NOC-AE-02001309, Supplement to Proposed Change to Radiation Monitoring Technical Specifications

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Supplement to Proposed Change to Radiation Monitoring Technical Specifications
ML022240458
Person / Time
Site: South Texas  STP Nuclear Operating Company icon.png
Issue date: 07/29/2002
From: Jordan T
South Texas
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NOC-AE-02001309, STI:31437879
Download: ML022240458 (39)


Text

Nuclear Operating Company South Trs PrjectEk Gewnarbn StLton RO Box&289 Mdomrth. Trxs 77483 'A/.

July 29, 2002 NOC-AE-02001309 10CFR50.90 STI: 31437879 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852 South Texas Project Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. STN 50-498, STN 50-499 Supplement to Proposed Change to Radiation Monitoring Technical Specifications

Reference:

Letter from J. J. Sheppard, STPNOC to NRC Document Control Desk dated February 14,2002 (NOC-AE-01001168)

In the referenced letter, STP Nuclear Operating Company (STPNOC) submitted a proposed amendment to South Texas Project Operating Licenses NPF-76 and NPF-80. This license amendment request proposed revising various Technical Specifications governing radiation monitoring instrumentation to eliminate the associated shutdown action requirements and relax certain other restrictions.

In subsequent discussions with the NRC staff, STPNOC agreed to supplement the proposed change to address NRC comments. The changes described below are included in this supplement and are denoted by change bars in the attachments. For the convenience of the staff reviewers, the proposed amendment is resubmitted in its entirety.

1. The proposed change to allow 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> for two inoperable Control Room HVAC radiation monitors is revised to make the 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> allowed time an option and to require the immediate suspension of movement of irradiated fuel and crane operations with loads over the spent fuel pool if that optional action is entered. Additional justification for the change is provided in the Technical Analysis, including additional information on the reliability of the subject radiation monitors.
2. The word "immediately" has been inserted for ACTION 28.b., 28.c, and 28.d. where the suspension of movement of irradiated fuel and crane operations with loads over the spent fuel pool is required. (Appearance of page 3/4 3-28 changed because it now reflects the changes from recent Amendments 136/125.)
3. Action 28.b. includes a provision to permit core alterations, movement of irradiated fuel, and crane operation with loads over the spent fuel pool if the control room recirculation and makeup filtration is operating at 100% capacity.

NOC-AE-02001309 Page 2 the

4. Reference to the requirements of 10CFR50.36(c)(ii) has been added to supplement justification for deleting the Technical Specification for the Iodine detection channel in Table 3.3-6.

of

5. Additional justification has been added to the Technical Analysis for the relocation and to the particulate and noble gas detection channels of Table 3.3-6 to TS 3/4.6.1 clarify that those channels have no function other than reactor coolant pressure boundary leakage detection.

to 30

6. The proposed change to extend the time to make a special report from 14 days days has been deleted.

days.

7. The time requested for implementation has been changed from 60 days to 120 STPNOC STPNOC requests approval of the proposed amendment by January 31, 2003.

requests 120 days for implementation of the amendment after it is approved.

Board The STPNOC Plant Operations Review Committee and Nuclear Safety Review have reviewed and concurred with the proposed change to the Technical Specifications.

this In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91(b), STPNOC is notifying the State of Texas of request for license amendment by providing a copy of this letter and its attachments.

If there are any questions regarding the proposed amendment, please contact Mr. A. W. Harrison (361) 972-7298 or me at (361) 972-7902.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on J. o 2' 00Z date

  • Jordann Vice President Engineering & Technical Services awh!

Attachments:

1. Description of Changes and Safety Evaluation
2. Annotated Technical Specification Pages
3. Technical Specification Pages with Proposed Changes Incorporated

NOC-AE-01001309 Page 3 cc:

(paper copy) (electronic copy)

A. H. Gutterman, Esquire Ellis W. Merschoff Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP Regional Administrator, Region IV M. T. Hardt/W. C. Gunst U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission City Public Service 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400 Arlington, Texas 76011-8064 Mohan C. Thadani U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk One White Flint North R. L. Balcom 11555 Rockville Pike Reliant Energy, Inc.

Rockville, MD 20852 A. Ramirez Richard A. Ratliff City of Austin Bureau of Radiation Control Texas Department of Health C. A. Johnson/A. C. Bakken II 1100 West 49th Street AEP - Central Power and Light Company Austin, TX 78756-3189 Jon C. Wood Cornelius F. O'Keefe Matthews & Branscomb U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. O. Box 289, Mail Code: MNll6 Wadsworth, TX 77483 C. M. Canady City of Austin Electric Utility Department 721 Barton Springs Road Austin, TX 78704

ATTACHMENT 1 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES AND SAFETY EVALUATION

NOC-AE-01001309 Attachment 1 Page 2 1.0 Introduction The proposed amendment will revise various Technical Specifications to eliminate shutdown actions associated with radiation monitoring instrumentation. The proposed changes will enhance plant reliability by reducing its exposure to unnecessary shutdowns and increase operational flexibility. Inoperable radiation monitoring instrumentation has little or no direct effect on plant safety and generally there are effective compensatory actions that can be taken for inoperable radiation monitoring instrumentation.

The proposed changes to the STP Technical Specifications are based in part on the Westinghouse Standard Improved Technical Specifications (NUREG-1431). STP's plant-specific differences are described and justified below.

2.0 Description Each of the proposed changes to the Technical Specifications is described in Table 1.

3.0 Background

STPNOC believes that the overall reliability of the plant can be enhanced by the elimination of unnecessarily restrictive TS requirements for radiation monitors. An overview of the basis for each of the proposed changes is provided in Table 1.

4.0 Technical Analysis A technical review of each of the proposed changes described in Table 1 is provided below. The review identifies the affected instrumentation, describes its function, including relevant references to the STP UFSAR, and provides a technical justification for the proposed change.

STPNOC is not proposing the changes described in this application as risk-informed changes to be reviewed in conformance with the criteria of Regulatory Guides 1.174 and 1.177. Where risk information for initiating events is presented, it is clear that their likelihood is very small. The compensatory actions proposed are based largely on the requirements that have already been accepted in other industry applications based on NUREG-143 1. In addition, the radiation monitors affected by the proposed changes are not modeled in the STP PRA so there is no detailed risk quantification. STPNOC applied deterministic and risk insights to rank the affected radiation monitors as either non-risk significant or low safety-significant.

Corresponding Bases changes will be provided subsequent to NRC approval of the proposed changes.

NOC-AE-0101309 Attachment I Page 3 Control Room Intake Air Radioactivity (Table 3.3-3 ACTION 28 for Functional Unit 10.d) function. Descriptions The STP design includes two redundant channels for the subject 7.3.2 and 11.5.2.3.4 of the of these monitors (RE/RT-8033, 8034) are found in Sections STP UFSAR:

7.3.2 Control Room Envelope HVAC ESFAS the control The ESFAS for the Control Room Envelope HVAC System uses room/EAB ventilation radiation monitors to sense whether predetermined ESFAS has setpoints have been exceeded. If they are, or if the Westinghouse signals to the generated a safety injection signal, this ESFAS sends actuation ESFAS meets the appropriate control room envelope HVAC components. The requirements of GDC 13, 19, 20, 21 and 22.

HVAC 7.3.2.1 Description. The ESFAS for the Control Room Envelope System receives high radiation signals from the redundant control signal room/EAB ventilation radiation monitors and the safety injection receipt of from the Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) ESFAS. Upon the any of these signals, the control room makeup air is diverted through air, makeup filters and then, along with a portion of the recirculation Room through cleanup filters. For a complete description of the Control Section 9.4.1. Section Envelope HVAC System and its operation, refer to Section 6.4 provides an analysis of Control Room Envelope habitability.

11.5 provides a description of the radiation monitors.

Monitors:

11.5.2.3.4 Control Room Electrical Auxiliary Building Ventilation continuously assess The CR/EAB ventilation monitors are Class 1E monitors that the intake air to the CR for indication of abnormal airborne radioactivity electrical concentration. Each monitor assembly is powered from a separate ventilation operation power source. In the event of high radiation CR emergency CR.

is initiated (Section 7.3.2). Failure of a monitor is alarmed in the change the time required STPNOC proposes that the TS for these monitors be revised to in the recirculation to place the Control Room Makeup and Cleanup Filtration System less than the minimum and makeup mode from 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to 7 days should there be one proposed extension in required channels operable (i.e., 1 of 2 channels inoperable). This with the the time to place the system in recirculation and makeup is consistent there is still an requirements in NUREG-1431. This is technically acceptable since envelope on a high operable channel that will function to realign the control room However, in radiation signal unless the failure mode is due to the output power supply.

7 day allowed outage time that case, the operator can manually initiate the function. The

NOC-AE-0101309 Attachment I Page 4 (DBA) in the NUREG is based on the low probability of a Design Basis Accident train to provide the occurring during this time period, and ability of the remaining required capability.

the Control Room STPNOC also proposes an option to relax the time required to realign makeup mode from 1 Makeup and Cleanup Filtration System to the recirculation and channels operable hour to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> should there be two less than the minimum required is applied, the (i.e., 2 of 2 channels inoperable). If the option to apply the 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> of irradiated additional requirement to immediately suspend core alterations, movement is imposed. The fuel assemblies and crane operations with loads over the spent fuel pool and no fuel option would apply in any of the four following scenarios: 1) plant operating and fuel movement or crane operations over the spent fuel pool, 2) plant operating and fuel movement or movement or crane operations being performed, 3) plant shutdown movement or crane crane operations being performed, and 4) plant shutdown and no fuel no action other than operations being performed. (Although Scenario 4 would require and crane logging the inoperability, it will preclude core alterations, fuel movement provides movement with loads over the spent fuel pool). The additional restriction inside and outside assurance that potential radiation releases from design basis accidents permits fuel containment have been considered for this configuration. The option if the Control Room movement and crane operation with loads over the spent fuel pool (any two of the three makeup and cleanup filtration system is operating at 100% capacity for Action 28).

50% trains that comprise the system, as currently described in the Bases actuate For a DBA inside the containment in Modes 1 - 4, the SI signal will automatically emergency the Control Room HVAC to the emergency recirculation mode. In addition, Room HVAC in the procedures require the operator to manually place the Control (The operator action emergency recirculation mode should the automatic SI actuation fail.

redundant is unlikely to be required since the automatic SI actuation is a safety-related, protects signal). In Modes 5 and 6, the restriction of core alterations and fuel movement against the potential for a fuel handling accident.

by the The DBA outside the containment (Fuel Handling Accident) is precluded with loads over requirement to suspend movement of irradiated fuel and crane operations the spent fuel pool.

change to affect the Based on the discussion above, STP would not expect the proposed calculations for dose to the operators.

STP's current The proposed option to allow a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> action time is also consistent with to be TS 3.7.7 for Control Room HVAC, which allows all three trains of the HVAC applications that inoperable for 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. STPNOC provided that justification in the staff found resulted in the issuance of Amendments 125/113 (Reference 3). The NRC in the 12 those proposed changes acceptable based on the low probability of a LOCA and the hour allowed outage time (2.2E-05 for all LOCAs, including tube rupture)

NOC-AE-0101309 Attachment 1 Page 5 associated compensatory actions. The configuration approved by the NRC for Amendments 125/113 is a more limiting configuration than the configuration considered in this application since it involves a brief loss of the function. For the configuration discussed in this proposed change there is no loss of function; only the automatic fuel actuation by the radiation monitors is considered to be inoperable. The suspension of movement and crane operation is an effective compensatory action for the proposed change.

The Control Room HVAC radiation monitors (RE/RT-8033, 8034) are reliable and have a good performance history at STP. STPNOC identified 41 conditions (Condition Reports, Work Orders, etc.) documented since 1987 where a monitor was unable to perform its intended function. For the four monitors (two in each unit), that is an average of less than one inoperable condition per monitor per year.

Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation for Plant Operations (TS 3/4.3.3)

The specific features of this TS are discussed below. STPNOC proposes to delete this TS in its entirety as discussed below and in Table 1.

Containment Atmosphere Radioactivity - High (Table 3.3-6, Functional Unit 1.a)

This function is performed by RT-801 1, which is comprised of three detectors, RE- 8011A (particulate), RE-8011B (iodine), &RE-8011C (noble gas). The instruments are described in the STP UFSAR Section 11.5.2.3.2 and Table 11.5-1.

These instruments have no actuation function. Except for the iodine detector, RE 80111B, the instruments governed by this TS are the same instruments required by TS 3/4.4.6.1, and Functional Unit 1.b, discussed below. STPNOC proposes to delete the requirements of TS 3/4.3.3 and Table 3.3-6 that pertain to these instruments and address them in TS 3/4.4.6.1.

This will effectively eliminate the Technical Specification requirements for the iodine monitoring function, RE-801 lB. This action is acceptable because this instrument serves no actuation function (containment ventilation and exhaust isolation is actuated by a separate monitor), has no significant role in accident mitigation, and is not used for the determination of Emergency Action Levels.

STPNOC is not proposing to eliminate the instrument itself as part of this change.

NOC-AE-0101309 Attachment 1 Page 6 The proposed elimination is also consistent with the LCO requirements of 10CFR50.36(c)(ii):

A. Although the instrument can detect radiation from a failure of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, it is not credited for this function in any analysis or for any action.

B. It is not a process variable, design function, or operating restriction that is an initial condition for an accident analysis or transient condition.

C. It has no accident mitigation function.

D. It is not otherwise risk-significant RCS Leakage Detection (Table 3.3-6 Functional Unit Lb)

The detectors that perform this function are RE-8011A (particulate) and 801 IC (noble gas). As discussed in Table 1, STPNOC proposes to relocate the requirements for these instruments to TS 3/4.4.6.1.

Relocation of the requirements to TS 3/4.4.6.1 is a less restrictive change. The current TS requires both the particulate and the noble gas detector to be operable and imposes an action if either detector is inoperable. With the proposed relocation, an action would be required only if both detectors were inoperable.

The STP UFSAR description of the particulate and noble gas monitors credits them only for RCS leakage detection (UFSAR Sec. 5.2.5.2, 11.5.2.3.2).

Consequently, it is appropriate for only the TS governing RCS leakage detection to apply.

In addition, STPNOC proposes to delete the requirement to perform the monthly Digital Channel Operational Test (DCOT) surveillance on the radiation detection instrumentation associated with the RCS leakage detection system. Radiation monitors at STP are highly reliable digital processors with extensive self diagnosis capabilities. Historical records for these monitors indicate that the monthly DCOT surveillance has not identified any unknown existing failures.

Because of this, the monthly DCOT function can be extended to 18 months.

STPNOC proposes to delete the DCOT requirement since the 18 month calibration requirement encompasses the DCOT requirements.

Accident Monitoring Instrumentation (Table 3.3-10)

Containment High Range Radiation Monitor (Functional Unit 17)

The function of the Containment High Range Radiation Monitor (REIRT-8050, 8051) is to detect, monitor, indicate and alarm radiation level inside containment.

These monitors are listed in UFSAR Table 7B3-1 as RG 1.97 Category Al

NOC-AE-0101309 Attachment 1 Page 7 instruments. The instruments perform a post-accident monitoring function and have no actuation functions. The proposed required action is consistent with NUREG-1431 and reflects the low probability of an accident requiring the monitors and the ability to establish a temporary alternative.

Steam Line Radiation Monitors (Functional Unit 16)

The steam line radiation monitors (RE/RT-8046, 8047, 8048, and 8049) are listed in UFSAR Table 7B.3 - 1 as RG 1.97 Category Al instruments. The detectors detect, monitor, indicate and alarm radiation level for main steam lines. The steam generator blowdown radiation monitors described below are identified in UFSAR Table 11.5-2 as being functionally redundant to the steam line radiation monitors.

Steam Generator Blowdown Radiation Monitors (Functional Unit 22)

The steam generator blowdown radiation monitors (REIRT-8022, 8023, 8024, and 8025) are listed in UFSAR Table 7B.3 - 1 as RG 1.97 Category Al instruments.

The instruments detect, monitor, indicate and alarm radiation level for steam generator blowdown lines. The steam line monitors described above are identified in UFSAR Table 11.5-2 as being functionally redundant to the steam generator blowdown radiation monitors.

There is adequate redundancy of radiation monitoring functions on the secondary side of the plant. Requiring a shutdown for inoperable radiation monitoring instrumentation does not contribute to plant safety, and may have negative effect because of the transient cycle a shutdown causes. The proposed requirements are consistent with the requirements in NUREG-1431 for monitoring instrumentation for which an alternate means of monitoring is acceptable.

The required report for the subject inoperable instrumentation will outline the preplanned alternate method of monitoring, the cause of the inoperability, and the plans and schedule for restoring the instrumentation channels of the function to OPERABLE status.

NOC-AE-0101309 Attachment 1 Page 8 5.0 Regulatory Safety Analysis 5.1 No Significant Hazards Determination STPNOC has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on the three standards set forth in 10CFR50.92, "Issuance of amendment," as discussed below.

1) Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The radiation monitors affected by the proposed amendment are not potential accident initiators. Adequate measures are available to compensate for radiation monitors that are out of service. The proposed amendment does not affect how the affected radiation monitors function or their role in the response of an operator to an accident or transient. The core damage frequency in the STP PRA is not impacted by the proposed changes. Therefore, STPNOC concludes that there is no significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2) Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The radiation monitors affected by the proposed amendment are not credited for the prevention of any accident not evaluated in the safety analysis. The proposed amendment involves no changes in the way the plant is operated or controlled. It involves no change in the design configuration of the plant. No new operating environments are created. Therefore, STPNOC concludes the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3) Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No.

The proposed change has no significant effect on functions that are supported by the affected radiation monitors. There will be no significant effect on the availability and reliability of the affected radiation monitors. Adequate measures are available to compensate for radiation monitors that are out of service.

NOC-AE-0101309 Attachment 1 Page 9 Therefore, STPNOC concludes the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

Conclusion a

Based upon the analysis provided herein, the proposed amendments do not involve significant hazards consideration.

5.2 Applicable Regulatory Requirements/Criteria Control Room Envelope Isolation Actuation:

The control room envelope is assumed in the accident analyses to be actuated to the filtered makeup and recirculation mode in a DBA to maintain doses to the operators HVAC below the limits of GDC 19. The radiation monitor actuation of the control room 24, and is an ESFAS function and is subject to the requirements of GDC 2, 4, 20 through 10 CFR 50.55a(h)(2).

of The proposed changes to the Technical Specifications would not change the function with the the affected radiation monitors and there is no significant impact on compliance regulatory requirements.

RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation:

GDC 30 of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50 requires means for detecting and, to the extent 1.45 practical, identifying the location of the source of RCS leakage. Regulatory Guide describes acceptable methods for selecting leakage detection systems.

STPNOC's proposed changes to the RCS leakage detection radiation monitoring instrumentation do not affect how the monitors perform their function.

Accident Monitoring Instrumentation:

Required accident monitoring instrumentation ensures that there is sufficient information available on selected unit parameters to monitor and to assess unit status and behavior following an accident. These essential instruments are identified in the STP UFSAR where it addresses the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.97 as required by Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737.

of The instrument channels required to be OPERABLE by TS 3.3.3.6 include two classes as parameters identified during unit specific implementation of Regulatory Guide 1.97 Type A and Category I variables.

NOC-AE-0101309 Attachment 1 Page 10 Type A variables are included in this LCO because they provide the primary information required for the control room operator to take specific manually controlled actions for which no automatic control is provided, and that are required for safety systems to accomplish their safety functions for DBAs.

needed Category I variables are the key variables deemed risk significant because they are to:

Determine whether other systems important to safety are performing their intended functions; Provide information to the operators that will enable them to determine the likelihood of a gross breach of the barriers to radioactivity release; and Provide information regarding the release of radioactive materials to allow for early indication of the need to initiate action necessary to protect the public, and to estimate the magnitude of any impending threat.

of There is adequate redundancy of radiation monitoring functions on the secondary side steam the plant. In addition, STPNOC applied deterministic and risk insights to rank the steam line generator blowdown radiation monitors as non-risk-significant and the main radiation monitors as low safety significant. The proposed changes to the Technical Specifications would not change the function of the affected radiation monitors and there is no significant impact on compliance with the regulatory requirements.

6.0 Environmental Considerations for 10 CFR 51.22(b) specifies the criteria for categorical exclusion from the requirements a specific environmental assessment per 10 CFR 51.21. This amendment request meets the criteria specified in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). The specific criteria contained in this section are discussed below.

(i) the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration the As demonstrated in the No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, requested license amendment does not involve any significant hazards consideration.

(ii) there is no significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite The requested license amendment involves no change to the facility and does not involve any change in the manner of operation of any plant systems involving the generation, collection or processing of radioactive materials or other types of effluents. Therefore, no increase in the amounts of effluents or new types of effluents would be created.

NOC-AE-0101309 Attachment 1 Page 11 (iii) there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure The requested license amendment involves no change to the facility and will not increase the radiation dose resulting from the operation of any plant system. Furthermore, implementation of this proposed change will not involve work activities that could contribute to occupational radiation exposure. Therefore, there will be no increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure associated with this proposed change.

Based on the above it is concluded that there will be no impact on the environment resulting from this change. The change meets the criteria specified in 10 CFR 51.22 for a categorical exclusion from the requirements of 10 CFR 51.21 relative to specific environmental assessment by the Commission.

NOC-AE-0101309 Attachment 1 Page 12 7.0 References

1. NUREG-1431 "Standard Technical Specifications, Westinghouse Plants"
2. South Texas Project Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 8
3. Application for License Amendment dated September 28, 1998 as supplemented on April 22, 1999, April 27, 2000 and August 15, 2000 (NOC-AE-000305, NOC-AE 000513, NOC-AE-00000822, NOC-AE-00000902)

NOC-AE-01001309 Attachment 1 Page 13 Table 1 Reason for Chance Affected Section Description of Change Reaqnn fnr Ch2rige Pa e Te proposed change allows for additional operational flexibility in 3/4 3-28 Table 3.3-3, ACTION 28 applies to Control Room Intake Air Radioactivity situations where one or more channels of Control Room Ventilation ACTION High. With less than the minimum channels operable, the radiation monitoring are inoperable. The seven days proposed in STATEMENTS, ACTION currently requires initiation of the Control Room ACTION 28.a. is consistent with the provisions of NUREG-1431. The ACTION 28 for Makeup and Cleanup Filtration System in the recirculation and 12-hour AOT proposed in ACTION 28.b. is consistent with 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Functional Unit makeup filtration mode within I hour. The proposed change AOT that is currently allowed in TS 3.7.7 for conditions where all trains 10d would split ACTION 28 into ACTION 28.a. 28.b., 28.c., and 28.d. of control room ventilation are inoperable. ACTION 28.c. and 28.d. are ACTION 28.a. would apply when the number of operable new requirements that clarify the required action if the recirculation and channels is one less than the minimum channels operable filtration mode cannot be implemented.

requirement and would extend the time allowed to place the system into the recirculation and filtration mode to 7 days.

ACTION 28.b. would apply when the number of operable channels is two less than the minimum channels operable requirement and would provide an option for 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> to place the system in the recirculation and filtration mode if CORE ALTERATIONS, movement of irradiated fuel assemblies and crane operation with loads over the spent fuel pool are suspended.

ACTION 28.c. would provide a required action and time to shutdown to MODE 5 and to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies and crane operation with loads over the spent fuel pool if ACTION 28.a. or 28.b. were not met in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4.

ACTION 28 d. would provide a required action to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, crane operation with loads over the spent fuel pool, or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies if ACTION 28.a.

or 28.b. were not met in MODE 5 or 6. 4.

The proposed change eliminates an implied, if not explicit, shutdown 3/4 3-50, TS 314.3.3, TS 314.3.3 defines the requirements for radiation monitoring action for the Containment Atmosphere Radioactivity-High 3-51,3 Table 3.3-6 instrumentation for plant operations and applies to the instrumentation. There is no justification for TS action for this 52, 3-53 Table 4.3-3 Containment Atmosphere Radioactivity-High and RCS Leakage instrumentation since it has no actuation function and there are no Detection instrumentation. The current TS action for the operator actions credited in the safety analyses that depend on this Containment Radioactivity-High function allows continued function. Because of the elimination of an unnecessary shutdown operation for up to 30 days provided grab samples are obtained action, this is viewed as a reliability enhancement.

and analyzed. The required action after 30 days is not specified.

Table 4.3-3 specifies the surveillance requirements for the The elimination of the DCOT surveillance requirement is a reduction of instrumentation. STPNOC proposes to delete TS 3/4.3.3, Table unnecessary burden and is justified by operational experience. This 3.3-6, and Table 4.3-3. The Containment Atmosphere change is less restrictive than NUREG-1431, which requires a quarterly Radioactivity-High instrumentation would be deleted from the TS, surveillance.

and the requirements for the RCS Leakage Detection instrumentation would be relocated to TS 3/4.4.6.1, as discussed below. In addition, the monthly DCOT for the gaseous and particulate monitoring systems would be eliminated. IJ

NOC-AE-010013091 Attachment Page 14 Description of Change Reason for Change Page Affected Section TS 3/4.3.3, TS 3/4.3.3 defines the requirements for radiation monitoring Relocation of the requirements to TS 3/4.4.6.1 is a less restrictive change.

3/4 3-50, Table 3.3-6 instrumentation for plant operations and applies to the RCS The current TS requires both the particulate and the noble gas detector to 3-51, 52, Table 4.3-3 Leakage Detection instrumentation. The current TS for the RCS be operable and imposes an action if either detector is inoperable. The 53 TS 3/4.4.6.1 Leakage Detection instrumentation invokes the ACTION proposed change is more convenient for the operators using the Technical 3/4 4-19 requirements for"TS 3.4.6.1, RCS Leakage Detection Systems. Specifications.

Table 4.3-3 specifies the surveillance requirements for the instrumentation. As mentioned above, STPNOC proposes to delete TS 3/4.3.3, Table 3.3-6, and Table 4.3-3 and relocate the RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation requirements to TS 3/4.4.6.1.

plant reliability by removing an 3/4 3-69 Table 3.3-10 The current TS include shutdown actions for Containment-High The proposed changes enhance unnecessary shutdown action. The proposed changes are consistent with 3/4 3-71 Range Radiation Monitor (ACTION 39a. and 39b). STPNOC proposes to change ACTION 39a. (one less than the total the requirements of NUREG-1431.

number of channels requirements for the Containment- High Range instrument) to have a required action of a report to the Commission if the channel cannot be restored in 30 days.

ACTION 39b. (number of channels less than the minimum channels operable requirement) would be changed to require a report to the Commission if at least one inoperable channel cannot be restored to operable status within 7 days.

Table 3.3-10 The current TS include shutdown actions for Steam Line The elimination of the shutdown actions associated with these radiation 3/4 3-69 Radiation Monitors and Steam Generator Blowdown Radiation monitoring instruments is considered to increase plant reliability. There is 3/4 3-71 functions on the secondary Monitors (ACTION 40). STPNOC proposes to revise ACTION adequate redundancy of radiation monitoring radiation would side of the plant. Requiring a shutdown for inoperable 40 to include ACTION 40a. and 40b. ACTION 40a. plant safety, and may operable channels is less than the monitoring instrumentation does not contribute to apply when the number for it causes. The proposed have negative effect because of the transient cycle minimum channels operable requirement and when a diverse for report to the requirements are consistent with the requirements in NUREG-1431 channel is functional. The action would require a means of monitoring is monitoring instrumentation for which an alternate Commission if at least one inoperable channel could not be restored in 30 days. ACTION 40b. would apply when the acceptable.

number of operable channels is less than the minimum channels operable requirement and the diverse channel is not functional.

In this case, the action would be to restore at least one inoperable channel to operable status within 7 days or prepare a I report to the Commission.

NOC-AE-01001309 Attachment 2 Page 1 ATTACHMENT 2 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES

NOC-AE-01001309 Attachment 2 Page 2 INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS PAGE SECTION 3/4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3/42-1 3/4.2.1 AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE FIGURE 3.2.1 AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE LIMITS AS A FUNCTION OF Deleted RATED THERMAL POWER 3/4 2-5 3/4.2.2 HEAT FLUX HOT CHANNEL FACTOR - FQ(Z)

HEIGHT.. Deleted FIGURE 3.2-2 K(Z) - NORMALIZED FQ (Z) AS A FUNCTION OF CORE 3/4 2-9 3/4.2.3 NUCLEAR ENTHALPY RISE HOT CHANNEL FACTOR 3/4 2-10 314.2.4 QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO 3/4 2-11 314.2.5 DNB PARAMETERS 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4 3-1 3/4.3.1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION 3/4 3-2 TABLE 3.3-1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION 3/43-9 TABLE 3.3-2 (This table number not used)

TABLE 4.3-1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE 3/4 3-11 REQUIREMENTS 3/4.3.2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM 3/43-16 INSTRUMENTATION TABLE 3.3-3 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM 3/4 3-18 INSTRUMENTATION TABLE 3.3-4 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM 3/4 3-29 INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS 3/4 3-37 TABLE 3.3-5 (This table number not used)

TABLE 4.3-2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM 3/4 3-42 INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3/4.3.3 M ..-- I ,.,-.

.-,. t,; .: .+r 161"1 3/4 3-50 f9t- 1 ,o N Etto D..Q.S 3/43-51 3/4 3-54 Movable Incore Detectors SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 v Unit 1 - Amendment No. -5 Unit 2- Amendment No. MON_

NOC-AE-01001309 Attachment 2 Page 3 I

0

[NO CHANGES ON THIS PAGE.

INCLUDED FOR COMPLETENESS.

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION MINIMUM CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE TOTAL NO. OPERABLE MODES OF CHANNELS TO TRIP ACTION FUNCTIONAL UNIT

10. Control Room Ventilation
a. Manual Initiation 3 (1/train) 2 (1/train) 3 (1/train) All 27 See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection initiating functions and requirements. 27
b. Safety Injection All
c. Automatic Actuation Logic 3 2 3 toJ and Actuation Relays 28 2 All
d. Control Room Intake Air 2 1 Radioactivity - High
e. Loss of Power See Item 8. above for all Loss of Power initiating functions and requirements.
11. FHB HVAC 3 (1/train) 2 (1/train) 3 (1/train) 1, 2, 3, 4 or with 29, 30
a. Manual Initiation irradiated fuel in tA, spent pool 1, 2, 3, 4 or with 29, 30
b. Automatic Actuation Logic 3 2 3 irradiated fuel in and Actuation Relays spent pool
c. Safety Injection See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection initiating functions and requirements.

1 2 With irradiated 30

d. Spent Fuel Pool Exhaust 2 fuel in spent Radioactivity - High fuel pool

NOC-AE-01001309 Attachment 2 "

Page 4 TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

ACTION STATEMENTS (Continued)

ACTION 24 With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or declare the associated valve inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specification 3.7.1.5.

ACTION 25 With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1 provided the other channel is OPERABLE.

ACTION 26 With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, declare the affected Auxiliary Feedwater Pump inoperable and take ACTION required by Specification 3.7.1.2.

ACTION 27 For an inoperable channel, declare its associated ventilation train inoperable and apply the actions of Specification 3.7.7.

ACTION 28 - Ma With the number of OPERABLE channels W- q less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, withinqy4 initiate and maintain operation of the Control Room Makeup and Cleanup Filtration System (at 100% capacity) in the recirculation and makeup filtration mode.

b-;ihthe'f-umberotq OERAB LEc chanel two lshAn~h MTniCiie pPERABLE-requirepa nd Fithiatuionitiatea an lm opactio herircla miakeupffItraton mode*FR operatnsOzr the

,,and .061W]and at n CREALTEIAIOStmatierpenif*COR, E*TEAI Nasi praino h dniti Conitrol Room.Makeup-eand',lau .4tfi'a'l.

capacty)nmthe rercuaiiona'd I fuel pore are permltted~durlng operationrfo the control Roon: makeup an_,InupI moeen cf,**ralin * ,-gt ilaIith reqire N

'b ue ,po Iraited fuel assemnbhesmany a~9p-era~ti*nS SOentp jith 5 *iALTmRA*ON,+*vme aso~r7me ACTION 29 For an inoperable channel, declare its associated ventilation train inoperable and apply the actions of Specification 3.7.8.

ACTION 30 - With irradiated fuel in the spent fuel pool: With the number of OPERABLE channels less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, fuel movement within the spent fuel pool or crane operation with loads over the spent fuel pool may proceed provided the FHB exhaust air filtration system is in operation and discharging through at least one train of HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers.

SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 3-28 Unit 1 Amendment No. 436 Unit 2 Amendment No. 425

NOC-AE-01001309 Attachment 2 Page 5 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.3 M*O....................NNOTUSE ADIATION MONITORING FOR PLANT OPERATIONS CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.3.1 The ra a*tion monitoring instrumentation channels for plant operations shown in Table 3.3-6 shall be OP ELE with their Alarm/Trip Setpoints within the specified limits.

APPLICABILITY: As s wn in Table 3.3-6.

ACTION:

a. With a radiation monitorin hannel Alarm/Trip Setpoint for plant operations exceeding the value shown in ble 3.3-6, adjust the Setpoint to within the limit within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or declare the cha 1inoperable.
b. With one or more radiation monitoring annels for plant operations inoperable, take the ACTION shown in Table 3.3-6.
c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not app le.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.3.3.1 Each radiation monitoring instrumentation channel for plant operati s shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CL CALIBRATION and DIGITAL CHAN~NEL OPERATIONAL TEST for the MOD nd at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-3.

SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 3-50 Unit 1 Amendment No.

Unit 2 Amendment No.

NOC-AE-01001309 Attachment 2 Page 6 TABLE 3.3-6 NUSED RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION FOR PLANT OPERATIONS S*CHANLS MINIMUM TO TRIP/ CHANNELS APPLICABLE ALARM/TRIP FUNCTIONALUNI M OPERABL MODES SETPOINT ACTION t 1. Containment

a. Containment Atmosphere N.A 3 All N.A. 31 Radioactivity - High
b. RCS Leakage Detection
1. Particulate N.A. 134 Radioactivity
2. Gaseous N.A. 1 1,2,3,4 N.A. 34 Radioactivity zz' 0 0i 00t

NOC-AE-010013092 Attachment Page 7 PAGEINTENTIA**IA NKO_____

TABLE 3.3-6 (Continued)

ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 31 - ith less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, op tion may continue for up to 30 days provided grab samples of the c ainment atmosphere are obtained and analyzed at least once p4 hours. Grab samples are not required to be obtained for the ation of containment pressurization for an Integrated Leak Rateu st (ILRT) provided that a grab sample is obtained and analyzed at start of depressurization of containment following the ACTION 32 - (Not Used)

ACTION 33 - (Not Used)

ACTION 34 - Must satisfy the ACTION requirement for Specification 3..

Unit 1 - Amendment No.2F SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS I & 2 3/4 3-52 Unit 2 - Amendment No.

C14 00 txo E

I0 C?

SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/43-53 Unit 1 Amendment No.

Unit 2 Amendment No.

NOC-AE-01001309 Attachment 2 Page 9 TABLE 3.3-10 NO CHANGES ON THIS PAGE.

INCLUDED FOR COMPLETENESS. ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION MINIMUM CHANNELS TOTAL NO. OPERABLE OF CHANNELS ACTION 36 INSTRUMENT 2 1

13. Containment Water Level (Narrow Range) 1 3 37
14. Containment Water Level (Wide Range) ** 1 42
15. Core Exit Thermocouples
    • 2 1/steam line 1/steam line 40 I
16. Steam Line Radiation Monitor 1 39 2
17. Containment - High Range Radiation Monitor 1* 41 2*
18. Reactor Vessel Water Level (RVWL) 1 36 2
19. Neutron Flux (Extended Range) 1 36 2
20. Containment Hydrogen Concentration 1 36 2
21. Containment Pressure (Extended Range) I/blowdown line 40 1/blowdown line
22. Steam Generator Blowdown Radiation Monitor 1 36 2
23. Neutron Flux - Startup Rate (Extended Range) sensors, one or more in the upper section
  • A channel is eight sensors in a probe. A channel is OPERABLE if four or more section and three or more in the lower section, are OPERABLE.

are OPERABLE, and at least one quadrant

    • A channel is OPERABLE if at least two core exit thermocouples per core quadrant has at least four OPERABLE thermocouples 3/4 3-69 Unit I - Amendment No. 77 SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 66

NOC-AE-01001309 Attachment 2 Page 10 TABLE 3.3-10 (Continued)

ACTION STATEMENTS (Continued)

ACTION 39 - a. With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels requirements, restore one inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within ,0 days, or Tt. su~binut a days,16r or HTnT O ~~i~ O

b. With the number of OPERABLE channels less than the Minimum Channels Operable reauirements, restore at least one inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within aenort*i. e acrnd a ad

_enal_ _i tytano PERA e i n

b. With the number of OPERABLE channels less than the Minimum Channels Operable requirements,- -a-f t*h f - .-,T-,*,,e- restore at least one inoperable channel ACTION 40 -

to OPERABLE status wit** l0 , or N E T, accordace wit Spe io 6 ithinhnet ternate thi T e1rf ftn ee 11he for r t_

a. With thenumber ofOPERABLE channels less than the Minim C nelsperable equirements tnoOPERABLE an-d wmih Ot.aýdiv~rse channelto A channe a

ýBLEstatiiswlthi.dSaStitA 1rep66-1 .ore hI~iopraetcnano d -the ,soprasbiiyandthepan n

b. With theSpecfictio6..2 number of OPERABLE fotlloingoneh less fithn30dy Channels vnthan ulning thectin4taenthe the MRqinimNum C r fhnnes e of caus*

ACTION 41 - b.within 48dous the noprablit an theomemp if repairs shut are feasible without e plans andshdlforetintesyemoOPRBEtats S2within 30 days following the event outlining the action taken, the cause t of inoperabilityand theplans and schedule for restoring the system to OPERABLE status; andpý naindýi an~

3. Retorethe 2.ttnPono repare schedued syste toOPR Report to the Commission pursuant and submit a SpecialLEsauthenx toSpcfato6.2 refeling 3.ERAEinTbe.-1,eterestore systeme the to OPERABLE hane~sstatusathenx ipealiyadtepasadscheduledfr erefueling.emtoOERBL sats 3/4 3-71 Unit I - Amendment No. P-7 SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 66

NOC-AE-01001309 Attachment 2 Page 11 TABLE 3.3-10 (Continued)

ACTION STATEMENTS (Continued)

ACTION 42 - a. With one required channel inoperable, restore the required channel to OPERABLE status within 30 days; otherwise, a report shall be prepared and submitted in accordance with Specification 6.9.2 within the next 14 days. The report shall outline the preplanned alternate method of monitoring, the cause of the inoperability, and the plans and schedule for restoring the instrumentation channels to OPERABLE status.

b. With two required channels inoperable, restore one required channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days; otherwise, be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and in HOT SHUTDOWN in the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

ACTION 43 - a. With the number of OPERABLE channels two less than the Total Number of Channels requirements, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 31 days, or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

b. With the number of OPERABLE channels three less than the Total Number of Channels requirement, restore at least one inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
c. With the number of OPERABLE channels less than the Minimum Channels Operable requirement, restore at least one inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />

[No changed requirements- simply rolled ACTION 42 to the next page]

SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 3-72 Unit 1 - Amendment No. q Unit 2 - Amendment No.

NOC-AE-01001309 Attachment 2 Page 12 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4.6 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE LEAKAGE DETECTION SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.6.1 The following Reactor Coolant System Leakage Detection Instrumentation shall be OPERABLE:

a. One Containment Atmosphere Radioactivity Monitor (gaseous or particulate), and
b. The Containment Normal Sump Level and Flow Monitoring System.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2,3, and 4.

ACTION:

a. With the required containment atmosphere radioactivity monitor inoperable perform the following actions or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hour3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />s:
1) Restore one containment atmosphere monitoring system to OPERABLE status within 30 days and,
2) Obtain and analyze a grab sample of the containment atmosphere for gaseous and particulate radioactivity at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, or
3) Perform a Reactor Coolant System water inventory balance at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
b. With the required containment normal sump level and flow monitoring system inoperable perform the following actions or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hour3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />s:
1) Restore the containment normal sump and flow monitoring system to OPERABLE status within 30 days and,
2) Perform a Reactor Coolant System water inventory balance at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

C. With both a. and b. inoperable, enter 3.0.3.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.4.6.1 The Leakage Detection Systems shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

a. 7frac fH1t 21)*Z HN'*~'CELCAIII4U Ntes p ner pe~lmoth
b. Containment Normal Sump Level and Flow Monitoring System performance of CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 18 months.

SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 4-19 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 96 Unit 2 - Amendment No 7-3

NOC-AE-01001309 Attachment 3 ATTACHMENT 3 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGE WITH PROPOSED CHANGES INCORPORATED

INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PAGE 3/4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3/4.2.1 AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE 3/42-1 FIGURE 3.2.1 AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE LIMITS AS A FUNCTION OF RATED THERMAL POWER Deleted 3/4.2.2 HEAT FLUX HOT CHANNEL FACTOR - FQ(Z) 3/4 2-5 FIGURE 3.2-2 K(Z) - NORMALIZED FQ (Z) AS A FUNCTION OF CORE HEIGHT.. Deleted 3/4.2.3 NUCLEAR ENTHALPY RISE HOT CHANNEL FACTOR 314 2-9 3/4.2.4 QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO 3/4 2-10 314.2.5 DNB PARAMETERS 3/42-11 314.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION 3/4 3-1 TABLE 3.3-1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION 3/43-2 TABLE 3.3-2 (This table number not used) 3/43-9 TABLE 4.3-1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3/4 3-11 3/4.3.2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION 3/43-16 TABLE 3.3-3 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION 3/4 3-18 TABLE 3.3-4 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS 3/4 3-29 TABLE 3.3-5 (This table number not used) 3/4 3-37 TABLE 4.3-2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3/4 3-42 3/4.3.3 Not Used 3 3 3/4 3-50 TABLE 3.3-6 Table Not Used 3/4 3-51 TABLE 4.3-3 Table Not Used 3/4 3-53 Movable Incore Detectors 3/4 3-54 SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 v Unit 1 - Amendment No.

Unit 2 - Amendment No.

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

ACTION STATEMENTS (Continued)

ACTION 24 With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or declare the associated valve inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specification 3.7.1.5.

ACTION 25 With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1 provided the other channel is OPERABLE.

ACTION 26 With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, declare the affected Auxiliary Feedwater Pump inoperable and take ACTION required by Specification 3.7.1.2.

ACTION 27 For an inoperable channel, declare its associated ventilation train inoperable and apply the actions of Specification 3.7.7.

ACTION 28 - a. With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, within 7 days initiate and maintain operation of the Control Room Makeup and Cleanup Filtration System (at 100% capacity) in the recirculation and makeup filtration mode.

b. With the number of OPERABLE channels two less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> initiate and maintain operation of the Control Room Makeup and Cleanup Filtration System (at 100% capacity) in the recirculation and makeup filtration mode, OR immediately suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, movement of irradiated fuel assemblies and crane operations with loads over the spent fuel pool, AND within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> initiate and maintain operation of the Control Room Makeup and Cleanup Filtration System (at 100%

capacity) in the recirculation and makeup filtration mode. CORE ALTERATIONS, movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, and crane operations with loads over the spent fuel pool are permitted during operation of the Control Room Makeup and Cleanup Filtration System (at 100% capacity) in the recirculation and makeup filtration mode.

c. With required ACTION 28a. or 28b. not met in MODE 1,2, 3, or 4, immediately suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies and crane operations with loads over the spent fuel pool, AND be in MODE 3 in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in MODE 5 in the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
d. With required ACTION 28a. or 28b. not met in MODE 5 or 6, immediately suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, and crane operations with loads over the spent fuel pool.

ACTION 29 For an inoperable channel, declare its associated ventilation train inoperable and apply the actions of Specification 3.7.8.

ACTION 30 - With irradiated fuel in the spent fuel pool: With the number of OPERABLE channels less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, fuel movement within the spent fuel pool or crane operation with loads over the spent fuel pool may proceed provided the FHB exhaust air filtration system is in operation and discharging through at least one train of HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers.

SOUTH TEXAAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 3-28 Unit 1 - Amendment No.

Unit 2 - Amendment No.

INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.3 (Not Used)

SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 3-50 Unit 1 Amendment No.

Unit 2 Amendment No.

3/4 3-51 Unit 1 - Amendment No.

SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 Unit 2 - Amendment No.

PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 3-52 Unit 1 - Amendment No.

Unit 2 - Amendment No.

0 z

A S SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 3-53 Unit 1 Amendment No.

Unit 2 Amendment No.

TABLE 3.3-10 (Continued)

ACTION STATEMENTS (Continued)

ACTION 39 - a. With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels requirements, restore one inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 30 days, or submit a report in accordance with Specification 6.9.2 within the next 14 days outlining the preplanned alternate method of monitoring, the cause of the inoperability, and the plans and schedule for restoring the inoperable instrumentation channels to OPERABLE status.

b. With the number of OPERABLE channels less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirements, restore at least one inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or submit a report in accordance with Specification 6.9.2 within the next 14 days outlining the preplanned alternate method of monitoring, the cause of the inoperability, and the plans and schedule for restoring the inoperable instrumentation channels to OPERABLE status.

ACTION 40 - a. With the number of OPERABLE channels less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirements and with a functional diverse Channel, restore at least one inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 30 days, or submit a report in accordance with Specification 6.9.2 within the next 14 days outlining the preplanned alternate method of monitoring, the cause of the inoperability, and the plans and schedule for restoring the inoperable instrumentation channels to OPERABLE status.

b. With the number of Channels less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, and with the diverse channel not functional, restore at least one inoperable Channel to operable status within 7 days or submit a report in accordance with Specification 6.9.2 within the next 14 days outlining the preplanned alternate method of monitoring, the cause of the inoperability, and the plans and schedule for restoring the inoperable instrumentation channels to OPERABLE status.

ACTION 41 - a. With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Required Number of Channels, either restore the system to OPERABLE status within 7 days if repairs are feasible without shutting down or prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days following the event outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to OPERABLE status.

b. With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE in Table 3.3-10, either restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> if repairs are feasible without shutting down or:
1. Initiate an alternate method of monitoring the reactor vessel inventory;
2. Prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days following the event outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to OPERABLE status; and
3. Restore the system to OPERABLE status at the next scheduled refueling.

SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 3-71 Unit I - Amendment No.

Unit 2 - Amendment No.

TABLE 3.3-10 (Continued)

ACTION STATEMENTS (Continubd)

ACTION 42 - a. With one required channel inoperable, restore the required channel to OPERABLE status within 30 days; otherwise, a report shall be prepared and submitted in accordance with Specification 6.9.2 within the next 14 days. The report shall outline the preplanned alternate method of monitoring, the cause of the inoperability, and the plans and schedule for restoring the instrumentation channels to OPERABLE status.

b. With two required channels inoperable, restore one required channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days; otherwise, be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and in HOT SHUTDOWN in the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

ACTION 43 - a. With the number of OPERABLE channels two less than the Total Number of Channels requirements, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 31 days, or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

b. With the number of OPERABLE channels three less than the Total Number of Channels requirement, restore at least one inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
c. With the number of OPERABLE channels less than the Minimum Channels Operable requirement, restore at least one inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 3-72 Unit 1 - Amendment No.

Unit 2 - Amendment No.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4.6 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE LEAKAGE DETECTION SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.6.1 The following Reactor Coolant System Leakage Detection Instrumentation shall be OPERABLE:

a. One Containment Atmosphere Radioactivity Monitor (gaseous or particulate), and
b. The Containment Normal Sump Level and Flow Monitoring System.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

actions

a. With the required containment atmosphere radioactivity monitor inoperable perform the following within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following or be in at least HOT STANDBY 30 hour3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />s:
1) Restore one containment atmosphere monitoring system to OPERABLE status within 30 days and,
2) Obtain and analyze a grab sample of the containment atmosphere for gaseous and particulate radioactivity at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, or
3) Perform a Reactor Coolant System water inventory balance at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

perform the

b. With the required containment normal sump level and flow monitoring system inoperable following actions or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hour3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />s:
1) Restore the containment normal sump and flow monitoring system to OPERABLE status within 30 days and,
2) Perform a Reactor Coolant System water inventory balance at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
c. With both a. and b. inoperable, enter 3.0.3.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.4.6.1 The Leakage Detection Systems shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

a. Containment Atmosphere Gaseous and Particulate Monitoring Systems performance of the following:
1) CHANNEL CHECK at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, and
2) CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 18 months
b. Containment Normal Sump Level and Flow Monitoring System performance of CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 18 months.

SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 4-19 Unit 1 - Amendment No.

Unit 2 - Amendment No.