failed at 1546 this afternoon and it was decided to commence the planned maintenance window at that time versus spending resources to attempt recovery of the computer for just a short time period. The planned maintenance window is expected to be 54 hours long and end February 28, around 2300. This will impact the Unit 1 data dissemination to the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), TSC Computer. PI (Plant Trending Software) and ERDS will also be out of service for both Unit-1 and Unit-2. Should an emergency be declared during this period, the Control Room will continue to have the capability to retrieve plant data inputs to assess plant conditions and perform core damage assessment. Control Room Emergency Response Organization personnel will use backup methods already captured in emergency response procedures to disseminate plant parameter data to the effected Emergency Response Facilities and NRC during the plant data network outage. MIDAS (Meteorological Data) will continue to be operational at the site. Applicable Reporting Requirement: 10 CFR 50.72 (b) (3) (xiii); 8 Hour report. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

• * * UPDATE AT 1209 EST ON 03/01/12 FROM JAY GAINES TO S. SANDIN * * *

At 1000 (EST) this morning planned maintenance was completed to the Unit 1 plant process computer. All plant assessment capabilities have been restored. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Ferdas).

Sirens in St. Mary's and Calvert counties are out of service exceeding the minimum required of 19. Currently 44 sirens are out of service due to local power outages caused by the storm. Compensatory measures are in place for the affected counties. Route alerting will be used if necessary. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

• * * UPDATE AT 1730 EDT ON 09/02/11 FROM TOM JONES TO S. SANDIN * * *

As of 1655 EDT on 9/2/11, all 72 emergency sirens have been returned to service. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (DiPaolo).

This is an eight hour report per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii). Calvert Cliffs will be implementing scheduled maintenance to the microwave radio system to improve reliability of the system at the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), State and County facilities. This work will require that the microwave radio system at the EOF be removed for a period of approximately 4 to 6 hours. During this time, the following systems will be impacted for the duration of maintenance: 1. The plant's (e.g., Control Room, Technical Support Center (TSC), Simulator) Dedicated Offsite Agency telephones will be out of service. (EOF's system will continue to function) 2. 800 MHz desk set radios at the EOF only will be out of service. 3. 153.44 MHz frequency at the EOF only will be out of service. (backup for MEMA and MDE) 4. MIDAS Terminal (Meteorological Data) located in the Dose Assessment Office at the EOF will be out of service. 5. TSC Computer data transfer to the EOF only will be out of service. Once the scheduled maintenance starts, the systems (listed above) can be returned to service within 1 hour. Should an emergency be declared during this period, the Control Room will continue to have the capability to make the event notification to the offsite agencies within 15 minutes using either commercial telephone lines or the 800 MHz radio console (includes the 153.44 MHz frequency). The Emergency Preparedness communications procedure provides a chart listing the communication devices available and the order in which the process is to be implemented. MIDAS (Meteorological Data) will continue to be operational at the site and can be obtained by contacting the Control Room or TSC. The ERPIPs also provide a backup process and the instructions necessary for the EOF Dose Assessment Office to obtain Meteorological Data. Plant data can be obtained from the CR or TSC and will continue to be downloaded from the plant computer to the ERO SharePoint site. All work associated with this microwave radio maintenance will be performed in an expeditious manner consistent with the goal of minimizing unavailability of the systems listed above. A test of the offsite agency notification devices in the Control Room will be made prior to the commencement of the maintenance. A test of all systems will be performed at the completion of the maintenance. All EOF responders and Control Room personnel have been briefed on this work and expected contingent actions. This job will start on Thursday, December 16, 2010 at approximately 8:00 am. We anticipate that all work will be completed by 2:00 pm on the same day, including testing of the system. We will provide a notification update upon completion of the job. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector and the affected State and County Agencies.

• * * UPDATE AT 1248 ON 12/16/2010 FROM TOM JONES TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The maintenance and testing was completed satisfactorily at 1130 EST. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R1DO (Holody).

At 1130 on 7/4/2010, Station Security contacted Calvert Control Center to notify them of a loss of offsite communication phone lines. Calvert Control Center recognized the loss of phone lines and reported that their phone lines were also out of service. This notification to an offsite government agency is reportable under 50.72(b)(2)(xi) and is a 4 hour ENS report. Security noted the lack of offsite communications at 1122 on 7/4/2010 and communicated this loss of communications to the control room. The control room verified that the microwave phone system, 800 MHz radio system, plant page, internal phone lines, satellite phone system, Emergency Response Organization Notification System (ERONS) and commercial line to NRC headquarters were still available, this met all of the requirements for contacting offsite agencies in the event of an emergency condition. It was noted that the ENS (dedicated) line to the NRC was not in operation. Contingency measures were put into place for communications with the NRC (CCNPP can still contact the NRC via commercial lines and the NRC can contact CCNPP via dedicated email and cell phone). The initiating event (loss of offsite communications - specifically the dedicated ENS phone line) which occurred at 1122 is reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) and is an 8 hour ENS report. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM JOE KLECHA TO PETE SNYDER ON 7/4/10 AT 1741 * * * 

DISCOVERY OF AN AFTER-THE-FACT EMERGENCY CONDITION At 1645, Calvert Cliffs recognized that they were unable to contact St. Mary's County emergency response organization due to a loss of phone communications and radio deficiencies on the counties part. This met the requirement of an Unusual Event in accordance with (EAL) AU 5.1.1 (Unplanned loss of all onsite or offsite communication capabilities). Prior to making the EAL notification, phone communications were restored at 1650 and the conditions of the EAL were no longer met. This report is a one hour ENS notification per 50.72(a)(1)(i) - Declaration of an emergency class, footnote for events which conditions are no longer met. Event classification "Other Unspecified Requirement" was added to the original header for this event concerning the after-the-fact emergency condition discovered by the licensee. Notified R1DO (Powell), NRR EO (Lubinski), and IRD (Grant).

Sixteen of seventy three ANS (Automatic Notification System) sirens are inoperable for failure to pass the weekly growl test. The following sirens that are OOS are located in Calvert County (9 of 50 sirens), St. Mary's County (5 of 17 sirens) and Dorchester County (2 of 6 sirens). The failures were most likely due to the weather conditions. The licensee has notified the local governments. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

• * * UPDATE AT 0750 EST ON 03/07/09 FROM BRUCE SHICK TO S. SANDIN * * *

The licensee is updating this report to show that all sirens were restored to service as of 1000 EST on 3/6/09. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Hansell).

EOF resources OOS due to planned maintenance of electrical supply transfer switch. No power available to EOF. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

• * * UPDATE AT 13:39 ON 5/24/07 FROM BRUCE SHICK TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

Power was restored to the EOF at 13:30 on 5/24/07.

A significant portion of the emergency notification sirens (19 of 50) located in Calvert County, MD are out of service due to a Southern Maryland Electric Cooperative (SMECO) power outage. The licensee stated that power is expected to be restored by 1700 ET 01/23/05. The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector.

• * * UPDATE FROM PACE TO CROUCH @ 2022 HRS EST ON 1/23/05 * * *

The out of service sirens have been tested and returned to service as of 2000 hrs. EST. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Gray).