NRC 2003-0031, Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Revisons
| ML031070404 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 04/08/2003 |
| From: | Cayia A Nuclear Management Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NRC 2003-0031 | |
| Download: ML031070404 (23) | |
Text
Committed to Nuclear Excellence Point Beach Nuclear Plant Operated by Nuclear Management Company, LLC NRC 2003-0031 April 8, 2003 Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Station P1-137 Washington DC 20555 Ladies/Gentlemen:
DOCKETS 50-266 AND 50-301 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE REVISIONS POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 Enclosed are copies of revised procedures to the Point Beach Nuclear Plant Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures. The revised procedures dated March 26, 2003 should be filed in your copy of the manual.
Sincerely, a.
Site Pres t
FAF d
Enclosures cc:
NRC Resident Inspector (wiole)
Incident Response Center, Region III 6590 Nuclear Road
- Two Rivers, Wisconsin 54241 Telephone: 920.755.2321
, POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EPIP INDEX Revision 94 March 26, 2003 INDEX PROCEDURE NUMBER REVISION PROCEDURE TITLE NUMBER EFFECTIVE PERIODIC DATE REVIEW DATE EPIP 1.1 Course of Actions.:.................
43 EPIP 1.2 Emergency Classification.................
38 EPIP 1.3 Dose Assessment and Protective Action.
Recommendations.29 EPIP 1.4 Credible High or Low Security Threat.
2 C
R R
C 02/11/03 12/27/02 06/24/02 01/10/03 02/11/03 12/27/02, 05/03/02 01/10/03 EPIP 2.1 Notifications - ERO, State & Counties, and NRC..... 26 EPIP 4.1 Technical Support Center (TSC) Activation and Evacuation.........
34 EPIP 4.2 Operations Support Center (OSC) Activation and Evacuation.........
16 EPIP 4.3 Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Activation and Evacuation.........
28 EPIP 4.7 Offsite Radiation Protection Facility (OSRPF)
Activation and Evacuation............
4.......
4 R
01/20/03 02/06/02 R
0 1/03/03 01/03/03 R
01/03/03 01/03/03 R
01/03/03 01/03/03 R
01/03/03 01/03/03 R
02/06/02 02/06/02 R
03/20/01 01/03/03 R
01/03103 01/03/03 EPIP 5.1 EPIP 5.2 EPIP 6.1 Personnel Emergency Dose Authorization 14 Radioiodine Blocking and Thyroid Dose Accounting..............................
13 Assembly and Accountability, Release and Evacuation of Personnel..............................
24 EPIP 7.3.1 EPIP 7.3.2 EPIP 7.3.7 Offsite Radiation Sampling and Survey 23 Post-Accident Isokinetic Stack Sampling System....... 7 Estimating Radioiodine Air Concentrations................ 5 R
R R
01/10/03 07/12/02 07/12/02 01/10/03 07/12/02 07/12/02 EPIP 8.4.1 Post-Accident Sampling and Analysis of Potentially High Activity Reactor Coolant............. 16 EPIP 8.4.2 Post-Accident Sampling of Containment Atmosphere.................................
1 l
EPIP 8.4.3 Emergency Containment Sump "A" Sampling...........
7 C
10/25/02 C
09/13/02 07/12/02 07/12/02 07/12/02 07/12/02 07/12/02 01/30/01 03/26/03 EPIP 10.1 EPIP 10.2 EPIP 10.3 Emergency Reentry................
22 Core Damage Estimation.20 Post-Accident Containment Hydrogen Reduction.6 R
R
-C 07/12/02 02/03/03 03/26/03 (T - Temporary Change)
C = Continuous Use R = Reference Use I = Information Use Page 1 of 2
I POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EPIP INDEX Revision 94 March 26, 2003 INDEX PROCEDURE NUMBER REVISION PROCEDURE TITLE NUMBER EFFECTIVE PERIODIC DATE REVIEW DATE EPIP 11.2 Medical Emergency.............
17 R
09/20/02 07/12/02 EPIP 12.1 Emergency Event De-Escalation, Termination, or Recovery Operations..........................................9.......9 EPIP 12.2 Recovery Implementation.15 (T - Temporary Change)
Page 2 of 2 R
R 12/27/02 01/10/03
'12/2 /02 07/12102
.j C = Continuous Use R = Reference Use I = Information Use
EPIP 10.3 POST-ACCIDENT CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN REDUCTION DOCUMENT TYPE:
CLASSIFICATION:
REVISION:
EFFECTIVE DATE:
REVIEWER:
APPROVAL AUTHORITY:
PROCEDURE OWNER (title):
OWNER GROUP:
Technical Safety Related 6
March 26, 2003 Manager's Supervisory Staff Department Manager Group Head Emergency Preparedness Verified Current Copy:
I Signature Date Time List pages used for Partial Perfornance Controlling Work Document Numbers
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT EPIP 10.3 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES SAFETY RELATED Revision 6 POST-ACCIDENT CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN March 26, 2003 REDUCTION TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION TITLE PAGE 1.0 "PURPOSE.............
, 3 2.0 PREIREQUISITES.
-3 3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS............................
4 3.1 Hydrogen Recombiner
.4 3.2 Directing The Containment Atmosphere To-The Auxiliary Building Ventilation System..............
4...................
.............. 4 4.0 INITIAL CONDITIONS.5
- .5 4.1 Hydrogen Recombiner 5
4.2 Directing The Containment Atmosphere To The Auxiliary Building Ventilation System..............
5 5.0 PROCEDURE.......
5 5.1 Hydrogen Recombiner.................
.5 5.2 Directing The Containment Atmosphere To The Auxiliary Building Ventilation System............
11
6.0 REFERENCES
14 7.0 BASES...
14 ATTACHMENT A NORMAL SYSTEM VALVE LINEUP FOR THE POST ACCIDENT '
CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM (PACVS)................................... 15 ATTACHMENT B INSTRUMENT AND CONTROL SETTINGS FOR STARTUP AND OPERATION OF HYDROGEN RECOMBINER...................................... 16 ATTACHMENT C HYDROGEN RECOMBINER INSTALLATION.17 ATTACHMENT D PROPRIETARY INFORMATION OF ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION - N1390MM120004.18 ATTACHMENT E POST ACCIDENT CONTAINMENT VENTING RATE.................................. 19 l ATTACHMENT F RECOVERY VALVE LINEUP FOR THE PACVS.20 Page 2 of 20 CONTINUOUS USE
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT EPIP 10.3 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES SAFETY RELATED Revision 6 POST-ACCIDENT CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN.
March 26, 2003 REDUCTION 1.0.
PURPOSE This procedure provides for the reduction of containment hydrogen concentrations in the post-LOCA environment.. This can be accomplished in two ways. The first method, detailed in Step 5. 1, provides guidance for the acquisition, installation, and operation of the Rockwell International Hydrogen Recombiner. The second method, which is detailed in Step 5.2, describes the. actions for directing the containment atmosphere from the containment to the Auxiliary Building ventilation system charcoal filter, F-23.
2.0 PREREOUISITES 2.1 Responsibilities 2.1.1 Operations is responsible for directing the containment atmosphere to the auxiliary building ventilation system under the direction of the OSC Coordinator and Rad/Chem Coordinator.
2.1.2 The Resource Coordinator at the EOF is responsible for making arrangements to have the hydrogen recombiner shipped to Point Beach Nuclear Plant.
2.1.3 The Maintenance and Operations group are responsible for the setup and operation of the hydrogen recombiner under the direction of the OSC Coordinator and Rad/Chem Coordinator.
l2.1.4
'Radiation Protection group is responsible for operation of Rad Monitors and operation of Isokonetic Sampling Sys.
2.2 Equipment 2.2.1
'Hydrogen Recombiner stored by the Pooled Inventory Management System (PIMS).
2.2.2 Auxiliary Building truck access.
2.2 3 Auxiliary Building Crane (both main and aux hoist).
2.2.4 MCC IB31.
2.2.5 Hydrogen Recombiner electrical and mechanical connections.
2.2.6 Training Installation Video tape #61.
Page 3 of 20-CONTINUOUS USE
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT EPIP 10.3 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES SAFETY RELATED Revision 6 POST-ACCIDENT CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN March 26, 2003 REDUCTION 3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 3.1 Hydrogen Recombiner 3.1.1l The hydrogen recombiner is a skid-mounted unit with a detached control cabinet. The unit has to be brought in from off-site; therefore, the Auxiliary Building truck access area must be-available.
3.1.2 The hydrogen recombiner must be placed on the El. 46' of the Auxiliary Building. This requires the use of the Auxiliary Building crane; therefore, the crane must be available. It is powered from MCC 1B3 1, which must also be available.
3.1.3 The hydrogen recombiner is stored in Memphis, Terinessee, so delivery will take 1-2 days.
3.1.4 All -electrical and mechanical connectors are on-site: No connectors come with the unit.
3.1.5 The unit may become highly radioactive (>500 R/hr) ahd ALARA considerations will need to be made.
3.1.6 The unit has an upper limit for hydrogen inlet concentration of 5%.
Reference Rockwell Component Iristruction Manual, 01398.
3.1i.7 If at any time during operation containment integrity must be established, valves H2V-19, H2V-20, H-V-22 and H2V-23 must be manually shut.
Do NOT enter pipeways.
3.1.8 The recombiner and associated piping is pressure tested to 10 psig. Fission product release could occur if aligned when containment pressure is > 10 psig.
3.2 Directini The Containment Atmosphere To The Auxiliary Building Ventilation System
'3.2.1 Ensure Auxiliary Building ventilation exhaust is in operation prior to AND during venting operations.
3.2.2 Use respiratory protection as prescribed by -Radiation Protection when sampling and draining.
3.2.3 The valves in this system provide-containment integrity and must NOT be operated unless authorized by the Shift Manager (SM).
3.2.4 Containment venting must be stopped immediately should the operating Auxiliary Building ventilation exhaust fan, W30 or W21, trip.
Page 4 of 20 CONTINUOUS USE
- PONT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN-IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES POST-ACCIDENT CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN REDUCTION EPIP 10.3 SAFETY RELATED Revision 6 -
March 26, 2003 INITIALS INITIALS_
4.0 INITIAL CONDITIONS 4.1 Hvdrogen Recombiner 4.1.1 4.1.2 Any event that may lead to or has caused significant core damage resulting in the release of hydrogen to the containment in a concentration of >0.5% and <5.0%.
The equipment listed in Step 2.2 is available, or will be available within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />.
4.2 Directing The Containment Atmosphere To The Auxiliary Building Ventilation System Any event that may lead to or has caused significant core damage resulting in the release of hydrogen to the containment in a concentration 25.0%.
5.0 PROCEDURE NOTE:
IF hydrogen concentration is >0.5% and <5.0tO, THEN complete Step 5.1, OTHERWISE go to Step 5.2 5.1 Hydrogen Recombiner
. 5.1.1 5.1.2 5.1.3 5.1.4 5.1.5 Contact an agent for the Pooled Inventory Management Systems (PIMS). See the Emergency Telephone Directory for a list of names and numbers.
Notify the agent of our need to have the hydrogen recoinbiner shipped to Point Beach. Specify Unit 1 16A.
Inform the agent that the hydrogen recombiner SHALL be shipped by flatbed or canvas top truck. It cannot be unloaded
'from a closed truck at Point Beach.
Inform agent-that PIMS SHALL load the hydrogen recombiner on the flatbed with the inlet and outlet connections facing toward the tractor if it is needed on Unit 2, facing towards the rear: of the trailer if it is needed on Unit 1.
Have the appropriate Maintenance and Operations groups view the hydrogen recornbiner installation video tape (No. 61):
EOF EOF EOF EOF TRN Page 5 of 20 CONTINUOUS USE
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES POST-ACCIDENT CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN REDUCTION I
.~.
EPIP fo.3 SAFETY RELATED Revision 6 March 26, 2003 INITIALS K)
NOTE: - -Hydrogen Recombiner Connectors are stored in warehouse
- 2 in a 4'x5' wood box marked Hydrogen Recombiner Electrical and Mechinkial Connectors.
5.1.6 5.1.7 5.1.8 5.1.9 Remove all hydrogen recornbiner electrical and mechanical connectois from 'their 'storage box in the warehouse and place them on the El. 46' of the Auxiliary Building near the center stairway.
Upon arrival of the hydrogen recombiner to the site, notify appropriate personnel (i.e., OSC Coordinator or Rad/Chem Coordinator).
Verify PIMS complied with Steps 5.1.3 and 5.1.4.
Direct Radiation Protection survey the area.'
IF dose rates in the area need to be reduced
- THEN flush the containment spray lines.
5.1.10 Uncrate/uncover the hydrogen recombiner while o'n the truck.
All materials used for delivery should be removed from the site. Move-the hydrogen recombiner into the Auxiliary Buildifig truck'access area.
5.1;11 The Ihydrogem recomnbiner weighs approximately 8,000 lbs. and therefore must be rigged for a 2.2 X 8,000 = 17,600 lb. load.
The control cabinet weighs approximately 2,000 lbs. and must be rigged for 2.2 x 2000 = 4400 lb. load. Safe load paths for safety-related handling services, SLP 4, Auxiliary Building Main Crane, SHALL be followed while transporting the unit..
5.1.12 The hydrogen recombiner is to be placed in the location shown on Attachment C. The control cabinet should be placed near the power supply located on the east wall of the spent fuel pool
- purification room. Controls are to be facing east.
5.1.13 Install barriers AND rope off the recombiner and floor hatch areas of M-3-8-34-F72 for Unit 1 or M-3-8-34-F69 for Unit 2 for personnel safety.
5.1.14 Floor hatch M-3-8-34 F72 for Unit 1 or M-3-8-34-F69 for Unit 2 should be removed and placed in an appropriate area.
MTN MTN MTN MTN MTN MTN MTN MTN Paae 6 of 20 CONTINUOUS USE
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES POST-ACCIDENT CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN REDUCTION EPIP 10.3 SAFETY RELATED Revision 6 March 26, 2003 INITIALS CAUTION For ALARA reasons do NOT enter pipeways to verify position of valves-H2V-1, H2V-2 or H2V-3; these valves are locked open.
5.1.15 Verifyyvalves are lined up per Attachment A.
(Reference Bechtel P&ID M-224) 5.1.16 Cautiously remove the blind flanges on the supply and return lines to prevent damage to-the gaskets.
5.1.17 Attach the two 8' sections of flexible 2" pipe to the flanges.
Flange and closure bolting instruction MI 32.1 SHALL be used for piping connections.
CAUTION Care must be taken to prevent damage to the bellows on the recombiner when connecting the flexible piping.
OPS MTN MTN MTN MTN 5:1.18 Remove the blind flanges on the recombiner. Flexible expansion joints are installed on the unit with restraining bars.
Since we connect flexible hoses to the recombiner the bellows on the recombiner remain fixed..Use Grade B-7 stud material to restrain the bellows in a similar configuration as it originally comes. (The video will show the restraint configuration but it is important that the studs be Grade B-7.)
5.1.19 The expansion joint allowable deflections for installation and operation are listed below.
- Page 7 of 20 CONTINUOUS USE
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES POST-ACCIDENT CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN REDUCTI.ON EPIP 10.3 SAFETY RELATED Revision 6 March 26, 2003 INITIALS NOTE:
The flexibility of the expansion joints is measured from the face centerline of the 2-inch raised face flanges.
Displacement Installation Operation (maximum) '
(maximum)
Axial Deflection 0.12 in
-0.06 in In-Plane Rotation 4 degrees 0.5 degrees In-Plane Displace 0.18 in 0.06 in Torsional Rotation 0 degrees 0.05 degrees CAUTION If the gasket on the motor blower assembly is made' of rubber, it must be exchanged for a flexitallic gasket before operation to prevent equipment damage or personnel hazards.
5.1.20 Ensure the motor blower assembly has a flexitallic gasket.
IF PIMS changed out the flexitallic gasket, THEN they will have enclosed a flexitallic gasket to go into the motor blower assembly, and~it must be installed.
5.1.21 Pressure test the recombiner and flexible pipes using service air to 10 psig. Using the existing pressure test connection H2V-21 hydrogen recombiner supply test connection valve, or H2V-25, hydrogen recombiner outl1t.test'connection drain valve, snooping all connections.
~~.
5.1.22 Remove the wood covers from the external blower and the top of the recornbirier. Remove any desiccant contained inside the recombiner.
Open all electrical junction boxes and remove all desiccant bags.
MTN
- MTN MTN OPS OPS MT MTN 5.1.23 Verify that the spare 100 amp breaker 1B52-312B, Z-287 Hydrogen Recombiner Disconnect is danger tagged OFF.
5.1.24 Verify that the spare 20 amp breaker at Position 31 in Lighting Panel-18L Z-287, Hydrogen Recornbiner. Receptacles, is danger tagged OFF.
5.1.25 PIMS sends a hydrogen analyzer along with the unit. It is NOT needed and therefore should NOT be electrically connected.
Pa-e 8 of 20 CONTINUOUS USE
- POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES POST-ACCIDENT CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN REDUCTION EPIP 10.3 SAFETY RELATED Revision 6 March 26, 2003 INITIALS NOTE:
Make sure the thermocouple cables are at least two feet from any power cable.
5.1.26 Using the electrical schematic provided in the component instruction manual, layout the 480 V, 120 V, and thermocouple cables from the control cabinet to the unit. Install guards and mark with black and yellow tape to prevent, tripping hazards and damage.
5.1.27 Inside the upper front panel of the control cabinet is a terminal block designed to provide remote indication and controlto the control room. The control power leads need to be jumpered out to operate the unit locally. Install a jumper on Terminal Block TB-7 between TB-7-322 and TB-7-33 (see video).
5.1.28
'Connect all power, control, and instrument cables per Rockwell International Thermal Hydrogen Recombiner System Component Instruction Manual;'Control No. 01398, maintained in the TSC Satellite File System.
MTN MTN MTN 5.1.29 Close local knife switch at the cabinet the connections are made in.
5.1.30 Remove danger tag and position to-"ON" the 100 amp breaker 1B52-312B, Z-287 Hydrogen Recombiner Disconnect.
5.1.31 Remove danger tag and position to "ON" the 20 amp breaker at Position.31 in Lighting Panel 18L, Z-287, Hydrogen Recombiner Receptacles.
-CAUTION The operation of the hydrogen recombiner may cause the area to become a high radiation area. Portable shielding may be installed prior to the operation of the recombiner, if appropriate.
OPS OPS MTN 5.1.32 Verify that all controls, settings, switches, and valves are as shown in Attachment B to establish startup and operating conditions.
Page 9 of 20 CONTINUOUS USE
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES POST-ACCIDENT CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN REDUCTION EPIP 10.3 SAFETY RELATED Revision 6 March 26, 2003 l
7 ~7-"INITIALS u CAUTION If at any time during operation containment integrity must be established, valves H2V-19, H7,V-20, H2V^-22 and H2Y-23 must be manually shut. Do NOT enter pipeways.
5.1.33 Open Containment Isolation Valves H2V-19, H2V-20,'H 2V-22 and H2V-23.
5.1.34 Turn HS-1 to START The unitis now in automatic startup and will stabilize at temperatures where hydrogen is being recombined. Operate the recombiner as necessary to achieve and-maintain a containment hydrogen concentration of less than 3 percent. Additional information is available from the Component Instruction Manual No. 01398.
', CAUTION.
r t
Evaluate radiological implications prior to obtaining sample, 5.1.35 Operate Valves HV-8 and H2V-9, containment sample isolation valves, as necessary to grab samples of the containment atmosphere for Chemistry analysis.
OPS OPS OPS OPS OPS CAUTION Radioactive gas may be released when draining the exhaust line.
Respiratory protection is required when draining/sampling.
5.1.36 Periodically during operation of the hydrogen recombiner, cycle Valves H2V-6 and H 2V-7 (the containment exhaust drain valves), to drain any moisture out of the system piping. Shut when gas starts to issue from the drain.
5.1.37 IF problems occur during operation of the recombiner, THEN reference Attachment D for troubleshooting assistance.
Pa-e 10 of 20 CONTINUOUS USE
- POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES POST-ACCIDENT CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN REDUCTION EPIP 10.3 SAFETY RELATED Revision 6 March 26, 2003 INITIALS 5.1.38 For Emergency Shutdown, set HS-I to STOP.
5.1.39 For Normal Shutdown of the recombiner:
- a. -Reset TIC-4 to 5000F.
- b. WHEN TIC-4 indicates below 600'F, set HS-1 to OFF and CB1, CB2, CB3, CB4, and CB5 to OPEN.
- c.
Set Facility Power Switch to OFF.
OPS OPS OPS 5.2 Directing The Containment Atmosphere To The Auxiliary Building Ventilation System 5.2.1 Ensure Auxiliary Building ventilation exhaust system in operation. (W30A or B and W21A or B.)
- CAUTION Do NOT enter pipeways to verify position of valves H2V-1, H2V-2, or H2V-3 for ALARA reasons; these valves are locked open..
i 5.2.2 Ensure valves are lined up per Attachment A.
(Reference Bechtel P&ID M-224)
.OPS OPS OPS RP 5.2.3 Shift the auxiliary building ventilation absolute filter control switch to the-'close" position, thereby shifting the auxiliary building exhaust fans W30A&B suction to the charcoal filter F-23.
5.2.4 Verify RE-214, PAB vent stack monitor, and SPING 23, PAB vent stack SPING, are operating. Secure flow to PAB vent stack ISOKINETIC sampler. (Ref EPIP 7.3.2)
Pacre I 1 of 0-0 CONTINUOUS USE
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES POST-ACCIDENT CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN REDUCTION EPIP 10.3 SAFETY RELATED Revision 6 March 26, 2003 INITIALS CAUTION High service air flow rates into containment may reduce header r
Cb SA compressor.
,pressure. Consider starting standby cmrso.~
5.2.5 Cut in service air (H2V-12 and H2V-13).to the containmnent if necessary to establish required pressure per Attachment E.
5.2.6 Operate Valves H2V-8 and H2V-9, containment sample isolation valves as necessary to giab Radiation Protection samples of the containment atmosphere for Chemistry analysis.
CAUTION Radioactive gas may be released when draining the exhaust line.
Respiratory protection is required when draining/sampling.
OPS OPS-OPS 5.2.7 Drain the exhaust line through H2V-6 and H2V-7, shut when gas starts to issue from the drain.
NOTE:
The position of H2V-5 will be determined by Chemistry and Radiation Protection based upon containment atmospheric radioactivity levels and the prevailing atmospheric conditions.
NOTE:
H2V-5 position indicator works like a clock. On first opening of H2V-5, check shut H2V-4, read position of H2V-5, fully open H2V-5 and read position, then position H2V-5 to correct setting. (i.e., if H2V-5 shut indicates 12:00, open indicates 2:30, 50% open will be 1:15, 25% open will be 12:37, etc.).
5.2.8 Throttle H2V-5 to the required position per Attachment E.
OPS Page 12 of 20 CONTINUOUS USE
, POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES POST-ACCIDENT CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN REDUCTION EPIP 10.3 SAFETY RELATED Revision 6 March 26. 2003 INITIALS INITIALS_
5.2.9 Open H2V-4, containment to ventilation line isolation valve (this initiates flow).
CAUTION Radioactive gas may be released when draining the exhaust line. Respiratory protection is required when draining/sampling.
OPS OPS OPS 5.2.10 Periodically during the containment venting, cycle Valves H2V-6 and H2V-7 (the containment exhaust drain
-valves), to drain any moisture out of the system piping, shut when gas starts to issue from the drain.
5.2.11 WHEN venting is complete,
' THEN shut Valves H2V-4 and H2V-5. Repeat venting as directed.'
5.3 Hydrogen Recombiner Recovery NOTE:
Steps 5.3.1 and 5.3.3 may be N/A if only section 5.2 was used.
53.1 Danger tag OFF the following breakers.-
- a. lB52-312B, Z-287, Hydrogen Recombiner disconnect.
- b. Bkr 31 on 18L, Z-287 Hydrogen Recombiner receptacles.
Align Valves per Attachment F.
When directed by the TSC, Disconnect Recombiner. Ref.
component instruction Manual.
5.3.2 5.3.3 OPS OPS OPS' MTN Page 13 of 20 CONTINUOUS USE
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT EPIP 10.3 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES SAFETY RELATED Revision 6 POST-ACCIDENT CONTAIN~MENT HYDROGEN March 26, 2003 REDUCTION
6.0 REFERENCES
6.1 Rockwell Component Instruction Manual, CI #01398 6.2 Bechtel P&ID M-224, Post Accident Containment Veraing and Monitoring System 6.3 Hydrogen Recombiner Video, Number 61 6.4
-SLP 4, Aux Building Main Crane 6.5 EPIP 7.3.2, Post-Accident Isokinetic Stack Sampling System 6.6 P&ID M-224 Post Accident Cont Vent Sys.
7.0 BASES None Pa-e 14 of 20 Page14 o 20CONTINUOUS USE
. POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES POST-ACCIDENT CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN REDUCTION.
EPIP 10.3 SAFETY RELATED Revision 6
. March 26, 2003 ATTACHMENT A NORMAL SYSTEM VALVE LINEUP FOR THE POST ACCIDENT CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM (PACVS)
Valve Name Normal Initials No.
Position Valve Position Designations are as follows.
LO - Locked Open, LS - Locked Shut,
-LS & C - Locked Shut and Capped.
The Following valves are located on the 26' elevation of the PAB.
U1 - Outside Pipeway # 2 U2 - Outside Pipeway # 3 H2-V-1 Containment Exhaust-Isolation LO*
H2-V-2
- Containment Sample LO*
H2-V-4 Containment to Vent Line LS H2-V-5 Containment to Vent. Line Regulator Valve LS
.H2-V-6 Containment Exhaust Drain LS H2-V-7 Containment Exhaust Drain LS&C H2-V-8 Containment Sample LS H2-V-9 Containment Sample LS H2-V-10 Exhaust Line Test Connection LS H2-V-1 1 Sample Line Test Connection LS&C H2-V-16 Containment Exhaust, PI-4199, Pressure Indicator Root Valve LS H2-V-17 Containment Exhaust, PI-4199,-Pressure Indicator Vent Valve Shut H2-V-18 Containment Exhaust, PI-4199, Pressure Indicator Isolation Shut-H2-V-19 Diaphragm Valve (Z-287, Hydrogen Recombiner Isolation)
LS H2-V-20 Diaphragm Valve (Z-287, Hydrogen Recombiner Isolatioh)
LS H2-V-21 Test Connection Shut H2-V-22 'Diaphragm V7, Hydrogen Recombiner Isolation LS H2-V-23 Diaphragm Valve (Z-287, Hydrogen Recombiner Isolation LS H2-V-24 Test Connection Drain LS&C l H2-V-25 Test Connection Drain LS&C The following valves are located on the 8" elevation of the PAB.
U I - Outside Pip'eway # 2-U2 - Outside Pipeway # 4 H2-V-3 Containment Air Supply LO*
H2-V-12 Supply Air to Containment LS H2-V-13 Supply Air to Containment LS&C H2-V-14 Supply Air Test Connection LS&C H2-V-15 Supply Air Test Connection LS&C I
These valves are located in the Pipeways and are normally locked open. Because of high radiation levels in the pipeways after the accident, it may NOT be possible to locally verify the valve position.
Page 15 of 240 CONTINUOUS USE
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES POST-ACCIDENT CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN REDUCTION EPIP 10.3 SAFETY RELATED Revision 6 March 26, 2003 ATTACHMENT B INSTRUMENT AND CONTROL SETTINGS FOR STARTUP AND OPERATION OF HYDROGEN RECOMBINER.
Device Function Setting Initials Temperature Control (deg.F)
TIC-4 Reaction Chamber Gas 1350 TISH-3 HeaterOutlet Gas Temperature 1325 TISH-6-Gas Return Temperature J90 Circuit Breakers lCB I Enclosed Blower/Motor Closed CB2 Heat Exchanger Fan Motor Closed CB3 Heaters Closed CB4 Instrument Control Power Cl6sed-CB5 Primary Power Closed Start Switch -_-_-
HS-Start-Stop Switch Center NOTE; HS-1 is a monietitary switch and -will return to center after operation.
Timers KS-I Low Temperature Start Cutoff 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> Motor Starter JS-l Enclosed Blower/Mptor Auto JS&
Heat. Exchanger Fan Motor Auto Valves VI Different4al Pressure Transmitter - Low Pressure Open V2 Differential Pressure Transmitter - High Pressure Open V3 Blower Inlet Valve Open
-Pa-e 16 of 20 CONTINUOUS USE
- POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES POST-ACCIDENT CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN REDUCTION EPIP 10.3 SAFETY RELATED Revision 6 March 26, 2003 ATTACHMENT C HYDROGEN RECOMBINER INSTALLATION
.I S.
Ir
>2 HX-1 3B
(~
I
-)
SFPH X's HX-1 3A SFP &
BA EVAP
- FILTERS, NEW GAS STRIP.
FUEL PREFILTER
.ROOM WASTE GAS COMPRESSOR ROOM RECOMB.
X71 LOCAO HATCH TYP.
S~H1 H2 RECOMI.
CONTROL vI 7 ETS Ni~_
HATCH E
I
-E LOCATION EL.46' Page I17 of 20 CONTINUOUS USE
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES POST-ACCIDENT CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN REDUCTION EPIP 10.3 SAFETY RELATED Revision 6 March 26, 2003 ATTACHMENT D PROPRIETARY INFORMATION OF ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION -
- N1390MM120004 Difficulty
. -Probable Cause
[
Remedial Action Temperature controller of switch indicates full scale, followed by. automatic system shutdown.
System sbutdown due to low-temperature indication.
Blower motor highi~empera~ture'.
.tnp.
Blower motor and hieat exchang~er fan shut off, causing system shutdown.
Temperature controller Thdicates zero,:and system shuts down due to 16w-temperature icaondition.
Blower low flhtw annunciates immediamtoy after acuating HS,1.
.Thermo-couple failure or associated circuit-failure of
.indicated channel.
- a. Temperature controller or-temperature switch failure.
- b. Low-voltage power provided. to-.
system.
- c. Heater failures (more than 33%
of heaters, which. is unlikely).
- d. Thermocouple failure.
- e. Circiit breaker failure.
C6ntainnment outlet valve closed or partially closed.
- a. Outlet teinperatufe'tbo high.
- b. Circuit breaker failure (CYV1 or CB2).
Cohnroller circuit open.
Containment isolation valves are.
partially or c'ornpletely closed; VI, V2, or V3 cosed.
Replace thermocouple associated with failed circuit-or associated circuit. The redundant thermo-couple leads are wired to the terminal block in the control console. The instrument leads
-must be connected to the reduridaint thermocouple leads.
- 1. Repaitbf replace component.
- 2. Improve facility power supply.
- 3..Replace open heaters, after
.determ'ining by-resistance test,. which are bad.
- 4. Switch to spare..
- 5. Repair or replace component.
Open containment outlet valve.
- 1. Make sure exhaust and inlet areas are clear of.obstructions.
- 2. Repair or replace components.
Replace 'or repair controller, or wiring.totbe SCR or SCR trigger circuits.
Make sure containment valves VI, V2, and'V3 are open.
=-
Z.
I I
I Z I
Page 18 of 20 CONTINUOUS USE
(
c OhIT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EPIP 10.3 SAFETY RELATED Revision 6 March 26, 2003' C-POST-ACCIDENT CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN REDUCTION ATTACHMENT E POST ACCIDENT CONTAINMENT VENTING RATE 100 0
I-7LU FLOW RATE SOFM Page 19 of 20 CONTINUOUS USE
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES POST-ACCIDENT CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN REDUCTION EPIP 10.3 SAFETY RELATED Revision 6 March 26, 2003
'Ij ATTACHMENT F RECOVERY VALVE LINEUP FOR THE PACVS Valve Name Normal Performed IV No.
-Position (Initials)
(Initials)
Valve Position Designations are as follows,
. LO - Locked Open, LS - Locked Shut, LS & C - Locked Shut and Capped.
The Following valves are located on the.
26' elevation of the PAB.
U1 - Outside Pipeway #2 U2 -; Outside Pipeway #3 H2-V-1 Containment Exhaust Isolation LO*
H2-V-2 Containment Sample LO*.
H2-V-4
-Containment to Vent Line LS H2-V-5
..,Containment to Vent. Line Regulator Valve LS H2-V-6 Containment Exhaust Drain LS H2-V-7 Containment Exhaust Drain LS&C lH2-V-8 Containment Sample
-LS..
H2-V-9 Containment Sample LS H2-V-10 Exhaust Line Test Connection LS H2-V-I I Sample.Line Test Connection LS&C H2-V-16.
Containment Exhaust, PI-4199, Pressure Indicator Root Valve LS H2-V-17 Containment Exhaust,.PI-4199, Pressure Indicator Vent Valve Shut
-_ -l H2-V-18 Containment Exhaust, PI-4199, Pressure Indicator Isolation Shut H2-V-19 Diaphragm Valve (Z-287, Hydrogen Recombiner Isolation)
LS H2-V-20 Diaphragm Valve (Z-287. Hydrogen Recombiner Isolation)
LS -.
H2-V-21 Test Connection Shut H2-V-22 Diaphragm Valve (Z-287,,Hydrogen Recombiner Isolation)
LS H2-V-23 Diaphragm Valve (Z-287, Hydrogen Recombiner Isolation LS H2-V-24 Test Connection Drain LS&C H2-V-25 Test Connection Drain LS&C The following valves are located on the 8' elevation of the PAB.
U1 - Outside Pipeway #2 U2 - Outside Pipeway #4 H2-V-3 Containment Air Supply LO*
H2-V-12 Supply Air to Containment LS H2-V-13 Supply. Air to Containment LS&C H2-V-14 Supply Air Test Connection LS&C H2-V-15.
Supply Air Test Connection LS&C
/
These valves are located in the Pipeways and are normally locked open. Because of high radiation levels in the pipeways after the accident, it may NOT bie possible-to locally verify the valve position.
Paae 20 of 20 CONTINUOUS USE,