NRC-2010-0029, Comment (73) of Nina Bell, on Behalf of Northwest Environmental Advocates, on Draft Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement for Renewed Operating License NPF-21, for Columbia Generating Station; NUREG-1437, Supplement 47

Comment (73) of Nina Bell, on Behalf of Northwest Environmental Advocates, on Draft Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement for Renewed Operating License NPF-21, for Columbia Generating Station; NUREG-1437, Supplement 47

ML11363A047
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	11/16/2011
From:	Bell N Northwest Environmental Advocates
To:	Cindy Bladey Rulemaking, Directives, and Editing Branch
References
76FR54502 00073, NRC-2010-0029-0015, NUREG-1437
Download: ML11363A047 (148)

Text

Gallaghier, Carol From: Bladey, Cindy Sent: Wednesday, November 16, 2011 6:28 PM To: Gallagher, Carol

Subject:

Fw: NUREG-1437, Supp. 47.DSEIS Comments -- Attachment that is too large to submit to regulations.gov Attachments: Yakima Fold 2011 Blakley Part 2 of 4 (part one).pdf From: Nina Bell <nbellcadvocates-nwea.org>

To: Bladey, Cindy Sent: Wed Nov 16 18:14:44 2011

Subject:

NUREG-1437, Supp. 47 DSEIS Comments -- Attachment that is too large to submit to regulations.gov

Dear Ms. Bladey,

Please find attached part 2 of 4 of a document that was too large'to process through the regulations.govwebsite. I was able to submit Parts 1, 3, and 4, after which the website would no ionger take my information. In addition, I have had to break up part 2 into two pieces so this is the first of.two emails. Thank you very much for including this document in, our comments on the DSEIS for the Columbia Generating Station-.

C:

Nina Bell, J.D., Executive Director r--

Northwest Environmental Advocates ** F I P.O&Box 12187 .0 Portland, OR 97212-0187 C-)

www.NorthwestEnvironmentalAdvocates.org

.1-i i::j nbellhadvocates-nwea.org

• m C)D 503/295-0490 kdn e-k. 2

Gallagher, Carol From: Bladey, Cindy Sent: Thursday, November 17, 2011 7:26 AM To: Gallagher, Carol

Subject:

Fw: pages 6-7 Attachments: Yakima Fold 2011 Blakley Part 2 of 4 (part two) pages 6-7.pdf From: Nina Bell <nbeIl(ladvocates-nwea.orq>

To: Bladey, Cindy Sent: Wed Nov 16 23:10:10 2011

Subject:

pages 6-7 I'm not sure if that last email will bounce so I divided the four pages into two sections of two pages each. I hope you won't have to use these.

Nina Bell, J.D., Executive Director Northwest Environmental Advocates P.O. Box 12187 Portland, OR 97212-0187 www.NorthwestEnvironmentalAdvocates.org nbellgadvocates-nwea.org 503/295-0490 I.

Page 1 of 2 As of: November 17, 2011 Received: November 16, 2011 PUBLIC PUBLC SUBMISSION SBMISIONTracking No. 80f6dfb9 tauas: renlnfg_roSL Comments Due: November 16, 2011 Submission Type: Web Docket: NRC-2010-0029 Notice of Receipt and Availability of Application for Renewal of Columbia Generating Station Facility Operating License Comment On: NRC-2010-0029-0015 Energy Northwest, Columbia Generating Station; Notice of Availability of Draft Supplement 47 to the Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants and Public Meetings for the License Renewal of Columbia Generating Station Document: NRC-2010-0029-DRAFT-0074 Comment on FR Doc # 2011-22415 Submitter Information Name: Nina Bell Address:

P.O. Box 12187 Portland, OR, 97212 Submitter's Representative: Nina Bell Organization: Northwest Environmental Advocates General Comment Please see attached. Final document will be attached in a separate comment due to its size.

Attachments Petition for Review of LBP-l 1-27 (11-2-11)

NWEA Motion to Reinstate Contention 10-28-11 Reply Memorandum re Fukushima Contentions 9-13-11 Comments on DSEIS November 2011 Petition to Intervene CGS v3 Makhijani Declaration for new Fukushima Contention with CV 8-8-11 (2) https://fdms.erulemaking.net/fdms-web-agency/component/contentstreamer?objectld=090000648Of6dfb... 11/17/2011

Page 2 of 2 Arjun Makhijani declaration and CV 19 April 2011 https://fdms.erulemaking.net/fdms-web-agency/component/contentstreamer?objectld=0900006480f6dfb... 11/17/2011

Page 1 of I As of: November 17, 2011 Received: November 16, 2011 PUBLIC PUBLC SUBMISSION SBMISIONTracking Status: PendingPost No. 80f6dfca Comments Due: November 16, 2011 Submission Type: Web Docket: NRC-2010-0029 Notice of Receipt and Availability of Application for Renewal of Columbia Generating Station Facility Operating License Comment On: NRC-2010-0029-0015 Energy Northwest, Columbia Generating Station; Notice of Availability of Draft Supplement 47 to the Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants and Public Meetings for the License Renewal of Columbia Generating Station Document: NRC-2010-0029-DRAFT-0075 Comment on FR Doc # 2011-22415 Submitter Information Name: Nina Bell Address:

P.O. Box 12187 Portland, OR, 97212 Submitter's Representative: Nina Bell Organization: Northwest Environmental Advocates General Comment I am submitting the last attachment to the comments of Northwest Environmental Advocates to Cindy.Bladey@nrc.gov because the file is too big to attach through this program.

httpsH//fdms.erulemaking.netlfdms-web-agency/component/contentstreamer?objectld=090000648Of6dfc... 11/17/2011

Page 1 of 1 As of: November 17, 2011 Received: November 16, 2011 PUBLIC PUBLC SUBMISSION SBMISIONTracking tatus: No. 80f6e02a FencdingPost Comments Due: November 16, 2011 Submission Type: Web Docket: NRC-2010-0029 Notice of Receipt and Availability of Application for Renewal of Columbia Generating Station Facility Operating License Comment On: NRC-2010-0029-0015 Energy Northwest, Columbia Generating Station; Notice of Availability of Draft Supplement 47 to the Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants and Public Meetings for the License Renewal of Columbia Generating Station Document: NRC-2010-0029-DRAFT-0076 Comment on FR Doc # 2011-22415 Submitter Information Name: Nina Bell Address:

P.O. Box 12187 Portland, OR, 97212 Submitter's Representative: Nina Bell Organization: Northwest Environmental Advocates General Comment Attachment to previous comments, part I of 4.

Attachments Yakima Fold 2011 Blakley part 1 of 4 https://fdms.erulemaking.net/fdms-web-agency/componentlcontentstreamer?obj ectld=0900006480f6e02... 11/17/2011

Page 1 of 1 As of: November 17, 2011 Received: November 16, 2011 PUBLIC PUBLC SUBMISSION SBMISIONTracking tatus: Penldingfost No. 80f6e02f Comments Due: November 16, 2011 Submission Type: Web Docket: NRC-2010-0029 Notice of Receipt and Availability of Application for Renewal of Columbia Generating Station Facility Operating License Comment On: NRC-2010-0029-0015 Energy Northwest, Columbia Generating Station; Notice of Availability of Draft Supplement 47 to the Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants and Public Meetings for the License Renewal of Columbia Generating Station Document: NRC-2010-0029-DRAFT-0077 Comment on FR Doc # 2011-22415 Submitter Information Name: Nina Bell Address:

P.O. Box 12187 Portland, OR, 97212 Submitter's Representative: Nina Bell Organization: Norrthwest Environmental Advocates General Comment Attachment to previous comment, part 3 of 4.

Attachments Yakima Fold 2011 Blakley Part 3 of 4 https://fdms.erulemaking.netlfdms-web-agency/componentlcontentstreamer?obj ectld=0900006480f6e02... 11/17/2011

Page 1 of I As of: November 17, 2011 Received: November 16, 2011 PUBLICPUBLC SUBMISSION SBMISIONTracking jMtatus: renlinvgYost No. 80fe032 Comments Due: November 16, 2011 Submission Type: Web Docket: NRC-2010-0029 Notice of Receipt and Availability of Application for Renewal of Columbia Generating Station Facility Operating License Comment On: NRC-2010-0029-0015 Energy Northwest, Columbia Generating Station; Notice of Availability of Draft Supplement 47 to the Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants and Public Meetings for the License Renewal of Columbia Generating Station Document: NRC-2010-0029-DRAFT-0078 Comment on FR Doc # 2011-22415 Submitter Information Name: Nina Bell Address:

P.O. Box 12187 Portland, OR, 97212 Submitter's Representative: Nina Bell Organization: Northwest Environmental Advocates General Comment Part 4 of 4 attachment to previous comments.

Attachments Yakima Fold 2011 Blakley Part 4 of 4 https://fdms.erulemaking.netlfdms-web-agency/componentlcontentstreamer?objectld=0900006480f6e03... 11/17/2011

NORTHWEST ENVIRONMENTAL ADVOCATES November 16, 2011 Cindy Bladey, Chief Rules, Announcements, and Directives Branch Office of Administration Mail Stop: TWB-05-BO1M U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Re: Draft Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement for renewed operating license NPF-21, for the Columbia Generating Station; NUREG-1437, Supplement 47

Dear Ms. Bladey:

Northwest Environmental Advocates submits the following comments on the Draft Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (DSEIS) for renewed operating license NPF-21, for the Columbia Generating Station.

We hereby attach and incorporate by reference the following documents:

1. Petition for Hearing and Leave to Intervene in Operating License Renewal for Energy Northwest's Columbia Generating Station, August 22, 2011, pages 5 - 7, and from page 17 to the end;

2. Reply Memorandum Regarding Timeliness and Admissibility of New Contentions Seeking Consideration of Environmental Implications of Fukushima Task Force Report in Individual Reactor Licensing Proceedings, September 13, 2011;

3. Declaration of Dr. Arjun Makhijani Regarding Safety and Environmental Significance of NRC Task Force Report Regarding Lessons Learned from Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Accident, August 8, 2011;

4. Motion to Reinstate and Supplement the Basis for Fukushima Task Force Report Contention, October 28, 2011;

5. Declaration of Dr. Aijun Makhijani in Support of Emergency Petition to Suspend All Pending Reactor Licensing Decisions and Related Rulemaking Decsisions Pending Investigation of Lessons Learned from Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Accident, April 19, 2011;

6. Blakely et al, Connecting the Yakima fold and thrust belt to active faults in the Puget Lowland, Washington, Journal of Geophysical Research, July 28, 2011; and www.NorthwestEnvironmnentalAdvocates.org P.O. Box 12187, Portland, OR 97212-0187 Phone (503) 295-0490 Fax Upon Request Printed on 100% post-consumer recycled, non-de-inked, non-rebleacbedpaper

Cindy Bladey November 16, 2011 Page 2

7. Petition for Review of LBP-I 1-27.

In addition we have the following comments. The DSEIS fails completely to address the implications for aging reactors and aging reactor components of the Fukushmia Daiichi reactor accident, as does the NRC Task Force Report, and therefore fails to meet the requirements of NEPA. In addition, the DSEIS fails to update the possible radiation effects from an accident based on the events at the Fukushima reactor including, specifically, the distance from the plant of dispersal of radioactive materials, discussed in Item No 1 above, pages 5-7. And, the DSEIS fails to update the potential costs to the environment and public health from the facility based on new information about the seismicity of the area where the Columbia Generating Station is located.

Sincerely, Nina Bell Executive Director

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE SECRETARY

)

In the Matter of )

)

ENERGY NORTHWEST ) Docket No. 50-397-LR

)

(Columbia Generating Station) ) August 22, 2011 PETITION FOR HEARING AND LEAVE TO INTERVENE IN OPERATING LICENSE RENEWAL FOR ENERGY NORTHWEST'S COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION Comes now Petitioner Northwest Environmental Advocates and respectfully seeks a hearing and leave to intervene in the operating license renewal for the Columbia Generating Station, Docket No. 50-397-LR. Northwest Environmental Advocates (hereinafter "NWEA" or "Petitioner") was founded in 1969 by citizens who were concerned about the imminent operation of the Trojan Nuclear Power Plant, located along the Columbia River at Rainier, Oregon.

Known then as the Coalition for Safe Power, the organization was known best in its first decade and a half for its involvement in U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") licensing hearings for the construction and operation of reactors in Oregon and Washington. NWEA also filed numerous petitions concerning safety matters to the Commission pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.206, including a petition addressing the impacts of the eruption of the Mt. Helens volcano on the safe operation of Trojan and emergency evacuation considerations and one concerning the unsafe construction of the Washington Public Power Supply System ("WPPSS") No. 2 reactor, now renamed the Columbia Generating Station. As Northwest Environmental Advocates, the organization has broadened the scope of its work to include protection of water, air, and habitat quality primarily but not exclusively in the Pacific Northwest.

I. Request for Hearing and Petition for Leave to Intervene Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(a), Northwest Environmental Advocates files this petition

seeking a hearing and leave to intervene in the operating license renewal for Energy Northwest's Columbia Generating Station (hereinafter "CGS"), facility operating license NPF-21. The pending application for an operating license renewal would authorize an additional 20 years of operation beyond the period specified in the current operating license which expires on December 20, 2023.

Energy Northwest submitted its application for the 20-year renewal on January 19, 2010.

75 Fed. Reg. 5353 (February 2, 2010). A notice of acceptance for docketing of this application and a notice of opportunity for a hearing regarding the renewal of the CGS was noticed in the Federal Register on March 11, 2010. 75 Fed. Reg. 11572 (March 11, 2010). Pursuant to that notice and 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(1), "any person whose interest may be affected by a proceeding and who desires to participate as a party must file a written request for hearing and a specification of the contentions which the person seeks to have litigated in the hearing." This document constitutes Petitioner Northwest Environmental Advocates' written request for a hearing, petition for leave to intervene, and its specification of the contentions it wishes to litigate in the proceedings.

II. Standing Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(d), Petitioner NWEA addresses the requirements for standing:

A. The Name, Address and Telephone Number of the Petitioner The name, address, and telephone number of the Petitioner is as follows:

Nina Bell, Executive Director Northwest Environmental Advocates P.O. Box 12187 Portland, OR 97212 503/295-0490 B. Nature of Petitioner's Right to be Made a Party to the Proceeding Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(d)(ii), a petitioner must set out the nature of the petitioner's right under the Atomic Energy Act to be made a party to the proceeding. When NWEA PETITION TO INTERVENE 2

assessing whether a petitioner has set forth a sufficient interest to intervene, NRC licensing boards generally rely on judicial concepts of standing. See Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, L.L. C., & Entergy Nuclear Operations,Inc. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station),

LBP-04-28, 60 NRC 548, 552 (2004). Those concepts "require the petitioner to show that (1) he or she has personally suffered or will personally suffer a distinct and palpable harm that constitutes injury in fact; (2) the injury can fairly be traced to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision." See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). Additionally, the petitioner must meet the "prudential" standing requirement by showing that the asserted interest arguably falls within the zone of interests protected by the governing law. "For construction permit and operating license proceedings, the Commission generally has recognized a presumption in favor of standing for those persons who have frequent contacts with the area near a nuclear power plant." See, e.g., ClevelandElec. Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1), CLI-93-21, 38 NRC 87, 95 (1993). In particular, "Commission case law has established a 'proximity presumption,' whereby an individual may satisfy ... standing requirements by demonstrating that his or her residence or activities are within the geographical area that might be affected by an accidental release of fission products, and in proceedings involving nuclear power plants this area has been defined as being within a 50-mile radius of such a plant." CarolinaPower & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1),

LBP-07-11, 65 NRC 41, 52 (2007).

Moreover, when an organization, such as the instant Petitioner, seeks to intervene in a proceeding, it must demonstrate either organizational or representational standing. Petitioner NWEA seeks to intervene based on representational standing, by demonstrating that one or more of its members would have standing to intervene on their own, and that the identified members have authorized the organization to request a hearing on their behalf. See Shaw AREVA MOX Servs. (Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility), LBP-07-14, 66 NRC 169, 183 (2007). In addition, the interests that the representative organization seeks to protect must be germane to its NWEA PETITION TO INTERVENE 3

own purpose, and neither the asserted claim nor the requested relief must require an individual member to participate in the organization's legal action. Id.

Petitioner NWEA asserts representational standing based on the attached declaration of Tom Bailie, a farmer who lives approximately 18 miles from the CGS, a "downwinder" already affected by the operations of the Hanford Nuclear Reservation. The Bailie declaration demonstrates that this member is concerned about the effects on his health and safety associated with extending the reactor operation of the CGS for 20 years beyond the year 2023. His declaration establishes that he would suffer a distinct and palpable harm to constitute injury-in-fact within the zone of interest that are to be protected by the AEA, 42 U.S.C. 2011, et seq. and the injury can be fairly traced to the challenged action and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. An alleged injury to health and safety, shared equally by many, can form the basis for standing. See PhiladelphiaElec. Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2),

LBP-82-43A, 15 NRC 1423, 1434 (1982). Even minor radiological exposures resulting from a proposed license activity can be enough to create the requisite injury-in-fact. See Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist. (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), LBP-91-17, 33 NRC 379, 391 (1991). Therefore, under the 50-mile presumption explained above, the declarant could have brought this action on his own behalf. Second, the Bailie declaration states that he has authorized NWEA to represent his interests in this licensing proceeding. Third, Petitioner NWEA's objectives in this matter are to protect the public health and safety and the environment by challenging the issuance of an operating license extension to the CGS, purposes which are germane to the health, safety, and environmental interests asserted by its members. Finally, neither the asserted claims nor the requested relief requires an individual member to participate in this action.

NWEA also relies on the declaration of Bruce Smartlowit who resides, works, and recreates in and around Wapato, approximately 50 miles from the CGS. For example, Mr.

Smartlowit's post office box is located in Toppenish, which is roughly 48 miles from the CGS.

NWEA PETITION TO INTERVENE 4

Mr. Smartlowit has frequent contacts with the zone of possible harm from the CGS and therefore NWEA may rely upon his membership for standing. See Pa 'ina Hawaii, LLC, LBP-06-4, 63 NRC at 105 (citing Fla. Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), LBP-01-6, 53 NRC 138, 146 (2001), aff'don other grounds, CLI-01-17, 54 NRC 3 (2001)).

NWEA also relies on the declaration of Scott Madison whose home and ranch lie approximately 50 miles from the CGS. The Madison and Smartlowit declarations similarly demonstrate that these members are concerned about the effects on their health and safety associated with extending the reactor operation of the CGS, establishes that they would suffer a distinct and palpable harm to constitute injury-in-fact, and that such injury can be fairly traced to the challenged action and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.

Petitioner has shown that it has members who live, work, and recreate within the 50-mile radius of the CGS, as well as members who do not reside within the 50-mile radius but who have frequent and regular contacts with the zone of possible harm from the CGS.

Therefore, Petitioner has demonstrated it has standing to intervene in this proceeding. In addition, Petitioner relies upon members for standing who are outside the 50-mile radius of the CGS.

The Commission has long used the 50-mile presumption to establish standing. The Commission has noted that "[t]he rule of thumb generally applied in reactor licensing proceedings" includes "a presumption of standing for persons who reside or frequent the area within a 50-mile radius of the facility." Sequoyah Fuels, CLI-94-12, 40 NRC at 77. See also North Anna, ALAB-522, 9 NRC at 56; GulfStates Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-183, 7 AEC 222 (1974). The 50-mile presumption "is a recognition of the potential effects at significant distances from the facility of the accidental release of fissionable materials."

Babcock & Wilcox (Apollo, Pennsylvania Fuel Fabrication Facility), LBP-93-4, 37 NRC 72, 83 (1993). However, this 50-mile presumption is now outdated in light of the effects of the nuclear accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear facility in Japan. For example, tests of the land NWEA PETITION TO INTERVENE 5

surrounding the sewage sludge incineration plant at Tokyo, Koutou-ku on May 22-25, 2011 showed high levels of contamination from Fukushima, reflecting the incineration of radioactive sludge from the accident.' The distance between Fukushima and Tokyo is approximately 238 kilometers or 148 miles. 2 Soil samples around the incineration plant showed contamination of cesium-137 at up to 122,000 Bq/m 2 (9-2 Ohshima Koutou-Ku, Toyko) as compared to the Belarusian limit of 37,000 Bq/m 2.3 Radioactive contamination has also been identified south of Tokyo, 180 miles from Fukushima.4 Likewise, soil samples taken in May 15-17, 2011 demonstrated levels of cesium- 137 up to 44,480 Bq/m 2 (Tsukazaki Kashiwa City, Chiba Prefecture)5 , again exceeding the Belarusian limit.

Another source of information concerning the geographic reach of radioactive materials from Fukushima is available in a map prepared by Yukio Hayakawa, a volcanologist at Gunma University. Because Japanese government officials have failed to adequately monitor radiation, particularly outside both a 30- and an 80-kilometer radius of Fukushima, radiation physicists and local government officials in Japan have been measuring radiation levels. Dr. Hayakawa plotted "Results of ACRO's monitoring in Japan (25th july 2011 update)," available at http://www.acro.eu.org/OCJ_en.html#result%203rd%20camp0 (last visited Aug. 2, 2011).

2 See, e.g., availableat http://distancecalculator.globefeed.com/Japan Distance Result.aspfromplace=Fukushima%20%2 8Fukushima%29&toplace=Tokyo%20%2 8Tokyo%729

&fromlat=37.75&tolat=35.6811259942652&fromlng= 140.4666667&tolng= 139.76705789566 (last visited Aug. 2, 2011).

3 Id. at "Surrounding of the sludge incineration plant of Tokyo, Koutou-ku (22-25th May 2011)," (last visited Aug. 2, 2011).

4 "Radiation 'hotspots' hinder Japan response to nuclear crisis," availableat http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2011/6/14/worldupdates/20 11-06-14T 153803Z 01 NOOTRRTRMDNC_0_-576864-1 &sec=Worldupdates (last visited Aug. 2, 2011).

5 "Results of ACRO's monitoring in Japan (25th july 2011 update)," at "Soil from the surroundings of Tokyo (15-17th of May 2011), available at http://www.acro.eu.org/

OCJen.html#result%203rd%20camp0" (last visited Aug. 2, 2011).

NWEA PETITION TO INTERVENE 6

the data on a map.6 This map demonstrates wide contamination of areas to both the North and South of the Fukushima plant with exposures over 1 millisevert/year 7 at least 200 kilometers or 120 miles from the accident site.' All of the color-shaded areas on this map represent levels of unsafe radiation from the Fukushima accident.

As the accident at Fukushima has demonstrated, nuclear reactor accidents can and do result in the distribution of unsafe levels of radioactive materials far outside the presumptive 50-mile radius used by the NRC in evaluating the standing of a petitioner. Therefore, Petitioner NWEA may correctly rely for standing on declarants who reside both slightly outside and well outside the 50-mile radius but close enough to be affected by the CGS.

Additionally, Petitioner has a right to participate in the license renewal for the CGS because its has standing and has submitted an admissible contention. See 10 C.F.R. § 2.309, 42 U.S.C. § 2339(a)(1). The admissible contention is set out in Section IV below.

C. Nature and Extent of the Petitioner's Interest in the Proceeding NRC regulations require that the Petitioner establish the nature and extent of the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding. 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(d)(iii).

Established in 1969 to oppose operation of the Trojan Nuclear Power Plant, NWEA subsequently engaged in extensive participation in nuclear licensing proceedings as well as demonstrated its leadership in protecting environmental quality of the Pacific Northwest. In 6 ENENews, "Radiation hot spots found in Tokyo - 3.5 times limit set by Japanese law (MAP)," June 18, 2011 availableat http://enenews.com/radiation-hot-spots-found-tokyo-35-times-limit-set-japanese-law (last visited Aug. 3, 2011). The same data, measured by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology Japan (MEXT) and local governments at 1.0 or 0.5 meters height are available on an interactive map availableat http://www.nnistar.com/gmap/fukushima.html (last visited Aug. 3,2011).

Assuming 0.114 microsieverts/hour is equivalent to 1.0 millisieverts/year.

S Yukio Hayakawa (Gunma Univ.), "Radiation contour map of the Fukushima Daiichi accident" available at http://gunma.zamurai.jp/pub/2011/18June.pdf (last visited Aug. 3, 2011).

NWEA PETITION TO INTERVENE 7

particular, NWEA has focused on restoring and protecting the water quality of the Columbia River, which is both the receiving water for the CGS discharge and would be affected by an accident at the CGS, through its efforts to obtain National Estuary Program (NEP) protection for the Columbia River under Section 320 of the Clean Water Act, its co-chairing of the Lower Columbia River Bi-State Water Quality Program, its publication of educational maps including Columbia River: Troubled Waters, a now-terminated boat-based education program called RiverWatch, among many other activities. NWEA has also participated extensively in the development of Clean Water Act (CWA) regulatory programs for the States of Oregon and Washington including the triennial review of state water quality standards for a wide range of pollutants, the identification of impaired waters pursuant to section 303(d) of the CWA, and the development of Total Maximum Daily Loads (TMDLs) to restore water quality in impaired waters in both states.

NWEA has a long history of advocating for safe and renewable energy resources including its 1996 lawsuit seeking to clean up the air emissions from the Centralia Coal Plant; its development of the Oregon CO2 Standard passed by the Oregon Legislature to offset greenhouse gases from new fossil fuel facilities and which led to the establishment of the Oregon Climate Trust; and its 1987 efforts that resulted in the closure of the N-Reactor at Hanford, a one-of-a-kind energy- and plutonium-generating nuclear reactor with no containment, following Congressional hearings with three NWEA experts after the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster in the Soviet Union.

In short, NWEA has a long and wide history of litigation and administrative involvement in environmental concerns in the Pacific Northwest as well as many national issues. NWEA seeks to protect its members' health, safety, and lives as well as the health and safety of the general public by ensuring, inter alia, that the NRC fulfills its non-discretionary duty under the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") to consider the new and significant information such as that advanced in the Petitioner's contention set out below. Petitioner has an interest in NWEA PETITION TO INTERVENE 8

this proceeding because of the "obvious potential for offsite consequences" to its members' health and safety. In the Matter Pacific Gas & Electric Co., (Diablo Canyon Power Plant Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-02-23, 56 NRC 413, 426-27, citing Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), LBP-0 1-6, 53 NRC 138, 146, aff'd, CLI-01-17, 54 NRC 3 (2001).

D. Possible Effect of the Proceeding on Petitioner's Interest Last, pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(d)(iv) the petitioner must set out the possible effect of any decision or order that may be issued in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. In response to this petition to intervene, the agency could issue an order that would establish public proceedings to evaluate the environmental and safety issues related to the operating license renewal for the CGP, proceedings that otherwise will not take place because there is no proceeding. Such an order establishing proceedings would allow the Petitioner to raise environmental and safety issues related to the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Facility accident that otherwise would, or would not, be resolved by the agency outside public proceedings and without public input. Relicensing the CGS will result in adverse health and safety risks to NWEA's members and supporters. As noted above, Petitioner's interest in a safe, clean, and healthful environment would be served by the issuance of an order requiring the NRC to fulfill its non-discretionary duty under NEPA to consider new and significant information before making a licensing decision. See Silva v. Romney, 473 F.2d 287, 292 (1st Cir. 1973).

Compliance with NEPA ensures that environmental issues are given full consideration in "the ongoing programs and actions of the Federal Government." Marsh v. Oregon NaturalRes.

Council, 490 U.S. 360, 371 n.14 (1989).

III. Nontimely Filing Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(c)(2), NWEA addresses below the factors associated with nontimely filings set out in 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(c)(1), seeking a determination by the Commission, the presiding officer, or the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board designated to rule on this NWEA PETITION TO INTERVENE 9

request, petition and contention that the request should be granted, the petition should be granted, and the contentions should be admitted.

A. Good Cause NRC regulations require that an untimely petition demonstrate "[g]ood cause, if any, for the failure to file on time." 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(c)(i)(i). The bases for NWEA's untimely petition are as follows. First, NWEA was not made aware of the opportunity to petition to intervene when Energy Northwest submitted its application for the 20-year renewal and the NRC issued a notice of opportunity for a hearing regarding the renewal of the CGS in the Federal Register on March 11, 2010. Coming as it did, a full thirteen years before the expiration of the CGS operating license, NWEA did not anticipate the notice of opportunity for hearing would be filed so many years prior to expiration of the operating license. Additionally, given NWEA's long-time interest in commercial nuclear reactors in Washington State, having most recently been intervenors in the Operating License proceedings for Washington Public Power Supply System

("WPPSS") Units 1 & 4 (Hanford), the Operating License proceedings for WPPSS Units 3 & 5 (Satsop), Construction Permit proceedings for the proposed Skagit/Hanford Units 1 & 2, and having submitted a substantial petition to the Commission pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.206 concerning the operational safety of the WPPSS No. 2 reactor, now known as the Columbia Generating Station, we incorrectly assumed that the licensee and the NRC staff would consider us potentially interested parties and would therefore inform us of the notice when it was issued.

NWEA was maintained on a variety of mailing lists associated with the aforementioned NRC proceedings long after the subject nuclear power plants were abandoned and the licensing proceedings terminated. It was therefore improbable that the NRC would not include NWEA on any physical mailings of any notice associated with the operating license of the GCS. Yet NWEA received no such notice.

Second, NWEA seeks to raise concerns about the operating license extension that are related to the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear accident which had not yet taken place on the date of NWEA PETITION TO INTERVENE 10

the notice of March 11, 2010 because the accident only began on March 11, 2011, precisely 12 months later. The NRC has held that new developments and the availability of new information support late-filed motions to intervene. See Duke Power Co. (Amendment to Materials License SNM- 1773- Transportation of Spent Fuel from Oconee Nuclear Station for Storage at McGuire Nuclear Station), ALAB-528 9 NRC 146, 148-49 (1979); Consumer Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-82-62, 16 NRC 571, 577 (1982); Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station Units, 1 &2), CLI-92, 36 NRC 62, 69-73 (1992). The availability of material information "is a significant factor in a Board's determination of whether a motion based on such information is timely filed." Houston Lighting & Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 & 2), LBP-85-19, 21 NRC 1707, 1723 (1985) (internal citations omitted). This petition and the accompanying contention are based upon information contained within a report which was not released until July 12, 2011. Although the Fukushima accident began on March 11, 2011, prior to issuance of the NRC's "Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor Safety in the 21st Century: The Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," (hereinafter "Task Force Report") dated July 12, 2011, the information material to the contention was simply unavailable. Moreover, NWEA could not have proposed a contention based on the Fukushima accident based on news accounts alone immediately after the accident but, rather, was required to wait until some reputable entity, such as the U.S. NRC, issued technical findings upon which a contention or contention could be based. In this case, NWEA has acted promptly in response to the issuance of the Task Force Report, thereby satisfying the requirement to demonstrate good cause.9 The information upon which the petition and accompanying contention are based is materially different than information previously available. Five months ago there was no nuclear accident that had occurred at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant. Nor was there the 9 A slight additional delay was encountered due to one of NWEA's declarant's being in Fukushima, Japan at the time this petition was being finalized.

NWEA PETITION TO INTERVENE 11

Task Force Report to provide a "systematic and methodical review of [NRC] processes and regulations to determine whether the agency should make additional improvements to its regulatory system." Task Force Report at vii. In response to that directive, the Task Force made twelve "overarching" recommendations to "strengthen the regulatory framework for protection against natural disasters, mitigation and emergency preparedness, and to improve the effectiveness of NRC's programs." Id. at viii. In these recommendations the Task Force, for the first time since the Three Mile Island accident occurred in 1979, fundamentally questioned the adequacy of the current level of safety provided by the NRC's program for nuclear reactor regulation.

In the Environmental Report for the CGS, the Applicant has assumed that compliance with existing NRC safety regulations is sufficient to ensure that the environmental impacts of accidents are acceptable. The information in the Task Force Report, however, refutes this assumption and is materially different from the information upon which the ER was based. See attached Declaration of Dr. Arjun Makhijani Regarding Safety and Environmental Significance of NRC Task Force Report Regarding Lessons Learned from Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Accident (hereinafter "Makhijani Declaration").

Finally, the petition and accompanying contention are timely based on the availability of the new information. The NRC has previously found good cause where (1) a contention is based on new information and, therefore, could not have been presented earlier, and (2) the intervenor acted promptly after learning of the new information. Texas Utils. Elec. Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units I & 2), CLI-92-12, 36 NRC 62, 69-73 (1992). Here, the Petitioner has sought to intervene in this license renewal in a timely and prompt fashion, within weeks of publication of the Task Force Report.

B. Right to be Made a Party NRC regulations require that a late-filing petitioner explain the nature of its right under the Atomic Energy Act to be made a party to the proceeding. 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(c)(1)(ii).

NWEA PETITION TO INTERVENE 12

Petitioner incorporates by reference the content of this petition, supra in Section 1I.B, in which NWEA provides the identical information as required by 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(d)(ii) to establish standing.

C. Petitioner's Property, Financial and Other Interests Likewise, NRC regulations require that a late-filing petitioner set out the nature and extent of the petitioner's property, financial or other interest in the proceeding. 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(c)(1)(iii). Petitioner incorporates by reference the content of this petition, supra in Section II.C, in which NWEA provides the identical information as required by 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(d)(iii) to establish standing.

D. Possible Effect of Any Order on the Petitioner's Interest NRC rules require the Petitioner to set out the the possible effect of any order that may be entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(c)(1)(iv). Petitioner incorporates by reference the content of this petition, supra in Section II.D, in which NWEA provides the identical information as required by 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(d)(iv) to establish standing.

E. Other Means by Which the Petitioner's Interests Will be Protected The NRC regulations require the Petitioner to address the "availability of other means whereby the requestor's/petitioner's interest will be protected." 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(c)(1)(v).

With regard to this factor, the question is not whether other parties may protect Petitioner's interests, but rather whether there are other means by which the Petitioner may protect its own interests. Long Island Lighting Co. (Jamesport Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-292, 2 NRC 631 (1975). Quite simply, no other means exist. Only through this hearing does the Petitioner have a right that is judicially enforceable to seek compliance by NRC with NEPA before the license renewal for the CGS is issued, permitting this reactor to operate and impose severe accident risks on the Petitioner and the individuals it represents. The only other means by which the Petitioner's interests will be protected is by the agency's own actions. There is no NWEA PETITION TO INTERVENE 13

proceeding without the granting of Petitioner's request. There are no other parties other than the Petitioner. Based on the issuance of several operating license extensions by the NRC since the start of the Fukushima accident, none of which addressed the lessons learned from Fukushima, including but not limited to the health and safety effects of the accident, it can be deduced that the NRC likewise does not intend to address the health and safety impacts of Fukushima in evaluating the environmental impacts of the CGS. Therefore, only the intervention of the Petitioner NWEA will accomplish this end and protect its and its members' interests.

F. Extent to Which Other Parties Will Represent Petitioner's Interests A late-filed petition must address the "extent to which the requestor's/petitioner's interests will be represented by existing parties." 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(c)(1)(vi). Here, there is no proceeding and there are no existing parties. Therefore, no existing parties can represent the Petitioner's interests.

G. Extent to Which Petitioner's Participation Will Broaden the Issues or Delay the Proceedings The NRC regulations require the late-filed petition to address "[t]he extent to which the requestor's/petitioner's participation will broaden the issues or delay the proceeding." 10 C.F.R.

§ 2.309(c)(1)(vii). This petition is filed 17 months following the date by which the agency originally intended to rule on any petitions to intervene in any proceedings that might have been held. The 17 months must be viewed in light of several considerations. First, the operating license for the CGP does not expire until December 2023, some twelve years from now. The NRC's schedule for relicensing the CGS presents a vast expanse of time in which to address the issues raised by the Petitioner. Specifically, the current proposed schedule calls for the issuance of a Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (FSEIS) in February 2012, a final Safety Evaluation Report (SER) that same month, and a final decision on the pending license extension by June 2012. That date is twelve and a half years before the operating license for the CGS expires. While any participation by any member of the public will perforce broaden the NWEA PETITION TO INTERVENE 14

issues or delay a currently non-existent proceeding, the question is the "extent" to which that is the case and whether it is appropriate to weigh this factor in evaluating the late-filing of the petition and single contention. Presumably the question of extent is relative to the benefits that may accrue the public from the proceeding being held at all and the participation of the petitioner in the proceeding. In this case, given the importance of the health and safety implications of the Fukushima accident on the operation of the CGS and the over twelve years in which those implications can be resolved prior to the need for a final operating license extension, the relative benefits of the Petitioner's participation weighs in favor of granting the petition to intervene.

Second, had NWEA successfully petitioned to intervene in a timely fashion, it would just now be submitting the very proposed contention included in this petition concerning the near-term lessons learned from the Fukushima accident, based on information that could not have been available prior to the accident or prior to the issuance of the Task Force Report. Therefore, such issues could not have been raised in March 2010, even had the Petitioner timely filed its request for a hearing and leave to intervene. Likewise, the NRC will not be addressing these lessons learned until it has performed its analysis. For this reason, the Petitioner's late-filed petition will not cause any delay or broadening of the proceeding beyond the effects of the Fukushima accident itself. The late-filed petition will broaden the issues in that the issues that could have been raised in 2010 did not include those related to the Fukushima accident. That broadening, however, is outweighed in importance by the need to incorporate the lessons learned from the world's most serious nuclear accident with relevance to U.S. commercial reactors.

Likewise, even had the Petitioner timely filed for leave to intervene in 2010, the issues related to the Fukushima accident would not have been raised until they happened. The lack of a proceeding to date does not affect the timeliness of the proceedings that will be held if the petition is granted. Alternatively, there is no on-going proceeding for the late-filed Petition to delay. Instead, the late-filed Petition would, if granted, establish proceedings for which a NWEA PETITION TO INTERVENE 15

procedural schedule can be developed without prejudice to the licensee/applicant or the NRC staff.

Finally, while Petitioner's participation may broaden or delay the proceeding, this factor may not be relied upon to deny this request and petition or to exclude the contention because the NRC has a non-discretionary duty under NEPA to consider new and significant information that arises before it makes its licensing decision. Marsh, 490 U.S. at 373-4.

H. Petitioner's Participation Will Assist in Developing a Sound Record Finally, the NRC requires a late-filed petition to demonstrate "[t]he extent to which the requestor's/petitioner's participation may reasonably be expected to assist in developing a sound record." 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(c)(1)(viii). NWEA was formed in 1969 to work for the safety of nuclear power reactors in the Pacific Northwest. NWEA participated in two license amendments for the Trojan Nuclear Power Plant (concerning the expansion of capacity of the spent fuel pool and the failure to design and construct the control building to meet federal earthquake standards),

in the Construction Permit for the Skagit-Hanford proposed reactors, in the Operating License proceedings for the WPPSS Units 3 & 5 (Satsop), and the Operating License proceedings for the WPPSS Units 1 & 4 (Hanford). In all of these proceedings, NWEA contributed to the development of a sound record. NWEA has a long history of contributing to the soundness of the nation's environmental protection through participation in advisory committees to such agencies as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality, and Washington Department of Ecology. Likewise, NWEA has assisted the government in ensuring conformity with federal law through litigation in such cases as Northwest EnvironmentalAdvocates v. U.S. EnvironmentalProtectionAgency, 537 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2008) concerning EPA's ultra vires regulations on vessel discharges and Northwest EnvironmentalAdvocates v. EPA, 268 F.Supp.2d 1255, 1269 (D.Or. 2003) concerning EPA's arbitrary and capricious approval of Oregon's water quality standards. Finally, NWEA has a track record of ensuring compliance with federal law by private and public entities through NWEA PETITION TO INTERVENE 16

litigation such as Northwest EnvironmentalAdvocates v. City of Portland,74 F.3d 945 (9th Cir.

1996), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 2550 (1996) which sought to end the discharge of millions of gallons of raw sewage annually to the Willamette River.

Petitioners will assist in the development of a sound record, as their contention is supported by the expert opinion of a highly qualified expert, Dr. Arjun Makhijani. See attached Makhijani Declaration. See also Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. (Diablo Canyon Power Plant Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-08-01, 67 NRC 1, 6 (2008) (finding that, when assisted by experienced counsel and experts, participation of a petitioner may be reasonably expected to contribute to the development of a sound record). Furthermore, as a matter of law, NEPA requires consideration of the new and significant information set forth in the Task Force Report. See 10 C.F.R. § 51.92(a)(2). A sound record cannot be developed without such consideration.

IV. Contentions to be Advanced by Petitioner A request for hearing or petition for leave to intervene "must set forth with particularity the contentions sought to be raised." 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(1). Petitioner seeks to raise a single contention seeking consideration of new and significant information relevant to the environmental analysis for the proposed re-licensing of the CGS. In the contention set forth below, Petitioner requests a hearing on the significant - indeed extraordinary - safety and environmental implications for the CGS licensing decision of the conclusions and recommendations of the Task Force Report. The contention is also supported by the expert declaration of Dr. Arjun Makhijani of the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research.

The Task Force, a group of highly qualified and experienced Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff members selected by the Commission to evaluate the regulatory implications of the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident, issued a report recommending the NRC strengthen its regulatory scheme for protecting public health and safety by increasing the scope of accidents that fall within the "design basis" and are therefore subject to mandatory safety regulation. The NWEA PETITION TO INTERVENE 17

Task Force's recommendation to establish mandatory safety regulations for severe accidents has extremely grave environmental and safety implications because it would not be logical or necessary to recommend an upgrade to the basic level of protection currently afforded by NRC regulations unless those existing regulations were insufficient to ensure adequate protection of public health, safety, and the environment throughout the licensed life of nuclear reactors. The recommendation is all the more grave because it constitutes the second warning that the Commission has received regarding the need to expand the scope of design basis accidents. The first warning, issued by the Rogovin Report over thirty years ago, following the Three Mile Island accident and explained in more detail below, essentially went unheeded. Id. at 16-17.

As the Task Force urges, "the time has come" to make fundamental changes to the NRC's program for establishing minimum safety requirements for nuclear reactors. Id. at 18.

Moreover, the Task Force's recommendation that the scope of mandatory safety regulations be expanded to include severe accidents raises significant environmental concerns in this proceeding, including that (1) the risks of operating the CGS under a renewed license are higher than estimated in the ER and (2) Energy Northwest's previous environmental analysis of the relative costs and benefits of severe accident mitigation alternatives ("SAMAs") is fundamentally inadequate because those measures are, in fact, necessary to assure adequate protection of the public health and safety and, therefore, should be imposed without regard to their cost.

Pursuant to NEPA, the analysis demanded by this contention may not be deferred until after CGS is relicensed. Given that the NRC Commissioners have postponed taking action on the Task Force's recommendations, admission of this contention constitutes the only way of ensuring that the environmental implications of the Task Force recommendations are taken into account in the license renewal decision for CGS.

The Petitioner notes that this contention is substantially similar to contentions and comments that were filed recently in pending reactor licensing and re-licensing cases and NWEA PETITION TO INTERVENE 18

standardized design certification proceedings. In addition, Petitioners have joined with other individuals and organizations in a rulemaking petition seeking to suspend any regulations that would preclude full consideration of the environmental implications of the Task Force Report.

Rulemaking Petition to Rescind Prohibition Against Consideration of Environmental Impacts of Severe Reactor and Spent Fuel Pool Accidents and Request to Suspend Licensing Decision (August 22, 2011). A copy of NWEA's rulemaking petition is attached. Finally, in an Emergency Petition, now pending before the Commission for nearly four months, many of the same organizations and individuals including the Petitioner previously asked the Commission to suspend its licensing decisions while it evaluated the environmental implications of the Fukushima accident and to establish procedures for the fair and meaningful consideration of those issues in licensing hearings. Emergency Petition to Suspend All Pending Reactor Licensing Decisions and Related Rulemaking Decisions Pending Investigation of Lessons Learned from Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Accident (April 14-18, 2011)

("Emergency Petition"). In the aggregate, these contentions and the rulemaking petitions follow up on the Emergency Petition's demand that the NRC comply with NEPA by addressing the lessons of the Fukushima accident in its environmental analyses for licensing decisions. Having received no response to their Emergency Petition, the signatories to the Emergency Petition now seek consideration of the Task Force's far-reaching conclusions and recommendations in each individual licensing proceeding, including the instant case.

The Petitioner recognizes that given the sweeping scope of the Task Force conclusions and recommendations, it may be more appropriate for the NRC to consider them in generic rather than site-specific environmental proceedings. That is for the NRC to decide. Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. NaturalResources Defense Council, 462 U.S. 87, 100 (1983). It is the NRC, and not the public, which is responsible for compliance with NEPA. Duke Power Co. et al. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-83-19, 17 NRC 1041, 1049 (1983).

NWEA PETITION TO INTERVENE 19

A. Statement of Contention.

The ER for CGS license renewal fails to satisfy the requirements of NEPA because it does not address the new and significant environmental implications of the findings and recommendations raised by the NRC's Fukushima Task Force Report. As required by NEPA and the NRC regulations, these implications must be addressed in the ER.

B. Brief Explanation of the Basis for the Contention.

1. The Task Force Report.

This contention is based on the Task Force Report, in which the Commission instructed the Task Force to provide:

A systematic and methodical review of [NRC] processes and regulations to determine whether the agency should make additional improvements to its regulatory system and to make recommendations to the Commission for its policy direction, in light of the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant.

Task Force Report at vii. In response to that directive, the Task Force prepared a detailed history of the NRC's program for regulation of safety and public health and evaluated that program in light of the experience of the Fukushima accident.

The Task Force then assessed the risk posed by "continued operation and continued licensing activities" for U.S. nuclear plants. Applying the NRC's standard for whether nuclear plants pose an "imminent risk" such that they should be shut down immediately, see, e.g.,

Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-96-6, 43 NRC 123, 128 (1996) (finding no "imminent hazard" that would warrant shutdown of a reactor), the Task Force found that no imminent risk was posed by operation or licensing. Id. at 18; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2133(d) (forbidding the NRC from licensing reactors if their operation would be "inimical to the common defense and security"). In addition, the Task Force concluded that U.S. reactors meet the statutory standard for security, i.e., they are "not inimical to the common defense and security." Notably, however, the Task Force did not report a conclusion that licensing of NWEA PETITION TO INTERVENE 20

reactors would not be "inimical to public health and safety," as the AEA requires for licensing of reactors. 42 U.S.C. § 2133.

Instead, the Task Force concluded that the regulatory system on which the NRC relies to make the safety findings that the AEA requires for licensing of reactors must be strengthened by raising the level of safety that is minimally required for the protection of public health and safety: In response to the Fukushima accident and the insights it brings to light, the Task Force is recommending actions, some general, some specific, that it believes would be a reasonable, well-formulated set of actions to increase the level of safety associated with adequate protection of the public health and safety.

Id. at 18 (emphasis added). In particular, the Task Force found that "the NRC's safety approach is incomplete without a strong program for dealing with the unexpected, including severe accidents." Id. at 20. Therefore, the Task Force recommended that the NRC incorporate severe accidents into the "design basis" and subject it to mandatory safety regulations. In order to upgrade the design basis, the Task Force also recommended that the NRC undertake new safety investigations and impose design changes, equipment upgrades, and improvements to emergency planning and operating procedures. See, e.g., Task Force Report at 73-75. 10 The Task Force also found that the Fukushima accident was not the first warning the NRC had received that it needed to strengthen its safety program in order to provide an adequate level of protection to public health and safety. After the Three Mile Island accident in 1979, an independent body appointed to investigate the accident's implications, headed by Mitchell Rogovin of the NRC's Special Inquiry Group (the "Rogovin Report"), recommended that the NRC "[e]xpand the spectrum of design basis accidents." Id. at 16. But the NRC did little to follow the recommendations of the Rogovin Report. While it "encouraged licensees to search for vulnerabilities" in their plant designs through Individual Plant Examination ("IPE") and Individual Plant Examination for External Events ("IPEEE") programs and encouraged the 10 The Task Force Report contains twelve "overarching" recommendations, which are summarized on pages 69-70.

NWEA PETITION TO INTERVENE 21

development of severe accident mitigation guidelines ("SAMGs"), "the Commission did not take action to require the IPEs, IPEEEs, or SAMGs." Id. Thus, the Task Force concluded that:

While the Commission has been partially responsive to recommendations calling for requirements to address beyond-design-basis accidents, the NRC has not made fundamental changes to the regulatory approach for beyond-design-basis events and severe accidents for operating reactors.

Id. at 17. Looking back on the Commission's failure to heed the Rogovin Report's recommendations, the Task Force urged that "the time has come" when NRC safety regulations must be "reviewed, evaluated and changed, as necessary, to insure (sic) that they continue to address the NRC's requirements to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health and safety." Id. at 18.

To finally fulfill the Rogovin Report's recommendation - a need now re-confirmed by the Fukushima Task Force - would require a major re-evaluation and overhaul of the NRC's regulatory program. As the Task Force recognized, the great majority of the NRC's current regulations do not impose mandatory safety requirements on severe accidents, and severe accident measures are adopted only on a "voluntary" basis or through a "patchwork" of requirements. Id.

The lack of an NRC program for mandatory regulation of severe accidents is clearly evident from the regulations themselves. The Part 50 regulations, which establish fundamental safety requirements for all reactors (including the current generation and the proposed new generation), are based on a "design basis" that does not include severe accidents. Task Force Report at 16. While NRC NEPA regulations require consideration of severe accident mitigation measures, they need not be adopted unless they are found to be cost-beneficial. See, e.g.,

Entergy Nuclear Operations,Inc. (Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3),

LBP-1 1-17, slip op. at 17 (July 14, 2011). Because the imposition of severe accident mitigation measures is based on cost considerations, they are not part of the design basis for adequate NWEA PETITION TO INTERVENE 22

protection of public health and safety. Union of ConcernedScientists v. NRC, 824 F.2d 108, 120 (D.C. Cir. 1987)."

Therefore, the NRC's current regulatory scheme requires significant re-evaluation and revision in order to expand or upgrade the design basis for reactor safety as recommended by the Task Force Report. The fact that this effort has been postponed for thirty years makes the scope of the required undertaking all the more massive and urgent.

2. The National Environmental Policy Act.

The contention is also based on NEPA, "our basic national charter for protection of the environment." 40 C.F.R § 1500. 1(a). NEPA requires a federal agency to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS") for any "major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(i). This duty to carefully consider information regarding a project's environmental impacts is non-discretionary. Silva v.

Romney, 473 F.2d 287, 292 (1 st Cir. 1973). Federal agencies are held to a "strict standard of compliance" with the Act's requirements. Calvert Cliffs CoordinatingCommission v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1971).

NEPA and the Council on Environmental Quality ("CEQ") regulations implementing NEPA are intended to ensure that environmental considerations are "infused into the ongoing programs and actions of the Federal Government." Marsh v. Oregon NaturalRes. Council, 490 11 Even the NRC's Part 52 regulations for new reactors do not contain mandatory requirements for severe accident mitigation features. While the Part 52 regulations require combined license applicants to submit analyses of measures to mitigate severe accidents, Part 52 contains no standards for the adequacy of such analyses. In addition, the Commission has also stated that Part 52 severe accident mitigation measures, which must be described under the NRC's safety regulations in 10 C.F.R. §§ 52.47(a)(23) and 52.79(a)(38), are subject to cost-benefit analysis. See, e.g., Statement of Considerations ("SOC") for AP1000 design certification rule, 10 C.F.R. Part 52 Appendix B, 71 Fed. Reg. 4,464, 4,469 (January 27, 2006): As stated in that notice:

Westinghouse's evaluation of various design alternatives to prevent and mitigate severe accidents does not constitute design requirements. The Commission's assessment of this information is discussed in Section VII (sic) of this SOC on environmental impacts.

NWEA PETITION TO INTERVENE 23

U.S. 360, 371 n.14 (1989). Thus, NEPA imposes on agencies a continuing obligation to gather and evaluate new information relevant to the environmental impact of its actions. Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 621 F.2d 1017, 1023-24 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing 42 U.S.C.

4332(2)(A), (B); Essex County PreservationAss'n v. Campbell, 536 F.2d 956, 960-61 (1st Cir.

1976); Society for Animal Rights, Inc. v. Schlesinger, 512 F.2d 915, 917-18 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).

"An agency that has prepared an EIS cannot simply rest on the original document. The agency must be alert to new information that may alter the results of its original environmental analysis, and continue to take a "hard look" at the environmental effects of [its] planned action, even after a proposal has received initial approval." Friends of the Clearwaterv. Dombeck, 222 F.3d 552, 557-58 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Marsh, 490 U.S. at 373-74).

In order to aid the Commission in complying with NEPA, each applicant shall submit to the Commission an environmental report ("ER"). See 10 C.F.R. §§ 51.14; 51.45. The ER must contain a description of the proposed action, a statement of its purposes, and a description of the environment affected. Id. § 51.45 (b). Further, the ER must discuss the impact of the proposed action on the environment, any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented, alternatives to the proposed action, the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and any reversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented. Id. § 51.45 (b)(5). The ER must also contain an analysis that considers and balances the environmental effects of the proposed action, the environmental impacts of alternatives to the proposed action, and alternatives available for reducing or avoiding adverse environmental effects. Id. § 51.45 (c). An ER for the licensing action contemplated in this instance must also include consideration of the economic, technical, and other benefits and costs of the proposed action and its alternatives. Id. The environmental report must to the fullest extent practicable, quantify the various factors considered and contain sufficient data to aid the Commission in its development of an independent analysis. Id.

NWEA PETITION TO INTERVENE 24

Within this regulatory framework, "[t]he Commission recognizes a continuing obligation to conduct its domestic licensing and related regulatory functions in a manner which is both receptive to environmental concerns and consistent with the Commission's responsibility as an independent regulatory agency for protecting the radiological health and safety of the public."

Id. § 51.10 (b) (emphasis added).

3. The Environmental Report Does Not Consider the Significant New Information Contained in the Task Force Report and the ER Must Be Supplemented to Comply with NEPA.

NEPA requires federal agencies to supplement their NEPA documentation when "there are significant new circumstances or information relevant to environmental concerns and bearing on the proposed action or its impacts." 40 C.F.R. § 1509(c)(1)(ii). A federal agency's continuing duty to take a "hard look" at the environmental effects of their actions requires they consider, evaluate, and make a reasoned determination about the significance of this new information and prepare supplemental NEPA documentation accordingly. Warm Springs Task Force v. Gribble, 621 F.2d at 1023-24; Stop H-3 Association v. Dole, 740 F.2d 1442, 1463-64 (9th Cir. 1984). The need to supplement under NEPA when there is new and significant information is also found throughout the NRC regulations. See 10 C.F.R. §§ 51.92 (a)(2),

51.50(c)(iii), 51.53(b), 51.53(c )(3)(iv).

The conclusions and recommendations presented in the Task Force Report constitute "new and significant information" under NEPA whose environmental implications must be considered before the NRC may make a decision that approves license renewal for CGS. First, the information is "new" because it stems directly from the Fukushima accident, which occurred only five months ago and for which the special study commissioned by the Commission has only just been issued.

Second, the information is "significant" because it raises an extraordinary level of concern regarding the manner in which the proposed renewed operation of CGS "impacts public health and safety." See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(2). For the first time since the Three Mile Island NWEA PETITION TO INTERVENE 25

accident occurred in 1979, a highly respected group of scientists and engineers within the NRC Staff has fundamentally questioned the adequacy of the current level of safety provided by the NRC's program for nuclear reactor regulation. NEPA demands that federal agencies "insure the professional integrity, including the scientific integrity, of the discussions and analyses" included in an EIS, 40 C.F.R. § 1502.24, and disclose "all major points of view on the environmental impacts" including any "responsible opposing view." 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.9(a), (b). Courts have found that an EIS that fails to disclose and respond to expert opinions concerning the hazards of a proposed action, particularly those opinions of the agency's own experts, are "fatally deficient" and run contrary to NEPA's "hard look" requirement.1 2 As a result, the NRC must revisit any conclusions in the CGS ER based on the assumption that compliance with NRC safety regulations is sufficient to ensure that environmental impacts of accidents are acceptable.

4. The Task Force Report Reveals that the Full Spectrum of All Design-Basis Accidents Has Not Been Assessed and the ER Must Be Supplemented to Consider Additional Design-Basis Accidents that Have the Potential for Releases to the Environment.

In Appendix B to 10 C.F.R. Part 51, the NRC reports a determination that the environmental impacts of both design basis accidents and severe accidents are "small." The findings of the Task Force Report call into question whether this represents a full, accurate description and examination of all the design basis accidents having the potential for releases to the environment. See Makhijani Declaration, ¶¶ 7-10. If the design basis for the reactor does 12 Centerfor BiologicalDiversity v. United States Forest Service, 349 F.3d 1157 (9 t" Cir. 2003) (finding an EIS's failure to disclose and discuss responsible opposing scientific viewpoints violated NEPA and the implementing regulations); Seattle Audubon Society v.

Moseley, 798 F.Supp. 1473, 1479 (W.D. Wa. 1992) aff'd sub nom Seattle Audubon Society v.

Espy, 998 F.2d 699 ( 9 1h Cir. 1993) (quoting Friends of the Earth v. Hall, 693 F.Supp. 904, 934 (W.D. Wa. 1988) ("[a]n EIS that fails to disclose and respond to 'the opinions held by well respected scientists concerning the hazards of the proposed action.. .is fatally deficient."));

Western Watersheds Project v. Kraayenbrink,632 F.3d 472, 487 ( 9 ,h Cir. 2010) (finding that agency failed to take a "hard look" under NEPA when it ignored concerns raised by its own experts). See also Blue Mtns. Biodiversity Projectv. Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208, 1213 ( 9 th Cir.

1998) (noting that an agency's failure to discuss and consider an independent scientific report's recommendations "lends weight to [plaintiff's] claim that the [agency] did not take the requisite

'hard look' at the environmental consequences" of the project).

NWEA PETITION TO INTERVENE 26

not incorporate accidents that should be considered in order to satisfy the adequate protection standard, then it is not possible to reach a conclusion that the design of the reactor adequately protects against accident risks.

5. The ER Must Be Supplemented in Light of the Task Force Findings that Certain Accidents Formerly Classified as Severe Should Be Incorporated into the Design Basis.

By recommending the incorporation of accidents formerly classified as "severe" or "beyond design basis" into the design basis, the Task Force effectively recommends a complete overhaul of the NRC's system for mitigating severe accidents through consideration of SAMAs.

See 10 C.F.R. § 51.45(c). As the Task Force recognizes, currently the NRC does not impose measures for the mitigation of severe accidents unless they are shown to be cost-beneficial or unless they are adopted voluntarily. Task Force Report at 15. See also 10 C.F.R. §§ 51.71(d);

51.75(c)(2) (allowing EISs for combined license applications that rely on certified standardized designs to reference the severe accident mitigation analyses for those designs)."3 But the Task Force recommends that severe accident mitigation measures should be adopted into the design basis, i.e., the set of regulations adopted without regard to their cost as fundamentally required for all NRC standards that set requirements for adequate protection of health and safety. Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 824 F.2d 108, 120 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Thus, the values assigned to the cost-benefit analysis for CGS SAMAs, as described in Section 4.20 of the ER, must be re-evaluated in light of the Task Force's conclusion that the value of SAMAs is so high that they should be elected as a matter of course.

Were SAMAs imposed as mandatory measures, the outcome of the ER and subsequently the future SEIS for CGS could be affected significantly in two major respects. First, severe 13 See also Memorandum from NRC Staff to AP1000 and ESBWR design-Centered Working Groups re: Summary of the March 22 and 23, 2007, Meeting to Discuss pre-Combined License Application Issues (April 23, 2007) (suggesting that some SAMAs for proposed reactors with standardized designs should be included in the design application and some should be included in COLAs).

NWEA PETITION TO INTERVENE 27

accident mitigative measures now rejected as too costly may be required, thus substantially improving the safety of the CGS operation if it is licensed. Second, consideration of the costs of mandatory mitigative measures could affect the overall cost-benefit analysis for the reactor. See 10 C.F.R. § 51.45 (c) (explaining that environmental reports should also include consideration of the economic, technical, and other benefits and costs of the proposed action and its alternatives).

As discussed in Dr. Makhijani's declaration, these costs may be significant, showing that other alternatives such as the no-action alternative and other alternative electricity production sources may be more attractive.1 4 As the fundamental purposes of NEPA are: (1) to guarantee that the government takes a "hard look" at all of the environmental consequences of proposed federal actions before the actions occur, Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989); and (2) to "guarantee[] that the relevant information will be made available to the larger audience that may also play a role in both the decisionmaking process and the implementation of that decision," id. at 349, the NRC cannot meet the fundamental purposes of NEPA if it does not include all of the costs associated with required mitigative measures. See Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957, 979 (5th Cir. 1983) ("There can be no 'hard look' at the costs and benefits unless all costs are disclosed.").

14 NEPA requires the NRC to include in its EIS a "detailed statement... on...

alternatives to the proposed action." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(iii). The alternatives analysis should address "the environmental impacts of the proposal and the alternatives in comparative form, thus sharply defining the issues and providing a clear basis for the choice among options by the decisionmaker and the public." 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14. This analysis must "rigorously explore and objectively evaluate all reasonable alternatives." 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(a). gencies must consider three types of alternatives, which include a no action alternative, other reasonable courses of actions, and mitigation measures not in the proposed action. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25.

The purpose of this section is "to insist that no major federal project should be undertaken without intense consideration of other more ecologically sound courses of action, including shelving the entire project, or of accomplishing the same result by entirely different means." EnvironmentalDefense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 492 F.2d 1123, 1135 (5th Cir.

1974). "The existence of a viable but unexamined alternative renders an [EIS]

inadequate." NaturalResources Defense Council v. U.S. ForestService, 421 F.3d 797, 813 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Citizensfor a Better Henderson v. Hodel, 768 F.2d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir.

1985)).

NWEA PETITION TO INTERVENE 28

6. The ER Must Be Supplemented to Include a Discussion of the Task Force Report's Recommended Measures to Ensure the Plant's Protection From Seismic and Flooding Events.

Following the devastating events in Japan, the Task Force Report explained the importance of protecting structures, systems and components (SSCs) of nuclear reactors from natural phenomena, including seismic and flooding hazards:

Protection from natural phenomena such seismic and flooding is critical for safe operation of nuclear power plants due to potential common-cause failures and significant contribution to core damage frequency from external events. Failure to adequately protect SSC's important to safety from appropriate design-basis natural phenomena with appropriate safety margins has the potential for common-cause failures and significant consequences as demonstrated at Fukushima.

Task Force Report at 30. Yet, the Task Force found that significant differences may exist between plants in the way they protect against design-basis natural phenomena (including seismic and flooding hazards) and the safety margin provided. Id. at 29. For instance, while tsunami hazards have been considered in the design basis for operating plants sited on the Pacific Ocean, the same cannot be said for those sited on the Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of Mexico. Id.

Accordingly, the Task Force recommended that licensees reevaluate the seismic and flooding hazards at their sites and if necessary update the design basis and SSCs important to safety to protect against the updated hazards. Id. at 30.

The ER must be supplemented in light of this new and significant information. The Task Force's findings and recommendations are directly relevant to environmental concerns and have a bearing on the proposed action and its impacts as they point to the need for a reevaluation of the seismic and flooding hazards at the CGS site, a "hard look" at the environmental consequences such hazards could pose, and an examination of what, if any, design measures could be implemented (i.e. through NEPA's requisite "alternatives" analysis) to ensure that the public is adequately protected from these risks.

7. The ER Must Be Supplemented to Include a Discussion of the Additional Mitigation Measures Recommended by the Task Force Report.

NWEA PETITION TO INTERVENE 29

"The discussion of steps that can be taken to mitigate adverse environmental consequences plays an important role in the environmental analysis under NEPA." Robertson v.

Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 351 (1989); see also 1502.16(h) (stating that an EIS must contain "means to mitigate adverse environmental impacts"). There must be a "reasonably complete discussion of possible mitigation measures." Id. at 352. Mitigation measures may be found insufficient when the agency fails to study the efficacy of the proposed mitigation, fails to take certain steps to ensure the efficacy of the proposed mitigation (such as including mandatory conditions in permits), or fails to consider alternatives in the event that the mitigation measures fail. Id.

The Task Force Report makes several significant findings when it comes to increasing and improving mitigation measures at new reactors and recommends a number of specific steps licensees could take in this regard. These recommendations include strengthening SBO mitigation capability at all operating and new reactors for design-basis and beyond-design-basis external events, (Section 4.2.1), requiring reliable hardened vent designs in BWR facilities with Mark I and Mark II containments (Section 4.2.2), enhancing spent fuel pool makeup capability and instrumentation for the spent fuel pool (Section 4.2.4), strengthening and integrating onsite emergency response capabilities such as EOPs, SAMGs, and EDMGs (Section 4.2.5), and addressing multi-unit accidents. See also Makhijani Declaration, J¶ 18-24. Accordingly, the ER must be supplemented to consider the use of these additional mitigation measures to reduce the project's environmental impacts. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.14 (f), 1502.16), 1508.25 (b)(3)).

8. Requirement for Prior Consideration of Environmental Impacts.

The Task Force urges that some of its recommendations be considered before certain licensing decisions are made. For instance, the Task Force concludes that Recommendation 4 (proposing new requirements for prolonged station blackout ("SBO") mitigation) and Recommendation 7 (proposing measures for spent fuel pool makeup capability and instrumentation) should apply to all design certifications or to COL applicants if the NWEA PETITION TO INTERVENE 30

recommended requirements are not addressed in the referenced certified design. Task Force Report at 71. The Task Force recommends that design certifications and COLs under active staff review address this recommendation "before licensing." Id. at 72.

Petitioner respectfully submits that this is the appropriate and required approach for NEPA consideration of Recommendations 4 and 7 and all of the Task Force's remaining conclusions and recommendations. Before making a decision regarding renewal of the CGS license, for example, the NRC must evaluate the relative costs and benefits of adopting Recommendations 4 and 7 in light of the NRC's increased understanding regarding accident risks and the strength of its regulatory program to prevent or mitigate them. And the NRC must apply the same analysis to all of the recommendations, not just Recommendations 4 and 7. NEPA requires the NRC to address the environmental implications of the Task Force's analysis before making a re-licensing decision for CGS, in order to ensure that "important effects [of the licensing decision] will not be overlooked or underestimated only to be discovered after resources have been committed or the die otherwise cast." Robertson, 490 U.S. at 349. See also 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.1(c), 1502.1, 1502.14. The NRC's obligation to comply with NEPA in this respect is independent of and in addition to the NRC's responsibilities under the AEA, and must be enforced to the "fullest extent possible." Calvert Cliffs CoordinatingCommittee, 449 F.2d at 1115. See also Limerick Ecology Action v. NRC, 869 F.2d 719, 729 (3rd Cir. 1989) (citing Public Service Co. of New Hampshirev. NRC, 582 F.2d 77, 86 (1st Cir. 1978)). Under NEPA, therefore, the Commission is required to address the Task Force's findings and recommendations as they pertain to CGS before making a licensing decision, regardless of whether it does or does not choose to do so in the context of its AEA-based regulations.

Of course the Commission could moot the contention by adopting all of the Task Force's recommendations. See Citizensfor Safe Power v. NRC, 524 F.2d 1291, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1975).

However, a majority of the Commissioners has voted not to do so immediately. See Notation Vote Response Sheets re: SECY-1 1-0093, Near-Term Report and Recommendations for Agency NWEA PETITION TO INTERVENE 31

Actions Following the Events in Japan.' 5 Thus, while the NRC may eventually address the Task Force's recommendations in the context of its AEA-based regulatory scheme, the Commission has given no indication that it intends to address any of the Task Force's conclusions in its prospective licensing decisions. In the absence of any AEA-based review of the Task Force's conclusions, the CGS ER must be supplemented in order to meet NEPA's goal that the NRC's licensing decision for CGS will be "based on an accurate understanding of the environmental consequences of [its] actions." Indian Point, LBP-1 1-17, slip op. at 17.

C. Demonstration that the Contention is Within the Scope of the Proceeding.

The contention is within the scope of the proceeding because it seeks compliance with NEPA and NRC-implementing regulations, which must be complied with before CGS may be licensed.

D. Demonstration that the Contention is Material to the Findings NRC Must Make to Re-License CGS.

As demonstrated above in Section IV.B, this contention challenges the NRC's failure to fully comply with NEPA and federal regulations for the implementation of NEPA in its EIS for the proposed CGS renewal. Unless the NRC complies with the procedural requirements of NEPA that are discussed in the contention, it cannot make a valid finding that CGS should be re-licensed. Therefore the contention is material to the findings the NRC must make in order to license this facility.

The Petitioner recognizes that some issues raised by the Task Force Report may be appropriate for generic rather than case-specific resolution. The determination of whether it is appropriate to address the issues raised in this contention generically or on a case-specific basis is a discretionary matter for the NRC to decide. Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 462 U.S. at 100. Nevertheless, any generic resolution of the issues 15 http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/cvr/20 11/.

NWEA PETITION TO INTERVENE 32

must be reached before the licensing decision in this case is made, and must be applied to this licensing decision. Robertson, 490 U.S. at 350.

E. Concise Statement of the Facts or Expert Opinion Supporting the Contention, Along With Appropriate Citations to Supporting Scientific or Factual Materials.

The Petitioner relies on the facts and opinions of the Task Force members as set forth in their Task Force Report and as summarized above in Section IV.B. The high level of technical qualifications of the Task Force members has been recognized by the Commission. See Transcript of May 12, 2011, briefing at 5, in which Commissioner Magwood refers to the Task force as the NRC's "A-team."

Additional technical supportis provided by the attached Declaration of Dr. Arjun Makhijani, which confirms the environmental significance of the Task Force's findings and recommendations with respect to the environmental analyses for all pending nuclear reactor licensing cases and design certification applications including the instant case.

F. Sufficient Information to Show the Existence of a Genuine Dispute With the Applicant and the NRC.

Based on the complete failure of the NRC to address the environmental implications of the Task Force Report for the proposed re-licensing of CGS, it appears that the parties have a dispute as to whether the ER for the facility must be revised to address those implications. As demonstrated above in Section IV.B, the Task Force Report, and Dr. Makhijani's Declaration provide sufficient information to show the genuineness and materiality of the dispute.

/H/

///

///

///

///

///

NWEA PETITION TO INTERVENE 33

V. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, the petition should be granted, the Petitioner should be granted standing to intervene, and the Petitioner's contention should be admitted for a hearing.

Respectfully submitted this 2 2 d day of August 2011.

Signed (electronically)by Nina Bell, Executive Director Northwest Environmental Advocates P.O. Box 12187 Portland, OR 97212 503/295-0490 nbell@advocates-nwea.org NWEA PETITION TO INTERVENE 34

REPLY MEMORANDUM REGARDING TIMELINESS AND ADMISSIBILITY OF NEW CONTENTIONS SEEKING CONSIDERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS OF FUKUSHIMA TASK FORCE REPORT IN INDIVIDUAL REACTOR LICENSING PROCEEDINGS INTRODUCTION The purpose of this Reply Memorandum is to address the most common arguments made in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") Staffs' and applicants' responses (collectively, the "Responses") opposing the admissibility of contentions that were submitted in over twenty NRC licensing and relicensing proceedings (collectively, the "Proceedings") on September 6, 2011. This Reply Memorandum also addresses the relevance of a decision issued by the NRC Commissioners shortly after the Responses were filed: Union Electric Co., d/b/a/

Ameren Missouri (Callaway Plant, Unit 2) et al., CLI- 11-05, __ NRC __ (Sept. 9, 2011)

("CLI-1 1-05").

BACKGROUND On August 11, 2011, intervenors and petitioners (collectively, "Intervenors") in over twenty proceedings submitted motions and contentions seeking consideration under the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") of new and significant information presented by the NRC's Fukushima Task Force in its report, "Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor Safety in the 21 " Century: the Near-term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident" (July 12, 2011) (the "Task Force Report").' While the contentions addressed the particulars of each individual proceeding, 1 Contentions were submitted in the following proceedings: Callaway Plant, Unit 2 (Docket No. 52-037-COL); Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 3 (Docket No. 52-016-COL); Fermi Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 3 (Docket No. 52-033-COL); William

they all relied on the far-reaching conclusions and recommendations of the Task Force Report.

In all but one the proceedings, the applicants and the NRC Staff submitted Responses on September 6, 2011. The Responses make very similar, if not identical, arguments with respect to the timeliness and the admissibility of the contentions. Three days after the Responses were filed, the NRC Commissioners also issued CLI 05, which contains language that bears on the timeliness and admissibility of the contentions.

1. INTERVENORS' CONTENTIONS ARE TIMELY All Responses argue that the contentions are not timely because they are late; some argue the contentions were both late and premature. None of these arguments has merit.

Notably, some applicants and the NRC Staff (all of whom now argue that the contentions are too late) previously contested the Emergency Petition to Suspend all States Lee III Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 (Docket No. 52-018-COL and 52-019-COL); Columbia Generating Station (Docket No. 50-397-LR); Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (Docket No. 50-293-LR); Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3 (Docket Nos. 50-247-LR and 50-286-LR); Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 (Docket No. 50-346-LR); Turkey Point, Units 6 and 7 (Docket Nos. 52-040-COL and 52-041-COL); Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 and 4 (Docket Nos. 52-034-COL and 52-035-COL); Seabrook Station, Unit 1 (Docket No. 50-443-LR); Diablo Canyon, Units 1 and 2 (Docket Nos. 50-275-LR and 50-323-LR); Bell Bend Nuclear Power Plant (Docket No. 52-039-COL); Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 2 and 3 (Docket Nos. 52-022-COL and 42-023-COL); Levy County Nuclear Power Plant, Units I and 2 (Docket Nos. 52-029-COL and 52-030-COL); Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 (Docket Nos. 52-027-COL and 52-028-COL); South Texas Project, Units 3

• and 4 (52-012-COL and 52-013-COL); Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4 (52-025-COL and 52-026-COL); Bellefonte Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 and 4 (Docket Nos. 52-014-COL and 52-015-COL); Watts Bar, Unit 2 (Docket No. 50-391-OL); and North Anna, Unit 3 (52-017-COL). In addition, comments for filed in the following rulemaking proceedings: AP 1000 Design Certification Amendment (NRC-2010-0131, RIN 3150-AI81); and ESBWR Design Certification Amendment (NRC-2010-0135, RIN-3150-AI85).

2

Pending Reactor Licensing Decisions pending Investigation of Lessons Learned from Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Accident (the "Emergency Petition"), which was filed within thirty days of the Fukushima accident, on the ground that it was too early to determine the environmental significance of the event. See, e.g., PG&E Opposition to Emergency Petition to Suspend Licensing Decisions and Proceedings at 8 (May 2, 2011).

To the extent that the NRC Staff and applicants have made inconsistent arguments within the proceedings regarding timeliness, and submit Responses that argue both sides of the timeliness question, an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board has previously dismissed such "Catch-22" tactics as a "shell game, with the usual street-corner outcome: whatever guess the [Intervenors] make will prove wrong." Shaw Area MOX Services (Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility), LBP-08-11, 67 NRC 460 at 502, n 15, 503 (2008).2 Regardless of the impermissible and inconsistent timeliness arguments made in the proceedings and Responses, the contentions are timely. The Responses argue that the contentions are late because they are based on the events of the Fukushima accident that occurred more than thirty days before the contentions were filed. While the Fukushima accident is relevant to the Task Force Report, it is the issuance of the Task Force's sweeping conclusions regarding the relevance of the Fukushima accident to NRC's regulatory program that serves as the basis for the contentions.

As the Commission found in CLI-1 1-05, while the Task Force Report does not justify a generic NEPA review, it is possible that new and significant information about 2 In MOX Services, the applicant controlled the creation of and access to the information that petitioners used as a basis for ongoing contentions. While the applicants and the NRC Staff did not control the creation of or access to the Task Force Report, the significant similarity is that interested members of the public were unable to predict or control the timing of the development and release of new, significant information contained in the Report.

3

the environmental implications of the Fukushima accident may "come to light" and require consideration "as part of the ongoing preparation of application-specific NEPA documents" with respect to individual reactor license applications. CLI-I 1-05, slip op. at

30. At this point in time, neither the Commission nor the NRC Staff has yet undertaken its independent NEPA obligations to consider the question of whether the Task Force Report constitutes such new and significant information that must be considered in individual reactor licensing decisions. By submitting the Task Force Report-based contentions within thirty days of the issuance of the Task Force Report, the Intervenors have timely raised their concern regarding this failure to satisfy NEPA.

Some Responses also argue that the Task Force Report is not "new" for purposes of assessing timeliness, because the Task Force Report is simply a collection and summary of existing facts. See, e.g., FPL Response (Turkey Point) at 11-12 (citing Northern States Power Co. (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-10-27, 72 NRC_, slip op. at 7 (Sep. 30, 2010)); NRC Staff Response (Watts Bar 2) at 38-

38. But the Task Force Report does not merely compile and organize certain pre-existing information, without further analysis. To the contrary, in the words of one applicant, the Task Force Report is a "short term and long term analysis of the lessons that can be learned from the Fukushima accident." FPL Response to Emergency Petition at 4 (May 2, 2011) (emphasis added).

Some Responses argue that the contentions are "premature" because the Commission may "moot" or "negate" the relief they seek. See, e.g., FPL Response (Turkey Point) at 2-3, NRC Staff Response (Diablo Canyon) at 11. But future action by the Commission is only a possibility, and the Commission has not guaranteed that it will 4

take action before licensing decisions are made, as required by NEPA. Whether the Commission might address the concerns of the Task Force Report at some point in the future is immaterial. The release or development of new and significant information, not future possible agency action, triggers the Commission's non-discretionary duty under NEPA.

The contentions are not only timely, but also meet the requirements for consideration of non-timely contentions in 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(c)(1). Most importantly, Intervenors have good cause for filing the contentions after the release of the Task Force Report. Given the lack of complete public information issued from Japan in the aftermath of the accident, and given the fact that the Task Force was chartered by the NRC Commissioners with the specific purpose of assembling information about the accident and subjecting it to analysis by some of the most highly qualified members of the NRC Staff, it was eminently reasonable for Intervenors to await and depend upon the Task Force Report for the contentions.

In sum, the contentions are timely because they are neither late nor premature.

Additionally, as the contentions provide, they also meet the eight requirements for the consideration of non-timely contentions in 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(c)(1).

I1. NEPA REQUIRES THE SUPPLEMENTATION OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, OR FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT The applicants and the NRC Staff devote surprisingly little attention to responding to the underlying basis for the contentions: that NEPA requires the environmental report, draft environmental impact statement, or final environmental impact statement (collectively, the "NEPA Documents") in each proceeding to be 5

supplemented in light of the significant new information contained in the Task Force Report. Most of the NRC Staffs' Responses make the barest mention of NEPA, while many applicants provide only a cursory and flawed treatment of the law. Their strategies for evading NEPA fall into three basic categories: (1) attempts to avoid all treatment of safety issues within the context of NEPA by employing an overly narrow definition of environmental effects to exclude those impacts to public safety, (2) mischaracterizations of the contentions as contentions of inadequacy rather than omission, and (3) attempts to shift the agency's NEPA responsibilities onto the shoulders of Intervenors. Where the Responses do address NEPA, they incorrectly claim that the contentions are based upon no significant or new information. None of these arguments has merit.

A. The Responses Mischaracterize the Public Safety Issues Raised in the Contentions to Avoid Addressing NRC's Responsibility to Consider These Issues in the NEPA Documents.

A number of Responses claim that the contentions are inadmissible because they "attack" or seek an "overhaul" of NRC regulations. See e.g. FPL Response (Turkey Point) at 17-23, Entergy Response (Indian Point) at 18-21, Unistar Response (Calvert Cliffs) at 6-10, NRC Staff Response (Diablo Canyon) at 9-12, NRC Staff (Watts Bar 2) at 16, 20-22, TVA Response (Watts Bar 2) at 17. As the contentions make clear, Intervenors do not challenge the adequacy of NRC regulations to protect public health and safety under the Atomic Energy Act. Instead, the contentions question the sufficiency of the NEPA Documents because those documents make factual determinations that compliance with NRC safety regulations will ensure that environmental impacts of reactor accidents will be "SMALL," and the NRC's Task Force has called such determinations into question in its Report.

6

NEPA requires consideration of the safety risks posed by nuclear reactors before final agency action. Indeed, an environmental impact statement must be prepared whenever a major federal action may have a significant effect on the human environment.

42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. The term "human environment" must "be interpreted comprehensively to include the natural and physical environment and the relationship of people with that environment." 40 C.F.R. § 1508.15. Moreover, the term "effect" is synonymous with "impact," and includes the ecological (such as effects on natural resources and on the components, structures, and functioning of affected ecosystems) as well as the aesthetic, historic, cultural, economic, social, and health impacts of a proposed action. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8. The degree to which a project may affect public health or safety is thus a major consideration under the statute. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27.

Therefore, the Responses' attempts to dismiss the numerous public health and safety issues raised by the Task Force Report as being the subject of an impermissible rule challenge are unavailing, as they obscure the necessary role public health and safety issues play in the examination of a project's environmental impacts under NEPA.

Incredibly, some applicants not only read the analysis of "safety" issues out of NEPA, but attempt to avoid addressing Intervenors' claims by further arguing that because there is "no mention of any environmental reviews, either by applicants or by the Staff' the Task Force Report cannot provide support for the contention, "which seeks to raise environmental claims against the [NEPA Document]." FPL Response at 23; see also Entergy Response at 23 (asserting "the Task Force Report does not discuss NEPA issues at all"), NRC Staff Response (Watts Bar 2) at 30. NEPA requires supplementation of a NEPA Document whenever there is significant new information relevant to 7

environmental concerns and bearing on the proposed action or its impacts. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(1)(ii). The applicants' position that NEPA requires the consideration of new information for supplementation purposes only where such documents reference specific "environmental reviews" is unfounded and has no support in the law.

B. The Responses Mischaracterize Intervenors' NEPA Contentions as Contentions of Inadequacy Rather Than of Omission.

Throughout the Responses, applicants make numerous references to Intervenors' alleged failure to point to specific flaws in the NEPA documents. See, e.g., FPL Response at 24-25; Entergy Response at 25-26; Unistar Response at 19-20, n. 12. For example, Florida Power & Light ("FPL") argues that the contention's reference to tsunami risks and seismic seiches does not dispute the findings of Turkey Point's Final Safety Analysis Report ("FSAR") and that the FSAR demonstrates that the units are not vulnerable to tsunamis. Therefore, according to FPL, Intervenors' flooding and seismic protection concerns do not raise any dispute on a significant issue with the application. See FPL Response at 24. FPL further argues that Intervenors' concerns with respect to spent fuel pool cooling do not demonstrate any genuine material dispute with the application because these issues are sufficiently addressed in the AP1000 DCD. See FPL Response at 25.

FPL's arguments completely miss the mark and are nothing more than an attempt to re-characterize the contention as one of inadequacy rather than of omission. Even a cursory reading of Intervenors' contention makes it abundantly clear that it is a contention of omission. The central thrust of the contention is that the Task Force Report constitutes "significant new information" under NEPA and the NEPA Documents need to be supplemented accordingly. The dispute is not that specific portions of the NEPA 8

Documents contain a flawed analysis or reach false conclusions, but rather that the NEPA Documents fail entirely to consider the findings, recommendations, and conclusions of the Task Force Report. Therefore, the Responses' efforts to dismiss the contentions based on the content of specific sections of the NEPA Documents and arguments that those sections do not demonstrate a genuine material dispute are without merit.

C. Applicants Erroneously Conflate Intervenors' Responsibilities under NEPA With Those of the Agency.

Applicants attempt to conflate Intervenors' responsibilities under NEPA with those of the agency by arguing that the contentions must explain in detail how the NEPA Documents should use the information contained in the Task Force Report. For instance, FPL argues that the contention "do[es] not identify any error in any of [the NEPA Document's] analyses" and that it "provide[s] no information indicating that the probability or consequences of any accident scenario is greater than as assessed in the

[NEPA Documents]," where it concerns the consequences of design basis accidents, consequences of severe accidents, and analyzing the cost and benefits of severe accident mitigation alternatives ("SAMA"). FPL Response (Turkey Point) at 29-30, 33; NRC Staff Response (Watts Bar 2) at 37. This argument highlights a fundamental misunderstanding of Intervenors' duties under NEPA by positing that before the NEPA Documents must be supplemented, Intervenors must demonstrate (1) that the new information will, in fact, result in different or greater environmental effects than those described in the NEPA Documents and, (2) precisely how the conclusions in the NEPA Documents should read. See Entergy Response at 23 ("Intervenors do not identify with the requisite specificity any substantial changes in the environmental analysis of the 9

proposed Indian Point license renewal action resulting from the Task Force recommendations").

Contrary to the applicants' arguments, Intervenors carry only the obligation of showing that the new information at issue is "significant," "relevant to environmental concerns," and has "bearing on the proposed action." 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9. Because intervenors meet this burden, NRC has the responsibility to conduct supplemental environmental analyses and report the results in the NEPA Document. In this instance, however, applicants seek to require Intervenors to supply these analyses. As courts have made abundantly clear, "[it] is the agency, not an environmental plaintiff, that has a

'continuing duty to gather and evaluate new information relevant to the environmental impacts of its actions,' even after release of an [EA or EIS]." Friendsof the Clearwater

v. Dombeck, 222 F.3d 552, 559 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Warm Springs Dam Task Force

v. Gribble, 621 F.2d 1017, 1023 (9th Cir. 1980)); See also Te-Moak Tribe v. Interior,608 F.3d 592, 605-606 (9th Cir. 2010); Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 671 (9th Cir. 1975)

("[C]ompliance with NEPA is a primary duty of every federal agency; fulfillment of this vital responsibility should not depend on the vigilance and limited resources of environmental plaintiffs."). As the First Circuit remarked in Dubois v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 102 F.3d 1273, 1291 (1st Cir. 1996), discussing the public's role under NEPA:

Such specifics are not required.... [T]he purpose of public participation regulations is simply to 'provide notice' to the agency, not to 'present technical or precise scientific or legal challenges to specific provisions' of the document in question.... Moreover, NEPA requires the agency to try on its own to develop alternatives that will 'mitigate the adverse environmental consequences' of a proposed project. Robertson v.

Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 351 (1989).

Here, Intervenors have met their burden in demonstrating that the Task Force Report contains new and significant information that is relevant to environmental 10

concerns and has a bearing on the proposed agency regulatory action. Thus NRC has the duty to evaluate this new information and, in conjunction with applicants, prepare supplemental NEPA Documents that rationally connect the facts found to the choices made. Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 158 (1972) (holding that the agency must consider "relevant factors" and articulate "a rational connection between the facts found and the choices made").

This same fundamental misunderstanding of NEPA undermines applicants' arguments relating to SAMAs. Applicants assert that the NEPA Documents need not be supplemented with regard to the SAMA analyses because only through a rule change --

which Intervenors are precluded from requesting in this forum -- can the Task Force recommendations on this issue be considered. See, e.g., FPL Response (Turkey Point) at

35. As discussed above, this attempt to shift the focus to the NRC regulations ignores the clear requirements of NEPA. Applicants' further argument that the contentions fail to demonstrate that the cost-benefit analysis set out in the NEPA Documents for the proposed action will be affected by implementation of the Task Force Report fails for the same reason. See, e.g., FPL Response at 37. It is not Intervenors' responsibility to explain how the cost-benefit analysis contained in the NEPA Documents would change.

That responsibility lies with the NRC.

Finally, to the extent the applicants argue that NEPA's supplementation requirements do not apply to environmental reports ("ERs"), see, e.g., FPL Response at 31, this argument also fails. Such a strained interpretation of the NEPA process as it applies to NRC decision-making is untenable for three reasons. First, to apply this interpretation would result in no conceivable trigger for the NRC to supplement its NEPA II

Documents when significant new information, excluded from consideration and analysis in the ER, becomes available in advance of EIS publication. Nor could Intervenors compel such action, as they would be time-barred from filing new contentions alleging the need to supplement a draft or final EIS because such information was available well before those documents were prepared. As mentioned above, this type of"Catch-22" must be precluded in order to ensure that NRC processes comply with NEPA. Shaw Area MOX Services, 67 NRC at 502. Second, to preclude evaluation of significant new information in the ER would limit the NRC's ability to adequately and timely consider and respond to new information relatively early in the decision-making process, before a significant amount of time and resources are expended in finalizing the project and developing the draft and final EIS for the action. Third, given that the NRC relies heavily on the contents of the ER to prepare its EIS, not including such information or analysis in the ER would create the potential for significant deficiencies in the resulting EIS. This would increase the likelihood for future litigation by parties seeking to cure these deficiencies. For all these legal and practical reasons, applicants' argument that supplementation does not apply to all NEPA Documents, including ERs, cannot stand.

D. The Responses Incorrectly Claim the Contentions Are Based Upon No Significant New Information The applicants also claim the contentions are inadmissible because Intervenors have failed to present "significant new information," as required by 10 C.F.R. § 52.39(c)(v). See, e.g., Entergy Response (Indian Point) at 21-25; FPL Response (Turkey Point) at 30-34; Unistar at 14-18; PEF Response (Levy) at 13-14. The contentions, however, are based upon the new and significant information contained in the Task Force Report. The Applicants' efforts to use the Task Force Report to support a claim that the 12

Task Force itself did not identify significant regulatory changes that represent significant new information in the context of NEPA requirements are simply incorrect.

Many of the Responses argue that the Task Force Report does not present new and significant information because it did not conclude that the recommended design basis changes are necessary at this time. See, e.g., NRC Staff Response (Watts Bar 2) at 28, TVA Response (Watts Bar 2) at 23, NRC Staff Response (Diablo Canyon) at 13.

This argument ignores the fact that such a conclusion is provisional, that is to say that the Task Force assumed the NRC would make the recommended regulatory reforms. Thus, the Task Force found that current regulatory requirements can support a reasonable assurance finding "until the actions set forth below have been implemented" and that continued operation of existing nuclear plants does not pose an immediate threat to public health and safety. That the Report contains provisional statements does not detract from or contradict the essential message of the Task Force Report that the NRC's program of mandatory safety regulations requires significant strengthening in order to provide, over the long term, adequate protection of public health and safety. 3 It is this longer term, i.e.,

the next 40 years or more, that is addressed by the NRC's licensing process and by the associated NEPA Documents.

CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the applicants' and NR Staff's oppositions to the Fukushima Task Force -related contentions submitted by Intervenors.

3 See Task Force Report at 18 ("As new information and new analytical techniques are developed, safety standards need to be reviewed, evaluated, and changed, as necessary, to insure that they continue to address the NRC's requirements to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health and safety. The Task Force believes, based on its review of the information currently available from Japan and the current regulations, that the time has come for such change.")

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Respectfully submitted, Electronicallysigned by Diane Curran, Esq.

Harmon, Curran, Spielberg & Eisenberg, L.L.P 1726 M Street NW, Suite 600.

Washington, D.C. 20036 Telephone: (202)328-3500 Facsimile: (202)328-6918 E-mail: dcurran charmoncurran.com Electronicallysigned by Mindy Goldstein Turner Environmental Law Clinic Emory University School of Law 1301 Clifton Road Atlanta, GA 30322 Phone: (404) 727-3432 Fax: (404) 727-7851 Email: magolds@emory.edu Electronicallysigned by Jason Totoiu Everglades Law Center PO Box 2693 Winter Haven, FL 33883 (561)568-6740 Jason@evergladeslaw.org September 13, 2011 14

Z*eo *eo ' INSTITUTE FOR ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH 6935 Laurel Avenue, Suite 201 Takoma Park, MD 20912 Phone: (301) 270-5500 FAX: (301) 270-3029 e-mail: ieer@ieer.org http://www.ieer.org DECLARATION OF DR. ARJUN MAKHIJANI REGARDING SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL SIGNIFICANCE OF NRC TASK FORCE REPORT REGARDING LESSONS LEARNED FROM FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI NUCLEAR POWER STATION ACCIDENT1 I, Arjun Makhijani, declare as follows:

Introduction and Statement of Qualifications

1. I am President of the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research ("IEER") in Takoma Park, Maryland. Under my direction, IEER produces technical studies on a wide range of energy and environmental issues to provide advocacy groups and policy makers with sound scientific information and analyses as applied to environmental and health protection and for the purpose of promoting the understanding and democratization of science. A copy of my curriculum vita is attached.

2. 1 am qualified by training and experience as an expert in the fields of plasma physics, electrical engineering, nuclear engineering, the health effects of radiation, radioactive waste management and disposal (including spent fuel), estimation of source terms from nuclear facilities, risk assessment, energy-related technology and policy issues, and the relative costs and benefits of nuclear energy and other energy sources. I am the principal author of a report on the 1959 accident at the Sodium Reactor Experiment facility near Simi Valley in California, prepared as an expert report for litigation involving radioactivity emissions from that site. I am also the principal author of a book, The Nuclear Power Deception: U.S. Nuclear Mythology from Electricity "Too Cheap to Meter" to "InherentlySafe'Reactors" (Apex Press, New York, 1999, co-author, Scott Saleska), which examines, among other things, the safety of various designs of nuclear reactors.

3. 1 have written or co-written a number of other books, reports, and publications analyzing the safety, economics, and efficiency of various energy sources, including nuclear power. I am also the author of Securing the Energy Future of the United States: Oil, Nuclear and Electricity I Task Force Review (Recommendationsfor EnhancingReactor Safeo, in the 21st Centuty: The Near-Term Task Force Review of Insightsfirom the Fukushima Dai-ichiAccident, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, July 12, 2011, at littp://pbadupws.nrc.czov/docs/ML I I 18iML 11861807.pdf)

Vulnerabilities and a Post-September 11, 2001 Roadmapfor Action (Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, Maryland, December 2001). In 2004, I wrote "Atomic Myths, Radioactive Realities: Why nuclear power is a poor way to meet energy needs," Journal of Land, Resources, & Environmental Law, v. 24, no. 1 at 61-72 (2004). The article was adapted from an oral presentation given on April 18, 2003, at the Eighth Annual Wallace Stegner Center Symposium entitled, "Nuclear West: Legacy and Future," held at the University of Utah S.J.

Quinney College of Law. In 2008, I prepared a report for the Sustainable Energy & Economic Development (SEED) Coalition entitled Assessing Nuclear Plant Capital Costsfor the Two ProposedNRG Reactors at the South Texas ProjectSite.

4. 1 am generally familiar with the basic design and operation of U.S. nuclear reactors and with the safety and environmental risks they pose. I am also generally familiar with materials from the press, the Japanese government, the Tokyo Electric Power Company, the French government safety authorities, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") regarding the Fukushima Daiichi (hereafter Fukushima) accident and its potential implications for the safety and environmental protection of U.S. reactors. I have also read Recommendationsfor EnhancingReactor Safety in the 2 1St Centuiy: The Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-chiAccident, July 12, 2011 (hereafter the "Task Force Review"),

published by the NRC.

5. On April 19, 2011, 1 prepared a declaration stating my opinion that although the causes, evolution, and consequences of the Fukushima accident were not yet fully clear a month after the accident began, it was already presenting new and significant information regarding the risks to public health and safety and the environment posed by the operation of nuclear reactors. My declaration was submitted to the NRC by numerous individuals and environmental organizations in support of a legal petition to suspend licensing decisions while the NRC investigated the regulatory implications of the Fukushima accident. Emergency Petition to Suspend All Pending Reactor Licensing Decisions and Related Rulemaking Decisions Pending Investigation of Lessons learned From Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Accident (April 14-18, 2011).

In my declaration I also stated my belief that the integration of new information from the Fukushima accident into the NRC's licensing process could affect the outcome of safety and environmental analyses for reactor licensing and relicensing decisions by resulting in the denial of licenses or license extensions or the imposition of new conditions and/or new regulatory requirements. I also expressed the opinion that the new information could also affect the NRC's evaluation of the fitness of new reactor designs for certification. Id., par. 5.

Purpose

6. The purpose of my declaration is to explain why the Task Force Review provides further support for my opinions that the Fukushima accident presents new and significant information regarding the risks to public health and safety and the environment posed by the operation of nuclear reactors and that the integration of this new information into the NRC's licensing process could affect the outcome of safety and environmental analyses for reactor licensing and relicensing decisions and the NRC's evaluation of the fitness of new reactor designs for certification.

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Agreement With Task Force Review's Conclusions Regarding Need to Expand Design Basis

7. In my opinion, the Task Force reasonably concludes that substantial revisions to the very framework of NRC regulations are needed to adequately protect public health and the environment. I also agree that a major overarching step that needs to be taken is to integrate into the design basis for NRC safety requirements an expanded list of severe accidents and events, based on current scientific understanding and evaluations. This would ensure that potential mitigation measures are evaluated on the basis of whether they are needed for safety and not whether they are merely desirable. Should the NRC fail to incorporate an expanded list of severe accident requirements in the design basis of reactors, then a conclusion that the design provides for adequate protection to the public against severe accident risks could not be justified. The necessity for an expanded list of design basis requirements should be viewed in light of the Fukushima experience and the nuclear accident experience which preceded Fukushima, including Three Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents. Specifically, adequate protection of the public is incompatible with the NRC's continued reliance on voluntary evaluation of severe external and internal events, voluntary adoption of mitigation measures, or the use of cost-benefit analysis to evaluate their desirability.

8. I believe my opinion is consistent with the Task Force's statement that:

Adequate protection has been, and should continue to be, an evolving safety standard supported by new scientific information, technologies, methods, and operating experience. This was the case when new information about the security environment was revealed through the events of September 11, 2001. Licensing or operating a nuclear power plant with no emergency core cooling system or without robust security protections, while done in the past, would not occur under the current regulations. As new information and new analytical techniques are developed, safety standards need to be reviewed, evaluated,and changed, as necessaiy, to insure that they continue to address the NRC's requirementsto provide reasonableassurance of adequateprotection of public health and safety.

The Task Force believes, based on its review of the information currently availablefrom Japan and the current regulations,that the time has comeJbr such change. [p. 18, italics added]

9. 1am concerned that over the past three decades or more, the NRC has not conducted the type of review of the adequacy of its safety regulations that is necessary to update its requirements so as to ensure that NRC safety requirements will provide the minimum level of protection required by the Atomic Energy Act. For instance, the Task Force Review points out that, over 30 years ago, the Rogovin Commission recommended that the scope of the design basis should be expanded to include a greater range of severe accidents. The Rogovin Commission explicitly stated that "[m]odification is definitely needed in the current philosophy that there are some accidents ("Class Nine accidents") [2] so unlikely that reactor designs need not 2 Class Nine accidents are now called "severe accidents." (Task Force Review p. 16) 3

provide for mitigating their consequences.'"3 . This recommendation was effectively disregarded by the NRC. Instead of imposing and enforcing mandatory requirements for prevention and mitigation of severe accidents, the NRC accepted voluntary measures and the use of cost-benefit assessments by licensees to exclude requirements for a range of preventive or mitigative measures. As a result the Task Force Review concluded that despite including some requirements for beyond-design-basis accidents, "the NRC has not madefimndamental changes to the regulatoty approachfor beyond-design-basis events and severe accidents for operating reactors." (p. 17, italics added). Even the installation of hardened vents on Mark I and Mark 11 BWRs was left to the voluntary discretion of the licensees. Given the NRC's failure to make the needed changes in its basic regulatory requirements for safety since the Rogovin Commission report was issued over thirty years ago, and in light of the disastrous consequences of the Fukushima accident, which continues nearly five months after it started, I consider the current inadequacies in the NRC's program for regulation of basic reactor safety to be extraordinarily grave problems.

Potential Effects of Task Force Review on Environmental Analyses for New Reactors, Existing Reactor License Renewal, and Standardized Design Certification

10. If the Task Force's recommendation to incorporate severe accidents into the design basis for NRC safety requirements is considered in environmental analyses for reactor licensing decisions or standardized design certifications, I think it would have very significant effects on the outcome of those analyses, in three key respects. First, the environmental analysis would have to consider the implication of the Task Force Review that compliance with current NRC safety requirements does not adequately protect public health and safety from severe accidents and their environmental effects. Second, for reactors that are unable to comply with new mandatory requirements, it could result in the denial of licenses. Third, the cost of adopting mandatory measures necessary to significantly improve the safety of currently operating reactors and proposed new reactors is likely to be significant.

Change to Estimate of Environmental Risk

11. An analysis of the environmental implications of the Task Force Review would have to consider the ramifications of the Task Force's implicit conclusion that compliance with current NRC safety standards does not adequately protect public health and safety from severe accidents and their environmental effects. For instance, the Task Force Review indicates that seismic and flooding risks as well as risks of seismically-induced fires and floods may be greater than previously understood by the NRC in some cases. Therefore in its environmental analyses, the NRC would have to revise its analysis to reflect the new understanding that the risks and radiological impacts of accidents are greater than previously thought.

Potential Denial of License Applications Based on Environmental Risk Analyses

12. The Task Force Review implicitly raises the potential that some reactors will be unable to Rogovin Commission report (Three Mile Island: A Report to the Commissioners and to the Public, by Mitchell Rogovin and George T. Frampton, et al. NUREG/CR-1250 1980. (Rogovin, Stern & Huge, Washington, DC, January 1980), v. 1, p. 151 4

comply with new mandatory requirements, thus resulting in the denial of licenses. For instance, this would be the case if a reactor cannot be adequately backfitted to comply with present-day assessment of ground shaking induced by earthquakes. Similarly, multi-unit siting may not be allowed in certain cases due to the impracticality of meeting upgraded emergency management requirements.

Significant Changes to Cost-Benefit Analyses

13. The cost of adopting mandatory measures necessary to significantly improve the safety of currently operating reactors and proposed new reactors is likely to be significant. Adoption of a coherent regulatory framework as recommended by the Task Force, including periodic reassessments of whether the design basis is up to date with scientific assessments of flooding and seismic threats, is likely to result in significantly increased costs for nuclear reactors.

14. The Task Force Review contains numerous recommendations for consideration of new mandatory requirements for increasing the capability of the reactors, equipment, and personnel to handle and to respond to a range of severe accidents. Adoption of such measures could have high costs. This, in turn, will affect the overall cost-benefit analysis for reactors, especially the comparisons of nuclear power with alternative sources of electricity. Examples of potentially significant costs if severe accident mitigation measures are adopted follow in paragraphs 15 through 24 below:

15. If the Task Force recommendations are adopted, all existing reactors will be required to make changes to extend their capacity to handle station blackouts. This design upgrade is likely to have significant costs.

16. Similar considerations apply to new reactor combined construction and operating license applications. For instance, the Task Force recommends adding station blackout requirements to the Advanced Boiling Water Reactor, which would also likely result in increased costs. (p. 72).

17. Even where the Task Force deems some narrow issues to be already resolved by COL (combined license) applications and/or design certification applications, the interplay of other Task Force recommendations may raise environmental issues and cost concerns. For instance, while the Task Force found that the AP1000 and ESBWR designs already have a 72-hour provision for passive emergency core cooling, thereby satisfying the design requirement recommendations for station blackouts (pp. 71-72), other statements in the Task Force Review indicate the existence of environmental concerns that should be addressed in an EIS. For instance, the Task Force recommendations relating to the provision of backup power during the time beyond 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> relate mainly to prepositioning equipment offsite (Recommendation 4.1, p.

38) and therefore were regarded as not relevant to AP1000 and ESBWR design certifications but only to the COL process (p. 72). However, in the context of emergency preparedness, the Task Force Review notes that "[fin the case of large natural disasters such as earthquakes, hurricanes, and floods, the phenomena challenging the plant will also have affected the local community. In these cases, prearrangedresources may not be available because of their inability to reach the plant site...." (p. 60, italics added). Therefore the designs of the AP1000 and the ESBWR need to be reviewed in the context of their ability to mitigate the environmental impacts of station 5

blackout lasting more than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. The potential for destruction of infrastructure that would prevent prestaged offsite equipment from reaching the site would also needs to be taken into account in environmental analyses for COLs and license extension applications.

18. Similarly, while the Task Force concludes that COL and Early Site Permit (ESP) applications already satisfy Recommendation 2.1 with respect to analysis of seismic and flooding risks (p. 71), it does not appear that all of the seismic and flooding-related implications of the Review have been addressed. Specifically, the flooding and fires that may be induced by earthquakes was closed by the NRC without imposing new requirements; the Task Force Review recommends reopening this issue (p. 32). These are issues that combine site characteristics and reactor design. For instance, the passive cooling features of AP1000s and ESBWRs involve pools of water located above the reactors. In addition, the ESBWR design has a buffer spent fuel pool in roughly the same position relative to the reactor as the Mark I design reactors (i.e., above the reactor vessel). Hence it is important to revisit this issue for these two reactor designs since they may be built at seismically active sites, including in the central and eastern United States (see paragraph 22 below), where there are active COL applications pending.

19. In the context of existing reactors, the Task Force Review recommends incorporating the latest understanding of seismic impacts and flooding (Recommendation 2, p. 30), and reopening the issue seismically induced flooding and fires (Recommendation 3, p. 32). This reassessment may also involve increased costs due to required backfits.

20. Taken as a whole, the Task Force Review's recommendations implicitly call for a review of all new reactor design certifications regarding station blackout (SBO) arrangements, including mitigation measures for SBO events that extend beyond 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and spent fuel pool instrumentation and make up water supply capability. The effects of seismically induced flooding and fires on spent fuel pool arrangements should also be reviewed. All of these reviews could result in the imposition of costly prevention or mitigation measures, affecting comparisons with the alternatives.

21.. In view of the events leading to the hydrogen explosions in Units 1, 3, and 4 at Fukushima, the reliability of the existing hardened vent system in Mark I and Mark II reactors has been thrown into question. The Task Force Review recommends installation of reliable hardened vents in all Mark I and Mark 11 BWRs (Recommendation 5, p. 41). Because such vents have not yet been designed and tested, their costs are unknown. However, they are likely to be substantial. These costs must be determined and evaluated for NEPA purposes for all 23 Mark I.

reactors and all eight Mark II reactors.

22. The recommended mandatory review of the flooding and seismic design basis of existing reactors to evaluate whether they meet the design basis safety requirements could result in greatly increased costs in some or many cases. The establishment of the Shoreline Fault just offshore the Diablo Canyon Power Plant and the Oceanside thrust in the area of the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station provides examples of recent developments that could lead to large expenditures for restoring the design basis safety margins for these reactors. As a reflection of the uncertainty, Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E), which owns Diablo Canyon has itself requested and obtained a delay of 52 months in its license extension application so that the necessary 6

seismic studies can be completed. Another example relates to seismic hazard assessments in the central and eastern United States. In that case, the NRC has concluded that "[u]pdates to seismic data and models indicate that estimates of the seismic hazard, at some operating nuclear power plant sites in the Central and Eastern United States, have increased.'A The NRC does not have enough data at present to determine what, if any, backfits may be called for, but intends to use a cost-benefit approach in deciding whether they should be implemented. It specifically states that

"[i]n order to progress with the Regulatory Analysis Stage, a comprehensive list of candidate plant backfits must be identified for subsequent value-impact analysis."5 "Value-impact analysis" is the NRC's terminology for a cost-benefit analysis. 6 However, if backfitting for more severe earthquakes than were incorporated into the original design were requiredfor safety rather than left to a cost-benefit analysis, the implications for comparison with the alternatives could be considerable for existing reactors in the Central and Eastern United States.

23. The Task Force noted that the same concern applies to flooding hazards, where "the assumptions and factors that were considered in flood protection at operating plants vary. In some cases, the design basis does not consider the probable maximum flood (PMF)." (p. 29)

Again, protection of reactors against updated flood hazards could involve significant costs, depending on the outcome of the updated evaluations.

24. Finally, the Task Force Review points out the importance of considering mitigation measures associated with multi-unit events. Such events had not been considered before and therefore were assigned zero probability for all intents and purposes. The Task Force review recommends a revision of regulations to cover multi-unit events, for instance, to ensure adequate emergency core and spent fuel cooling for more than one unit at a time:

As part of the revision to 10 CFR 50.63, the NRC should require that the equipment and personnel necessary to implement the minimum and extended coping strategies shall include stlfficient capacity to provide core and spentfiel pool cooling, and reactorcooling system andprimary containment integrityfor all units at a multiunitfacilio,. The staff should also make the appropriate revisions to the definitions of "station blackout" and "alternate ac source" in 10 CFR 50.2. [p. 39, italics added]

Because most new applicants for COLs, such as Vogtle 3 and 4, propose to locate the new units at sites that already have reactors, the entire basis of emergency response adequacy, station-blackout related requirements, and emergency core and spent fuel pool cooling needs to be 4 Implicationsof Updated ProbabilisticSeismic HazardEstimates in Centraland Eastern United States on Existing Plants Safety/Risk Assessments, Generic Issue 199 (GI- 199), Nuclear Regulatory Commission, August 2010, at http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1002/ML100270639.pdf p. 30 5 GI-199 p. 30 6 NRC guidelines require "that the value-impact of an alternative be quantified as the "net value" (or "net benefit").

To the extent possible, all attributes, whether values or impacts, are quantified in monetary terms and added together (with the appropriate algebraic signs) to obtain the net value in dollars. The net value calculation is generally favored over other measures, such as a value-impact ratio or internal rate of return (RWG 1996,Section III.A.2)."

(RegulatoryAnalysis Technical EvaluationHandbook: Final Report, NUREG/BR-0 184, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, January 1997, p. 5.2. Link at http://www.osti.gov/energycitations/product.biblio.isp?osti id=446391.

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reconsidered for the total number of units proposed at the site. The design and cost implications could be significant and must be reconsidered and reevaluated.

Conclusions

25. I agree with the conclusions of the Task Force that significant changes to the NRC's regulatory system are needed in order to ensure that the operation of new reactors and re-licensed existing reactors does not pose unacceptable safety and environmental risks to the public. In light of the disastrous and ongoing events at Fukushima since March 11, 2011, it is clear that the issues of public safety raised by the Task Force are exceptionally grave. I also believe that it is highly likely that consideration of the Task Force's conclusions and recommendations in environmental analyses for new reactor licensing, existing reactor re-licensing, and design certification rulemakings, would materially affect the outcome of many and possibly all those studies.

The facts presented above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, and the opinions expressed therein are based on my best professional judgment.

Date: 8 August 2011 Dr. Arjun Makhijani 8

INSTITUTE FOR ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH 6935 Laurel Avenue, Suite 201 Takoma Park, MD 20912 Phone: (301) 270-5500 FAX: (301) 270-3029 e-mail: ieer@ieer.org http://www.ieer.org Curriculum Vita of Arjun Makhijani Address and Phone:

Institute for Energy and Environmental Research 6935 Laurel Ave., Suite 201 Takoma Park, MD 20912 Phone: 301-270-5500 e-mail: arjun@ieer.org Website: www.iecr.org A recognized authority on energy issues, Dr. Makhijani is the author and co-author of numerous reports and books on energy and environment related issues, including two published by MIT Press. He was the principal author of the first study of the energy efficiency potential of the US economy published in 1971. He is the author of Carbon-Freeand Nuclear-Free:A Roadmapfor U.S. Energy Policy (2007).

In 2007, he was elected Fellow of the American Physical Society. He was named a Ploughshares Hero, by the Ploughshares Fund (2006); was awarded the Jane Bagley Lehman Award of the Tides Foundation in 2008 and the Josephine Butler Nuclear Free Future Award in 2001; and in 1989 he received The John Bartlow Martin Award for Public Interest Magazine Journalism of the Medill School of Journalism, Northwestern University, with Robert Alvarez.

He has many published articles in journals and magazines as varied as The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Environment, The Physics of Fluids, The Journalof the American Medical Association, and The Progressive,as well as in newspapers, including the Washington Post.

Dr. Makhijani has testified before Congress, and has appeared on ABC World News Tonight, the CBS Evening News, CBS 60 Minutes, NPR, CNN, and BBC, among others. He has served as a consultant on energy issues to utilities, including the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Edison Electric Institute, the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, and several agencies of the United Nations.

Education:

• Ph.D. University of California, Berkeley, 1972, from the Department of Electrical Engineering. Area of specialization: plasma physics as applied to controlled nuclear fusion. Dissertation topic: multiple mirror confinement of plasmas. Minor fields of doctoral study: statistics and physics.

• M.S. (Electrical Engineering) Washington State University, Pullman, Washington, 1967.

Thesis topic: electromagnetic wave propagation in the ionosphere.

" Bachelor of Engineering (Electrical), University of Bombay, Bombay, India, 1965.

CurrentEmployment:

• 1987-present: President and Senior Engineer, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, Maryland. (part-time in 1987).

" February 3, 2004-present, Associate, SC&A, Inc., one of the principal investigators in the audit of the reconstruction of worker radiation doses under the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act under contract to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

Other Long-term Employment

• 1984-88: Associate Professor, Capitol College, Laurel, Maryland (part-time in 1988).

• 1983-84: Assistant Professor, Capitol College, Laurel, Maryland.

• 1977-79: Visiting Professor, National Institute of Bank Management, Bombay, India.

Principal responsibility: evaluation of the Institute's extensive pilot rural development program.

• 1975-87: Independent consultant (see page 2 for details)

• 1972-74: Project Specialist, Ford Foundation Energy Policy Project, Responsibilities included research and writing on the technical and economic aspects of energy conservation and supply in the U.S.; analysis of Third World rural energy problems; preparation of requests for proposals; evaluation of proposals; and the management of grants made by the Project to other institutions.

• 1969-70: Assistant Electrical Engineer, Kaiser Engineers, Oakland California.

Responsibilities included the design and checking of the electrical aspects of mineral industries such as cement plants, and plants for processing mineral ores such as lead and uranium ores. Pioneered the use of the desk-top computer at Kaiser Engineers for performing electrical design calculations.

ProfessionalSocieties:

• Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers and its Power Engineering Society

• American Physical Society (Fellow)

• Health Physics Society

• American Association for the Advancement of Science Awards and Honors:

• The John Bartlow Martin Award for Public Interest Magazine Journalism of the Medill School of Journalism, Northwestern University, 1989, with Robert Alvarez

• The Josephine Butler Nuclear Free Future Award, 2001

" Ploughshares Hero, Ploughshares Fund, 2006

• Elected a Fellow of the American Physical Society, 2007, "Forhis tireless efforts to provide the public with accurateand understandableinformation on energy and environmnental issues"

• Jane Bagley Lehman Award of the Tides Foundation, 2007/2008 2

Invited Faculty Member, Centerfor Health and the Global Environment, HarvardMedical School: Annual Congressional Course, Environmental Change: The Science andHuman Health Impacts, April 18-19, 2006, Lecture Topic: An Update on Nuclear Power - Is it Safe?

Consulting Experience, 19 75-198 7 Consultant on a wide variety of issues relating to technical and economic analyses of alternative energy sources; electric utility rates and investment planning; energy conservation; analysis of energy use in agriculture; US energy policy; energy policy for the Third World; evaluations of portions of the nuclear fuel cycle.

Partial list of institutions to which I was a consultant in the 1975-87 period:

" Tennessee Valley Authority

• Lower Colorado River Authority

• Federation of Rocky Mountain States

• Environmental Policy Institute

• Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory

• Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

• International Labour Office of the United Nations

" United Nations Environment Programme

" United Nations Center on Transnational Corporations

• The Ford Foundation

• Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific

• United Nations Development Programme Languages: English, French, Hindi, Sindhi, and Marathi.

Reports, Books, and Articles (Partiallist)

(Newsletter, newspaper articles, excerpts from publications reprinted in books and magazines or adapted therein, and other similar publications are not listed below)

Hower, G.L., and A. Makhijani, "Further Comparison of Spread-F and Backscatter Sounder Measurements," Journal of GeophysicalResearch, 74, p. 3723, 1969.

Makhijani, A., and A.J. Lichtenberg, An Assessment of Energy and Materials Utilization in the U.S.A., University of California Electronics Research Laboratory, Berkeley, 1971.

Logan, B. G., A.J. Lichtenberg, M. Lieberman, and A. Makhijani, "Multiple-Mirror Confinement of Plasmas," PhysicalReview Letters, 28, 144, 1972.

Makhijani, A., and A.J. Lichtenberg, "Energy and Well-Being," Environment, 14, 10, June 1972.

Makhijani, A., A.J. Lichtenberg, M. Lieberman, and B. Logan, "Plasma Confinement in Multiple Mirror Systems. I. Theory," Physics ofFluids, 17, 1291, 1974.

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A Time to Choose: America's Energy Future, final report of the Ford Foundation Energy Policy Project, Ballinger, Cambridge, 1974. One of many co-authors.

Makhijani, A., and A. Poole, Energy andAgriculturein the Third World, Ballinger, Cambridge, 1975.

Makhijani, A., Energy Policyfor the Rural Third World, International Institute for Environment and Development, London, 1976.

Kahn, E., M. Davidson, A. Makhijani, P. Caeser, and S. Berman, Investment Planning in the Energy Sector, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, Berkeley, 1976.

Makhijani, A., "Solar Energy for the Rural Third World," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 1977.

Maklhijani, A., "Energy Policy for Rural India," Economic and PoliticalWeekly, 12, Bombay, 1977.

Makhijani, A., Some Questions of Method in the Tennessee Valley Authority Rate Study, Report to the Tennessee Valley Authority, Chattanooga, 1978.

Makhijani, A., The Economics and Sociology ofAlternative Energy Sources, Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, 1979.

Makhijani, A., Energy Use in the Post-HarvestComponent of the FoodSystems in Ivory Coast and Nicaragua,Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome, 1982.

Makhijani, A., Oil Prices and the Crises of Debt and Unemployment: Methodological and StructuralAspects, International Labour Office of the United Nations, Final Draft Report, Geneva, April 1983.

Makhijani, A., and D. Albright, The Irradiationof Personnelat Operation Crossroads, International Radiation Research and Training Institute, Washington, D.C., 1983.

Makhijani, A., K.M. Tucker, with Appendix by D. White, Heat, High Water, andRock Instability at Hanford,Health and Energy Institute, Washington, D.C., 1985.

Makhijani, A., and J. Kelly, Target: Japan - The Decision to Bomb Hiroshima andNagasaki, July 1985, a report published as a book in Japanese under the title, Why Japan?, Kyoikusha, Tokyo, 1985.

Makhijani, A., Experimental IrradiationofA ir Force PersonnelDuring OperationRedwing -

1956, Environmental Policy Institute, Washington, D.C., 1985.

Makhijani, A., and R.S. Browne, "Restructuring the International Monetary System," World Policy Journal,New York, Winter, 1985-86.

4

Makhijani, A., R. Alvarez, and B. Blackwelder, Deadly Crop in the Tank Farm:An Assessment of Management of High-Level Radioactive Wastes in the Savannah River Plant Tank Farm, Environmental Policy Institute, Washington, D.C., 1986.

Makhijani, A., "Relative Wages and Productivity in International Competition," College Industry Conference Proceedings,American Society for Engineering Education, Washington, D.C., 1987.

Makhijani, A., An Assessment of the Energy Recovery Aspect of the ProposedMass Burn Facility at Preston, Connecticut, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, 1987.

Makhijani, A., R. Alvarez, and B. Blackwelder, Evading the Deadly Issues: Corporate Mismanagement of America's Nuclear Weapons Production, Environmental Policy Institute, Washington, D.C., 1987.

Franke, B. and A. Makhijani, Avoidable Death: A Review of the Selection and Characterization of a Radioactive Waste Repository in West Germany, Health & Energy Institute, Washington, DC; Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, November 1987.

Makhijani, A., Release Estimates of Radioactive andNon-Radioactive Materials to the Environment by the Feed MaterialsProduction Center, 1951-85, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, 1988.

Alvarez, R., and A. Makhijani, "The Hidden Nuclear Legacy," Technology Review, 91, 42,1988.

Makhijani, A., Annie Makhijani, and A. Bickel, Saving Our Skins: Technical Potentialand Policiesfor the Eliminationof Ozone-Depleting Chlorine Compounds, Environmental Policy Institute and Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, 1988.

Makhijani, A., Annie Makhijani, and A. Bickel, Reducing Ozone-Depleting Chlorineand Bromine Accumulations in the Stratosphere:A Critique of the U.S. EnvironmentalProtection Agency's Analysis andRecommendations, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research and Environmental Policy Institute/Friends of the Earth, Takoma Park, 1989.

Makhijani, A., and B. Franke, Addendum to Release Estimates of Radioactive and Non-Radioactive Materials to the Environment by the Feed Materials ProductionCenter, 1951-85, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, 1989.

Makhijani, A., Global Warming and Ozone Depletion: An Action Programfor States, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, 1989.

Makhijani, A., ManagingMunicipal Solid Wastes in Montgomery County, Prepared for the Sugarloaf Citizens Association, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, 1990.

Saleska, S., and A. Makhijani, To Reprocess or Not to Reprocess: The Purex Question - A PreliminaryAssessment ofAlternatives for the Management of N-Reactor IrradiatedFuel at the 5

U.S. Departmentof Energy's HanfordNuclear Weapons ProductionFacility, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, 1990.

Makhijani, A., "Common Security is Far Off," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 1990.

Makhijani, A., Draft Power in South Asian Agriculture: Analysis of the Problem and Suggestions for Policy, prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, 1990..

Mehta, P.S., S.J. Mehta, A.S. Mehta, and A. Makhijani, "Bhopal Tragedy's Health Effects: A Review of Methyl Isocyanate Toxicity," JAMA 264, 2781, December 1990.

Special Commission of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War and the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Radioactive Heaven and Earth: The Health and EnvironmentalEffects of Nuclear Weapons Testing In, On, andAbove the Earth, Apex Press, New York, 1991. One of many co-authors.

Makhijani, A., and S. Saleska, High Level DollarsLow-Level Sense: A Critique of Present Policyfor the Management of Long-Lived Radioactive Waste andDiscussion of an Alternative Approach, Apex Press, New York, 1992.

Makhijani, A., From Global Capitalism to Economic Justice: An Inquiry into the Eliminationof Systemic Poverty, Violence and EnvironmentalDestruction in the World Economy, Apex Press, New York, 1992.

Special Commission of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War and the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Plutonium: Deadly Gold of the Nuclear Age, International Physicians Press, Cambridge, MA, 1992. One of several co-authors.

Makhijani, A., "Energy Enters Guilty Plea," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 1994.

Makhijani, A., "Open the Files," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Jan./Feb. 1995.

Makhijani, A., "'Always' the Target?" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 1995.

Makhijani, A., and Annie Makhijani, Fissile Materialsin a Glass, Darkly: Technical and Policy Aspects of the Disposition of Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium, IEER Press, Takoma Park, 1995.

Makhijani, A., and K. Gurney, Mending the Ozone Hole: Science, Technology, and Policy, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1995.

Makhijani, A., H. Hu, K. Yih, eds., Nuclear Wastelands: A Global Guide to Nuclear Weapons Production and the Health and EnvironmentalEffects, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1995.

6

Zerriffi, H., and A. Makhijani, The Nuclear Safety Smokescreen." Warhead Safety and Reliability and the Science Based Stockpile Stewardship Program,Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, May 1996.

Zerriffi, H., and A. Makhijani, "The Stewardship Smokescreen," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 1996.

Makhijani, A., Energy Efficiency Investments as a Source of Foreign Exchange, prepared for the International Energy Agency Conference in Chelyabinsk, Russia, 24-26 September 1996.

Makhijani, A., "India's Options," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 1997.

Ortmeyer, P. and A. Makhijani, "Worse than We Knew," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 1997.

Fioravanti, M., and A. Makhijani, Containingthe Cold War Mess: Restructuring the EnvironmentalManagement of the US. Nuclear Weapons Complex, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, October 1997.

Principal author of three chapters in Schwartz, S., ed., Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Since 1940, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.,

1998.

Franke, B., and A. Makhijani, RadiationExposures in the Vicinity of the Uranium Facility in Apollo, Pennsylvania, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, February 2, 1998.

Fioravanti, M., and A. Makhijani, Supplement to Containing the Cold War Mess - IEER's Response to the Departmentof Energy's Review, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, March 1998.

Makhijani, A., "A Legacy Lost," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 1998.

Makhijani, A., and Hisham Zerriffi, Dangerous Thermonuclear Quest: The Potentialof Explosive Fusion Researchfor the Development of Pure Fusion Weapons, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, July 1998.

Makhijani, A., and Scott Saleska, The Nuclear Power Deception - U.S. Nuclear Mythology from Electricity "Too Cheap to Meter" to "InherentlySafe" Reactors, Apex Press, New York, 1999.

Makhijani, A., "Stepping Back from the Nuclear Cliff," The Progressive,vol. 63, no. 8, August 1999.

Makhijani, A., Bernd Franke, and Hisham Zerriffi, PreliminatyPartialDose Estimatesfrom the Processingof Nuclear Materials at Three Plantsduring the 1940s and 1 9 50s, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, September 2000. (Prepared under contract to the newspaper USA Today.)

7

Makhijani, A., and Bernd Franke, FinalReport of the Institutefor Energy and Environmental Research on the Second Clean Air Act Audit of Los Alamos NationalLaboratory by the Independent TechnicalAudit Team, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, December 13, 2000.

Makhijani, A., Plutonium End Game.-Managing Global Stocks of Separated Weapons-Usable Commercial and Surplus Nuclear Weapons Plutonium, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, January 2001.

Makhijani, A., Hisham Zerriffi, and Annie Makhijani, "Magical Thinking: Another Go at Transmutation," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 2001.

Makhijani, A., Ecology and Genetics: An Essay on the Nature of Life and the Problem of Genetic Engineering.New York: Apex Press, 2001.

Makhijani, A., "Burden of Proof," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 2001.

Makhdijani, A., "Reflections on September 11, 2001," in Kamla Bhasin, Smitu Kothari, and Bindia Thapar, eds., Voices of Sanity: Reaching Outfor Peace, Lokayan, New Delhi, 2001, pp.

59-64.

Makhijani, A., and Michele Boyd, Poison in the Vadose Zone: An examination of the threats to the Snake River Plain aquiferfrom the Idaho NationalEngineeringand Environmental Laboratory,Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, October 2001.

Makhijani, A., Securing the Energy Future of the United States. Securing the Energy Futureof the United States: Oil, Nuclear, and Electricity Vulnerabilities and a post-September 11, 2001 Roadmapfor Action, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, November 2001.

Makhijani, A., and Sriram Gopal, Setting Cleanup Standardsto ProtectFuture Generations: The Scientific Basis of Subsistence FarmerScenario and Its Application to the Estimation of Radionuclide Soil Action Levels (RSALs) for Rocky Flats, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, December 2001.

Makhijani, A., "Some Factors in Assessing the Response to September 11, 2001," Medicine and Global Survival, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, Cambridge, Mass.,

February 2002.

Makhijani, Annie, Linda Gunter, and A. Makhijani, Cogema: Above the Law?.- Concerns about the French Parent Company of a U.S. CorporationSet to Process Plutonium in South Carolina.

A report prepared by Institute for Energy and Environmental Research and Safe Energy Communication Council. Takoma Park, MD, May 7, 2002.

Deller, N., A. Makhijani, and J. Burroughs, eds., Rule of Power or Rule of Law? An Assessment of U.S. Policies andActions Regarding Security-Related Treaties, Apex Press, New York, 2003.

8

Makhijani, A., "Nuclear targeting: The first 60 years," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2003.

Makhijani, A., "Strontium," Chemical & EngineeringNews, September 8, 2003.

Makhijani, A., and Nicole Deller, NATO and Nuclear Disarmament:An Analysis of the Obligationsof the NA TO Allies of the United States under the Nuclear Non-ProliferationTreaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, Maryland, October 2003.

Makhijani, A., Manifesto for Global Democracy.- Two Essays on Imperialism and the Struggle for Freedom, Apex Press, New York, 2004.

Makhijani, A., "Atomic Myths, Radioactive Realities: Why nuclear power is a poor way to meet energy needs," Journalof Land, Resources, & EnvironmentalLaw, v. 24, no. 1, 2004, pp. 61-72.

Adapted from an oral presentation given on April 18, 2003, at the Eighth Annual Wallace Stegner Center Symposium titled "Nuclear West: Legacy and Future," held at the University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law."

Makhijani, A., and Michele Boyd, Nuclear Dumps by the Riverside: Threats to the Savannah River from Radioactive Contamination at the Savannah River Site, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, Maryland, March 2004.

Makhijani, A., and Brice Smith, The Role of E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company (Du Pont) and the General Electric Company in Plutonium Production and the Associated 1-131 Emissions fi-om the Hanford Works, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park.

Maryland, March 30, 2004.

Makhijani, A., Peter Bickel, Aiyou Chen, and Brice Smith, Cash Crop on the WindFarm: A New Mexico Case Study of the Cost, Price,and Value of Wind-GeneratedElectricity, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, Maryland, April 2004.

Makhijani, A., Lois Chalmers, and Brice Smith, Uranium Enrichment: Just PlainFacts to Fuel an Informed Debate on Nuclear ProliferationandNuclear Power, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, Maryland, October 15, 2004.

Makhijani, A., and Brice Smith, Costs and Risks of Management andDisposal of Depleted Uraniumfrom the NationalEnrichment Facility Proposedto be Built in Lea County New Mexico by LES, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, Maryland, November 24, 2004.

Makhijani, A., project director, Examen critique du programme de recherche de I'ANDRA pour d6terminer l'aptitude du site de Bure au confinement gýologique des d&hets iý haute activitý et c vie longue: Rapportfinal, prepared for le Comitd ocal d'Information et de Suivi; coordinator:

Annie Makhijani; authors: Detlef Appel, Jaak Daemen, George Danko,Yuri Dublyansky, Rod Ewing, Gerhard Jentzsch, Horst Letz, Arjun Makhijani, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, Maryland, December 2004 9

Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Lower Boundfor Cesium-137 Releasesfrom the Sodium Burn Pit at the Santa Susana FieldLaboratory,IEER, Takoma Park, Maryland, January 13, 2005. (Authored by A. Makhijani and Brice Smith.)

Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Iodine-131 Releasesfrom the July 1959 Accident at the Atomics InternationalSodium Reactor Experiment, lEER, Takoma Park, Maryland, January 13, 2005. (Authored by A. Makhijani and Brice Smith.)

Makhijani, A., and Brice Smith. Update to Costs and Risks of Management and Disposalof Depleted Uraniumfrom the NationalEnrichment Facility Proposedto be Built in Lea County New Mexico by LES. Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, Maryland, July 5, 2005.

Makhijani, A., "A Readiness to Harm: The Health Effects of Nuclear Weapons Complexes,"

Arms Control Today, 35, July/August 2005.

Maklhijani, A., Bad to the Bone. Analysis of the FederalMaximum ContaminantLevels for Plutonium-239 and Other Alpha-Emitting TransuranicRadionuclides in Drinking Water, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, Maryland, August 2005.

Makhijani, A., and Brice Smith, DangerousDiscrepancies:Missing Weapons Plutonium in Los Alamos National Laboratory Waste Accounts, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, Maryland, April 21, 2006.

Makhijani, Annie, and A. Makhijani, Low-Carbon Diet without Nukes in France.-An Energy Technology and Policy Case Study on Simultaneous Reduction of Climate Change and ProliferationRisks, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, Maryland, May 4, 2006.

Makhijani, Annie, and A. Makhijani. Shifting Radioactivity Risks: A Case Study of the K-65 Silos and Silo 3 Remediation and Waste Management at the FernaldNuclear Weapons Site, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, Maryland, August 2006.

Smith, Brice, and A. Makhijani, "Nuclear is Not the Way," Wilson Quarterly,v.30, p. 64, Autumn 2006.

Makhijani, A., Brice Smith, and Michael C. Thorne, Sciencejbr the Vulnerable.-Setting Radiation and Multiple Exposure EnvironmentalHealth Standardsto ProtectThose Most at Risk, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, Maryland, October 19, 2006.

Makhijani, A., Carbon-Freeand Nuclear Free: A Roadmapfor U.S. Energy Policy, IEER Press, Takoma Park, Maryland; RDR Books, Muskegon, Michigan, 2007.

Makhijani, A., Assessing Nuclear Plant CapitalCosts for the Two ProposedNRG Reactors at the South Texas Project Site, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, Maryland, March 24, 2008.

10

Makhijani, A., Energy Efficiency Potential:San Antonio's Bright Energy Future,Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, Maryland, October 9, 2008.

Makhijani, A., The Use of Reference Man in RadiationProtectionStandards and Guidancewith Recotnmendationsfor Change, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, Maryland, December 2008.

Makhijani, A., Comments of the Institutefor Energy andEnvironmentalResearch on the U.S.

NuclearRegulatory Commission's Proposed Waste Confidence Rule Update and ProposedRule Regarding EnvironmentalImpacts of Temporamy Spent Fuel Storage, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, Maryland, February 6, 2009.

Makhijani, A., Technical and Economic Feasibilityof a Carbon-FreeandNuclear-FreeEnergy System in the United States, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, Maryland, March 4, 2009.

Fundaci6n Ideas para el Progreso, A New Energy Model For Spain."Recommendationsfor a Sustainable Future (originally: Un nuevo modelo energ~ticoparaEspaha: Recomendaciones para unfiuturo sostenible), by the Working Group of Foundation Ideas for Progress on Energy and Climate Change, Fundaci6n Ideas , Madrid, May 20, 2009. Arjun Makhijani contributed Section 2.2. The cost of nuclear energy and the problem of waste.

Makhijani, A., lEER Comments on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Rulemaking Regarding the "Safe Disposalof Unique Waste Streams Including Significant Quantities of Depleted Uranium,"JInstitute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, Maryland, October 30, 2009.

Makhijani, A., The Mythology and Messy Reality of Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, Maryland, April 8, 2010.

CV updated October 11, 2010 11

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

)

In the Matter of )

) Docket No. 50-397-LR ENERGY NORTHWEST )

October 28, 2011 (Columbia Generating Station) ))

MOTION TO REINSTATE AND SUPPLEMENT THE BASIS FOR FUKUSHIMA TASK FORCE REPORT CONTENTION INTRODUCTION Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.323(e), Petitioner Northwest Environmental Advocates hereby moves to reinstate and supplement the basis of its contention seeking consideration of the environmental implications of the Fukushima Task Force Report in the Environmental Report for the proposed re-licensing of the Columbia nuclear power plant. Petition for Hearing and Leave to Intervene in Operating License Renewal for Energy Northwest's Columbia Generating Station (August 22, 2011). The contention was rejected as premature by this Atomic Safety and Licensing Board ("ASLB") in LBP-11-27, Memorandum and Order (Denying Motions to Reopen Closed Proceedings and Intervention Petition/Hearing Request as Premature), _ NRC _ (Oct. 18, 2011).

Northwest Environmental Advocates seeks to supplement the contention's basis to assert that the Commissioners of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC" or "Commission") have recognized the safety and environmental significance of the conclusions and recommendations of the Fukushima Task Force Report by issuing an order directing the NRC Staff to "strive to complete and implement the lessons learned

from the Fukushima accident within five years - by 2016." SRM/SECY-11-0124, Memorandum from R.W. Borchardt, Executive Director for Operations to Annette L.

Vietti-Cook, Secretary, re: Recommended Actions to be Taken Without Delay from the Near-Term Task Force Report (October 18, 2011).1 Northwest Environmental Advocates also requests the ASLB to rule that in light of SRM/SECY-1 1-0124, the contention is no longer premature under the standard established by the ASLB in LBP- 11-27 and should be admitted. 2 DISCUSSION In LBP-1 1-27, the ASLB interprets the Commission's decision in Union Electric Co. d/b/a Ameren Missouri (Callaway Plant, Unit 2), et al., CLI-11-05, __ NRC __ (Sept.

9, 2011) to preclude admission of the Petitioner's contention because "it remains much too early in the process of assessing the Fukushima event in the context of the operation of reactors in the United States to allow any informed conclusion regarding the possible safety or environmental implications of that event regarding such operation." Id. at 13.

LBP-1 1-27 indicates, however, that the ASLB would consider the contention to be admissible if and when the Commission adopts the Task Force recommendations:

It is difficult to fathom how the Commission could have stated more precisely and definitively that it remains much too early in the process of assessing the The SRM is posted on the NRC's website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-r-n/doc-collections/commission/srnm/2011/201 1-0124srm.pdf.

2 Northwest Environmental Advocates also wishes to notify the ASLB that it believes that LBP-l 1-27 is based on an erroneous interpretation of the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") and the Commission's decision in Union Electric Co. d/b/a Ameren Missouri (Callaway Plant, Unit 2), et al., CLI-1 1-05, __ NRC _ (Sept. 9, 2011), and therefore intends to petition the Commission for review of LBP- 11-27. Petitioner will request the Commission to hold its petition for review in abeyance pending the outcome of this motion. See, e.g., Private Fuel Storage, L.L. C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-0 1-1, 53 NRC 1, 3 (2001) (citing InternationalUranium Corp. (White Mesa Uranium Mill), CLI-97-9, 46 NRC 23, 24-25 (1997).

2

Fukushima event in the context of the operation of reactors in the United States to allow any informed conclusion regarding the possible safety or environmental implications of that event regarding such operation. Ofstill greater importance given [the Petitioners] entire reliance on thefindings and recommendationsof the Task Force, the Commission stressed with equalforce and clarity that, while under active study, none of those findings and recommendationshas been accepted Thus, they scarcely have been given the effect that, according to [the Petitioners], gives rise to the environmental implications that undergird the contention that is sought to be admitted.

Id. (emphasis added).

Northwest Environmental Advocates respectfully submits that the ASLB's condition for admission of the contention is satisfied by SRM/SECY-1 1-0124, which directed the NRC Staff to "strive to complete and implement tile lessons learned from the Fukushima accident within five years - by 2016." id. at 1.3 While the SRM did not order the adoption of every single recommendation, it did endorse a significant number of them, including the sweeping Recommendation # I which would expand the scope of the adequate protection standard. Thus, the Commission has "accepted" the Task Force Report in significant respects. LBP-1 1-27, slip op. at 13.

Therefore Northwest Environmental Advocates requests the ASLB to take the following actions:

" order the reinstatement of the contention;

• permit the supplementation of the contention's basis to include (in addition to the language of the Task Force Report itself and the Declaration of Dr. Arjun Makhijani) SRM/SECY-1 1-0124 as an indication of the significance of the Task Force Report's conclusions and recommendations; and 3 There is no indication in LBP-1 1-27 that the ASLB was aware of the issuance of SRM/SECY- 11-0124 at the time it issued LBP- 11-27.

3

• rule on the admissibility of the reinstated and revised contention in light of SRM/SECY- 11-0 124.

CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, this motion should be granted.

Respectfully submitted, Signed (electronically)) by Nina Bell, Executive Director Northwest Environmental Advocates P.O. Box 12187 Portland, OR 97212 503-295-0490 nbell@advocates-nwea.org October 28, 2011 CERTIFICATE PURSUANT TO 10 C.F.R. § 2.323(b)

I certify that on October 27, 2011, I contacted counsel for the applicant and NRC Staff and attempted to resolve the issues raised by this motion. They stated that they do not agree with the motion and intend to oppose it.

Nina Bell 4

L27 INSTITUTE FOR ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH 6935 Laurel Avenue, Suite 201 Takoma Park, MD 20912 Phone: (301) 270-5500 FAX: (301) 270-3029 e-mail: ieer@ieer.org http://www.ieer.org DECLARATION OF DR. ARJUN MAKHIJANI IN SUPPORT OF EMERGENCY PETITION TO SUSPEND ALL PENDING REACTOR LICENSING DECISIONS AND RELATED RULEMAKING DECISIONS PENDING INVESTIGATION OF LESSONS LEARNED FROM FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI NUCLEAR POWER STATION ACCIDENT I, Arjun Makhijani, declare as follows:

Introduction and Statement of Qualifications

1. I am President of the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research ("IEER") in Takoma Park, Maryland. Under my direction, IEER produces technical studies on a wide range of energy and environmental issues to provide advocacy groups and policy makers with sound scientific information and analyses as applied to environmental and health protection and for the purpose of promoting the understanding and democratization of science. A copy of my curriculum vitae is attached.

2. I am qualified by training and experience as an expert in the fields of plasma physics, electrical engineering, nuclear engineering, the health effects of radiation, radioactive waste management and disposal(including spent fuel), estimation of source terms from nuclear facilities, risk assessment, energy-related technology and policy issues, and the relative costs and benefits of nuclear energy and other energy sources. I am the principal author of a report on the 1959 accident at the Sodium Reactor Experiment facility near Simi Valley in California, prepared as an expert report for litigation involving radioactivity emissions from that site. I am also the principal author of a book, The Nuclear Power Deception - U.S. Nuclear Mythology from Electricity "Too Cheap to Meter" to "inherentlySafe'Reactors " (Apex Press, New York, 1999, co-author, Scott Saleska), which examines, among other things, the safety of various designs of nuclear reactors.

3. I have written or co-written a number of other books, reports, and publications analyzing the safety, economics, and efficiency of various energy sources, including nuclear power. I am also the author of Securing the Energy Future of the United States: Oil, Nuclear and Electricity Vulnerabilities and a Post-September 11, 2001 Roadmapfor Action (Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, Maryland, December 2001). In 2004, 1 wrote "Atomic

Myths, Radioactive Realities: Why nuclear power is a poor way to meet energy needs," Journal ofLand, Resources, & EnvironmentalLaw, v. 24, no. I at 61-72 (2004). The article was adapted from an oral presentation given on April 18, 2003, at the Eighth Annual Wallace Stegner Center Symposium entitled, "Nuclear West: Legacy and Future," held at the University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law. In 2008, I prepared a report for the Sustainable Energy &

Economic Development (SEED) Coalition entitled Assessing Nuclear Plant CapitalCosts for the Two ProposedNRG Reactors at the South Texas Project Site.

4. I am generally familiar with the basic design and operation of U.S. nuclear reactors and with the safety and environmental risks they pose. I am also generally familiar with materials from the press, the Japanese government, the Tokyo Electric Power Company, the French government safety authorities, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") regarding the Fukushima Daiichi accident and its potential implications for the safety and environmental protection of U.S. reactors.

5. The purpose of my declaration is to explain the reasons I believe that although the causes, evolution, and consequences of the Fukushima accident are not yet fully clear, the accident is already presenting new and significant information regarding the risks to public health and safety and the environment posed by the operation of nuclear reactors. I will also explain why I believe that integration of this new information into the NRC's licensing process could affect the outcome of safety and environmental analyses for reactor licensing and relicensing decisions by resulting in either the denial of licenses or license extensions or the imposition of new conditions and/or new regulatory requirements. It could also affect the NRC evaluation of the fitness of new reactor designs for certification. It is therefore reasonable and necessary to suspend licensing and re-licensing decisions and standardized design certifications until the NRC completes its review of the safety and regulatory implications of the Fukushima accident.

Statement of Facts

6. Although many details about the Fukushima reactor accident remain unclear, the general contours of the accident are described in NRC Information Notice No. 2011-08 (March 31, 2011)

(NRC Accession No. ML110830824) as follows:

On March 11, 2011, the Tohoku-Taiheiyou-Oki earthquake occurred near the east coast of Honshu, Japan. This magnitude 9.0 earthquake and the subsequent tsunami caused significant damage to at least four of the six units of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station as the result of a sustained loss of both the offsite and onsite power systems. Efforts to restore power to emergency equipment were hampered and impeded by damage to the surrounding areas due to the tsunami and earthquake.

Units 1, 2 and 3 were operating at the time of the earthquake. Following the loss of electric power to normal and emergency core cooling systems and the subsequent failure of backup decay heat removal systems, water injection into the cores of all three reactors was compromised, and reactor decay heat removal could not be maintained. The operator of the plant, Tokyo Electric Power Company, injected sea water and boric acid into the reactor vessels of these three units, in an effort to cool the fuel and ensure that the 2

reactors remained shut down. However, the fuel in the reactor cores became partially uncovered. Hydrogen gas built up in Units 1 and 3 as a result of exposed, overheated fuel reacting with water. Following gas venting from the primary containment to relieve pressure, hydrogen explosions occurred in both units and damaged the secondary containments.

Units 3 and 4 were reported to have low spent fuel pool (SFP) water levels.

Fukushima Daiichi Units 4, 5 and 6 were shut down for refueling outages at the time of the earthquake. The fuel assemblies for Unit 4 had recently been offloaded from the reactor core to the SFP. The SFPs for Units 5 and 6 appear to be intact. Emergency power is available to provide cooling water flow through the SFPs for Units 5 and 6.

The damage to Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station appears to have been caused by initiating events beyond the design basis of the facilities.

7. In a March 21, 2011, briefing, Bill Borchardt, the NRC's Executive Director for Operations, stated that the NRC believes that hydrogen explosions occurred on March 12, 14, and 15 in the reactors of Units 1, 3, and 2 respectively, in that order. He also stated that the NRC believed that a hydrogen explosion had occurred at spent fuel pool of Unit 4 on March 15 due to overheated spent fuel in the pool. Briefing on NRC Response to Recent Nuclear Events in Japan, Transcript at 11.

8. According to Mr. Borchardt, the NRC believes that Units 1, 2, and 3 have likely sustained some degree of core damage. Id. Further, he stated that the loss of emergency AC power was caused by the tsunami and not the earthquake. Therefore, he concluded that the NRC believes that the "damage in Fukushima was not really caused by the earthquake; it was the tsunami that came afterwards." Id.

9. At the outset of the emergency, large volumes of sea water were used to cool the reactors.

The salt water injections were then replaced by fresh water injections. While judgments have changed over time, and much remains uncertain, we note here that as of March 21, Mr.

Borchardt also stated that "[t]he radiation releases and the dose rates that we've seen on site, I think, were primarily influenced by the condition of the Units Three and Four spent fuel pools."

Id. at21.

10. The French authorities also reported that sea water was used to cool spent fuel pools Units 3 and 4. Communique de presse n0 17 du mardi 22 mars 2011 1lOhO0 S~isme au Japon -

L 'ASNfait le point sur la situationde la centrale nuclgaire de Fukushima Daiichi: Les travaux en vue de r~tablirI 'alimentationýlectrique se poursuivent mais la mise sous tension n 'est pas rdalis~eParis,le 22/03/2011 10:27, http://japon.asn.fr/index.php/Site-de-l-ASN-Special-Japon/Communiques-de-prcsse (March 22, 2011). They also reported that three spent fuel pools (of Units 2, 3, and 4) appear to have experienced boiling at some point. Note d'information :

Situation des rkacteurs nuclaires au Japon suite au s~isme majeur survenu le 11 mars 2011 Point de situation du 18 mars 2011 ii 14 heures, Institut de Radioprotdction et de SfIretd Nucldaire (March 18, 2011),

3

http://www.irsn.fr/FR/Actualites presse/Actualites/Documnents/IRSN Seisme-Japon Point-situation- 1803201 l-14h.pdf -- hereafter IRSN March 18, 2011)

11. In response to the Fukushima reactor accident, the NRC announced the formation of a "senior level agency task force to conduct a methodical and systematic review" of NRC processes and regulations. COMGBJ-1 1-0002, Memorandum from Chairman Jaczko to Commissioners, re: NRC Actions Following the Events in Japan at 1 (March 21, 2011) (NRC Accession No. MLl 10800456). The purpose of the task force is to "determine whether the agency should make additional improvements to our regulatory systems and make recommendations to the Commission for its policy direction." Id.

12. Chairman Jaczko's memorandum specifies both a near-term review and a longer-term review. For the near-term review, the Commission required the task force to evaluate issues "affecting domestic operating reactors of all designs" in areas that include "protection against earthquake tsunami, flooding, hurricanes; station blackout and a degraded ability to restore power; severe accident mitigation; emergency preparedness; and combustible gas control." Id. at

1. The Commission instructed the task force to complete the report in 90 days. In the meantime, the task force was instructed to provide a 30-day "quick look report" and another "status" report in 60 days. Id.

13. The "longer term" review would begin "as soon as NRC has sufficient technical information from the events in Japan with the goal of no later than the completion of the 90 day near term report." Id. at 2. The longer-term study should "evaluate all technical and policy issues related to the event to identify additional research, generic issues, changes to the reactor oversight process, rulemakings, and adjustments to the regulatory framework that should be conducted by the NRC." Id. For the longer-term effort, the Commission instructed the task force to "receive input from and interact with all key stakeholders." Id. The Commission specified that within six months after commencing the evaluation, the task force should "provide a report with recommendations, as appropriate, to the Commission." Id.

14. The "Task Force to Conduct a Near-term Evaluation of the Need for Agency Actions Following the Events in Japan" ("Task Force") has formed and its charter has been approved.

The Task Force aims to accomplish the following:

"Evaluate currently available technical and operational information from the events that have occurred at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear complex in Japan to identify potential or preliminary near-term/immediate operational or regulatory actions affecting domestic reactors of all designs, including their spent fuel pools. The task force will evaluate, at a minimum, the following technical issues and determine priority for further examination and potential agency action:

" External event issues (e.g. seismic, flooding, fires, severe weather)

" Station blackout

" Severe accident measures (e.g., combustible gas control, emergency operating 4

procedures, severe accident management guidelines)

• 10 CFR 50.54 (hh)(2) which states, "Each licensee shall develop and implement guidance and strategies intended to maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities under the circumstances associated with loss of large areas of the plant due to explosions or fire, to include strategies in the following areas: (i) Fire fighting; (ii) Operations to mitigate fuel damage; and (iii) Actions to minimize radiological release." Also known as B.5.b.

Emergency preparedness (e.g., emergency communications, radiological protection, emergency planning zones, dose projections and modeling, protective actions) 0 Develop recommendations, as appropriate, for potential changes to NRC's regulatory requirements, programs, and processes, and recommend whether generic communications, orders, or other regulatory actions are needed."

Charter for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Task Force to Conduct a Near-Term Evaluation of the Need for Agency Actions Following the Events in Japan at 1 (April 1, 2011) (NRC Accession No. ML11089A045).

15. With respect to the longer-term review, the Charter states that the short-term report will make: "[r]ecommendations for the content, structure, and estimated resource impact...." Id. at 1.

Statement of Professional Opinion

16. 1 agree with the Commission's approach of conducting a long-term investigation of the regulatory implications of the Fukushima accident, in addition to its short-term investigation of whether immediate actions are needed. In my opinion, the longer-term investigation is necessary to address a number of respects in which the Fukushima accident is unprecedented in the sense that its characteristics are not anticipated in NRC safety regulations or environmental analyses.

Thus, it is providing new and significant insights into the inadequacy of NRC regulations to protect public health and safety and the inadequacy of NRC environmental analyses to evaluate the potential health, environmental and economic costs of reactor and spent fuel pool accidents.

This significant new information covers the following major topics:

o Unanticipated compounding effects of simultaneous accidents at multiple co-located reactor units, including spent fuel pools.

o Unanticipated risks of spent fuel pool accidents, including explosions.

o Frequency of severe accidents and explosions.

o Inadequacy of safety systems to respond to long-duration accidents.

o Nuclear crisis management with contaminated control and turbine buildings that have lost power o Unanticipated aggravating effects of some emergency measures.

o Health effects and costs of severe accidents 5

o The hydrogen explosions at Fukushima and their implications for aircraft crash evaluations.

Unanticipated compounding effects of simultaneous accidents at multiple co-located reactor units, including spent fuel pools.

17. Perhaps the most unprecedented feature of the Fukushima accident is that three reactors and four spent fuel pools have been stricken at the same site. In the entire history of nuclear power, there has not been another major accident (level- 5 or above) that has involved multiple major sources of radioactivity -- including multiple reactors and multiple spent fuel pools. For instance, the Fukushima Daiichi complex is the first to have experienced multiple hydrogen explosions in various facilities, all as part of the same event.

18. The NRC has long followed the practice of allowing new reactors to be built at existing sites, without examining the consequences of simultaneous failure of existing and new reactors through common mode failures such as complete station blackouts and loss of fresh water supply. The NRC also proposes to co-locate a significant number of new reactors at existing reactor sites. Examples include Bellefonte, Calvert Cliffs, Comanche Peak, Fermi, North Anna, Shearon Harris, Turkey Point, the South Texas Project, and Vogtle.

19. But the Fukushima accident graphically demonstrates that NRC's failure to evaluate the safety and environmental implications of co-locating multiple reactors was incorrect.

Specifically, when a new reactor is to be sited at a location where there are existing reactors, the entire system at the site should be re-examined in addition to whatever additional impacts the new unit(s) might create. The EISs for these new reactors and the designs on which they rely should consider the significant new information revealed by the Fukushima accident about the potential for simultaneous multiple failures and accidents in existing and new reactors and/or spent fuel pools.

Unanticipated risks of spent fuel pool accidents, including explosions.

20. Another unprecedented feature of the Fukushima accident is that an explosion occurred in Unit 4 despite the fact that there was no fuel in the reactor. The entire core had been unloaded into the spent fuel pool prior to March 11, 2011; the reactor was down for maintenance. A loss of cooling apparently led to boiling and to hydrogen generation, which appears to be the likely cause of the major explosion and ensuing damage to the reactor building of Unit 4. Further, as noted above the spent fuel pools of Units 2 and 3 also appear to have experienced boiling of the cooling water at some point. It should be noted that much detail remains to be learned about all three spent fuel pools, especially as to what went on in the first week of the accident.

21. The apparent occurrence of spent fuel pool accidents at Fukushima significantly undermines the NRC's conclusion that high-density pool storage of spent fuel poses a "very low risk." The Attorney General of Commonwealth of Massachusetts; the Attorney General of California;Denial of Petitionsfor Rulemaking, 73 Fed. Reg. 46,204, 46,207 (August 8, 2008).

That conclusion is all the more subject to question in light of the fact that spent fuel in U.S. pools is typically packed more tightly than in the pools at Fukushima. U.S. reactors, including reactors 6

that are candidates for license renewal, use high-density pool storage for spent fuel. Fukushima indicates that the NRC policy that allows such storage needs to be revisited. Given that onsite storage of spent fuel may continue for decades, these circumstances also call for a thorough reexamination of the spent fuel storage capacity, spent fuel pool location, and configuration of new reactor designs. For instance, should the construction and use of above ground-level spent fuel pools in reactor buildings be allowed, as is the case with the advanced boiling water reactor

("ABWR")? The NRC should examine the potentially exacerbating relationship between reactor core accidents and spent fuel pool accidents, for both existing reactor designs and new reactor designs. In addition, environmental impact statements ("ElSs") for license renewal and new reactor licensing should reexamine the relative costs and benefits of measures to mitigate the environmental impacts of pool fires and/or explosions. Measures would include reducing the density at which fuel is stored in pools, using dry storage for as much of each reactor's inventory of spent fuel as safety will allow, and dry storage of all spent fuel at closed reactors, a few years after closure.

Frequency of severe accidents and explosions

22. The NRC must also re-examine the frequency per reactor per year of spent fuel pool accidents as well as the frequency of core damage events. The NRC's current spent fuel damage assessments are based on a best estimate of a spent fuel pool fire probability of about 2x 10.6 per reactor-year, including the probability of structural failure during a seismic event NUREG-1353, Regulatory Analysis for the Resolution of Generic Issue 82, "Beyond Design Basis Accidents in Spent Fuel Pools", at 5-5 and Table 5.1.3 (1989). This means one such accident for every 500,000 reactor-years. The NRC's estimate of the frequency of spent fuel pool loss of cooling from all causes other than earthquake-induced structural failure is even lower: 1.5x 107. The conditional probability of a fire in the event of a loss of cooling is estimated to be 1.0 for a PWR and 0.25 for a BWR. Id. at 4-36. Based on this, the overall probability estimate in NUREG-1353 for a non-seismic-induced spent fuel pool fire for a PWR is 1.5x10 xl.0 = 1.5x10 7; for a BWR it is 1.5x10-7 x0.25 = 4x10-8 for a BWR - in the latter case is it one spent fuel pool fire every 25 million reactor-years. Hydrogen explosions originating in the spent fuel pool were not considered. Further, at least two spent fuel pools at Fukushima (Units 3 and 4) that seem to have experienced boiling as well as the destruction of the portions of the reactor building that are a barrier between the pool surface and the environment. According to the French safety authorities, the spe nt fuel pool in Unit 2 also experienced boiling. IRSN March 18, 2011 op. cit.

One reactor building, that of Unit 4, appears to have experienced a hydrogen explosion, with the hydrogen apparently emanating from the spent fuel pool (see Paragraph 7 above). The explosion destroyed a good part of the reactor building. Any damage to the spent fuel pool structures and equipment, to the fuel assemblies in the pools, as well as to the racks remains to be fully assessed. It appears that the only way that a significant amount of hydrogen could originate in a spent fuel pool is through uncovering of the spent fuel and the reaction of the zirconium in the fuel rods with steam. Explosions destroyed substantial portions of the reactor buildings of Units 1 and 3 as well; it appears that there were also significant releases of radioactivity from the spent fuel pool of Unit 3. In view of these facts, the NRC's estimate of loss of cooling probability accompanied by a fire is far too low, probably by orders of magnitude. It appears that the overall principal initiating event in the station blackout and failure of emergency core cooling was not the earthquake but the tsunami, though the earthquake may have caused equipment damage that 7

led to or contributed to some of the spent fuel pool problems. This indicates that the non-earthquake station blackout probabilities will need to be revisited. Further, the NRC's list of events leading to spent fuel structural failure does not include hydrogen explosions due to loss of emergency core cooling in the reactor (NUREG-1353, op. cit., Table 4.7.1 at 4-36), which appears to have been the cause of the damage to the structures of reactor buildings 1 and 3 and possibly to the spent fuel pool of Unit 3. It may be that many details of the analysis will be different for each of the four spent fuel pools. Whatever the details, the events so far make it quite clear that the NRC needs to thoroughly reevaluate the probability of severe spent fuel pool accidents as well as the kinds of events that could initiate damage and major releases of radioactivity from spent fuel pools. Further, in view of the fact that three BWRs appear to have had core damage, the NRC also needs to evaluate whether presently operating reactors, notably (but not only) BWRs, meet the Commission's target of limiting annual core damage frequency to the 10-4 to 5x10 5 per reactor-year range for reactors (NUREG-1353, op. cit., at ES-2 and ES-3).

23. In conducting its review, the NRC needs to thoroughly revisit its methods for estimating the probabilities and mechanisms of hydrogen explosions and fires in spent fuel pools (with and without a natural disaster component) as well as the methods for estimating hydrogen explosions, and meltdowns in existing and new light water reactor designs. For instance, the computer code used in evaluating the accidents assumes that "[t]he geometry of the fuel assemblies and racks remains undistorted." NUREG-1353, op cit. at 4-8. To judge by the photographs and videos of the damage, this assumption is unlikely to be correct at least for spent fuel pools in Units 3 and 4.

As another example, hydrogen generation due to partial uncovering of spent fuel but with water still remaining in the pool is not included. Rather, the computer program assumes that "[t]he water drains instantaneously from the pool." Id. This is important because if the investigation confirms that hydrogen was indeed generated in the spent fuel pool of Unit 4, the exothermic zirconium-steam reaction that creates it would be an additional source of heat for causing the accident to develop more rapidly and destructively than assumed by the NRC.

24. More generally, the events at three reactors and four spent pools have drastically changed the underlying frequency data that should go into the estimation of the probability of severe accidents at light water reactors. As a result, integration of the Fukushima data into NRC analyses of risks could lead to significant changes in design of new reactors and also lead to modifications at existing reactors, as would be required for protection of public health and safety under 10 CFR 50.109. Specifically, the Fukushima accident indicates that the basis of the NRC's conclusion in NUREG-1353 that dense storage of spent fuel in pools is safe and that dry storage is not warranted is incorrect.

Inadequacy of safety systems to respond to long-duration accidents

25. U.S. reactors appear to have insufficient backup power capacity to maintain safety equipment during a prolonged severe accident. The Fukushima accident, in which the emergency diesel generation system started but then failed very soon after the tsunami and the battery backup ran out of power in eight hours. The accident illustrates the serious environmental risk posed by insufficient backup power when catastrophic events destroy both offsite power supplies and onsite infrastructure. These risks need to be taken into account in safety and environmental analyses for all prospective NRC licensing decisions. The fact that 8

there was a complete station blackout at Fukushima accompanied by a failure of fresh water supply that forced sea water use for days (Communiquý depresse n'17 du mardi 22 mars 2011 i lOhOO Sýisme au Japon - L 'ASNfait le point sur la situationde la centrale nucldaire de Fukushima Daiichi : Les travaux en vue de r~tablirI 'alimentationýlectrique se poursuivent mais la mise sous tension n 'est pas r~alis~eParis,le 22/03/2011 10:27, http://xvww.asn.fr/index.php/Haut-de-page/Presse/Actualites-ASN/Communique-de-presse-n du-rnardi-22-mars-201 I-a- I OhOO) clearly points to the need for a full review of the depth (in terms of number of levels) of backup systems, the length of time of emergency power supply operability, the location of these power supplies, and the relation of the power supplies to ad hoc emergency pumping and emergency water supplies, including in the context of potential major damage to multiple units at a single site.

Nuclear crisis management with contaminated control and turbine buildings that have lost power

26. Another critical and unanticipated feature of the Fukushima accident is that the control rooms of Units 1, 2, and 3 became highly contaminated in the course of the first week of the accident, according to the French safety authorities. IRSN March 18, 2011 op. cit.. This has made re-establishment of normal cooling more difficult, apart from the question of on-site or offsite power supply. Turbine buildings also became contaminated with radioactive water in the course of the accident. Fukushima DaiichiNuclearPower Station: the result of measurement of sub drain, http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/prcss/corp-comn/rclease/betuL I I e/images/ 11033 1cI 8.pdf and The detection of radioactivematerials in the water on 1st basement of turbine building at the site of Fukushima DaiichiNuclear Power Station: Press Release (Mar 31,2011),

http://www.tepco.co.ip/en/press/corp-coinirelease/1 1033112-e.html.

27. The loss of power in and radioactive contamination of the control rooms and turbine buildings points to the need to review the piping and ventilation arrangements of these facilities, and the likely need to isolate them more thoroughly from contaminated air and water during beyond-design-basis accidents. Based on the information available so far about the Fukushima event, the risks of turbine building contamination would appear to be greater for boiling water reactors than for pressurized water reactors since steam generated from primary water is used to directly drive the turbines; in PWRs the heated primary water is routed to steam generators and not to the turbines.

Unanticipated aggravating effects of some emergency measures

28. Light water reactors are not designed to be cooled by sea water. Thus, the fact that TEPCO was forced to use sea water for emergency cooling for an extended period is a critical feature of the accident that needs evaluation. For instance, salt from sea water deposited on the fuel rods may have blocked or partially blocked some cooling channels during the accident. This raises the question of whether the use of sea water may have aggravated the fuel damage. It also raises the question of whether salt deposits may have interfered with the neutron absorption capacity of the control rods thereby increasing the likelihood of an accidental criticality. An understanding of these issues is important to the understanding of the accident and to any design and or emergency operations changes that may be needed.

9

Health effects and costs of severe accidents

29. While a detailed evaluation will take time and more data, the Fukushima accident indicates that the health consequences of a severe reactor accident and/or spent fuel pool fire could be significantly greater than estimated by the NRC in EISs for license renewal and new reactor licensing. For instance, the NRC estimates an average population risk (population dose multiplied by probability) in a 50-mile radius of only 16 person-rem per year per spent fuel pool

- or 480 rem in 30 years. The dose estimate was recently used in the 2009 draft Generic Environmental Impact Statement ("GEIS") by the NRC. Generic EnvironmentalImpact Statementfor License Renewal of Nuclear PlantsAppendices, Draft Report for Comment, NUREG-1437, Volume 2, Rev. 1 at E-35 (July 2009). See also NUREG-1353, op. cit., at ES-3.

The estimate of 480 rem in 30 years translates into a probability of just 0.27 fatal cancers over 30 years in a population of more than 2.5 million (using a risk factor of 0.000575 fatal cancers per rem). The NRC's best estimate of the total population dose dose in the event of an accident was 8 million person-rem (NUREG-1353, op cit. at 5-4, Table 5.1.2) - which translates into 4,600 excess cancer deaths in a fifty-mile radius. The NRC put the worst case population dose estimate at just over three times the best estimate - 26 million person-rem. NUREG-1353, op cit. Table 5.1.2 at 5-4. But if the probability is much higher for a single failure and if multiple failures can happen at the same site, then the number of expected fatal cancers would be higher, all other things being equal. Further, it is necessary to consider that the spent fuel pools in the United States are more typically full than the ones at Fukushima. In its review of Fukushima, the NRC should revisit the higher of the health damage estimates for spent fuel pool accidents at closed power plants in a 1997 study by Brookhaven National Laboratory. R.J. Travis, R.E.

Davis, E.J. Grove, M.A. Azarm, A Safety andRegulatory Assessment of Generic BWR and PWR Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power Plants, BNL-NUREG-52498, NUREG/CR-6451 (Brookhaven National Laboratory, 1997),

http://www.osti.aov/bridge/product.biblio.jssp?osti id=510336. NUREG-/CR6451 estimated the worst case population dose in a 50 mile radius at 81 million person-rem for both BWRs and PWRs. Id. at Tables 4-1 and 4-2. This is more than three times higher than in the estimate in NUREG-1353 cited above.

30. The Fukushima accident also indicates that the economic costs of a spent fuel pool accidents may be much higher than the current estimates used by the NRC. In NUREG-1353, the worst case property damage was estimated at $30 billion (1988 dollars) in a 50-mile radius.

Id. at Table 5.1.2. That amount is about $50 billion in 2010 dollars (constant 2010 dollar estimates calculated using the Gross Domestic Product deflators of the U.S. Department of Commerce, as published by the St. Louis Federal Reserve at http://research.stlouiisfed.org/fi'ed2/data/GD.P.DEF.txt and rounded to the nearest $10 billion). But in the Brookhaven study, the worst-case property damage in a 50-mile radius was estimated at

$280 billion for BWRs (ld. at Table 4-2), which would be about $370 billion in 2010 dollars - or more than seven times the NUJREG-1353 estimate cited above. The worst case damages in a 500-mile radius were estimated at $546 billion for U.S. boiling water reactors ("BWRs") plus 138,000 excess cancer deaths (Id. at Table 4-2) with a high population density. The damage amount would be about $720 billion in 2010 dollars. Results were slightly higher for pressurized water reactor spent fuel pools. Id. at Table 4-1. The overall 500-mile population density 10

assumed in the Brookhaven study was lower than the population density near several U.S.

reactors, notably in the Northeast. Further, the Brookhaven study itself notes its calculations would not "reasonably envelope" the situation (including projected population growth) at certain locations where there are reactors close to major metropolitan centers. "There are several existing plant sites (i.e., Indian Point, Limerick, and Zion) that precede the issuance of R.G. 4.7 and exceed the site population distributions generally considered acceptable by current NRC policy.") Id. at 3-4 and footnote at 3-4. Moreover, certain assumptions of the 1997 Brookhaven study may prove optimistic especially in densely populated areas. For instance, the study assumes that the population could be evacuated in one day, should evacuation become necessary.

Id. at 3-8. As another example, the relocation radius was only 10 miles, as per NUREG- 1150.

Id. at 3-8 and NUREG- 1150, An Assessment for Five Severe Accident Risks: An Assessmentfor Five U.S. Nuclear Power Plants:FinalSumninary Report, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research Vol. 1 at 2-20 (December 1990),

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rim/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr 1150/v 1/sr 1150v 1-intro-and-part-L.pdf The relocation radius around Fukushima is greater than 10 miles. Moreover the U.S.

advised its citizens early on to evacuate within a 50-mile radius of Fukushima Daiichi. This indicates that emergency management criteria and procedures need to be revisited.

31. In view of the severe crisis with multiple units at Fukushima in a densely populated industrialized country where there has been both direct and indirect economic damage, the 1997 Brookhaven study provides a reasonable starting point for a reevaluation of spent fuel accident consequences. Of course, Fukushima shows that the results of the Brookhaven study must be reviewed in the context of the potential for multiple failures at a single site in both reactors and spent fuel pools. Evacuation and population assumptions will likely need to be changed. As a result, both the monetary damages and health effects estimates may have to be revised upwards, possibly by substantial amounts in densely populated areas. Further, Fukushima is showing that there has already been indirect economic damage in industries like shipping and manufacturing that are not directly affected by fallout. While, the long-term and overall direct and indirect costs of the reactor and spent fuel damages from the Fukushima accident will take time to be tallied, it is clear that they will be enormous.

Hydrogen explosions and implications for aircraft crash evaluations

32. The Fukushima accident has revealed significant new information about the potential effects of hydrogen explosions. The estimated Unit 1 generation of hydrogen was 300 to 600 kg; for Units 2 and 3 it was 300 to 1,000 kg. Estimates were by an expert commissioned by AREVA. Matthias Braun, The Fukushima DaiichiIncident, AREVA, April 15, 2011, at 18, http://www.xwdr.de/tv/r-onoitor//sendungen/2011/0407/pdf/areva-fukushina-report.pdf This indicates an urgent need to revisit the issue of aircraft crashes, deliberate or accidental, at existing reactors and spent fuel pools. The energy of the estimated amounts of hydrogen involved in the Fukushima explosions is far smaller than fuel in fully-loaded commercial jetliner

- a type of crash that must be evaluated under NRC regulations. Five thousand gallons of jet fuel (not at all unusual for larger passenger jets -- the largest ones have much larger fuel capacities) have an energy content about four times as large as the largest estimate of the hydrogen explosions (1,000 kilograms of hydrogen gas) at Fukushima. Indeed, in light of Fukushima even a smaller, regional jet crash needs to be taken into account, especially for older 11

BWRs. Such damage needs to be evaluated both in the safety and environmental analyses. For instance, the Fukushima accident has demonstrated that evacuation planning in the circumstances of a natural disaster that is combined with a reactor accident is far more challenging than assumed by NRC emergency planning regulations.

Conclusions

33. As discussed above in pars. 16 through 32, the Fukushima accident has already revealed an enormous amount of new information regarding the safety vulnerabilities and environmental risks that need to be taken into account in licensing of new reactors, the re-licensing of existing reactors, early site permits, emergency procedures for protecting the civilian population, and approval of standardized reactor designs in rulemakings.

34. 1believe that if the significant new information emanating from the Fukushima Daiichi accident is taken into consideration in NRC safety and environmental analyses, it is likely to fundamentally alter the outcome of those analyses in important ways. In the safety arena, consideration of this new information is likely to result in more rigorous regulation with respect to issues such as loss of offsite power, hydrogen explosion prevention, the siting of more than one reactor at a single site, spent fuel accident and reactor accident probabilities, the re-racking of spent fuel pools, permitting extended storage of spent fuel in pools after decommissioning, and emergency planning.

35. In the environmental and health arenas, consideration of this significant new information is likely to result in higher accident probability estimates, new accident mechanisms for spent fuel pools, higher accident cost estimates, and higher estimates of the health risks posed by light water reactor accidents. These increased risk and cost estimates will lead to much more serious consideration of alternatives for avoidance or mitigation of environmental risks. For instance, although the Commission has long rejected low-density pool storage combined with dry onsite storage as an alternative for mitigating the effects of catastrophic pool fires, that option may now prove to be very cost-beneficial. Present policy also does not require the transfer of all spent fuel from pools into dry casks at closed sites, as soon as safely possible after closure. A change of policy would be indicated by the scale of the disaster at Fukushima. In view of the large variation in potential damage and differences in emergency response needs, a plant-specific analysis will also be needed, including for all reactors in the Northeast.

36. It is likely that more (and more expensive) protective features will be needed to ensure a level of safety and security that will avoid the kinds of disastrous consequences occurring at Fukushima Daiichi. It is also likely that additional measures involving significant costs will have to be taken to reduce the likelihood and consequences of multi-reactor and/or spent fuel disasters. In light of this new information, a comparison between the economic attractiveness of a proposed new nuclear reactor or a proposed re-licensing of an existing reactor that might need modifications with other less risky and less expensive energy sources (such as wind, solar, and storage technologies such as compressed air) may well result in a decision that licensing of new reactors and re-licensing of existing reactors is not cost-effective.

12

37. Therefore, I believe it is reasonable and necessary for the NRC to suspend licensing and re-licensing decisions and standardized design certifications until the NRC completes its review of the regulatory implications of the Fukushima accident.

The facts presented above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, and the opinions expressed therein are based on my best professional judgment.

19 April 2011 Dr. Arjun Makhijani Date 13

t.

INSTITUTE FOR ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH 6935 Laurel Avenue, Suite 201 Takoma Park, MD 20912 Phone: (301) 270-5500 FAX: (301) 270-3029 e-mail: ieer@ieer.org http://www.ieer.org Curriculum Vita of Arjun Makhijani Address and Phone:

institute for Energy and Environmental Research 6935 Laurel Ave., Suite 201 Takoma Park, MD 20912 Phone: 301-270-5500 e-mail: arjun@ieer.org Website: www.ieer.org A recognized authority on energy issues, Dr. Makhijani is the author and co-author of numerous reports and books on energy and environment related issues, including two published by MIT Press. He was the principal author of the first study of the energy efficiency potential of the US economy published in 1971. He is the author of Carbon-FreeandNuclear-Free:A Roadmapfor U.S. Energy Policy (2007).

In 2007, he was elected Fellow of the American Physical Society. He was named a Ploughshares Hero, by the Ploughshares Fund (2006); was awarded the Jane Bagley Lehman Award of the Tides Foundation in 2008 and the Josephine Butler Nuclear Free Future Award in 2001; and in 1989 he received The John Bartlow Martin Award for Public Interest Magazine Journalism of the Medill School of Journalism, Northwestern University, with Robert Alvarez.

He has many published articles in journals and magazines asvaried as The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Environment, The Physics of Fluids, The Journalof the American Medical Association, and The Progressive,as well as in newspapers, including the Washington Post.

Dr. Makhijani has testified before Congress, and has appeared on ABC World News Tonight, the CBS Evening News, CBS 60 Minutes, NPR, CNN, and BBC, among others. He has served as a consultant on energy issues to utilities, including the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Edison Electric Institute, the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, and several agencies of the United Nations.

Education:

• Ph.D. University of California, Berkeley, 1972, from the Department of Electrical Engineering. Area of specialization: plasma physics as applied to controlled nuclear fusion. Dissertation topic: multiple mirror confinement of plasmas. Minor fields of doctoral study: statistics and physics.

• M.S. (Electrical Engineering) Washington State University, Pullman, Washington, 1967.

Thesis topic: electromagnetic wave propagation in the ionosphere.

• Bachelor of Engineering (Electrical), University of Bombay, Bombay, India, 1965.

CurrentEmployment:

• 1987-present: President and Senior Engineer, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, Maryland. (part-time in 1987).

" February 3, 2004-present, Associate, SC&A, Inc., one of the principal investigators in the audit of the reconstruction of worker radiation doses under the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act under contract to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

OtherLong-term Employment

• 1984-88: Associate Professor, Capitol College, Laurel, Maryland (part-time in 1988).

• 1983-84: Assistant Professor, Capitol College, Laurel, Maryland.

• 1977-79: Visiting Professor, National Institute of Bank Management, Bombay, India.

Principal responsibility: evaluation of the Institute's extensive pilot rural development program.

• 1975-87: Independent consultant (see page 2 for details)

• 1972-74: Project Specialist, Ford Foundation Energy Policy Project. Responsibilities included research and writing on the technical and economic aspects of energy conservation and supply in the U.S.; analysis of Third World rural energy problems; preparation of requests for proposals; evaluation of proposals; and the management of grants made by the Project to other institutions.

• 1969-70: Assistant Electrical Engineer, Kai'ser Engineers, Oakland California.

Responsibilities included the design and checking of the electrical aspects of mineral industries such as cement plants, and plants for processing mineral ores such as lead and uranium ores. Pioneered the use of the desk-top computer at Kaiser Engineers for performing electrical design calculations.

ProfessionalSocieties:

• Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers and its Power Engineering Society

• American Physical Society (Fellow)

• Health Physics Society

• American Association for the Advancement of Science A wards and Honors:

• The John Bartlow Martin Award for Public Interest Magazine Journalism of the Medill School of Journalism, Northwestern University, 1989, with Robert Alvarez

• The Josephine Butler Nuclear Free Future Award, 2001

• Ploughshares Hero, Ploughshares Fund, 2006

• Elected a Fellow of the American Physical Society, 2007, "Forhis tireless efforts to provide the public with accurateandunderstandableinformation on energy and environmentalissues"

" Jane Bagley Lehman Award of the Tides Foundation, 2007/2008 2

Invited Faculty Member, Centerfor Health and tihe GlobalEnvironment, HarvardMedical School: Annual Congressional Course, Environmental Change: The Science and Human Health Impacts, April 18-19, 2006, Lecture Topic: An Update on Nuclear Power - Is it Safe?

ConsultingExperience, 19 75-1987 Consultant on a wide variety of issues relating to technical and economic analyses of alternative energy sources; electric utility rates and investment planning; energy conservation; analysis of energy use in agriculture; US energy policy; energy policy for the Third World; evaluations of portions of the nuclear fuel cycle.

Partial list of institutions to which I was a consultant in the 1975-87 period:

• Tennessee Valley Authority

• Lower Colorado River Authority

• Federation of Rocky Mountain States

• Environmental Policy Institute

• Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory

• Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

" International Labour Office of the United Nations

• United Nations Environment Programme

• United Nations Center on Transnational Corporations

• The Ford Foundation

• Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific

" United Nations Development Programme Languages: English, French, Hindi, Sindhi, and Marathi.

Reports, Books, and Articles (Partiallist)

(Newsletter, newspaper articles, excerpts from publications reprinted in books and magazines or adapted therein, and other similar publications are not listed below)

Hower, G.L., and A. Makhijani, "Further Comparison of Spread-F and Backscatter Sounder Measurements," Journalof Geophysical Research, 74, p. 3723, 1969.

Makhijani, A., and A.J. Lichtenberg, An Assessment of Energy and Materials Utilization in the U.S.A., University of California Electronics Research Laboratory, Berkeley, 1971.

Logan, B. G., A.J. Lichtenberg, M. Lieberman, and A. Makhijani, "Multiple-Mirror Confinement of Plasmas," PhysicalReview Letters, 28, 144, 1972.

Makhijani, A., and A.J. Lichtenberg, "Energy and Well-Being," Environment, 14, 10, June 1972.

Makhijani, A., A.J. Lichtenberg, M. Lieberman, and B. Logan, "Plasma Confinement in Multiple Mirror Systems. I. Theory," Physics of Fluids, 17, 1291, 1974.

3

A Time to Choose: America's Energy Future,final report of the Ford Foundation Energy Policy Project, Ballinger, Cambridge, 1974. One of many co-authors.

Makhijani, A., and A. Poole, Energy andAgriculturein the Third World, Ballinger, Cambridge, 1975.

Makhijani, A., Energy Policyfor the Rural Third World, International Institute for Environment and Development, London, 1976.

Kahn, E., M. Davidson, A. Makhijani, P. Caeser, and S. Berman, Investment Planningin the Energy Sector, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, Berkeley, 1976.

Makhijani, A., "Solar Energy for the Rural Third World," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 1977.

Makhijani, A., "Energy Policy for Rural India," Economic andPolitical Weekly, 12, Bombay, 1977.

Makhijani, A., Some Questions of Method in the Tennessee Valley Authority Rate Study, Report to the Tennessee Valley Authority, Chattanooga, 1978.

Makhijani, A., The Economics and Sociology ofAlternative Energy Sources, Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, 1979.

Makhijani, A., Energy Use in the Post-Harvest Component of the Food Systems in Ivoiy Coast and Nicaragua,Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome, 1982.

Makhijani, A., Oil Pricesand the Crises of Debt and Unemployment: Methodologicaland StructuralAspects, International Labour Office of the United Nations, Final Draft Report, Geneva, April 1983.

Makhijani, A., and D. Albright, The Irradiationof Personnelat Operation Crossroads, International Radiation Research and Training Institute, Washington, D.C., 1983.

Makhijani, A., K.M. Tucker, with Appendix by D. White, Heat, High Water, and Rock Instability at Hanford,Health and Energy Institute, Washington, D.C., 1985.

Makhijani, A., and J. Kelly, Target: Japan - The Decision to Bomb Hiroshima andNagasaki, July 1985, a report published as a book in Japanese under the title, Why Japan?, Kyoikusha, Tokyo, 1985.

Makhijani, A., Experimental IrradiationofAir Force PersonnelDuring OperationRedwing -

1956, Environmental Policy Institute, Washington, D.C., 1985.

Makhijani, A., and R.S. Browne, "Restructuring the International Monetary System," World Policy Journal,New York, Winter, 1985-86.

4

Makhijani, A., R. Alvarez, and B. Blackwelder, Deadly Crop in the Tank Farm:An Assessment of Management of High-Level Radioactive Wastes in the Savannah River Plant Tank Farm, Environmental Policy Institute, Washington, D.C., 1986.

Makhijani, A., "Relative Wages and Productivity in International Competition," College Industry Conference Proceedings, American Society for Engineering Education, Washington, D.C., 1987.

Makhijani, A., An Assessment of the Energy Recovery Aspect of the ProposedMass Burn Facility at Preston, Connecticut, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, 1987.

Makhijani, A., R. Alvarez, and B. Blackwelder, Evading the Deadly Issues: Corporate Mismanagement ofAmerica's Nuclear Weapons Production,Environmental Policy Institute, Washington, D.C., 1987.

Franke, B. and A. Makhijani, Avoidable Death: A Review of the Selection and Characterization of a Radioactive Waste Repository in West Germany, Health & Energy Institute, Washington, DC; Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, November 1987.

Makhijani, A., Release Estimates of Radioactive and Non-Radioactive Materials to the Environment by the Feed MaterialsProduction Center, 1951-85, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, 1988.

Alvarez, R., and A. Makhijani, "The Hidden Nuclear Legacy," Technology Review, 91, 42,1988.

Makhijani, A., Annie Makhijani, and A. Bickel, Saving Our Skins: Technical Potentialand Policiesfor the Elimination of Ozone-Depleting Chlorine Compounds, Environmental Policy Institute and Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, 1988.

Makhijani, A., Annie Makhijani, and A. Bickel, Reducing Ozone-Depleting Chlorine and Bromine Accumulations in the Stratosphere:A Critique of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's Analysis and Recommendations, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research and Environmental Policy Institute/Friends of the Earth, Takoma Park, 1989.

Makhijani, A., and B. Franke, Addendum to Release Estimates of Radioactive and Non-Radioactive Materials to the Environment by the Feed MaterialsProduction Center, 1951-85, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, 1989.

Makhijani, A., Global Warming and Ozone Depletion: An Action Programfor States, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, 1989.

Makhijani, A., Managing Municipal Solid Wastes in Montgomery County, Prepared for the Sugarloaf Citizens Association, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, 1990.

Saleska, S., and A. Makhijani, To Reprocess or Not to Reprocess: The Purex Question - A PreliminaryAssessment of Alternativesfor the Management of N-Reactor IrradiatedFuel at the 5

U.S. Departmentof Energy's HanfordNuclear Weapons ProductionFacility,Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, 1990.

Makhijani, A., "Common Security is Far Off," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 1990.

Makhijani, A., Draft Power in South Asian Agriculture.' Analysis of the Problem andSuggestions for Policy, prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, 1990.

Mehta, P.S., S.J. Mehta, A.S. Mehta, and A. Makhijani, "Bhopal Tragedy's Health Effects: A Review of Methyl Isocyanate Toxicity," JAMA 264, 2781, December 1990.

Special Commission of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War and the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Radioactive Heaven and Earth: The Health and Environmental Effects of Nuclear Weapons Testing In, On, and Above the Earth, Apex Press, New York, 1991. One of many co-authors.

Makhijani, A., and S. Saleska, High Level Dollars Low-Level Sense: A Critique of Present Policyfor the Management ofLong-Lived Radioactive Waste andDiscussion of an Alternative Approach, Apex Press, New York, 1992.

Makhijani, A., From Global Capitalism to Economic Justice: An Inquiry into the Eliminationof Systemic Poverty, Violence and EnvironmentalDestruction in the World Economy, Apex Press, New York, 1992.

Special Commission of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War and the Institute for Energy and EnvironmentalResearch, Plutonium.' Deadly Gold of the Nuclear Age, International Physicians Press, Cambridge, MA, 1992. One of several co-authors.

Makhijani, A., "Energy Enters Guilty Plea," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 1994.

Makhijani, A., "Open the Files," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Jan./Feb. 1995.

Makhijani, A., "'Always' the Target?" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 1995.

Makhijani, A., and Annie Makhijani, Fissile Materials in a Glass, Darkly: Technical and Policy Aspects of the Disposition of Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium, IEER Press, Takoma Park, 1995.

Makhijani, A., and K. Gurney, Mending the Ozone Hole.' Science, Technology, and Policy, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1995.

Makhijani, A., H. Hu, K. Yih, eds., Nuclear Wastelands.' A Global Guide to Nuclear Weapons Production and the Health and EnvironmentalEffects, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1995.

6

Zerriffi, H., and A. Makhijani, The Nuclear Safety Smokescreen: WarheadSafety and Reliability and the Science Based Stockpile StewardshipProgram, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, May 1996.

Zerriffi, H., and A. Makhijani, "The Stewardship Smokescreen," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 1996.

Makhijani, A., Energy Efficiency Investments as a Source of Foreign Exchange, prepared for the International Energy Agency Conference in Chelyabinsk, Russia, 24-26 September 1996.

Makhijani, A., "India's Options," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 1997.

Ortmeyer, P. and A. Makhijani, "Worse than We Knew," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 1997.

Fioravanti, M., and A. Makhijani, Containingthe Cold War Mess: Restructuring the EnvironmentalManagement of the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, October 1997.

Principal author of three chapters in Schwartz, S., ed., Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Since 1940, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.,

1998.

Franke, B., and A. Makhijani, RadiationExposures in the Vicinity of the Uranium Facility in Apollo, Pennsylvania, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, February 2, 1998.

Fioravanti, M., and A. Makhijani, Supplement to Containingthe Cold War Mess - JEER's Response to the Departmentof Energy's Review, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, March 1998.

Makhijani, A., "A Legacy Lost," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 1998.

Makhijani, A., and Hisham Zerriffi, Dangerous ThermonuclearQuest: The Potentialof Explosive Fusion Researchfor the Development ofPure Fusion Weapons, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, July 1998.

Makhijani, A., and Scott Saleska, The Nuclear Power Deception - U.S. Nuclear Mythology from Electricity "Too Cheap to Meter" to "InherentlySafe" Reactors, Apex Press, New York, 1999.

Makhijani, A., "Stepping Back from the Nuclear Cliff," The Progressive,vol. 63, no. 8, August 1999.

Makhijani, A., Bernd Franke, and Hisham Zerriffi, PreliminaryPartialDose Estimatesfrom the Processingof Nuclear Materials at Three Plantsduring the 1940s and 1950s, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, September 2000. (Prepared under contract to the newspaper USA Today.)

7

Makhijani, A., and Bernd Franke, FinalReport of the Institutefor Energy andEnvironmental Research on the Second Clean Air Act Audit of Los Alamos NationalLaboratory by the Independent TechnicalAudit Team, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, December 13, 2000.

Makhijani, A., Plutonium End Game: Managing Global Stocks of Separated Weapons-Usable Commercial and Surplus Nuclear Weapons Plutonium, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, January 2001.

Makhijani, A., Hisham Zerriffi, and Annie Makhijani, "Magical Thinking: Another Go at Transmutation," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 2001.

Makhijani, A., Ecology and Genetics. An Essay on the Nature of Life and the Problem of Genetic Engineering.New York: Apex Press, 2001.

Makhijani, A., "Burden of Proof," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 2001.

Makhijani, A., "Reflections on September 11, 2001," in Kamla Bhasin, Smitu Kothari, and Bindia Thapar, eds., Voices of Sanity: Reaching Outfor Peace, Lokayan, New Delhi, 2001, pp.

59-64.

Makhijani, A., and Michele Boyd, Poison in the Vadose Zone: An examination of the threats to the Snake River Plain aquiferfrom the Idaho NationalEngineeringand Environmental Laboratory,Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, October 2001.

Makhijani, A., Securing the Energy Future of the United States: Securing the Energy Future of the United States: Oil, Nuclear, and Electricity Vulnerabilitiesand a post-September 11, 2001 RoadinapforAction, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, November 2001.

Makhijani, A., and Sriram Gopal, Setting Cleanup Standards to Protect Future Generations. The Scientific Basis of Subsistence FarmerScenario and Its Application to the Estimation of RadionuclideSoil Action Levels (RSALs) for Rocky Flats, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, December 2001.

Makhijani, A., "Some Factors in Assessing the Response to September 11, 2001," Medicine and Global Survival, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, Cambridge, Mass.,

February 2002.

Makhijani, Annie, Linda Gunter, and A. Makhijani, Cogema: Above the Law?.- Concerns about the French ParentCompanLv of a U.S. CorporationSet to Process Plutonium in South Carolina.

A report prepared by Institute for Energy and Environmental Research and Safe Energy Communication Council. Takoma Park, MD, May 7, 2002.

Deller, N., A. Makhijani, and J. Burroughs, eds., Rule of Power or Rule of Law? An Assessment of U.S. Policiesand Actions Regarding Security-Related Treaties, Apex Press, New York, 2003.

8

Makhijani, A., "Nuclear targeting: The first 60 years," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2003.

Makhijani, A., "Strontium," Chemical & EngineeringNews, September 8, 2003.

Makhijani, A., and Nicole Deller, NATO andNuclear Disarmament:An Analysis of the Obligationsof the NA TO Allies of the United States under the Nuclear Non-ProliferationTreaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, Maryland, October 2003.

Makhijani, A., Manifestofor GlobalDemocracy: Two Essays on Imperialism and the Struggle for Freedom, Apex Press, New York, 2004.

Makhijani, A., "Atomic Myths, Radioactive Realities: Why nuclear power is a poor way to meet energy needs," JournalofLand, Resources, & EnvironmentalLaw, v. 24, no. 1, 2004, pp. 61-72.

Adapted from an oral presentation given on April 18, 2003, at the Eighth Annual Wallace Stegner Center Symposium titled "Nuclear West: Legacy and Future," held at the University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law."

Makhijani, A., and Michele Boyd, Nuclear Dumps by the Riverside: Threats to the Savannah River from Radioactive Contaminationat the Savannah River Site, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, Maryland, March 2004.

Makhijani, A., and Brice Smith, The Role of E.I du Pont de Nemours and Company (Du Pont) and the General Electric Company in Plutonium Productionand the Associated 1-131 Emissions from the Hanford Works, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park.

Maryland, March 30, 2004.

Makhijani, A., Peter Bickel, Aiyou Chen, and Brice Smith, Cash Crop on the Wind Farm: A New Mexico Case Study of the Cost, Price,and Value of Wind-GeneratedElectricity, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, Maryland, April 2004.

Makhijani, A., Lois Chalmers, and Brice Smith, Uranium Enrichment: Just Plain Facts to Fuel an Informed Debate on Nuclear Proliferationand Nuclear Power, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, Maryland, October 15, 2004.

Makhijani, A., and Brice Smith, Costs and Risks of Management and Disposalof Depleted Uraniumfrom the National Enrichment Facility Proposedto be Built in Lea County New Mexico by LES, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, Maryland, November 24, 2004.

Makhijani, A., project director, Examen critique du programme de recherche de l'ANDRA pour d~terminer l'aptitude du site de Bure au confinement g~ologique des dichets at haute activitý et 6 vie longue: Rapportfinal, prepared for le Comitd ocal d'Information et de Suivi; coordinator:

Annie Makhijani; authors: Detlef Appel, Jaak Daemen, George Danko,Yuri Dublyansky, Rod Ewing, Gerhard Jentzsch, Horst Letz, Arjun Makhijani, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, Maryland, December 2004 9

Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Lower Boundfor Cesium-137 Releasesfrom the Sodium Burn Pit at the Santa Susana Field Laboratoty, LEER, Takoma Park, Maryland, January 13, 2005. (Authored by A. Makhijani and Brice Smith.)

Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Iodine-131 Releasesfrom the July 1959 Accident at the Atomics InternationalSodium Reactor Experiment, lEER, Takoma Park, Maryland, January 13, 2005. (Authored by A. Makhijani and Brice Smith.)

Makhijani, A., and Brice Smith. Update to Costs andRisks of Management and Disposalof Depleted Uraniumfrom the NationalEnrichment FacilityProposedto be Built in Lea County New Mexico by LES. Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, Maryland, July 5, 2005.

Makhijani, A., "A Readiness to Harm: The Health Effects of Nuclear Weapons Complexes,"

Arms Control Today, 35, July/August 2005.

Makhijani, A., Bad to the Bone: Analysis of the FederalMaximum ContaminantLevels for Plutonium-239 and OtherAlpha-Emitting TransuranicRadionuclides in Drinking Water, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, Maryland, August 2005.

Makhijani, A., and Brice Smith, DangerousDiscrepancies:Missing Weapons Plutonium in Los Alamos NationalLaboratory Waste Accounts, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, Maryland, April 21, 2006.

Makhijani, Annie, and A. Makhijani, Low-Carbon Diet without Nukes in France:An Energy Technology andPolicy Case Study on Simultaneous Reduction of Climate Change and ProliferationRisks, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, Maryland, May 4, 2006.

Makhijani, Annie, and A. Makhijani. Shifting RadioactivityRisks: A Case Study of the K-65 Silos and Silo 3 Remediation and Waste Management at the FernaldNuclear Weapons Site, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, Maryland, August 2006.

Smith, Brice, and A. Makhijani, "Nuclear is Not the Way," Wilson Quarterly, v.30, p. 64, Autumn 2006.

Makhijani, A., Brice Smith, and Michael C. Thorne, Sciencefor the Vulnerable.: Setting Radiation and Multiple Exposure EnvironmentalHealth Standards to Protect Those Most at Risk, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, Maryland, October 19, 2006.

Makhijani, A., Carbon-Freeand Nuclear Free: A Roadmapfor U.S. Energy Policy, IEER Press, Takoma Park, Maryland; RDR Books, Muskegon, Michigan, 2007.

Makhijani, A., Assessing Nuclear Plant Capital Costsfor the Two ProposedNRG Reactors at the South Texas Project Site, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, Maryland, March 24, 2008.

10

Makhijani, A., Energy Efficiency Potential:San Antonio's Bright Energy Future,Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, Maryland, October 9, 2008.

Makhijani, A., The Use of Reference Man in Radiation ProtectionStandards and Guidancewith Recommendationsfor Change, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, Maryland, December 2008.

Makhijani, A., Comments of the Institutefor Energy andEnvironmental Research on the U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Proposed Waste Confidence Rule Update and ProposedRule Regarding EnvironmentalImpacts of Temporary Spent Fuel Storage, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, Maryland, February 6, 2009.

Makhijani, A., Technical and Economic Feasibility of a Carbon-FreeandNuclear-FreeEnergy System in the United States, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, Maryland, March 4, 2009.

Fundaci6n Ideas para el Progreso, A New Energy Model For Spain: Recommendationsfor a Sustainable Future(originally: Un nuevo modelo energ~ticoparaEspaha."Recomendaciones para unfuturo sostenible), by the Working Group of Foundation Ideas for Progress on Energy and Climate Change, Fundaci6n Ideas, Madrid, May 20, 2009. Arjun Makhijani contributed Section 2.2. The cost of nuclear energy and the problem of waste.

Makhijani, A., lEER Comments on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Rulemaking Regarding the "Safe Disposal of Unique Waste Streams Including Significant Quantities of Depleted Uranium,"Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, Maryland, October 30, 2009.

Makhijani, A., The Mythology and Messy Reality of Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Takoma Park, Maryland, April 8, 2010.

CV updated October I1, 2010 11

JOURNAL OF GEOPHYSICAL RESEARCH, VOL. 116, B07105, doi:l 0.1029/2010JB008091, 2011 Connecting the Yakima fold and thrust belt to active faults in the Puget Lowland, Washington Richard J. Blakely,1 Brian L. Sherrod,2 Craig S. Weaver, 2 Ray E. Wells,' Alan C. Rohay, 3 Elizabeth A. Barnett, 2 and Nichole E. Knepprath' Received 5 November 2010; revised 12 April 2011; accepted 4 May 201 l; published 28 July 2011.

[i] High-resolution aeromagnetic surveys of the Cascade Range and Yakima fold and thrust belt (YFTB), Washington, provide insights on tectonic connections between forearc and back-arc regions of the Cascadia convergent margin. Magnetic surveys were measured at a nominal altitude of 250 m above terrain and along flight lines spaced 400 m apart.

Upper crustal rocks in this region have diverse magnetic properties, ranging from highly magnetic rocks of the Miocene Columbia River Basalt Group to weakly magnetic sedimentary rocks of various ages. These distinctive magnetic properties permit mapping of important faults and folds from exposures to covered areas. Magnetic lineaments correspond with mapped Quaternary faults and with scarps identified in lidar (light detection and ranging) topographic data and aerial photography. A two-dimensional model of the northwest striking Umtanum Ridge fault zone, based on magnetic and gravity data and constrained by geologic mapping and three deep wells, suggests that thrust faults extend through the Tertiary section and into underlying pre-Tertiary basement. Excavation of two trenches across a prominent scarp at the base of Umtanum Ridge uncovered evidence for bending moment faulting possibly caused by a blind thrust. Using aeromagnetic, gravity, and paleoseismic evidence, we postulate possible tectonic connections between the YFTB in eastern Washington and active faults of the Puget Lowland. We suggest that faults and folds of Umtanum Ridge extend northwestward through the Cascade Range and merge with the Southern Whidbey Island and Seattle faults near Snoqualmie Pass 35 km east of Seattle. Recent earthquakes (Mw < 5.3) suggest that this confluence of faults may be seismically active today.

Citation: Blakely, R. J., B. L. Sherrod, C. S. Weaver, R. E. Wells, A. C. Rohay, E. A. Barnett, and N. E. Knepprath (2011),

Connecting the'Yakima fold and thrust belt to active faults in the Puget Lowland, Washington, J. Geophvs. Res., 116, B07105, doi:10. 1029/2010JB008091.

1. Introduction distributed across Oregon and Washington [McCaJfrey,et al.,

2007]. Oregon is rotating clockwise at about 1/Ma,

[2] The Cascadia convergent margin (northern California, squeezing Washington against a slower-moving Canadian Oregon, Washington, and British Columbia) is a region of buttress [Wells et al., 1998; McCaffi'ey et al., 2007]. Most profound tectonism and magmatism, ultimately caused by people in this region live in the seismically active forearc oblique subduction of the Juan de Fuca plate beneath North lowland, consisting of the Puget Lowland in Washington, America (Figure 1). The Pacific plate, moving northwest-Willamette Valley in Oregon, and Fraser Lowland in British ward -50 mm/y relative to North America, establishes Columbia.

dextral shear across the Juan de Fuca plate and western

[3] In the Puget Lowland, a complex system of east-west North America [Atwater, 1970; DeMets et al., 1994]. Most and northwest trending faults (Figure 2) accommodates 4.4 +/-

of the Pacific-North America relative motion is accommo-0.3 mm/yr of permanent north-south shortening [Wells et al.,

dated by the Juan de Fuca spreading center and Cascadia 1998; Mazzotti et al., 2002; McCaffi'ey et al., 2007].

subduction zone, but the remaining 20 to 25 percent is Numerous paleoseismic studies [Nelson et al., 2003; Johnson et al., 2004a; Sherrod et al., 2004; Kelsey et al., 2004;

'U.S. Geological Survey, Menlo Park. California, USA.

Sherrod et al., 2008] demonstrate that Puget Lowland faults 2U.S. Geological Survey at Department of Earth and Space Sciences, produced earthquakes as large as Mw 7 in Holocene time, and University of Washington, Seattle, Washington, USA. a diffuse pattern of modern-day earthquakes (Figure 2) shows Environmental Characterization and Risk Assessment Group, Pacific that many of these faults likely remain active today. Puget Northwest National Laboratory, Richland, Washington, USA.

Lowland faults are largely concealed by young glacial deposits, water, and urban development, and much of what Copyright 2011 by the American Geophysical Union.

0148-0227/11/201 0JB008091 we know about their mapped location and three-dimensional B071 05 I of 33

B07105 BLAKELY ET AL.: FAULTS LINK CASCADIA FOREARC AND BACKARC B07105 44' 40*o '*',. . Quaternaryfaults Pacific Plate (Columbia River SBasalt Group Olympic-Wallowa lineament 4=1 Pole of rotation 200 km Figure 1. Tectonic and magmatic setting of the Pacific Northwest. Red lines are faults from U.S. Geolog-ical Survey Quaternary fault database (http://earthquake.usgs.govIhazards/qfaults). Quaternary volcanoes from Gujlnti and Weaver [1988]. Earthquake locations and magnitudes from the Pacific Northwest Seismic Network and historic records, as compiled by Katie Keranen (written communication, 2009).

Olympic Wallowa lineament as described by Raisz [1945]. Green dashed rectangle shows area of Figure 2.

F, Fraser Lowland; P, Puget Lowland; W, Willamette Valley. Pole of rotation is for Oregon Coast Range domain relative to North America, 1.02' Myr- [McCaffrey et al., 2007].

framework has come fi'om geophysical investigations [e.g., 1989a, 1989b]. Columbia River Basalt Group (CRBG; Johnson el al., 1994, 1996; Brocher et al., 2001; Blakely 17.5-6.0 Ma) and suprabasalt sedimentary deposits record ei aL, 2002; Pratt et al., 1997]. Late Miocene and Pliocene faulting and folding in the YFTB.

[4] As its name implies, the Yakima fold and thrust belt Paleoseismic investigations show that the YFTB continued to (YFTB), situated on the east side of the Cascade Range, is evolve in Quaternary time [West et al., 1996; Campbell and also a region of profound deformation [e.g., Reidel et al., Bentley, 1981; Repasky et al., 2009], and moderate-sized 2 of 33

B07105 BLAKELY ET AL.: FAULTS LINK CASCADIA FOREARC AND BACKARC B07105 (A)~

480 46*

(B>

48° 460 Figure 2 3 of 33

B07105 BLAKELY ET AL.: FAULTS LINK CASCADIA FOREARC AND BACKARC B07105 earthquakes in the region suggest that some of these struc- geologic hazards, we only show faults currently considered to tures remain active today (Figure 2). have been active in Quaternary time (http://earthquake.usgs.

[5] If extended southeastward along strike, important gov/hazards/qfaults). The latter database is essentially a Holocene faults in the Puget Lowland coincide with Qua- subset of the former, and captions indicate which database ternary faults of the YFTB. Structures linking the two regions was employed.

would cross the Cascade Range along the Olympic-Wallowa lineament (OWL, Figure 1), a topographic and struc- 2.1. Puget Lowland tural lineament extending from the Olympic Peninsula in [8] North-south compression in westernmost Washington Washington to the Wallowa Mountains in Oregon [Raisz, is accommodated in part by a system of east-west and 1945; Hooper and Conrey, 1989]. McCaffri'e et al. [2000, northwest striking crustal faults crossing the Puget Lowland 2007] argued from GPS measurements that the OWL is the (Figure 2). Many of these faults have been active in Holocene primary locus of deformation resulting from clockwise time and are spatially and structurally associated with large rotation of Oregon and Washington relative to stationary structural basins and uplifts observable in gravity and seismic North America. In this paper, we use (1) new aeromagnetic data. Three Holocene faults are particularly important to and paleoseismic data and (2) existing gravity and lidar subsequent discussion: (1) The east striking Seattle fault is a (light detection and ranging) data to investigate the possibility north verging thrust fault that, over the course of the last 40 m.

that Puget Lowland and YFTB structures are kinematically y., has lifted its hanging wall up and over the Seattle basin to linked, and we attempt to map the linking structures through the north, now a 9 to 10 km deep basin filled with Oligocene the intervening Cascade Range of Washington. and younger sedimentary rocks and glacial deposits [Johnson et al., 1994; Pratt et al., 1997; Blakely et al., 2002; Brocher

2. Geologic and Structural Setting et al., 2001, 2004; ten Brink et al., 2002]. (2) The Tacoma fault, along the southern margin of the Seattle uplift, is a south

[6] Paleomagnetic [e.g., Simpson and Cox, 1977; Wells, verging thrust fault serving as the structural contact between 1990; Wells et al., 1998] and global positioning system the uplift and the Tacoma basin to the south [Johnson et al.,

(GPS) measurements [e.g., Mazzotti et al., 2002; McCaffrey 2004b; Sherrod et al., 2004]. (3) The northwest striking el al., 2000, 2007] show that western Oregon and Washington Southern Whidbey Island fault, extending from near Vancouver are rotating clockwise with respect to stable North America Island to east of Seattle, accommodates right-lateral oblique at a rate of 0.4 to 1.0' Myr' and have been doing so at displacement and forms the southwestern structural margin approximately steady rates for the last 10-15 Ma. This broad of the Everett basin [Johnson et al., 1996; Sherrod et al.,

rotation relative to stable North America within British 2008]. The Seattle and Southern Whidbey Island faults, if Columbia produces horizontal strain that varies in direc- continued eastward along strike, merge near Snoqualnie Pass tion and magnitude throughout Cascadia. The region of (Figure 2, label H) 35 km east of Seattle.

Washington. immediately west of the Cascade Range, for [9] Holocene fault scarps of the Puget Lowland are each example, is translating northward at a rate of 4.2 to 6.2 mm/yr associated with linear magnetic anomalies that reflect the relative to stable North America, whereas regions immedi- juxtaposition of lithologic units of differing magnetic prop-ately east of the Cascade Range are translating northeastward erties. This association has proved useful in mapping Puget at -1/3 that rate [McCaffirey el al., 2007]. McCaJjf'ey et al. Lowland faults where concealed beneath Pleistocene glacial

[2007] modeled Pacific Northwest GPS velocities with strain deposits, water, and urban development [e.g., Blakely et al.,

accommodated between rigid blocks. The YFTB constitutes 2002, 2009; Sherrod et al., 2008]. With the advent of air-two block boundaries in their model, together accommodat- borne lidar methods during the past decade, nunmerous topo-ing -3 mm/yr of northeast shortening. graphic scarps were discovered throughout the Puget Lowland.

[7] It should be noted that the various maps employ two These scarps often offset Pleistocene and younger surfaces published fault databases. When discussing mapped geol- and lie parallel and very near to linear magnetic anomalies ogy, we show all faults regardless of age, as mapped at [e.g., Sherrod et al., 2008]. Paleoseismic excavations, tar-1:100,000 scale by the Department of Natural Resources, geted at lidar-identified scarps, show a rich history of Holo-Washington State. When the purpose of the map is to describe cene earthquake activity throughout the Puget Lowland [e.g.,

Figure 2. (a) Earthquakes and Quaternary faults of western and central Washington and northern Oregon. Earthquake loca-tions and magnitudes provided by Katie Keranen (written communication, 2009). YFTB, Yakima fold and thrust belt. Red lines are Quaternary faults from U.S. Geological Survey Quaternary fault database (http://earthquake.usgs.gov/hazards/

qfaults). DM, Devils Mt.; SW, Southern Whidbey Island; SF, Seattle; TF, Tacoma; OF, Olympia; DF, Doty; SC, Straight Creek; FH, Frenchman Hills; SM, Saddle Mountains; UR, Umtanum Ridge; AR, Ahtanum Ridge; RM, Rattlesnake Mountain; TR, Toppenish Ridge; HH, Horse Heaven Hills; CH, Columbia Hills; GM, Gable Mountain. Cities and towns indicated by white boxes: E, Everett; S, Seattle; T, Tacoma; 0, Olympia; P, Portland; D, The Dalles; PA, Pasco; Y, Yakima; EL, Ellensburg; W, Wenatchee; H, Hyak (Snoqualnie Pass). Yellow triangles are major volcanoes: GP, Glacier Peak; Mount Rainier; MSH, Mount St. Helens; MA, Mount Adams. Black dashed rectangle is location of Figures 4, 6-10. (b) Magnetic anomalies of central Washington and northern Oregon [Finn et al., 1989; Roberts et al., 1997]. Dotted lines indicate boundaries of high-resolution aeromagnetic data used in subsequent figures: PL, Puget Lowland magnetic survey [Blakelv et al., 1999]; CE, Cle Elum survey; HA, Hanford survey. Label D indicates north-northwest striking magnetic anomalies interpreted as dikes by Swanson el al. [1979] and discussed in text.

4 of 33

B07105 BLAKELY ET AL.: FAULTS LINK CASCADIA FOREARC AND BACKARC B07105 Nelson et al., 2003; Sherrod et al., 2008; Johnson et al., parts of the CRBG [Campbell, 1989]. These basement 2004a]. In particular, the Seattle, Tacoma, and Southern rocks include Jurassic metamorphic and ophiolitic rocks of Whidbey Island faults each produced multiple Mw 6.5-7.0 the Ingalls Tectonic Complex [Dragovich et al., 2002] and earthquakes in Holocene time. Cretaceous granitic rocks of the Mount Stuart batholith

[Smith, 1904; Dragovich et al., 2002]. As discussed sub-2.2. Yakima Fold and Thrust Belt sequently, gravity anomalies indicate the subsurface distri-

[io] Flows of the CRBG (Figure 3) dominate the geologic bution of these lithologies.

landscape of the YFTB. CRBG flood basalts erupted from [14] Continental sedimentary and volcaniclastic rocks vents and fissures in southeastern Washington and north- comprise the Tertiary stratigraphy above pre-Tertiary base-eastern Oregon 17.5 Ma to 6.0 Ma (Figure 4). Together they ment and below CRBG flows, and variations in their strati-filled a volume of 174,000 kin 3 , covered an area of about graphic thickness have important implications for both 163,700 km 2 [Tolan et al., 1989, 2009], and in some cases hydrocarbon exploration and earthquake hazards. Geophys-flowed all the way to the Pacific Ocean [Beeson et al., 1989; ical studies indicate that basement relief exceeds relief on the Wells et al., 2009]. By far the greatest pulse of CRBG base of CRBG [Saltus, 1993; Jarchow, 1991 ], implying that extrusion occurred 17.0 to 15.6 Ma, with eruption of the YFTB deformation was underway before and continued Grande Ronde Basalt: approximately 120 individual flows during CRBG emplacement. If it can be shown that topog-that together comprise 148,600 km 3 of basaltic lava [Reidel raphy on the basement interface is spatially associated with et al., 1989b]. The Grande Ronde Basalt is the most prevalent CRBG folds and faults, this would provide a strong case that CRBG formation in our study area. Eruptions of Grande faults seen at the surface extend into the basement rather than Ronde Basalt spanned four polarity intervals (Figure 3), at shoaling into detachment surfaces within or at the base of least two of which (R2 and N 2 ) are exposed in our study area CRBG. In the study area, exposures of pre-CRBG Tertiary (Figure 4). rocks include Eocene continental sedimentary rocks of the

[Ii] North-south compression of the YFTB has formed a Swauk, Manastash, Roslyn, and Chumstick Formations; and series of east-west anticlines, synclines, and associated faults volcanic rocks of the Oligocene Ohanepecosh Formation and more or less evenly spaced across the landscape (Figures 2 Miocene Fifes Peak Fonnation [Tabor et al., 2000; Walsh and 4). The mapped distribution of YFTB structures essen- et al., 1987; Stoffel et al., 1991; Schuster et al., 1997; Dragovich tially fans out in the westward direction (Figure 2), such that et al., 2002].

the northern anticlines (Frenchman Hills, Saddle Mountains [15] CRBG flows are overlain and intercalated by Mio-and Ulntanum Ridge) are directed northwestward toward the cene continental sedimentary and volcaniclastic rocks of the Puget Lowland, and southern anticlines (Toppenish Ridge, Ellensburg Formation, which in turn is overlain by Pliocene-Horse Heaven Hills, and Columbia Hills) are directed Miocene Ringold Formation, Pliocene Thorp Gravel, and southwestward toward Portland, Oregon. This distribution Pleistocene outburst flood deposits [Walsh et al., 1987; suggests complexities in the north-south compressive strain Schuster et al., 1997; Dragovich et al., 2002]. All of these over the course of YFTB evolution. The region now occu- post-CRBG units are defonned, including the I Ma to 12 ka pied by the YFTB was a focus of back-arc subsidence Hanford Formation [Repask-v et al., 2009].

before, during, and after CRBG emplacement [Reidel, 1984, Reidel et al., 1989a, 1994], and YFTB anticlines continued 2.3. Olympic-Wallowa Lineament to evolve during this time so that the degree of folding in- [16] A regional-scale topographic lineament, extending creases with depth into CRBG stratigraphy [Reidel. 1984]. from the Olympic Peninsula to the Wallowa Mountains, is Deformation of CRBG also postdates its eruption and superimposed on the tectonic magmatic framework of the emplacement [e.g., Mitchell and Montgomeyl, 2006; West Pacific Northwest (Figure 1). The origin of the Olympic-et al., 1996; Campbell and Bentley, 1981 ], as discussed Wallowa lineament, first recognized 65 years ago by Raisz in the following sections. [1945], is still a matter of discussion. Kienle et al. [1977]

[12] CRBG flood basalts naturally filled whatever terrain referred to that part that crosses the central Columbia existed at the time of extrusion, but in general, each newly Basin as the Cle Elum-Wallula (CLEW) lineament. Within erupted flow fonned a quasi-horizontal layer that recorded the YFTB, the OWL corresponds with the Rattlesnake subsequent folding and faulting. This obvious point has Mountain and Umtanum Ridge anticlines (Figure 2). Beyond important implications for geophysical analysis: Basalts are the Columbia basin, the OWL aligns with linear topographic strongly magnetic, having induced magnetizations on the features in pre-CRBG rocks both northwest and southeast order of 0.1 to 0.5 A/m and natural remanent magnetiza- of these anticlines [Campbell, 1989]. Hooper and Conrey tions of I to 10 A/in. Deformed CRBG flood basalts, [1989] envisioned the OWL as a giant megashear accom-therefore, produce distinctive magnetic anomalies that facil- modating differential extension rates, with opening rates to itate mapping and characterization of these structures. The the south approximately 20 percent greater than regions to the CRBG includes both normal and reversely magnetized north. A differential opening rate implies shear strain along flows, as well as flows with transitional remanent mag- the OWL, but direct evidence of strike-slip displacement netizations. CRBG flows have Koenigsberger ratios gener- has been elusive [Tabor et al., 1984; Reidel et al., 1989a; ally >10 (Figure 5), and the juxtaposition of normal and Price and Watkinson, 1989; Saltus, 1993]. Moreover, dextral reversed flows adds complexity to the analysis of magnetic shear on the OWL is not evident in GPS measurements.

anomalies. McCaffrcev et al. [2007] document northeast directed short-

[13] Pre-Tertiary rocks exposed in the northern part of our ening across the OWL, decreasing in magnitude to the study area (Figure 4) likely extend in the subsurface beneath southeast. In their microplate model, the OWL formis a 5 of 33

B07105 BLAKELY ET AL.: FAULTS LINK CASCADIA FOREARC AND BACKARC B07105 Member Isotopic Age(_m.y._!Mgnetic Polarity Series Group Formation I Fomto I It Ag I____________ P olagnetic I U n.r.nnisl U-krar A NI C.

Ice Harbor Member Z) Basalt of Goose Island 8.5 N Basalt of Martindale R Basalt of Basin City N Buford Member R Elephant Mountain Member 10.5 R,T Pomona Member 12 R Esquatzel Member N Weissnefels Ridge Member Saddle Basalt of Slippery Rock N Mountains Basalt of Tenmile Creek N Basalt of Lewiston Orchards N Basalt Basalt of Cloverland N Asotin Member 13 Basalt of Huntzinoer N Wilber Creek Member Basalt of Lapwai N Basalt of Wahluke N

0. Umatilla Member 13.5 N 0 Basalt of Sillusi N a) 0 00. If . f H - 01 . RA.11. ký. KM

-C 0 1 Priest Rapids Member I

14.5 I

Basalt of Lolo 4.

R R

4.

Basalt of Rosalia R Roza Member TR CD Shumaker Creek Member N

0) Frenchman Springs Member 0 Wanapum Basalt of Lyons Ferry N EI. Basalt Basalt of Sentinel Gap N Basalt of Sand Hollow 15.3 N Basalt of Silver Falls NE (0 Basalt of Ginkgo E Basalt of Palouse Falls E U. Eckler Mountain Member Basalt of Dodge N Basalt of Robinette Mountain N Vantaae Horizon 7>---------- * -

• 7 Sentinel Bluffs Member 15.6 Slack Canyon Member Field Springs Member 7 Winter Water Member N2 7 Umtanum Member

• - Grande Ortley Member

• Ronde Armstrong Canyon Member Basalt Meyer Ridge Member Grouse Creek Member R Wapshilla Ridge Member 2 Mt. Horrible Member 0

.- Picture Gorge 7 China Creek Member N, Basalt Downey Gulch Member _-_

Center Creek Member Rogersburg Member Teepee Butte Member 0,,Ilk a nRAn~ l~kr iRr I UV V M~I** ri *19 w,,.I.Mw! j.j R,

Imnaha T Basalt No Ro 17.5 Figure 3. Stratigraphic elements of the CRBG [Reidel et al., 1989b]. N, R, T, E refer to normal, reversed, transitional, and east directed magnetizations, respectively.

6 of 33

B07105 BLAKELY ET AL.: FAULTS LINK CASCADIA FOREARC AND BACKARC B07105

-119" 40 km Figure 4. Generalized geology of the YFTB and surrounding regions, simplified from Walsh et al.

(1987], Schuster el al. [1997], Stoffel et al. [1991], and Dragovich et al. [2002]. Black solid lines are faults of all types and ages, modified from the above references. Note that these faults differ from those shown on Figures 1, 2, 6, 7, 9, 10, and 20, which reflect Quaternary faults only (http://earthquake.usgs.

gov/hazards/qfaults). Black dotted line indicates western limit of exposed Columbia River Basalt Group.

Black dashed line shows extent of high-resolution aeromagnetic surveys discussed in text. Red line is location of gravity and magnetic model discussed in text and shown in Figure 20. Magenta symbols are deep exploratory boreholes [Reidel et al., 1989b] discussed in text. UR, Umitanum Ridge.

boundary between YFTB blocks, with poles of rotation in south in the eastern survey. In each survey, flight lines and Idaho near the southeastward projection of the OWL. perpendicular tie lines were spaced 400 in and 4 km apart, respectively. Stationary magnetometers were operated con-

3. Geophysical Analysis tinuously during data acquisition in order to monitor and subsequently correct for transient magnetic fields. Total 3.1. Aeromagnetic Anomalies field measurements were reduced to total field anomaly

[17] Two high-resolution airborne magnetic surveys values by subtraction of the International Geomagnetic acquired by the U.S. Geological Survey in 2008 and 2009 Reference Field, updated to the date of flying. The two new (Figure 6) help improve our understanding of the YFTB and surveys were gridded at 100 in spacing, then merged with possible links to neighboring tectonic structures. The sur- each other and with a third high-resolution magnetic survey veys were acquired by separate geophysical companies flown over the Puget Lowland in 1997 [Blakelv et al.,

working under contract to the USGS. Both surveys mea- 1999]. Each of the three surveys overlaps its neighbors by sured the total magnetic field at a nominal altitude of 250 m small amounts, which facilitated the merging procedure.

above ground or as near to the ground as safely possible. Merging was accomplished by deternining a suture path Topographic relief in some parts of the study area necessi- within the overlap regions. Mismatches at each point of the tated higher flight altitudes, nevertheless, 87 percent of the suture path were then corrected within circular regions area was flown at altitudes less than 500 in above ground, surrounding each point. Figure 6 shows merged total field and 99.4 percent at altitudes less than 1000 in. Flight lines magnetic anomalies reduced to the pole. Together, the three were directed east-west in the western survey and north- aeromagnetic surveys extend from the YFTB to the Puget 7 of 33

B07105 BLAKELY ET AL.: FAULTS LINK CASCADIA FOREARC AND BACKARC B07105 100 10-1 cu) cu) 10.3 (U

(b Zi 10"61 10-5 Induced Magnetization (emu)

Figure 5. Koenigsberger ratios (Q) for a set of CRBG rocks. Data provided by Jon Hagstrum (written communication, 2009).

Lowland and include the intervening region where the OWL on a horizontal surface immediately above the highest crosses the Cascade Range. topography assuming uniformly magnetized crust and using

[18] The new airborne magnetic surveys cover the entire the method of Parker [1972]. These calculated anomalies northern parts of the YFTB, including the Frenchman Hills, showed little resemblance to observed anomalies when Saddle Mountains, Umtanum Ridge, Ahtanum Ridge, and continued upward to the same level. We conclude that long-Toppenish Ridge anticlines, and their possible extensions wavelength topographic anomalies are not significant in this into the Cascade Range (Figure 6). The surveys are under- area, and that observed anomalies instead are caused mostly lain by rocks with diverse magnetic properties, ranging from by subsurface magnetic sources (e.g., faulted contacts, folded highly magnetic CRBG, with both normal and reversed layers, changes in magnetic polarity, etc.).

remanent magnetization, to essentially nonmagnetic sedi- [20] Figure 7 shows magnetic anomalies filtered in order mentary rocks. Flows of the CRBG produce a distinctive, to emphasize shallow magnetic sources. These anomalies short-wavelength pattern of magnetic anomalies, making it were calculated by analytically continuing the original possible to trace the western extent of CR.BG volcanic units magnetic field (Figure 6) 50 in upward, then subtracting that (Figure 6, dotted line). Each faulted anticline within the result from the original field. This two-step procedure is CRBG produces a clear aeromagnetic lineament, which is equivalent to a discrete vertical derivative, which emphasizes expected considering the high magnetizations of CRBG magnetic anomalies caused by shallow sources at the expense rocks. Of particular note in Figure 6 is the close alignment of anomalies originating from deeper sources [Blakely, 1995].

of distinct magnetic gradients with each Quaternary fault Regions of distinctly different magnetic character are appar-cataloged by the U.S. Geological Survey (http://earthquake. ent in Figure 7. For example, it is easy to distinguish near-usgs.gov/hazards/qfaults). Additional linear anomalies lie surface CRBG from less magnetic lithologies, and it is west of CRBG exposures with trends similar to Quaternary apparent fi'omn this pattern that CRBG does not extend west of faults mapped within the CRBG. its geologically mapped surface exposures (Figure 7, dotted

[19] Figure 2a shows significant topographic relief asso- line).

ciated with YFTB anticlines and synclines, and we should [21] Figure 7 dramatically illuminates the major folds and consider the possibility that linear magnetic anomalies in thrusts of the YFTB, with distinct linear anomalies closely Figure 6 are caused simply by topographic effects in this aligned along each mapped Quaternary fault (http://earthquake.

highly magnetic terrain. To investigate this possibility, we usgs.gov/hazards/qfaults). A number of linear anomalies calculated the magnetic anomalies that would be observed with similar trend lie northwest of the mapped faults and 8 of 33

B07105 BLAKELY ET AL.: FAULTS L[NK CASCADIA FOREARC AND BACKARC B07105

-121"30' -121* -120*30' -12O0 -119'30O _119o

• V~Ent~at Ir 47'0'Q Wenatchee

]

03  %*

InW 47' D

4630'O

'-sco 0

Figure 6. Total field magnetic anomalies of the YFTB and surrounding regions. Brightly colored region shows magnetic anomalies from a merge of three high-resolution surveys (see Figure 2b for survey identification). Anomalies transformed to the north magnetic pole. Subdued background colors show magnetic anomalies from a statewide compilation [Finn et al., 1989] reduced to pole. White lines are Quaternary faults from the U.S. Geological Survey Quaternary fault database (http://earthquake.usgs.gov/

hazards/qfaults). Note that these faults differ from those shown in Figure 4, which show faults of all ages.

Dotted line shows mapped western extent of CRBG. Red line is location of magnetic and gravity profile (Figure 20). Label D indicates north-northwest striking magnetic anomalies interpreted as dikes [Swanson et al., 1979]. See Figure 2 for description of other labels.

beyond exposed CRBG. In some cases, these linear ronment, tend to shift the calculated boundaries in the direc-anomalies can be explained by mapped lithologic contacts. tion of dip, but these shifts are small and barely observable at For example, the northwest striking magnetic lineament the scale of Figure 8.

immediately west of Cle Elum (Figures 6 and 7) overlies a [23] Using original magnetic anomalies (Figure 6) and fault-bounded sliver of Eocene volcanic rocks [Walsh et al., derivative products (Figures 7 and 8), we interpreted magnetic 1987; Dragovich et al., 2002]. Other northwest striking contacts that to us appear to be most significant (Figure 9). We lineaments, however, are not associated with mapped fea- were as objective as possible in our selection process, tures and apparently originate from lithologic contacts focusing on both anomaly amplitude and sharpness of gra-concealed by younger rocks and surficial deposits. dients, and recognizing that a certain amount of subjectivity

[22] We employed a method described by Phillips et al. was unavoidable. We tended to favor magnetic lineaments

[2007] to assist in mapping aeromagnetic lineaments. Black that fall on or near faults already identified as active in Qua-lines (made up of intersecting black dots) in Figure 8 indicate ternary time (http://earthquake.usgs.gov/hazards/qfaults), as the locations of magnetic contacts calculated directly from the well as lineaments that lie on or near any fault, regardless of mathematical curvature of total field magnetic anomalies. age, mapped by the Department of Natural Resources, State Although this method is entirely objective, it does involve of Washington.

several simplifying assumptions, the most significant being [24] Numerous magnetic contacts are located directly the assumption that faults dip vertically. Violations of this along mapped Quaternary faults. Indeed, all geologically assumption, as surely must occur in this thrust fault envi- mapped Quaternary faults correlate with magnetic contacts, 9 of 33

B07105 BLAKELY ET AL.: FAULTS LINK CASCADIA FOREARC AND BACKARC B07105 Figure 7. Residual magnetic anomalies of the YFTB and surrounding regions. Magnetic anomalies of Figure 6 filtered in order to emphasize shallow magnetic sources, as described in text. White lines are Quaternary faults (see Figure 6). See Figure 6 for description of other items.

suggesting that some of the other highlighted magnetic 3.2. Analysis of Gravity Anomalies lineaments in Figure 9 are caused by concealed Quaternary [26] Regional gravity data provide additional subsurface faults. A good example is the sharp, west-northwest striking information. Our gravity database includes published data magnetic lineament immediately south of Ellensburg, evi- from Finn et al. [1991], supplemented with high-quality dent in Figures 6-8. This magnetic lineamnent follows proprietary data acquired in the 1980s for hydrocarbon Manastash Ridge, a faulted anticline in CRBG. Manastash exploration. Gravity measurements were reduced to isostatic Ridge does not appear as a fault on Figures 6 and 7 (white residual gravity anomalies [Simpson et al., 1986] using lines) because it has not been recognized as active in Qua- standard procedures [Blakely, 1995]. Station spacing is ternary time (http://earthquake.usgs.gov/hazards/qfaults). highly variable in the study area, ranging from 400 m along On the other hand, we do believe the Manastash Ridge many roads and trails to greater than 10 km in some areas. In magnetic lineament reflects a significant structure, and thus general, station density is adequate for regional-scale inter-it does appear on Figure 9. pretations, especially over the YFTB.

[25] Within CRBG terrane, faults often bound regions

[27] Figure 10 shows isostatic residual gravity anomalies with distinct magnetic character, and Uintanum Ridge is a of the study area. Saltus [1993] described regional gravity good example. This fault bounded ridge displays charac- anomalies in this area, and we use his nomenclature and teristic, short-wavelength magnetic anomalies distinctly labeling scheme where possible. The dominant gravity different from regions immediately south and north of the anomaly in the region lies north of Cle Elum (Figure 10, bounding faults (Figure 7). In the case of Umtanum Ridge, label PT). This positive anomaly overlies exposures of pre-the change in character across the faults is caused by the Tertiary rocks of the Wenatchee block: the Cretaceous relative depth of CRBG: basalts exposed at Umtanum Mount Stuart batholith, the Jurassic Ingalls Tectonic Com-Ridge are faulted to deeper levels both south and north of plex, and other Mesozoic metamorphic rocks (Figure 4) the ridge. [Dragovich et al., 2002]. The spatial association of this 10 of 33

B07105 BLAKELY ET AL.: FAULTS LINK CASCADIA FOREARC AND BACKARC B07105

-121*30' -121* -120"30' -120" -119"30' -119" Figure 8. Magnetic contacts of the YFTB and surrounding regions. Black dots indicate contacts between lithologies of differing magnetic properties, as determined from curvature analysis [Phillips et al., 2007]

and applied to the magnetic anomalies of Figure 6. Background colors are magnetic anomalies, reduced to pole as shown in Figure 6.

anomaly with pre-Tertiary exposures suggests that the entire basin filled with >5 kin of Tertiary sedimentary rocks, high-amplitude anomaly is caused by similar, mostly con- whereas the central gravity high is caused by thinning of cealed pre-Tertiary basement. Tertiary sedimentary rocks, in some places being completely

[28] Other gravity anomalies shown in Figure 10 include absent. Saltus [1993] also recognized that the gravity the central gravity high (CH), the Yakima gravity low (YL), anomalies could be caused by lateral variations in base-the Pasco gravity low (PL), and the Grand Coulee gravity ment density, as might be caused by the presence of silicic low (GCL). These anomalies have been interpreted in two intrusions. These disparate interpretations [Catchings and rather different ways: Catchings and Mooney [1988] mod- Mooney, 1988; Saltus, 1993] have led to spirited debate eled Bouguer gravity values along a 260 km long, northeast [e.g., Catchings and Saltus, 1994] that, in our view, has not striking seismic refraction and wide-angle reflection transect been fully resolved.

and concluded that the central gravity high is caused by a [29] In our interpretation, the Wenatchee block is bisected thickened section of lower crust, possibly the result of by a south-southeast trending gravity trough (Figure 10, crustal underplating from mantle sources. Saltus [1993], on label CG) coincident with the Chiwaukum structural low, a the other hand, used isostatic residual gravity anomalies to down-faulted block filled with Eocene and Oligocene con-construct a three-dimensional model of the entire Columbia tinental sedimentary rocks [Gresens et al., 1981; Cheney basin. Saltus [1993] assumed that CRBG is uniformly dense and Hayman, 2009; Haugerud and Tabor, 2009]. The grav-in this area and that CRBG thickness is given by published ity trough extends southward and broadens beneath the CRBG.

isopach estimates [Reidel et al., 1989b]. Thus defined, separating the western Wenatchee block from the central Saltus [1993] then calculated the gravitational effects of gravity high (Figure 10, label CH). The Yakima low (YL)

CRBG and assumed the remaining gravity anomaly was and the Ellensburg basin could be related in part to Eocene caused primarily by variations in the thickness of sub- deformation prior to emplacement of the CRBG. Within the CRBG Tertiary sedimentary rocks. His model predicted, for YFTB, the central gravity high has lower amplitude highs example, that the Yakima gravity low overlies a sub-CRBG and lows trending roughly east-west. Some of the highs II of 33

B07105 BLAKELY ET AL.: FAULTS LINK CASCADIA FOREARC AND BACKARC B07105

-121"30' -121" -120"30' -120" -119"30' -119" I

• Entdat I 47*30' oh'Belnd 4N _ S *

-  : ~

A Figure 16', VVniatchie f "

Hy~k, 'Figure,11 ..

0l

'r"e.. ... 0 -~

r

..

• I I Figure 12 N , ..

S--"--.---- ... .:: , .. --

,Z- --, . . .

,Z

~*.. unavU  :~I.. rn.:7- -

47*

Mt Rainir I ~ ~ Nches \

AAFCF P9 1 -

46030' I 'N~~RM NZ

--- -- 7 Mt. Adams:

I~~4 km~Ii Figure 9. Solid black lines indicate significant magnetic contacts from Figure 8 used in subsequent analysis. White lines are Quaternary faults (see Figure 6). Black dashed line indicates boundary of high-quality aeromagnetic data, to which this analysis was restricted. Red lines are scarps discussed in text:

MR, Manastash Ridge fault; RC, Reecer Creek fault; WV, Wenas Valley fault; BR, Boylston Ridge fault; BF, Burbank fault; AF, Artesian fault; CF, Coyote Spring fault. Red stars and accompanying focal mechanisms refer to two regions of recent seismic activity: EL, a Mw 3.8 earthquake near Ellensburg in March 2010; WI, a swarm of >1000 mnicroearthquakes at Wooded Island in 2009 (Pacific Northwest Seismic Network, http://www.pnsn.org/welcome.html, 2010). Other locations: UR, Umtanum Ridge; KV, Kittitas Valley. See Figure 6 for description of other items.

coincide with post-CRBG structures inferred from aero- Conrey [1989]. However, the western margin of the central magnetic data and suggest basement involvement. Large- gravity high is not offset by this northwest striking structure, amplitude, north-northwest striking magnetic anomalies, suggesting that dextral shear, if it exists, is older than the interpreted as CRBG feeder dikes [Swanson et al., 1979], basement uplift that causes the central gravity high [Saltus, are visible in older aeromagnetic data (Figures 2b and 6, 1993]. Analysis of GPS data suggests that the OWL in the label D) and appear to be restricted to the adjacent Pasco low YFTB is largely a zone of northeast directed shortening, (Figure 10, label PL). although some dextral slip is permissible in the Cascade

[3o] A northwest striking gravity lineament (Figure 10, Range [McCaffrey et al., 2007].

white dotted lines) extends across the entire study area. West of the central gravity high, this lineament is manifested as a 4. Geomorphology and Lidar Topography positive gravity anomaly that in part overlies basement ex-

[31] Using magnetic anomalies and magnetic lineaments as posures south of Cle Elum. Thus, we interpret this anomaly as being caused by shallow basement, as also noted by general guides, we searched available lidar topographic data Saltus [1993]. East of the central gravity high, the lineament and airborne photography for geomorphic evidence of past is characterized as a gradient between the central gravity surface ruptures. Lidar data were collected using high-reso-high and the Pasco gravity low. Saltus [1993] suggested that lution airborne laser swath mapping techniques and are the northwest striking gradient east of the central gravity available from two sources: the Puget Sound Lidar Consor-high may reflect dextral shear, as proposed by Hooper and tium (http://pugetsoundlidar.ess.washington.edu; resolution =

12 of 33

B07105 BLAKELY ET AL.: FAULTS LINK CASCADIA FOREARC AND BACKARC B07105 T_. - ,

Figure 10. Isostatic residual gravity anomalies of the YFTB and surrounding regions. Stipple pattern indicates exposed pre-Tertiary rocks (Figure 4). Black lines are magnetic lineaments identified in Figure 9. White dotted lines show location of gravity lineament discussed in text. Other labels identify specific anomalies: PT, Pre-Tertiary rocks; YL, Yakima gravity low; PL, Pasco gravity low; GCL, Grand Coulee gravity low; CH, north-south striking central gravity high; CG, Chiwaukum graben. See Figure 6 for description of other items.

1.83 m to 1 in grids) and the U.S. Anry Yakima Training a maximum height of 2.5 m (Figure 11). This scarp is parallel Center (1 mn grid). Overlaying magnetic anomalies and to and in close proximity to a northeast striking magnetic magnetic lineaments on lidar topography and aerial photog- lineament (Figure 9, label MR), 4.5 km long, with a positive raphy revealed a number of possible fault-related features, anomaly to the southeast, also suggesting uplift on the including northeast tending fractures and scarps, possible southeast side. The magnetic lineament is one of numerous flexural slip scarps along bedding planes, contacts along the northeast striking anomalies over Manastash Ridge. Other flanks of anticlines, and linear scarps. Significant examples well-expressed northeast trending bedrock features are seen are detailed in the following sections. on the northern flank of Manastash Ridge west of the Yakima River and along the northern flank of Manastash Ridge 4.1. Faults and Tectonic Features at Manastash Ridge between the Yakima and Columbia Rivers.

and Kittitas Valley 4.1.2. Boylston Ridge Scarp

[32] Lidar slope images and aerial photography illuminate [34] Lidar data also illuminate a northeast trending scarp northeast striking fractures and possible scarps in several across the northwestern end of Boylston Ridge in eastern places, most notably along Manastash Ridge (western Saddle Kittitas Valley, about 16 km east of Ellensburg (Figure 9, Mountains) and along the anticlines bordering Kittitas Valley label BR; Figure 12). This scarp, here referred to as the (Figure 9). These features trend dominantly northeastward, Boylston Ridge scarp, trends roughly northeast, is up-thrown do not offset stream drainages, and resemble etched bedrock on its northwestern side, and is 3-4 m high at its highest point.

fractures. The scarp crosses a small stream valley adjacent to a high-4.1.1. Manastash Ridge Scarp way (streamflow is to the west). Here the stream incises

[33] At least one of these features, on Manastash Ridge, is alluvium that fills the valley on the up-thrown side of the associated with a topographic scarp, southeast side up, having scarp, resulting in a narrow ravine (Figure 12). Field 13 of 33

B07105 BLAKELY ET AL.: FAULTS LINK CASCADIA FOREARC AND BACKARC B07105 46.89 Contourinterval = I meter Figure 11. (a) Shaded relief image (azimuth = 3150, altitude = 40') of a part of Manastash Ridge, over-lain by a transparent slope map, generated using a 1 in grid of elevations from airborne lidar survey.

(b) Interpreted lidar image showing topographic contours and bedrock fractures (thick black lines). Star indicates the topographic scarp discussed in text.

reconnaissance suggests that a small wetland or pond may to the northeast striking Boylston Ridge scarp. However, have formed in the stream valley at the tine the scarp magnetic lineaments extending beyond both ends of the formed. Down-cutting of the stream into late Quaternary Boylston Ridge scarp (Figure 9, label BR) are on strike with alluvium in the valley suggests relatively recent movement. the scarp and may help constrain its overall length. A The scarp continues to the northeast and crosses into an prominent northeast striking anomaly occurs in the Kittitas alluvium-filled valley (part of Kittitas Valley) and appears Valley immediately southwest of Boylston Ridge and lies to warp the valley surface mapped as Quatemary alluvium. directly on strike with the scarp. The lineament is positive on

[35] A complex pattern of magnetic anomalies appears its northwestern side, consistent with northwest side up along the Boylston Ridge scarp (Figures 7 and 9, label BR), scarp morphology. The broad gradients of this anomaly caused by nonnally magnetized CRBG exposed at the surface. suggest that its source lies at depth. To the northeast of the On close examination, the high-amplitude, short-wavelength Boylston Ridge scarp, a complex pattern of anomalies is magnetic anomalies generally strike north-northwest, oblique similarly on strike with the scarp. Taken together, the lidar 14 of 33

B071!05 BLAKELY ET AL.: FAULTS LINK CASCADIA FOREARC AND BACKARC B07105

/

• a a ~'

46.98, -\ -? -~'~?

/ ~, I '-'-.k

~ a~

Intprtt~ **'*~a a,.

/kf-~. /r~

I 0

'.1/

~

(V N '~ \

• ,\' ~  :-:~

a' K.\<' 4 \ -~

46.96* ~

N~""'~ A Primaryscarp '.Magnetic lineament Warp Contours = 5 meters

, Secondaryscarp 1km.. -a' \ Flexuralslip/bedding plane scarp

\ \.(

Figure 12. (a) Shaded relief image (azimuth = 3150, altitude = 400) of Boylston Ridge, overlain by a transparent slope map, generated using a 1 m grid of elevations from airborne lidar survey. Blue line is Boylston Ridge scarp. The small stream in the center of the image flows west. (b) Interpreted lidar image showing topographic contours, magnetic lineaments, possible fault scarp, and bedding plane scarps.

and magnetic data suggest that the Boylston Ridge scarp. is a gravity and: magnetic anomalies. A ground-based geophysi-northeast striking fault at least 15,km in length. - .al traverse across the scarp.[ Weston GeoplhsicalResearch, 4.1.3. Reecer Creek Scarp . 1977, Waitt, 1979] found a 500 nT magnetic anomaly and

[36] Waitt [19,79] identified a 50 m high, 10km long scarp 4 mGal gravity, anomaly high immediately south of the scarp.

in northern Kittitas Valley about 15 km north of Ellensburg, The position of the geophysical anomalies and the south side which we refer to here as the Reecer Creek scarp (Figure 9, up topography of the scarp are consistent with a south dipping label RC). The Reecer Creek scarp offsets gravel deposits in reverse fault. The age of faulting is constrained by the age of the Thorp Formation, a Pliocene fluvial deposit. Waitt [1979] tephra in the youngest part of the Thorp Formation (-3.7 Ma) noted that the Reecer Creek scarp is associated with both and u.ndeformed Quaternary fluvial deposits (-130 ka) 15 of 33

B07105 BLAKELY ET AL.: FAULTS LINK CASCADIA FOREARC AND BACKARC B07105 I

nT 20.0 11.2 46*37'30" 6.7 4.3, 2.6 1.5 0.5

-0.5

-1.51

-2.7

-4.1

-5.8

-8.2

-12.7

-21.7 46'32'30" 5 km Figure 13. North-northwest striking faults near Yakima, Washington. (a) Aerial photograph of Yakima Ridge. Arrows indicate topographic lineaments. AF, Artesian fault; CF, Coyote Spring fault. White dashed rectangle indicates location of maps on Figure 14. (b) Residual magnetic anomalies of same area. White dotted lines determined from aerial photograph. Pairs of black dashed lines indicate piercing points, with offset indicated by accompanying number.

[Waitt, 1979]. The magnetic lineament associated with the 4.2. Right Lateral Faults and Lidar Scarps Reecer Creek scarp is evident in the new aeromagnetic survey [37] Topographic lineaments on aerial photographs reveal (Figures 7 and 9, label RC), where it can be traced for at two parallel, north-northwest striking faults located 14 and least 16 km. 24 km due east of Yakima, which we here refer to as the 16 of 33

B07105 BLAKELY ET AL.: FAULTS LINK CASCADIA FOREARC AND BACKARC B07105 Artesian and Coyote Spring faults (Figures 9 and 13, labels [42] A prominent magnetic lineament follows the entire AF and CF), respectively. The strike of both faults is ori- length of the Umtanum Ridge anticline (Figures 2, 6, and 9) ented about 600 clockwise from the trend of Yakima Ridge, and is caused mostly by folded and faulted CRBG of both placing them approximately on strike with the Hog Ranch- normal and reversed polarity. One strand of the Umtanumr Naneum Ridge anticline to the north, a major north trending Ridge magnetic lineament passes directly through Mt. Baldy CRBG structure [Tolan and Reidel, 1989; Schuster, 1994]. and the Yakima River Canyon (Figure 8). Here the strong Schuster [1994] mapped the Coyote Spring fault with right- magnetic gradient is caused by reversely magnetized R2 lateral displacement. The Artesian fault is not shown by Grande Ronde Basalt exposed in the core of a faulted anti-Schuster [1994] but is revealed as a scarp/topographic line- cline, overlain by nonnally magnetized N2 Grande Ronde ament on lidar images. The Artesian fault scarp trends in the Basalt and Wanapum Basalt (Figure 3). The magnetic same direction as the Coyote Spring fault and displaces ridges anomaly at the Yakima River canyon is dominated by these in a right-lateral sense, with scarps on opposite sides facing intensely magnetic and deformed rocks, obscuring specific different directions (Figure 14). Ridge crests along the evidence for bedding-parallel faults.

Artesian fault are apparently offset as much as -150 m in a fight lateral manner. 4.4. Umtanum Ridge Fault Scarps

[38] The Coyote Spring fault lies precisely along a sharp, 4.4.1. Burbank Scarp well-defined magnetic lineament (Figure 13b, label CF). [43] Possible fault scarps lie along the flanks of Umtanum Offset magnetic features on opposing sides of the lineament Ridge and separate areas of slope-parallel bedding traces provide at least three pairs of piercing points indicating 300 to and bedding plane scarps. These scarps also tend to lie near 500 m of right-lateral offset on the Coyote Spring fault. The and parallel to magnetic lineaments lying along the flanks of magnetic expression of the Artesian fault is more problem- Umtanum Ridge. In particular, a magnetic lineament lies atic, but a complex pattern of short-wavelength anomalies along the mapped trace of a thrust fault-herein referred to does lie subparallel to the scarp (Figure 13b, label AF). as the Burbank fault (Figures 9 and 15, label BF)--that follows Burbank Creek just south and east of Mount Baldy 4.3. Unitanum Ridge Bedding Plane Scarps (Figure 15, label B). A scarp identified on lidar images also

[39] Bedding-parallel scarps are seen on lidar data along falls near the magnetic lineament and lies very close to the the flanks of several YFTB anticlines. Some of these scarps mapped trace of the Burbank fault [Schuster, 1994]. Another also lie along prominent magnetic lineaments and mapped scarp, located about 1 km north of Roza Creek, falls directly faults (Figures 7, 8, and 15). These features may represent on a magnetic lineament (Figure 15). The magnetic linea-flexural slip along bedding planes in the CRBG and inter- ment follows a contact between N2 Grande Ronde Basalt calated sedimentary units. Some of the more prominent and the Frenchman Springs Member of the Wanapum features lie along Umtanum Ridge, Rattlesnake Ridge, Basalt, both nornmally magnetized. This scarp and its asso-and Yakirna Ridge west of Hanford. In the following, we ciated magnetic lineament may be the continuation of the illustrate the correlation of these bedding-parallel scarps and Burbank fault on the west side of the Yakima River canyon, magnetic lineaments at Umtanum Ridge, where the ridge is where the fault becomes the subsurface contact between cut by the Yakirna River (Figure 15). Similar features lie Grande Ronde and Wanapum Basalt.

along the flanks of most anticlines on the Columbia Plateau. 4.4.2. Wenas Scarp

[40] Figure 15 shows a lidar image with interpreted geo- [44] A linear scarp runs along the northern edge of Wenas logical features and magnetic lineaments along Umtanum Valley for about 11 kin, approximately 400 in south of the Ridge at the Yakima River canyon. Bedding traces appear steeply dipping south flank of Umtanum Ridge (Figure 9, on the lidar image in two forms: (1) bedding plane traces label WV; Figure 16). The scarp trends west-northwest and that follow topography in flat-lying areas and along dip varies in height from -2 in to over 8 m. The scarp lies on a slopes, and (2) bedding plane scarps that cut across topog- relatively flat alluvial fan surface, sloping southward toward raphy in areas of defomaed and steeply dipping volcanic and Wenas Creek at about 1 to 9 degrees. The scarp is parallel to sedimentary rocks. Bedding plane traces tend to lie along an aeromagnetic lineament that tracks the flank of Umtanum gentle dip slopes in broad synclines and follow topographic Ridge (Figure 9, label WV). The scarp and magnetic line-contours. Bedding plane scarps cut across topographic con- ament are offset -400 in, but the scarp follows each bend tours and tend to lie in deformed rocks near the crest of an- and wiggle of the magnetic lineament. This close association ticlines-in this case Umtanum Ridge-and are roughly between scarp and magnetic lineament suggests that the parallel to the anticlinal axis and magnetic lineaments asso- scarp may be structurally controlled and caused by the same ciated with the anticline. structure that generates the magnetic lineament.

[41] The architecture of the Umtanum Ridge anticline is [45] Geologic maps and field exposures in the area sug-exposed in the Yakima River Canyon at Mount Baldy gest that the Wenas Valley scarp is related to either recent (Figure 15, label B). Here CRBG dips steeply to the north faulting along the southern flank of Umtanum Ridge or and corresponds to similar rocks along the northern flank of deep-seated landslides (Figure 16). The best way to weigh the Umtanum Ridge that produce the bedding plane scarps merits of these two hypotheses is with trench excavations shown in Figure 15. These bedding plane scarps may rep- across the scarp.

resent either differential erosion between adjacent strata or flexural slip scarps along bedding planes within the anti- 4.5. Paleoseismic Trenching cline. Flexural slip scarps have been interpreted as potential [46] We sited two trenches across the Wenas Valley scarp seismogenic faults in other fold and thrust belts around the to observe and map stratigraphy and structure beneath the world [Yeats, 1986; Kelsey et al., 2008]. scarp. One trench was positioned across a -5 m high seg-17 of 33

B07105 BLAKELY ET AL.: FAULTS LINK CASCADIA FOREARC AND BACKARC B07105 Figure 14. (a) Shaded slope map in the area of the Artesian fault. See Figure 13 for location of map.

(b) Topographic contour map showing location of the Artesian fault.

ment of the scarp at Hessler Flat; the second was sited across stratigraphic and structural contacts with tags of survey tape a -7 m high segment at McCabe Place. Each excavation was and nails. Each cell was photographed, and trench logs were up to 24 in in length and 3 in deep, with walls benched to constructed by mapping large photomosaics of the cells. At improve stability. At McCabe Place, we constructed a grid Hessler Flat, we mapped the trench wall directly on scale system of lxl m cells on one wall of the trench after drawings and transferred field notes to a large photomosaic clearing the wall of loose debris. We marked important to create the final trench log.

18 of 33

B07105 BLAKELY ET AL.: FAULTS LTNK CASCADIA FOREARC AND BACKARC B07105 46.85' . .

46.80* . .. ,* "

120.55o 120.500 120.450

'" *- - Explanation

,Un- U Bedding plane scarp

. - ". Normal fault ?).scaqf

%- " , * ., ., ",, Bedding trace 46.850 . , ... ," VAIE. 0 Magnetic lineame

'. .Landsh I-- ,. .I ., ,.

46.80' BF~

Figure 15. (a) Shaded relief image (azimuth =315, altitude =40) of the eastern portion of Umntanum Ridge, overlain by a transparent slope map, generated using a 1 m grid of elevations from airborne lidar survey. (b) Interpreted lidar image showing topographic contours, magnetic lineaments., possible fault scarps, bedding plane scarps, landslides, and bedding plane traces. B, Mt. Baldy; BF, Burbank fault.

19 of 33

B07105 BLAKELY ET AL.: FAULTS LINK CASCADIA FOREARC AND BACKARC B07105 46.85* -

SFltL1Explanation

".~Scarp ..... Bedding plane scarp K* Bedding ° Magnetic lineament Landslide SContour Contour interval = 50 m A A' A. Fault hypothesis 3'.*

1200o*

1000 800 400 S600 5 UE200 No vertical exaggeration 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 Distance (in)

B. Landslide hypothesis 1200-1000-800-

• 600

" 400 63 200 No vertical exaggeration 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 Distance (m)

Figure 16. Interpreted shaded slope image of Umntanum Ridge and Wenas Valley, generated using a 10 n- DEM. Map shows topographic contours, magnetic lineamnents, possible fault scarps, bedding plane scarps, landslides, and bedding plane traces. Black dots are locations of two trench excavations. Cross sections (A-A') at bottom show two possible interpretations for the Wenas Valley scarp. In cross section B, the Wenas Valley scarp is shown as a landslide headscarp, with the landslide moving along a flat glide plane.

20 of 33

B07105 BLAKELY ET AL.: FAULTS LINK CASCADIA FOREARC AND BACKARC B07105 North 8BC Hessler Flats 8A 1mL Im South 0 Basalt clast

• eSurface sol A horizon Dark brown, piaty, undisturbed, 10-15cm thick. Contains lightgray MSH ash in upper-most part.

Brown, cobbly silty, sandbetween units I and BA.Only appears in hanging wall, ormerges with units 4a and4b.

f Colluvium(Bwho.izon 8B* on) Contact with a obscuredby trench rubble.

8BeC Colluvium (BC horizon) Tan, cobbly, silty, sand above unit 1. Only appearson upper tread.

7 Loess Similar in appearanceto unit 5, but contains some cobbles and is slightly less compact. Contains some cobbles, no stratification.Much softer than units 3, 4a, 4b. Slightly lighter andless compact than unit 6.

Colluvium Similar to unit 3, except fewer cobbles, more boulders, a little less dense than unit 4a, darker brown finer grained than unit 3. hard to scrape.

5Colluvium Same as unit 3, except few boulders, a little less dense than unit 3, darker brown than unit 3. Very hardto scrape.

Contact with unit 8Bw obscured by trench rubble.

10-20cm thick, dark brown, silty, few/none cobbles and pebbles. Runs along the top of lower bench. Disappears Buried soil beneath rubble S of unif 3. Not visible N of unit 6. Possibly disturbed by excavatorand/oreroded in piaces.

3 Loess Mostly homogenous brown sandy silt appearsto onlap unit 3. Contains very few cobbles, no stratification.

Much softer than units 3, 4a, 4b. Slightly darkerand more compact than unit 6.

Brown silty-sandy, semi-consolidated,contains tighly packed cobbles near bedrock. At the contact with unit 3 2f Colluvium there is a density change but no color change, and cobbles/boulders disappear.Can be broken into two units, one containingmore boulders than the other, which is slightly more cobbly nearest to bedrock.

I Weathered basalt Yellowish, highly weathered basalt. Spheroidally weathered into SA boulders and cobbles. Upper contact is at bench andis overlain by a cobbly soil horizon, unit BBC.

Figure 17. Simplified log of excavation at Hessler Flats.

4.5.1. Stratigraphy The entire sequence is capped by modem surface soil (unit 9),

[47] The excavation at Hessler Flat uncovered weathered which includes thin pods of tephra from the 1980 eruption of basalt overlain by alluvium beneath the upper tread above Mount St. Helens.

the scarp, and a sequence of loess deposits, a buried soil, 4.5.2. Faulting/Folding and colluvial deposits beneath the lower tread (Figure 17). A [49] Relief on the surface of the basalt in the Hessler Flat sharp down to the south step in the basalt of at least 3.5 m excavation was possibly caused by folding. The nearest underlies the scarp. outcrop-a panel of Frenchman Springs Member of the

[4s] The excavation across the scarp at McCabe Place Wanapumn Basalt about 300 m away-dips about 22°SSW revealed a sequence of volcaniclastic alluvial deposits, (Figure 16). Bedding in the Ellensburg Formation is cobble-rich debris flow deposits, angular unconfonnities, approximately horizontal -400 m south-southeast of the and buried soils (Figure 18). The oldest exposed deposits trench. It is likely, therefore, that basalt at the Hessler Flat (units 1 through 3) are white- to cream-colored, sandy silt to trench has a shallow dip (less than 22°SSW and possibly cobble-rich silt to sand volcaniclastic deposits. An angular closer to 00), suggesting that the basalt step observed in the unconformity separates the volcaniclastic deposits from the trench is not a reflection of basalt layering and erosion.

overlying pumice-rich sandy silt (unit 4). Overlying the [50] We did consider the possibility that valley-wide sandy silt of unit 4 is a gravelly silty sand (unit 5). Both erosion by Wenas Creek eroded the basalt leaving the scarp units 4 and 5 taper out and disappear in the lower third end at Hessler Flat. We think this is improbable because valley-of the trench. A dark chocolate brown sandy clay (unit 6) wide stream erosion would likely remove knobs ofEllensburg displaying well developed prismatic soil structure overlies Formation, a slightly indurated volcaniclastic deposit, bor-unit 5 and extends along the entire length of the trench. A dering Hessler Flat on the south side. Preservation of these sandy silt (unit 7) buries the chocolate brown clay in the knobs suggests that stream erosion from Wenas Creek was lower half of the trench and is missing from the upper part of limited to the valley axis. Analysis of digital elevation the trench. Overlying unit 6 in the tipper half of the trench is models shows that Hessler Flat dips gently toward the valley unit 8, a sandy silt similar in lithology to unit 7 but with axis, much like modem alluvial fans in the area, whereas slightly different color. Unit 8 buries unit 6 in the upper half modem alluvial surfaces along Wenas Creek slope gently to of the trench but buries unit 7 in the lower half of the trench. the east (in a downstream direction). Without exception, 21 of 33

B07105 BLAKELY ET AL.: FAULTS LINK CASCADIA FOREARC AND BACKARC B07105 NE Faults M ~b ic

- Primary fault (with motion indicated)

Inferred fault . . .

Contactsand Bedding r......

Primarystratigraphic Inferredcontact contact i

A Radiocarbon sample2F0 1 1~ 7

........ 7 1ESy i l ----- ------ --- - - -* -. ,** 5 ~ -- _ --- --- --- ---

2A Gravelly silty sand E Sandy silta ith pumice

........ . 2B Sandysilt 5 Gravelly silt ysand 2C Gravelly silty sand E Sandy clay 2D i Sandy silt 1 7 ý Sandy silt 2E Cobbly silty sand 8 Sandy silt 0

In 0

2F Sandy silt with lapilli Sandy silt with ash as 2G Clay with pumice fragments Sheared Si 0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 Distance (m)

Figure 18. Simplified log of excavation at McCabe Place.

strealnflow in the vicinity of Hessler Flat is orthogonal to the McCabe Place are due to bending moment normal faulting scarp, rather than along the scarp. Last, if the scarp is a in the hanging wall of an oblique and blind thrust fault. The former fluvial feature, we would expect to find fluvial blind thrust may be the cause of the aeromagnetic lineament deposits preserved in the subsurface banked against the 400 tn to the north that closely parallels the entire Wenas scarp, only colluvial deposits and loess banked against the Valley scarp. Although alternative explanations for the scarp were observed. Wenas Valley scarp are possible, such as the headscarp of

[51] The stratigraphic sequence exposed in the McCabe a shallow landslide or erosion along bedding planes, the excavation is broken by several normal faults (Figure 18, length and morphology of the scarp favors a fault origin.

labels F1 to F9). The oldest units also show evidence for folding (Figure 18). Bedding in units 1 to 3 and the 4.6. Wooded Island Earthquake Swarm unconfon-nity between units 3 and 4 forn a slight arch, with [54] A swarm of over 1000 microearthquakes occurred the apex of the arch about in the center of the excavation. from January through June 2009 in the vicinity of Wooded Fl to F5 are normal faults that offset the stratigraphy in a Island in the Columbia River about 8 km north of Richland, down to the south fashion. F6 to F9 are normal faults that Washington (Figure 9, label WI; Figure 19). Hypocenters bound two horsts, with the southernmost horst bounded on were concentrated in an area about 2 km2 and less than 2 kin the down-thrown side by a small syncline. deep. The largest earthquake was Mw 3.0, with recorded

[52] The stratigraphy, unconformities, and faults exposed peak ground accelerations of 0.15 g in the horizontal direction in the McCabe excavation suggest at least three episodes of and 0.02 g in the vertical direction [Rohay, 2009]. The first deformation. The total amount of normal faulting is -3 m, motions of the largest earthquake were consistent with a while the total scarp height is -7 m, suggesting substantial northwest striking reverse fault [Thelen et al., 2009] (see also deformation not accounted for by faults evident in the Pacific Northwest Seismic Network, http://wxvw.pnsn.org/

trench. Bedding in the volcaniclastic alluvium is folded and welcome.html, 2010). The earthquake swarm was accompa-could account for the discrepancy between scarp height and nied by about 35 mm of surface deformation observable in observed faulting. The small syncline adjacent to one of the satellite interferometry [Wicks et al., 2009]. Models of this horsts suggests that contraction accompanied movement on deformation are consistent with 50 nmnof slip on a west-F8 and F9, which predated movetnent on the other horst northwest striking reverse fault and associated bedding plane bounded by F7 and F6. The most recent episode of move- fault in underlying CRBG [Wicks et al., 2009].

mient is on fault F2, which extends through the entire [ss] The Wooded Island earthquake swann occurred stratigraphic package except for the modern soil, suggesting about 16 kin northeast of the Rattlesnake Mountain fault a relatively recent age for movement along this fault. (Figures 2 and 19, label RM) and about 17 ktn south of the

[53] We favor an interpretation that the possible folding/ Gable Mountain fault (Figures 2 and 19, label GM). Both of faulting of basalt at Hessler Flat and nonnal faulting at these YFTB structures produce distinct magnetic anomalies 22 of 33

B0710(5 BLAKELY ET AL.: FAULTS LINK CASCADIA FOREARC AND BACKARC B07105 (B) nT 248 96 22

-31:

-85

-140

-200

-322 (c) 15 km Figure 19 23 of 33

B07105 BLAKELY ET AL.: FAULTS LINK CASCADIA FOREARC AND BACKARC B07105 (Figures 6-8), but other more subtle lineaments in the eroded by successive Pleistocene floods and buried beneath immediate vicinity of Wooded Island may be relevant to the younger fluvial sediments.

earthquake swarm itself. Without exception, positive mag- [58] A second magnetic lineament strikes northeastward, netic anomalies overlie mapped anticlines in this area orthogonal to the Yakima Ridge anomaly and directly (Figure 19). Notable examples include linear magnetic through the Wooded Island earthquake swarm. This broad anomalies over Yakima Ridge and Rattlesnake Mountain. gradient is evident in the original magnetic anomalies While the correlation between magnetic anomalies and an- (Figure 19b) but barely discernible in anomalies filtered to ticlines is not surprising, it does present an interesting emphasize shallow sources (Figure 19c), suggesting that its puzzle: Most exposures of CRBG in this area are magnetized source lies at significant depth, probably deeper than bore-in reversed directions (Figure 19a), which would predict hole penetration in this area. The sense of the anomaly, with negative magnetic anomalies over anticlines. The presence of more positive values to the east, is consistent with an up to positive anomalies suggest that the exposed, reversely mag- the east fault. Its northeast strike is parallel to nearby faults, netized CRBG sections may be thin relative to underlying notably the May Junction fault located 20 km to the north, normally magnetized units. This interpretation is supported to which cuts Pleistocene Hanford Fornation (Figure 19a, some extent by geologic mapping [Reicel et al., 1989a], label MJ) [Repasky et al., 2009]. Other interpretations are which shows that reversely magnetized flows exposed in this possible, of course. For example, the anomaly could indicate area are 30 to 50 in thick, while underlying normally mag- the northwestern extent of the Ice Harbor Member (Figure 3),

netized Wanapum Basalt (Figure 3) is >180 m thick. How- a relatively young and normally magnetized CRBG unit.

ever, an even thicker section of reversely magnetized Grande [so] Wicks et al. [2009] have shown that surface defor-Ronde R2 underlies the Wanapum Basalt, adding complexity mation associated with the Wooded Island earthquake swarm to the puzzle. is consistent with displacement on two faults: a northwest

[56] Linear anomalies over Yakima Ridge and Rattlesnake striking, northeast dipping reverse fault and an adjacent Mountain extend southeastward beyond exposed CRBG, bedding pane fault immediately to the northeast. The reverse suggesting that the structures causing the anomalies also fault lies within CRBG of our hypothesized southeastward extend southeastward in the subsurface. This interpretation continuation of the Yakima Ridge anticline, and the bedding is consistent with the depth to the top of CRBG as deter- plane fault lies within the northeast limb of the same anticline.

mined from closely spaced boreholes in this area [Thorne The dip of the bedding plane fault could be as much as 300 et at., 2006]. For example, borehole depth to CRBG defines [Wicks et al., 2009], consistent with the limb of this small a subsurface ridge extending southeastward from Yakima anticline. We suggest that the Wooded Island earthquake Ridge, coincident with the magnetic anomaly, to about longi- swarm was caused by slip on both the reverse and bedding tude I I 9'26'W. The CRBG ridge seen in borehole data does plane faults in response to horizontal compression across the not obviously continue east of this longitude, however, where concealed Yakima Ridge anticline.

the linear anomaly has low amplitude (-100 nT). A simple forward model of the Yakima Ridge magnetic anomaly near 5. Discussion Wooded Island shows that the anomaly could be caused by a

[60] Folded and faulted stratigraphy of the CRBG produces small (<100 in) anticlinal fold on the top of basalt. Unfortu-nately, the distribution of boreholes would not have resolved distinctive magnetic anomalies, including dramatic linea-this small fold at this location. ments along each of the major YFTB anticlines (Figures 6-8).

[57] The magnetic anomaly here interpreted to be caused Quaternary faults are mapped along most of the YFTB anti-by the Yakima Ridge anticline continues discontinuously to clines (http://earthquake.usgs.gov/hazards/qfaults), and we the Columbia River and beyond, where the source of the should consider the possibility that magnetic lineaments anomaly is entirely concealed by Quaternary sediments. elsewhere in the YFTB reflect unrnapped Quaternary faults.

Along this reach we see subtle hints of uplift in 7.5 min In this study, we are especially interested in the Frenchman topographic maps and in a discontinuous pattern of late Hills, Saddle Mountains, and Umtanum Ridge anticlines and Pleistocene Missoula flood deposits exposed through younger associated Quaternary faults (Figure 2) because, west of dune sands. Lineaments associated with this anomaly pass the Columbia River, these structures strike northwestward immediately south of the Wooded Island earthquake swami, toward active faults in the Puget Lowland. In this regard, the where they strike parallel to subtle patterns in the distribu- Umtanum Ridge anticline is likely the most significant:

tion of epicenters. We presume that the entire anomaly, Magnetic lineaments associated with the Frenchman Hills including the segment south of Wooded Island, is caused by and Saddle Mountains faults merge with north-northwest a continuation of Yakima Ridge beneath the Hanford res- trending anomalies along the east side of Kittitas Valley east ervation. Near Wooded Island, the ridge is now completely of Ellensburg (Figure 9), suggesting that the Frenchman Hills Figure 19. (a) Geologic map of the Wooded Island area, generalized from Schuster et al. [1997]. Yellow symbols show all earthquakes with Mw > 1 occurring from January 1, 2009, to April 23, 2010. Focal mechanism is for largest earthquake (Mw 3.0), which occurred on May 4, 2009 (Pacific Northwest Seismic Network, http://www.pnsn.org/welcome.html, 2010).

Blue dotted lines are magnetic contacts interpreted from aeromagnetic anomalies. MJ, May Junction fault; GM, Gable Mountain fault and anticline; YR, Yakima Ridge; RM, Rattlesnake Mountains anticline; WI, Wooded Island. (b) Unfiltered magnetic anomalies, with interpreted magnetic contacts and mapped structures. Black dashed line outlines Wooded Island earthquake swarm. (c) Magnetic anomalies filtered in order to emphasize shallow magnetic sources.

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B07105 BLAKELY ET AL.: FAULTS LINK CASCADIA FOREARC AND BACKARC B07105 SW NE 0) 0 25 50 Distance, km El Quatemary ED Grande Rondo, N2 F Mapped fault N Quaternaryvolcanic rocks ED Grande Ronde R2 A Mapped anticline Dl Tertiary sedimentaryrocks IM Grande Ronde N1 S Mapped syncline El Pomona Member, Saddle Mts. Basalt E Grande Ronde R, El Roza Member, Wanapum Basalt El Pre-CRB sedimentary rocks E Frenchman Springs Member, Wanapum Basalt El Pre-Tertiaryrocks Figure 20. Crustal model across Umtanum ridge. Forward model is based on gravity and magnetic data constrained by geologic mapping and three deep exploratory boreholes. Model assumed infinitely extended in the directions perpendicular to the profile. Dashed gravity profile is calculated anomaly with-out pre-Tertiary interface. See Figures 4, 6, and 10 for profile location. See Table I for magnetizations and densities used. Well labels: CRB, base of CRBG; Pre-T, top of pre-Tertiary; TD, total depth of penetration.

and Saddle Mountains faults do not serve as throughgoing associated with this Quatemary deformation may extend structures to the Puget Lowland. On the other hand, magnetic through the sub-CRBG Tertiary section and into pre-Tertiary lineaments of the Umtanum Ridge anticline continue west- basement rather than shoaling into CRBG stratigraphy.

northwestward well into the Cascade Range.

[61] Figure 10 shows that the Umtanum Ridge fault is 5.1. Umntanum Ridge Gravity and Magnetic Model spatially associated with a positive gravity anomaly extend- [62] Figure 20 shows a cross section through Umtanum ing from longitude 120'W to at least longitude 121'45'W. Ridge calculated from gravity (Figure 10, red line) and This gravity anomaly overlies pre-Tertiary basement south magnetic (Figure 6, red line) anomalies and constrained by of Cle Elum, and we postulate that the entire positive geologic mapping [Walsh et al., 1987; Dragovich et al.,

anomaly is caused by shallow basement rocks extending 2002] and three deep boreholes drilled for hydrocarbon from the YFTB into the Cascade Range. The correlation exploration [Reidel et al., 1989b]. Table 1 provides the rock between Umtanum Ridge magnetic lineaments and the magnetic and density properties used in the model. We have basement gravity high has several important implications: assumed in this model that magnetic anomalies are caused First, it further supports a connection between Quaternary primarily by highly magnetic CRBG, with both normal and defoination in the YFTB and Puget Lowland. Second, faults reversed polarities, whereas gravity anomalies are caused 25 of 33

B07105 BLAKELY ET AL.: FAULTS LINK CASCADIA FOREARC AND BACKARC B07105 Table 1. Physical Properties Used in Umtanum Ridge Gravity and 5.2. Connecting the Yakima Fold and Thrust Belt Magnetic Model' to Puget Lowland Structures Ap X MR [66] As described in the preceding sections, abundant Quaternary sediments -250 evidence exists for Quaternary deformation both east and 0 0 Quaternary volcanic rocks -200 0 1.06 R west of the Washington Cascade Range, and recent geologic Tertiary sedimentary rocks -200 0 0 mapping [e.g., Dragovichet al., 2009a, 2009b] has described Pomona Member, Saddle Mts. Basalt 0 6.28 2.5 R Quaternary faulting in parts of the Cascade Range itself.

Roza Member, Wanapum Basalt 0 6.28 2.5 R Exposed Tertiary plutons in the Cascade Range imply long-Frenchman Springs Member, 0 3.95-11.57 2.5 N Wanapum Basalt term uplift and compressional tectonism. Exhumed granitic Grande Ronde, N, 0 6.28 2.5 N plutons as young as 14 Ma [Mattinson, 1977] within the Grande Ronde, R2 0 6.28 4.0 R Cascade Range and the relatively high elevations and east-Grande Ronde, N, 50 6.28 2.5 N ward regional tilt of CRBG on the east side of the Range Grande Ronde, R, 100-120 6.28 2.5 R [e.g., Mitchell and Montgomneiy, 2006] testify to Miocene Sub-CRBG sedimentary rocks -100 0 0 Pre-Tertiary rocks 200 0 0 and younger uplift. (U-Th)/He ratios and fission track data fuirther indicate a pulse of rapid Cascade Range uplift (0.5-

'See Figure 20. Ap = density contrast relative to Bouguer reduction 1.5 km/m.y.) since 12 Ma, and high exhumation rates may 3

density (2670), kg/rn ; X= magnetic susceptibility in SI units, multiplied by 1000; MR = remanent magnetization, Aim (N norntal, R reversed). persist locally today [Reiners et al., 2002].

[67] A series of parallel structural and magnetic linea-ments imply the continuation of the YFTB through the mostly by topography on underlying pre-Tertiary basement Cascade Range (Figure 21). These structural/magnetic zones

[Saltus, 1993]. Remanent magnetization directions were include the White River-Naches River fault zone (Figure 21, assumed parallel or antiparallel to the field of a geocentric label WRF and NRF), the Mount Lindsay structural zone dipole. (Figure 21, label ML), and the Green River structural zone

[63] Our model honors deep borehole infonnation except (Figure 21, label GR).

in one location. Our model shows borehole Yakima 1-33 5.2.1. White River-Naches River Fault Zone penetrating well into pre-Tertiary rocks, even though pre- [68] The White River-Naches River fault zone, the Tertiary rocks were not encountered in this hole (Figure 20). southernmost of the structural zones, is perhaps the best We feel that the pronounced positive gravity anomaly in this example of a link between the YFTB and active Puget location demands a shallowing of the pre-Tertiary interface. Lowland faults. This fault zone consists of several en echelon The discrepancy between our model and borehole stratig- faults and folds that together extend entirely across the raphy probably reflects the fact that the borehole is 9 km Cascade Range, from Enumclaw to Naches, Washington.

distant from the profile in a region where gravity anomalies On the west side of the Cascade crest, the fault zone follows vary in the direction nonnal to the profile. the White River drainage (Figure 21, label WRF), where it

[64] Densities and magnetizations of CRBG units are separates Oligocene Ohanapecosh Formation to the north critical to outr model. In his three-dimensional inversion, from Miocene Fifes Peak Fonnation to the south [Taboret al.,

Saltus [1993] inferred densities from four borehole gravity 2000]. On the east side of the Cascade crest, it follows the studies, three at the Hanford site and one in the Rattlesnake Naches River drainage (Figure 21, label NRF) from the Hills [Robbins et al., 1979]. These measured densities range Cascade crest to the base of Cleman Mountain (Figure 21, from 1600 to 2900 kg/m 3, depending on the relative label CM), where it merges with the Umtanum Ridge fault amounts of competent basalt, fractured basalt, rubble, and zone [Tolan and Reidel, 1989]. From the Cascade crest volcaniclastic rocks. We follow Saltus [1993] and assume to Naches Pass, the White River-Naches River fault zone that deep CRBG units have higher densities than shallow separates Oligocene Ohanapecosh Fornation to the north CRBG units. Our densities are somewhat higher than those from Miocene Fifes Peak Formation. Farther east, the zone used by Saltus [1993] to reflect high density values observed juxtaposes Eocene-Oligocene Naches Formation to the north in a fifth borehole gravity study [MacQueen andMann,2007] against Ohanapecosh Formation and Miocene Grande Ronde not available to Saltus at the time. Basalt (CRBG) to the south [Schuster et al., 1997].

[65] Umtanum Ridge is modeled in Figure 20 as a trans- [69] Elements of the White River-Naches River fault zone pressive uplift bounded on its northeast and southwest sides produce distinct magnetic anomalies. Most anomalies lie near by opposing thrust faults. In this view, the thrust along the and parallel to mapped fault segments or fold axes within the northeast margin of Umtanum Ridge is the primary struc- zone (Figure 21 b). Taken together, the mapped faults, folds, ture. Note that faults are modeled in Figure 20 as penetrating and magnetic lineaments comprise a fault zone that extends at through the entire CRBG section and into underlying pre- least 100 km from Enumclaw to Naches. On the basis of Tertiary rocks. Admittedly, this latter interpretation is not magnetic anomalies, we argue that the White River-Naches well constrained by gravity and magnetic modeling; how- River fault zone merges with the Umtanum Ridge fault ever, gravity anomalies do require the presence of signifi- northeast of Cleman Mountain, as described by Tolan and cant topography on high-density basement rocks at this Reidel [1989]. The fault zone may be significantly longer location. As shown by the dashed profile in Figure 20, it is still, depending on how and if it traverses the Puget Lowland.

not possible to fit observed gravity anomalies with a geo- Weak gravity anomalies [Danes and Phillips, 1983] and logically reasonable cross section unless offsets of deeply magnetic lineaments in the eastern Puget Lowland may buried, high-density basement rocks are included. indicate the continuation of the White River-Naches River 26 of 33

B07105 BLAKELY ET AL.: FAULTS L[NK CASCADIA FOREARC AND BACKARC B07105 47.5*

47.0*

122.0" 121.5" 121.00 120.5' Figure 21 27 of 33

B07105 BLAKELY ET AL.: FAULTS LINK CASCADIA FOREARC AND BACKARC B07105 fault zone merging with the Tacoma fault in the western Puget mentary and volcanic rocks. If continued eastward, these Lowland (Figure 21, label TF). If so, the White River-Naches features would merge with structures in the Yakima fold and River fault zone extends from near the Olympic Mountains to thrust belt.

Umtanum Ridge, a distance greater than 185 kmi.

5.2.2. Mount Lindsay and Green River Structural 5.3. Earthquake Hazard Assessments Zones [73] Figure 22 summarizes the foregoing discussion link-

[7o] The northern limit of YFTB deformation in the ing major fault systems of northwestern Washington through Cascade Range is marked by a northwest striking lineament the Cascade Range to the YFTB. In the Puget Lowland, the that we informally call the Mount Lindsay structural zone Southern Whidbey Island, Tacoma, and Seattle faults pro-(Figure 21, label ML). Mount Lindsay itself is a syncline, duced multiple Mw > 6.5 earthquakes in Holocene time, and with Miocene Fifes Peak Formation in its core and Mio- the general distribution of crustal earthquakes during the past cene-Oligocene Eagle Gorge volcanic rocks and Oligocene few decades (Figures 2 and 22) suggests that Puget Lowland Ohanapecosh Fornmation on the limbs. A prominent mag- faults are active today.

netic anomaly follows the trend of the synclinal axis. The [74] A possible link between these active Puget Lowland northwest ends of the Mt. Lindsay syncline and its magnetic faults and the YFTB may warrant a reexamination of the anomaly swing northward toward the north striking western treatment of earthquake hazards in eastern Washington. Since Rattlesnake Mountain fault (Figure 2 1, label WRM) zone in 1996. USGS National Seismic Hazards Maps [Frankelet aL, the foothills of the Cascade Range [Dragovichet al., 2009a, 1996] have treated earthquake hazard assessments in 2009b]. (We add the adjective "western" in order to dis- western Washington differently from assessments in east-tinguish this Rattlesnake Mountain fault in the western ern Washington. First, from the Cascade Range eastward, Cascades from the better known Rattlesnake Mountain fault background seismicity zones have taken into account tec-in the YFTB.) Evidence for Quaternary faults in the Cascade tonic provinces with low historical seismicity but still Range is generally sparse, but the western Rattlesnake capable of producing large magnitude earthquakes. The Mountain fault zone is an exception, where Dragovich et al. background seismicity zone for eastern Washington is part

[2009a, 2009b] have mapped numerous north striking normal of a much larger zone that includes most of the Basin and faults. Volcanic rocks associated with the western Rattle- Range in the western United States and portions of stable snake Mountain fault zone produce a linear, high-amplitude North America (e.g., Idaho batholith, Okanogan Highlands, magnetic anomaly directly over western Rattlesnake Moun- Blue Mountains). Second, since 2002 [Frankelet al., 2002],

tain (Figure 21 b). Puget Sound hazard calculations have included an areal

[71] We suggest that the northwest striking Mount Lind- zone of hazard, in addition to well-documented faults (e.g.,

say fold (Figure 21, label ML) provides the mapped location the Seattle and Southern Whidbey Island faults), in an effort of a possible link between the Quaternary Umtanum Ridge to account for undiscovered crustal faults. Third, because so fault and the southern end of the western Rattlesnake little fieldwork has been conducted on faults in eastern Mountain fault zone (Figure 21, label WRM). The anomaly Washington since the mid-1990s, crustal' faulting para-over western Rattlesnake Mountain continues northward meters for the YFTB used in the 2008 National Seismic beyond the mapped extent of the fault zone, where it con- Hazard maps are essentially the same as those used in the nects with the southwestern end of the active Southern 1996 version [Petersen et al., 2008].

Whidbey Island fault (Figure 21, label SW). In this inter- [75] Our model suggests that the YFTB portion of eastern pretation, the Umtanum Ridge and Southern Whidbey Washington tectonically links to Puget Sound through the Island faults are segments of a throughgoing structure ex- Cascade Range. The linkage in our model is similar to the tending from eastern Washington to the Olympic Peninsula, block tectonic model of McCaffrey et al. [2007], where with a right step along the western Rattlesnake Mountain differences in measured crustal slip distribution between fault zone. In this view, the active Seattle fault is a westward eastern and northwestern Washington require similar link-splay from the main throughgoing structure (Figure 21), as age through the Cascades. Our trenching in Wenas Valley also suggested by Dragovichet al. [2009b]. We consider the on the Umtanum Ridge system has identified previously throughgoing structure to be the northwestern portion of the unknown late Quaternary/Holocene earthquakes and/or OWL. tectonic deformation episodes. Lidar data and aeromagnetic

[72] The Green River structural zone (Figure 21, label interpretations identified several other potential faults where GR) lies midway between the White River fault zone and future trenching is likely to confirm late Quaternary or the Mount Lindsay structural line. This zone consists of a Holocene faulting. Thus, the developing understanding of down to the south reverse fault that places Eocene Puget the YFTB, where major faults have both characteristic Group sedimentary and volcanic rocks against Oligocene aeromagnetic and lidar signatures, is remarkably similar to Ohanapecosh Formation. The fault follows the Green River results already found for faults in Puget Sound. Further, as eastward into the Cascade Mountains, where the fault par- noted above, the YFTB has significant crustal seismicity allels a syncline and an anticline mapped in Tertiary sedi- loosely related to mapped faults (Figure 22b), similar to Figure 21. Possible structures linking Quaternary faults of the Yankima fold and active faults of the Puget Lowland.

(a) Geologic map generalized from Schuster et al. [1997], Walsh et al. [1987], Stoffel et al. [1991], and Dragovich et al.

[2002]. Black dotted lines are magnetic lineaments from Figure 9. WRM, western Rattlesnake Mountain fault; MSB, Mount Stuart batholith; ML, Mount Lindsay structural zone; GR, Green River structural zone; WRF, White River fault; NRF, Naches River fault; CM, Cleman Mountain. See Figure 2 for other labels. (b) Aeromagnetic anomalies.

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B07105 BLAKELY ET AL.: FAULTS LINK CASCADIA FOREARC AND BACKARC B07105 the Puget Lowland where considerable crustal earthquake Additional trenching on YFTB structures should clarify the activity is only approximately correlated with the numerous late Quaternary/Holocene slip history and provide a basis for faults now mapped with confirmed Holocene displacement. constructing an areal source zone similar to Puget Sound.

(A4) 48° 47*

(B),

48' 470 Figure 22 29 of 33

B07105 BLAKELY ET AL,: FAULTS LINK CASCADIA FOREARC AND BACKARC B07105 (A) 1610.

Figure 23. Comparison of the Sakhalin fault and the trans-Cascadia structural zone. (a) Japan-Kuril sub-duction zone. Map has been rotated so that trench is north-south for comparison with the accompanying Cascadia map. Triangles are Quaternary volcanoes. Bold arrow indicates motion of the Pacific plate rel-ative to the Eurasian plate. Mapped location of Sakhalin fault from Fournieret al. [1994]. (b) Cascadia subduction zone. Note difference in scale between two maps.

[76] A second issue for earthquake hazard assessments is difficult to argue that one possibility for the swami is related the potential length implied for mapped faults crossing the to major tectonic elements as opposed to hydrologic effects Cascade Range. Fault length is a fundamental measure of [Wicks et al., 2009].

potential maximum magnitude on mapped crustal faults, and our model suggests that the Southern Whidbey Island fault 5.4. Analogs From Other Convergent Margins is part of a continuous system that includes the western [78] The model depicted in Figure 22 argues for a long-Rattlesnake Mountain and Umtanum Ridge faults (Figure 22). lived and currently active zone of faults linking the back arc This trans-Cascadia system forms a fault zone over 200 km in and forearc of the Cascadia convergent margin in Washington.

length. Although it seems unlikely that earthquakes rupture Similar structures are observed in other oblique subduction the entire length of this structural zone, it does raise the zones of the world, including the active Bio Bio and Gastre possibility that the maximum magnitude used for hazard fault zones across the southern Andes [Bohrn et al., 2002], the calculations for the Southern Whidbey Island fault, currently transition from the Hikurangi subduction zone to the Alpine set at 7.44, will need adjustment as additional fieldwork is Fault system across New Zealand [Furlongand Kamp, 2009; completed. Eberhard-Phillipsand Bannister, 2010], and the Sakhalin

[77] Our interpretation of the Wooded Island earthquake fault across the island of Hokaido [Fournieret al., 1994].

swarm illustrates one advantage of using high-quality aero- [79] Figure 23 illustrates similarities between the Sakhalin magnetic surveys as the basis for exploring tectonic models fault and the trans-Cascadia structure proposed here. Like and processes. Using aeromagnetic interpretations, we are Cascadia, the Japan-Kuril convergent margin is an oblique able to track the Yakima Ridge southeastward beneath sedi- subduction zone, with the Pacific plate subducting obliquely mentary cover toward the location of the earthquake swarm, beneath the Eurasia plate. Both the Sakhalin fault and the suggesting that the swarm may be related to reactivated faults trans-Cascadia structure strike oblique to their respective within the buried ridge. Without the ability to track the arcs, extend from back-arc regions to across the arc, and Yakima Ridge with aeromagnetic lineaments, it would be upon entering the forearc rotate into trench-normal, com-Figure 22. Interpretation of regional structures connecting Quaternary faults of the YFTB to active faults of the Puget Lowland. (a) Aeromagnetic anomalies. White dotted line indicates limit of high-resolution surveys discussed in this paper.

Black solid lines are Quaternary faults (http://earthquake.usgs.gov/hazards/qfaults). Black dashed lines are interpreted struc-tures. White dotted lines show limits of high-quality aeromagnetic data. Blue arrows indicate the Olympic-Wallowa line-ament (OWL). See Figure 2 for label definitions. (b) Isostatic residual gravity anomalies and upper plate earthquakes, sized according to magnitude. See Figure 2 for magnitude scale.

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B07105 BLAKELY ET AL.: FAULTS LINK CASCADIA FOREARC AND BACKARC B07105 pressional faults. Both structures have evolved since at least Blakely, R. J. (1995), Potential Theon, in Gravitv and Magnetic Applica-Miocene time and continue to be active today Fournieret al., tions. .441 pp., Cambridge Univ. Press, New York, doi: 10.1017/

CB09780511549816.

1994]. Blakely, R. J., R. E. Wells, and C. S. Weaver (1999), Puget Sound aero-

[so] Important differences between the Sakhalin and magnetic maps and data. U.S. Geol. Surv. Open File Rep., 1978, trans-Cascadia structures are also observed: the Sakhalin 99-514. (Available at http://geopubs.wr.usgs.gov/open-file/of99-514.)

fault is 2000 km long [Fournier el al., 1994], many times Blakely, R. J., R. E. Wells, C. S. Weaver, and S. Y. Johnson (2002), Location, structure, and seismicity ofthe Seattle fault zone, Washington: Evidence from longer than the trans-Cascadia structure. The Sakhalin fault aeromagnetic anomalies, geologic mapping, and seismi reflection data, is largely a dextral strike-slip fault [Fournieret al., 1994], Geol. Soc. Ain. Bull., 114, 169-177, doi:10.1 130/0016-7606(2002)114<

whereas geologic arguments [e.g., Reidel et al., 1989a] and 0169:LSASOT>2.0.CO;2.

Blakely, R. J., B. L. Sherrod, J. F. Hughes, M. L. Anderson, R. E. Wells, GPS measurements [e.g., McCaffrey et al., 2007] indicate and C. S. Weaver (2009), Saddle Mountain fault deformation zone, that the trans-Cascadia structure is dominated by horizontal Olympic Peninsula, Washington: Western boundary of the Seattle uplift, compression along most of its length and during most of its Geosphere, 5, 105-125, doi:10.1 130/GES00196.1.

Bohm, M., S. LULth,H. Echtler, G. Asch, K. Bataille, C. Bruhn, A. Rietbrock, evolution. P. Wigger (2002), The southern Andes between 360 and 40'S latitude:

Seismicity and average seismic velocities, Tectonophlysics, 356, 275-289,

6. Conclusions doi: 10. 1016/S0040-1951(02)00399-2.

Brother, T. M., T. Parsons, R. J. Blakely, N. 1. Christensen, M. A. Fisher,

[81] New aeromagnetie data from eastern Washington show R. E. Wells, and the SHIPS Working Group (2001), Upper crustal struc-ture in Puget Lowland, Washington: Results from 1998 Seismic Hazards the YFTB extending westward to beneath the Washington Investigation in Puget Sound, J. Geophvs. Res., 106, 13,541-13,564, Cascade Range. Paleoseismic investigations demonstrate doi: 10. 1029/2001JB000154.

that at least one of the YFTB faults was active in Quaternary Brocher, T. M., R. J. Blakely, and R. E. Wells (2004), Reinterpretation of time, and diverse earthquake activity suggests that the region the Seattle uplift, Washington, as a passive roof duplex, Bull. Seismnol.

Soc. Am., 94, 1379-1401, doi:10.1785/012003190.

remains seismically active. We suggest that the Umtanum Campbell, N. P. (.1989), Structural and stratigraphic interpretation of rocks Ridge anticline splays into two structural zones that cross the under the Yakima fold belt, Columbia Basin, based on recent surface Cascade Range. The southern zone, the White RiverNaches mapping and well data, in Voicanismn and Tectonismn in the Columbia River Flood-Basalt Province, edited by S. P. Reidel and P. R. Hooper, River structural zone, may continue to the active Tacoma Spec. Pap. Geol. Soc. Amn., 239, 209-222.

fault. The northern zone, the Mount Lindsay structural zone, Campbell, N. P., and R. D. Bentley (1981), Late Quaternary deformation of links with the western Rattlesnake Mountain fault in the the Toppenish Ridge uplift in south-central Washington, Geology, 9, 519-524, doi: 10.1130/0091-7613(1981)9<519: LQDOTT>2.0.CO;2.

western Cascade Range foothills, which in turn links with Catchings, R. D., and W. D. Mooney (1988), Crustal structure of the the Southern Whidbey Island fault. Together these faults Columbia Plateau: Evidence for continental rifting,J. Geophyvs. Rex.,

form a throughgoing structural zone extending from central 93, 459-474, doi:10.1029/JB093iB0Ip00459.

Washington to the Olympic Peninsula. In the western YFTB, Catchings, R. D., and R. W. Saltus (1994), Upper-crustal structure beneath the Columbia River Basalt Group, Washington: Gravity interpretation potential field data require dense basement rocks with greater controlled by borehole and seismic studies: Discussion and reply, Geol.

relief than exhibited by deformed CRBG, suggesting that Soc. Ant. Bull., 106. 1096-1105, doi:10.1130/0016-7606(1994) some faults in the YFTB penetrate pre' Tertiary basement. 106<1096:UCSBTC>2.3.CO;2.

[82] Thus, we suggest that faults and folds of the YFTB Cheney, E. S., and N. W. Hayman (.2009). The Chiwaukum structural low:

Cenozoic shortening of the central Cascade Range, Washington State, structurally connect with active faults in the Puget Sound. USA, Geol. Soc. Am. Bull., 121, 1135-1153, doi: 10.1 130/B26446.1.

Puget Sound faults are known to have produced M6.5 to 7.0 Danes, Z. F., and W. M. Phillips (1983), Complete Bouguer gravity anom-earthquakes in Holocene time. Generally speaking, long aly map, vol. 27, scale 1:250,000, Div. Geol. and Earth Res., Wash.

Dept. Nat. Res., Olympia.

faults are potentially more dangerous than short faults WVells DeMets, C., R. G. Gordon, D. F. Argus, and S. Stein (1994), Effect of recent and Coppersmith, 1994], and the throughgoing faults pro- revisions to the geomagnetic reversal time scale on estimates of current posed here would pose significantly increased seismic plate motions. Geophkvs. Res. Lett., 21, 2191-2194, doi:10.1029/

94GL02118.

hazards if they should prove to be active along their entire Dragovich, J. D., R. L. Logan, H. W. Schasse, T. J. Walsh. W. S. Lingley Jr.,

lengths. Additional geologic and geophysical studies are D. K. Norman, W. J. Gerstel, T. J. Lapen, J. E. Schuster, and K. D. Meyers needed, especially in the Cascade Range, to confirm and (2002). Geologic map of Washington-Northwest quadrant, Geol. Map quantify their level of seismic potential. GAM-50, 72 pp., Div. Geol. and Earth Res., Wash. Dept. Nat. Res., Olympia.

Dragovich, J. D., H. A. Littke, M. L. Anderson, R. Hartog, G. R. Wessel, S. A. DuFrane, T. J. Walsh, J. H. MacDonald Jr., J. F. Mangano, and R. Caker (2009a), Geologic map of the Snoqualmie 7.5-minute quadrangle,

[83] Acknowledgments. We thank Steve Reidel for providing King County, Washington, Geol. Map GAI-75, scale 1:24,000, Div. Geol.

borehole information and helpful comments. Discussions with Tom Sisson, and Earth Res., Wash. Dept. Nat. Res., Olympia.

Rowland Tabor, and Mike Sawlan helped clarify our thinking. Pat Hill, Eric Dragovich, J. D., et al. (2009b), Geologic map ofthe North Bend 7.5 minute Anderson, and Michelle Graham of the U.S. Geological Survey were instru- quadrangle, King County, Washington, with a discussion of major faults, mental in establishing contracts for the new aeromagnetic surveys. This folds, and basins in the map area, Geol. Map GM-73. scale 1:24,000, Div.

manuscript greatly benefited from early reviews by Jon Hagstrum and Rick Geol. and Earth Res., Wash. Dept. Nat. Res., Olympia.

Saltus and from journal reviews by two anonymous reviewers. Eberhard- Phillips, D., and S. Bannister (2010), 3-D imaging of Marlborough, New Zealand, subducted plate and strike-slip systems, Geophys. J. Int,,

182, 73-96, doi:10. 111 I/j.1365-246X.2010.04621.x.

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE COMMISSION In the Matter of Luminant Generation, Co., L.L.C. ) Docket Nos. 52-034-COL (Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, ) and 52-035-COL Units 3 and 4) ) ASLBP No. 11-914-02-COL-BDO1 ENERGY NORTHWEST ) Docket No. 50-397-LR (Columbia Generating Station) ) ASLBP No. 11-912-03-LR-BDO0 Southern Nuclear Operating Co. ) Docket Nos.52-025 & 52-026-COL (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, ) ASLBP Nos. 11-912-02-COL-BD01 Units 3 and 4) ) 11-913-01-COL-BD01 Duke Energy Carolinas, L.L.C. ) Docket Nos.52-018 and 52-019 (William States Lee III Nuclear Station, ) ASLBP No. 11-913-01-COL-BDO0 Units I and 2) )

PETITION FOR REVIEW OF LBP-11-27

1. INTRODUCTION Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.341(b), Petitioners hereby seek review by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC" or "Commission") of LBP-1 1-27 (Memorandum and Order (Denying Motions to Reopen Closed proceedings and Intervention Petition/Hearing Request as Premature) (Oct. 18, 2011).' In LBP-1 1-27, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board ("ASLB")

relied on the Commission's decision in Union Electric Co. d/b/a Ameren Missouri (Callaway Plant, Unit 2), et al., CLI- 11-05, __ NRC __ (Sept. 9, 2011) ("CLI- 11-05") to deny as premature I Petitioners are Lon Burman, Sustainable Energy and Economic Development ("SEED")

Coalition, Public Citizen, and True Cost of Nukes (Comanche Peak combined operating license "COL" proceeding); Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League ("BREDL"), (Vogtle COL proceeding); Center for a Sustainable Coast, Georgia Women's Action for New Directions f/k/a Atlanta Women's Action for New Directions, and Southern Alliance for Clean Energy ("SACE")

(Vogtle COL proceeding); Northwest Environmental Advocates (Columbia license renewal proceeding); and BREDL (William States Lee COL proceeding).

the admission of contentions which assert that the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA")

requires the NRC and license applicants to consider the environmental implications of the Fukushima Task Force Report 2 before it may issue combined operating licenses or renewed operating licenses in the above-captioned proceedings. The Commission should take review of LBP-1 1-27 because it is based on erroneous interpretations of both NEPA and CLI-1 1-05. In addition, even assuming for purposes of argument that the ASLB's legal interpretations were correct, the Commission has now provided the endorsement of the Fukushima Task Force Report that the ASLB requires as a condition for admission of the contentions, by broadly directing the NRC Staff to adopt certain Task Force recommendations within the next five years.

SRM/SECY- 11-0124, Memorandum from R.W. Borchardt, Executive Director for Operations to Annette L. Vietti-Cook, Secretary, re: Recommended Actions to be Taken Without Delay from the Near-Term Task Force Report, __ NRC _ (October 18, 201 1)("SRM/SECY-I 1-0124").'

Petitioners note that on October 28, 2011, in the Columbia, Comanche Peak, Vogtle, and W.S. Lee cases, they petitioned the ASLB to reinstate and supplement the bases for their contentions in light of SRM/SECY-11-0124. Therefore, Petitioners respectfully request the Commission to hold this petition for review in abeyance pending the issuance of a ruling by the ASLB on their petition to reinstate and supplement. See, e.g., PrivateFuel Storage, L.L. C.

(Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-01-1, 53 NRC 1, 3 (2001) (citing InternationalUranium Corp. (White Mesa Uranium Mill), CLI-97-9, 46 NRC 23, 24-25 (1997)).

2 Recommendationsfor EnhancingReactor Safety in the 21st Century: the Near-Term Task ForceReview of Insightsfrom the FukushimaDai-ichiAccident ("Task Force Report").

3 The SRM is posted on the NRC's website at http://www.nrc.giov/reading-rmi/doc-collections/con-mission/srni/2011/2011-0124s.rn.pdf 2

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In March 2011, a catastrophic accident began at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station, Units 1-6 in Okumu, Japan. The NRC Commissioners immediately appointed a high-level Task Force, composed of its most qualified and experienced technical staff, to study the regulatory implications of the accident for the United States. The Commission instructed the Task force to provide:

a systematic and methodical review of [NRC] processes and regulations to determine whether the agency should make additional improvements to its regulatory system and to make recommendations to the Commission for its policy direction, in light of the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant.

Charter for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Task Force to Conduct a Near-Term Evaluation of the Need for Agency Actions Following the Events in Japan (March 30, 2011).

On July 17, 2011, the Task Force issued its report, which contained a series of recommendations that "are intended to clarify and strengthen the regulatory framework for protection against natural disasters, mitigation, and emergency preparedness, and to improve the effectiveness of the NRC's programs." Task Force Report at viii. Underlying these recommendations was a conclusion with enormous environmental and safety significance: that the NRC needed to strengthen the level of protection that is minimally required for the protection of public health and safety. As stated in the Report:

In response to the Fukushima accident and the insights it brings to light, the Task Force is recommending actions, some general, some specific, that it believes would be a reasonable, well-formulated set of actions to increase the level of safety associatedwith adequateprotection of the public health andsafety.

Id. at 18 (emphasis added). In particular, the Task Force found that "the NRC's safety approach is incomplete without a strong program for dealing with the unexpected, including severe accidents." Id. at 20. Therefore the Task Force recommended that the NRC incorporate severe 3

accidents into the "design basis" and subject it to mandatory safety regulations. In order to upgrade the design basis, the Task Force also recommended that the NRC undertake new safety investigations and impose design changes, equipment upgrades, and improvements to emergency planning and operating procedures. See, e.g., Task Force Report at ix-x, 73-75.

Based on the Task Force Report, in the summer of 2011, Petitioners submitted contentions and motions to re-open the record in the above-captioned reactor licensing proceedings. The contentions challenge the failure of the environmental impact statements or environmental reports prepared in support of the licensing decisions to address the environmental implications of the Task Force Report, especially its conclusion that the requirements of the adequate protection standard needed to be upgraded.

On September 9, 2011, the Commission issued CLI- 11-05 in response to an Emergency Petition, to which some of the Petitioners had been party. The Emergency Petition, filed in April 2011, had asked the Commission to establish a procedure for addressing the safety environmental implications of the Fukushima accident in licensing proceedings; and to suspend all licensing decisions, as it had after the Three Mile Island accident in 1979, pending resolution of the safety and environmental issues raised by the Fukushima accident.

In CLI-I 1-05, the Commission refused to suspend any licensing decisions or to establish procedures for addressing Fukushima-related issues in licensing proceedings. Id. at 25. The Commission also concluded that "given the current state of information," the Fukushima accident had not raised any generic environmental issues that should be addressed in a generic NEPA review. Id. at 30-3 1. The Commission instructed that:

Reactor adjudications should go forward, including those that may involve proposed contentions based on issues implicated by the Fukushima events. To the extent that the Fukushima events provide the basis for contentions appropriate for litigation in individual proceedings, our procedural rules contain ample provisions through which litigants may 4

seek admission of new or amended contentions, seek stays of licensing board decisions, appeal adverse decisions, and file motions to reopen the record, as appropriate.

Id., slip op. at 35.

On October 18, 2011, the ASLB issued LBP- 11-27, rejecting as premature Petitioners' contentions. The ASLB interpreted CLI-1 1-05 to preclude admission of the Petitioners' contentions because "it remains much too early in the process of assessing the Fukushima event in the context of the operation of reactors in the United States to allow any informed conclusion regarding the possible safety or environmental implications of that event regarding such operation." Id. at 13. LBP-1 1-27 indicates, however, that the ASLB would consider the contentions to be admissible if and when the Commission adopts the Task Force recommendations:

It is difficult to fathom how the Commission could have stated more precisely and definitively that it remains much too early in the process of assessing the Fukushima event in the context of the operation of reactors in the United States to allow any informed conclusion regarding the possible safety or environmental implications of that event regarding such operation. Ofstill greaterimportance given [the Petitioners'7 entire reliance on the findings and recommendationsof the Task Force, the Commission stressedwith equalforce and clarity that, while under active study, none of those findings and recommendationshas been accepted. Thus, they scarcely have been given the effect that, according to [the Petitioners], gives rise to the environmental implications that undergird the contention that is sought to be admitted.

Id. (emphasis added).

111. ARGUMENT Under 10 C.F.R. § 2.341(b)(ii), a decision may be reviewed if a "necessary legal conclusion is without governing precedent or is a departure from or contrary to established law."

In addition, review may be granted where a "substantial and important question of law, policy, or discretion has been raised." 10 C.F.R. § 2.341(b)(iii). See also Nuclear Management Company LLC (Palisades Nuclear Plant), CLI-06-17, 63 NRC 727, 729 (2006). Both of these standards are 5

met here, because the ASLB's decision misinterprets CLI-1 1-05's holding and the standard for new and significant information in 10 C.F.R. § 51.92.

A. LBP-11-27 is Based on a Misinterpretation of CLI-11-05.

LBP-l 1-27 is based on a fundamental misperception of CLI- 11-05: that the Commission held in CLI- 11-05 that currently there is no basis for concluding that new and significant information has arisen in any licensing proceeding such that NEPA consideration is warranted.

In CLI- 11-05, however, the Commission ruled only that, to date, there is insufficient basis for a "generic" NEPA review. See, e.g., slip op. at 30 ("... any generic NEPA duty-if one were appropriate at all--does not accrue now"); 31 (". . . we decline petitioners' request to commence a generic NEPA review today"); 41 (For the reasons provided above, we: ... Deny petitioners' request for a separate generic NEPA analysis of the potential impacts of the Fukushima events")

(emphasis in original).

Nowhere in CLI- 11-05 does the Commission state that it has made a determination as to whether the Task Force Report raises new and significant information that should be considered in individual licensing proceedings. Indeed, the Commission states that the appropriate forum for considering the question is in individual licensing proceedings. For instance, at page 30 the Commission states that:

Although the Task Force completed its review and provided its recommendations to us, the agency continues to evaluate the accident and its implications for U.S. facilities and the full picture of what happened at Fukushima is still far from clear. In short, we do not know today the full implications of the Japan events for U.S. facilities.

If however, new and significant information comes to light that requires considerationas part of the ongoingpreparationof application-specificNEPA documents, the agency will assess the significance of that information, as appropriate. Our regulations specify the circumstances under which the Staff must prepare supplemental environmental review documents.

Id., slip op. at 30-31 (emphasis added). And at page 35, the Commission states:

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Reactor adjudications should go forward, including those that may involve proposed contentions based on issues implicated by the Fukushima events. To the extent that the Fukushima events provide the basis for contentions appropriate for litigation in individual proceedings, our procedural rules contain ample provisions through which litigants may seek admission of new or amended contentions, seek stays of licensing board decisions, appeal adverse decisions, and file motions to reopen the record, as appropriate.

Thus, the ASLB's reading of CLl-1 1-05 is too broad. CLI-1 1-05 does not contain any ruling with respect to the question of whether the Task Force Report contains new and significant information that must be considered in individual licensing proceedings. Not only is CLI- 11-05 devoid of any statement to that effect, but no indication is given that the Commission gave the issue the "hard look" required by NEPA. See, e.g., SUWA v. Norton, 301 F.3d 1217, 1238-39 (10th Cir. 2002).4 Instead, CLI- 11-05 contains only a determination that (a) the Commission does not yet have enough information to make broad generalizations about the environmental implications of the Fukushima accident in a generic proceeding and (b) the question is more appropriately addressed in individual licensing proceedings. Contrary to the ASLB's ruling in LBP- 11-27, the admissibility of Petitioners' contentions was not disposed of by CLI- 11-05.

B. LBP-11-27 is Based on a Misinterpretation of NEPA.

Petitioners also seek review of LBP-1 1-27 to the extent that it holds that information is not "new and significant" for purposes of NEPA consideration unless and until it is acted upon by the agency. See slip op. at 11 (expressing "considerable doubt" as to how the attribute of 4 To evaluate whether an agency took a "'hard look' at the new information to determine whether [supplemental NEPA analysis] is necessary, (id. (quoting HeadwatersInc. v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., Medford Dist., 914 F.2d 1174, 1177 (9th Cir. 1990)) (internal citations omitted)),

Courts consider "whether the agency 'obtains opinions from its own experts, obtains opinions from experts outside the agency, gives careful scientific scrutiny, [] responds to all legitimate concerns that are raised,' . . . or otherwise provides a reasoned explanation for the new circumstance's lack of significance." Id. (quoting Hughes River Watershed Conservancy v.

Johnson, 165 F.3d 283, 288 (4th Cir. 1999) (internal citations omitted)). See also Natural Resource Defense Counsel, Inc. v. F.A.A., 564 F.3d 549, 561 (2nd Cir. 2009).

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"new and significant" could be attributed to "a mere report that had neither received the endorsement of the Commission nor, more importantly, led to some concrete affirmative action being taken in light of its content.") Slip op. at 11. The Commission should take review of LBP-1 1-27 because such a reading of NEPA is "contrary to established law." 10 C.F.R. § 2.34 1(b)(ii). NEPA review is triggered by the release of "new and significant information," not by an agency's decision to consider and evaluate such information. 10 C.F.R. 51.92. Indeed, the purpose of NEPA is to force consideration and evaluation of relevant information that comes to the agency's attention. Marsh v. Oregon NaturalResources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 371 (1989)

("NEPA ensures that the agency will not act on incomplete information.. ."); see also Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350-51 (describing requirement to prepare an environmental impact statement as "action-forcing.")

The ASLB's circular reasoning in LBP- 11-27 would deprive NEPA of any action-forcing effect and therefore must be rejected. Instead, the Commission should require the ASLB to assess whether the Petitioners have raised a litigable claim, under an objective test of reasonableness, regarding the newness and significance of the Task Force Report. South Trenton Residents Against 29 v. FederalHighway Administration, 176 F.3d 658, 663 (3d Cir. 1999)

("[A]n agency's determination not to revise an Environmental Impact Statement must be reasonable under the circumstances when viewed in the light of the mandatory requirements and high standards set by NEPA.") (quoting Township of Lower Alloways Creek v. Public Serv. Elec.

& Gas Co., 687 F.2d 732, 742 (3d Cir. 1982) (internal quotations and citations omitted)).

Petitioners respectfully submit that the Task Force's recommendation to completely overhaul the NRC regulatory structure, including redefining what level of protection of public health and safety should be regarded as adequate, easily surpasses the objective "new and significant" test 8

because it "paints a "seriously different picture of the environmental impact" of the licensing and re-licensing of nuclear reactors than before the release of the Task Force Report. South Trenton, 176 F.3d at 663; see also Arkansas Wildlife Federationv. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 431 F.3d 1096, 1102 (8th Cir. 2005).

IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the petition should be granted and LBP- 11-27 should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted, Signed (electronically)by:

Nina Bell Northwest Environmental Advocates P.O. Box 12187 Portland, OR 97212-0187 503-295-0490 E-mail: nbellkadvocates-nwea.org Duly authorizedrepresentativeof Northwest EnvironmentalAdvocates in Columbia Generating Station license renewalproceeding Signed (electronically) by:

Robert F. Eye Kauffman & Eye 112 SW 6 th Ave., Suite 202 Topeka, KS 66603 785-234-4040 E-mail: bob(akauffmaneye.corn Counselfor Public Citizen and SEED Coalition in Comanche Peak COL proceedingand South Texas COL proceeding 5 Even assuming for purposes of argument that the Task Force Report constitutes new and significant information only if its recommendations are adopted by the Commission, that condition has been fulfilled by SRM/SECY-1 1-0124, which directed the NRC Staff to "strive to complete and implement the lessons learned from the Fukushima accident within five years - by 2016." Id. at L' While the SRM did not order the adoption of every single recommendation, it did endorse a significant number of them, including the sweeping Recommendation # 1 which would expand the scope of the adequate protection standard. Thus, the Commission has "accepted" the Task Force Report in significant respects. LBP-I 1-27, slip op. at 13.

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Signed (electronically)by:

Mindy Goldstein Turner Environmental Law Clinic 1301 Clifton Road Atlanta, GA 30322 404-727-3432 Fax: 404-7272-7853 Email: magolds(a)emorv.edu Counsel to Centerfor a Sustainable Coast, Georgia Women's Action for New Directions,and the Southern Alliance for Clean Energy in Vogtle Units 3 and 4 COL proceeding.

Louis A. Zeller Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League P.O. Box 88 Glendale Springs, NC 28629 336-982-2691 E-mail: BREDL(&skybest.com Duly authorized representativeof Blue Ridge EnvironmentalDefense League in William States Lee COL Proceeding 10