NL-16-1830, Southern Nuclear Operating Company Response to RAI for License Amendment Regarding Emergency Action Level Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant, Part 1B of 1C
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{{#Wiki_filter:ATTACHMENT Southern Nuclear Operating Company Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2; Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2; Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 1 and 2; License Amendment Request for Changes to Emergency Action Level Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant Responses to Requests for Additional Information NL-16-1830
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SNC Responses to NRG RAls Pertaining to LAR for EALs based on NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 Page 1 Applicable Sites: HNP, FNP, and VEGP Section 2.4, "Consideration of Mode Changes During Classification," does not address the guidance provided in Section 5.4 of NEI 99-01, Revision 6, which states (in part): Once a different mode is reached, any new event or condition, not related to the original event or condition, requiring emergency classification should be evaluated against the /Cs and EALs applicable to the operating mode at the time of the new event or condition. The above statement is important to ensure the appropriate and consistent classification of events based on changing operating modes. Please provide justification as to why this key guidance from NEI 99-01, Revision 6, was omitted, or revise the application accordingly. SNC Response Section 2.4 has been revised to include the omitted guidance. Applicable Sites: HNP, FNP, and VEGP Section 2.7, "Classification of Short-Lived Events," does not contain the guidance provided in Section 5.7 of NEI 99-01, Revision 6, which states (in part): If an event occurs that meets or exceeds an EAL, the associated EGL [emergency classification level} must be declared regardless of its continued presence at the time of declaration. The above statement is important to ensure the appropriate and consistent classification of events. Please provide justification as to why this key guidance from NEI 99-01, Revision 6, was omitted, or revise the application accordingly. SNC Response Section 2.7 has been revised to include the omitted guidance. Section 4.3, "Instrumentation Used for EALs," to NEI 99-01, Revision 6, states, in part, Scheme developers should ensure that specific values used as EAL setpoints are within the calibrated range of the referenced instrumentation, and consider any automatic instrumentation functions that may impact accurate EAL assessment. In addition, EAL setpoint values should not use terms such as "off-scale low" or "off-scale high" since that type of reading may not be readily differentiated from an instrument failure. a. Applicable sites: HNP, FNP, and VEGP NL-16-1830
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SNC Responses to NRG RAls Pertaining to LAR for EALs based on NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 Page2 Please confirm that all setpoints and indications used in the proposed EAL scheme are within the calibrated range(s) of the stated instrumentation and that the resolution of the instrumentation is appropriate for the setpoint/indication. SNC Response SNC uses an administrative process identified in NMP-EP-312, Development of Emergency Preparedness Technical Products, to validate that the setpoints and indications used in the proposed EAL scheme are within the calibrated ranges. This process also verifies that the indicated values can be read on the identified instruments. SNC Form 312-F03, Initiation Condition/Emergency Action Level Validation and Verification Worksheet, documents this validation process. b. Applicable site: VEGP For EAL RU2 [AU2], please provide justification that supports the utilization of LSHL-0625 "off scale low," as this reading may not be readily differentiated from an instrument failure, or revise the application accordingly. SNC Response SNC provides the following response. LSHL-0625 is a switch that actuates annunciator ALB05 E021 once the SFP level reaches the low level alarm setpoint value. The EAL threshold has been revised to reflect actuation of the annunciator (SFP low level Alarm) instead of "off scale low." c. Applicable site: HNP For RG1 [AG1], RS1 [AS1], and RA1 [AA1], the instrument numbers are different than what is in the existing EAL scheme (ADAMS Accession No. ML 15138A229 (non-public)); Revision 37, April 2015). For example, the existing EAL scheme references monitor 1 D11-P005 and 1 D11-P006, while the proposed EAL scheme references monitors 1 D11-P601 and 1 D11-P007. The existing monitors, 1 D11-P005 and 1 D11-P006, are specifically referenced on pages 30 and 31 of the proposed Enclosure 3, "Hatch EAL Calculations." Please clarify which instruments should be used to assess RG 1, RS 1, and RA 1, or revise the application accordingly. This clarification should, at a minimum, enable the NRG staff to verify which instruments will be used to assess RG1 [AG1], RS1 [AS1], and RA1 [AA1], and link those monitors to the provided calculations in Enclosure
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SNC Responses to NRC RAls Pertaining to LAR for EALs based on NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 Page 3 SNC Response SNC provides the following response. 1 (2)D11-P005 and 1 (2)D11-P006 are panels that display values determined by the detectors listed in the calculation. These panels are located in the Turbine Building and are not readily accessible for evaluation by the decision makers. Readings from the P005 and P006 turbine building panels are transmitted to control room instruments (P601 and P007), which are identified in the proposed EALs for RG1, RS1 and RA 1. The P601 and P007 control room instruments are used by the decision makers to assess radiation levels and determine the emergency classification.
- d. Applicable sites: VEGP and FNP
- For RG2 [AG2] and RS2 [AS2], Enclosure 4, "Vogtle EAL Verification and Validation Documents" (Version 4, page 3 of 3), provides the bottom of span for spent fuel pool (SFP) level indication as 194 feet and 1 /8 inch. The proposed threshold value for RG2 and RS2 is 194 feet.
- For RG2 [AG2] and RS2 [AS2], Enclosure 4, "Farley EAL Verification and Validation Documents" (Version 4, page 3 of 3), provides the bottom of span for spent fuel pool {SFP) level indication as 130 feet and 1 Y2 inches. The proposed threshold value for RG2 and RS2 is 130 feet. Although the above threshold values are close to the minimum indication value, the provided . instrumentation does not appear capable of providing a reading corresponding to the threshold value for EALs RG2 and RS2. As such, it does not appear that a decision maker could accurately perform an assessment of EALs RG2 and RS2. To enable decision makers to make an accurate assessment of RG2 and RS2, please provide a threshold value for RG2 and RS2 that is within the calibrated range of the provided SFP level instrumentation, or provide additional justification as to why the currently proposed threshold values are adequate.
SNC Response SNC has made the following revisions to the proposed EALs for VEGP: RG2 and RS2 have been revised to incorporate a value of 195 feet. This value is above the SFP Level 3 value of 194 feet and Ye inches identified in the Verification and Validation Documents. 195 feet has been chosen as an alternative value within the calibrated range of the instrument. This level is indicative of a significant loss of SFP inventory and can be used by the decision makers to accurately perform an assessment of the EAL threshold. SNC has made the following revision to the proposed EALs for FNP: RG2 and RS2 have been revised to incorporate a value of 131 feet. This value is above the SFP Level 3 value of 130 feet and 1 Y2 inches identified in the Verification and Validation Documents. 131 feet has been chosen as an alternative value within the calibrated range of the instrument. This level is indicative of a significant loss of SFP inventory and can be used by the decision makers to accurately perform an assessment of the EAL threshold. NL-16-1830
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SNC Responses to NRG RAls Pertaining to LAR for EALs based on NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 Page 4 e. Applicable site: HNP The developer notes for Loss and/or Potential Loss 5.A (boiling-water reactor (BWR) containment barrier threshold for Other Indications) of NEI 99-01, Revision 6, state: Developers should determine if other reliable indicators exist to evaluate the status of this fission product barrier (e.g., review accident analyses described in the site Final Safety Analysis Report, as updated). The goal is to identify any unique or site-specific indications that will promote timely and accurate assessment of barrier status. Any added thresholds should represent approximately the same relative threat to the barrier as the other thresholds in this column. Basis information for the other thresholds may be used to gauge the relative barrier threat level The Fission Product Barrier Table, proposed Fuel Clad Barrier Loss 5A, uses Offgas Pre-and Post-Treatment Monitors "Off-Scale High" as a threshold value. The submittal indicates the detector has a maximum reading of 1 x 10 6 with a calculated value of 4.82 x 10 8 {equivalent to 300 µCi/gram (gm)). Please provide additional information on how the Offgas Pre-and Post-Treatment Monitors can be used to provide a timely and accurate assessment of the fuel clad barrier, or revise the application accordingly. {Note: This explanation should provide clarification that the proposed Fuel Clad Loss 5.A would represent approximately the same relative threat as the 300 µCi/gram threshold.) SNC Response SNC provides the following response. HNP personnel determined that since the monitors would be reading off-scale high use of this threshold as a site-specific indicator for Fuel Clad Loss 5.A is not appropriate. This threshold has been deleted. Applicable Sites: VEGP For RG1 [AG1], RS1 [AS1], and RA1 [AA1], the RG1 threshold value was changed for radiation monitor RE-12839E from the current EAL scheme (ADAMS Accession No. ML 15138A227 public)), page D-31) of 50 µCi/cubic centimeter (cc) to a proposed 2.1 x 10 3 µCi/cc, and the threshold value for RE-124440 was changed from 2.1 x 10 3 µCi/cc to an RE-12444E instrument value of 50 µCi/cc. The RS1 instrument threshold values were changed in a similar fashion. It appears that the values were transposed. Please verify that proposed threshold values and instrumentation for EALs RG1, RS1, and RA 1 are correct, or revise the application accordingly. NL-16-1830
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SNC Responses to NRC RAls Pertaining to LAR for EALs based on NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 Page 5 SNC Response VEGP personnel have verified that the radiation monitors identified in the proposed NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 EAL scheme are correct and not transposed. As a result of a previous NRC finding for SNC plants related to the current NEI 99-01 Rev. 4 EAL scheme, SNC performed new calculations for radiation monitor related EALs, including RE-12839E and RE-12444E. Applicable Sites: VEGP For RA2 [AA2]-EAL 2, no setpoint or alarm is provided that is consistent with the NEI 99-01, Revision 6, EAL guidance for a "site-specific listing of radiation monitors, and the associated readings, setpoints, and/or alarms." Please clarify how a timely and accurate assessment can be performed without the associated readings, setpoints and/or alarms, or revise the application accordingly. SNC Response SNC provides the following response. RA2 has been revised to indicate that a HIGH Alarm on the identified radiation monitors meets the EAL threshold. Use of the term HIGH Alarm is consistent with Annunciator Response Procedure 17102-1 (2) and would enable timely and accurate assessment by the decision maker(s). Applicable Sites: VEGP For RU 1 [AU 1 ]-EAL 1, the provided table includes the steam jet air ejector (SJAE) radiation monitor (RE-12839) with thresholds of 2 times the release permit setpoint. The guidance in NEI 99-01, Revision 6, states that effluent monitor reading should be based on limits provided in a "site-specific release controlling document." However, based on an email string starting on Attachment C3, "Calculations for Farley, Hatch, Vogtle 2," page 25 (ADAMS Accession No. ML 16071A144 (non-public)), it appears there is normally no release permit (or site-specific release controlling document) tor RE-12839. Please explain how a decision maker can determine that the turbine building vent, SJAE (RE-12839) is 2 times the release permit setpoint (or the offsite dose calculation manual (ODCM) limit), when there is no release permit for RE-12839. SNC Response A review of the calculation determined that for continuous releases without a primary-secondary leak, a release permit is not required. In this case, the alarm setpoint is 7.84E-04 µCi/cc. Two times this value would be 1.57E-03 µCi/cc. This value was rounded to 1.6E-03 µCi/cc and included in the EAL threshold for RE-12839C. A release permit is required whenever a secondary leak exists. A threshold of 2 times the release setpoint has been included for RE-12839C for conditions when a primary-secondary leak exists. NL-16-1830
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SNC Responses to NRC RAls Pertaining to LAR for EALs based on NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 Page 6 Applicable Sites: HNP and VEGP For RU1 [AU1]-EAL 1, NEl99-01, Revision 6, assessment criteria is based on one of the listed radiation monitors being greater than 2 times the ODCM limits. However, in addition to providing a list of site-specific monitors, the developer notes in NEI 99-01, Revision 6, state: Radiation monitor readings should reflect values that correspond to a radiological release exceeding 2 times a release control limit. Please explain how an assessment of this EAL can be performed in a timely and accurate manner without including instrument values that represent 2 times the ODCM limits, or revise accordingly. SNC Response SNC provides the following response for HNP. HNP personnel calibrate and determine setpoint values for the identified radiation monitors based on the ODCM values. Therefore, the alarm setpoints are based on the ODCM value. The calibration and determination of the setpoint values is required to be performed every week due to the efficiency of the detectors; therefore, the setpoint values are not static. The revised setpoint values are provided to Operations personnel and maintained in the Radmonitor Setpoints binder. Once an alarm is received, the Shift Manager (decision maker) refers to the binder and performs a simple calculation (multiply by 2) to determine if the EAL threshold of 2 times the ODCM limit has been exceeded. This assessment can be performed in a timely manner. SNC provides the following response for VEGP. VEGP personnel calibrate and determine setpoint values for the identified radiation monitors based on the ODCM values. Therefore, the alarm setpoints are based on the ODCM value. The calibration and determination of the setpoint values is performed periodically (periods vary based on the instrument) due to the efficiency of the detectors; therefore, the setpoint values may not be static. The alarm setpoints are updated as needed and included with other monitor details displayed on the radiation monitoring display system. If an alarm is received during the release, the Shift Manager (decision maker) identifies the setpoint for the specified radiation monitor on the display system and performs a simple calculation (multiply by 2) to determine if the EAL threshold of 2 times the ODCM limit has been exceeded. This assessment can be performed in a timely manner NL-16-1830
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SNC Responses to NRC RAls Pertaining to LAR for EALs based on NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 Page 7 Applicable Site: VEGP For EALs CG1 and CS1, the currently approved VEGP EAL scheme (ADAMS Accession No. ML071010426 (non-public)) includes RE-0011 as an indication of core uncovery. Please justify why this instrument was not included as a method to determine core uncovery for the proposed CG1 and CS1 EALs, or revise the application accordingly. SNC Response As a result of a previous NRC finding for SNC plants related to the current NEI 99-01 Rev. 4 EAL scheme, SNC performed new calculations for radiation monitor related EALs, including those used for CG1 and CS1. Although the calculation references RE-0011 as an indication of core uncovery the calculated value (3 mR/hr) is significantly lower than the value for RE-005/006 (40 REM/hr). During Mode 5 and 6, other activities are conducted in the Seal Table Room. These activities would affect the radiation levels, such that the monitor would have a reading greater than the calculated threshold value. Because the RE-0011 value is significantly lower (by orders of magnitude) than the RE-005 and RE-006 values, SNC personnel determined that it was not a reliable/reasonable indication of core uncovery. Due to the shielding in the Seal Table Room, the instruments identified in the proposed EAL scheme, RE-0005 and RE-006, provide the most reliable indication of core uncovery. Applicable Site: HNP NEI 99-01, Revision 6, developers notes associated with CS1 -EAL 3, and CG1 -EAL 2, for "Core uncovery is indicated by ANY of the following," state: As water level in the reactor vessel lowers, the dose rate above the core will increase. Enter a "site-specific radiation monitor" that could be used to detect core uncovery and the associated "site-specific value" indicative of core uncovery. For EALs CG1 and CS1, the currently approved Hatch EAL scheme (ADAMS Accession No. ML071010426) lists drywell radiation monitors DWRRM 1 (2)D11-K621 A/B as indications of core uncovery. Please justify why no radiation monitor, or alternate EAL threshold, was provided for the proposed CG1 or CS1, or revise the application accordingly. NL-16-1830
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SNC Responses to NRC RAls Pertaining to LAR for EALs based on NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 Page 8 SNC Response SNC calculation SMNH-13-021 determined that DWRRM 1 (2)D11-K621 A/B would not be valid for determining core uncovery because the readings were less than the minimum range of the instruments. This calculation also determined that other area radiation monitor readings would be higher than the maximum range of the instruments. Based on these considerations, SNC has decided to use 95% of the full scale range as a threshold for area radiation monitors that could be used to detect core uncovery. CG1 and CS1 have been revised accordingly. RAI 10 Applicable Site: FNP In NEI 99-01, Revision 6, CG1 -EAL 1 and CS1 -EAL 2 includes the condition, "Reactor vessel/RCS [reactor coolant system] [PWR] [pressurized-water reactor] or RPV [reactor pressure vessel] [BWR] level less.than (site-specific level)." The developer notes further state: The "site-specific level" should be approximately the top of active fuel. If the availability of scale level indication is such that this level value can be determined during some shutdown modes or conditions, but not others, then specify the mode-dependent and/or configuration states during which the level indication is applicable. If the design and operation of water level instrumentation is such that this level value cannot be determined at any time during Cold Shutdown or Refueling modes, then do not include EAL #2 (classification will be accomplished in accordance with EAL #3). The current EALs for FNP include reactor vessel level indication for "approximately the top of active fuel"; however, the proposed EAL scheme does not provide an indication for the top of active fuel. Although FNP may not have an exact top of active fuel indication, it is acceptable to use an indication that is "approximately the top of active fuel. Please provide justification as to why FNP does not use Reactor Vessel Level Indication System (RVLIS) on any other level instrument to assess CG1 -EAL 1 and CS1 -EAL 2, or revise the application accordingly. SNC Response SNC provides the following response. The FNP EAL threshold has been revised for CG1 -EAL 1 and CS1 -EAL 2 to include use of RVLIS during Cold Shutdown (Mode 5) or an installed temporary level indicator during refueling (Mode 6) conditions. RVLIS is only valid if all reactor vessel head closure bolts are fully tensioned. In Mode 6 a temporary level indicator is installed. A reading of 119' on this indicator equates to the top of active fuel. NL-16-1830
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SNC Responses to NRC RAls Pertaining to LAR for EALs based on NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 Page 9 RAI 11 Applicable Sites: HNP and VEGP In NEI 99-01, Revision 6, the Containment Challenge Table for CG1 includes the condition, "UNPLANNED increase in containment pressure." However, the proposed CG1 Containment Challenge Table C1 and related basis notes contain values for maximum containment pressures based on containment closure/integrity status, which are not consistent with the endorsed guidance. Please revise the Containment Challenge Table for CG1 to reflect an, "UNPLANNED increase in containment pressure," or provide justification for this difference. SNC Response SNC provides the following response for HNP. Table C1, Containment Challenge Table, was revised to reflect an UNPLANNED increase in Primary Containment pressure, deleting the maximum containment pressure value. SNC provides the following response for VEGP. Table C1, Containment Challenge Table, was revised to reflect an UNPLANNED increase in Containment pressure, deleting the containment pressure values. RAI 12 Applicable Sites: HNP, FNP, and VEGP For CA2, the proposed EAL is for the loss of all alternating current (AC) power sources to essential power buses. NEI 99-01 guidance uses the following wording as part of these EALs: "Loss of ALL offsite and ALL onsite AC power to (site-specific emergency buses) .... " The proposed CA2 contains Table S-1, which provides a list of offsite and onsite AC power sources. This table is referenced in the basis and is not included as part of the EAL threshold. Additionally, the threshold value for CA2 is, "ALL offsite and ALL onsite AC power sources." As such, CA2 is not limited to those sources identified in Table S1. Alternative power sources, such as those used for a mitigation strategy, may be able to power the essential buses. Emergency Preparedness Frequently Asked Question (EPFAQ) 2015-015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML 16166A 191) provides clarification relative to CA2. Please explain whether the clarification provided in EPFAQ 2015-015 was used in the development of CA2, or revise the application accordingly. NL-16-1830
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SNC Responses to NRC RAls Pertaining to LAR for EALs based on NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 Page 10 SNC Response SNC provides the following response. SNC personnel reviewed the clarification provided in EPFAQ 2015-015 and determined that it is not applicable to FNP, HNP, or VEGP because these alternative power sources are not permanently installed and are only used to supply power to specific loads (e.g., DC Inverters) and are not capable of supplying the full load of the essential buses. The proposed EAL CA2 has been revised to include Table S1. RAI 13 Section 4.6, "Basis Document," of NEI 99-01, Revision 6, states, in part: A Basis section should not contain information that could modify the meaning or intent of the associated IC or EAL. Such information should be incorporated within the IC or EAL statements, or as an EAL Note. Information in the Basis should only clarify and inform making tor an emergency classification.
- a. Applicable site: HNP For proposed CA6, a wind speed of 35 miles per hour (mph) is included in the basis discussion and not in the EAL threshold value. As provided, the basis section appears to modify the meaning or intent of EAL CA6. Please revise CA6 to include a wind speed of 35 mph, or provide justification for this difference from the guidance in NEI 99-01, Revision 6. SNC Response SNC provides the following response.
The applicable EAL threshold for CA6 and SA9 has been revised to define High winds as being > 35 mph sustained.
- b. Applicable Sites: HNP, FNP, and VEGP Basis discussions for the proposed SA 1 and CU2 include references to Table S1 and the proposed SU1 references Table S2. These references could modify the meaning or intent of EALs SA 1 and SU2 since the EAL threshold values do not include references to tables S1 or S2, as appropriate.
Please revise EALs SA 1, SU1, and CU2 to include reference to Table S1 or Table S2, as appropriate, or provide justification for this difference from the guidance of NEI 99-01, Rev. 6. SNC Response EALs SA 1, SU1, and CU2 have been revised to include reference to Table S1 or Table S2 as appropriate. NL-16-1830
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SNC Responses to NRC RAls Pertaining to LAR for EALs based on NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 Page 11 c. Applicable site: HNP The proposed Fission Product Barrier Table, Proposed Fuel Clad Barrier Loss SA, includes the statement that, "Sample results are still needed to establish that the 300 µCi/gm threshold is being exceeded." This reference appears to modify the proposed Fission Product Barrier Table for the Fuel Clad Barrier Loss SA. Please revise the proposed Fission Product Barrier Table for the Fuel Clad Barrier Loss SA to include the need for sampling, or provide justification for this difference from the guidance of NEI 99-01, Revision 6. SNC Response This statement was included in the basis section for the Fuel Clad Barrier Loss SA. The EAL threshold for Fuel Clad Barrier Loss SA "Offgas Pre-and Post-Treatment Monitors Offscale High" has been deleted (see RAI 3.e response). The intent of the sampling was to confirm the Offscale High reading to determine if the 300 µCi/gm threshold is being exceeded. This requirement is subsumed by the EAL threshold for Fuel Clad Barrier Loss 1 A. Therefore, the EAL basis has been revised to delete Fuel Clad Barrier Loss SA. RAI 14 Applicable Sites: HNP, FNP, and VEGP The proposed radiation values for a loss of the fuel clad barrier and RCS barrier, and a potential loss of the containment barrier, have substantially changed from the previously approved EAL scheme (ADAMS Accession No. ML071010426 (non-public)), while the bases for these EALs have not changed.
- Please provide justification for this substantial difference from the previously approved EAL scheme, or revise the application accordingly.
SNC Response SNC provides the following response. As a result of a previous NRC finding for SNC plants related to the current approved EAL scheme, SNC performed new calculations for radiation monitor related EALs, including those used in the Fission Product Barrier matrix. These new values were incorporated into revisions of the current EALs and implemented under 1 O CFR SO.S4(q) as part of the finding resolution. The proposed EAL scheme incorporates the latest radiation monitor calculations. NL-16-1830
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SNC Responses to NRG RAls Pertaining to LAR for EALs based on NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 Page 12 RAI 15 Applicable Site: VEGP The Fuel Clad Barrier and RCS Barrier threshold discussions of NEI 99-01, Revision 6, for a PWR contain the following statement: In accordance with EOPs [emergency operating procedures], there may be unusual accident conditions during which operators intentionally reduce the heat removal capability of the steam generators; during these conditions, classification using threshold is not warranted. The proposed VEGP Fission Product Barrier Table threshold values for Fuel Clad Barrier Potential Loss 2.B and RCS Barrier Potential Loss A.1 do not contain a note indicating that a classification based on a loss of heat sink capability under conditions where operators intentionally reduce heat removal in accordance with the EOPs is not warranted. (Note: The proposed FNP EAL scheme does provide an appropriate note.) Please revise the VEGP Fission Product Barrier Table threshold values for Fuel Clad Barrier Potential Loss 2.B and RCS Barrier Potential Loss 2.A to include an appropriate note, or provide justification for this difference. SNC Response A Note has been added to the Fuel Clad Barrier Potential Loss 2.B and RCS Barrier Potential Loss 2.A to clarify that a Heat Sink CSF entry condition should not be considered RED if total available feedwater flow is less than 535 gpm due to operator action. RAI 16 Applicable Site: HNP The Fission Product Barrier Basis discussion for the proposed containment barrier thresholds states, " ... within the context of a containment barrier loss or potential loss threshold, a release path to the wetwell is a direct release path." Considering that RCS leakage to the wetwell does not constitute containment leakage, this statement may not be correct. EPFAQ 2015-006 (ADAMS Accession No. ML 16012A 178, page 32) provides clarification relative to this RAI. Please justify using leakage to the wetwell in lieu of leakage through the wetwell as a threshold for containment leakage, or revise the application accordingly. SNC Response The Fission Product Barrier Basis has been revised to read that" ... a release path through the wetwell is a direct release path." consistent with the guidance in EPFAQ 2015-006. NL-16-1830
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SNC Responses to NRC RAls Pertaining to LAR for EALs based on NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 Page 13 RAI 17 Applicable Site: FNP For Containment on the Fission Product Barrier Table, the developer notes for Loss 4B state, in part: Increases in sump, temperature, pressure, flow and/or radiation level readings outside of the containment may indicate that the RCS mass is being Jost outside of containment... However, the proposed Containment Barrier Loss B is limited to radiation monitoring instrumentation. Please provide justification for limiting assessment of Containment Barrier Loss 4B to radiation monitoring instrumentation, or revise the application accordingly. SNC Response The Containment Barrier Loss 4B has been revised to include a Note that identifies other indicators of RCS mass being lost outside of containment. The addition of this note provides clarification that the Containment Barrier Loss is not limited to the radiation monitoring instrumentation. RAI 18 Applicable Site: FNP The proposed Containment Barrier Potential Loss Bon the Fission Product Barrier Table for FNP provides a hydrogen concentration of greater than 5.5 percent as a threshold value. However, the developer notes in NEI 99-01, Revision 6, for Potential Loss 4B state, in part: The existence of an explosive mixture means, at a minimum, that the containment atmospheric hydrogen concentration is sufficient to support a hydrogen burn (i.e., at the lower deflagration limit). The proposed FNP CG1 uses 6 percent as a containment challenge condition, while the proposed CG 1 and Fission Product Barrier Proposed Containment Barrier Potential Loss B for VEGP provides a hydrogen concentration of greater than 6 percent as threshold values. Please provide further clarification for using 5.5 percent hydrogen concentration as a threshold value for Containment Barrier Potential Loss B, or revise accordingly. SNC Response The Containment Barrier Potential Loss B threshold has been revised to 6 percent. This value for hydrogen concentration is consistent with the containment challenge condition for CG 1. NL-16-1830
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SNC Responses to NRC RAls Pertaining to LAA for EALs based on NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 Page 14 RAI 19 Applicable Sites: FNP and VEGP The developer notes in NEI 99-01, Revision 6, for the PWR Containment Barrier Threshold state, in part: Enter the site-specific pressure setpoint value that actuates containment pressure control systems (e.g., containment spray). Also enter the site-specific containment pressure control system/equipment that should be operating per design if the containment pressure setpoint is reached. The proposed Containment Barrier Potential Loss C.1 on the Fission Product Barrier Table uses a containment critical safety function (CSF) status of orange as a threshold value. Based on a review of the verification and validation (Version 16, page 8 of 8 for FNP and Version 16, page 4 of 4 for VEGP), there is no direct tie to a containment pressure condition that would actuate the containment pressure control systems at a containment CSF status of orange. Please revise Containment Barrier Potential Loss C.1 for FNP and VEGP to include a specific pressure setpoint value that actuates containment pressure control systems, or provide justification for this difference. SNC Response SNC provides the following response for FNP. The Containment Barrier Potential Loss C.1 has been revised to include 27 psig as the containment pressure setpoint that actuates containment pressure control systems. SNC provides the following response for VEGP. The Containment Barrier Potential Loss C.1 has been revised to include 21.5 psig as the containment pressure setpoint that actuates containment pressure control systems. RAl20 Applicable Sites: HNP, FNP, and VEGP HG1, EPFAQ 2015-13 (ADAMS Accession No. ML 16166A366), which was recently issued, provides clarification that could be used, if deemed appropriate, to meet the intent of HG1. Please consider EPFAQ 2015-13 and revise EAL HG1, if deemed appropriate, to reflect the latest staff clarification of NEI 99-01, Revision 6, guidelines. NL-16-1830
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SNC Responses to NRG RAls Pertaining to LAR for EALs based on NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 Page 15 SNC Response SNC personnel have considered EPFAQ 2015-13 and determined that, since it is not a requirement to include this guidance, EAL HG1 is appropriate as written and does not need to be revised RAI 21 NE1 99-01, Revision 6, guidance for HG1, HS1, HA1, and HU1, specifically identifies specific security shift supervision" to report the occurrence of a hostile action. Additionally, the provided basis discussion states, "Timely and accurate communications between Security Shift Supervision and the Control Room is essential for proper classification of a security-related event." a. Applicable site: HNP The proposed wording of HG1, HS1, HA 1, and HU1 allows for a "designee" to report the occurrence of a hostile action. Please revise HG1, HS1, HA 1, and HU1, to remove "or designee," or provide a justification for this difference. SNC Response SNC provides the following response. EALs HG1, HS1, HA1, and HU1 have been revised to reference the "on shift Security Captain or designee" as the site-specific term for security shift supervision. Including a designee is appropriate because the Security Captain may not be readily available to provide this notification in a timely manner, e.g., when engaged in field observations. In these kinds of situations, the Security Captain may appoint a designee who is qualified to perform this function.
- b. Applicable site: FNP The proposed wording to HG1, HS1, HA 1, and HU1 does not contain the reference to specific security shift supervision" as provided by NEI 99-01, Revision 6. Please revise EALs HG1, HS1, HA 1, and HU1 to specifically reference the site-specific term for security shift supervision, or provide a justification for this difference.
SNC Response SNC provides the following response. EALs HG 1, HS 1, HA 1, and HU 1 have been revised to reference the "on shift Security Captain or designee" as the site-specific term for security shift supervision. Including a designee is appropriate because the Security Captain may not be readily available to provide this notification in a timely manner, e.g., when engaged in field observations. In these kinds of situations, the Security Captain may appoint a designee who is qualified to perform this function.
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SNC Responses to NRC RAls Pertaining to LAR for EALs based on NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 Page 16 RAI 22 Applicable Sites: FNP and VEGP The proposed basis for EALs HS1 and HA1 includes the statement: This IC does not apply to a HOSTILE ACTION directed at an ISFSI [independent spent fuel storage installation] PROTECTED AREA located outside the plant PROTECTED AREA. The proposed basis for EAL HU4 includes the statement: This basis extends to a FIRE occurring within the PROTECTED AREA of an ISFSI located outside the plant PROTECTED AREA. To avoid confusion and possible misclassification of an event, please remove all of the information associated with statements regarding an ISFSI that is not located in the protected area, since the ISFSls at FNP and VEGP are currently located inside the protected area, or explain why reference to ISFSI location should be retained. SNC Response SNC provides the following response for FNP and VEGP. Information related to the ISFSI Protected Area has been removed from the basis for HS1, HA1, and HU4. In addition, EAL threshold HU4 (3) and (4) have been revised to delete reference to the ISFSI Protected Area. RAl23 Applicable Site: VEGP The NRC staff reviewed the VEGP EAL verification and validation document for HU2 and could not determine if the provided alarm would indicate that a seismic event occurred with an acceleration of 0.12 grams (g) or greater had occurred. Please provide additional justification that on-shift personnel can determine if a seismic event of greater than 0.12 g acceleration, as indicated by the Seismic Monitoring System, has occurred within 15 minutes of the event, or provide an alternate method to assess seismic events as provided by NEI 99-01, Revision 6. SNC Response The Seismic Monitoring System is located in the VEGP control room envelope. Whenever a seismic event occurs an audible alarm is sounded. The control room operator will review the indications on the panel. If a seismic event of greater than 0.12 g has occurred, the OBE Exceedance window changes from green to red. This determination can be readily made by shift personnel in the control room within 15 minutes. The EAL threshold for HU2 has been revised to reflect the status change of the OBE Exceedance indicator on the panel display. NL-16-1830
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SNC Responses to NRG RAls Pertaining to LAA for EALs based on NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 Page 17 RAl24 Applicable Site: FNP The developer notes for EAL HU4 include the following: The "site-specific list of plant rooms or areas" should specify those rooms or areas that contain SAFETY SYSTEM equipment. For HU4, the currently approved FNP EAL scheme (ADAMS Accession No. ML071010426 (non-public)) includes the refueling water storage tank (RWST) and the condensate storage tank (CST) rooms or areas on the table provided for a fire within the protected area. However, the RWST and CST rooms or areas are not included in the proposed FNP EAL set. Please clarify whether these rooms or areas contain safety system equipment, and if so, explain why the RWST and the_ CST were removed from Table H2, or revise the application accordingly. SNC Response Table H2 for FNP has been revised to include the RWST and CST. RAl25 Applicable Site: VEGP For SSS, VEGP uses the heat sink CSF red condition as a threshold value but does not contain a note about not needing a heat sink under conditions where operators intentionally reduce heat removal in accordance with EOPs, as discussed in RAl-1S. (Note: The proposed FNP EAL scheme does provide an appropriate note.) Please revise SSS to add a note indicating that a classification based on a heat sink CSF red condition as a threshold value would not be appropriate if operators intentionally reduce heat removal in accordance with EOPs, or provide justification for not including a note. SNC Response A Note has been added to SSS to clarify that a Heat Sink CSF entry condition should not be considered RED if total available feedwater flow is less than S3S gpm due to operator action.
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SNC Responses to NRC RAls Pertaining to LAR for EALs based on NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 Page 18 RAl26 Applicable Sites: FNP and VEGP Proposed SA2 and SU2 contain "RCS level" as a listed parameter. Developer notes in NEI 99-01, Revision 6, state: Developers may specify either pressurizer or reactor vessel level in the PWR parameter column entry for RCS Level. The proposed SA2 and SU2 do not specify which RCS level instrument to use. Depending on the nature of the transient, pressurizer level indication may, or may not, provide an accurate assessment of core conditions. Please provide justification for not using RVLIS to determine RCS level for EALs SA2 and SU2 for FNP and VEGP, or revise the application accordingly. SNC Response SNC provides the following response for FNP and VEGP. Specific level instrumentation was not provided because Senior Reactor/Reactor Operators (SRO/ROs) are cognizant of the various instruments, including limitations, required to determine RCS level. Operators may use pressurizer level, as well as RVLIS, to determine reactor level depending upon existing plant conditions. Additionally, SRO/RO training includes modules on the use of instrumentation to monitor specific reactor parameters, including reactor level. Operators would be able to recognize when a loss of the RCS Level instrumentation required for monitoring plant parameters has occurred and would be able to provide the information needed by the decision makers to assess this EAL. The FNP and VEGP EAL Basis for SA2 and SU2 have been revised accordingly. RAl27 The NEI 99-01, Revision 6, basis for SA2 and SU2 includes the following: This EAL is focused on a selected subset of plant parameters associated with the key safety functions of reactivity control, core cooling [PWR]I RPV level [BWR] and RCS heat removal. a. Applicable site: FNP The proposed SA2 and SU2 include steam generator auxiliary or emergency feedwater flow taken generically from NEI 99-01, Revision 6. Please provide site-specific terminology for this parameter (either steam generator auxiliary or emergency feedwater flow, but not typically both), or justify using the proposed wording. NL-16-1830
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SNC Responses to NRG RAls Pertaining to LAA for EALs based on NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 Page 19 SNC Response FNP personnel determined that the appropriate parameter for this indicator is steam generator auxiliary feedwater flow. SA2 and SU2 have been revised accordingly.
- b. Applicable site: VEGP The proposed SA2 and SU2 include main feedwater as a plant parameter to monitor in addition to auxiliary feedwater flow. Please clarify whether main feedwater flow indication can provide an accurate measurement of total available feedwater to the steam generators following a reactor trip, or revise the application accordingly.
SNC Response VEGP personnel determined that main feedwater flow is an appropriate parameter to accurately measure feedwater flow for transients that do not result in a reactor trip. As indicated in the proposed EAL, steam generator auxiliary feedwater flow would be the indicator following a reactor trip. Licensed SROs/ROs are provided training on which steam generator feedwater flow to use based on the event in progress. RAl28 Applicable Site: VEGP The NEI 99-01, Revision 6, basis for SU? states: EAL #2 addresses a condition where containment pressure is greater than the setpoint at which containment energy (heat) removal systems are designed to automatically actuate, and less than one full train of equipment is capable of operating per design. The proposed VEGP EAL SU? (2) uses "containment pressure greater than 52 psig [pounds per square inch gauge]" as a threshold value. Please revise EAL SU? (2) to use the containment spray actuation setpoint as a threshold value, or justify this difference. SNC Response EAL SU? (2) has been revised to the containment spray actuation setpoint of 21.5 psig. NL-16-1830
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SNC Responses to NRC RAls Pertaining to LAR for EALs based on NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 Page 20 RAl29 Applicable Site: FNP SNC is proposing changes to RG1 [AG1], RS1 [AS1], RA1 [AA1], and RU1 [AU1]. The licensee is requesting the EAL change to support relocation of safety valve monitoring system radiation monitors RE-60A, RE-608, and RE-60C, and the removal of Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Steam Exhaust Monitoring System radiation monitor RE-60D. However, the license amendment request (ADAMS Accession No. ML 16071A110) does not provide specific information regarding the location changes of RE-60A, RE-608, and RE-60C. a. The application states that the RE-60 series radiation monitors provide post-accident effluent monitoring in compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.97, "Criteria for Accident Monitoring Instrumentation for Nuclear Power Plants.: Please provide justification that the replacement monitors will reliably continue to provide an indication of steam generator tube leakage (SGTR) and support offsite dose assessment for conditions such as an open code safety, SGTR, Terry turbine operation, or open atmospheric relief valve. SNC Response SNC provides the following response. RE-60A, RE-608, and RE-60C are being relocated adjacent to their respective main steam lines (RE-60A -A main steam line, etc.), upstream of the safety/relief valves. Because bleed steam from the B and C main steam lines provides the steam supply for the TDAFWP and is monitored by the new RE-608 and RE-60C instruments, the need for RE-60D no longer exists. The 1 O CFR 50.59 evaluation completed for this modification provides the following information relative to this response: The new R-60 monitors are located adjacent to the main steam lines and will comply with RG 1.97, GDC 60, and GDC 64. NUREG-0737 states that offline monitors are not required for the PWR secondary side main steam safety valve and dump valve discharge lines; and that externally mounted monitors viewing the main steam line upstream of the valves are acceptable. At their new locations, the new R-60 monitors will monitor radiation level inside the main steam lines instead of the exhaust of the safety valves, and still provide accident effluent monitoring to meet the requirements of the Updated FSAR. Data from the detector is transmitted to the (local processing display unit) LPDU for processing and displays. Data from the LPDU is transmitted to the RDU (remote display unit). The RDU provides measurement display, status, and alarms on its front panel. The RDU interface with the RMDA (radiation monitoring data acquisition) and the Unit 1 and Unit 2 plant computers are the same as the existing UDR (universal digital ratemeter). NL-16-1830
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SNC Responses to NRC RAls Pertaining to LAA for EALs based on NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 Page 21 The new R-60 monitors provide the same measurement display, status, and alarms as the existing monitors. There is no change to the functional interface of the new R-60 monitors with the AMOA or the Unit 1 and 2 plant computers. The existing R-60 monitors' measuring range is 10 mR/h to 1000 R/h. The new R-60 monitors measuring range is 0.01 mRad/h to 1000 mRad/h. The Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) analysis concludes that the new R-60 monitors measuring range will meet the RC 1.97 required range of 0.1 µCi/cc to 1000 µCi/cc. The changes in the R-60 monitors' measuring range are acceptable. The existing R-60 monitoring system monitors the steam plume from the steam generator atmospheric relief valve and safety valve (R-60A, B, and C), and the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump vent (R-600) for effluent noble gas releases due to tube leakage from the primary reactor coolant loop into the secondary main steam lines. The new R-60A, B, and C monitors instead monitor the main steam lines upstream from the safety and relief valves. The R-600 monitor is retired in place and not replaced. Plant Farley uses MIDAS-NU (Meteorological Information Dose Assessment System -Nuclear) software for calculating R-60 dose rates as part of the Emergency Plan. The replaced monitors will have the same design interface with MIDAS. A software change package has been prepared to revise the MIDAS application. As stated in the above excerpts from the 1 O CFR 50.59 evaluation, the new monitors will be installed such that they would monitor the main steam lines prior to the safety/relief valves and TDAFW pump exhaust enabling estimation of effluent activity based on activity inside the main steam line regardless of the release pathway. These monitors will be able to monitor the radiation levels of the steam and as such would be able to provide appropriate inputs for the site dose assessment model. b. Considering the safety evaluation will only address proposed EAL scheme changes, please clarify what process is being used to document and approve the replacement and relocation for the RE-60 series radiation monitor. SNC Response SNC's design process is being used to document and approve the replacement and relocation of the RE-60 series radiation monitors. Design Change Packages (DCP) SNC54928 (Unit 1) and SNC73409 (Unit 2) provide the design details for the modification to relocate the R-60 monitors and retire RE-600 in place. As part of the design process for replacing and relocating the RE-60 series radiation monitors, a 1 O CFR 50.59 evaluation was performed. This evaluation determined the impact on the UFSAR and emergency plan. As a result, the design modification itself did not require NRC approval, but the associated EAL changes do require NRC approval. NL-16-1830
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SNC Responses to NRG RAls Pertaining to LAR for EALs based on NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 Page 22 c. Please provide an explanation of how the transition from the current RE-60 series radiation monitor configuration to the new RE-60 series radiation monitor configuration will occur without impacting the ability to assess either the current or proposed EALs, as appropriate. If this explanation includes a transition to the new monitors subsequent to implementation of the proposed EAL scheme, please provide the relevant EALs in the pre-equipment change status for NRG review and approval. SNC Response The existing RE-60 monitors identified in the current EAL scheme will continue to be used to support emergency classification. The new monitors will be installed and will not be implemented until after the proposed EAL scheme has been approved and implemented. Once the proposed EAL scheme is approved, the existing RE-60 monitors will be abandoned in place and no longer used. The proposed EAL scheme will still be able to provide sufficient assessment of a SGTR or steam generator tube leak based on the use of the Steam Jet Air Ejector (SJAE) radiation monitors (RE-15C). In addition, the new RE-60 monitors will provide an input into the offsite dose assessment model. d. Section 4.1, Precaution 5 of NMP-EP-104, "Dose Assessment" (ADAMS Accession No. ML 15022A223 (non-public)) states: (FARLEY) IF R[E]-60 A, B, OR Care used for dose assessment when an emergency release has not been indicated on these instruments, there is a possibility that a false high TEDE AND Thyroid COE could be calculated causing an unnecessary Site Area Emergency OR General Emergency declaration. Please explain how the proposed RE-60 series radiation monitor changes will address this precaution. SNC Response SNC provides the following response. The existing R-60 monitoring system monitors the steam plume from the Steam Generator Atmospheric Relief Valve and Safety Valve (R-60A, B, and C) and the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (TDAFWP) Vent (R-600) for effluent noble gas releases due to a steam generator tube leak or rupture. These monitors are designed to monitor the effluent steam plume activity as it is released from these pathways. However, the current R-60 monitors have issues of poor reliability, equipment aging, and obsolescence. This precaution was added to account for these issues. With the installation of the proposed R-60 monitoring system, these issues are no longer valid and therefore the precaution will be removed from the procedure. NL-16-1830
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SNC Responses to NRC RAls Pertaining to LAR for EALs based on NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 Page 23 e. The application provides the following statement: In accord with a proposed plant modification, SNC proposes to revise the Farley EAL thresholds for Initiating Conditions (/Cs) in RG1, RS1, RA 1, and RU1. Due to limitations of the monitors and obsolescence, SNC proposes a design change to remove Steam Generator Relief & Safety Valve Monitoring System radiation monitors RE-60A, RE-608, and RE-60C and relocate the three new radiation monitors adjacent to the main steam lines inside the Main Steam Valve Room. In addition, the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Steam Exhaust Monitoring System radiation monitor RE-60D will be removed. Consequently, the removal of all four radiation monitors will be reflected in the referenced EAL /Cs. The NRC staff could not determine how, or if, the proposed RE-60 series radiation monitors address "limitations of the monitors" or are equivalent to or better than the current RE-60 series monitors. Please provide clarification on how the proposed RE-60 series radiation monitors will provide the ability to assess a SGTR and support the performance of off-site dose assessments in a manner that is as good as or better than the existing RE-60 series radiation monitors. SNC Response SNC provides the following response. The new monitors will be installed such that they '-"(OUld monitor the main steam lines prior to the safety/relief valves and TDAFW pump exhaust enabling estimation of effluent activity based on activity inside the main steam line regardless of the release pathway. The new monitors provide the same measurement display, status, and alarms as the existing monitors. There is no change to the functional interface of the new R-60 monitors with the RMDA or the Unit 1 and 2 plant computers. The 1 O CFR 50.59 evaluation for the modification concluded that the range for the new monitors, although different from the existing monitors, continues to meet the RG 1.97 required range of 0.1 µCi/cc to 1000 µCi/cc, and therefore, is acceptable. These monitors will be able to monitor the radiation levels of the steam in the main steam line and as such would be able to assess a SGTR or steam generator tube leak, providing appropriate inputs for the off-site dose assessment model. I __ Southern Nuclear Operating Company Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2; Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2; Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 1 and 2; License Amendment Request for Changes to Emergency Action Level Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant Responses to Requests for Additional Information ENCLOSURE 1 EAL DEVIATIONS AND DIFFERENCES MATRIX MARKED-UP PAGES Southern Nuclear Operating Company License Amendment Request for Changes to Emergency Action Level Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant Responses to Requests for Additional Information JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT EAL DEVIATIONS AND DIFFERENCES MATRIX MARKED-UP PAGES NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Deviations and Differences Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant -Units 1 and 2 Table of Contents Generic Di ffere nc es . .......... ...... ... .. . . . . . . . . . ........ .. . . .................. I H G7: Initi ati n g Conditions .......................... .... .............. ..... . ..... 4 I RG I: Init iating Co ndition s ......................................................... 2 HS I: Initiatin g Co ndit ions ............................... .................. . ..... 42 RG 2: In itiating Co ndition s ........................................... ................. 3 H S6: Initiatin g Co ndit ions ............................. .................. . ..... 43 RS I: In i t iating Co ndition s .......... ....... . ................... .................... .4 H S7: Initiatin g Conditions ............................. ................... . ..... 44 RS 2: Initi ati n g Co ndition s .S HA I: Initi at in g Co ndit ions..... ........................ ............ ....... . 4S RA I: Initi ating Co nditio ns .................... ....................................... 6 H AS: Initiating Conditio n s .......................... ........................................... 46 RA 2: Initi ating Co nditio ns ................... ..... ...... . ............... 7 HA 6: Initiating Co ndit ions....................... ..... . ........................ 47 RA3: In itiating Co nd i t ions. ................... . .............. 8 HA 7: Initi a tin g Conditio n s . . ...................... 4S RU I: Initia ting Co ndition s. . .............................. J O H U I: Initiatin g Co ndit io n s ...................... ...... ................. .. .................. .. 49 RU2: In itiating Co nditi ons . . . ...................................... 1 2 HU 2: Initiating Co ndit io n s . ..................... .............. ........ . ..... SO CG I: Initiatin g Co nditio ns . . ............. ................. I 3 H U3: Initiating Co ndit ions....................... ............................ . S I CS I: Initi a tin g Co ndition s .... .. ...... ..... . . . . ...... ...... ...... . I 6 HU4: Initi a tin g Co ndit io n s .............................. ...................... . .... S2 C A I* In itiating Co nd itions ....................................................................... I 8 HU7: I nitiat in g Conditions ............................ . ............. ........ S4 C A 2: Initiati ng Co ndition s................... . .................. ................. I 9 SG I: Initiatin g Co nditi o n s .. ...... ...... .... .......... . ..... .......... . .... SS CA3: Initi ating Co ndition s................... . .................. ................... 20 SGS: Initiating Co nditi o n s ..... S6 CA6: In itiating Co nditio ns ........................................................ ............... 22 SS I: In itia tin g Co nditi ons .... ........ ......... ..... ......... .... S7 CU I: In i ti ating Co nditio ns ............ ................... 24 SSS: Initi a tin g Condi ti ons ............................ ................................. ....... SS CU2: Init iating Co ndition s ................................. ................... ................... 2S SSS: Initi a tin g Conditions .. . .............. ......................... S9 CU3: Init iating Co ndition s....................... .............. ...... . ............ . ...... 26 SA I: Initiating Co nditi o n s .. ......... ....... ........... . .. ...... ......... . ... 60 CU4: Ini tiating Conditions .... ...... ....... ......... ... . ... ......... . ...... 27 SA2: Initi a tin g Co nditi ons ..................... . ..... 6 I CUS: I nitiating Co nd it io ns ...................................................................... .. 2S SAS: Initi a tin g Con d ition s ............. ...... . ..... 63 E-HU I: Initi ati n g Co ndit i ons ............................................................ 29 SA9: Initi a tin g Co ndition s ........... ...... .............. ..... . ............. . ..... 64 PW R Fission Product Ba rr ier s Matrix -Initi ati n g Condi ti onsff hre sholds .3 I SU I: Initiatin g Co nditi ons ........................... ... ................. . ..... 6S I. RCS or SG T ube Leakage... . ...... 3 I 2. In a dequate Heat Remov a l .......... .......................................... 33 3. RCS Activity I Conta inm e nt Radiat io n ................. 3S 4. Co ntainmen t Int egrity or B y pa ss .......................................... 36 S. O th e r Ind ications.. ............................. ................... ..3S 6. Emergency Di r ecto r Judgment ..... 39;& SU2: Initiatin g Conditions ............................. ............... ... . .... 66 SU3: Initiatin g Co nditions ....................... .... .. .... 6 7 SU4: Initiating Co nditi o n s ...... 6S SUS: Initiating Co ndit ions.. ................. . ...................... 69 SU6: Initi a tin g Conditions ........... ...... ........ . .. .. .. ...... ...... ..... ........ ...... . . .. 70 SU7: Initi at in g Co nditi ons ........... ...... ........ ..... .. ...... ........ . ..... 71 HG I: In itiating Co ndition s ............ . . .............................. ................. .40 GENERIC DIFFERENCES NEl 99-01 Rev 6 Farley Reference s BWRs Deleted BWR r efere n ces as approp ri ate Uses A for the radiolog ica l effluent/radiation level !C s Uses R for the radio l ogical effl uen t/ra diati o n le ve l !Cs Emergency Class ificati o n I Cs are presented in asce nding order (NOUE -GE) Emergency C l assification I Cs a re pre s ented in descendi n g order (GE -NOUE) GENERAL NOTES In s trum ent se tpoint read i n gs u sed as threshold val ue s to determine emergency classifications have been ve rified by Far l ey per son nel as b e in g within the ra n ge of the in s trument and c l ea rl y and co n s i ste ntl y read wi thin the sca l e of the in s trument. 11is \Crtficat1on 1s documented on SNC Form 312-1'03. lnit1<1t1n 1 Condition/fmernency >\ctmn Level Valtdat1on and Venficat1on \\ orkshcet Site specific information is hi g hli g hted in ye ll ow. [ Commented [JRB1 ): RAJ 3.a r evisio n RPV u sed in stea d of com m o n PWR terminology of RCS. ODCM is the co ntrollin g R a diation E ffluent D oc ument. WOG CSFSTs are u s ed for E AL thr es hold s as allowe d bv NE I 99-0 I Rev 6 Develooer No te s. [pf-*\Q 2015-013 guidance \\as reviewed and considered for implcmcntat1on No re\ 1sions to llG I \\ere made as a result ot'tlHs re\ 1ew.I jEP I* AQ 2015-015 guidance \\as re\ IC\\cd and detcrmmcd to be not applICablc to JNP Altcmamc power sources at I NI' arc not pcnnancntl) installed md only ll'>Cd to supplv po11er to spccllic loads (i e .. DC Inverters) and arc not capable ofsupph 111g the full load of the cssenual buses Appendix A -Deleted BWR Acronvms a nd Abbre viat ions. Added additiona l acronvms as needed. [ Commented [JRB2): RAJ 20 revision [Commented [JRB3): RAJ 1 2 revi s i o n Appendix B -Incorpora t ed Site Spec ifi c definit io ns as appropr i ate. ABNORMAL RAD LEVEL S I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS RG I: INITIATING CONDITIONS NE I 99--01Rev6 Farley R e l ease of gaseo u s radi o activity re s ultin g in offsite dose greater than 1 , 000 Rel ease of gaseo us radioactivity resu l ting in offsite dose g r ea ter th an 1 , 000 mr e m TEDE or 5 , 000 mrem thyroid COE. mrem TEDE or 5 , 000 mrem th y roid COE. Difference I Deviation I Ju s tifiration one THRESHOLDS NEI 99--01 Rev 6 Farley (I) Reading on ANY of th e followi n g radiation monitor s greater th a n (I) Reading on ANY of the fo ll owing radiation monitor s greater than the reading s hown for 15 minute s or longer: the reading shown for 1 5 minute s or longer: (site-specific monitor li s t a nd thre s hold va lue s) I Steam Jet Air Eiector RE-I 5C I 130 uC i/cc ( 13 0 R/hr) I (2) Dose assess ment using actua l meteoro l ogy indicates do ses grea t er I Plant Vent Stack RE-298 (NG) I 0.8 uCi/cc l than 1 ,0 00 mrem TEDE or 5 , 000 mrem th yro id COE at or beyond (2) Do se assessment u s ing ac tual meteorolo gy indicate s do ses g re a ter (site-spec ific d os e receptor point). than 1 , 000 mrem TE D E or 5 , 000 mrem th yroid COE at or beyond (3) Field s urve y re s ult s indica t e EITHE R of the following at or beyond the si te bounda J:X. (site-spec ific d ose receptor point): (3) Field s urve y r es ult s indicate EITHER of the fol l owing at or be yo nd
- Closed window dose rates grea ter than 1 , 000 mR/hr expected to the s ite bounda ry: continue for 60 minute s or l onger.
- Closed window dose rates greater than 1 , 000 mR/hr expected to
- Analyses of fi e ld s urve y sa mple s indicate t h yro id C DE g r eate r co nt inue for 60 minute s or lon ger. than 5 , 000 mrem for one h our of inhalation.
- Ana l yses of field s urve y sa mple s indicate th y roid CDE grea ter than 5 , 000 mrem for one hour of inhalation. Difference I Deviation I Ju s tification Difference
- S ite specific information provided. See V2 Rad Monitor Calculation and VJ ODCM Si te Boundary Drawing. 2 A B N ORM A L RAD L EVE L S I RA DIOLO G I CA L EFF L UENT I CS/EA L S RG2: I N ITL A TING C O N DITIO NS NE I 99-01 Rev 6 Fa rl e y S p e nt fue l pool l eve l cannot b e r esto r e d to at l east (si t e-s p ec ifi c L evel 3 S p e nt fuel p ool l eve l ca nn ot be re s tor ed to at l eas t IHG-1 31 for d esc rip t i o n) for 60 mi nu tes o r lo n ger. 60 minu tes o r l o n ge r. ( Commented
[JRB4): RAJ 3.d re vi s i o n Differ e nc e I Dev iation I Justification Diff e r e n ce: S ite s p eci fi c in fo rmation pro vi d e d. See V4 SF P Leve l 3 and 2 Indi c a tio n. THRE S HOLD S NE I 99-0 1 R ev 6 F a r le y (1) Spe n t f u e l pool l e ve l ca nn ot b e r e s tore d to at l eas t (s i t e-s p eci fi c (1) S p e nt f u e l po o l l evel c a nn ot b e re s t o r e d to a t l e as t HG-I i I fe et Leve l 3 va l u e) fo r 60 minut es or l o n g e r. 60 m i nut es or lon g er. ( Commented [JRBS]: R A I 3.d r e vi s i o n Diff e ren ce I Dev iati o n I Justification Diff e r e n ce: S ite s p eci fi c in for m a ti o n pro vi d e d. See V4 SFP Leve l 3 a nd 2 Indi catio n. \lthOU!!:h thi\ *alue ;, aboH the Le\ el 3 indication or 130 feet IY, inches identified in Y4, it has been detrrmined that this rnlue can be used h} the deci,ion ma ken to prrform an assessment of the E,\L threshold. [Commented [JRB6): RAJ 3.d r e vi s i o n 3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVEL S I RAD I OLOGI CA L EFFLUENT ICS/EALS RSI: INIT I ATING CONDITIONS NE I 99-0 I Re v 6 F ar l e y R e l ease of gaseo u s ra di oactivity res ultin g in offsite dose g r eater than 100 R elease of gaseo u s ra d ioactiv i ty res ul t in g in offsite d ose g r ea t er t h an I 00 m r em TEDE or 500 mr e m thyroid CDE. m r em TEDE or 500 m rem thyroid CDE. Differenc e I De v iation I Justification N on e THRESHOLD S N El 99-01 Re v 6 Farl ey (I) Reading o n ANY of the follow in g ra d i a t ion m o ni to r s g r eater t h a n (I) Read ing o n ANY of t h e fo ll ow in g radiat i on m o nit o rs g r ea t er t h a n the readi n g s h own for 15 mi nut es or l onger: the r ea ding s h own for 1 5 minut es or longer: (site-specific mo ni tor list a n d thr es h o l d values) I S t ea m J et A ir Ejecto r RE-1 5C I 1 3 µCi/cc (13 R/h r) I (2) Dose assess m ent using ac tu al m e t eorology i nd icates doses greater I Pl a nt V e nt S t ack RE-29B (NG) I 0.08 µCi/cc I than I 00 mr em TEDE o r 500 mr e m th yroid C D E at or beyond (s it e-(2) Dose assess m e nt u sing ac tu a l m e t eorology i ndi ca t es doses grea t e r spec ific d ose receptor point). t h an I 00 m rem TEDE or 500 mrem th yro id CDE at or beyo n d the (3) Field s urvey re s ul ts indicate E ITH E R of t h e fo ll owi n g at or beyond s i t e bo und a ry. (site-spec i fic dose recepto r po in t): (3) Fie l d s u rvey r esults i nd ica t e E I T H E R of t h e fo ll owing at or beyond
- C l osed window dose ra t es g r ea t er t han I 00 m R/hr expected t o t h e si t e bo un d ary co n ti n ue for 60 min u tes or l o n ger.
- C l osed window dose rates g r eater than I 00 mR/h r expected t o
- Analyses of fie l d survey sa mpl es i n dicate th yro i d CDE greater co nt inue for 60 minutes or l onger. tha n 500 m r e m for o n e h o ur of i nh alat i o n.
- A n a l yses of fie l d s u rvey sa m ples ind i cate th yro i d CDE grea t er t h a n 500 mrem fo r o n e h o u r of in h a l atio n. D i ffer e nc e I D e viatio n I Ju s tification D i fferen c e: S ite s pe ci fic informat i on prov i ded. S ee V2 R a d M onit o r C alcu l a tion a nd V J OD C M S ite Boundar y Dra w in g. 4 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS RS2: INITIATING COND I T I ONS El 99-01 Rtv 6 Farle y Spe nt fuel pool level at (site-speci fie Level 3 description). Spent fuel pool l eve l at il-:W--1 JI feet (beYel [ Commented
[JRB7): RAJ 3.d revision Difftrence I Deviation I Ju s tification Difference: Site specific information provided. See V4 SFP Le vel 3 and 2 Indication. THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Far l e y (I) Lowering of s pent fuel pool l eve l to (site-s pecific Leve l 3 value). (I) Lowering of s pent fue l pool l evel to -HQ.-13 I (Commen t ed [JRBS): RAJ 3.d revision Difference I Deviation I Ju s tification Difference
- S ite specific information provided. See V4 SFP Level 3 and 2 Indication. ,\lthouj!h thi' 'alue i\ nboH the LeHI 3 indicati o n nl 130 feet I Y, inchc' identified in\ .t, it has been determined that this value can be used the deci\ion mnkcr\ to perform au of the E.\L thre,hold.
(C ommented [JRB9): RAI 3.d r evision 5 ABNORMAL RAD LEVEL S I RADIOLOGI CA L EFFLUENT IC S/EALS RAI: INITIATING CONDITIONS NE I 99-01 Rev 6 Farle y R e l ease of gas eous o r l iq ui d rad i oac tivit y r es ultin g in offsite d ose greater R e l ease of gaseo u s or l iq u id radioactivity r esu ltin g i n offs it e do se greate r than I 0 mrem TED E or 50 mrem thyroid COE. th an 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mre m t h yro i d COE. Differenc e I Deviation I Justification N one THRESHOLDS El 99-0 I Rev 6 Farle y ( l) Reading on A Y of the following radiation monit o rs greater than ( l) Reading on ANY of the following radiation monitors grea ter than the readi n g shown for 15 minutes or longer: the r eadi ng s h own for 1 5 minut es or l onge r: (site-specific mo n itor list a nd threshold values) I Steam J et Air Ejector RE-15 0 I 13 µCi/cc ( 13 R/hr) I (2) Dose assess me nt using actual m eteorology indicates doses greater I P l ant Vent Stack RE-29B (NG) I 0.008 uCi/cc l than l 0 mr e m TE DE or 50 mr e m th yro id C O E at or b eyo nd (s ite-(2) Dose assessme n t u si ng act u a l m e t eorology indic a te s doses g r ea ter spec ific dose r eceptor point). than l 0 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem th yroi d COE at or beyond the s ite (3) Analysis ofa liquid effl u ent samp le i n dicates a conce n tration or bounda r elease ra t e th at wo uld re s ult in doses greater than I 0 mr em TEDE (3) Analysis of a liquid efflue nt sample indicates a concentration or or 50 mrem th yroid COE at or beyond (site-s pecifi c do se receptor release rate that would res ult in doses grea ter than l 0 mrem TEDE point) for one hour of expo s ure. or 50 mr e rn th yro id C O E at or beyond th e si t e bou nd ary for o n e (4) Field s urvey re s ult s indicate EITHER of the fo ll ow ing a t o r beyo nd hour of exposure. (site-s pecific d ose receptor poi nt): (4) Fie l d s urv ey result s indicate EITHER of th e fo ll owing at or be y o nd
- Closed window dose rates greater than l 0 rnR/hr expected to the si t e boundary: continue for 60 minutes or longer.
- Closed window dose rates greater than l 0 mR/hr expected to
- Analyses of field survey sa mpl es indicate thyroid COE greate r co ntinu e for 60 minutes or longer. than 50 mr e m for one h o ur of inhalation.
- Ana l yses of field s ur vey samples indica t e thyroid COE greate r than 50 mrem fo r one hour of inhalation. Differenc e I Deviation I Justification Differenc e: S it e s pe ci fic information pro vi d e d. See V2 Rad Mo nitor Ca lculation and VJ OD CM Si te Boundar y Drawing. 6 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS RA2: I NITIAT I NG CONDIT I ONS EI 99-01 Re v 6 Farle y Significant loweri n g of wa t e r level a b ove , o r d a m age to , ir rad i a t ed fuel. S i g nifi ca nt l owe rin g of water l eve l above , o r damage t o , irr a di a ted f u e l. Difftreoce I Deviation I Justification No oe TH R ESHOLDS NE I 99-01Rev6 Far l ey (I) Uncovery of irradi a ted f uel in th e REF UEL ING PATHWAY. (I) U n covery of irradiated f u e l i n the REFUELING PATHWAY. (2) Damage t o irradia t ed fuel r esu lt ing in a r e l ease of ra d ioact ivi ty from (2) Damage t o irradiated fuel re s ul ting in a release of radioactivity from the fue l as indi ca t ed by A Y of the fol l owi n g radiation m o n itors: the fue l as indicated by alarms on ANY of the fo ll owing radiatio n (site-s pecific li s tin g ofradiat i o n m o nit ors , and th e associated monitor s: r ead in gs , se tpo i nt s and/o r a l a rm s) I Soe nt F u e l Pool Ve ntil a ti o n Mo n i t or RE-25A OR B I (3) Lowering of s p e nt fuel pool l eve l to (site-specific L eve l 2 va lu e). I Spe nt F u e l R ad i a t ion M o nit o r RE-5 I [See Deve l oper No t es] I Con t ai n ment Pur ge Vent il ation Monitor RE-24A OR B I (3) Lowering of s pent fuel pool l eve l to 140 feet (Level l). Difference I Dev i atio n I Justification Difference
- Fa rle y EAL Thres h o l d (2) specifies that alarms on identified radiation monitor s are required to satisf y the EAL thre s hold. See VS FNP-1 (2)-ARP-1.6. Justification:
llse of the alarm indiciations for the radiation monitors provides site personnel with a clear indicntion that fuel has been damaged and a release of radioactivity is occurring as a result. Difference: S ite s pecific information provided for Farley EAL Thresho l d (3). See V4 SF P Level 3 and 2 Indication. 7 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS RA3: IN I TIAT I NG CONDITIONS N E I 99-01 Rev 6 Farle y R a d ia t ion leve l s th a t i m p ede access to e quipm e nt n ecessary fo r no rm a l p l an t R ad i ation leve l s th a t i m pede access to e qu ipment n ecessary for no r ma l p l a nt o p era ti ons , coo ld own or sh ut down. operatio n s , c o o ld o wn o r s hu t d o wn. D i ffere n ce I Dev i ation I Justification THRESH O LDS N EI 99-01 Rev 6 Farle y (I) Dose ra t e greate r t h an 1 5 m R/hr in AN Y of t he fo ll ow in g areas: (I) Dose r a t e g r ea t e r t h an 1 5 mR/hr on RE-I A , Co nt ro l Room Radia tion
- Co ntro l R oo m o nit or
- Ce ntral Alarm S t atio n (2) A n UN PL ANNED even t r es ult s in radia ti on l eve l s that pro hibit o r * (o th e r s it e-s p ecific a r eas/roo m s) impede access to any If ab le HI p l a n t roo m s o r areas: (2) A n UN P LANNED eve nt r es u l t s in ra diatio n l eve l s th at p ro h ibi t o r impede access to a n y of t h e fo ll owi ng p l ant roo m s or a r eas: 'f ab l e HI (site-speci fi c l is t of p l a nt roo m s or areas wit h ent ry-r e l a t ed m ode Mode Room Na me Room N u mber a p p li ca bilit y i de nt ified) E l ec tric a l Penetration 334,333 , 347/ Room !2334 , 2333 , 2347 H a l l way O u tside Fi l ter 312,332/ (3 R oo m !23 1 2 , 2332 I A.2A MCC areas Samp l e Ro om and 323 , 324/ Prim ary C HM lab s , 2323 , 2324 Sample Room a nd 323 , 324/ 4 Prima ry CHM l abs 2323 , 2324 )lilR H x Ro o m 128/ !2 128 D i fference I Dev i at i o n I Justification 8
ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGIC A L EFFLUENT ICS/EAL S Differenc es: F arl ey T hre s hold (I)-CAS i s loc a ted in the C R en v el o pe; no additional area s identified. S ee V6 A l a rm Re s pon se -FN P-l-A RP-1.6 (C ontro l R o om Rad Monitor). Justification: No additional rooms applicable to this EAL threshold. CAS is included in the Control Room envelope. Differen c e: F arle y T hre s hold (2) pro v ides s ite s p e cific information. 9 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS RUt: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley R e l ease of gaseo u s or l i qu i d ra di o activity g rea te r than 2 time s th e (s it e-R e l ease of gaseo u s or liquid ra di oac ti v i ty g r eatre th a n 2 tim es th e ODCM s p ec i fic effl u e nt r e le ase co nt ro llin g d oc um e nt) lim i t s fo r 60 minu tes o r imit s for 60 minut es or l o n ger. l o n ge r. Difference I Deviation I Justifiration None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-0 I Rev 6 Farle y (I) R eadi ng o n A N Y effl u e nt r a di a ti on m o nit or g r ea t e r than 2 t im es th e (I) R ea din g on ANY effl u e nt radi a ti o n mo nit o rs g r ea t e r t h a n 2 time s th e (s it e-s p ec ific e fflu e nt r e l ease controllin g d oc um e nt) limit s fo r 6 0 ODCM limit s fo r 60 minutes o r l o n ger: min u tes or lo n ge r: j_,iquid Effluents (site-s pecifi c m o nit o r li s t and thre s hold v alue s co rr es p o nd i n g to 2 Steam Generator Slowdown Effl uent Line RE-238 2.80 x 1 0 1 com ti m es t h e co nt ro ll i n g d oc um e nt limit s) Gaseous Effluent s (2) Rea din g on A N Y e fflu e nt radiati o n m o nit o r g r ea t e r th a n 2 tim es th e S te am Jet Air E i ector RE-I 5 3.5 x 10 2 cpm alarm se tp o int estab li s h ed by a c urr e n t ra di oac ti v i ty di sc h a r ge Plan t Vent Gas pe rmit for 6 0 minutes o r lon g er. R-14 3.2 x J O' cpm (3) Sa mpl e a n a l ys i s fo r a gaseo us o r liquid r e l ease ind ica t es a RE-22 4.0 x 1 0 2 cpm co n ce ntration or r e le ase rate g re a ter th a n 2 tim es the (sit e-s p ec ifi c RE-298 (NG) 8.90 x 10-' uCi/co effl u e n t r e l ease co nt ro llin g d oc um e n t) l i m its fo r 60 minu tes or lo n ger. (2) R ea ding o n A Y effl u e nt radi at i on m o n ito r g r ea t e r th a n 2 ti m es th e a l a rm se ptp o in t e s t a bli s h ed b y the c u r r e nt ra di oac t iv i ty di sc h a r ge pe rmit for 60 minut es or l o n ger. Liqu_icl Radwaste Efn u ent Line RE-I 8 2 x relea s e permit setpoi n t (planned release) Plant Vent Ga s R-1 4 Q x relea s e pennit s etpoint (planned r e l ease) (3) Sa mpl e a n a l ysis fo r a gaseo us o r liqui d r e l e a se indi ca t es a co n ce ntration or r e l eas e rate g r ea t e r t h a n 2 tim es th e ODCM limit s fo r 60 min mu tes o r lo n ger. 10 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. See V2 Rad Monitor Calculation. 11 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS RU2: INITIATING CONDIT IONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley UNPLANN ED Jo ss of water l eve l above irradi ated fuel. UNPLANNED l oss of water leve l above irradiated fuel. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Far l ey (I) a. UNPLANNED water level drop in the REFUELTNG (I) a. UNPLANNED wa t er l eve l drop in the REFUELING PATHWAY as indicated by ANY of the fo llo wing: PATHWAY as indicat ed b y ANY of the following: (site-specific level indication s). AND I Per so nnel report of l ow water level I b. UNPLANNED rise in area radiat io n l eve l s as indic a ted by I A nnun c i a tor El-12 " SF P L VL HI/LO" I ANY of the fo ll owing radiation monitors. (site-specific list of area radiation monitors) AND b. UNPLANNED ri se in area radiation l eve l s as indicated b y ANY of the fo llo w in g radiation monitor s. I RE-5 in t he f u e l buildin g I I in conta inment I I RE-27A ORB in co nt a inm ent I Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference
- Far l ey Threshold (l)a -site specific information provided.
See V7 A larm Response-FNP-1(2)-ARP-l.S (SFP Leve l). Difference: Farley Threshold (l)h -s it e specific information provided. See VS Rad Mo nitor Info rmation (FSAR). 12 COLD SHUTDOWN/REFUELING SYSTME MALFUNCTION IC S/EALS CGI: INITIATING CONDITIONS NE I 99-01 Rev 6 Farley Lo ss of(r eac t o r ve ss el/R CS [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) inventory affe c tin g fuel Lo ss of RPV i n ve n to ry a ff e cting fue l clad int eg rit y with cont a inm e nt clad int eg ri ty with cont a inment c hallenged. c hall e n g ed. Differen ce I Deviation I Justification Differen ce: E l 99-0 I Rev 6 refer s to reactor vessel/RCS in vento r y for PWRs. Fa rle y u ses RPV inventory. Justification
- Site use of terminology differs from NEI guidance.
THRESHOLDS E l 99-01 Rev 6 Fa rl ey 1 3 COLD SHUTDOWN/REFUELING SYSTME MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS (I) a. (Reac t or vessel/R CS [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) l evel le ss than (I) (2) * (s ite-sp ecific level) for 30 mi n ut es or lon ge r. AND b. ANY i ndication from the Containme nt C h a ll enge Table (see be l ow). a. (Re actor vessel/R CS [P WR] or RPV [BWR]) l eve l cannot be monitored for 30 minutes or l o nger. AND b. Co r e unco very i s indicated b y ANY of th e followin g: * (Si te-specific rad i a tion m o nitor) rea ding g r eater t h a n (site-s pecific va lu e)
- Erra tic so ur ce range m o n i tor indication
[P WR]
- UN PLANN ED i n c re ase in (s it e-s p ec ific s ump a nd/o r t ank) levels of s uffi c i e nt magnitude to indi cate co r e uncove ry * (O th e r s ite-spec ific indi cat i ons) AND c. ANY in di ca tion from the Co n tainme nt C h a lle nge Table (see b elow) C ontainme n t C h a ll enee Table CONTA I NMEN T CLOSURE n o t establis h ed* * (Explosive mi xture) exists in s id e co ntainm e n t
- UN PLANNED i ncrea se in co nt a inm ent pre ss ure
- Secondary co nt ai nm ent rad iati o n monit o r reading above (sis pe ci fi c va lue) f B WRl
- lf CONTAfNMEN T CL OSURE 1 s r e-estab li shed pnor to ex ceedin g the 3 0-minut e time limit , th e n declaration ofa Genera l E mergenc y is not required. Difference I Deviatio n I Ju s tifi c ati o n b .\:\' tndrcat1on from the Containment Chalkngo:
l l (-l-)(2) a. Reactor vesse l le ve l c ann o t be monitored for 30 minutes or lon g er. * *
- b. C. AND C ore unco very is indicated b y ANY of the fo ll owing:
- Co n ta inm e nt Hi gh R a n ge R a di a ti on M o nit or R E27A or 27 8 re adi ng greater th a n o r e qua l t o I 00 R/H r
- Erratic so urce range m o nit o r indication
- UN PL ANNE D incre ase i n Co nt a inm e nt Sump , o r eac t o r Coo l ant D ra i n Tank @C D l), o r W as te o l d up Ta nk (WHT level s of s uffici e nt magnitude to indic a te core un covery AND ANY indicatio n from th e Co ntainment Challenge Table C I. C ontainment Challenee Tab l e C l CONTA fNMENT CLOSURE not established*
Grea t e r th a n o r eq u a l to 6 % H 2 e x i s t s in s ide co nt ain m ent UNPLANNE D increa s e in containment pre ss ur e
- I f CON TAINM E NT CLOSU R E is r e-estab li s hed prior to exceed in g t h e 30-minut e tim e limit , then d eclaratio n of a Ge ne ra l E mergency i s not required.
Differ e nce: N EI 99 ThFeshehl (I) is net used ot FHrley. RemHining thre s hold renumllered.S ite \pecifir information pro\ided for I* Threshold (!)>1. See \'9 in I IS/RP\ Le.el Information. 14 [C o mme nt ed [JRB10J: RAJ 10 revi s i o n COLD SHUTDOWN/REFUELING SYSTME MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS Jusliflulien: Sile speeifle design fNP !lees nel h11 o e lhe 11bility le 11eettr111el) ' me11sure leo el 111 TOAF; JleF 9e<<eleper's Note guill11nee, this threshelll e11n be deleted. Difference
- NE I 99-01Rev6 Threshold (2)b, la s t bullet, refers to Other s ite-specific indications of core uncovery. No Other site-specific indicati o ns are u se d at Farley. Justification:
Farley does not use any other site-specific indications of core uncovery than those already identified in FNP Threshold 1 (.J.2)b. Difference: Table d esig nator C l assigned to Co ntainment C hallenge Table. Justification: Editorial change to clearly identify tables within the document. Difference: Site specific information provided. See V2 Rad Monitor Calc ulation , VI I Co nt S ump-R C DT-W HT FSAR Reference, and Vl2 H2 Co ncen tra tion. 15 (Commented [JRB11]: RAI 10 revi s i o n (Commented [JRB12): RAJ 10 revisi o n COLD SHUTDOWN/REFUELING SYSTME MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS CSI: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley Loss of(reactor vesse l/RCS [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) inventory affecting core Loss of'RPV inventory affecting core decay heat removal capability. decay heat removal capability. Difference I Deviation I Ju st ifi ca ti o n Difference
- NE I 99-01 Rev 6 refers to reactor vessel/RCS inventory for PWRs. Farley uses RPV inventory.
Ju s tifi cat i o n: S it e u se o f termin o l ogy diff e r s fr o m NE I g uid a n ce. THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley (I) a. CONTAfNMENT CLOSURE not estab li shed. (I) a. CONTAfNMENT CLOSURE not e s tablished. AND AND b. (Reactor vessel/RCS [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) l evel less than b. YLIS (Mode5) level less than 121 '0" (6" below bottom (site-specific level). D ofRCS loop). (2) a. CONTAfNMENT CLOSURE establis hed. (2) µ CONTAINMENT CLOSURF established AND A'\'0 b. (Reactor vessel/RCS [PWR] or RPY [BWR]) l evel less than b RPY level less than ANY of the following: (s it e-specific level). . 0% RVLIS (Mode 5} (3) a. (Reactor vessel/RCS [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) l evel cannot
- 119" Temporary Level lnd1cmor (Mode 6) be monitored for 30 minute s or longer. a. RPV le vel cannot be monitored for 30 minute s or longer. [ Commented
[JRB13]: RAJ I 0 revision ANO AND b. Core uncovery is indicated by ANY of the followin g: b. Core uncovery is indic a ted by ANY of the following: * (Si te-s pecific radiation monitor) reading greater than
- Containment High Range Radiation Monitor RE27A (s i te-specific va lue) or 278 reading greater than or equal to 100 R/Hr
- Erratic s ource range mon it or indication
[PWR]
- Erratic source range monitor indication
- UNPLANNED increase in (site-specific sump and/or
- UNPLANNED increase Containment Sump , or tank) levels of sufficient magnitude to indicate core eactor Coo l ant Drain Tank (RCDT), or Wast e uncov ery old up Tank WHT levels of sufficient magnitude to * (Other site-specific indications) indicate core uncovery 16 COLD SHUTDOWN/REFUELING SYSTME MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS Differ e nce I Deviation I Justification Differen ce: NE I 99-01Rev6 Threshold (l)b refers to reac tor vesse l/R CS level for PWRs. Fa rle y uses RVLIS (Mo de 5) l eve l. See V9 RVLIS/ RP V L e ve l an d V IO RP V Level Calc ulation. Justification:
RVLIS (Mode 5) level i s used s ince it can be monitored b y control room per s onnel at Farle y. Difference
- NEI 99 91 Rev (i Threshold (2) is not used at fHrley. Remftining threshold renumhered Site s p e cific informat i on prO\ ided fot h1rlt') EAL Threshold 2(b). See\ 9 RV LIS/RP\ Level. Jnstifiution:
Site speeifie design fNP does not the Hhility to fteeurt1te1,* meftsure le-.*el at TOAi"; peF De-.*elo11eF's Note guide nee, this tl1Hshold eft11 he deleted. Differen ce: NE I 99-01 Re v 6 Threshold (J)b , la st bullet, refer s to Other site-specific indications of core uncover y. No Other s ite-s pecific indicati o n s are u se d at Farley. Ju s tification
- Farle y doe s not u s e an y other s ite-s pecific indication s of core uncov e r y than tho s e alread y identified in FN P Thre s hold (2 3)b. Difference:
S it e speci fic information provided for Fa r l e y EAL Threshold 2(b). See V2 Rad Monitor Ca lculation and VI I Co nt S ump-RWHT F SA R Reference. 17 [Commented [JRB14): RAJ 10 revision ( Commented (JRB15): RAJ I 0 revision COLD SHUTDOWN/REFUELING SYSTME MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS CA I: INITIAT I NG CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley Loss of(reacto r vessel/RCS [PWR] o r RPV [B W R]) in ve nto ry. Loss of RPY in ve nto ry. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference
- NE I 99-01 Rev 6 refers to reactor vesse l/RCS inventor y for PWRs. Far l ey uses RPV inventory.
Justification
- Site use of terminology differs from NEI guidance.
THRES HO LDS NEI 99-0 I Rev 6 Farley (1) Loss of(reactor vessel/RCS [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) inventory as ( 1) Loss of RPV invento ry as indicated by l eve l le ss 122'1 l'. indicated by l eve l less than (si te-s peci fic l eve l). (2) a. V level ca nn o t be monitored for 1 5 mi nutes or l o n ger (2) a. (Reactor vessel/RCS [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) l evel cannot AND be mo n itor ed fo r 15 minute s or longer b. UNPLANNE D increase in Cona inm e nt S ump , Reactor AND Coo lant Drain Tank lRCDT o r Waste Holdup Tank b. UNPLANNED increase in (site-specific su mp and/or tank) (W H T) l eve l s due to a l oss of RPY invent ory. leve ls d u e to a l oss of(reactor vesse l/RCS [P WR] or RPV [BWR]) inventory. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference
- NEI 99-0 1 Rev 6 refers to reactor vessel/RCS inventory for PWRs. Farley u ses RPV inventory. Justification:
Site use of terminology (RPV vs R CS) differs from NEI guidance. Difference: S ite s pecific information provided for T h resho l d (I). See V9 RVLIS/RPV Level. Justific11tion: The 122'1 I" level s pecified in EAL threshold (I) is the minimum RC S level for RHR operation provided in procedure for mid loop operations. Difference
- Site s p ecific informat i on provided for T h resho l d (2)b. See VI I Cont Sump-RCDT-WHT FSAR Reference.
18 COLD SHUTDOWN/REFUELING SYSTME M A LFUN C TION I C S/E A L S C A 2: INITI A T I NG C ONDITIONS N EI 99-01 R ev 6 Farle y Los s of all offs ite a n d all o n s ite A C power t o emergency b u ses for 1 5 m inut es Los s of a ll offsi t e a nd a ll onsite AC power to emerge n cy b u se s for 15 or l o n ger. m inute s or lon ge r. Differ e nce I Deviatio n I Justification N one THRESHOLD S NE I 9 9-01 R ev 6 Farle y (!) Loss of AL L offs i te and AL L o n si t e AC Power to (s it e-specific (I) Loss of A LL off s ite and A LL onsite AC Power Tahle <;I 1 to emerge n cy b u ses) for 15 mi nu tes o r longer. BOTH 4 I 60V ESF busses I (VF AND I (2)G fo r 1 5 minute s o r (Comme n ted [JRB16]: RA! 1 2 r evision lo n g er. ff able SI U nit I U nit2 Start-uo A u x XFMR I A Start-uo Aux XFMR 2A Start-up Aux XFMR I B Start-up Aux XFMR 2B Diesel Ge nerat or l-2A Diesel Generator l-2A Diesel Generator I B Diesel Ge n era t or 2B Diesel Genera t or I C Diesel Ge n era t or I 0 Diesel Ge n erator 2 0 D i ese l Generator 2 0 D i fference I De v iation I Ju s tification Differen ce: S ite s pe c ifi c information pr ov ided. S ee V IJ ESF Ru ss e s Drawin g. 1 9 COLD SHUTDOWN/REFUELING SYSTME MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS CA3: IN I TIAT I NG CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Far l e y Inab il ity t o maintain t h e pl ant in co ld s hutdown. In ab ili ty to m a intain th e plant in co ld s hutd own. Difference I Deviatio n I Justifiration None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-0 I Rev 6 Far l ey (I) UNPLANNED inc rease in RCS temperature to g r ea ter than (s ite-(!) UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperat ur e to greater than 200 " fl s pecific Tec hn ica l Specifica tion co ld sh utd o wn temperature limit) for grea ter th an th e duration s pecifi ed in Table C2. for greate r t h an the duration spec ified i n the fo llow i n g table. Table Cl: R CS He at-uo Duration Thresho l d s Table: R CS Heat-up Duration T hr es holds R CS Status Co ntainment Clos ure H ea t-up C ontai n ment C l os ure Heat-up Status Dur ati on RCS S tatus Status Duration No t int act No t Es t ab li shed 0 m inutes Int act (b ut n o t at r educed (or at reduced in ve nt ory) Established 20 minut es* 1nventorv rPWJm Not a ppl icab l e 60 minutes* lntact Not app l icab l e 60 m i nut es* Not intact (o r a t reduced Estab li s hed 20 minute s* (b ut not at r educed inventory) i n ventory [/'WR]) Not Es t ablis h ed 0 minute s
- If an R CS heat rem ova l system i s in o per at i o n wi thin thi s time fr ame and
- If an RCS h eat rem ova l sys t e m is in o p e ration wit hin thi s tim e frame and RCS temperature is reduced , th e EAL i s not appl i cab l e RCS temoerature i s be m u. r ed uc ed , the EAL is n ot aoo li cab le. (2) UNPLANNED RCS pressure increa se greate r th a n 1 0 psig. (Th i s (2) UNPLANNED R CS pressure increa se greate r than (s it e-specific EAL do es not apply during water-solid plant conditions
.) pres s ure re a din g). (This EAL doe s not apply during water-solid plant conditions. [PWR]) Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference
- Table designator C2 assigned to RCS Heat-u p Duration Thres h olds. Justifiration:
Ed itoria l rhange to clearly identify tables within the document. Difference: Information included in RCS Heat-up Duration Thresho l ds Table for Far l ey is inverted from the presentation in NEI 99-01 Rev 6. Information is the same. 20 COLD SHUTDOWN/REFUELING SYSTME MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS Justification
- E ditorial c han g e for Human F a c tor s con s ideration
-worst ca se i s pre s ented fir s t. Difference: Site specific information provided. See VI TS Table 1.1-1 Modes. 21 C OLD S H U TDO WN/R E F UE LI NG SYSTME MALFUNC TIO N I CS/EA L S CA 6: I N ITI A TING C O N DITION S ( Formatted: Left E l 99-0 1 Rev 6 Fa rl ey Hazardous event affect in g a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current Hazardou s event affecting a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode. operating mode. Differ e n ce I Deviatio n I Justification No n e T HR ES HOLD S NE I 99-0 1 Rev 6 F arl ey (I) a. The occurrence of ANY of the following hazardous events: (!) a. The occurrence of ANY of the fol l owing hazardou s eve nts:
- Seismic event (earthquake)
- Seismic event (earthquake)
- Int ernal or exte rnal flooding event
- Intern al or ex ternal floodin g event
- High winds or tornado strike
- Hi g h winds or tornado strike
- F I RE
- FIRE
- EX PLO S ION
- EX PLOSION * (site-specific hazards)
- Other events with s imilar hazard c haracteri stics as
- Other events with similar hazard characteristics as determined by the hift Manager determined by the Shift Manager AN D AN D b. E I T H E R of the following: b. EIT H ER of the following: . Event damage ha s caused indicat i ons of de grade d I. Eve nt damage ha s caused indications of de gra ded performanc e in at l east one trai n ofa SAFETY performance in at lea s t one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the c urrent operating mode. SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode. . The event h as caused VISIBLE DAMAG E to a O R SAFETY SYSTEM component or struct u re needed for 2. The event has caused VISIBLE DAMAG E to a the current operating mode. SAFETY SYSTEM co mponent or s tructur e needed for the current operating mode. Di ffe r e nc e I D ev i a ti o n I Justification 22 COLD SHUTDOWN/REFUELING SYSTME MALFUNCTION I CS/EA LS Difference:
NE I 99-01 Re v 6 Threshold (l)a , next to the la st bullet , refer s to site-specific hazards. o additional site s pecific hazard s are identified for Far l e y. Ju s tification: F arle y ha s not identified an y additional s ite-s pecifi c hazard s applic a bl e t o thi s EAL thre s h o ld. 23 COLO SHUTDOWN/REFUELING SYSTME MALFUNCTION I CS/EAL S CUI: INITIATING CONDITIONS El 9 9-01 R ev 6 Farle y UNPLANNED l oss of(reacto r vesse l/RCS [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) inventory UNPLANNED loss of RPV for 15 minutes o r l o n ger. for 15 minutes or longe r. Differ e nce I Deviation I Ju s tifi r ati o n Differenc e: NE I 9 9-01 Re v 6 refer s to rea c tor v e ss el/R CS in v entor y for PWR s. F arle y u s e s RP V in v entor y. Ju s tifi catio n: S ite u s e of t e rmi no l ogy differ s fr o m NE I g uid a n ce. THRESHOLDS N EI 99-01 Rev 6 Farle y (I) UNPLANNED loss of reactor coolant resu l ts i n (r eac t or vesse l/RCS (I) UN P LANNED lo ss of reactor coolant resu l ts in RPV level l ess t h a n [P W R] or RPV [BWR]) level l ess t h an a required l ower limit for 15 a requi r ed lower limit for 15 minute s or longer. minute s or lon ger. (2) a. RPV level cannot be monitored. (2) a. (Reactor vessel/RCS [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) l evel cannot AN D be monitored. b. UNPLANNED increase in Containment Sump , Reactor A D Coolant Drain Tank , or Waste Holdup Tank l eve l s. b. UN PLANN ED inc r ea se in (site-specific sump and/or tank) levels. D i ffer e nce I Deviation I Ju s tifi ca ti o n D i fferenc e: NE I 99-0 1 Re v 6 refer s to reactor v e ss el/R CS level for PWR s. Farle y u s e s RP V le ve l. J u s tifi catio n: S ite u se o f t er min o l ogy (RP V vs R CS) differ s fr o m 'E l g uid a n ce. Diff e r e n ce: S it e s pe c ific information pro vi ded. S ee VI I Co nt S ump-R C D T-WH T FSA R Ref e ren ce. 24 COLD SHUTDOWN/REFUELING SYSTME MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS CU2: INITIATING CONDITIONS NE I 99-01 Re v 6 F arle y L o s s of a ll bu t o n e AC powe r s o ur ce to e m e r genc y b u s es for 1 5 minut e s o r Lo ss of all b ut o n e AC pow e r s o ur ce to e m er ge n c y b u se s for 1 5 m i nu te s or long e r. l on ge r. D i fference I De v iation I Ju s tification No ne THRESHOLDS NE I 99-01 Re v 6 Farle y (1) a. A C p o wer ca pabi li t y to (s i te-s pe c ific e m e r ge n c y b u ses) i s (I) a. AC p ow e r ca p ab ili ty to BOTH 4 I 60V ESF busses I (2)F r ed uc e d t o a s in g l e p ower s o u rc e for 1 5 m i nu te s o r lon g er. AND I Q)G i s red u ced t o a si n g l e powe r s o u rce I *'ii AN D fo r 1 5 minute s or lo n g er. ( Commented [JRB17): RAJ 1 3.b r e vi s i o n b. A n y a d diti o n a l s in g l e pow e r s o u r ce fa ilur e w ill resu l t in AN D l o ss o f a ll A C power t o SA F ETY SYSTEMS. b. A n y additiona l s in g l e p ow e r so u rce fa ilure w ill r es ul t in l o ss o f a ll A C pow e r to SAF E TY S Y ST E MS. r rable SI U nit I U nit 2 S t art-up A u x XFMR I A Start-up A u x XFM R 2A S t a rt-uo Aux XFMR I B Start-uo Aux XFMR 28 Diese l Ge n erator l-2A Diesel Generator l-2A Diese l Ge n era t or I B Diesel Generator 28 Diesel Ge n erator IC Diesel Generator I C Di e s el Ge nerat or 2C Diesel Generator 2 Cr Differen c e I Deviation I Ju s tification Difference
- S ite s pecifi c information pr o vid e d. S ee V IJ ESF Ru ss e s Drawin g. 25 COLD SHUTDOWN/R EFUELING SYSTME MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS CU3: I NIT I AT I NG CONDIT IO NS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farle y UN P LANNE D in c r eas e in R CS t e mper a ture. U NPL A NN E D in c r ea s e in R CS t e mp e r a tur e. Difference I Deviation I Ju s tifi r ati o n one THRES HOLD S NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farle y (I) UNPLANNE D in c r ease i n R CS t e mpe ratu r e to g r ea t e r th a n (s it e-(1) UN P L A NNE D increase in R CS te m peratu r e to g r eate r th an 200 °F. s pec i fic Tec hn i c a l Speci fi ca ti o n co ld sh ut down t e mp e ratur e li m i t) (2) Loss o f A LL R CS te mp era ture a n d RP V l eve l indi cation for 1 5 (2) Loss of ALL R CS t em p era ture a nd (r eac t or vessel/R CS [P WR] or m i nut es or l o n ger. RPV [BW R]) l ev el in d i ca ti o n for 1 5 m i n u t es o r l o n ge r. Difference I Deviation I Ju s tifi c ation Difference: N EI 99-0 1 Rev 6 EAL Thresho ld (2) refer s to reactor ve s sel/R C S level for PWRs. Farle y uses RP V l evel. Ju s tifi ca ti o n: S it e u se of te rmin o l ogy (RP V vs R CS) dif fr r s fr o m NE I g uidan ce. Difference:
S ite s pecific information provided. S ee VI T S Table I.I-I Mode s. 2 6 COLD SHUTDOWN/REFUELING S Y S TME M A LFUNCTION ICS/EAL S CU4: INITIATING CONDITIONS NE I 99-01 R ev 6 Farle y Lo ss of Vit a l D C p ow e r for 1 5 min u t es or l o n ge r. Lo ss of Vita l DC p ower for 15 min u te s or l on ge r. Differ e n c e I Deviation I Ju s tification N one THRESHOLD S NEI 99-01 Re v 6 F arle y {I) I ndi ca ted v o l ta ge i s l ess t h a n (s ite-s pec i fi c bu s vo lt age va lu e) o n (1) I n d i cated vo lt age i s le ss t h a n 1 05VD O on Technical Specifica ti on r e qu i r e d Vita l DC b u s e s for 1 5 min ute s or lon g er. re qu ir ed 1 25 VDC vital b u ss e s fo r 15 mi n ute s o r lon g er. Differ e n ce I D e viation I Ju s tifi c ation Differen ce: S ite s pecifi c information pro v ided. S ee V l4 D C Vo ltag e Refe re n ce. 2 7 COLD SHUTDOWN/REFUELING SYSTME MALFUNCTION IC S/EALS CUS: INITIATING CONDITIONS NE I 99-01 Rev 6 Farle y Loss of all onsite o r offsi t e communicat i o n s ca p abilities. Loss of all onsite or off s it e communicatio n s capabilities. Difference I Deviation I J ustifiration Non e THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley (I) Loss of ALL of t he following onsite communica tion method s: (I) Loss of ALL of the fo ll ow in g onsite communicat i on method s: (site-spec ific l i st of communications methods) I In plant telephone s I (2) Loss of ALL of t h e following ORO co mmuni catio n s m et hod s: I Pub li c add r e ss sys tem I (site-spec i fic list of communications me thods) I Plant radio sy s tem s I (3) Loss of ALL of t he following NRC communication s method s: (site-specific li st of communica tions methods) (2) Loss o f ALL of the fo ll owing ORO communicat i ons methods: I ENN (E m e r gency Notification Network) I I C ommerc i a l phone s I (3) Loss of ALL of the following NRC communications meth ods: I ENS o n Federal Telecommu ni cation s System (FTS) I I Co mm erc i a l phone s I Difference I D ev iation I Justification Differenc e: S it e speci fic information pro v ided. 28 INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAG E INSTALLATION (ISF S I) IC S/EALS E-HUI: INITIATING CONDITIONS N EI 9 9-01 R ev 6 Farle y Da m age to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT B OUNDA R Y. Damage to a loade d cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY. Difference I Deviation I Justifiration one THRESHOLDS NE I 99-01 R ev 6 Farle y (I) Damage to a loaded cask CONF I NEMENT BOUNDARY as (I) Damage t o a l oaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY as indicated by an on-contact radiation reading greater tha n (2 times the indicated by a n on-co n tact rad i atio n reading greater than AN Y of th e site-specific cask specific technical specification a ll owab l e radiation va lu es li s t e d in Tab le E I. level) on the s u rface of the spe n t fue l cask. able El Location of Do s e Rat e Total Do s e Rate (j'l cutron +Gamma mR/hr) HI-TR AC 125 S id e -Mid h e i g h t 1 360 fop 1260 I-STORM 100 Side -60 i nc h es be l ow mid-h e i g ht 340 S id e -Mid-h eig h t 350 Side -60 in c h es above mid-h e i g ht 1 70 Ce nt e r o f li d 50 Midd e l of t op lid 60 [_op d u d 1 60 B otto m inl e t) d u ct 460 29 I NDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL S TORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI) I CS/EALS Difference I Deviation I Ju s tification Difference
- A dded ne w Table E l to Farley EAL Threshold (I). Si te s pecific inform at ion provided.
See V I S ISF S I TS/Do se Reading Calc ulation. Ju s tifi c ation: U tili z ed t a ble to di s pla y I S F S I t e chnical s pecifi c ation rad ia tion le ve l s for the diff e r e nt I SFS I modul es. Intent of NE I 99-01 R ev 6 EA L thre s hold remains s ati s fi e d. 30 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EALS PWR F I SS I ON PR ODUCT BA RR IERS MATR IX -INITIATJNG CONDITIONS/THRESHOLDS NE I 99-01 Rev 6 FA I -A n y Loss or any Pote nti a l Loss of either FSI -Loss or Potential L oss of any two barriers. FG I -Loss of any two barriers a nd Loss or Potential Loss the Fuel C lad or RCS barrier. of t h e third barrier. Farley FG I -Lo ss of any two ba rri ers a nd Loss or FSI -Loss o r Potenti a l Loss of a n y two barriers. FA I -A n y Lo ss or any Potential Loss of either the Fuel P o t e nti al Loss of t h e third barrier. C l ad or RCS barr i er. Differe n ce I Deviation I Justification Difference: I C's li s ted in de s cending order (GE-A lert) instead of ascending order u s ed b y NE I 99-01 Rev 6. Fuel Clad Barrier RCS Barrier Containment Barrier Loss Po t ential Loss Loss Potential Loss Loss Potential Loss NE I 99-01 Rev 6 I. RCS or SG Tube Leakage I. RCS or SG Tube Leakage I. R CS or SG Tube Leakage Not Ap pli cab le A. R C S/re ac tor A. An auto m at i c or A O p eration of a s tandby A. A leaking or Not Applicab l e vessel l eve l le ss manual ECCS (SI) charging (m ake up) RUPTURED SG is th a n (site-specific act u a t ion i s r eq u ired pump i s req ui red by FAU L TED outside of l evel) by EITHER of the EITHER of the conta inm e n t. follow in g: fo ll owing:
- UN I SO LAB LE I. UNISOLAB L E RCS l eakage RCS leakage OR OR . SG tube 2. SG tube leaka ge. RUPTURE. OR B. RCS cooldown ra t e grea ter than (site-specific press uri ze d thermal s hock 31 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EAL S c ri ter i a/li m its d e fin e d by s i te-s p ec ifi c indi cat i o n s). Fa rl ey No t A ppl i ca b le A. CORE COOLING A. An a ut o m a ti c or A. O p eration of a s ta n db y A. A l e a k in g or No t App l ica bl e CSF-ORANGE m a nu a l ECCS c h a r gi n g pump i s RUPTUR ED SG i s entry co ndition s act u a t ion i s r equired re qu ired b y EITHER FAU LT E D o u t s ide of met by EITHER o f th e o f th e fo ll ow in g: co nt a inm e nt. fo llo w in g: . UN I SOLA BL E . UN l SO L A B LE R CS leakage R CS l ea k a g e . SG t u be l ea k age . . SG tu be OR R U PT U R E. B. CS INTEGRITY CSF RED entry conditions m et Difference I Deviation I Ju s tifi c ation Difference
- R CS Barrier Loss EAL T hr es h old I.A-NEI 99-0 1 Rev 6 includes (SJ) a s clarifier for ECC S. Farle y th r es h old I.A does not include this clarifier. Ju s tification
- Te rminolo gy d i ff e r e nc e Difference:
R CS Barrier P o tential Lo ss EAL Threshold I.A -NEI 99-01 Rev 6 claritie s a charging pump a s a makeup pump. F ar l e y thre s hold I.A doe s not include this cla r ifier. Ju s tification
- Te rm i nolo gy d i fferenc e -F arle y doe s not r e fer to char g in g pump s a s mak e up pump s. Difference
- S ite S pecific information provided. S e e V I6 CSFST Information.
32 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER I CS/EA LS NE I 99-01 Re v 6 2. Inadequate Heat Remo v al 2. Inadequate Heat Removal 2. Inadequate Heat Removal A. Co r e exi t A. Co r e exit Not A p p li ca b le A. In a d eq u a t e R CS h ea t Not A ppli cab l e A. I. (Site-s p ecific th e rm oco u ple th e rm oco upl e r e m ova l ca p a bili ty v i a c riteri a fo r e nt ry r ea d in g s greater r ead in gs g r ea t e r s t eam generators as i n to co r e coo lin g th a n (s i te-specific t h a n (site-s p eci fi c i ndi ca t ed b y (s it e-restoratio n te m perature temperature specifi c i n dicatio n s). p r oce dur e) va lu e). va l ue). A D OR 2. Restora ti o n B. I n adequate R CS p r oce dur e n ot heat r e m ova l eff e c ti ve w ith i n c a p abi l ity v i a 15 m i nu te s. s te a m ge n erato r s a s i nd ica t ed b y (si t e-specific i n d i catio n s). Farley 33 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EAL S A. CORE COOLING A. C OR E COOLING Not Applicable A. HEAT SINK CSF-Not App l icab l e A. CORE COOLING CSF -RED entry CSF-ORANGE RED entry condition CSF -RED entry conditions m et. e ntry co ndition s met. conditions met for 1 5 met minutes or lon ger. O R NOTE Heat Sink CSF B. HEAT SINK CSF s hould not be -RED entry considered RED if t ota l co ndition s met. AFW flow i s le ss than 395 g pm due t o NOTE Heat Sink operator action. CSF s hould not be co n sidered RED if t o tal AFW flow i s l ess than 395 g pm due t o operator ac ti on. Difference I Deviation I Justification Diffuenc e: Site s p eci fic in fo rmation provided. See V16 CSFST Information. A dded NOTE to Fuel C lad and R CS Potential Loss EAL Thresho ld s related to validity of H EAT S I NK CSF indication
- s. Ju s tification: S ite specific difference
/consideration. F P has determined that Heat S ink CS F Red i s not applicable if AFW flow i s le ss than 395 g pm due to operator action. NEI 99-01 Rev 6 34 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EAL S 3. RC S Activity I Co ntainmut Radiation
- 3. R CS Ac t iv ity I Containment Radiation
- 3. R CS Ac ti vity I Co ntainmut Radiation A. Containment Not Applicable A. Contai nm e nt radiation Not Applicable Not App li cab l e A. Containment radiation monitor monitor reading radiatio n mon itor reading greater g r ea t e r than (s it e-reading greate r than than (site-specific s pecific value). (site-spec ifi c va lu e). va lu e). OR B. (Site-specifi c indications that r eactor coolant activity is greater th a n 300 µCi/gm dose equivalent 1-1 3 1). Farley A. Co nt a inm ent Not App li cab l e A. Containmen t radiation Not Applicable Not Applicable A. Containment radia t ion monitor monitor RE-2 g r ea t er radiation m o nit or RE-27A or B than I R/hr OR RE-27 A or B g r ea ter greater than 600 Co nt a inm e nt radiation than 8000 R/h r. R/hr. monitor RE-7 greater OR t han 500 mR/hr. B. Indication s that reactor coolant ac ti vity is greater than 300 µCi/gm dose equivalent I-1 3 1. Difference I De via tion I Justification Difference:
F u e l C l a d Barri er Loss EAL Threshold 3.8-NE I 99-01Rev6 direct s u s e of s ite s pecific indiciation s of do se equivalent 1-131. Fa rle y thre s hold u ses the term Indica tio n s. Justification: Variou s method s for determining when this E AL thre s hold i s met. Difference: Site speci fic info r mation provided. See V2 Rad Monitor Calcu lation. 35 F I SS IO N PROD UC T B A RR IE R I CS/EALS E l 99-01 R ev 6 4. C ontainm e nt I nt eg ri ty o r B y p ass 4. C ontainm e nt Int eg ri ty or B y p ass 4. C ontainment Int eg ri ty or B y p ass Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Not App l ic ab le A. Containment isolation A. Containment pres s ure is required greater than (site-AN D s pecifi c value) EIT H E R of th e O R following: B. Explosive mixt u re I. Containment exists inside integri ty h as been containment l ost based on O R Emergency C. I. Co n tai n ment Director judgment. pre ss ure greater O R than (site-specific 2. UNISOLABLE pressure setpoint) pat h way from the AN D contai n ment to the 2. Less t h an one environment exists. full train of(site-O R s pecific system B. I n dications of RCS or equipment) i s le a kage o u t s ide of ope r at in g per contai nm ent. de s ign for 1 5 minute s or longer. Farle y 36 Not Applicable Not Applicable FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EAL S Not Applicab l e Not Applicable A. Containment isolatio n is r eq uired AN D E ITH E R of the following: A. CONTAINMENT CSF -RED entry cond tions m et OR B. Hydrogen concentration greater
- Co nt ainment integrity has been l ost based on E m e r gency Director judgment. (Commented
[JRB19): RAJ 1 8 revision OR
- UN I SOLABLE p athway from the co nt a inment to t h e environment exists. OR B. Indi cations of RCS le akage o ut side of co nt a inm e nt as indicated by alarms on any of th e following 111stru1m:nts
- R E-1 0
- RE-1 4
- RE-21
- R E-22 olc Increases in sump le\ els. tcmpc*ratures rcssurcs thl\\ rates und'or radiation level readmgs outside containment ma\ 111d1catc that the RCS mass 1s hcmg lost outside of contammcnt C. 1. COJ>ITAIJ>I M eJ>IT CSF O R MIGE> ee nd i!1 e A s met{ >Ill. r .: A D 2. Less than one CT MT fan coo ler s a nd one fu ll train of CTMT spray is operati n g per des i g n for 1 5 min ut es o r longer. Difference I Deviation I Ju s tification Difference:
Loss EAL T hre s hold 4.8-NE I 99-01 Rev 6 refer s to generic indications of R CS leakage outside containment. Farle y thre s hold s p eci fies s pecific indications u s i n g identified rad monitor s. S ee V I 7 Rad Monitor Referenc e (A RP). 3 7 (Commented [JRB20]: RAJ 1 9 revision ( Commented [JRB18]: RAJ 1 7 revi s i o n FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EALS J ustifiration: lluman factors consideration, use of specific measurable and recognizable indications facilitates the determination that EAL threshold has been met. Difference
- Potential Loss EAL Thres h old 4.B-NE I 99-01 Rev 6 refers to Ex plo s iv e mi x ture exists in s ide c ontainment.
Fa rle y thre s ho l d s pecifie s the h y dro g en co ncentration that i s considered an e xplo sive mixture in containment. See V l2 H 2 C oncentration. Justification: lluman factors consideration, use of a specific measurable and recognizable concentration facilitates the determination that EAL threshold has been met. Differencr: "iite s1lecific information provided for Potential Loss L. \L 'I hreshold .t.C 1. See \'21 Containment Spra y Initiation Setpoint. (Commented [JRB21]: RAJ 1 9 revi s ion Diff e rence: Potential Loss EAL Thresho l d 4.C.2 -E l 99-01 Rev 6 refers to o n l y one train ofa s ite specific sys tem. Farley thre s ho l d include s additional compone n ts (one CTMT fan coolers) that s upport CTMT s pr ay to meet thi s entry condition. Justification: Plant design difference. Diffue11eei Sile speeifie i 11H!Fme1ie11 See \qti tSFS+ l11H!F11111tie11 , [ Commented [JRB22]: RAJ 1 9 revi sio n NEI 99-01 Rev 6 5. Ot h er In dication s 5. Other Indications
- 5. Ot h er Indication s A. (si t e-specific as IA. (s ite-specific as A. (si te-s pecific as I A. (si t e-specific as A. (s it e-spec i fie as I A. (s ite-speci fie as applicable) applicable) applicab le) applicable) app li cab l e) applicable)
Farley Not App li cab l e I Not Applicable Not Applicab l e I Not Applicable Not Applicable I Not Applicable Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference
- o additio n a l EAL Thresho l ds ide n tified for Far l ey. Justification:
o additional EAL Thresholds identified. NEI 99-01 Rev 6 38 FISSION PRODU CT B A RRIER IC S/EALS 6. E mer ge nc y Dir ec tor J u dgment 6. E m ergency Director J u d g ment 6. E mer ge n cy Director Judgment A. A Y condition in A. A Y co ndition in A. ANY condition in the A. ANY condition in the A. ANY condition in the A. A Y co ndition in the the opinion of the the opinion of the opinion of th e opinion of the opi nion of the opinion of the E mergency Emergency Emergency Director Emergency Director Emergency Director Emergency Director Director that Director that that i n dicates Loss of that indicates Potential that indic ates Loss of that indicates indicates Loss of i ndicates Potential the RCS Barrier. Lo ss of the RCS the Co nt ainment Potential Loss of the the Fuel Clad Loss of the F u e l Barrier. Barrier. Contai nment Barrier. Barrier. C lad Barrier. Fa rl ey A. ANY condition in A. ANY condition in A. ANY co ndition in the A. ANY condition in the A. ANY condition in the A. A Y condition in the the opinion of the t he opinion of the opinio n of th e opinion of the opinion of the opi ni o n of the e mergenc y e mer gency emerge n cy dir ec tor emergenc y director that emergency director th a t emerge n cy director director that director that that indicates l oss of indicate s potential lo ss indicates loss of the that indicates indicates lo ss of indicates potential the RCS Barrier. of the RCS Barrier. conta inment barrier. potential lo ss of the the fuel clad loss of the fuel containme nt barrier. barrier. c lad barrie r. Difference I De viatio n I Ju s tifi c ati o n No ne 39 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HGI: INITIAT I NG CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley HOSTILE ACTION r e s ulting in los s of phy s ical control of the facility. HOSTILE ACT I ON re s ulting in lo ss of ph ysica l control of the facility. Diffuence I Deviation I Ju s tifiration No ne THRESHOLDS NEI 99-0I Rev 6 Farley (I) a. A HOSTIL E ACTION i s occurring or ha s occurred within (I) a. A HOSTIL E ACT I ON is occurring or has occurred wi thin th e P ROTECTED AREA as reported by the (site-specific the PROTECTED AREA as reported by the s ile s e e tm tf sec u ri ty shift s upervi sio n). feree<m shttl Captain or dcsigncl'. AN D A D ( Commented [J RB23]: RAJ 21.b r evision b. EITHER of the fo ll owi n g ha s occurred: b. EITHER of the fo ll owing ha s occ urred: I. A Y of the fo llo w in g sa fety function s cannot be I. ANY of the following safe ty functions can not be controlled or maintained. contro lled or maint ained.
- Reactivity control
- Reactivity control
- Core coo l ing [PWR] I RPV water l evel [BWR]
- Core cooling
- RCS heat removal
- RCS he a t removal OR OR 2. Damage to spe nt fuel ha s occurred or i s 2. Damage to spent fuel ha s occurred or i s IMMfNENT.
IMMfNENT. Difference I Deviation I Ju s tification Difftrence
- S ite specific information provided. 40 HAZARDS AND OTHER C ONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY IC S/EALS HG7: INITIATING CONDITIONS El 99-0 1 Rev 6 Farley O th er conditions exist w hich in the judgment of the E mer ge n cy Director Other co nditi o n s ex i st which in the judgment of the emergency director warrant declaration of a General E mergenc y. warrant declaration of a Genera l Eme r ge n cy. Difference I Deviation I Ju s tification No ne THRESHOLDS NE I 99-01 Re v 6 Farley (I) Othe r co n ditions exist whic h in the j u dgment of the E mer gency (I) Other condi ti ons exist which in the judgme nt of the emergency Director i ndi ca t e th a t eve nts are in progress or hav e occurred w hi c h director indicat e that events are in progress o r ha ve occurred which involve actual or IMMTN ENT substantial core degradation or involve actual o r IMMTN ENT substantial core degradation or melting melting wi th p o tential for lo ss of containment integrity or HOST I LE wit h potential for l oss of co nt ainment integrity or H OSTILE ACTION that r es ult s in a n actual l oss of physica l co nt ro l of the ACT I ON that re su lt s in an actual los s of physical control of the facility. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA facility. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Actio n Guideline exposure levels offsi te for more than the Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate si t e area. immediate s ite area. Difference I Deviation I Ju s tification one 4 1 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITION S AFFECTING PLANT S AFETY IC S/E ALS H S I: INITIATING CONDITIONS NE I 99-01 R ev 6 Farle y H OST I LE ACT I ON withi n t h e PROTECTED AREA. H OST I LE ACT I ON wit h in the PROTECTED AREA. Differenc e I D ev iation I Justification one THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farle y (I) A HOST I LE ACT I ON is occ urr i ng o r has occurred within the (I) A HOST I LE ACTION is occ u rri n g or has occ u rred within the PROTECTED AREA as reported by the (site-specific security shift PROTECTED AREA as reported by the s ite feree supervision). Security Captain or <les1gnce. ( Commented
[JRB24): RAJ 2 1.b revision Differenc e I De v iation I Justification Differen ce: S it e s pe ci fic information pro v ided. 42 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY I CS/EA L S HS6: INITIATING CONDITIONS NE I 99-01 Rev 6 Farley I nability to control a key safety function from o ut side the Co n trol Room. In ability to contro l a key safety func t ion from outside the Co ntrol Room. Differ ence I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley {I) a. An event has resulted in p l ant co ntrol bein g transferr ed (I) a. An event h as resulted in plant co ntrol being tran sferred from t he Control Room to (site-speci fie remote shutdown from the con trol room to the r e mote s h utd o wn p a nel. pane l s and l ocal control s tation s). A D AN D b. Control of ANY of the following key safety functions is not b. Control of ANY of the fo ll owing key safety functions is not reestablished wit hin 1 5 minute s ree s ta b li s hed with i n (si t e-specific number of minut es).
- R eactivity co ntrol
- Reactivity control
- Core coo lin g
- Co re cooling [PWR] I RPV water le vel [BWR]
- RCS heat removal
- RCS heat removal Difference I Deviation I Justification Differen ce: S ite spe cific information pro v ided. 43 HAZARDS AND OTHER C ONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HS7: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farle y Other co ndition s ex i s t w hich i n the j ud g ment of the E mer ge n cy Dir ector Other con diti o n s exis t w hi ch in the judgment of the e m erge n cy director wa rr an t declaratio n of a Site Area E m e r ge n cy. warrant declaration of a Site A r ea E m e r gency. Difference I Deviation I Ju s tifiration No ne THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Re v 6 Farley (I) Other co nditions exis t w hich in the jud g ment of the E mer ge n cy (I) Other co ndition s ex i st which in the judgment of th e emergency Direc t or indica te th at eve nts a r e in pro g r ess or h ave occ urr ed which di r ecto r indicate that events a re i n progress or have occurred whic h involve ac tu a l o r likel y major fai lure s of plant functions needed for involve act u a l or likel y ma jor fai lur es of plant fu n ct ion s needed for protectio n of th e public or HO S TIL E ACT I ON th at r es ult s in protection of the public or HOSTIL E ACT ION th at r esu lt s in inte ntional d a m age o r maliciou s ac t s , (I) t owa rd site per so nn e l o r intentiona l d a m age or maliciou s ac t s , (I) toward si t e personnel o r equipment th at c ou ld l ead to th e likel y fai lur e of or , (2) th at prevent eq u ipme nt th at could lead to the likel y failure of or , (2) that p r eve nt effective access to eq uipment n eeded for the protection of t h e public. effec ti ve access to eq uipm e nt n ee d ed fo r th e protection of the pub l ic. Any releases a r e n ot expecte d to re s ult in exposu re levels which A n y releases a r e not expec t ed to re su lt in expos ur e lev e l s w hi c h exceed E PA P ro te ct i ve Action Guideline ex po s ure leve l s beyo n d the excee d E PA Prot ec ti ve Action Guideline expos ure l evels be yo nd th e s it e boundary. site bo und ary. Difference I Deviation I Ju s tificlltion one 44 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY IC S/EALS HAI: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley HOSTIL E ACT ION w i thin the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA or airbo rne HOSTIL E ACTION within the OWNER CONTRO LL E D AREA or airbo rn e attack threat wit hin 30 minutes. attack threat within 30 minute s. Difference I Deviation I Ju s tifi c ati o n None THRESHOLDS E I 99-01 Rev 6 Farley (I) A HOSTILE ACT ION is occ urrin g or has occurred within the (I) A HOSTIL E ACTION is occurring or h as occurred within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA as r epo rted by the (site-specific OWNER CONTROLLED AREA as reported by the site see11rily sec uri ty s hift su pervi s ion). -lfilee on sh1Ji Sccunt) Captwn or dl";1°11cc. (2) A va lidated no t ification from NRC of an ai rcraft attack thre at wi thin (2) A validated notification from NRC of an aircraft attack threat within [ Commented
[JRB25): RAI 2 1.b revisi o n 30 minute s of the s ite. 30 minute s of the si te. D i fference I Deviation I Ju s tifi c ati o n Differenc e: S ite s pecific information p rovided. 45 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITION S AFFECTING PLANT S AFETY I C S/E A LS HAS: INITIATING CONDITIONS NE I 99-01 Re v 6 F arle y Gaseous relea se im p eding access to e q u ipm e n t necessary for n o rm al plant Gaseous re l ease i m ped i ng access to eq u ip m ent necessary fo r norma l p l a n t o p era t io n s , coo l down or s hu tdown. operations , coo l dow n or shutdown. Differen c e I Deviation I Justification o ne THRESHOLDS N E I 99-01 R ev 6 Farle y (I) a. Re l ea se of a to xic , corrosive , asphyxiant or flammable gas (I) a. Release of a toxic , corrosive , asp h yx ia n t or flammab l e gas into any of the fol l owi n g pl a n t roo m s o r a r eas: into any Tab le HI p l ant room s or a r eas: (site-specific list of p l a n t rooms or areas with e n try-related Table HI mode app li cabi li ty id e ntifi e d) Mode RoomNam i; Room Number AN D E l ec tri cal P ene trati on R oo m 3 34 ,3 3 3 , 34 7 I b. E n try i nto the room o r area is prohib i ted or impeded. 2 3 34 , 2333 , 234 7 ll H a ll way Ou t si d e F ilt er R oo m 3 1 2 , 332/ I A.2A M CC areas 23 1 2 , 2332 Sa m p l e R oo m a n d Pri m ary C H M Ja b s 323 , 324 1 2323 , 2324 Sa mpl e R oom a nd Prim ary C HM J a b s 323 , 324/ 4 2323 , 2324 Rl-IR H x R oo m 1 2 8 1 '2 1 28 AN D b. Entry into the room or area is prohibited or impeded. Differenc e I De v iation I Justification Differen c e s: S it e s pecific information provided. 46 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HA6: INITIATING CONDITIONS NE I 99-01 Rev 6 Farley Control Room evac u ation r es ulting in t ransfer of pl a nt co ntrol to alternate Control Room evacuation resulting in tran sfer of plant control to alternate location s. loc ations. Differenc e I Deviation I Justification one THRESHOLDS El 99-01 Rev 6 Farley (I) An eve nt has r es ulted in plant control being transferred from the (I) An eve nt has re s ulted in plant control being tran sfe rred from the Contro l Room t o (si te-s pecific remote s hutdown p ane l s and local contro l room to the remote s hutdown panel. contro l s t a tion s). Difference I Deviation I Justification D i fference: S ite speci fic information provided. 47 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HA7: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farle y Oth e r cond i tio n s exis t wh i c h in t he j ud g m e n t of t h e E m e r ge n cy Dir ector Ot h e r cond i tions ex i s t which i n the j ud gme n t of the e m e r ge n cy director warrant declaration of an A l ert. warra n t declaratio n of an Alert. Difference I Deviation I Justification one THRESHOLDS EI 99-01 Rev 6 Farle y (I) Ot h er con d i ti o n s ex i st w h ic h , i n the j ud g m e n t of the E m e r ge n cy (I) O th er co nd i ti o n s exist w hi c h , in t he j u dg m e nt of the e m ergency Director , in d icate t hat events a re i n progress or h ave occ urr ed which director , i nd icate that eve nt s are in progress or have occurred w h ich involve a n ac tu al o r pote nt ia l s ub s t a nti a l degra d a ti o n o f th e l eve l of i n vo l ve a n ac tu al o r pote nti a l s u bs t a nt ial degra d a ti o n of th e l eve l of safety of th e pl an t o r a sec uri ty e v e nt th a t i n vo l ves p rob a bl e l ife safety of th e p l a n t o r a sec uri ty eve nt t h at i n vo l ves pr obab l e life threate n i n g r is k to si t e perso nn e l or d a m age to s it e eq uipm e n t t hrea t e n i n g ri sk t o site pe r so nn e l o r damage t o site eq u ipme n t because of H OST I LE ACT I ON. Any r e l eases a r e expec t e d to be beca u se of H OST I LE ACT I ON. A n y re l eases are expected to be limi t ed to s m a ll fractions of t he E P A P rotective Ac t io n G u i d e l i n e li m i t ed t o s m a ll frac t ions of the E PA P r otec ti ve Ac ti o n G u ide lin e expos ur e l eve l s. ex p os ur e l eve l s. Difference I Deviation I Justification one 4 8 H A Z A RD S AN D OT H E R C O N DI T IO NS AFFECT I N G PL ANT SAFE T Y I CS/EA L S H U I: I N I T I AT I N G C O N DITIO NS NE I 99-0 1 Rev 6 Fa rl e y Confirm e d SECU RITY C O N D I T I O N or thr ea t. Co nfirm ed SEC URITY CO NDITI O N o r thr ea t. Diff e r e n ce I Dev i a tion I , lu s tifiration o n e T HR ES HOLD S E l 99-01 R ev6 Fa rl e y (I) A SECU RITY CO NDI T I O N th a t doe s n o t in vo l ve a H OS TI LE (I) A SECU R I TY CON D I T I O N t h at d oes n o t in v o l ve a H OS T I LE ACT I O N as repo rt ed by th e (s it e-s p ec i fic sec uri ty s hi ft s u pervisio n). ACT I O N as r eported by the seem11y Alree on 'hi tis, " (2) Notificatio n ofa cre d ible sec uri ty thr eat di r ec t e d a t t h e si t e. CJptain or <lcs1gncc. (3) A va l i d a t e d not i ficat i o n from t h e NR C provi din g i n fo rm a ti o n of a n (2) Not i fica ti o n ofa credib l e sec ur ity thr eat dir ec t e d a t FNP. [ Commented [JRB26]: RAJ 2 1.b r e vi s i o n aircraft th r eat. (3) A va l i d a t ed n otificatio n fro m th e NRC providing i n formation of a n a ir c ra ft thr ea t. Diff e r e n ce I D ev i a ti o n I Ju s tification Diff e r e n ce: EAL T h res h o ld (2); re pl ace d 't he s i te' wi th F N P. Ju s tifiration
- E ditorial chan ge -clearl y iden t ifie s that th relit i s direrted again s t the Fa rl ey s ite. D iff e r e n ce: S it e s p eci fic i n fo rm a ti o n provided.
4 9 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY I CS/EA LS HU2: INITIATING CONDITIONS NE I 99--01 R ev 6 Farley Seismic event grea t e r th an OBE levels. Seismic event grea t er th an OBE level s. Differen ce I Deviation I Ju s tification No ne THRESHOLDS NEI 99--01 Rev 6 Farley (I) Seismic eve nt greater than Operating Basis Eart hqu ake (OBE) as (I) Seismic eve nt greater than Operating Basi s Ea rthquak e (OBE) as indicated b y: indicated by seismic sw itch activation with t h e se ismic s s tem (s ite-specific indication that a seis mic event met or exceeded OBE computer indicatin g EIT H E R of the following: limit s) . C u mu l ative Absolute Veloc i t y (CA V) greater than 0.1 60 g-seo AND Spectral Accelaration g reater than 0.200g
- C umul ative Abso l ute Ve l ocity (CAV) g r eater t h a n 0 160 g-sec AND Spe c tral Velocit y grea ter than 15.240 cm/sec Difference I Deviation I Justification Differen ce: Site s pec ific information pro vided. See V IS Seis mi c ARP-FNP-1 (2)-ARP-t.12. 50 ---------------------------------
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT S AFETY ICS/EALS HU3: INITIATING CONDITIONS El 99-01 Re v 6 Farle y H aza r dous event. H aza rd o u s eve n t Differen c e I D e viation I Ju s titiration N one THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farle y (I) A tornado str i ke wit h in the PROTEC T ED AREA. (I) A tornado s t r i ke within the PROTECTED AREA. (2) Inte rn al roo m or a r ea fl ood in g of a m ag n it ude s u fficie nt to r equi r e (2) Int e rn a l ro o m o r a r ea floodi n g ofa m ag ni t u de s u ffic i e nt to req ui re manual o r a ut oma t ic e l ectr i ca l iso l a ti on ofa SAFETY SYSTEM manua l o r a u tomatic e l ect r ica l isola t ion ofa SAFETY SYSTEM component n eeded for the c u rre nt operati n g m ode. compone nt needed fo r t he c urr e n t operati n g m ode. (3) Movement of perso n nel wit h in th e PR OTECTED AREA is impeded (3) Movement of pe r sonnel wit h in the P R OTECTED AREA is impeded due to an offs it e eve nt i n vo l v in g h aza r do u s m a t e ri a l s (e.g., a n offs it e d u e to a n offsi t e eve nt i n vo l v in g h aza r do u s m a t e ri a l s (e.g., a n offs it e chemica l sp ill or t oxic gas re l ease). chemica l spi ll or toxic gas re l ease). (4) A hazardo u s eve n t tha t res ult s in o n-s i te cond i t i o ns s u fficient to (4) A h azar d o u s eve n t that r es ult s in on-site co n d iti o n s sufficient to prohibit the p l an t staff fro m access in g the site via perso n a l vehicles. pro h ibit the p l ant staff from accessi n g the si t e via pe r so n al ve hi c l es. (5) (Site-specific l is t of n at u ra l or t ec hn o l ogical h aza rd eve nt s) (5) Sustained hurricane force winds greater than 74 m p h forecast lo be at the plant site in the next four hours. Differenc e I Deviation I Justitiration Differenc e: S ite s pecific information provided for EA L Thre s hold (5). 5 1 H A ZARD S AN D OTHER C O N DITION S AFFECT I N G PL AN T SAFET Y I CS/EA L S HU4: I N ITI A TING CONDI T IONS NE I 99-01 Rev 6 Fa rl ey F I RE potentia l l y deg r a ding the l eve l of safe t y of the plant. FIRE potentially degradin g the level of safety of the pl a nt. Differen ce I D ev iatio n I Ju s tifiration N one THRE S HOLD S NE I 99-01 R ev 6 F arl ey (I) a. A F I RE is NOT exti n g u i s hed within IS-min u te s of ANY of (I) a. A F I RE is NOT extinguished within IS-minute s of ANY of the following F I RE detection indicatio n s: the follow i ng F I RE detection indica t io n s:
- Report from t h e fie l d (i.e., visua l observation)
- Report from the field (i.e., visual observation)
- Receipt of m ult ip l e (more than I) fire a l arms or
- Receipt of mu lt ip l e (more t h an I) fire a l arms or indi cat ion s indications
- Fie l d ve r ificatio n of a sing l e fire a l arm
- Field verificatio n ofa s in g le fire a l arm AN D AN D b. ll 1e F I RE is located wi t hin ANY Tab l e H 2 room s or areas. b. T h e FIRE is loca t ed wi t hin A Y of the fo ll owing plant (2) a. Receipt ofa si ngle fire a larm (i.e., no other indications ofa room s or areas: F I RE). (site-specific list of plant rooms or areas) AN D (2) a. Receipt ofa sing l e fire a l a rm (i.e., no o th e r in dica t ions ofa b. The F I RE is located within ANY of t h e Table 1-12 rooms or FIRE) areas. AN D AN D b. The FlRE is located wi th in A 'Y of the following plant C. The existence of a F I RE is not ve rified within 30-minutes rooms or areas: of a l arm receipt. (site-specific list of plant rooms or areas) (3) A F I RE within the plant PROTECTED A D PROT6GT6E:>
AREA n ot ex t i n gu i shed within 60-minutes of the c. The existence ofa FIRE is not verified within 30-minutes initia l report , a l arm or indication. ( Commented [JRB27): RAJ 22 revis i on of a l arm r eceipt. (4) A F I RE within the plant PROTECTED (3) A FIRE within t he plant or JSFSJ [for plants with an I SFS/ outside PROT6GT6E:> AREA t ha t req uir es firefighting support by an offsite th e plant Pro t ected A r ea] PROTECTED AREA not exti n guished fire re s pon se agency to exti n g u ish. (Commented [JRB28): RA I 22 r evisio n within 60-minutes of the in i tial report , alarm or indication. 52 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECT I NG PLANT S AFETY IC S/E A LS (4) A F I RE w ith in the p l a n t o r I S F S I [f or p l a nts w i t h a n I SFSI outs i de rfab l e H2 the p l a nt P r otec t ed A r ea] P R OTECTED AREA that r eq u i r es Auxiliary Bui l ding firefig htin g su pp ort by a n offs it e fi r e r es p o n se age n cy t o exti n g u is h. Diesel Generator Building Service Water Intake Structure (SW I S) Containment 1rn s 11 cs n C ommented [JRB29]: RAJ 24 revision Commented [JRB30]: RAJ 24 r evisio n D i fference I Deviat i on I Justification Difference s: E AL Thre s holds (l)b and (2)b-added reference to Table H2 instead oflisting areas s eparately for ea c h thre s hold. Justification
- lluman factors consideration
-applicable rooms are the same for each threshold. Placing these room s into one table and referencing the table simplifies the proce s s for identifying applicable room s. Difference s: EA L Thre s holds (3) and (4)-added PROTE C TED AREA after plant. Justification: Clarifies plant areas that are applicable to these EAL thresholds. Difference s: Added Table H2 with app l icable s ite specific room listing. 53 -------" ------------ H AZA RD S AN D O T H E R C O N DI T IO NS AFFECT I NG PL ANT SAFETY I CS/EA L S H U 7: I N I T I A TI N G C O N DITIO NS E l 99-0 1 Rtv 6 Fa rl e y O th e r condit i o n s ex i s t w hi c h i n th e jud g m e nt of the E m e r ge n cy Dir ec t or O ther co nditi o n s ex i s t w h ic h in th e j u d g m e n t of t he e m e r ge n cy d i r ector wa rr a n t dec l aratio n ofa (NO)UE. warrant d ec l ara t io n ofa NOUE. Diff t r toct I Devia tio n I Justification o n e T HRESHOLD S E l 99-0 I Rtv 6 Fa rl e y (I) Othe r co nditi ons ex i s t w hich i n th e jud g m e nt of the E m e r ge n cy (I) O th e r co nditi o n s ex i s t w hi c h in the j u dg m e nt of the e m erge n cy Directo r i nd ica te t h at eve n ts a re i n progress or h ave occ urr e d w hi c h d i r ector i n di cate tha t eve nts a re in p rog r ess or h ave occ u rred w h ic h i n dica te a po t e nti a l d eg rad a ti o n o f th e l e v e l of safe t y of th e pl a nt o r i n di c a te a p o t e nti al d eg rad a tion o f th e l eve l of sa fe ty of t h e pl a nt o r indicate a security t hr eat to fac il i t y p ro t ection h as be en initiated. No i n dica te a secu r ity thr eat t o faci l ity protection h as bee n i n i ti ated. No r e l eases of ra d i oac ti ve m a t e ri a l requir i n g offs i te r es pon se o r r e l eases o f ra di oac t ive m a teri a l re q u ir in g offsi t e re s p o n se o r monito r i ng a r e ex p ec t ed u nl ess f urthe r degra d a ti o n of safe t y sys t e m s m o nit o ring a r e expecte d un l ess f urth e r degrada ti o n of safety sys t e m s occ u rs. occ ur s. Diff e r t n ct I Dev iation I Justification No n e 54 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SGI: INITIATING CONDITIONS El 99-01Rev6 Farle y Prolonged loss of all offsi t e a nd a ll onsite AC power to eme r ge nc y bu ses. Pro l o n ged lo ss of a ll offs ite a nd a ll onsite AC power to emer g enc y buses. Difference I Deviation I J u s tifkation None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley (I) a. Loss o f ALL offs ite a nd A LL onsi te AC power to (s it e-(I) a. Loss of A LL offsite a nd ALL onsite AC power to BOTH s pecific emergency b u ses). 4 I 60V ESF busses I 2 F AN D I (£)G. AND A D b. E ITH E R of the fo llowin g: b. EITHER of th e fo llo wing:
- R estora tion of a t l east one AC e m ergenc y bus in l ess . Re stora tion of at l east one AC e m e r ge n cy bus in l e ss th a n (s it e-s pecifi c h o ur s) i s not li ke l y. th an 4 hours is not likel y. * (Site-s pecific indication of an inabi l ity to adequate l y . CORE COOLING CSF -RED co n d i uons met remove h eat fro m the co r e) Differenc e I Deviation I Justification Difference
- ite s pecific information provided.
S ee VIJ ESF Ru ss e s Drawing and V l6 CSFST Information. 55 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SGS: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99--01 Rev 6 Farley L oss of a ll AC and Vit al D C power so urce s for 1 5 minute s or Loss of a ll A C and vital D C power so urce s for 1 5 minute s or l o n ge r. Difference I Deviation I Ju s tifiration one THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley (I) a. Lo ss of ALL offsite and ALL onsite AC power to (si t e-(I) a. Lo ss of ALL offsite and ALL o n si te AC power to BOTH s p ec i fic emergency buses) for 1 5 minutes o r longer. 4 1 60 V ESF bu sses I 2 F AND I Q)G for 1 5 minute s or AND l onger. b. In dicated voltage i s le ss than (site-specific bus vo lta ge AND va lue) on ALL (site-specific Vital DC busses) for 1 5 b. Indicated vo lt age is l ess than I 05 VD on ALL 1 25 VD C minut es or lon g er. v it a l bu sses for 1 5 minute s or longer. Difference I Deviation I Ju s tification Difference: Site specific information provided. See VIJ ESF Busses Drawing and Vl4 DC Voltage Reference. 56 ----------- SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SSl: INITIATING CONDITIONS EI 99-01 Rev 6 Farle y Loss of a ll offs ite a nd all o n site AC power to e m e r ge n cy bu ses for 15 m i nute s L oss of a ll offs ite a nd a ll o n site AC p owe r to e m erge n cy bu ses for 1 5 o r l onger. minut es or l o n g er. Difference I Deviation I Justification one THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley (I) Loss of ALL offs it e an d ALL o n s it e AC power t o (s ite-spec ifi c (I) Loss of ALL offsi te a nd ALL o n s i te AC p o w er t o BOTH 4 I 60 V e m e r ge n cy bu ses) fo r 1 5 minut es or l onge r. ESF busses I Q)F AN D 1 (2)G for 1 5 minut es or l o n ger. Difference I Deviation I Ju s tification Difference
- Site s pecific information provided. S ee V IJ E S F Busse s Drawing. 57 L_ ________________________ ------
SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SSS: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley In a bil ity to s hut d o wn t he r eacto r ca u s ing a c h a ll e n g e t o (c or e coo lin g [PW R] Inabili ty to s hutdown th e reacto r c au s ing a c h a ll e n ge t o co r e coo l i n g or R CS I RPV water l eve l [BWR]) o r R CS h eat r e m ova l. h eat r e m ova l. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEl 99-01Rev6 Farley (I) a. A n a u t o m atic or m a nu a l (trip [PWR] I scra m [BWR]) d i d (!) a. A n a u to m a t ic or m a nu a l t rip d id n o t s hu t d own the reac t o r. n o t s h u td o wn th e r eac tor. A N D AN D b. A ll m an u a l ac ti o n s to s hu t do wn th e re ac t or h ave bee n b. A ll m a nu a l ac t io n s to s hut d own t h e r eac t o r h ave un s u cce ss fu l. been u n s u ccess ful. AND A D c. E ITH E R of th e follo w in g co nditi o n s ex i st: c. EITHER of t h e fo ll ow in g co n ditio n s ex i s t: * (S i t e-s p ecific i ndi c ati o n of a n in a bilit y to a d e qu a t e l y . Core Cooli n g CSF -RED conditio n s m et r em o ve h ea t fro m th e co r e)
- He at Sink CSF -RED conditions met . (S i te-s pe c ifi c indi ca ti o n of a n in a bilit y to a d eq u a t e l y r emove h eat fr o m the R CS) Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference
- Site sp e cific information pro v ided. See Vl6 C S FST Information. 58 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SSS: INITIATING CONDITIONS N EI 99--01 R ev 6 Farle y Lo ss o f a ll Vital D C p owe r for 15 m i nut e s or l o n ge r. Lo ss of a ll v it a l D C pow e r for 1 5 minu t es or l o n g er. .. Difference I Deviation I Justification on e THRESHOLD S N EI 99--01 Re v 6 Farle y (I) Indi ca t e d v o lt age i s l ess th a n (s ite-s pe c i fic bu s v olt ag e va l u e) o n (I) Ind ica t e d vo lt age is l ess t h a n I 05 VD on A LL 1 25 VDC v it a l ALL (si t e-s p eci fic V i t al D C b u s ses) for 1 5 mi nu te s or l o n g er. bu ss e s fo r 1 5 m i n utes or l o n g er. Differen ce I D e viation I Justification Diff e r e n c e: S ite sp ecific information pro v ided. S ee V l 4 D C Vo lt ag e Refer e n c e. 59 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SAi: INITIATING CONDITIONS NE I 99-01 Rev 6 Farle y L oss of a ll b ut o n e AC power so urce to e m e r ge n cy b u ses fo r 1 5 minut es o r Lo ss of a ll but one AC power sou rce to emergency b u ses for 15 minutes or lon ger. lon ger. Difference I Deviation I Justification THRESHOLDS EI 99-01 Re v 6 Farley (I) a. AC p owe r capabi l ity t o (si t e-s pecifi c e m ergency buses) is (I) a. AC power capabi li ty t o BO T H 4160V ESF busse s I (2)F reduc e d to a si n g le power source for 1 5 m i nute s or longer. AN D I Q)G is red u ced to a si n g le power so urce AN D for 1 5 minutes o r lon ger. (Comme n ted [JRB31): RA J 1 3.b r evisio n AND b. A n y ad dition a l si n g l e power so ur ce fai lur e wi ll re s ult in a lo ss o f a ll AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS. b. Any ad diti o nal s ing l e power so urce failure will resu lt i n a lo ss of a ll AC power t o SAFETY SYSTEMS. Ff able S I U n it I U nit 2 Start-up Aux XFMR IA Start-up A u x XFMR 2A Start-u p A u x XFMR I 8 Start-up A u x XFMR 28 Diesel Generator l-2A Diesel Generator 1-2A Diese l Ge n erator I 8 Diese l Ge n erator 28 Diese l Generato r I C Diese l Ge n erato r I 0 Diese l Ge n erator 2C Diesel Ge n erato r 2C Differenc e I Deviation I Justification Differenc e: ite s pe cific information provided.
See V IJ ESF Busses Drawin g. 60 SYS T EM M A LF UNC TIO NS S A2: I N ITI A TING C O N DITIO NS NE I 99-0 1 R ev 6 Fa rl ey UNPLANNED Joss of Control Room indication s for 15 minute s or longer UNPLANNED lo ss of Control Room indications for 15 minute s or longer with a sig nificant transient in progre ss. with a significa n t tran s ient in progress. Diff e r e n ce I Dev i a ti on I .Justification o n e T HR ES HOLD S E l 99-0 1 Rev 6 Fa rl ey {I) a. An UNPLANNED event result s in the inabi li t y to monitor ( l) a. An UNPLANNED event results in the inability to monitor one o r more of the fo ll owing paramete r s from within the one or mor e of t h e fo ll owing parameters from within the Co n trol Room for 1 5 minutes or longer. Control Room for 15 minute s or longer. fBWR varam e t e r lis t l f PWR varameter listl Reactor P ower Re ac tor Power Reactor Power RCS Level RCS Pressure RPV Water Level RCS Level In-Core/Core Exit Temperature RPV Pre ss ure RCS P r ess u re Wi d e R a n ge Level in at lea st o n e s team ge nerator Prim ary Co ntainment In-Core/Core Exit Steam Generator Auxiliary
- --n-* Feed Water Flow Pre ss ure Tempera tu re [ Commented
[JRB32): RAJ 27 revision Suppression Pool Level Levels in at l east (site-AND specific number) s te am generators
- b. ANY of the following transient events i n progre ss. Suppression Pool Steam Generator Auxiliary
- Automatic or manual runback greater than 25% Temperature or Emerge n cy Feed Water thermal reactor power Flow
- E lectri cal load reje c tion grea ter than 25% full electrical l oad AN D
- Re actor trip
- ECCS actuat i o n b. ANY of the following transient events in progress. 6 1 SYSTEM MALFUNCTION S
- A u tomatic or man u a l runback greater t h a n 25% thermal re ac tor power
- Electrical load r e jec t io n g r eate r th a n 25% full elect ri ca l l oa d
- Reactor scram [BWR] I trip [PWR]
- ECCS (S I) actua ti o n
- Therma l power o s c ill a t io n s greater tha n 1 0% [BWR] Differenc e I D ev iation I Ju s tification D i fferen ce: NE I 99-0 1 Re v 6 doe s not s pecify s te a m ge nerator le v el tran s mitter (wide or narrow ran g e). F arley s pecifie s n s e of W ide Ran g e Level indic a ti o n. Justificat i on: S ite det e rmination that Wide Ran g e Level indic a tion i s applicable to thi s EA L thr"e s h o ld. D i ff e r e n ce: E I 9 9-0 1 Rev 6 include s (S J) aft e r ECCS. F arle y doe s not includ e (S I) after ECCS. Justification
- S ite pre f erence, doe s not detract or affect EA L determination.
62 S Y S T E M M A LF UNC TIO NS S AS: I N ITIAT I NG CONDITIO NS NE I 99-0 1R ev6 Fa rl ey Automatic or m a nu a l (trip [PWR] I scra m [BWR]) fails to s hut down t he Automatic or m a nual trip fai l s to s hutdo w n the reactor , and s u bseq uent react o r , an d s ub se quent manu a l ac tions taken at th e r eac tor control conso l es manu a l actio n s taken a t the reactor control co n so l es are not s u ccess ful in are not successf ul in sh utting down the re ac to r. s huttin g do wn the r eactor. Diff e r e n ce I D ev iatio n I Justification N on e T HR E SHOLD S NE! 99-01 R ev 6 F arl ey (I) a. An au tomat ic or manual (trip [PWR] I scram [BWR]) did (I) a. An a utom atic or m a n ua l trip did not s hu t down t h e reactor. not sh utdown the r e actor. AN D AND b. Manua l action s taken at the r eac tor control conso l es ar e not b. M a nu a l ac tion s taken at th e r eacto r co ntrol consoles ar e not s uc cessfu l in s huttin g down the reactor. s u ccessful in s hutti n g down the rea c tor. Diff ere n ce I D ev i a ti o n I Justification No n e 63
SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SA 9: INITIATING CONDITIONS NE I 99-01 Rev 6 Farley Hazardou s even t affecting a SAF E TY S YST EM needed for the current Ha zardous event affec tin g a SAFETY SYST E M neede d for th e current operating mode. operating mode. Diff e renc e I Deviation I Ju s tification No n e THRESHOLDS NE I 99-01 Rev 6 Farley (I) a. The occur r ence of A Y of the following hazardous events: (I) a. T h e occurr ence of A Y of the followi n g h azardous events:
- S e ismi c eve nt (earthquake)
- Seismic event (earthquake)
- In t ernal or external flood i n g event
- Int erna l or externa l flooding eve nt
- H i gh winds or t orna do strike
- Hi g h winds or torn a do st rike
- FLRE
- FIRE
- EXPLOSION
- EXPLOS ION * (s i te-s pe c ific h azards)
- Other e v ents with s imil ar h azard characteri s tic s as
- O t h e r events wit h s imil ar h aza rd c haracteri s tic s as determined by the Shift M a na ge r d et ermined b y the Shift Manager AND AND b. EIT H E R of th e following: b. E I THER of the fo ll owing: . Eve nt damage h as cau se d indication s o f degraded I. Event damage ha s cau se d indications of degraded performan ce in at l eas t one train of a SAFETY performance in a t lea st one train ofa SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating m o de. SYSTEM n eeded for the current opera tin g mod e.
- The event has ca u se d VISIBLE DAMAG E to a OR SAFETY SYST E M component or structure ne e ded for 2. The event ha s caused VISrBL E DAMAGE to a the current operating mod e. SA F E TY SYSTEM co mponent or s tructure need e d for the current operating mode. Differenc e I Deviation I Justification Differenc e: No additional site speci fic ha zar d s identified.
Justification: ite personnel have determined that no additional site specific hazard s are applicable to this EAL thre s hold. 64 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SUI: INITIATING CONDITIONS E I 99-01 Re v 6 Farley Lo ss of a ll offsite AC p owe r capab ilit y to e m e r gency buses fo r 15 minut es o r Loss of a ll offsite AC power ca pabilit y to emergency buses for 15 minutes or lon ger. lon ger. D i ff ere n ce I Deviation I Ju s tifi r ation one THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley (I) Loss of ALL offsite AC power ca pabili ty to (site-spec ifi c (I) Loss of ALL offsite AC power capability jTahle S2) to BOTH emergency bus e s) for 15 minutes or l onger. 4 I 60V ESF bu sses I (l)F AN D I for 1 5 minutes or longer. ( Commented [JRB33]: RAJ 1 3.b revision rr able S2 U nit I I U nit 2 Start-up Aux XFMR I A I Sta rt-uo Aux XFMR 2A S tart-uo Aux XFMR I B I Start-uo Aux XFMR 28 Differenc e I Deviation I Ju s tification Differen ce: S ite s pe ci fic information provid ed. See V IJ ESF Russes Drawin g. 65 S Y STEM MAL FUNCT IO NS S U2: INITIATING CO N DITION S E l 9 9-01 Rev 6 F arle y UNPLANNED loss of Control Room indications for 15 minutes or longer. UNPLANNED loss of Control Room indications for 15 minutes or longer. Differ e n ce I Dev iation/ .lu s tifiration o n e THR E SHOLD S NE I 99-0 I R ev 6 F arle y (I) a. AnU P LANNED event results in the i n abi l ity to monitor (I) a. An UNPLANNED event result s in the inabilit y to monitor one or more of the fo ll owing parameters from within the one or more of t h e fo ll owing parameters from within the Co n trol R oom for 15 minu tes or lo n ger. Co n trol Roo m for 1 5 mi n utes or longer. f B WR parameter list] f PWR parameter list] Reactor Power Rea c tor Power Reactor Power RCS Level RCS Pressure RPV Water Leve l RCS Level I n-Cor e/Core Exit Te m perature RPV Pres s ure RCS Pressu r e Wide Range Level in at l east one s team generator Primary Containment In-Core/Core Exit Steam Generator Auxiliary-* -Feed Water Flow Pre ss ure Temperature [COm mented [JRB34): RAJ 27 revision S u ppression Poo l Leve l Leve l s in at l east (site-specific number) steam generators Sup p re s sion Pool Steam Generator Temperature Auxiliary or Emergency Feed Water F l ow Differen ce I Dev i a tion I Justifiration Differ e n ce: NE I 99-0 I R ev 6 do es not s pecify s t e am generator l e vel tran s mitter (wide o r narro w r a n ge). F arley s pe c ifi es u se o f Wid e Ran ge L e ve l i ndic a ti on. Ju s tification
- S ite determination that Wide Ran g e Level indiration i s applicable to this E AL thr es hold. 66 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SU3: INITIATING CONDITIONS NE I 99-01 Rev 6 Farle y R eactor coolant activity grea t er than Tec hni ca l Spec ific atio n a ll owable limit s. Re ac tor coo lant ac ti vity g r eater than Technical Specifica tion allowable limits. Di ffe rence I Deviation I Justification N one THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Re v 6 Farle y (I) (Site-speci fi c radiation m oni tor) r eadi n g greater t h an (site-specific I RCS coo l ant sa mple activity value indicating fuel clad degradation value). greater than Techni ca l Specification allowable limits as indicated b y ANY of t he fo ll owing: (2) Sample a nal ys is i ndi ca t es that a r eac t o r coo lant ac ti vity va lu e is greater than an allowa bl e limit s pe c ifi ed in Techn i cal Specifications. D'Os'" e Equivalent 1-131 g reater than 0.5 µCi/gm for g reat er than 48 hours DOSe Equivalent 1-13 1 g reater than Technical Specification figure 3.4.1 6-1. I F le ss than 20% power , T H EN u se the Dose Equivalent 1-131 20% power l imit on Tec hn ica l Specification fig u re 3.4.16-1 R CS gross specific activity grea t e r than 1 00/E µCi/g m. Difference I Deviation I Justification Differen ce: NE I 99-01Rev6 EAL Threshold (I) is not i ncluded in the Farley EAL sc heme. Justification:
Plant design difference. Farley doe s not have radiation monitors that survey reator coolant sys tem. Difference: Renumb e red E l 99-0 1 R ev 6 EAL T hre sho ld (2) to (I) for Fa rle y and re v i se d wording including table with condition s that meet the EAL thr es h old. S ee V 19 R CS Ac tivity Tech Spec. Justification
- Editorial change to clearly indicate Technical Specification limit s to plant personnel.
67 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SU4: INITIATING CONDITIONS NE I 99-01 Rev 6 Far le y R CS l eakage for 1 5 minut es or l onger. RCS l eakage for 1 5 minu tes or longer. Difference I D ev iation I J u s tiliration None THRESHOLDS NE I 99-01 Rev 6 Fa rle y (I) RCS unidentifie d or pre ss ure bo un dary l eakage grea t e r th a n (site-(I) RCS unid e nti fied or pressu r e bo un dary leakage greater than I 0 g pm specific va lu e) for 15 minutes o r l o n ger. for 15 minute s or lon ger. (2) RCS identified l eakage greate r than (site-specific value) for 15 (2) RCS identified leakage g reater than 25 g pm for 1 5 minute s or minut es or l onge r. longer. (3) Leakage fro m th e R CS to a l oca ti o n ou t si de containmen t g r eater (3) Leakage from the RCS to a l ocation outside co nt a inm e nt g r ea t er than 25 gp m fo r 15 minute s or l o n ge r. than 25 gp m for 15 minutes or longer. Differen ce I Deviation I J u s tification Differen ce: S ite s peci fic value i s not u se d for EAL Threshlds (I) a nd (2). Se e V20 R CS Leakage Tech S pe c. Ju s tifiration
- FN P T erh S pec leak rate i s le ss than identified EAL thre s hold value s. Per De v eloper ote s the identified va lue s ar e u s ed. 68
SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SUS: INITIATING CONDITIONS NE I 99-01 Rev 6 Farley Automatic or manual (t ri p [PWR] I sc ram [BWR]) fails to s hutdown the Automatic or manual trip fails to s hutdown the reactor. reactor. Difference I Deviation I J ustification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley (I} a. An a ut omat ic (trip [PWR] I scram [BWR]) did not (I) a. An automatic trip did not shutdown the reactor. sh utdown the reactor. A D A D b. A s u bsequent manual action taken at the reactor control b. A s ub seq uent m anua l action ta ken at the reactor control consoles is successf ul in s hutting down the re actor. co nsole s is s uc cessf ul in shutting down the reac tor. (2) a. A manual trip did not shutdown the reactor. (2) a. A manu al trip ([PWR] I scra m [BWR]) did not s hutd own AND the rea ctor. b. E ITH ER of the fo ll owing: AND
- A s ub seque nt manual action taken at the reactor control b. E ITH E R of the following: consoles is successfu l in shutting down the reactor.
- A s ub seq uent automatic trip is s ucces sf ul in shutting I. A s ubsequent man u al action taken at the reactor control down the reactor. consoles is success ful in shutti ng down the react or. OR 2. A s ub seq uent auto m atic (trip (PWR] I scra m [BWR]) is successful in s hutting down the reactor. Difference I De v iation I Ju s tification N one 69 S Y S T E M M A LF UNCT IO NS S U6: INITI A TING CO N DI T ION S NE I 9 9-01 R ev 6 F a r l ey Loss of all onsite or offsite communications capabilities. Loss of all onsi t e or offsite co mmunica t ions capabilities. Diff erence I D ev iati o n I Justifiration o n e T HR ES HOLD S NE I 99-0 I R ev 6 Fa rl ey (I) Loss of ALL of the following onsite communication method s: (I) Loss of ALL of the following onsite communication methods: (s ite-spec ific lis t of communications methods) I In plant telephon es I (2) Loss of ALL of the following ORO communications method s: I Pub l ic add r ess system I (s ite-spec ific li st of communications m e thod s) I Plant radio sys tem s I (3) Loss of ALL of the following NRC communications method s: (s ite-spec ific lis t of communicatio n s m e thod s) (2) Loss of ALL of the fol l owi n g ORO communications methods: I ENN (Emergency Notification Network) I I Commercia l phone s I (3) Loss of ALL of the fo ll owi n g NRC communications methods: I ENS on Federal Telecommunications System (FTS) I I Commercia l phones I Differ e n ce I D ev iation I Justification Diff e r e n ce: S it e s pe ci fic i n fo rm a ti o n pr ov i de d. 70 SU7: INITIATING CONDITIONS El 99-01 Rev 6 Farle y Fa ilur e to isolate con t ainment or loss of co nt a i nment pressure control. (PWR] Fail ur e to iso l a t e con t ainment or l oss of containment pressure co ntrol. Differenc e I Deviation I , fustification N one THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farle y (I) a. Fa ilu re of contai nm ent to isolat e whe n req uir ed by a n (I) a. Fai lur e of co nt ai nm e n t to iso l ate w h e n required b y a n act u ation sig nal. act u ation s ignal. AN D AND b. A LL r equired penet r ations are not closed within 15 b. ALL required pe n etrations are not closed within 15 minutes of the actuation signal. minutes of t h e act u a ti o n s ign al. (2) a. Co nt ai nm ent pressure g r eater th an (site-specific pre ss ure). (2) a. Containment pre ss ure g r eater than 27 psig. A D AN D b. Less than one full trai n of(site-specific system or b. Less th an on CTMT fa n cooler and o n e full train of eq uipm e nt) is opera tin g per d esig n fo r 1 5 minut es or CTMTspra i s opera tin g p er design for 1 5 minut es or l o n ger. longer. Differenc e I Deviation I Ju s tification Differen ce: S ite s pecific information provided for EAL threshold (2)a. See V2 I C ontainment S pr ay Initiation Set point. Differenc e: E l 99-0 1Re v 6 EAL thre s hold (2)b. refer s to onl y o n e train ofa s it e s pecific syste m. Fa rle y EAL thre s h o ld include s additional co mpon e nt s (o ne C TMT fan cooler) that s upport CTMT s pra y to meet thi s thre s hold entry condition.
Ju s tification
- Pia n t de s ign difference.
7 1 Southern Nuclear Operating Company License Amendment Request for Changes to Emergency Action Level Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 Responses to Requests for Additional Information EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT EAL DEVIATIONS AND DIFFERENCES MATRIX MARKED-UP PAGES NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Deviations and Differences Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant -Units 1 and 2 Table of Contents Generic Differences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. .. ...... . .................................. I HG7: Initiating Conditio n s .......................... ..................... . .. 39 RGI: Initi ating Co nditio ns . . . .............. ............................................ 2 HS I: Initi a tin g Conditions .......................... . .... 40 RG 2: Init iating Co nditi ons ............ ...... . ............. 3 HS6: Initiating Co nditi ons ........... ...... ...... ...... . .. ...... .................. .. 4 I RS I: Initiating Co ndition s ............. .... .................. .... 4 HS7: Initi a tin g Co nd itions .................................................................... 42 R S2: Ini tiating Co ndition s ...................................................... S HA I: Initiating Conditions . . .................................. ............................ 43 RA I: Initiating Conditions .. . ................ .................... 6 HAS: Initiating Conditions .................... . ..... 44 RA2: In itiating Condi ti ons .................. . ............. S H A6: Initiating Conditions .................... ..................... ......................... ... 4S RA3: Init iating Co nd itions ..................................................... 10 HA 7: I ni ti ating Conditions .......... ...... .............. . ................ ....... 46 RU I: In itiating Conditions . ...... ............ ...... ....... ...... ........ .............. . 11 HU I: Initiating Conditions ........................................ ........................... .. 4 7 RU2: Initi ating Co ndition s ............................ ......................... ................. 1 2 H U2: Initi a tin g Cond iti o n s ................................. .................................. .. 4S CG I: Initi ating Co ndition s................................ ............... .......... . .. 13 H U3: Initiating Conditions . . ...................... 49 CS I: Initiating Conditions .. . 16 HU4: Initi a tin g Condition s. . ............................................ SO CA I: Init iating Co ndition s ............................. .......................................... 19 HU7: Initi at in g Conditions ......................... .................... .................... .. S2 CA2: Initiating Conditions ................................. ..................................... 20 SG I: Initiating Conditions ..................... .......... . ..... S3 CA3: Initiating Conditions .......... 21 SGS: Initiating Conditions .......... ............................. S4 CA6: Init iating Cond ition s ............... ..... ............. ............ . .. 23 SS I: Initiating Co nditi ons.. ....... ................ .................. . ..... SS CU I: Init iating Condi tio ns.............................. .................. . .......... 2S SSS: Initi ating Co nd itions ...................................................................... S6 CU2: Initi ating Co ndition s ................ ........................................ 26 SSS: Initi a tin g Co nditi ons ............... .. . ....................................... S7 CU3: Initi ating Co ndition s ................. ..................................... 27 SA I. Initi a tin g Co ndit ions ....................... ........ ................... . .. SS CU4: Initiating Cond i tions.............. ... . ........... 2S SA2: Initiating Conditions ............................. .. . ...................... S9 CUS: Init iating Co nd it i ons ........................................................................ 29 SAS: Initiating Conditions ........................... .. 6 I E-H U I: I nitiating Conditions ................................... 30 SA9: Initiating Conditions ............... .. . ... 62 BWR Fission Product Barrier Matrix -Initi ati n g Conditions!fhresholds . 32 SU I: Initiating Conditions ....................... .............................................. 64 I. RCS Ac t ivity. .. . ..... 32 SU2: Initiating Co nditi ons. . ................. . ..... 6S 2. RPV Water L evel ............................................................ 33 SU3: Initiating Con diti ons ........................................... ....................... .. 66 3. Not Applicable .. .................... . ............ 34 SU4: Initiating Conditions ................................................................ ..... 67 4. Primary Containment Radiation . . .......... 36 SUS: Initi a tin g Conditions ... . ................... ... 68 S. Other Indi ca t ions ......... . ............ 36 SU6: In itiating Conditions ................ . .... 69 6. Emerge nc y Director Judgment ................... . ........ 37 HG I: Ini tiating Condi tio ns ............ ........ ........ .. . ... . . ......... 3S GENERI C DI F F E R EN C E S NE I 99-01 Re v 6 H it ch R eferences PW R s De l eted P W R r efere n ces as appro p ria t e Uses A for th e ra diol ogica l effl u e n t/r a d i a t i o n l evel I Cs Uses R fo r t h e ra di o l ogical effl u e n t/rad i a ti on l eve l !Cs E m e r ge n cy Classifica t ion !Cs are p r ese nt e d i n asce n di n g or d er (NOUE -GE) E m ergency C l ass i fica t ion !Cs a r e presen t ed in desce n di n g order (GE -NOUE) BWR OG EPG/SAG R evis i o n 3 g u i d a n ce n ot i nc lud ed I n co r pora t e d E P F A Q 20 1 5-003 a n d 20 1 5-004 g uid a n ce in EA Ls a n d B as i s 'Di rect' re l ease to t h e environment is no t defi n ed in F PB Mat r ix B asis In corpo r a t e d E P FAQ 20 15-006 g u i d a n ce in FP B Ma t r i x B asis GEN E RAL NOTE S I n s trum ent setpoi nt r ead in gs used as t h r es h o l d va lu es t o d e t e rm i ne e m e r ge n cy c l assificatio n s h ave bee n ve r ified b y H a t ch p erso nn e l as be ing w ith in th e ra n ge of t h e inst rum e nt a nd clea rl y a nd co n sis t e ntl y read w it h in t h e sca l e of the i n s trnm ent. f rhts vcnfirnt1011 1s documented on 'iNC l*onn :l 1' 1*03 ln11 I Cond1t1on. l merl.tcnc1 ct1on l ewl Vahdat1nn ,md Venficat1011 Worksheet S i t e s p ecific in fo rm a ti on i s hi g hli g ht e d in ye ll ow. (Commented
[JRB1): R A J 3.a r evisio n Grev t ex t it e m s to b e p ro vid e d o n ce i n s tr u m e n t a t i o n in s ta ll e d. S i t e s p ec i fic inform a ti o n w i ll be a dd ed u s in g 50.54(q) pro cess. O D C M is t h e co ntro ll i ng R a di a ti o n E ffluent D oc um e nt. !Pl* AQ 20I'>-013 guidance was rcvtC\\Cd and cons1dercJ for 1mokmentallon No re11s1ons tn 11< i I 11cre made as a result of tl11s re\ IC\\ l Pl A() 2015-015 guid. nee 11a-, revicweJ and dctcnnmed to be not <ipplicablc to lli'
<'i ,, 1111101 l c t<* ,1t lc<1;,t lor61 111m11tc II de s cripti o n) for 60 minute s or long e r. (lf1"l'I. Difference I Deviation I Ju s tification one THRESHOLDS El 99-01 Re v 6 Hatch (I) S pent f u e l po o l level c annot be re s tor e d to at lea s t (si t e-s pe c ifi c t ) '>pent ucl 1 lool kh ldnnot bt* n.*sturcJ lllUI 1..",l'\l -fn1 flt L ev el 3 v a lu e) for 60 min ut e s or l on ge r. 111111 1 1,* or It r per Differen ce I Deviation I Ju s tification one 3 A BNORMAL RAD L EV EL S I RADIOLOGI CA L EF FL UENT I CS/EA L S R S I: I N ITI A TING C O N DITIO NS E I 99-0 1 R ev 6 H a tch Re l ease of gaseo u s ra d io ac t ivity re s u l tin g in off s it e dose g r ea ter than I 00 Re l ease of gaseo u s radioactivity re s u l ti n g in offs ite do se g reat e r than I 00 mrem TEDE or 500 mr e m thyroid COE. mrem TEDE or 500 mr em th yroi d C O E. Diff e r e n ce I D ev iation I Justification N on e THRESHOLD S E I 99-0 1 R ev 6 H a t c h (I) Reading on ANY of the fo llowin g radiati on monitors g re a ter than (I) R ea din g on ANY of the following radiation monitors grea ter than the reading s h own fo r 15 minute s or l o n ge r: the r ea ding s hown for 15 minute s or l o n ge r: (si t e-s p ec ific monitor li s t a nd t hr eshold va l ue s) Reactor Buildin g V e nt Acc id e nt R a n ge Monit or: (2) Dose assess ment u s in g actual meteorol ogy indi ca te s do ses greater IOI l-P60 1 (feeding IOI l-R 63 1 , Rx Bldg 2.6 x 10-1 µCi/cc than I 00 mrem T E D E or 500 mrem t h yro id COE at or be y ond (si te-Vent Wide R a n ge) spec i fi e do se r ec eptor poi n t). 20 11-P 60 I (fe e din g 20 11-R63 1 , R x Bldg 12.6 x I 0-1 µCi/cc (3) Field survey r es ult s indicate E I T H E R of the following at or be yo nd Vent Wide R a n ge) (si t e-spec i fic dose r ece ptor point): Main Stack Accident R a nge Monitor:
- C l ose d window dose r a t es g reater than 10 0 mR/hr expected to ID I l-P007 (feeding ID I l-R 63 1 , M a in Stack 8.1 X I 0 2 µCi/cc co ntinue fo r 60 minutes o r longer. Wide Range)
- Ana l yses o f field s urvey samples i ndi ca te thyroid COE g rea t e r (2) Dos e asse ss m ent u s i n g ac tu a l meteorolog y indicates do ses greater than 500 mrem for o ne ho u r of inhalation. than I 00 mrem T E D E or 500 mr e m thyroid COE at or beyond the s ite boundary. (3) Fie l d s u rve y r es ults indicate E I THE R of the fo ll owing a t or beyo n d the si te boundary:
- Closed window d ose rates g re a ter th a n I 00 mRlhr expected to continue fo r 60 minutes or lon ger.
- Analyses of field survey sa mple s indica te thyroid COE g reater th a n 500 mrem for o n e h our of inha l ation. Differen ce I D ev i a tion I Justification Differ e n ce: S it e s pec ific in for m at i o n pr ov id e d. See Y2 R a d Mo ni to r Ca lcula t i o n a nd V 3 O D CM it e B ou nd ary R e f ere n ce. 4 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS RS2: INITIATING CONDITIONS EI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch Spent fuel pool l eve l at (s ite-s p ecific Level 3 d esc ription). '-11L'lll li1d pool lc'd Difference I Deviation I Justifiration None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01Rev6 Hatch (1) Lowering of spent fuel pool l eve l to (s ite-sp ecific Level 3 value). (I) I rn\c1111g nf,pcnt fuel pool knl In-D i fference I Deviation I Justifiration None 5 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EF FL UENT ICS/EA LS RAJ: INITIATING CONDITIONS NE I 99--01 Rev 6 H atch Relea se of gaseous or li qui d radioac ti v i ty resu l ting in offs it e do se greater Relea se of gaseo u s or liquid radioa c ti vity re sulting in offs it e dose g reater than 1 0 mrem TEDE o r 50 mr em th y roid C O E. than I 0 mre m TEDE or 50 mrem th y roid COE. Difference I Deviation I Ju s tification No ne THRESHOLD S E l 99--01Rev6 Hatch (1) Re ading on ANY of the following radiati o n monitors g re ater than (I) Reading on ANY of the fo ll owing radi a tion monitors g re a ter t h a n th e re a di ng s h own for 15 minut es or lon ge r: the reading s hown for 1 5 minut es or l onge r: (site-spec ifi c m oni t or list a nd thre s hold va lue s) Reactor Bui l ding Vent Accident Range Monitor: (2) Do se assess m ent u si n g ac tual m eteorology indicates do ses greate r JO I l-P 60 1 (feeding IO I l-R63 1 Rx B ld g 2.6 x I 0-2 µCi/cc than 10 mrem T E D E o r 50 mrem th y ro i d C D E at or be y ond (s ite-Ve n t Wi d e Ra n ge) specific do se re c eptor point). 20 11-P 60 1 (feeding2D I l-R631 , Rx Bldg 2.6 x I 0-2 µCi/cc (3) A nal ys i s ofa li q uid efflue nt sa m ple indi cates a co n ce nt ra ti on o r Vent Wi d e Ran ge) release rate that wo uld result in do s es greater t h an 1 0 mrem TEDE Main Stack Acc i dent R a nge Monitor: or 50 mrem th yroi d C D E at o r beyond (s ite-s pecific do s e re ceptor ID 1 l-P 00 7 (feeding ID 1 l-R 63 l Ma in 8.1 X 1 0 1 µCi/c c point) for o n e h o ur of expos ur e. Stack Wide Ran ge) (4) Fie ld s ur vey re su lt s indicate E ITH E R of the fo ll owi n g at o r beyo nd (2) Do s e assess m ent u s ing act u a l m e t eorology in d i cate s doses g reater (s ite-spec ifi c d ose re ce ptor poi nt): than I 0 mrem T E D E or 50 mr e m th yro id CDE at or beyond the s it e
- C l ose d window dose r a te s grea ter than I 0 mR/hr expected to bo un dary. con tinue fo r 60 minutes o r l o n ger. (3) Ana l ys i s ofa li quid effluent sa mple indicates a co n centration or
- Analyses o f field s urve y sa mpl es indi ca te th y ro i d COE greate r rel ease rate th at would re s ult in dose s grea ter than I 0 mrem TEDE th a n 50 mr e m for one ho u r of inhal a t ion. or 50 mrem th y roid COE at o r beyond the si t e bo un dary for o n e hour of expos ur e. (4) Fie ld s u rvey re s ult s indicate E ITH E R of the fo ll owi n g at or be yo nd the s ite boundary:
- C l ose d window d ose r a te s greater t h a n 1 0 m R/hr expected to co ntinue for 60 minute s or l onger.
- Ana l yses of field s urve y sa mples i ndic a te th yro id COE grea t er than 50 mrem fo r one hour of inh a l at i on. 6 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: S i te s p e cific informat i on pro v ided. See V2 Rad Monitor C alculation and V J OD C M S ite Boundar y Reference. 7 ABNORMAL RAO LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS RA2: INITIATING CONDITIONS E l 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch S i gnificant lowering o f water l eve l a b ove , or damage t o, irradiated fuel. S i gnifica nt l owe rin g of water l eve l above , or damage to , irr adiated fuel. Differen ce I Deviation I .lu s tifiration one THRESHOLDS NE I 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (I) Uncovery of irradiat e d fuel in the REFUEL fN G P A THW AY. (I) U n covery of ir radia t ed fuel i n the REFUEL fNG PATHWAY. (2) Damage to irradiated fue l res ultin g in a r elease of radioactivit y fro m (2) Dama ge t o i rradiated f u e l res ul ting in a release of radioactivit y fro m the fuel as ind i ca t ed by ANY of th e fo ll owing ra d ia ti on monitors: the fuel as indicated bv a l anns on ANY Table RI monitor s: (si te-spec ific l i sting of ra di a ti o n monitor s , and th e associated Table R1 readings , se tp o ints and/or a l a rm s) Refue l Floor Area Rad iati on M o n ij ors (3) Lowe r ing of spe nt fuel pool l eve l to (si t e-s p ecific Leve l 2 value). Unit 1 Unlt2 1021-K601 A -Rx Head Laydown Area 2D21-K601 A -Rx Head Laydown Area 1D21-K601 B-Refueling Floor Stairway 2D21-K601 M -Spent FueVFuel Pool Areas 1D21-K601 D -Refue l Floor 2D21-K601 E -Dryer/Separat0< Pool 1D21-K601 E -Drywell Shield Plug 2D21-K611 K -RPV Refuel Floor 228' 1D21-K601 M -Spent Fuel Pool and New Fuel 2021-K611 L-RPV Refuel Floor 228' Storage area R efue l Floor Venti l ation llonrs Unit 1 Unlt2 1D11-K609 A-D -Rx Bldg. Potential 2D11-K609 A-D -Rx Bldg. Potential Contaminated A r ea Ve n t Exhaust Rad Mooitor Contaminated Area Ven t Ex h aust Rad Mon i tor 1D 1 1-K611 A-D -Refuel Floor Vent Exhaust 2D11-K611 A-D -Refuel Floor Vent Exhaust 2D11-K634 A-D-Refuel Floor Rx Well Ven tJ Exhaust 2D11-K635 A-D -Refuel Floor OW/Sep. Vent Exhaust (3) I 1,J\\.l:llW 1 Ul pc HI ei r *I" 8 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference
- Hatch EAL Threshold (2) incorporates Table RI to identify applicable site specific monitors.
Ju s tification: E ditor ia l change-lluman Factors con s ideration. Difference: Site specific information provided. See V4 Alarm Response Procedure Reference. 9 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT IC S/EALS RAJ: INITIATING CONDITIONS NE I 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch R adia t ion level s that i m p ede access to e qu ipment necessary for n o rm a l plant Radiation level s th at impede access t o equipment n ecessary for normal plant operations , coo ldown or s hut down. operations , cooldown or s hutdown. Diff e r e n ce I Deviation I Justification one THRESHOLDS NE I 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) Dose rate grea t er t h a n 1 5 mR/hr in ANY of th e following areas: (I) Dose rate greater t h a n 1 5 mR/hr in ANY of the following areas:
- Co ntrol R oo m I Co n trol Room area rad i a ti on monitor I D2 l-K 600 B or C I
- Ce ntral A l arm Station I Ce ntral A l arm Station (by s urve y) I * (ot her s ite-specific areas/roo ms) (2) An UNPLANNED event resu lt s in radiation l eve l s th at proh i bit o r (2) An UNPLANNED event re s ult s in radiation level s that prohibit or impede access to any of the fo ll ow in g plant roo m s or areas: impede access to a n y Table HI pl a nt rooms o r a r eas: 'fa bl e HI (si te-speci fic l is t of plant roo m s o r a r eas with e n try-r e l a t ed mode Buildin f R oo m s A pplicabl e Mode s applica bilit y i dentified)
Piesel ge n era t o r buildin g Al l Al l Uni t 1/2 1 30' All Reactor bui l di n g U n it 1/2 SE D i agonals (RHR) All U n i t 1/2 NE Diagonals (RHR) A ll Difference I Deviation I Justification D i fferen ce: NE I 99-01Rev6 EAL T hre s h o ld (I) include s applicable area s as bullets and identifie s other s ite-s pecific a rea s/room s. Hatch T hr es h o ld (I) include s applic a ble areas in table format. In addition , no a dditional s ite-s pecific areas/rooms , other than tho se identified in fir s t two bullet s ofNEI 99-01Rev6 EAL Threshold (1) a re included. S ite s pecific informati on provided. See VS A l a rm Re s pon s e Procedure Referenc e -C ontrol Room R ad Mo nitor. Justification: E ditorial change -table format u s ed in s tead of bullet s. llatch pH s onnel have determined that no additional site-s pecific area s/rooms are applicable to EAL Threshold (I). D i ffer e nce: S ite s pe ci fic information pro vi ded. Hatch EAL T hre s h o ld (2) inc or p o rate s Table HI to id e ntif y applicable s ite s p ec ifi c room s/area s. 10 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT I CS/EA L S RUI: INITIATING CONDITIONS El 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch Re l ease of gaseo u s or liqui d radioactivity grea ter than 2 time s the (site-Re l ease of gaseous or l iquid radioactivity g re ater than 2 time s the ODC specific effluent release controlling document) limits for 60 minutes or limit s for 60 minutes or longer. longer. Differen ce I Deviatio n I Ju s tification No ne THRESHOLDS NE I 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch ( 1) Reading on A Y effluent radiation monitor greater than 2 times the ( 1) Reading on A Y effluent radiati o n monitor g re ate r than 2 times t he (site-s pecific e ffluent relea se co nt ro ll i n g doc um ent) lim its for 60 O DCM limit s for 60 minute s or longer: minutes or lon ger: Reactor Building Vent Nonna) Range Monitor: (site-specific monitor list and t hreshold values corresponding to 2 t D J l-K 6 1 9 A(B) times the co ntrollin g d ocu ment lim i t s) 120 1 l-K 636 A(B) (2) Reading on A Y effluent radiation monitor greater than 2 times the Main S t ack Nonna! Range Monito d alarm se tpoint estab li s hed b y a current r adioac tivity di sc h a r ge t DI t -K600 A(B) permit for 60 mi n utes or l onge r. Liquid Radwaste Ef nuent Li n e Moni t or: (3) Sample ana l ysis for a gaseous or liquid release indica t es a I DI J-K604 12 0 1 t-K 604 conce ntration o r release rate greater th a n 2 times the (site-specific Serv ic e Wate r Sy s t e m Efnuent Line Mo nit or: efflue nt release contro ll i n g document) limits for 60 minutes or JOI l-K605 longer. 2D l 1-K 605 (2) Reading o n ANY effl u ent radiation monitor greater than 2 time s the alarm setpoi nt established by a current radioactivity discharge permit for 60 minutes or lon ger. (3) Samp l e a n a l ysis for a gaseo us or liquid release indicates a conce nt ration or release rate grea ter than 2 times ODCM limits for 60 minute s or longer. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference
- S ite s pecific information provided. See V2 Rad Monitor C alculation. 11 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT IC S/EALS RU2: INITIATING CONDITIONS N EI 99-01 Re v 6 Hatch UN PL ANNED l o ss o f water l eve l above irra d iated f u el. UNPLANNED l oss of water l eve l above irradia t e d f u e l. Difference I Deviation I Justificalion N one THRESHOLDS N EI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (I) a. UN P L ANN E D wa t er l eve l d ro p in th e RE F UE L ING (I) a. U NP LA NN E D wa t er l eve l drop in th e REFUEL IN G PATHWAY a s indi ca t ed b y ANY of t h e fo ll owing: P ATHWAY a s indi ca t e d b v ANY of th e fo ll owi n g: (s i t e-s p ecific l e v e l i nd ication s). Per so nn el report of l ow water lev e l AN D SFP l ow l eve l a l ann a nnunciat or -Spent Fuel S t orage P oo l b. UN P L ANNED r i se i n a r ea radi a tion l eve l s a s i n dicated b y Low 654-0 22-1/2 A Y o f t he fo ll owi n g r a di atio n mo nit o r s. AN D (s ite-s pe c i fi c li s t of a r ea rad i a ti on m on it ors) b. UN P LANN E D ri se in area rad i ation l eve ls a s indica t ed b y AN Y of the fo ll ow in g radiation m o n itor s. I D 2 l-K601 A -Rx Head Laydown Area I D 2 I -K60 I D -Refuel Fl oor I D2 1-K60 I E -Drywell Shield Plug I D 2 l-K60 I M -Spent Fuel Pool a nd New Fuel area 2D2 l-K60 I A -Rx Head L aydow n Area 2 D21-K 60 1 M -Spent Fue l/Fuel Pool Area s 2D2 l-K60 I E -Dryer/Separator Poo l Q D2 l-K6 I I K -RPV Refuel Floor 228' 2D2 l-K6 I I L -RPV Refue l Floor 228' Difference I Deviation I Justificalion Differenc e: S ite s pecific information prov i ded. S ee V6 SFP L e vel Low A nnunciator and V 2 Rad M oni t or C alculati o n. 1 2 COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EAL S CGJ: INJTIA TING CONDITIO N S E I 99-0 1 R tv 6 Hatch Loss of(reactor vessel/RCS
[PWR] or RPV [BWR]) inventory affecting fuel Loss ofRPV inve nt ory affecting fue l clad integrity wi t h containment c l ad i nt egrity wit h co n tai nm ent c h a ll e n ged. cha ll enged. Difftrtnct I Dtviation I Justification on t THRESHOLDS E l 99-01 Rt v 6 Hatch 1 3 C OLD S H UT DO WN I R E F UE LI NG SYS TE M MA L FUNCT IO N I CS/EA L S (I) (2) * * *
- a. (R eac tor vesse l/R CS [P WR] or RPV [B W R]) l evel less th a n (s ite-specific level) for 30 minutes or l o n ge r. A D b. ANY indication from the Co nt ainme nt C hall enge Tab l e (see be l ow). a. (Rea c tor vessel/RCS
[PWR] or RPV [BWR]) l evel ca nn o t be monitored fo r 30 minute s or longer. A D b. Core u n covery is i n dicated by ANY of t he following: * (S i te-specific ra d i a tion mo nit o r) re ad ing g r eater than (site-specific val ue)
- Erratic so urce range monit or indication
[P WR]
- U NPLANNED i n crease i n (site-specific s u mp a n d/or tank) l eve l s of s uffi c ien t magnitude to indicate core uncovery * (Othe r site-s pe c ifi c indi catio n s) AND c. ANY indi catio n from the Contai nment Cha ll enge Tab l e (see below). Co nt a inm e n t C hallen l!e Ta bl e CONTA I NME NT CLOS URE not e s t ab li she d* (Explosive mi xt ur e) exists i n side co nt ain m e nt UNPLANNED increase in containment pressu r e Seco nd ary co n ta inm en t radiation moni to r readin g above soecific value) r BWRl
- l fCONTAfN M EN T CLOSURE 1s re-established pnor to excee din g the 30-minut e time limit , t h en dec l ara tion ofa General E m erge nc y i s not requir ed. D i ff e r e n ce I D ev i a ti o n I J u s tifi ca ti o n 1 4 (I) (2) a. b. a. RPV l eve l les s th a n -1 55" (TAF) for 30 minute s or lo n ger. AN D ANY indication fr o m the Co ntainm e nt C h a llen ge Tab l e CI. RPV level canno t be mon itored for 30 minu tes or longer. AN D b. Core un covery is ind i cated by ANY of the followi n g: * * \ re dmg than 9 ' IO n R hr o \ tollo\\ 111° radrnttnn monitors I nit I .Ill' 1-h60I M Spent"'"'
Pool and Ne" Fuel St, a* c \rca -D.' 611 K.
- UNPLANNED level increase in a n y of the fo ll ow in g of sufficient m a nitude to indicate co r e uncove Reactor Buildin ' F lo o r Dra in Su m s urbinc Buildin *Floor Drain Sum s Rad Waste Tank s A D c. A Y indic a tion from the Co nt a inment C hallen ge Table C I. Co nt a inm e n t C hall e n 2e Ta bl e C l Co ntainment H i !(rea l e r th an o r e qual t o 6% AND 0 2 oreater th a n or ea u a l t o 5% l I NPL \NNI [) 111crc 1 bc 111 Pr i mary Co utainment Pressu r e --cc Secondarv CO NTAINMENT INTEGRITY NOT establis h ed* Secondary Co nt ai nm e nt radia ti on m o nit ors greater than Max Safe EOP -Tab l e 6)
- If Seco ndar y CONT Al NM ENT I NTEGRITY 1 s re-establi s h ed pnor t o exceed in g t h e 30-minut e time l imit hen declarati o n of a Ge n e ral Emerge n cy i s n ot required Commented
[JRB4]: RAJ 9 r evision F o rmatted: Highlight Formatted: Highlight ( F o rmatted: Highlight Formatted: Highl i gh t Formatted: Highl i ght Fo r matted: Highl ig ht ( Co m mented [JRBS]: RA! 11 r evisio n COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION IC S/E ALS [D ifference: NEI 99 01 Re*" 6 EAL ThFeshold (2)b, fiFst bullet Fel'.eFs to Site 8peeifie FadiAtion monitor readings greater th11n 11 site speeifi e -.*ulue. lleteh EAL Threshold (2)b de es net inelude site speeifie F1tdi11tion monitor Feedings.Site information pro\ idfd for l \I Threshold 2(b). See \'2 Rad \lonitor Calculations. Ju s tifi c ation: J!lent design Celeulatien 8MN"4 IJ 021 determined thllt t11e Qr,*well Wide Renge Redintien Monifer weuld be offse11le le w end Aree Redietien Menliers would be offseele high. Therefore, theFe HFe no site speeifie FRdietion monitors e-.*11i111ble fe1* use Sin re thl' calculated value for these monitors is off scale high, a reading of 95% full range 11 as selected .. Differen ce: NE I 99-01 Re v 6 EAL Threshold (2)b u ses le ve l s as a clarifier after the li ste d s ite s pecific co mponent s. Hatch EAL Threshold (2)b place s leve l before increa se and includes the a ppli cab le components in table format. Ju s tification
- Human factor s con s ideration
-an i ncrea s e in an y of the identified c o mponent s continue s to s ati s fy the EAL thre s hold. Li s tin g th e applicable component s in table format fa c ilitat es id e nt i fication (rather than being includ e d in a li s t). Differen ce: E l 99-01 Re v 6 EAL Threshold (2)b , la s t bullet refers to Other s it e-spe cifi c indication s of core uncover y. No Ot h e r s it e-speci fic indications are used at Hatch. Ju s tific a tion: llatch doe s not us e an y other s it e-s pecific indication s of core unco v e ry th a t tho s e alread y id e ntified in EAL T hre s hold (2)b. Difference
- Tab le designator (C l) a ss i g ned to Co ntainment C hallen ge Table. Ju s tification
- E ditori a l chan g e to clearly identif y tabl e s within th e document.
Differen ce: NE I 99-0 1 Re v 6 Co ntainmen t C hallen ge Table li s t s item s in bullet format. Hatch Co nt a inment C h a llen ge Table li s t s it ems in table format. Ju s tificati o n: E ditori a l c han ge -table form a t doe s not aff e ct u se o f the C ontainm e nt C hallen g e T abl e. D i fference: E I 99-01Rev6 Co ntainmen t C h a llen ge Table identifies CO TAINMENT CLOSURE not established as a containment challenge. Hatch i de ntifie s Seco ndar y CONTA I NMENT I NTEGRITY NOT established as a co nt ai nment challenge. Ju s tification
- Hatch c o n s id e rs S e c ondar y Co ntainment Inte g ri ty not es tabli s hed t o be equival e nt to C ontainment C l os ur e not es tabli s hed. Us e of thi s terminolog y doe s not affe c t th e EA L thr es hold wh e re thi s condition would b e u se d. D i fferen ce: S ite s pe c ifi c information prov i ded. See V7 RPV Level Indications/Display, V9 Co mponent/Sys tem Ref erences, V IO H 2 and 0 2 Co ncen t ration , i\'1 I J!rim11ry Cent11inment Pressure RefeFRee (> Sli psig), and V l 2 Seco ndar y Co ntainm e nt Rad Mon itor s. 15 [ Commented
[JRB6): RAJ 9 revi sion ( Commented [JRB7): RAJ 11 revi sion COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS CSI: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch Loss of(reacto r vessel/R CS [PW R] o r RPV [BWR]) i n ve nt ory affec t ing co r e Loss of RPV in ve nt ory affec tin g co r e d ecay h eat r e m oval capabi l ity. d ecay h eat r e m ova l capa b i lit y. Difference I Deviation I Justification N one THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch 1 6 (1) a. b. (2) a. b. (3) a. b. COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EAL S CO TAINMENT CLOSUR.E not estab l is h ed. (I) A D (Reactor vesse l/RCS [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) level less than (s it e-specific l eve l). CONTAINMENT CLOSURE estab li s h ed. (2) AND (Reac t or vesse l/RCS [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) level less than (site-s p ecific leve l). (Reac t or vessel/R CS [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) level cannot be monitored for 30 minut es or l o n ger. A D Core uncovery is indi cate d by ANY of th e fo llo wing: * (Si t e-specific rad i a tion monitor) r ea ding g r ea t e r tha n (s it e-specific va lu e)
- Erra ti c sou r ce ra n ge m o nit o r i nd ica ti o n [PWR] (3) a. b. a. b. a. Seco nd ary CON T A INM E N T I N T EG RIT Y not estab li s h e d. AND RPV level less than -41" 6" be l ow the L evel 2 ac tu a ti o n se tp o int). Seco nd ary C ONTAINM E N T IN TEG RITY estab li s h e d. AN D RPV l evel less than -1 55" (TAF). RPY l evel cannot be monitored for 30 minutes or l o n ger. AND b. Core un covery i s indi cated by ANY of the fo ll ow in g: * ,\reading greater tha. 'J -i" 10 ml<ihr 01 \ ' loll0\rn1 radiation monttors
- UNPLANNED i n crease in (site-specific sump and/or tank) levels of s uf ficien t magnitude to ind icate core uncovery * (O th er si t e-specific indications)
.1 D2 l-Ku0 I M SpcOI hid Pool and Ne\\ I ucl Storcll'C A1 ea 1 1>1 1-K6111
- UNPLA NN E D l eve l increase in a n y of th e fo ll o win g of suffic i e nt m a nitud e to i ndic a te core uncove Reacto r B uildin , F l oor Drai n S um s T u rb in e Buildin
- F l oor Dra i n S um s Rad Was t e Ta n ks Differenc e I Deviation I Ju s tifi c ati o n 17 Commented
[JRB8]: RAI 9 r evisio n Formatted: Highlight Fo r matted: Highlight [ Fo r matted: Highlight Formatted: Highlight Formatted: Highlight Formatted: Highlight COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION I CS/EAL S Differ e n ce: E l 9 9-01Re v 6 EA L Thre s holds (l)a and (2)a u s e th e term C O NT Al M E T CL O SU R E. Hatch EAL Thre s holds (l)a a nd (2)a u s e the term S econdar y C O N T Al M EN T I NTEG RIT Y. Justification: !latch co nsiders Secondary CO TAI ME T INTEGRITY to be equivalent to CONTA I MENT CLOSU R E. Use of this terminology doe s not affect the threshold for these EA Ls. Differen ce: NE I 99-01 R ev 6 EAL Thre sho ld (J)b u ses le v el s a s a clarifier a fter the li s ted s ite s pe c ific c omponent s. H a tch EAL T hreh so ld (J)b place s l e v el before increa s e and include s th e applic a ble c omponent s in t a ble form a t. Justification: lluman factors consideration -a level in c rease in any of the identified components continues to satisfy the EAL threshold. Listing the applicable components in table format facilitates identification (rather than being included in a list). Differ e nc e: !lEl 99 01 Re.* 6 EAL Threshold (J)b, first bullet rerers te Site Sfleeilie relliRtien monitor reRllings greater thRn e site Sfleeilie '<'Rlue , llRteh E AL Thresh el II (J)b does net inelulle site speeifie rRlli11tien nlenitor reRllings. Site sped fir information pm' ided for I* \I Thre)hold (J)h. See V2 Rad \lonitor Calculations. Justification: PIRnt design CeleulRtien SMNll OS 009 lleterminell thRt the o,., ..... ell Wille RRnge R1ulietion Monitor 'A'Olllll he oUseRle low end Area Rellietion Montiors would be 0Use11le high. Therefore, there ue ne site Sf!eeifie nlliRtien monitors eoeilRble for 11se.S 111 calrulated value for these monitoo i\ om.ca le high, 11 reading of 9S% full range\\ a' \elected. Differen c e: NE I 99-01 Re v 6 E A L Thre s hold (J)b , la s t bullet ref e r s to Other s it e-s p e cific indication s of core unco v er y. N o Other s ite-s p e cifi c indicat i on s are u s ed at Hatch. Justification
- !latch d oes not use any other s ite-s pecific indication s of core unco very that those already identified in EAL Threshold (J)b. Differen ce: S ite s p e cific information pro v id e d. S ee V 8 Le vel 2 Ac tuation Se tpo i nt Information, V7 RP V Le vel Indi c ati o n s/Di s pla y, and V9 C omponen t/Sys tem Referenc e. 1 8 [Commented
[JRB9]: RA I 9 r evision COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS CAI: INITIATING CONDITIONS NE I 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch Loss of(reactor vessel/RCS [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) inventory. Lo ss ofRPV inven t ory. Difference I Deviation I Justification one THRESHOLD S NE I 99-0 I Rev 6 Hatch {I) Loss of(r eacto r vessel/R CS [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) in ve nt ory as (I) Lo ss of RPV inventory as indic a ted by level l ess than -35" Leve l 2 indicated by l eve l le ss than (si t e-specific level). ac tu a ti o n setpoi n t). (2) a. (Rea c tor vessel/R CS [P WR] o r RPV [BWR]) l evel ca nnot (2) a. RPY l evel ca nnot be m o nit ore d for 1 5 minut es or l o n ger be m o nit o r ed fo r 1 5 minut es or longer A D AND b. UNPLANNED l e v e l increase in any of th e fo ll owi n g d u e t o b. UN P LA NN E D increase in (si t e-specific s ump and/or tank) a lo ss of RPY inve nt on : level s due to a lo ss of(r eactor vesse l/R CS [P WR] or RPV Dry w e ll F l oo r Dra in S ump s Reac t o r Building F l oor Dra in S ump s [BWR]) in ve nto ry. Drvwe ll E aui o m e n t Dra in S umo s T ur bi n e Buildin g Fl oo r Dra in Sumo s r To ru s Ra d Was t e Ta n ks T o ru s R oo m S ump s Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference
- NE I 99-01 Re v 6 EAL Threshold (2)b use s level s as a clarifier after the li ste d site s pecifi c components.
Hatch EAL Threshold (2)b places l e vel before increa se and include s the applicable component s in table format. Justification: lluman factors consideration -a level increase in an y of the identified component s continues to satisf y the E AL threshold. Listing the applicab l e components in table format facilitates identification (rather than being included in a li s t). Differen ce: S ite specific information provid e d. See VS Level 2 Actuation Setpoint Information and V9 Co mponent/Sys t e m Reference. 19 COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION IC S/EA L S CA2: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch L oss of a ll offs ite a nd a ll o n s it e AC p ow er to e m e r ge n cy bu ses for 1 5 minute s L oss of all o ffs ite a nd a ll o n s it e A C po wer t o esseffiiak mcr!!c" b u s e s for or lon ge r. 1 5 minute s or lon g er. Differen ce I Deviation I Justification Oiffere11 e e1 S ite Sfl e eiJie iHffiF1fu1tie11 flF9* itletl ffi* I G , l\o n t Ju s tiJiealien1 +ermineleg'.I' tliffeFenee Heleh Fefer s te bu s e s n s e ss enlinl bu s e s. THRESHOLDS EI 99-0 I Rev 6 Hatch (I) Lo ss o f ALL o ff s ite a nd A LL o n s ite A C Power t o (s ite-s pe c ifi c (I) Lo ss of ALL o ff s ite and A LL on s ite A C Power labk S I to 4 1 60 e mer ge nc y bu s e s) for 1 5 minute s or l o n ge r. VAC l'lcr<'enn Bu ses l/2E , l/2 F , a nd J/2G fo r 15 (Commented [JRB10]: RAJ 1 2 revisi o n m inut e s or l on g er. Ta ble SI U nit I U nit2 Start-up Au x XFMR I C Start-up Aux X F MR 2 C Start-up Aux XFMR ID Start-u p Aux XFMR 2D Diesel Generator I A Diesel Generator 2A Diesel Generator I B Diesel Ge n erator I B Diesel Generator I C Diesel Generator 2C ( Commented [JRB11 ]: RAJ 1 2 revision Differenc e I Deviation I Justification Difftr ence: S ite s pe ci fic information pro vide d. See V IJ 4 160 VAC Buses Information. 20 COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/E A L S CA3: I NITIATING CONDITIONS El 99-01 Re v 6 Hatch Inabili ty to mai nt ai n th e p l a nt in co l d s hut down. In a bilit y to maint a in th e plant in co l d s hutdown. Differenc e I Deviation I Ju s tification No ne THRESHOLDS NEI 99-0 1 Rev 6 Hatch {I) UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature to greater than (s ite-{I) UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature to greater th an 212 °F s pecific Techn i cal Specifica tion cold shu tdown temperature limit) for greater than the duration spec ifi ed in Tab l e C2. for greater than the duration s pecified in the following table. Tab l e Cl: R CS H e al-1111 Duration Thres hold s Table: R CS H eat-up Duration Thresholds Seco nd ary Heat-up Co ntainm e nt C l osure Hea t-up R CS S tatu s C ONTAINMENT R CS S t a ll" INTEGR I TY Stat u s Dur a ti on Sta tu s Dur a ti o n In tact (but not at r ed uced Not int act No t E s tablished 0 minute s* in ve nt orv f PWRl) Not app li cable 60 mmutes* Established 20 minut es Not mtact (o r at re d u ced E s tablished 20 mmutes* Int act Not aool1cable 60 minutes* in ve nt orv f PWR]) Not Established 0 minutes
- If RHR 1s 10 o peration w 1thm this time frame and RCS temperatur e a s
- If an RCS heat re moval sys tem ts m operation w ithin this time frame and beimz. redu ced , the EAL I S not RCS temperature 1s reduced , the EAL 1 s n o t aoo li cab le. (2) UN PLANN ED RCS pressure increa se grea ter than I 0 psig. (2) UNPLANNED RC S pressure increase g r eater th a n (site-specific pre ss ure readin g). (T hi s EAL doe s no t app l y durin g water-solid plant co ndition s. [PWR]) Differenc e I De v iation I Ju s tific11tio11 2 1 COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS Difference:
Table de sig nator C2 assigned to R CS Heat-up Duration Thresholds Table. Ju s tifi ca ti o n: E ditorial c han g e to clearl y identif y tabl es within th e document. Difference: Information included in RC S Heat-up Duration Thresholds Table for Hatch is inverted from the pre se ntation in NE I 99-0 I Re v 6. Information is the same. Ju s t i fi ca t io n: E ditorial ch a n ge for Human Fac t o r s c o n s id e r at i o n s-wo r s t case is pr ese nt e d fir s t. Difference: NEI 99-0 I Rev 6 RCS Heat-up Duration Threaholds Table refer s to R CS heat removal sys tem. Hatch table u s e s RHR. J u s tifi ca t io n: S it e t er m o ni o l ogy diff e ren ce fr o m NE I 99-01 R ev 6; llllll is e qui va l e nt to R CS h eat r e m ov al sys t e m. Differenc e: S ite speci fic information provided. See Attac hment V I TS Table 1.1-1 Modes a nd Vl4 RCS Pre ss ure Indication
- s. 22 COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION IC S/EALS CA6: INITIAT I NG CONDIT I ONS NE I 99--01 Rev 6 Hatch H aza rd o u s eve nt affecti n g a SAFET Y SYSTEM n eede d for the c urr ent Hazardous eve nt affec ting a SAFETY SYSTEM needed fo r the curre nt operating mode. operating mod e. Differ e n ce I Deviation I Justification o n e TH R ES H OLDS NE I 99--01 Rev 6 Hatch (I) a. The oc c urrence of A Y of the following h azardous events: (I) a. The occurrence of ANY of the fo ll owing hazardou s events:
- Seismic event (eart hqu ake)
- Seismic eve nt (earthquake)
- I nternal or ex t erna l floodin g event
- I nterna l or ex tern a l flooding event
- High winds or tornado strike
- High wi nd s r 15 mph 'ustaineu) or t ornado strike
- FIRE
- F I RE (Comme n ted [JR B 12]: RAJ 1 3.a r evisio n
- EX PLO S I ON
- EXPLOS ION * (s ite-specifi c hazards)
- Other events with simi lar hazard characteristics as
- Other events with similar hazard characteristics as determined by the Shift Manager d e termined b y the Shift Manager AN D A D b. E I THER of the following: b. EIT H E R of the following: I. Even t damage h as caused indicatio n s of degraded
- Event damage h as caused indications of degraded performance in at le as t o n e train ofa SAFETY performance in at l east one train ofa SAF ET Y SYSTEM n eeded for the current operating mode. SYSTEM needed for the curre n t operating mode. OR
- The event has caused VISIBLE DAMAG E to a 2. The event has caused VISIBLE DAMAGE to a SAFETY SYSTEM component or str u cture needed for SAFETY SYSTEM compo nent or structure the current operating mode. needed for the current operating mode. D i fferenc e I Deviation I Justification 23 COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS Difference:
NEI 99-01 Rev 6 EAL Threshold (l)a, ne x t to the last bullet, refers to s ite-specific hazard s. No additional site specific hazards are identified for Hatch. Justification: llatch has not identified any additional site-specific hazards applicable to this EAL. Difference: NE I 99-01 Rev 6 EAL Threshold (l)b uses number s and a conditional OR. Hatch u ses bullets to separate the two conditions. Justification: Editorial change -doesnot impact the ability to classify the event. 24 COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS CUI: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch UNP LA NN E D l oss o f (r eac tor vesse l/R C S [P W R] o r RPV [B W R]) in ve n t o ry UNPL A NN E D l oss ofRPV in ve nto ry for 1 5 m i nut es or lon ger. fo r 1 5 m i nut es o r l o n ge r. Difference I Deviation I ,Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (I) UN P LA NN ED l oss of r eac tor c o o l a n t res ult s in (r ea ct o r vessel/R CS (I) UN PLANN E D l oss of r e a c tor coo l a nt r es ult s in RPV l eve l l ess th a n [PWR] o r RP V [BW R]) l ev el l ess th a n a r e quir e d l o w e r limi t for 1 5 t he l owe r limit of the contro ll ing level band fo r 1 5 minut es or minut es o r lon ge r. lon g er. (2) a. (R ea c t or vessel/R CS [P W R] o r RPV [BW R]) l eve l ca nn o t (2) a. RPV l eve l ca nn ot b e m o n i t o r ed. b e m o nit o r ed. A N D AND b. U NPL A NN E D level in c r ease in any of the fo ll owing: b. UN P LANNE D i n c r ease in (si t e-spec i fic s ump a nd/or ta nk) Dryweel Floor Drain Sumos Reactor Floor Drain Sumos l eve l s. Drvwe ll Eouioment Dra in Su mo s Turbine F l oor Drain Su mp s To ms Rad Waste Tanks To m s Room S um ps Difference I Deviation I Ju s tification Difference: Site specific information provided for EAL Threshold (I). Difference: N EI 99-01 Rev 6 EAL Threshold (2)b uses levels as a clarifier after the listed site specific components. Hatch EAL Thre s hold (2)b places level before increase and includes the applicable components in table format. See V9 Component S y stem Reference. Justification
- Human factors consideration
-a level increa s e in an y of the identified component s continue s to s ati s f y th e EA L thre s hold. Li s tin g the applicabl e component s in table format facilitat es id e ntification (rather than being includ e d in a li s t). 25 COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS CU2: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch Lo ss of a ll b ut o n e A C powe r so u rc e to e m e r ge n cy b u ses for 1 5 m i nut es o r Loss of a ll but o n e AC powe r so ur ce t o essetttiek mcr!!cnc bu ses fo r 1 5 l o n ge r. minut es or l o n ge r. Difference I Deviation I Ju s tificati o n DiffeFenee1 Sile speeii:ie inf6Fmt1lio11 f1F91<ided feF IG. None Justilieelien!
- reFminelegy diffeFenee Heleh FefeFs le enieFgene, , buses 11s essenli11I buses. THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (I) a. AC powe r ca p a bilit y to (s it e-s p ec ific e m e r ge nc y bu ses) i s (I) a. AC p owe r ca p a bili ty t o 4160 VAC me r e du ced to a s in g l e p owe r so ur ce fo r 1 5 minut es or l o n g er. Buses l/2E , l/2 F , and l/2G i s r edu ced t o a s in g l e powe r s ourc e A D (!'able S I for 1 5 minut es or l o n ger. b. A n y a ddit io n a l s in g l e po we r s our ce fa ilur e will r esu lt i n AND ( Commented
[JRB13): RAJ 1 3.b r e vi s ion l oss of a ll AC p ower t o SA F ET Y S Y STE M S. b. A n y a dditi o n a l s in g l e p ower so ur c e fa ilur e wi ll r es ult in lo ss of a ll AC p o wer t o SAFE TY S YST E M S. ff able SI U nit I Unit2 Start-up Aux XFMR 1 0 Start-up Aux XFMR 2C Start-up Aux XFMR ID Start-up Aux XFMR 2D Diesel Generator I A Diesel Generator 2A Die se l Generator I B Die s el Generator I B Die se l Generator I C Die se l Generator 2C D i fference I Deviation I Ju s tifi c ation D i fference: Site spe c ific information provided. See Attachment VIJ 4160 VAC EssetttttH Emer:,!ency Bu s es Information. 26 COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS CU3: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch UNPL ANNE D in c r ease in R CS t e mp e ratur e. UN PL A NN E D in c r ease in R CS temp e ratur e. Difference I Deviation I Ju s tification N one THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (I) UN PL A NN ED in c r ease in R CS t e mp e ratur e to g r e at e r th a n (s it e-(!) UN PL A NN E D in c r ease in R CS t e m pera tu re to g r ea t e r th a n !2 12 °F. specific Tec h n i ca l S p ec ifi ca tion co ld s hutd o wn t e mp e rature l imi t). (2) Loss of ALL RCS t e mp e ra t ure a nd (r eac t o r v essel/R CS [P W R] o r (2) Loss o f ALL R CS t e mp e r a ture a nd RPV l eve l indi ca ti o n for 1 5 RP V [BW R]) leve l indi ca ti o n fo r 1 5 minut es or l o n ge r. minut es or l o n ge r. Difference I Deviation I Ju s tification Difference: Site spe c ific information provided. See Attachment VI TS Table I.I-I Modes. 2 7 COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS CU4: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch Lo ss of Vital D C pow e r for 15 minute s o r lon ger. Lo ss of Vital DC power for 1 5 minut es o r lon ger. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (I) Indi ca t ed vo lt age is l ess than (site-specific b u s vol t age va lue) o n (I) Indi cated vo lt age i s less th a n 1 0 5/21 0 VDC on Te c hnical req uired Vital D C buses for 1 5 minut es o r lon ger. Specification required 125/250 VDC bu s es l/2R22-SOl 6 OR l/2 R 22-SO 17 for 15 minute s or l o n ger. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difftrence: El 99-01Rev6 EAL Threshold (I) refers to Vital D C bu s e s. Hatch EAL Threshold (I) identifie s lhe s pecific D C bu s es applicable lo this EAL. Justification: Editoria l change-lluman Factors consideration that docs not affect EAL. Difference
- Site specific information provided. See Attachment VIS D C System Information. 28 COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EAL S CU5: INITIATING CONDITIONS El 99-01 Re v 6 Hatch Lo ss of all onsi t e or offsite com muni cat i o n s c a pabilitie s. Loss of all o n si t e or off s ite co mmunication s capa bilitie s. Differen ce I Deviation/ , Ju s tifiration No oe THRESHOLDS NE I 99--01 Rev 6 Hatch (I) Loss of ALL of the following onsite co mmunicati o n method s: (I) Loss of ALL of the fo ll owing o n si te co mmunication method s: (si te-s p ec ific l i s t of co mmuni ca tion s method s) (2) Loss of ALL of the following O R O co mmunicati o n s m et hod s: I Pla nt telephones (I ncludes hardwired and w ir e l ess) I (s ite-spec ifi c l i s t of communica ti o n s method s) I Plant page; I (3) Loss of ALL of th e fo llowin g NRC comm uni catio n s m ethods: I P l a n t rad i o systems I (si te-s pe c ifi c l i s t of co mmuni ca tion s meth o d s) (2) Loss of ALL of the following ORO com muni cat i ons m et hod s: I ENN (Eme r gency Notifica t ion Network) I I Com m e r c i a l p h ones I (3) Loss of ALL of the fo ll owing NRC co mmuni ca t ions methods: I ENS on Federal Telecommunications System (FTS) I I Commercia l phones I Difference I D ev iation I Ju s tification Difference: S ite s pecific information prov ided. 29 INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE FACILITY (ISFSI) ICS/EAL S E-HUI: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hat c h Damage to a loaded ca s k CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY. Damage to a l oaded cask CONFINE MENT BOUNDARY. Differenc e I Deviation I Ju s tification N one THRESHOLDS NE I 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (I) Damage to a l oaded cask CONF IN EMENT BOUNDARY as (I) Damage to a l oaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY as indica t ed by an o n-contact rad i at ion r ead ing g r ea t er than (2 times the indica t ed b y an on-contact radiation r eadi ng g reater than ANY va lu e si te-specific cask specific te c hnical specificatio n allowab le radiation li ste d in rable EI. level) on the surface of the s pent fuel cas k. T a bl e E l Location of Dos e R a t e To t a l D ose Rate (Ne utr o n+ Ga mm a mR/hr) HI-TRA C 12 5 S id e -Mid-he 1gb_! 450 Top 1 10 HI-STA R 100 o r HI-STO RM 100 S i de -60 in c h es be l ow mid-he i g ht 80 Side-Mid-height 80 S i de -60 in ch es above mid-height BO Center of lid 1 0 Midd l e of t o p hd Q O lfop_(ciu tl et) duct 40 B o ttom (lnkt) du ct 1 40 Differenc e I Deviation I Ju s tification 30 INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE FACILITY (ISFSI) ICS/EALS Difference
- Added new Table E2 to Hat c h EAL Threshold (I). S ite specific information provided. See Attachment Vl6 ISFSI TSffiose Reading Ca lcu la tion. Ju s tific a ti o n: tiliz e d tabl e to di s pla y I SFS I t ec hni c al s p ec ifi ca ti o n radiati on l eve l s fo r th e differ e nt I SFS I modul es. Int e nt of NE I 99-0 1 R ev 6 EAL thre s hold r e main s s ati s fi e d. 31 FISSION PROD UCT B A RRIER ICS/EAL S BWR FISSION PROD UC T BARRIER MATRIX-INITIATING CONDITIONS/THRESHOLDS NE I 99-01 R ev 6 FA I -Any Joss or any Potenti a l Loss of either the Fuel FS I -Loss or Potential Loss of any two barriers. FG I -Loss of any two barriers and Loss or Potential Clad or RCS b arrier. Loss of the third barrier. Hatch FG I -Loss of any two barrie rs and Loss o r Pot e n tial FS I -Loss or Potentia l Loss of any two ba rrier s. FA I -A n y loss or any Potential Loss of e ith er the Fuel Loss of the thir d barrier. Clad or RCS barrier. Difference I Deviation I Justification No ne Fuel Clad Barrier RCS Barrier Containment Barrier Loss Potential Loss Loss Potential Loss Loss Potential Loss NE I 99-01 Rev 6 I. R CS A cti vity I. Primary Co ntainment Pressure I. Primar y Co ntainment Co nditi o n s A. (Si te-s pecific Not Applicable A. Primary containme nt Not App l icable A. UNPLANNED rapid A. Primary indications that pre ss u re g re ater than drop in primary conta inment reactor coolant (site-specific va lu e) con t ainment pressure pressure greater ac tiv i ty is greater due to RCS l eakage. fol l owing primary than (site-specific than 300 µCi/gm con tainm ent pressure value) dose equivalent I-ri se O R 131). OR B. (site-specific B. Primary containme nt explos ive mixture) pressure response not exists inside consistent with primary LOCA conditions. contai nment OR c. HCTL exceeded. 32 FISSION PROD UCT BARRJER ICS/E A L S Hatch A. Activity of 300 Not Applicable A Primary containment Not Applicab l e A UNPLANNED rapid A Primary µCi/g m D E l 111 pressure greater than drop in primary containment 18 5 p s i g due to RCS containment pressure pre s s ur e greater l eakage. fo ll owing primary than 56 psig containment pre ss ur e OR rise B. Grea t er than or OR equal to 6% H z B. Primary containment AN D 5% 0 2 exists pressur e re s pon s e not in s ide primary co n s istent with con t ainme nt LOCA conditions. OR c. HCTL exceeded. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference:
Si t e spe cific information pro v ided. See V IO H 2 and 02 Co ncentration Ca lculation/Reference , VI I Primary Co ntainment Pre ss ure Reference(> 56 p sig), a nd Vl7 Primary Co ntainment Pressure Reference (l.85 psig). NE I 99-01 R ev 6 2. RP V Water Level 2. RPV Waler Level 2. RPV Water Level A P r imary containment A. RPV water l evel A RPV water level Not Applicab l e Not App li cable A. Primary conta inm ent flooding required. cannot be restored cannot be restored flooding required. and maintained above a n d maintained above (site-specific RPY (s it e-specific RPY water level water l evel corresponding t o the corresponding to th e top o f active fuel) or top of active fuel) or cannot be determined. cannot be determined. Hatch 33 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EAL S A. SAG entry i s A. RPV wa t er l eve l A. RPV water level Not App l icab l e Not App l icable A. SAG entry is req uir ed. can n ot be resto r ed ca nn ot be r estored req u i r e d. and maintai n ed above and maintained above -1 55 inches or cannot -155 inches or be determined. canno t be determined. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Fuel C lad Bar r ier Loss EA L Threshold 2.A -added "SAG entry is required". Justification: Revised EAL threshold based on EP FAQ 2015-004 guidance. Difference: Co ntainment B arrier Potential Loss EAL Threshold 2.A -added "SAG entry is required". Justification: Revised EAL threshold based on EP FAQ 2015-004 guidance. Difference: S ite s pecific information provided for Fuel C lad Barrier Potential Lo ss EAL Threshold 2.A and R CS Barrier Loss EAL Threshold 2.A. See A ttachment V 7 RPV Level Indication/Di s pla y. NEI 99-01 Rev 6 3. Not Applicable
- 3. RC S Leak Rate 3. Primary Containment Isolation Failure Not Applicable Not Applicable A. UNISOLABLE break A. UN I SO LAB LE A. UN I SO LAB LE direct Not Applicab l e in ANY of the primary sys tem downstream pathway fo ll owing: (site-l eakage that results to the environment specific systems wit h in exceeding exists after primary potential for hi g h-EIT I-LER of the co n tainment isolation energy l ine breaks) following: sig nal OR I. Max Norma l OR B. E mergenc y RPV Operating B. Intentional primary Depressurization. Temperature co nt ain m ent venti n g OR per EOPs 2. Max Normal OR Operat in g Area c. UN I SO LAB LE Radia ti o n Level. primary system l eakage t h at re s ults in exceeding EITHE R of the fo ll owing: 34 FISSION PROD UC T BARRIER ICS/EALS I. M ax Safe Operating Temperature. OR 2. Max Safe Operating Area Radiation Level. Hatch Not App l icable Not Applicab le A. UNISOLABLE break A. UN I SOLABLE A. UN I SOLABLE direct Not Applicable in )\.1ain S t eam lin e primary sys t em down s tr eam pathway 1-IPCI , Feedwater , l eakage th at r es ult s to the e n vironme nt RWCU , or RCIC in exceedi n g ex i s t s after primary OR E I T HER of the co nt a inm ent isolation B. E m e r gency RPV following: signal Depressurization. I. Max Norma l OR Operati n g B. Int entional primary Te mp era tur e co n ta inm e nt venting OR per EOPs 2. Max No rm a l OR Operating Area c. UN I SOLABLE Radiation Le vel. pr im ary system leakage that results in exceeding EIT HER of th e fo ll owing: I. Ma x Safe Operating Temperature. OR 2. Max Safe Operating Area R adiation Level. Difference I Deviation I Justifi c ation 35 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EAL S Difference:
Site speci fic li sting of syste m s pro v id e d. See V 12 Seco ndary C ontainment Rad Monitors a nd V I S Secon dar y Contai nm e nt Te mper at ure for Max Safe/No rmal R a d and Operating Temperature va lues. E I 99-01 Rev 6 4. I Primary Co ntainment R a diation 4. Primar y Co ntainment Radiation
- 4. Primary Co ntainment Radiation A. Primary containment Not Applicab l e A. Primary containme nt Not Applicable Not Applicable A. Primary containment radiation monitor radiation monitor radiation monitor reading greater than reading greater than reading g re a t er th a n (site-specific value). (site-specific value). (site-spec ifi c value). Hatch A. DWRRM greater Not Applicab l e A. DWR.RM greater Not Applicable Not Applicable A. DWRRM greater than 1 400 R/hr. than 40 R/hr. than 26 , 000 R/h r. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference:
EAL T hre s hold 4.A for Loss of Fuel C lad and R CS Barriers a nd Potential Loss of Co ntainment Barrier doe s not include the followin g wording -"Pri mar y co nt a inment radiation monitor reading ... ". Ju s tification
- Human factor s con s ideration
-DWRR M i s the s ite de s i g nator for th e Prim a r y C ontainment radiation monitor. Difference: S ite speci fi c in fo rm sa ti on pro v ided. See A tta c hment V2 Rad Mo nitor Calc ul a tion. NEI 99-01 Rev 6 5. Other Indication s 5. Other Indication s 5. Other Indi cat ions A. (site-specific as A. (site-speci fie as A. (si t e-specific as A. (site-spec i fie as A. (site-specific as A. (site-specific as applicable) applicable) applicable) applicable) applicable) applicable) Hatch A. gi:rgas llFe aR!I Iles! Not Applicable A. Drywell Fission Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicab l e TFeatmenl MeRiteFs Product M o nit o r gffueele Higli.Not reading 5.0 x I 0 5 Applicable cpm (Commented (JRB14]: RAJ 3.e revi sion 36 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EAL S Diff e rence I Deviation I Ju s tifi c ation Difference: Site s pecifi c information provided. See A ttachment V2 Rad Monitor Ca lculation. EI 99-01 R ev 6 6. Emtrgency Director Judgment 6. E mergenc y Dir ecto r J u d g ment 6. E mer ge n cy Director Judgm e nt A. ANY co ndit ion in the A. A Y condition in the A. A Y condition in the A. A Y condition in the A. A Y condition in the A. ANY condi t ion in the opinion of the opinion of the opi n ion of the opinion of the opinion of the opi nion of the E m ergency Director Emergency Director Emergency Director Emergency Director Eme r gency Director Emergency Director that indicate s Loss of that indicates that indicates Loss of that indicates that indicates Loss of that indicates the Fuel Clad Barrier. Potential Lo ss of the the RCS Barrier. Potentia l Lo ss of the the Containment Potential Loss of th e Fuel Clad Barrier. RCS Barrier. Barrier. Contain m e nt Barrier. Hatch A. ANY co nditi on in the A. ANY co ndition in th e A. ANY co nditi on in the A. ANY condi tion in the A. A Y condition in th e A. A Y co ndition in the opinion of the opinion of the opi n ion of the opinion of the opinio n of the opinion of the e mer gency director emergenc y director e mergenc y director emergency director eme r ge nc y director emergency director that indicate s lo ss of that indica t es that indicates lo ss of that indicates that indi cates lo ss of that indicates the fuel clad barrier. potential loss of the the RCS Barrier. potential l oss of the the Co ntainm ent potential l oss of the fuel clad barrier. R CS Barrier. B a rri er. Contai nment Barrier. Differenc e I Deviation I Ju s tifi c ation one 3 7 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY IC S/EALS HGI: INITIATING CONDITIONS E l 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch HO ST I LE ACT I ON r esu ltin g in loss of p h ys i cal co ntrol of th e fac ili ty. HO ST I LE ACT I ON r es ultin g in l oss of physical contro l of th e facilit y. D i fferenc e I Deviation I Ju s tification No ne THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (I) a. A HO ST I LE ACT I ON i s occu rring o r h as occurred wi thin (I) a. A H OSTILE ACT I ON i s occ u r rin g or h as occ urr ed wit hin the PROTECTED AREA as reported by the (s ite-spe c ific the PROTECTED AREA (PA) as reported b y the s ec uri ty shift s upervision). Security Sffill-C a pt a in or de s i g nee. AN D AN D ( Commented [JRB15]: RA I 2 1.a revision b. E ITH E R of the following h a s occurred: b. EIT H ER of the followin g ha s occurred: I. A Y of the fo ll owing safety f un ctions cannot be I. ANY of the following safety f un c tion s ca nnot be contro ll ed or m ai nt a i ned. controlled or m aintained.
- Reactivit y control
- R ea cti v ity control
- Core coo l ing [PWR] I RPV wa t er l evel [BWR]
- RPV wa ter level
- RCS heat remo v al
- RCS heat r emoval OR OR 2. Damage to spe nt f u el h as occu rr e d o r is 2. Damage to s pent fue l h a s occ urr ed o r i s IMMIN ENT. I MMINENT. D i fferenc e I Deviation I Ju s tification D i fferenc e: Si te s pecific information provid ed. 38 H AZA RD S AN D O T H E R C O N DITIO NS AFFECT I N G PL ANT SAFE T Y I CS/EA L S H G 7: I N ITI A TI N G C O N DITIO NS NE I 99-01 Rev 6 H a t c h Ot h er conditions exis t whic h in the judgment of the Emergency Director Ot h er cond i tions exist which in the judgment of the emergency director warrant declaration of a General E mer ge nc y. warrant d eclara tion of a General Emergency. Diffe re n ce I Dev i a tion I Justification o n e T HRE S HOLD S NE I 99-0 1 R ev 6 H a t c h (I) Other conditions exis t which in the judgment of th e Emergency (I) Other co ndition s exist which in the judgment of the emergency Director indicate that events a re in progre ss or have occurred which director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve act u a l o r IMMINENT substantial core degradation or invo l ve actual or IMMINENT s ub s tantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or HOSTILE melting with potential for lo ss of containment integrit y or HOST I L E ACTION that r esults in an actual l oss of physica l control of the ACT I ON t h at re s ults in an actua l lo ss of physica l control of the faci l it y. Re l eases can be rea s onab l y expected to exceed EPA faci l it y. Re l eases can be re aso nabl y expected to exceed E PA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the Protective Action Guideline exposure le ve ls offsite for more than immediate s ite area. the immediate s ite area. Diff e r e n ce I D ev i a ti o n I Justjfiration o n e 39 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY I CS/EA LS HSI: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch HOSTILE ACTION within the PROTECTED AREA. HOSTILE ACTION within the PROTECTED AREA. Difference I Deviation I Ju s tifi c ation None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (I) A HOSTILE AC TION is occ urrin g or has occ urred within the (I) A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the PROTECTED AREA as reported by the (site-specific security shift PROTECTED AREA (PA) as reported b y the m sh1H Security Sftttf s upervision). Captain or de s i g ne e. [Commented
[JRB16): RAJ 21.a revision Difference I Deviation I Ju s tification Difference: Site specific information provided. 40 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY I CS/EA LS HS6: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch In ability to contro l a ke y safety function from outside the Con t ro l Room. In abi l ity to contro l a ke y safety functio n from outside the Control Room. Difference I Deviation I J u s tifiration No ne THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) a. An e ve nt has resulted in plant contro l being transferred (1) a. An event has res ulted in plant co ntrol being transferred from t h e Contro l Room to (site-speci fie remote s hutdown from the contro l room to remote shutdown panel s. panel s and local con trol stations). AND AND b. Contro l of ANY of the following key safety functions is not b. Contro l of ANY of the fo llo wing key safety functions i s not ree sta blished within 1 5 minutes. reestablished withi n (site-specific number of minutes).
- Reactivity control
- Reactivity contro l
- RPV water le ve l
- Core cooling [PWR] I RPV water level [BWR]
- RCS heat removal
- RCS heat remova l Difference I Deviation I Ju s tification Difference:
Site specific information provided. 41 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HS7: INITIATING CONDITIONS El 99--01Rev6 Hatch O th e r co nditi o n s ex i s t w hi c h in the jud g m e nt of the E m e r ge n cy Dir ec t o r O th e r co nditi o n s ex i s t w h ic h in the j ud g m e n t of t he e m e r ge n cy di r ec t o r wa r ran t declara t io n ofa Si t e Area E m e r ge n cy. warrant declarat i o n of a Site A r ea E m e r ge n c y. Difference I Deviation I Ju s tification one THRESHOLDS EI 99--01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) Ot h e r co nditi o n s exist w hi c h in th e jud g m e nt of the E m e r ge n cy (I) O th e r co nditi o n s ex i s t w hi c h in the j u dg m e nt of th e emerge n cy Direc t o r in d ica te t h a t eve n ts a re in p rogress or h ave occ urr ed w hi c h d ir ec t o r indi cate t h a t eve nts a r e in p r ogress or h ave occ u rred w hi c h i n vo l ve ac tu al or li ke l y m ajo r fa ilur es of p l a nt fun c ti o n s n ee d ed fo r i n vo l ve ac tu a l or l i k e l y m a j or fa ilur es of p l a nt f un c ti o n s nee d e d for protec t io n of the public o r H OST IL E ACT I ON th at r es ult s in pro t ec ti o n of th e pu bl ic o r H OST I LE ACT I O N th at r es ul ts i n i nt e nt io n a l dam age or m a li c i o u s ac t s , (I) t owa rd s it e p e r so nn e l o r int e nti o n a l d a m age or m a li c i o u s ac t s , (I) t o w a rd s it e p e r so nn e l o r eq u ip m e nt th at co ul d l ead t o th e lik e l y fai lur e of o r , (2) th a t preven t eq uipm e nt th at co ul d l ead t o th e l ike l y fai lur e of o r , (2) th at p r eve nt e ffective acces s to equip m e nt nee d e d fo r t h e pr o t e c ti o n of t he p u b l ic. effective acce s s to eq u ip m e nt n eeded for the pro t ect i on of t he publi c. Any releases are n o t ex p ec t ed t o r es ult i n exp o s ur e l eve ls w h ic h A n y r e l eas es a r e n o t ex p ec t ed t o r es ult in e x p os ur e l eve ls w hi c h excee d E PA P ro t ec ti ve Ac tion Guidelin e ex p os ur e l eve l s b eyo nd th e exc e e d E PA Pro tective Ac ti o n Guid e l i n e e x p os ur e l eve l s b eyo nd th e s ite bo u n d ary. site bo und ary. Difference I Deviation I Justification one 42 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SA FETY I CS/EA LS HAI: INITIATING CONDITIONS NE I 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch HOSTIL E ACT I ON wit h in the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA or airborne HO ST IL E ACTION within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA or airborne attack thr eat w i thi n 30 minutes. attack threat wit hin 30 minut es. Differenc e I Deviation I Ju sti fi ca ti o n No ne THRESHOLDS NE I 99--01 Re v 6 Hatch ( 1) A HOST I LE ACT ION is occurring or ha s occurred wi th in the ( 1) A HOSTIL E ACTION is occ u rring or h as occu rr ed within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA as reported b y th e (site-specific OWNER CONTROLLED A R EA (OCA) as reported by the ' I. security s hift s upervision). Secur i ty Sffi4t..C aptain or d es i g n ee. (2) A va lidated n ot ification from N R C of an aircraft attack threat wit h in (2) A va lid ated n otificatio n from NRC of a n a ir craft attack threa t w i th in ( Commented [JRB17): RAJ 21.a revision 30 minutes of t he site. 30 minutes of the site. Difference I Deviation I Ju s tifi ca ti o n Difference
- S ite s pe c ific information provided. 43 ----------L_ __ _
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HAS: I NIT I AT I NG CONDIT I ONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch Ga s e o u s re l e a se imp e d i n g access t o e quipm e n t n ec e ssary for norm a l pl a nt G aseo u s relea se imp e d i n g access to e quipment n ec e ss a ry for n o rm a l plant o p era t i on s , coo l down o r s hutd o wn. o p e rati o n s , c ooldown or s hutdown. Difference I Deviation I Ju s tifiration None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (I) a. Rele ase of a t ox i c , co rrosiv e , as ph yx iant or flamm a ble g a s (I) a. Relea se of a to x ic , corro s ive , a s ph y xiant or fl a mmable g a s into a n y of th e follo w in g pl a nt ro om s or a rea s: int o an y Tab l e HI pl a nt r oo ms o r ar eas: (s ite-s pe c ifi c li st of pl a nt rooms o r a r eas with ent ry-rel a ted mod e appli c ability id e ntifi e d) Table HI AND Buildi n e Room s App l icable Mo d es b. E nt ry int o th e roo m o r a re a i s p ro hibit e d o r imp e d e d. D i ese l l!enerator building All All U nit 1/2 1 30' A ll R eacto r build i ng U nit 1/2 SE Dia go n a l s (RHR) All U nit 1/2 NE Diag o n a l s (RJ-!R) All AND b. E ntry int o th e room or are a is prohibited or imp e ded. Difference I Deviatio n I Ju s tifiration Difference: Site specific information provided. Hatch EAL Thresho l d (I )a incorporates Tab l e HI to identify applicable site specific rooms/areas. 44 HAZARDS AND OTHE R CONDIT I ONS AFFECT I NG PLANT SAFETY I CS/EA LS HA6: INIT I ATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch Co ntrol Room evacua t i on re s ultin g in transfer of plant co ntrol to alte rn ate Co ntrol Room evac u atio n re s ultin g in tr a n sfe r of plant co ntrol to alte rn a t e l oca t ions. l ocations. Difference I Deviation I Justification None TH R ESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (I) An event ha s res ulted in p l a n t co ntrol being transferred from the (I) An event ha s resulted in plant control being transferred from the Cont rol Room to (site-specific remote shutdown panels and local co ntrol room to remote s hut down panels. contro l s t a tion s) Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference
- Site specific information provided.
45 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY I CS/EA LS HA7: INITIATING CONDITIONS NE I 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch Other conditions exist w hich in the j udgment of the Emergency Dire cto r Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the emergency director warrant declaration of a n Alert. warrant declaration of an Alert. Difference I Deviation I Justification No ne THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (I) Other co nditi ons exist w hi c h , i n the judgment of the E mer ge nc y (I) Other co ndition s exist which , in the ju d g ment of the emergency Director , indi ca te that eve nts a re in pro gress or have occurred which director , indicat e that events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actua l or potentia l substantial degradation of the level of invo l ve a n actual or potential s ub s tantial degradation of the level of safe t y of the p la nt or a sec urity event that involves probable life safety of the plant or a sec urity event that involve s probable life thr ea tening ris k to si te per s onnel or dama ge to s ite equipment threatening risk to s ite personnel or damage to s ite equipment beca u se of HO ST I LE ACT I ON. Any releases are expected to be because of HOSTIL E ACT I ON. Any releases a re expected to be limited to s m all fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline limited to s m a ll fractions of the E PA Protective Action Guideli n e expos ure l evel s. exposure l eve l s. Difference I Deviation I Justification one 46 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HUI: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch C onfirm e d SEC URIT Y CON DI T I O N or thre a t. C onfirm e d SEC URITY CO NDITION o r thr eat. Difference I Deviation I ,Justification one THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (I) A SECU RJT Y CON DI T I ON th at d oes n ot i n vo l ve a H OST IL E (I) A SECU RIT Y CON DITI O N th a t does no t in v ol ve a H OST I LE ACT I ON as r e p o rt ed by th e (s it e-s pe cific sec uri ty s h ift s u pervisio n). ACT I ON as reporte d by th e pn 'h1 ti S e c urit y Sfti.ft-Ca ptain or (2) Notifica ti o n ofa c r e d ib l e sec uri ty thr eat di r ec t ed a t th e si t e. de s ignee. (Commented [JRB18): RAJ 2 1.a r evisio n (3) A va lid a t ed n o tifi ca ti o n fro m the NR C prov id i ng i n fo rm a t ion of a n (2) No tifi ca ti o n ofa c r e dibl e sec urit y t h rea t dir ec t e d a t ll NP. aircraft thr ea t. (3) A v alid a t ed n otifica t io n fro m th e N R C p rovid i n g in fo rm a ti o n of a n a i rc raft thr ea t. Difference I Deviation I Ju s tification Difference: EAL Threshold (2); replaced 'the s ite' with HNP. Ju s tification: E ditor i al chan g e -clearl y identifie s that thr e at i s dir ec ted a g ain s t the llat c h s it e. Difference
- Site specific information provided.
47 ---------------------- HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY IC S/EALS HU2: INITIATING CONDITIONS E I 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch Seismic eve nt grea ter than OBE l eve l s. Se i s mi c event g reater than OBE lev e l s. Differen ce I Deviation I Ju s tifiration one THRESHOLDS NE I 99-0 I R ev 6 Hatch (I) Seismic eve nt g r ea t er than Opera ti ng Basis Eart hqu ake (OBE) as (I) Seis mi c eve n t greater than Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) as indicated by: indicated b y ANY of the following: (site-spec ific i ndication that a seis mic event met or exceeded OBE
- Unit O n e " Seismic Peak Shock Recorder Hi g h G Level" limit s) (657-066) alarm
- Unit Two " Seismic Instrumentation Triggered" (657-048) alarm . A 1 2.7 H z amber light illu m i nated in t he N/S OR E/W co l u mn on pane l I 1-1 I I -P70 I . A 12.7 H z red light illuminated in the N/S OR E/W column on panel 1 I-I ll-P70 I Differen ce I Deviation I Ju s tifi c ation Difference
- S ite speci fi c information pr ovi d e d. See V l9 Seis mi c Indication
- s. 48 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFE TY IC S/EA LS HU3: INITIATING CONDITIONS NE I 99-01 Re v 6 Hatch Hazardou s event. H azardous event. Difference I Deviation I Justification No n e THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch ( 1) A tornado strike within the PROTECTED AREA. ( 1) A tornado strike within the PROTECTED AREA (PA). (2) Internal room or area flooding of a m agni tude sufficient to require (2) Int e rnal r oo m or area floodin g of a ma g nitude s ufficient t o require manual o r automatic electrical isolation ofa SAFETY SYSTEM manual or automatic electrical isolation ofa SAFETY SYSTEM component n eeded for the c urrent operating mode. co mponent needed for the c urrent operating mod e. (3) Movement of person n el within the PROTECTED AREA is impeded (3) Movement of personnel within the PROTECTED AREA (PA) is due to a n offsite eve nt invo l ving ha za rdou s materi a l s (e.g., an offsite imp e ded due to an offsite eve nt involvin g h aza rd ous m ater i a l s (e.g., chemical spi ll o r toxic gas release). an offsite chemical spi ll or toxic gas release). (4) A hazardous even t that results in o n-site co ndit ions s uffi cient t o (4) A h azar dou s event that res ult s in on-site conditions sufficient to prohibit the plant staff from accessing the site via personal vehicles. prohibit the plant s t aff from accessing the site in p ersonal vehicles. (5) (Site-specific l ist of natura l or technolo gical h azard events) (5) S u s t a in e d hurri ca n e force w ind s greater t ha n 74 m p h foreca st t o be a t the p l ant s ite in th e ne x t four h o ur s. Differenc e I Deviation I Justification Difference
- EAL Threshold (4) -r e placed "via" with " in". Justification
- Editorial change. D i fferenc e: S ite s pecific informatio n provid e d for EAL Threshold (5). 49 I -
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY IC S/EA LS HU4: INITIATING CONDITIONS NE I 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch FIRE potentially degrading the level of safety of the plant. FIRE potentially degradin g the l eve l of safety of the plant. Difference I Deviation I Ju s tifiration None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-0I Rev 6 Hatch (I) a. A FIRE is NOT exti ngui shed withi n JS-minutes of ANY of (I) a. A FIRE is NOT ex tin guished wit hin IS-minut es of ANY of the fo ll owing FIRE detection indication s: the followi ng F IRE detection indications
- Re port from the field (i.e., vis ual ob s ervation)
- Report from the field (i.e., vis u a l observation)
- Rece ipt of multiple (more than I) fire a l arms or
- Receipt of multiple (more than I) fire alarms or indications indicatio n s
- F i eld verification ofa single fire a l arm
- Field verificat ion ofa single fire a l arm AND AND b. The F I RE is located w ithin A Y of the fo ll owing plant b. The FfRE i s located within ANY Table H2 rooms or areas. room s or areas: (site-s pecific list of plant rooms or areas) (2) a. Receipt ofa sing l e fire alarm (i.e., no other indications ofa (2) a. Rece ip t ofa si n g l e fire a l a rm (i.e., n o other indication s ofa FIRE) FIRE). AND AND b. The FIRE is located within ANY Table H2 rooms or a r eas. b. The FIRE is located within ANY of the fo ll owing plant AND room s or areas: C. The existence of a FIRE is not ve rifi ed within 30-minutes (site-s pecific list of plant rooms or areas) of a l arm receipt. AND (3) A FIRE within the plant PROTECTED AREA (!'A) or ISFSI c. The existence of a F IRE is n ot verified within 30-minutes PROTECTED AREA not exti n guished wit hin 60-mi nu tes of the of a l arm receipt. initial report , a l arm or indication. (3) A FIRE wi thi n the plant or ISFSI [for plants with an ISFSI ou tside (4) A F I RE within the plant PROT ECTED AREA PA) or ISFSI th e plant Prote c ted Area] PROTECTED AREA not exti n guished PROTECTED AREA that requires firefighting support b y an off s ite within 60-m in utes of the initial report , a l arm or indication. fire re s ponse agency to ext in guish. 50 HAZARDS AND OTHER C ONDITION S A FFE C TING PL A NT SA FETY I CS/E A L S (4) A FIRE wit h i n the pl a nt or ISFSJ [for plants wi th an JSFSI owside Table H2 th e plant Protected Are a] PROTECT E D AREA that requires Buildine Room s firefig hting support by an offsite fire res ponse age nc y to extin g ui s h. Con t ro l Building CB 1 47' Cable Soreadi n g Room U l/2 CB 11 2' Statio n Battery Room s A , B Diese l !(e n era t or b uildin!( A ll Primary Co nt ai nm e nt A ll Unit 1/2 130' U nit 1/2 SE Diago n als (RHR) Reactor bui l din g \Jnit 1/2 NE Diagona l s (RHR) Unit I SW Dia!(onals (RCIC) U nit 2 NW Dia!(o n a l s (RC I C) Unit 1/2 HPCI Rooms Intake s tru c tur e A ll Diff e r e n ce I De v i a tion I Justification Differen ces: EAL Th r es h o lds (l)b and (2)b-added r e feren ce t o Ta bl e H2 in s te a d o f li s ting a r eas s ep a ratel y for ea ch EAL. Justification
- Human factors consideration
-applicable rooms are the same for each EAL. Placing these rooms into one table and referencing that table in the EAL simplifies the proce ss for identif y ing applicable rooms. Differen ces: EAL T h re s hold s (3) and (4)-add e d PROT EC T E D A R EA (P A) a ft e r plant. Justification: C larifits plant areas that are applicable to these EA Ls. Differen ces: S it e s p e cifi c information pro v ided -added Ta ble H 2 wi th a ppli c abl e r oo m li s tin g. S e e V20 Ta ble H 2 B as i s. Justification: Human factor s consideration. 5 1 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HU7: INITIATlNG COND I TIONS NE I 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch Other conditio n s ex ist w h ich in the judgment of the E merg e nc y Director Other co ndition s exist w hich in the jud gme nt of the e m ergency director warrant declaration of a (NO)UE. warrant declaration ofa Notifica ti on of U nu sua l Even t (NOUEJ. D i fferenc e I Deviation I Justification Difference: E ditori a l change that doe s not c hange I C. THRESHOLDS NE I 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (I) Other condi t ions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency (I) Othe r condition s exist w hi ch in the judgme nt of the emergency Director indic a te that eve n ts are in pro g re ss or h ave oc c urred which direc t or indicate that events are in pr ogress or have occurred whic h indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the p l ant or indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to faci lit y protection has been initiated. No indicate a sec urity threat to faci lit y protectio n ha s been initiated. No releases of rad i oactive material requiri n g offsite re spo n se o r re l eases of radioactive material requir ing offs i te re sponse or monitoring are expected unles s further degradat i on of safety sys t ems moni t oring are expected unle ss further degradation of safety syste m s occ urs. occ ur s. Difference I Deviation I Justification No ne 52 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SGI: INITIATING CONDITIONS NE I 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch Prolonged loss of a ll offsite and all o n si te AC power to emergency buses. Prolonged l oss of all offsite and al l o n site AC power to esseftttt!k 11, buses. Difference I Deviation I Justification l)il:reFenee 1 Sile Sf!e eifie i11feFnu1lio11 feF I G. None Juslifieelion 1 '.J eFminolog' ' rlil:rue11ee llulelt Fefn s lo emeFgen e , , bu s e s e s e ss entittl bu s e s. THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (I) a. Loss of ALL offs i te and ALL onsite AC powe r to (site-(I) a. Loss of ALL offsite and ALL ons it e AC p owe r to 4160 spec i fic emergency b u ses). VAC Buses l/2E J l/2F and l/2G. A D AND b. E ITHER of the fo ll owing: b. EITHER of the fo ll owing:
- Restoration of at lea st one AC eme r ge n cy bus in les s . Restoration of at least one AC
'
- bus t han (site-specific h o ur s) is not li ke l y. in le ss than 4 h o ur s is not likely. * (Site-specific indication of an inabi li ty to adequately . Reactor vesse l water level cannot be restored and r e m ove heat fro m the core) maintained above Minimum Steam Coo lin g RPV Water Level. Difference I Deviation I Justification Differen ce: S ite specific information provided. S ee VIJ 4160 VAC EssetHitH Emerge11cy Buse s Information and V21 Minimum Steam Coo ling RPV Water Level. 53 ----------------
S Y S T E M MA LF UNCT IO NS S GS: I N ITI A TING CO N DITIO NS NE I 99-0 1 R ev 6 H atc h Loss of a ll AC a nd Vit al D C p owe r so ur ces fo r 1 5 minut es o r l o n ger. Loss of a ll AC a nd v it a l DC powe r so ur ces for 1 5 minut es or l onger. Diff e r e n ce I D ev i a tion I Justification o n e THRE S HOLD S E l 99-0 1 R ev 6 H a t c h (I) a. L oss o f ALL o ff s ite a nd A L L o n s it e A C pow e r to (si t e-(I) a. L oss of ALL offs ite a nd ALL o n s it e A C p ower t o 4160 s p ec i fic e m e r ge n cy bu ses) for 1 5 m i nut es or l o n ger. VAC 8sefltt!tt l m.:1 'L'nc\ Buses l/2 F and l/2G fo r A N D 1 5 m i nut es or l o n ger. b. I ndi ca t e d vo lta ge i s l e ss than (s it e-s pe c ifi c b u s vo lt age AN D v a l u e) o n A L L (s i te-s p ec ifi c Vi t al D C bu sses) fo r 1 5 b. In di cate d vo lt age i s le ss th a n I 05/2 1 0 VDC o n ALL m i nu tes or l o n ger. 12 5/250 VDC Bus l/2 R22-S O l 6 and l/2R22-S Ol7 fo r 1 5 m i nut es or l o n ger. Diff e r ence I Dev i a ti o n I Justification Diff e r e n ce: S it e s p eci fic i n fo rmati o n pr ov i d e d. See VI J 41 60 VA C Bu ses I nfo rm a tion , V I S D C Sy s t e m Inform at i o n. 54 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SS1: INITIATING CONDITIONS E l 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch Loss of a ll offs ite a nd all o n s it e AC po we r to em e r g en cy bu s e s fo r 1 5 m i nu t e s Loss of a ll offs ite a nd a ll o n s it e AC po wer t o e55eflttalc mcr"c ' bu ses fo r or l on ge r. 1 5 minut es o r l o n ge r. DifTtren ce I Deviation I Justification 9ille*ertee. S ile s pe e ifie irtfe*meti1111 flFO 1*itletl fer I G. '.'lone +e*mirt e log,* tlille*enee Hnleh fefers lo bu s es es essenlinl bu s es. THRESHOLDS E l 99-01 R ev 6 Hatch (I) Loss o f ALL offs ite a nd ALL on s ite AC po we r to (s it e-s pe c i fic (1) L oss of ALL offs ite a nd ALL o n s it e AC pow e r to 41 60 VA C e m e r g en cy bu ses) fo r 1 5 minut es o r l o n ger. 111crLCl1L' Bu s e s l/2E , l/2F , a nd l/2G for 1 5 m i nut es or lon g er. Differenc e I Deviation I Justification Differenc e: Site s pe c ific information prov ided. See Vl3 4 160 VAC Buses In fo rm at i on. 55 S Y S T E M M A LF UNC TIO NS SSS: INITIA T ING CO N DITION S NE I 99-0 1 R ev 6 H a t c h I nabili ty to s hut down th e reactor causing a challenge to (core cooling [PWR] In ability to s hutdown t h e reactor causing a challenge to RPV water leve l or I RPV wa ter le ve l [BWR]) or RCS heat removal. RCS heat remova l. Differ e n ce I D ev iation I Justification o ne THRE S HOLD S NE I 99-01 R ev 6 Hatch (I) a. An automatic or m a nual (trip [PWR] I scram [BWR]) did (I) a. An automatic or manual scra m did not s hutdown the n o t s h utdown the reactor. r eactor. AN D AN D b. All m an ual actions to shut down the reactor h ave b. A ll manu a l ac ti ons to s hutdown the reactor h ave been bee n uns u ccessfu l. un s ucce ssf ul. AN D AND c. E I T H E R of the following conditions exist: C. E I T H E R of the fo ll owing conditions exist: * (Site-specific i n d i ca t io n of an inabi l it y to adequately
- Reactor vesse l water l evel cannot be restored and r e mov e heat from the core) maintained above Minimum Steam Cooling RPV . (Site-specific i n d i cat i on of an inabi l it y to adequate l y Water Leve l r e mov e heat from th e RCS) . Exceeding the Heat Capacity Temperature Limi (HCTL Curve (EOP Graph 1.) D i fferenc e I D ev i a ti o n I Justification D i ffer e n ce: S ite s p ec ifi c info r mation pr ov id e d. Se e V2 I M inimum S t e am Coo lin g RP V Wa t e r Leve l a nd V22 H ea t Ca p a ci ty T emp era tur e Li mit (H CTL) C u rve. 56 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SSS: INITIATING CONDITIONS EI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch Loss of all Vital DC power for 15 minu t es or longer. Loss of all vita l DC power for 15 minutes or longer. Difference I Deviation I Ju s tifiration one THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01Rev6 Hatch (I) Indi cated vo lt age is l ess than (site-s p ecific bus vo lt age va lu e) on (I) Indicated voltage is l ess t h an 1 05/2 1 0 VDC on ALL 125/250 VDC ALL (site-specific Vital DC busses) for 1 5 minutes or longer. Bus l/2R22-SO 16 and l/2R22-SO 17 for 15 minutes or longer. Difference I Deviation I Ju s tific a tion Difference:
S ite s pecific information provided. Se e V IS D C Sys tem Information. 57 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SAi: INITIATING CONDITIONS N EI 99-01 R tv 6 Hatch Loss of a ll but one AC power source to e m e r ge n cy buses fo r 1 5 m inutes or Loss of all but one AC power source t o 1 buses for 15 longer. minutes or longer. Difference I Deviation I J u stification QiffeFenee1 Sile s11eeifie inffiFmelien HJF IG. "'one Juslifie11lien1 diffeFenee Heleh refeFs le emeFgene buses 11s essenli11I buse s. THRESHOLDS N EI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (I) a. AC power capabi lity to (si t e-specific e m e r ge n cy b u ses) is (I) a. AC power ca p ab il ity to 4 1 60 V AC red u ced to a single powe r so ur ce fo r 15 mi n ut es or lo n ger. Bu ses l/2E , l/2 F , a nd l/2G is reduced to a s in gle powe r A D source (I ahlc SI) for 15 minutes or l o n ger. [Commented [JRB19): RAJ 1 3.b r evision b. A n y addi t io n al sing l e powe r source fa ilu re wi ll res u lt in a A D loss of all AC power t o SAFE T Y SYSTEMS. b. A n y additio n a l s in g l e p ower so u rce fa ilur e will res ul t in a l oss of all AC power t o SAFETY SYSTEMS. [l'able S I U nit I U nil2 S t a rt-u o A u x XF MR I Q Sta rt-uo A u x XFMR 2C S t a rt-uo A u x XFMR ID S t a rt-up Au x XFM R 2D Di ese l Ge n era t or I A D i ese l Ge n erato r 2A Di ese l Ge n era t or I B D i ese l G en era t or I B Di ese l Ge n era t or I q D iese l G en erato r 2 q Difference I Deviation I Ju s tification Differenc e: S ite s pe ci fic information provided. S ee V IJ 41 6 0 VAC EssetttffH E m erge n cy Bu s e s Information. 58 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SA2: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch UNPLANNED lo ss of Control Room i ndi cations for 15 minutes or lon ger UNPLANNED los s of Control Room indic ations for 15 minutes or longer with a significant transient in progress. with a significan t tran s ient in progress. Difference I Deviation I Justification one THRESHOLDS NE I 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch 59 ------------------------- SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS (I) a. A n UNP L ANNED eve nt re s ult s in the inability to m onitor (I) a. An UN PL ANNED event r es ult s in the in ab ili ty to monitor one or m o r e of the following pa ra met ers from within the o ne or m o r e of th e following parameters from withi n the Contro l Room for 15 minutes or longer. Con trol Room for 1 5 minute s or l onger. [BWR parameter li s t] [ PWR parameter li s t] R eactor Power R eacto r P ower R eacto r Powe r RPV Water Leve l RPV Pressure RPV Water Leve l R CS Leve l Prim arv Co nt ai nment Pres s ure RPV P r essure R CS Pressure S up p r ession Pool Level Prim ary Containme nt In-Core/Core Ex it S uoor ess i on P oo l Temoerature Pr essu r e Temperature Supp r ession Pool Level Levels i n at least (site-AND spec ifi c numb e r) s t eam ge n erato r s b. A Y of the followi n g transient events in progres s. Suppression Pool Stea m Ge nerat o r Auxiliary Temperature or Emerge nc y Feed Water
- Automatic or m a nu a l runback grea t e r than 25% F l ow therm a l reactor p ower
- E l ectrical l oad rejection greater than 25% fu ll e le ctrica l AND l oad
- R eactor sc r a m b. ANY of the fo ll owi n g transient eve nt s in progre ss.
- ECCS actuation
- Thermal power oscillation s g re ate r th a n 1 0%
- Automatic or manual run back greater t han 25% th e rm al reactor power
- E l ec t rica l load re jec ti o n greater th a n 25% full electrica l l oad
- R ea ct or scram [BWR] I tri p [PWR]
- ECCS ( I) actuation
- Thermal power osc ill a tions g r ea ter th a n I 0% [BWR] D i ffe r e n ce I Dev i a ti o n I Ju s tifi ca ti o n No n e 60 S Y S T E M M A LF UNCT IO NS SA S: INITI A TING C ONDITIO NS NE I 99-01 Rev 6 H a t c h A ut o m a t ic or m a nu a l (tr ip [PWR) I sc ram [BWR)) fa il s to s hut d o wn the A u t o m a tic or m a n u a l sc ram fa il s t o s hu tdown th e r eac t o r , a nd s u bseq u e n t r eac t o r , a nd subseq u e nt m a nu a l act i o n s t a k e n at t he reac tor co n t ro l conso l es m a nu a l ac t io n s t ake n a t th e reac t or co ntr o l co n so l es a r e n o t s u ccessf ul in ar e n o t s u ccessf ul i n s h u tti n g d o wn t h e r eac t o r. s h u tt in g down t h e r eac t o r. Differ e n ce I Dev i atio n I J u s tific a ti o n No ne THRE S HOLD S NE I 99-01 R ev 6 Hat c h (I) a. A n a ut o m a tic or m a nu a l (trip [PWR) I sc ram [BWR)) did (I) a. A n a ut o m a t ic o r manu a l scra m did n o t s hutd own t he n o t s h ut d own the r eac t or. r eactor. AN D A D b. M a n u a l ac ti o n s tak e n at th e re ac t o r co ntro l co n so l es are n o t b. Manu a l ac t io n s t ake n a t th e r eac t o r co nt ro l co n so l es a r e n ot s u ccessf ul i n s hu tt in g d o wn th e reac t o r. s u ccess ful in s hu t tin g d o wn th e r eac tor. Differ e n ce I Dev iation I Ju s tifi c ation No n e 6 1 ---------
SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SA9: I N I TIAT I NG C O N DI T IO NS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatc h Hazardous event affec tin g a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current H azardous eve nt affec t ing a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for th e current o peratin g mode. operatin g mode. D i ffe r e n ce I Deviation I Justification None T HR ESH O LDS NEI 99-01 Re v 6 Hatch (I) a. The occurrence of ANY of th e fo ll owi n g h aza rd o u s eve nt s: (I) a. T h e occurrence of A Y of the fo ll owi n g h aza rd ous eve nt s:
- Seismic event (eart hqu ake)
- Seismic eve nt (earthquake)
- In t e rnal or exte rnal floodin g eve nt
- Int erna l or externa l flooding eve nt
- H ig h winds o r tornado s trike
- Hi gh wi nd s (> 35 mph sustai11L'd) o r tornado str ik e
- FIRE
- F I RE
- EXPLOS I ON
- EX P LOS I ON * (site-s pecific hazards)
- Ot h e r eve nt s wit h si mil ar hazard c h aracteristics as
- Other events wit h s imil ar h aza rd c ha rac ter ist i cs as determined b y th e S hi ft Manager determined by t he S hi ft Manager A D AND b. E ITH E R of the fo ll owi n g: b. E ITH ER of the fo ll owing: I Event damage h as caused indications of degraded . Event damage h as ca u se d indica ti ons of degraded performance in at l east one t r a in of a SAFETY performance in at l east one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM n eede d for the current operating mode. SYSTEM n eeded fo r the current operat in g mode. OR
- The event ha s caused V I SIBLE DAM AGE to a 2. The event h as ca u sed VISIBLE DAMAGE to a SAFETY SYSTEM compone nt o r st ructure needed for SAFETY S YST EM compone nt o r st ru cture the current operating mode. needed for the c urr ent operati n g mode. D i fferenc e I D ev iatio n I Ju s tification 62 [C o mm ent e d [JR B2 0]: RAJ 1 3.a r evi s i o n l I I I ------------------------
SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Difference: E l 99-01Rev6 EA L Thresho l d (l)a , next to the la s t bullet , refer s to s ite-s pecific ha za rd s. o additional s ite s pecific ha z ard s ar e identified for H a tch. Justification: Hatch has not identified any additional site-specific hazards applicable to this threshold. Difference
- NE I 99-0 1 Re v 6 EA L Thre s hold (l)b u s e s number s and a conditional OR. Hatch u s e s bullet s to s eparat e the two conditi o n s. Justification:
Editorial change-doesnot impact the ability to classify the event. I I I I 63 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SUI: INITIATING CONDITIONS El 99-01 Re v 6 Hatch Los s of a ll offsite AC power capabi li ty to e m e r gency b u ses for 1 5 minute s or Lo ss of all offsite AC po wer capability to e55ffiltftk mc11*cnc 1 bu ses for 15 lon ger. minute s or longer. Differen ce I Deviation I Ju s tification Qiffuenee. Sile speeif;e infeFmetien feF IG. ;'rnne dustrneatien i tliffeFenee Hateli FereFs le emeFgeney IJuses 11s essential IJuses. THRESHOLDS NE I 99-01Re v6 Hatch ( 1) Loss of ALL offsi t e AC power capability to (site-s pe ci fi c (1) Lo ss of ALL offsite AC power capability Tuhlc S'.!)to 4160 V A emergency bus es) for 15 min ut es o r lon ger. mc1*'<*nc*\ Bu ses l/2E , l/2F , a n d l/2G for 1 5 minutes or (Commented [JRB21]: RA J 1 3.b revision longer. r rable S2 Unit I I U nit2 S t a rt-up A u x XF MR 1 0 I Sta rt-up A u x XF MR 2 0 S t a rt-up A ux X FMR 1 D I S t a rt-up A u x XF MR 2 D Differen ce I Deviation I Ju s tification D i fferenc e: S ite s pecific information provided. See VIJ 4160 VAC Bu ses lnform a t o n. 64 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SU2: INITIATING CONDITIONS El 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch UNPLANNED loss of Control Room indications for 15 minutes o r longer. UNPLANNED lo ss of Control Room indications fo r 15 minute s or l onger. Difference I De v iation I Ju s tifiration N one THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (I) a. An UN PLANNED event r esults in the inabi l ity to monitor (I) a. An UNPLANNED event re sults in t he i n abi li ty to monitor o n e o r mor e of the fo ll ow in g paramete r s fro m w ithin the one or mor e of the fo ll owi n g parameters from within t h e Control Room for 1 5 minut es o r longer. Co ntrol Room for 15 minute s or longer. f BWR parameter /i stl f PWR parameter listl React or Power Re acto r Power Reactor Power RPV Water Level RPV Pressure RPV Water Leve l R CS Level Prim ary Co ntainment Pre ss ure RP V Pressure RCS Pr essure Suppression Pool Level Prim ary Contain ment Jn-Core/Core Exit Suppres s ion Pool Temperature Pr ess ure Temperatu r e S u p pr ession Pool Leve l Leve l s in at l east (site-s pecific number) steam ge nerators Suppression Pool Steam Generator Temperature Auxiliary or Emergency Feed Water Flow Difference I Deviation I Ju s tifiration one 65
SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SU3: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch Re ac tor coolant ac ti v i ty g re a t er than Tech n ica l Specifica tion a ll owable limits. R eactor coo l an t activity g r eater than T ech ni cal Specificatio n allowable limits. Difference I Deviation I Justification one THRESHOLDS El 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (I) (S ite-s pecific ra di atio n monitor) reading grea ter th an (s ite-s pe c ifi c I N ot e: Use the Unit I or Unit 2 Pr etreatment (F l ow vs mR/h r) Grap h s to I value). de t e rmin e i f th e Pre tr ea tm e nt R a di a t ion Mo nit o r exceeds t h e T V of240 , 000 µCi/sec (2) Sample a n a l ys i s indicate s that a reactor coo l a nt activity va lu e is (I) F e tr ea tm e nt R ad i at i on M o nit o r greater th an a n a ll owable limit s p ecified in Tec hni ca l Specifications. (2)D I IK60 1 IQ)Dl I K602 reading greater than 240 000 µCi/s ec for greater than 60 minutes. (2) Samp le a n a l ys i s indicates that the reactor coo l ant s peci fie activity i s E ITHER:
- Greater than 0.2 µCi/gm and l ess than or eq u a l to 2.0 µCi/gm dose e qui va l e nt I 111 fo r g r ea t e r t h a n 48 h o ur s
- Greater t han 2.0 µCi/g m dose equiva l ent 1 111 . Difference I Deviation I Ju s tification Difference
- El 99-01 Re v 6 EAL Threshold (1) does not include a No te box. Hat c h EAL Threshold (I) include s a 'ote box.
- Justification:
Editorial change to provide guidance on use of U nit I or llnit2 Pretreatment Graphs to determine if threshold has been exceeded . Difference
- S ite s pecific information provided for Thre s hold (I). See V23 T 3.7.6 Pretreatment Radiation Monitor Readin g. Difference
- NE I 99-01 Rev 6 EAL Thre s hold (2) doe s not s pecif y a Technical S pecification value. Hat c h EAL Threshold (2) identifie s the coolant ac tivity values that s ati s f y the EAL threshold. See V24 TS 3.4.6 R CS S ample Ac tivi ty. Justification
- Editorial change to clearly indicate Technical S pecification limits to plant personnel.
66 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SU4: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch RCS l eakage for 1 5 minute s or lon g er. R CS le akage for 1 5 minut es or lon ge r. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (I) RCS unidenti fie d or pressure boundary l eakage g reater than (site-(I) RCS unidentifi e d or pr ess ure boundary l eakage g re a ter than I 0 gpm specific va lu e) for 15 minute s o r lon ger. fo r 1 5 minute s or lon ger. (2) RCS identified le akage grea t e r than (si te-specific va lue) for 15 (2) R CS identified leakage g reat er than 25 g pm for 15 minute s or minutes or l onger. lon g er. (3) Leakage from t he RCS to a location outside containment greater (3) Leakage from the RCS to a location outside containment grea ter th an 25 g pm for 1 5 minutes or l onger. than 25 gpm for 15 minute s or longer. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: S ite specific value i s not used for EAL Thresholds (I) and (2). See V25 TS 3.4.4 RC S Operational Leakage. Justification: llNP Tech Spec leak rate is less than identified EAL threshold values. Per Developer Notes the identified values are used. 67 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SUS: INITIATING CONDITIONS E l 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch Auto m atic or manua l (trip [PWR] I scra m (BWR]) fa il s to sh utd own the A ut o m atic or m a nual scram fails to s hutdown the reactor. reactor. Differ e n ce I Deviation I Justification No ne THRESHOLD S NE I 99-01 Re v 6 Hatch (I) a. An automatic (trip [PWR] I sc ram (BWR]) did not (I) a. A n automatic sc ram did not shutdown the reactor. s hutd own th e reactor. A D A D b. A subsequent manual action taken at the reactor contro l consoles is successful in s hut ting down the rea ctor. b. A s ub sequent manual action taken a t th e rea ctor co ntrol (2) a. A manual trip ([PWR] I scram [BWR]) did n ot s hutdown co n so l es is successf ul in shutting down the reactor. the reactor. (2) a. A manual scram did not shutdown the r eactor. A D b. E ITH E R of the fo ll owing: A D I. A s ub seq u ent manual action taken at the reactor co nt rol conso le s is s u ccessful in s huttin g down the b. E ITH E R of the following: reactor.
- A subsequent manual action taken at the reactor control OR consoles is s u ccessfu l in shutti n g d own the re ac tor. 2. A s ubsequent a ut omatic (trip [PWR] I scram (BWR]) . A subseque nt au t o m atic scra m i s s u ccessful in sh uttin g i s s uccessful in sh uttin g down the reactor. down the reactor. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference
- NE I 99-01Rev6 EAL Threshold (2)b u ses number s and a conditional OR. Hatch u s e s bullet s to s eparate the two conditions.
Justification: Editorial change -doesnot impact the ability to classif y the event. 68 ---------------------- SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SU6: INITIATING CONDITIONS EI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch L oss of a ll o n s ite or o ffs it e co mmuni ca tion s ca p ab iliti es. L oss of a ll o n s ite o r offs it e co mmuni ca ti o n s ca p ab iliti es. Differ ence I Deviation I ,lustification N one THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (I) Loss of ALL o f th e fo ll ow ing o n si te co mmuni ca t io n m e th o d s: (1) Loss of ALL of th e fo ll o win g o n s i te co mmun ica t ion m ethods: (site-s p ecific li st of co mmun ica ti o n s m e th ods) (2) Loss of ALL of t he follow in g O R O co mmun ica ti o n s m et h ods: I Plant telephone s (Includes hardwired and wireless) I (si t e-s p ec ific li s t of co mmuni ca ti o n s m e th o d s) I Plant page I (3) Loss of ALL of t he fo ll ow ing N R C co mmuni ca ti o n s m e th ods: I Plant rad i o svs tem s l (si t e-s p ec ifi c l i s t o f co mmuni ca ti o n s m e thod s) (2) Loss o f ALL of t h e fo ll ow in g O R O co mmuni ca ti o n s met h ods: I ENN (Emergency Notification Network) l I Commercial phones I (3) Loss o f ALL of t h e fo ll ow in g NR C co mmunic a ti o n s m e th o d s: I ENS Federal Telecommunications System (FTS) I I Commercia l phones I Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference
- Site specific information provided. 69 Southern Nuclear Operating Company Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2; Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2; Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 1 and 2; License Amendment Request for Changes to Emergency Action Level Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant Responses to Requests for Additional Information VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 EAL DEVIATIONS AND DIFFERENCES MATRIX MARKED-UP PAGES NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Deviations and Differences Vogtle Electric Generating Plant -Units 1 and 2 -_J Table of Contents Generic Differences
..................... ......................................................... I RGI : I nitiating Conditions ....................................... .............. 2 RG2: In itiati n g Co ndi t i o n s ............... .. ***********************
- ...... 3 RS I: I nitiating Co n d iti o n s ............
..................... ................................. 4 RS 2: Initi a tin g Co n d it io n s..... .................. . ............................ S RA I: In i ti ati n g Co ndi t ion s ................. .................................................. 6 R A2: In itia tin g Co n d ition s ....................... ................. ............. .............. 7 RA 3: In itiati n g Co ndit io n s .......................................... ....................... S RU I* In itia tin g Co n dit io n s .................................................................. I O RU 2: Ini tiating Co n d it i on s ........... ........ . ......................... 12 CG I: Initi a tin g Co ndit i on s .................................................... ............. 1 3 CS I: Init ia tin g Co nditi o n s . . . . ..... .. ...... .. .... ....... ... . .................. 16 CA I: Init iat in g Co n di ti ons ............ .............................................. ...... 1 8 CA2: Ini tiating Co nd it i o n s................ ...... . .......................... 1 9 CA3: Initi at in g Co nditi o n s ..................................... ........................... 20 CA6: In i tiatin g Co nd i ti o n s ................................................................. 2 1 CU I: Initi ati n g Co nd it i ons ................................................................. 23 CU2: Init iat in g Co nd it i o n s ............................ ..................................... 24 CU3: Initi ati n g Co ndi t i o n s .. CU4: In itiating Co nditi o n s . .................................................... 26 ...... ........... ........ . ................. 27 CUS: Ini tiating Co nditi o n s ............ ..................... ............................... 2S E-H U I: In it i ating Co nd it i ons ............................... ... .. ...................... 29 PWR Fission Product Barriers Matrix -Ini tiating Co ndit io n s/Th re s h o ld s .............................. .......................... .................. 3 1 I. RCS o r SG T u be Leakage .................................... 31 2. In adeq u a te H eat R emova l ................................... ................ 33 3. RCS Activ i ty I Co nt ain m e nt R a di a ti o n ................................ 3S 4. S. 6. Conta inment I ntegrity or B y p ass................. . ....... 37 O th er In dication s ............... ..................... .............................. 39 E m e r ge n cy Dir ector Judgme nt ........................................ .40 J9 H G I: In i ti ati n g Co ndit ions ............................................ ................ .... 41 HG7: In it iatin g Conditio n s ..................... ... .. ........ ......... 42 HS I: Initi a tin g Co ndition s ....................................... ..................... 43 H S6: Initi a t ing Co nditi o n s H S7: Initiatin g Co nditi ons HAI: In itiat in g Conditio n s HAS: I nitiating Co ndit ions HA6: Initi a tin g Conditions HA7: Initi ating Cond iti ons ************************ .............. ................... 44 ........... ..... .. . ...................... 4S .. . . .. . ................ 46 .............. ...................... ........... 47 ..........................................
- 49 .... ... ....... ...... . .............................
so HU I: Initi ating Conditio n s ................ ........................ ...................... S I H U2 Initiatin g Condi ti ons ....... ......... ... ..... .................. .. S2 HU3: Initi ati n g Condit i ons ........ ....... .......... ... ............ . .................. S3 H U4 Initi a tin g Co nd i ti o n s ............................................ ................... 54 H U7: Initi a tin g Cond iti ons ........................................................ S6 SG I: I n itiating Co n ditions ...... S7 SGS: Initi at in g Con d itions........... ...... .... ............. ..... . . ................. SS SS I: Initi a tin g Co nd itio n s ................... .... . ......................... S9 SSS: In i tiatin g Con diti o n s .................... ... . ....................... 60 SSS: Initi a tin g Co ndi tions. .................... ................. . 6 1 SA I: In it i a tin g Con d itions .......................... .................................... 62 SA2: I n iti a tin g Co n d iti o n s ............................................ ................... 64 SAS: Initiatin g Co nd itio n s ....................................... .............. 66 SA9: Initiatin g Co ndit io n s........... . ....................................... ......... 67 SU I. Initiatin g Co nditi ons. . ............................................. 69 SU2: Initi at in g Co n ditions............ .......... .......... ....... . ...................... 70 SU3: Initiati n g Cond it ions .................... ... .. . . .... .. 72 SU4: Initiating Co nd i t ions .......................... .. . ................. 73 SUS: Initiatin g Co ndi tio n s ................................................ . .. 74 SU6: Initiatin g Co nditi ons SU7: In it iatin g Conditions . -. ...... ..... .. .. .. .. . .................. 76 GENERIC DIFFERENCES N EI 99-01 Rev 6 V 02t l e References BWRs Deleted B WR references as appropriate Uses A for the radiolog i cal effiuenUradiation level !Cs Uses R for the radiolog i ca l effiuenUradiation level !Cs Emergency Classification I C s are presented in ascending order (NOUE -GE) Emergency Classification !Cs are presented in descending order (GE -NOUE) GENERAL NOTES I nstrumen t setpoint readings used as thres h o ld values to determ i ne e m ergency c l assifications have been verified by Vogt l e personnel as be i ng within the range of the instrument and clearly and consistently read within the scale of the instrument. 'rl11s \Crlfirntt0111s ducumcntcd on SNC Form J 12-103 lntll<ll <'11 Con<lit1onif mernenc\ Act1011 le1 d Validation and Verification \.Vorkshcct. Site specific information is hig h lighted i n vellow. [Comme n ted (JRBl]: RAJ 3.a revision RPV u sed instead of common PWR termino l ogy of RCS. ODCM is the controlling Radiation Effluent Document. WOG CSFSTs are used for EAL thresholds as a ll owed bv NEI 99-0 I Rev 6 Deve l oper Notes. r PrAQ 2015-013 guidance as renewed and considered for 1mpkmcntauon No rc11s1on s to llG I \\ere made as a result o f this rc1 ie\\ )':PFAQ 2015-015 guidance \\3.S reviewed and dctcrm111cd to be not applicable lo VI (11' Altcrnal1vc po\1cr sources at VH1P are not permanent!) in stalled and ( Comme n ted [JRB2]: RA! 20 revision are onlv used to supnly OO\\Cr to socc1fic loads (1 e .. DC Inverters) and are not c:mablc ofsuonl11nc the full load of the cmcrccncv bu s e s Appendix A -Deleted BWR Acronyms and Abbreviation
- s. Added additional acronvms as needed. (Commented (JRB3]: RA! 12 revision Appendix B -I ncorporated S it e Specific defi ni tions as appropriate.
ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/ RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS RGI: I N I TIAT I NG CONDIT IO NS NE I 99--01 R ev 6 Vog tle Release of gaseous radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greate r than 1 , 000 Release of gaseous radioactivity resulting in offsite dose grea t e r than 1 , 000 mrem TEDE or 5 , 000 mr em thyroid CDE. mrem TEDE or 5 , 000 mrem thyroid CDE. Differe n ce I Deviation I Ju s tification o n e TH R ESH OLD S El 99--01Rev6 Vogtle (1) Re ad in g on ANY of th e followi n g radi at i on m o nit o r s greater than (I) R ead ing o n ANY of the following r adiat i o n monitors g r eater than the reading shown for 1 5 minutes or lon ger: the r ea ding s hown fo r 15 minute s or l o n ge r: (s it e-specific mon i t o r li st and t hre sho ld va lu es) (2) Do s e assess m e nt using actua l meteorolo gy i nd ica t es do ses g r ea t er I Plant V e nt RE-124448 I 50 µCi/cc I th an 1 , 000 mrem TE D E or 5 , 000 mr e m th yroid COE at or beyond I 1 Turbi n e Building Vent (SJAE) RE-12839 8 I 2.1 x I O' u Ci/cc I (s it e-specific do se r eceptor point). (3) Field survey results indicate EIT HER of the followi ng a t or beyond (2) Dose assess m e nt u si n g act u a l met eoro l ogy i ndi cates doses greater (s it e-specific do se r ece pt or point): t han 1 , 000 mr e m TEDE or 5 , 000 mr em thyroid C DE a t or beyond
- C l ose d window d ose ra tes g re a ter th an 1 , 000 mR/hr ex p ected t o the si te bo u nd ary. con tinue for 60 minut es o r lon ge r. (3) Field s ur vey r es ult s indicate EITHER of the fo ll owi ng a t or beyond
- Ana l yses of fie ld s urv ey sa mple s i ndic a t e thyroid CDE g r ea t er the si te boundary: than 5 , 000 mrem for one hour of inhalation.
- Closed wi nd ow dose rates greater than 1 , 000 m R/hr expected to conti nu e for 60 minutes o r longer.
- A n a l yses of field survey sa mpl es indicate t h yroi d C D E greate r than 5 , 000 mrem for one h ou r of in h alation. Difference I Deviation I Justification Differe n ce: S ite s pecifi c information provided. See V2 Rad Monitor Ca l cu l a tion s and VJ ODCM Site Boundar y Reference. 2 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/ RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS RG2: INITIATING CONDITIONS NE I 99-01 Rev 6 Vog tle Spent fuel pool level can n o t be restored to at l ea s t (site-specific Level 3 Spent fuel pool l eve l ca nn ot be restored t o at foot l evel fbe¥e! description) for 60 minute s or longer. 37-for 60 minutes or l onger. ( Commented
[JRB4): RA I 3.d revision Difference I De v iation I Ju s tification one THRESHOLDS NE I 99-01 Re v 6 Vogt l e ( 1) Spent fue l pool l evel ca nn ot be restored to at lea s t (s i te-spec ific ( 1) Spent fuel pool l eve l can n ot be restored to at le as t J-94-1 'i' foot leve l Level 3 val ue) for 60 minutes or longer. 60 minute s or longer. (Commented [JRBSJ: RAJ 3.d revision Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Si te s pecifi c information provided. See V4 SF P Level 3&2 Indication
- s. \lthoueh this' alue is above the LeHI 3 indication of l'J-1 feet and Y,. inchr' identified in \'4, it has been determined that this \alue can be u*ed b) the derision makers to acruratel) perfor m an a"essment of the E.\l threshold. ( Commented
[JRB6): RAJ 3.d r evis i on 3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/ RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS RS I: I N I TIAT I NG CONDITIONS N EI 99-0 1 Rev 6 V o g t l e Re l ease of gaseous radioac t ivity re s ulti n g i n offsite do se greate r t h an I 00 Re l ease of gaseous radioactivity resu l t in g in offsite dose g r ea t e r than I 00 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem thyroid CDE. m r em TEDE or 500 m r em th yroid CDE. Diffe r e n ce I De v iation I Justification one THRESHOLDS E l 99-01 R ev 6 V o g t l e (I) Readin g o n ANY of the followi n g rad i ation mon it ors g rea t er than (I) Reading on ANY of the fo ll owi n g radiation monitors greater than the reading shown for 15 minutes or longer: the reading s hown for 15 minute s or lon ge r: (site-specific mo n itor list and threshold values) (2) Dose assess m e n t u sing actual m e t eorology indica t es doses grea t er I Plant V e nt RE-12444 8 I 5.0 µCi/co I than I 00 mrem T E DE or 500 mrem thyroid CDE at or be yo nd (site-I Turbine Building Vent (SJAE) R E-128398 I 1 2.1x1 0 2 uCi/co I specific dose r eceptor point). (3) F i eld survey r es ul ts in dicate E ITH E R of the fol l owi ng a t or be yo nd (2) Do se assess m ent u sing actual m e t eoro l ogy indicates do s es greater (site-specific dose receptor point): than I 00 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem th y roid CDE at or beyond the
- Closed win d ow dose ra t es grea t er t h an I 00 m R/h r expec t ed to s ite boundary. contin u e for 60 mi n u tes or l o n ger. (3) Fie l d survey res ult s indicate E I T H E R of the fo ll owi n g at or beyo n d
- Analyses of field survey sa m ple s indicate th yro id CDE greater the si te bo un da than 500 mr e m fo r one ho ur of i nh a l ation.
- C l o s ed wi nd ow dose ra t es g r ea t er than I 00 mR/h r expected to contin u e for 60 minute s or l onger.
- Ana l yses of field survey samp l es indicate th y roid CDE greater than 500 mre m for one hou r of i n h alation. Difference I D e viatio n I Justification Difference
- S ite s pe c i fic i nformation provided. S e e V 2 Rad Monit o r C alc ul ation s and V J OD C M S ite B o undar y Ref e r e n ce. 4 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/ RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS RS2: I NITIAT I NG CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogt l e Spent fu el pool l eve l a t (site-specific Level 3 d esc ripti on). Spen t f u e l pool l eve l a t +94-195 foo t level 3). (Comm en ted [JRB7]: RAJ 3.d revi s ion Difference I Deviation I Ju s tifi ca ti o n No ne THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle ( 1) Lowering of s p e nt fuel pool l eve l to (si t e-specific Level 3 va lu e). (I) Lowering of s p e nt fuel pool level to +94-1 95 foot le ve l E be*'el 3). (Commented
[JRB8]: RAJ 3.d revi sio n Difference I Deviation I Ju st ifi c nti o n Difference
- S ite specific information provided. See V4 SFP Leve l 3&2 Indi ca tion s. \!though thi s \:line i' above the 1.cHI 3 indication or l')-1 frd nnd V. inches identified in \-I, it lrns been determined that thi' \alue can be u!>ed b) the decisi o n m a kers to a crurat e l) perfo rm un R!tSe\\mcnt of the E.\L threshold. ( Commented
[JRB9]: RAJ 3.d revision 5 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/ RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT I CS/EALS RAl: I NITIAT I NG CONDIT I ONS NEI 99--01 Rev 6 V ogtle R e l ease of gaseo u s or li q u i d radioac t iv i ty r es ulti ng i n offs it e d ose g r eater R e l ease of ga s eo us or l i qui d radioactiv i ty r esulting in offsi t e dose grea t er th a n I 0 mr em TE DE o r 50 mr e m thyro id C O E. th a n 1 0 mr e m TE DE o r 50 mr e m th y roid C O E. Difference I De v iatio n I Ju s tification N one THRES H OL D S NEI 99--01 Re v 6 Vogt l e (I) R ea din g on AN Y of th e fo ll ow in g ra di at i on m o nit o rs g r ea t e r t h an (1) R eading o n AN Y of t he follow in g ra di a t ion m o ni tors g r eater t h a n th e r eadi ng s h own fo r 1 5 minut es o r lon ge r: th e r ea ding s h o wn for 1 5 minut es or l o n ge r: (s it e-spec i fic m o nit o r li s t a nd thr es h o l d va lu es) I Plant Vent RE-12444 8 I 0.50 u Ci/c c l (2) D ose a s sess m e n t us i n g actual m e t eo rol ogy in dicates d oses g r eater I Turbi n e Buildin g Vent (S JA E) RE-128390 I 2.1 x I 0 1 uCi/co I th a n 1 0 mrem T E D E o r 50 mrem th y roid C O E at or b eyo nd (s it e-(2) D ose assess m e nt u s in g act u a l m e t eoro l ogy ind ica t es d oses greater specific d ose r ecep t or p oi n t). t h a n I 0 mr e m TE D E or 50 mr e m th yroid COE at o r beyo n d the s ite (3) A n a l ysis ofa liqu i d e fflu e nt sa mpl e indic a t es a co n ce nt ra tion o r boundary. r e l ease rate t h a t wou ld r es ult in d oses g r ea t e r t h a n 1 0 mr e m TE D E (3) A n a l ys i s ofa liquid efflue n t sa mple i n dicates a co n ce nt ra t ion or o r 50 mre m th y roid C O E a t or b eyo nd (si t e-s p ecific d ose r eceptor r e l ease rat e th at w o ul d r es ult in d oses g r ea t er than I 0 m re m TEDE poi nt) fo r o n e h o u r of ex p os ure. o r 50 mrem th yroi d C O E at or beyo n d the s it e bo un dary for one (4) Fie ld s u rvey res ul ts ind ica t e E ITH E R of t h e fo ll ow ing a t o r beyond ho ur of ex p os u re. (s it e-s p ec i fic d ose r ece pt or p o int): (4) F i e ld s ur vey r es u lt s in d i cate EITHER of th e fo ll owi ng a t o r be y o nd
- C l osed wi nd ow d o s e ra t e s g r e at e r t h an 1 0 mR/hr ex p ected t o the s it e boundary: co ntinue fo r 60 m i nut es o r l o n ge r.
- C l ose d w indow d ose ra t es g r ea ter th a n I 0 m R/hr ex p ec t ed to
- Ana l yses of fi e ld s u rvey s a mpl es indi ca t e thyro id C O E g r ea t er co ntinu e fo r 60 m i nut es or l o n ge r. t h a n 50 mr e m fo r o n e h o ur of inhal a ti o n.
- A n a l yses o f fi e ld s u rvey sa mp l es indi cate th y roid C O E g r ea t e r t h a n 50 mr e m for o n e ho ur o f inh a l atio n. D i ffe r e n ce I Deviation I Justification Diffe r e n ce: S ite spec ifi c i n formatio n provi d ed. See V2 Rad Monitor C alc ul a ti o n s and VJ OD C M Site Boundary Reference. 6 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/ RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS RA2: I N I T I A TING C O N DI T IO NS NE I 99-01 Re v 6 Vo g t le S i g ni fica n t l owe r ing of wa t e r l evel above , o r da m age to , irrad i a t ed f u e l. S i g ni fica n t lowe rin g of wa t e r l e vel above , o r d a mage t o , i r rad i ated fu e l. D i ffe re nce I D e viatio n I J u s tification N one THRES HO L D S NE I 99-01 Rev 6 V og tl e (1) U n covery of irr adi a t ed fue l in t h e REFUELING PAT H WAY. ( 1) U n covery of irr ad i ated f u e l i n th e REFU E LING P AT H WAY. (2) D a m age to i rra di a te d f u el res ul t in g in a r e l ease of ra dio ac t iv i ty from (2) Da m age t o irradi ated f u el r es ultin g in a r elease of r a di oac ti v i ty fro m the fue l as i n d i ca t ed b y AN Y of th e fo ll owi n g radia t io n mo nit ors: the f ue l a s in di cate d b y It fllGll *\l a rm o n ANY of t h e fo ll owin g (s ite-s pec i fic li s tin g of ra di at i on m o nit o r s , an d t h e assoc i a t e d rad i a ti on m o nit ors: (C o m m en t e d [J RB 1 0): RAJ 5 r evi s io n r ea d i n gs , s e t po in ts a n d/or a l arms) (3) Lowe r ing of s p en t f u e l pool l evel t o (si t e-spec i fic Leve l 2 va lu e). F u el H a ndling B ui l din g RE-008 CNMT B LD G L ow R ange** RE-002/003 **M ode 6 o n l y dur i ng f u el m ove m e nt F u e l Ha n d l i ng B L DG EFFL. ARE-2532 A/B F u el H a nd l i n g BLD G EFFL. ARE-2533 A/B (3) Low e rin g of s p e nt f u e l pool l evel t o 204 feet (Leve l 2 . Diffe r ence I Deviation I Justification Diffe r e n ce: S ite s pec ific i nformat i o n p r ovi d ed. S ee V4 S FP Level 3&2 Ind ications a nd V S A n n un ciator Respo n se Procedure.
7 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/ RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS RA3: I NITI A TING CONDIT IO N S E l 99-0 I R tv 6 V o g tle Radiation levels that impede access to equipment necessary for normal plant Radiation levels that impede access to equipment nece ssary for normal plant operations , cooldown or s hu tdown. operations , cooldown or s hutdown. Differ e nce I De v iation I J u s tifi ca ti o n one THRESH OLD S N E:l 99-01 R ev 6 V o g tle (I) Dose rate greater t han 15 mR/hr in A Y of the following areas: (I) Dose rate greater than 15 mR/hr in ANY of the following areas:
- Control Room
- Control Room (R E-00 I
- Central Alarm Station
- Central A l ann Station (Survey Only) * (other s ite-specific areas/rooms) (2) An UNPLANNED event resu l t s in radiation level s that prohibit or (2) An UNPLANNED eve nt result s in radiation levels t h at prohibit or impede access to any Tab l e HI plant rooms or areas: impede access to any of th e fo ll owing p l ant rooms or area s: (site-specific l i s t of plant rooms or areas with entry-re l ated mode 1 Tab l e HI app licability iden tified) Hildin g Room N umb er Mode I C B-226 , I C B-A4S , B 2CB-223 , 2C B-A22 I CB-A77 , I C B-B 6 1 , I CB-B76 , I C B-8 79 2 CB-A79 , 2C8-801 Control Buddmg 2 C8-804 , 2CB-81 8 I C8-226 , I C 8-A4S I C8-884 , 2C 8-88S QCB-223 , 2CB-A22 I C8-A48 , I CB-ASO *2CB-A IS , 2C8-A 16 AFW Pum p AFW Pum p Opera ti on and I , 2 , 3 H o u se standbv Readine ss 8 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/ RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS I AB-A28 , 2A B-A 72 A-level d em tn vessel I , 2 , 3 valve e s I AB-A24 , 2AB-A77 G IAB-A08 , B Aux 1 ll a 2AB-A I OI )3 u dd m g I AB-C 8S , I AB-C89 4 2 AB-C38 , 2A B-C 44 !AB-B I S M EZZ IAB-B l 9 MEZ Z 4 2AB-B 1 1 7 MEZ Z 1 9 ME ZZ Di ff e r e n ce I Deviatio n I Ju s tification Diffe r enc e: EAL T h r es ho l d (I)-NE I 99-01 Rev 6 ha s b ull et for other s ite-s peci fi c ar e a s/room s. Vogtl e does n ot id en t if y other a r ea s/room s a pp l ic a b l e t o t h i s thr es h o l d. S i te s pecific information provided.
S ee V 6 A nnuciator Re s p o n se Proced u r e (Co n t ro l Ro o m) Refer e n ce. Justification: No additional rooms at Vogtle have been determined to be applicable to this EAL threahold. Differe n ce: V o g tle EAL Thre s hold (2) provides s ite s peci fi c r oom l i s tin g in t ab ul ar format (T a b l e HI). Justification: E ditorial change -Human Factors consideration. 9 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/ RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT I CS/EALS R U I: I N I T I AT I NG CON DI T I ONS NE I 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle Release of gaseous or liqui d radioactivity greater t han 2 times th e (site-Relea se of gaseous o r liquid radioact i vity greater than 2 ti m es the ODCM specific effluent release co n tro lling document) limit s for 60 minutes or limit s for 60 minute s or l onger. l onger. Differe n ce I Deviation I Ju s tification No n e TH R ES HO LDS NEI 99-0 I Rev 6 Vogtle (!) Readin g o n ANY effl u ent radiat ion m o ni tor grea t e r than 2 time s t h e (!) Reading o n ANY effluent rad i a tion monitor greater than 2 times the (site-specific effluent release con t ro llin g document) l i m its for 60 ODCM limit s for 60 minute s or lon ger: minute s or longer: SG Bl o wd o wn Effluent Line (RE-002 1) 2 x rel eas e pennit s etp o 111t (si t e-specific m onitor li s t and threshold values corres p o ndin g to 2 rr ur b in e Effl u e nt Line (RE-0848) 2 x relea s e pennit s e tp o int tim es the co ntrolli ng doc um ent limit s) r * ' (2) Re ading on ANY effluent radiation m onitor greater t h an 2 times the Plant V e nt (R E-12442 C) Q x relea se p e nnit se tp o int [Co mm e nt e d [JRB11]: RAJ 6 revision a larm setpoi nt established by a c urrent radioactivity discharge P l ant Vent (RE-I 2444C) 2 x rel e a se pennit s etp o 111t permit for 60 mi n u tes or longer. r 1 urb111e Vent 'iJA I !RI -12839Cj (3) Sample a n a l ys i s for a gaseous or liquid relea se ind i cates a No C onfimH:d Prm1;u\-Sct.:f111daf\ I I 6 x 10 uC1 cc C omm e nt e d [JR B12): RA J 6 r evis i on co n centratio n or release rate g r eate r than 2 times the (site-specific ( ontinncd Prnnar. -Si:l 1ntlaf\ I **1l "< rck ncrmn "'I.: effluent release controlling document) l imits for 60 minute s or (2) Reading o n ANY effluent radiation monitor grea t er t h an 2 times the lon ger. a l arm se tpoint establ i shed by a c urr e n t r ad i oactiv i ty di sc h arge Commented [JRB13]: RA J 6 revision [ C o m m e nte d!J R B14): RA J 6 r ev i s i o n permit for 60 minute s or longer. Liquid R a d wa s te Effluent Line (R E-0018) 2 x relea s e perm it s et poin t Gaseous Rad waste (ARE-0014) 2 x release p e rm it s e t point (3) Samp l e ana l ys i s for a gaseous or liquid release i nd ica tes a co n centratio n or release rate g reater than 2 times ODCM limits for 60 minutes or l onger. D i fference I Deviation I Ju s tification 10 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/ RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS Difference
- Site s pecific information provided. See V2 Rad Monitor Ca lculation s. !Difference:
A value of 1.6 x 10-3 µCi/cc i> for the >etpoint ofRE-12839(' \\henenr there h '\o ( onfirmed l'rinrnr)-Secondar} ,Jm.tification: This value diffen from the calculated\ alue and i\ used due to the scale of the inotrumenl. The intent of the EAL threshold t*ontinue' to be met. 11 (Commented [JRB15]: RAJ 6 r ev i s i o n ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS RU2: I N I TIATING C O NDITIONS N EI 99-01 Rev 6 Vo g tl e UNPLANNED los s of water level above irradiated fuel. UNPLANNED lo ss of water level above irradiated fuel. Diff e r e n ce I D ev iation I Ju s tification N one TH R ESHOL D S NE I 99-01 R ev 6 Vo g tl e (1) a. UNPLANNED water leve l drop in the REFUELING (I) a. UNPLANNED water l evel drop in the REFUELING PAT H WAY as ind i ca t ed by ANY of th e fo ll owi n g: PA T l-IW A Y as indica t ed by ANY of t he fo ll ow i ng: (site-specific level indica t io n s). I Personnel report of l ow water lev el I AN D I LSHL-0625 &fHeale SI P l ow Je,cl l\lann (ALB05 E02) I b. UNPLANNED ri se in area ra d iation leve l s as indicated b y AN D [C o m m en t e d [JR B16): RAJ 3.b r evision ANY of the following radiation monitors. b. UNPLANNED ri se in a rea radiation level s as indicated by (site-specific li s t of area radiation monitors) ANY of t h e followi n g radia t ion moni t ors. RE-0008 in the spent fuel pool building RE-0002 , -0003 , -0004 in containment
- RE-00 1 1 at the sea l tab l e
- RE-0005 , -0006 in containment
- Not applicable in Mode s 1-4 Differtnc e I D ev iation I Ju st ification Differ e nc e: S ite s pecifi c i nformation provided. See V7 A nnunci a t o r Re s pon s e Proced u re (SF P Le v el) Ref e r e n c e and VS R a d M onit o r Infor m ation. 1 2 C O LD SHUTDOWN/ REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS I CS/EALS CG I: I NIT I ATING COND I T IO NS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle Loss of (r eac t or ve s se l/R C [PWR] o r RPV [BWR]) i n ve n tory affec t i n g fue l Loss of RPV inventory affecti n g fue l c l a d int egrity wit h co n ta inm e n t clad inte g ri ty wi th co nta i nm e nt c h a ll e n ge d. c h a llen ged. Difference I Deviatio n I Ju s tification Difference:
EI 99-01 Rev 6 refer s to reactor ves s el/RCS i n ventor y for PWR s. Vogtle use s RPV inventor y. Justification
- S it e u s e of terminolo gy differ s from NE I g uidance. THRES HO L D S El 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle 1 3 C O LD SHUTDOWN/ REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS (I) a. (Reacto r vessel/RCS [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) level l ess than (I) a. RPV l evel Je ss than I 8 I ' -I O" [TOA F (63% on RVLI S fu ll (s ite-spe cific l evel) for 30 minute s or l o n ger. ra n ge for 30 minutes or l onger. A D A D b. ANY indication from the Containment C h a ll e n ge Table b. A Y indication from the Containment Challenge Table CI. (s ee below). (2) a. RPV l evel cannot be mo nit o r ed for 30 minut es or l onger. (2) a. (Reactor vessel/RCS
[PWR] or RPV [BWR]) le vel cannot A D be monitored for 30 minutes or longer. b. Co r e un covery is indicated by ANY of th e followinl!
- A D R E-005 OR 006 I >40 R E M/hr b. Co r e un covery is indicated by ANY of the fo ll owi n g Erra ti c So ur ce Ra n ge mo n it or indi cation * (Site-specific radiation monitor) reading greater than UNPLANNED increase in Containment Sump , R eac t or Coo lan t (site-specific va lu e) D ra in T a nk (RCDT) or W as te H o ldu p Tanks (WI IT) level s of
- Erratic source range monitor indication
[PWR] sufficient magnitude to indicate core uncoverv
- UNPLANNED increase in (si te-specific su mp a nd/or AN D tank) level s of sufficie nt magnitude to in di cate core c. A Y indication from the Containment Challenge Table C I. uncovery * (Other site-specific i ndic ation s) C ontainment C ha ll enee Tab l e C l CONTA I NMENT CLOSURE NOT established*
AN D Explosive mixture inside contai nmen t -c. ANY indication from th e Con t ai nm ent C h a ll enge Table g r eater than OR eq u a l to 6% H 2 (see be lo w). l "JPI \'\;Nl D mcrcas.: m cnntammcnt prcssurc Con t a inment C ha ll e n l!e Table gFealeF lhaA OR eEjual le 13 f!Sig
- CONTAfNMENT C L OSURE not estab li shed* WITH CONTAINMENT
- (Explosive mixture) exists inside containment GbOSYRE estaeilsi'lea
- UNPLANNED inc rease in con t ai nment pressure GeAtaiAmerll PFessure gFeeleF li'leA eEjual 10 S;! f!Sig
- Secondary co nt ai nm e n t radiation m o nit or r eading above (site-Wl+ll Teei'l Sflee eeAteiArfleAt soecific val u e) rB WRl
- lf CONTAfNMENT CLOSURE is re-establis h ed prior to exceeding the 30-* l fCONTAfNMENT CLOSURE i s re-e s tablished prior to exceeding the JO-m inute time limit , then declaration ofa General Emergency i s not minute time limit , then declara t ion ofa Genera l E m e r gency is n o t required.
required. ( C o mmented [J RB17]: RAJ 11 r evi sio n t Commen t ed [JRB19]: RAJ 11 r evision Co mme nted [JR B18]: RA! 11 revi sio n (C o mmen t ed [JR B20): Commen t ed [JRB21]: RAJ I I revi sion > Commen t ed [J RB22]: > Co mme n t ed [JR B23]: 14 COLD SHUTDOWN/ REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference
- NE I 99-01Rev6 refers to reactor vesse l/R CS level for PWRs. Vog tle u ses RPV level. S ite spec ific information provided.
See V9 RPV LeveURVLIS Information. Justifiration: Site use of terminology (RPV vs RCS) differs from NEI guidance. Difference
- EAL Thre s hold (2)b-El 99-01 Rev 6 illu st rate s thre s hold s in bullet format. Vog tle thre s hold (2)b illustrate s these thre s hold s u si n g table form a t. S ite specific information provided.
See V2 Rad Monitor Ca lculation s and VIO Co ntainment S ump , R CDT, WHT Reference. Jus t ification: Editorial change -Human Fartors ronsideration. Difference
- EAL Thre s h o ld (2)b , la s t bullet , refer s to Other s ite-s pecific indication s of co re unco very. No Other s ite-s pecific indication s are u sed at Vog tle. Justifiration:
Vogtle doe s not use any other site-specific indications of core unrovery than those alread y identified in EAL Threshold (2)b. Differen ce: Tab l e de s i g n a tor C l assig ned to Co nt ai nment C hallen ge Tab le. Justifiration: Editorial rhange to dearly identify tables within the document. Difference
- E I 99-01 Rev 6 Co ntainment C hallen ge Table identifie s an UNPLA ED increa se in co ntainment pr ess ur e. Vog tle Table Cl identifies spec ific co ntainment pre ssures for s pecific conditions.
Justification: Editorial change to clearly specify conditions when rontainment is challenged by pressure increase. Difference
- Si t e s pecifi c information provided.
See VI I H 2 Co ncentration and Vl2 Centeinment PFessuFe RefeFenee. 1 5 [Commented [JRB24): RAJ 11 r e vi s ion COLD SHUTDOWN/ REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS I CS/EALS CSl: I NIT I ATING C O NDIT I ONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle Loss of(reactor vesse l/RC S [PWR] o r RPV [BWR]) inventory affec tin g co r e L oss of RPV i n v ento ry affec t i n g core de cay h eat r e mov a l capabi li ty. de cay h ea t removal capability. Difference I Deviatio n I Ju st ifi c a t i o n Differe n ce: NE I 99-01 Rev 6 refers to reactor vessel/RCS inventor y for PWRs. Vogtle use s RPV inventor y. Ju s tifi ca ti o n: S it e u se o f t e r min o l ogy diff e r s fr o m NE I g uidan ce. THRESH O LDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogt l e (!) a. CONTAINMENT CLOSU R E not estab l ished. (I) a. CO NTAINM ENT C LOSURE n ot established. AND AND b. (Re ac t or vessel/R CS [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) l eve l l ess than b. RPV l eve l le ss than 185'-4" 6" below Bottom ID of l oopj (site-spec i fic level). (72% on Full Range RVLIS. (2) a. CO NTAINM ENT CLOSURE established. (2) a. CO NTAINM ENT CLOSU R E estab li s h e d. AND AND b. (Re ac tor vesse l/R CS [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) l eve l le ss than b. RPV l evel l ess than 181 '-I O" TOAF (63% on RVLIS full (si te-speci fic l eve l). range). (3) a. (Reac tor vesse l/R CS [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) l eve l cannot (3) a. RPV l eve l can not be monit o red fo r 30 minute s or l o n ger. be monit o r ed for 30 minutes or lon ger. AN D AN D b. Co re unco very i s indi ca ted by ANY of the fo ll ow in g: b. Co re unc overy i s indicated b y ANY of th e following: RE-005 OR 006 I> 40 REM/hr * (S it e-specific radia tion monitor) readi ng g re a ter th an E rrati c So ur ce R a n ge monitor indi ca ti on (si t e-specific va lue) UN PLANNED increa se in Co nt a inm ent Sump , Reactor Coo l ant
- E rrat ic so ur ce range monitor indi ca tion [PWR] rain Tank RCDT or Waste Holdup Tanks (W H T) l evels of
- UNPLANNED i n crease in (site-specific s ump and/or s u fficie nt m ag nitud e to indicate core un covery t a nk) l evels of s ufficient ma g nitud e to i ndi cate co r e unco very * (O th e r s ite-spec ific indication s) Difference I Deviation I Ju s t i fi utio n 1 6 COLD SHUTDOWN/
REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS Difference: EAL Thresholds (l)b and (2}b -EI 99-01 Rev 6 refer s to reactor vessel/RCS level for PWRs. Vog tle u ses RPV level. Site specific information provided. S ee V9 RPV Level/RVLIS Indications. Justification: S ite use of t erminology (RPV vs R CS) differ s from NEI guidance. Difftrence
- EAL Threshold (J)b-NE I 99-01 Rev 6 illu st rate s thre s holds in bullet format. Vogtle EAL Threshold (J)b illustrates the se thre s hold s u s ing table format. S ite specific information provided.
See V2 Rad Monitor Ca lculation s and VIO Co ntainment S ump , R CDT , WHT Reference. Justification: E ditorial change -Human Factors consideration. Difference
- EAL Threshold (J)b, la s t bullet , refer s to Other site-specific indications of core uncover y. No Other s ite-speci fic indication s are u se d at Vog tle. Justification
- Vogtle doe s not u se any other s ite-s pecific indication s of core unco v ery than tho se alread y identified in EAL Threshold (J)b. 17 COLD SHUTDOWN/ REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS CA I: I NIT I ATING CONDITIONS N EI 99-01 R ev 6 V o g tle Loss of(reactor vessel/RC S [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) inventory. Loss of RPV inve n tory. Differ e n ce I D ev i a tion I Justifiration Differe n ce: NE I 99-01 Rev 6 ref e r s to reac t or v e sse l/R CS in v ento ry for PWR s. V o g tl e u s e s RP V in v ent o r y. Justification
- S ite use of terminology differs from E l guidance.
THRE S HOLDS E l 99-01 R ev 6 V o g t l e (I) Los s of(reac t or ve ssel/RCS [PWR] o r R PV [BWR]) i n ve n tory as (I) Loss of RPV in ve n tory as i ndi cated b y l eve l less t h an elevation indicated by leve l le ss th an (site-specific l evel). 1 85'-I O" (73% on Fu ll Range RVLIS . (2) a. (Reactor vessel/RCS [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) l eve l cannot (2) a. RPV level cannot be monitored for 15 mi n ute s or lon ger be mo n i tored for 15 min u tes or l o n ge r AN D A D b. U NPLANNED increase in Containment Sump , Reactor b. UNPLA E D increase in (site-specific s ump and/or tank) Coola nt Drain Tank (RCDT or Waste Holdup Tank s leve l s d u e to a los s of(reacto r vessel/RCS [PWR] or RPV WI-levels due to a loss of RPV inventory. [BW R]) inventory. Diffe r e n c e I De v iat i on I Justification Differ e n c e: EAL T hr es h o ld s (1) a nd (2)a -NE I 99-0 1 Re v 6 refer s t o r eac t o r v e ss el/RCS fo r P W R s. Vogt le u s e s RP V. Justification: Si te use of terminolo gy (RPV vs R CS) differs from 'E l g uidance. Diff e ren c e: S ite s pecifi c inform a ti o n pro v ided. See V9 RP V Le ve l/R VL I S lndi c at o ns a nd V IO Co nt a inm e nt S ump , R C D T, W HT R e f e ren ce. 1 8 COLD SHUTDOWN/ REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS CA2: I NITIATING C O NDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle Lo s s of all off s ite a nd all ons i te AC powe r to emergenc y buse s for 15 minute s Lo s s of all off s ite and all onsite AC power to emer g enc y bu s es for 15 o r lon ger. minutes or lon g er. Difference I Deviation I Ju st ifi c ati o n N one T HR ES H OL D S NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle (I) Loss of ALL offs i te and A LL onsite AC Power to (site-s p ecific (1) Lo s s of ALL offsi t e and ALL on s ite AC Power l abk '>I to e m ergency b u s es) for 1 5 minutes or l onger. BOT I-1 1 Ql_AA02 ANDI 2 B A03 for 1 5 minutes o r longer. ff able S t U nit I U nit2 U n it Auxiliary Transformer Unit A u xiliary Transformer I NXAA f2NXAA U n it Auxiliary Transformer U n it Aux ili ary Tra n sfor m er IN XA B 2NXAB Reserve Auxi li ary Tra n sformer Reserve Auxiliary Transformer I NXRA r 2NX R A Reserve Auxiliary Tra n sformer Reserve Auxilia Transformer I NXRB 2NXRB D iese l Genera t or I A D i esel Generator 2A Diesel Ge n erator I B D i ese l Generator 2 B S t a ndb y A u x ili ary Tra n sfo rm er S t a nd by A u x i l i ary T ra n sfor m e r ANXRA ANXRB Diffe r e n ce I Deviation I Ju s tificati o n Diffe r ence: S ite s pecific information provided in Tab l e S I. S ee ¥4J-.\ 12 E mergenc y Bu s e s Drawing. 1 9 [ C o m m ente d [J R B25): RAJ 12 r evis i o n C o mmente d [JR B26): V & V r eference change due t o RA J 1 1 revision COLD SHUTDOWN/ REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS CA3: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Re v 6 V ogt l e In abi li ty to maintain the plan t in cold s hutdown. In ability to maintain th e plant in c old s hutd own. Differe n ce I Deviation I Ju st ifi c ati o n None THRESHOL D S NEI 99-01 Rev 6 V ogt l e (1) UNPLANNE D i n crease in RCS temperatur e to grea ter th a n (si te-(I) UNPLANNED in crease in R CS t e m perature to g r ea t e r th an 00 °F specific Tec hnical Specifica t io n co ld shutdown temperature limit) for greater than the duration specified i n the fo ll owi n g t ab l e. for g r eater t h a n t h e durati o n s pecified in th e fo ll ow in g t a ble. Tab l e Cl: R CS H ea l-up Dural i on Thre s hold s Table: R CS H ea t-up Duration Thr es h o lm R CS S t at u s Co nt a inm e nt C l os ure H ea t-up Co ntainment C lo s ure Heal-up S tatu s Dura li on R CS S lalu* S tatus Durati o n No t in tact Nol Esiabhsh ed 0 minut es Int ac t (b ut n o t a t redu ced (or at r ed u c ed in ven t o ry) Esia bh s h ed 20 minut es* in v enl o ry [/'WR]) No t a pp li ca ble 60 minut es* I nt ac t No t a ppl 1 cab l e 60 minut es* Not int ac t (o r a t reduced Es 1 ab h s hed 20 minut es* (but n o t at r e du ce d in ve nt o ry) in ve nl o ry [l'WRl) No l E s tablished 0 m111ute s
- If an R C S h ea t rem ov a l sys tem 1 s m o pe ra tion w llhm th i s t ime fr a m e
- lf a n R C S heat r e m oval sys t e m i s m o p e ratio n wit hin th i s time fram e and and R C S t e m oeratu re i s beinu: redu c ed , the E AL i s n o t aoolicab l e RCS tempe ra lure is bein g r e du c ed , lh e EAL is nol a pp l i cab l e (2) UNPLANNE D R CS pres s ure in c r ease greate r th a n 1 0 p s i g. (Th i s (2) UN P LANNED R CS pres s ure increase greater than (site-specific EAL doe s not app l y durin g water-s olid plant condition s.) pre ss ure reading). (This E AL does not a ppl y during wa ter-so li d plant condit i o n s. [PWR]) Differe n ce I Deviatio n I Ju s tificati o n Differe n ce: Information included in R CS Heat-up Duration Thresho l d s Tab l e for Vogtle is inverted from the presentation in El 99-01 Re v 6. Information i s the s ame. A dded Table C2 as desi g nator for table. Ju s tifi c ation: E ditorial chan g e for lluman Factor s con s id e rations -wor s t ca se i s pres e n te d fir s t; clearly i d e ntif y table s u se d in d o cum e nt. Difference: S ite s pecific information provided. See V I TS Table I.I-I Modes. 20 COLD SHUTDOWN/ REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS CA6: I NIT I ATING C O NDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogt l e H aza rd o u s event affecti ng a SAFETY SYSTEM ne eded fo r the current Ha za rd ou s event affec ting a SAFETY S YST EM needed for the c urr e n t opera tin g m ode. opera tin g mode. Difference I Deviation I Justification one THRESH O LDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogt l e (1) a. T he occ urr e n ce of ANY of th e following h aza rdou s events: (1) a. The occurrence of ANY of the fo ll owi n g h aza rdou s events:
- Seismic event (eart hquak e)
- Seis mi c even t (eart hqu ake)
- Intern a l o r exte rn a l floodin g eve nt
- Int erna l or exte rn a l flo oding eve nt
- Hi g h wi nd s or tornado s trik e
- Hi g h wind s or t orna do st rik e
- FIRE
- F IRE
- EXPLOS I ON
- EXPLOS I ON * (site-s p ec ifi c hazards)
- Other events wi th si mil ar h azard c hara c t er i st i cs as
- Other events with simi l a r hazard c h arac t e ri st i cs a s de t e rmin ed by the S hi ft Manager det e rm i n e d by the S hift M a n ager AND AN D b. E I THER of t h e fo ll ow in g: b. EITHER of t h e followi n g:
- Eve nt damage has ca u sed indica ti o n s of degraded I. Eve nt damage h as caused indi ca tion s of d egraded performance in a t l eas t one train of a SAFETY performance in at l east one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM n eeded for th e current operat in g mode. SYSTEM n eede d for the c urr ent opera tin g m ode. . The eve nt has caused VI S IBL E DAMAGE to a OR SAFETY SYSTEM compone n t or st ru ct ur e n eeded for 2. The event h as cause d VI S IBL E DAMAGE to a t he c urr ent operat in g m ode. SAFETY SYSTE M component o r st ru c tur e n eeded for the c urr e nt o p e r ati n g mod e. D i ffe r e n ce I Deviatio n I Ju s tification 2 1 COLD SHUTDOWN/
REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS Difference
- NE I 99-01 Rev 6 EAL Threshold (l)a, next to the la s t bullet , refers to s ite-s pecific hazard s. No additional site s pecific ha za rd s are identified for Vog tle. Justification:
Vogtle has not identified any additional site-specific hazards applicable to this threshold. Difference: NE I 99-01Rev6 EAL Threshold (l)b u ses number s to identify the two threshold conditions. Vog tle EAL T hre s hold (l)b u ses bullets. Justification: Editorial change for clarity. This change does not affect the EAL threshold. 22 COLD SHUTDOWN/ REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS CUI: INITIATING CONDITIONS E I 99--01Rev6 Vogt le UNPLANNED loss of(r eactor vessel/RCS [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) inventory UNPLANNED lo ss of V inventory for 15 minutes or lon ger. for 15 minute s or longer. Difference I Deviation I Ju st ificati o n Difference: NEI 99-01 Rev 6 refers to reactor vessel/RCS in ve ntor y for PWRs. Vogt le u ses RPV inventor y. Ju s tification
- S it e u s e of t e r minolo gy differ s from NE I g u i dance. THRESHOLDS NE I 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle (I) UNPLANNE D lo ss of reactor coo l ant re s ult s in (reac tor vessel/RCS (I) UNPLANNED l oss of reactor coo l a nt r es ult s in RPV l eve l le ss than [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) level les s th a n a r equired l ower limit for 15 a r equired l owe r limit for 1 5 minute s or l onger. minute s or longer. (2) a. RPV l evel cannot be monitored. (2) a. (Reactor vesse l/RCS [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) l evel cannot AND be monitored. b. UNPLANNED in crease in Containmen t s ump , Re ac tor AN D Coolant Drain Tank (RCDT), or Waste Holdup T a nk b. UNPLANNED increase in (s ite-s pecific s ump a nd/or tank) (WHT) le vels. leve l s. Difference I Deviation I Ju s tifi c ati o n Difference:
NE I 99-01 Rev 6 refer s to reactor vessel/RCS level for PWRs. Vogtle u ses RPV level. Ju s tificati o n: S it e u s e of t e r min o l ogy (RP V vs R CS) diff e r s fr o m NE I g uid a n c e. Difference: Si te s pecifi c information provided. See V IO Co ntainment S ump , R C DT , WHT Reference. 23 COLD SHUTDOWN/ REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS CU2: INITIATING CONDITIONS N EI 99-01 Re v 6 V o g tle Loss of a ll but one AC powe r source to eme r ge n cy b u ses for 1 5 minu tes or Loss of a ll but one AC power source to e m e r gency b u ses for 1 5 mi nutes or longer. l o n ger. Difference I Deviatio n I Justification N one THRESHOLDS N E I 99-01 Rev 6 V o g tle (I) a. AC power capability to (si t e-s p ec i fic emergency b u s es) is (I) a. AC power capability to BOTH 1(2)AA02 AN D 1 (2)BA03 reduced to a single power so u rce for 15 min u tes or longer. is reduced to a s ingle power so urce ( I able SI) for 15 A D m inu tes or lon ge r. [ Commented [JRB27]: RAJ I 3.b revision b. Any add i t iona l s ing l e powe r so ur ce fai l ure wil l r esult in A D loss of a ll AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS. b. Any additional single power source failure will result in l oss of all AC power t o SAFETY SYSTEMS. Tab l e SI U n it I U ni t2 U ni t Aux ili ary Tran s former U ni t Auxi li ary Tra n sformer I NXAA !2 NXAA U n it A u x ili ary Tra n s fonne r U ni t Au x i li ary T ransformer INXAB 2NXAB Re s erve A u xi li ary Tran s fo rm er R e s erve A u xi li ary T r a n s fo n n e r INXRA !2 NX R A Reserve A u x i lia ry Tran s for m er R e s erve Auxi li ary Tr a n s form e r I NXRB !2 NX R B Die s el Generator I A Die s e l Genera t or 2A Die s el Ge n era t o r I B Die s el Genera t or 28 Sta n dby A u x i li ary Tran s fo rm e r S t a n d by A u x i l i a ry Tra n s fonn e r ANXRA ANX R B 24 ------------ COLD SHUTDOWN/ REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS Difference I De v iation I Ju s tification Differ e nc e: S ite s pecifi c i nformation provided. S ee A tta c hment 1¥.H-\ 12 E mer g enc y Bu s e s Dr a win g. 25 Commented [JRB28]: V&V refere n ce change due t o RA I 11 revis i o n
COLD SHUTDOWN/
REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS CU3: INITIATING CONDIT IO NS NEI 99..01 Re v 6 Vog tl e UNPLANNED increase in RCS temp era ture. UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature. Difference I Deviat ion I Ju st ificati o n None THRESHOLDS NE I 99..0 1Re v6 Vog tl e (I) UNPLANNED incr ease in RCS temperature to grea ter than (site-(I) UNPLANNED increa se in RCS t emperature to greater than 200 ° *. specific Technica l Specification co ld s hutd own temperature limit). (2) Loss of ALL RCS temperature and PV level indic a tion for 15 (2) Loss of ALL RCS temperature a nd (reactor ve sse l/RCS [P WR] or minute s or l onger. RPV [BWR]) level indi cation for 1 5 minute s or longer. Difference I Deviation I Ju s t i fication Difference
- NEI 99-0 1 Rev 6 refers to reactor vesse l/R CS l eve l for PWRs. Vogt l e uses RPV l eve l. Ju s tification:
S ite u se of terminolo gy (RP V v s R CS) differ s from NE I g uidance. Difference: Site specific information provided. See VI TS Table I.I-I Modes. 26 COLD SHUTDOWN/ REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS CU4: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle L oss of V i t al D C power for 1 5 m i nu tes or l o n ge r. Loss of Vi ta l DC p owe r fo r 1 5 minut es or l o n ger. Difference I Deviation I Justification one THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle (I) Indic a t e d v olta ge i s less th an (si te-s p e ci fic bu s vo lt age va lu e) o n (I) Indi ca t e d vo lt age i s l ess t h a n I 05 VDC on req u i red 1 25 VD O bu ses r e qu i r ed Vit al D C bu ses for I 5 m i nut es or l o n ger. I Q)ADI , I 2 BDI , I G_)CD I , I G_)DDI fo r 1 5 minu tes or l o n ger. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: N EI 99-01 R ev 6 EAL Threshold (I) refers to Vital DC buses. Vogtle EAL thre s hold (I) identitie s the s pe c ific D C buse s. Justification: E ditorial change -lluman Factors c on s ideration that doe s not a ff e ct thre s hold. Difference
- S ite specific information provided.
See !\1-14-\ 13 D C S ys tem Information. 2 7 Commented [JRB29): V&V Ref e r e nc e ch a n ge du e to RAI 11 r ev i s i on COLD SHUTDOWN/ REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS CU5: I NITIATING CONDITIONS NE I 99-01 Rev 6 Vo g tle Lo ss of a ll o n s ite o r off s ite co mmunic a ti o n s capabi l i tie s. L oss of a ll o n s it e o r o ffs it e c o mmun i c a tion s ca p a biliti es. Differ e nce I D ev iation I Justification N one THRESHOL D S NE I 99-01 Rev 6 V o g t l e (I) L oss of AL L of th e fo ll ow ing o n s ite c ommun ication m e th o d s: (I) Loss of A LL o f th e fo ll ow ing o n s ite co mmuni ca tion m e t h ods: (s i t e-s p ec ific li s t of c o mm uni ca ti o n s m et h od s) I In plant te l ephone s I (2) Lo ss of AL L of t h e fo ll o win g ORO communi ca ti o n s m e thods: I Publi c a ddre ss sys tem I (s it e-s p ec ifi c li st o f co mmuni ca t io n s m et h o d s) I Pl a nt ra dio sys t e m s I (3) L oss of AL L of th e fo llo w i n g NRC co mmu ni ca ti o n s method s: (si t e-speci fi c l i s t of co mmun ica ti o n s meth o d s) (2) L oss of A LL of the fo ll owi n g O RO com muni ca t io n s m e th ods: I ENN (E mer g en cy No tificati o n Net wo rk) I I Co mm e r c i a l ph o ne s I (3) Lo ss of A LL of th e fo ll ow in g NRC co m mu ni ca ti o n s m et h o d s: I E N S on F e d e ral T e l eco mmuni ca tion s Sys t e m (FT S) I I Co mmer c ial ph o ne s I Differ e nce I D ev iation I Justification Differen c e: S ite s pecifi c information provided. 28 INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE FACILITY (ISFSI) ICS/EALS E-H UL: I N I T l AT I NG CONDIT IO NS NE T 99-01 Re v 6 V o g tle Dama ge to a l oa d e d ca sk CON FrN E M E NT BOUND A RY. D a m age to a l oa d e d cas k CO NFrN E M E NT B OUN D A RY. Differe n ce I D ev iation I Ju st ification N o n e TH R ES HOLD S NE l 99-01 Re v 6 V o g tle (1) D a m age to a load e d cas k CO NF I NEMENT BOUNDARY a s (I) D a ma ge to a lo a d ed c as k CO NFrN E M E NT BOUNDARY a s indi ca t ed b y a n on-c o nt a ct radia ti on r eadi n g g reater t h an (2 ti m e s t h e indicated b y an o n-contac t ra d ia t ion r ea di n g grea t er t h a n ANY of t h e s ite-s p ec ifi c ca s k s p ec ifi c t ec hni ca l s p ec i fi c a t io n a ll owab l e r adiation val u e s li s t ed i n T a b l e E I. le v el) on t h e s u rfa c e of t h e s pe nt fue l c as k. [f a b l e E l Locat i o n o f Dose R a t e Total D ose R a t e (Ne utr o n+ G amm a m R/hr) Ill-T R AC 1 25 Si d e -Mid-h e i g h t 950 [c>p 2 0 0 HI-ST O R M IOO Si d e -60 in c h es b e l ow mi d-h e i g ht 1 70 S id e -Mid-h e ight 1 80 Sid e -60 i n c h es a b ove mid-h e ig h t 11 0 Ce nt e r o f lid* so M idd l e of t op lid** 60 To p (Qtot l et) duc t 1 30 B o tt o m (i n l et} du c t 360 . T h e c e nt e r o f t h e t o p lid r e pr ese n ts a 6 i n. ra di us . ** Th e midd le o f th e t o p l i d r e pr es e n t s a n a pp roxi m a t e ly 4 i n. wid e c v lindri ca l .. s tria" l oca t e d a b o ut m i d-di sta n ce of th e lid. 29 INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE FACILITY (ISFSI) ICS/EALS Differenc e I D ev iation I Ju st ification Differenc e: S it e s p ec ific i nformation provided. S ee A ttachment I S F S I T S/Do s e Readin g Ca lcul a tion. 3 0 Commented [JRB30): V&V R e f e r e n ce c h a n ge du e t o RAJ 11 r ev i s i o n FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EALS PWR FISSION PRODUCT BARRIERS MATRIX -INITIATING CONDITIONSffHRESHOLDS NE I 99-01 Re v 6 FAI -Any Loss or any Potentia l L oss of eit her FSI -Loss or Potential Loss of any two barriers. FG I -Loss of any two barriers an d Loss or Pote ntial the Fue l Clad or RCS barrier. Loss of th e third barrier. V ogtle FG I -Loss of any two barriers and Lo ss or FSI -Loss or Potential Loss of any two barrie r s. FAI -Any loss or any Potential Loss of either the F u e l Potential Los s of the third barr i er. Clad or RCS barrier Difference I Deviation I Jus tifi ca t ion No ne Fuel Clad Barrier RCS Barrier Containment Barrier Loss Potent i al Loss Loss Potential Loss Loss Potential Loss NE I 99-01 Rev 6 I. RCS or SG Tube Leakage 1. R CS or SG Tube Leakage I. R CS or SG Tube Leakage Not App l icab l e A. RCS/r eactor A. An automatic or A Operation of a standby A A leaking or Not Applicable vessel level le ss manual ECCS (S I) cha r gi n g (makeup) RUPTURED SG i s tha n (si te-specific actuation is required pump is required by FAULTED outside of level). b y EIT H E R of the E ITH E R of the containment. fo ll owing: fo ll owing:
- UNISOLABLE I. UNISOLABLE RCS l eakage RCS l eakage OR OR . SG tube RUPTURE. 2. SG tube leakage. OR B. RCS coo ld own rate 3 1 Not App li ca ble A. CORE COOLING CSF-ORANGE entry condition s met. Difference I Deviation I ,Justifkation FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EALS A. An a u to m atic or m a nu a l ECCS ac tu ation is required by EITHER of the fo ll owing:
- UN I SOLA BL E RCS leakage OR
- SG tube RUPTURE. g r ea t er t h an (sitespecific pressurized thermal shock c rit e ri a/limit s defined by s it e-s pecific ind ica ti o n s). Vogtle A. Operation of a standby c h a r g in g pump is required by EITHER of th e fo ll owing: I. UN I SOLABLE R CS l eakage OR 2. SG tub e l eakage. OR B. RCS INTEGRITY CSF -RED en t ry cond it io n s met A. A leaking or R U PTURED SG is FAUL TED outside of conta inm en t. Not Applicable Difference
- R CS Barrier Loss EAL Thresho ld 1.A-NE I 99-01Rev6 include s (S I) as clarifier for ECCS. Vogtle EA L Threshold I.A does not include this clarifier. Justification:
Terminology difference Difftrence
- R CS Barrier Potential Loss EAL Threshold I.A-El 99-01 Re v 6 clarifie s a charging pump as a makeup pump. Vog tle EAL Threshold I.A does not include thi s clarifi e r. Justification:
Terminology difference -Vogtle does not refer to charging pumps as makeup pumps. Difference
- S ite s pecific infor m atio n provided. 15 CSFST Information. l Comment e d [JRB31): V&V Refe r e n ce change due lo RAJ I '---------------------------------------------------------------'
11 revision 32 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EALS NE I 9 9-01 Re v 6 2. Inadeq u ate H ea t R e mo v al 2. Inadeq u ate Heat Remo v al 2. Inadeq u ate Heat Remo v a l A. Core exit A. Core exit No t Applicable A In adequate RCS heat Not Applicable A I. (Site-specific thermocouple thermocouple removal capability via criteria for readings greater read in gs greater steam generators as entry into core than (site-specific t h an (site-specific indicated by (site-cooling temperat u re temperature specific i n dicatio n s). restora t io n va lu e). va lu e). proced u re) OR AN D B. I nadequate RCS 2. Restoration hea t removal procedure not capability via effective w ith i n steam generators 15 minutes. as indicated by (site-speci fie indicatio n s). Vo gtle 33 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EALS A. CORE COOLING A. CORE COOLING Not Applicab l e A. SfNK CSF -Not App l ica ble A. CO R E COO LING CSF -RED entry CSF-ORANG6 D entry cond iti o n s CSF -RED e nt ry conditions met entry conditions met. conditions met for met 15 minutes or OR OTf Heat Sink csr lon ger B. HEAT SINK CSF should not he -RED entry RIJ) 1ftotal ava1labk conditions met fced\1ater ilo\1 is Ic,s than gpm dul! to opcmtor o n H eat Smk CST* action ( Commented [JRB33]: RAJ 1 5 rev i s i on l shuu I d no t he cons1<.lc r eJ RFD 1r tota l a1a1Jab l e fcl!dwater tlcm 1s less than 535 gpm due to operator ac ti on (Commented [JRB32]: RAJ 15 revi s io n ) Difference I Deviation I J u st ifi ca ti on Difference
- S ile s pecific informat i on pro v ided. S ee ;v..u;..\'IS C SF S T Information.
I Commented [JRB34]: V&V R e f ere n ce c h ange d u e t o RAJ 1 11 r ev 1 s 1on 34 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EALS N EI 99-01 Rev 6 3. R C S Ac ti vity I C o n tainme n t Ra di ation 3. R CS A ct i vity I C o n t a inment Ra di ation 3. R CS Ac tiv i ty I C ont a in m e n t Radiation A. Conta in ment Not Applicab l e A. Con t ainmen t radiation Not App li cab l e Not Applicab l e A. Containment radia t ion m o n i t or mo ni tor read in g radia t ion mo ni tor reading greater greater than (site-reading greater than tha n (site-specific specific va l ue). (si t e-specific va l ue). value). OR B. (Si t e-specific indica t io n s t h at reactor coo l ant activity is greater than 300 µCi/gm dose eq u ivalent I-131). V ogt l e A. Co n tai nm ent No t Appl i cable A. Containme n t radiatio n Not Applicable Not Applicab l e A. Containme n t radia t ion m on i tor m o n itor )lE-005 OR radiat i o n mo n i t or RE-005 O R 006 006 8.7E+2 m RJ h r. RE-005 OR 006 2.6E+5 m R/hr. 1.3E+ 7 m RJ h r. O R B. Indicatio ns t h at reactor coo l a n t activity is g r eate r than 300 µCi/gm dose e qui va l e n t 1-131. Difference I D ev i atio n I J u s titirati o n 35 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EALS Difference: Fuel Clad Barrier Loss EAL Threshold 3.B-NEI 99-01Rev6 directs use of site specific indiciations of dose equivalent 1-131. Vogt l e EAL T hre shold uses generic indications. Justification: It is implied that thi s EAL is satisfied by analysis of an RCS Sample. The Vogtle EAL ba s is document provides the u se r with additional guidance. !Difference: Site specific information provided. See V2 Rad Monitor Calculatio n s. 36 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EA LS E l 99-01 R ev 6 4. Co nt a i nment Int eg ri ty or B ypass 4. Co ntainment Inte g ri ty or B y p ass 4. Co nt a inment Int eg ri ty or Byp a ss Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable A. Containment isolation is A. Containment required pressure greater than A D (site-specific va l ue) E I T H E R of the O R followi n g: B. Exp l osive mix tur e I. Containment exists inside i n tegrity h as been co n tainme n t lost based on O R Emergency
- c. I. Containment Director judgment.
pressure greater O R than (site-2. UN I SOLABLE specific press u re pat h way from the setpoint) containment to the AND environment exists. 2. Less than one OR full train of B. Indications of RCS (site-specific leakage o ut side of system or containme n t. equipment) is operat in g pe r design for 1 5 minutes or longer. 3 7 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EALS Vogt l e Not App l icable Not A p p li cable Not Applicab l e No t Ap pli cab l e A. Co n ta inm e nt i so l a t ion is A. CONTAfN M ENT required CSF R ED e n try AN D co ndi t i o n s m e t. E ITH E R of th e OR follow in g: B. CTMT h y dro g e n I. Co nt a inm e n t co n ce n trat i o n g r ea t e r i n teg r ity h as been than 6% l ost b ased on OR Emergency
- c. I.
D ir ecto r ju dgment. GSF GIM!>IGl> OR eeRE!itieRs
- 2. UN I SOLABLE ll lll\!ll pat h way from the r* .. ' ,. e: . .ltct co nt ai nm en t to the th* 1 .; 1Slot environme nt exist s. A D ( Com m e n te d [J RB35]: RAJ 1 9 revisio n O R 2. Less than Four B. I ndicat i o n s of RCS CTMT fa n c ool e r s leakage o ut si d e of a n d o ne f ull tra in con t ai nm e n t. ofCTM T S p ray is operating per d esign for 1 5 minutes or l o n ger. Difference I Deviation I Ju s t i fi r ati on 38 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EALS Diff e renc e: P o tential Lo ss EAL T hre s hold s 4.A and 4.C. I -S ite s pecifi c information pro v ided. See i\l.M-\ 15 CSFS T Inform a ti o n a nd\ 20 ( o n tainmrnt l Commented
[JRB36]: V&V Refer e nce change due to RAJ Initiation Setpoint. 11 r ev i s i o n Diff e rence: Potential Loss EAL Thre s hold 4.8-NE I 99-01 Rev 6 refer s to Ex plo s ive mixture exists in s ide containment. Vogtle thre s hold s pecifie s the h y drogen (Commented [JRB37]: RAJ 1 9 r evisio n ] concentration that i s considered an explosive mixture in containment. See VI I l-1 2 C oncentration. Justification: Human factors consideration, use of a specific measurable and recognizable concentration facilitates the determination that EAL threshold has been met. Difference
- Potenti a l Loss EAL T hre s hold 4.C.2-NE I 99-01 Rev 6 refer s to onl y one train of a s ite s pecific syste m. Vogtle thre s hold include s additional component s (four CT MT fan coolers) that s upport CTMT s pra y to meet thi s entr y co ndition. Justification:
Plant design difference. NE I 99-01 Rev 6 5. Other Indications
- 5. Other Indications
- s. Other Indication s A. (si te-spec ific as IA (site-specific as A. (site-specific as I A. (si t e-specific as A. (site-speci fie as I A. (s it e-specific as app licabl e) ap pli cab l e) app li cab l e) a pplicabl e) a ppli ca b l e) app li cable) Vogtle Not applicab l e I Not app li cab le Not a pplic ab l e I Not a ppli cab l e Not applica bl e I Not a ppli cable Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference
- o additional EALs identified for Vog tle. Justification:
o additional EALs identified. NE I 99-01 Rev 6 39 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER I CS/EALS 6. Emergency Director J u dgment 6. E mergenc y D i r ecto r Judgment 6. E merge n cy Dir ector Jud gme nt A. ANY condition in A. ANY co nd ition in A. A Y con dition in the A. ANY condition in the A. ANY condition in the A. ANY condition in the opinion of the the opinion of the opinion of the opinion of the opinio n of the the opinion of th e Eme r ge nc y E mer ge n cy Emergency Dir ector Eme r gency Di rector E m e r gency Dir ector that mer ge n cy Dire c tor Director that Director that that indicates Loss of that indicates Potential indicate s Potential Loss th at indicates Loss of indicates Lo s s of indicates Potential the RCS Barrier. Loss of th e RCS of the Co nt ain m ent the Containme nt the Fuel Clad Loss of the Fuel Barrier. Barrier. Barrier. Barrier. C lad Barrier. Vogtle A. ANY co nditi on in A. A Y condition in A. ANY conditio n in the A. A Y condition in the A. ANY co ndition in th e A. ANY condit ion in the opinio n of t h e the op i nion of the opinion of the o pinion of th e opinio n of the th e opinion of the e mer ge nc y emergency emergency dir ecto r eme r ge n c y director that emerge n cy director that emergency director director that director th at th at indicates l oss of ind ic ates potential lo ss indicates lo ss of th e that indi ca te s i ndicates lo ss of indica tes potential the RCS Barrier. of the RCS Barrier. contai nment barrier. potential loss of the the fue l clad loss of the fuel co nta inment barrier. barrier. c lad barrier. Difference I Deviation I Ju s tification No ne 40 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HG I: IN I TlATING C O NDITIONS El 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle HOSTILE ACTION resulting in lo s s of p h ysica l control of the fac ili ty. H OST I LE ACTION resulting in loss of physical control of the facilit y. Difference I Deviation I Ju s tifi ca ti o n None TH R ESH O L D S NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle (I) a. A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occu rr ed within (I) a. A HO ST IL E ACT I ON is occurring or has occ urr ed within the PROTECTED AREA as reported by the (site-specific the PROTECTED AREA as reported by security shift security s h ift supervisio n). s u perv i s i on. AND A D b. E rTHER of the followi n g h as occ urr ed: b. EITHER of the following has occurred: I. ANY of the fo llo wi n g safety functio ns ca nn ot be I. ANY of the following safety functio n s canno t be controlled or maintained. contro ll ed or maintained.
- Reactivity co ntrol
- R eactivit y control
- C ore cooling [PWR] I RPV water level [BWR]
- Core cooling
- RCS heat removal
- RCS heat removal OR OR 2. Damage to spe nt fuel h as occurred or is 2. Damage to s pent fuel has occurred or is IMMIN ENT. IMMIN ENT. Difference I Deviation I Ju s tifi c ati o n Differe n ce: Site specific information provided.
41 HA ZA RDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HG7: I N I TIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogt l e Ot her co nditi o n s exist which in the j ud g ment of th e Emerge n cy Dire cto r O th e r co nditi o n s ex i s t whic h in the judg ment of th e eme r ge nc y direct o r warrant decl aration of a Genera l Eme r gency. wa rr a nt d eclaratio n of a General E m e r gency. Difference I Deviation I Ju s tifi ca ti on one THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogt l e (I) O th er co ndition s exist which in the jud g m ent of the Eme r ge n cy (I) Ot h e r co ndition s ex i s t w hi c h in th e jud g m e nt of the e m e r ge nc y Dire c t o r ind i ca t e th at eve nts a re in prog r ess or h ave occu rr ed which director indicate that eve nt s are in pro g r ess or h ave occurred which in vo l ve act u a l or IM MINENT subs t a nti a l core degradation or in vo l ve ac tu a l or I MMIN ENT s ub s t a nti al core degradatio n or m e lt ing m el tin g wi th pot e nti a l for loss of conta inm ent inte g rity o r HOSTIL E with p o t e nti a l for l oss of con tainment inte g rity o r H OST IL E ACT I ON that re s ult s in a n ac tu a l Jo ss of ph ysica l co ntrol of the ACTION that results in an act u al J oss of p h ysica l co nt ro l of the faci li ty. Releases can be Justifi ca tion ab l y expected to exceed E PA fac ili ty. Rele ases can be Ju stifica t io n a bl y expected to exceed E P A P rotective Action Guideline expos ure l evels offsi t e for mor e th a n the Protecti ve Act i o n G uid eline expos ur e l evels offsite for mor e than the i mmed iate site area. immediate si t e area. Differe n ce I Deviation I Ju s t i fi ca ti o n No ne 42 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HS I: I N I T I AT I NG C O NDITIONS NE I 99-01 Rev 6 Voglle HOSTILE ACT I ON wi thin t h e PROT EC TED AREA. HOSTILE ACT IO N wit hin th e PROTECTED AREA. D i fference I Deviation I Ju s t i fic a ti o n None THRESH O LDS NEJ 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle (I) A HOSTIL E ACTION is occurring o r ha s occurred wi thin the (I) A HOSTIL E ACTION is occurr in g or has occurred within the PROTECTED AREA as reported by the (site-specific security shift PROT ECTE D AREA as reported b y sec u rity s hift s u pe r vision. supervision). Difference I Deviation I Ju st ifi cHt i o n Difference: Site s pecific information provided. 43 HA ZA RDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HS6: IN I TIATING COND I TIONS NE 1 99-0 1 Rev 6 Vogt l e In abi li ty t o control a key safe t y fu n ction from outside the Co ntr o l Room. In ability to co n trol a key safety function fro m outside the Contro l R oom. Difference I Deviation I Ju s tifiration one T HR ESHOL D S El 99-01 Rev 6 Vogt l e (I) a. An event h as re s ulted in plant contro l being tran sferred (1) a. An eve nt ha s resulted in plant co ntrol bei n g tra n sfe rred fro m th e Control Room to (s it e-s p ec ifi c remote s hutd own from th e con t rol room t o th e remote s hutdown panel s due pane ls a nd local contro l statio n s). to a contro l room evacua ti on. A D AND b. Co ntro l of ANY of the fo ll ow in g key safe ty fu n ct i o n s i s not b. Contro l of ANY of the fo ll owing key safe t y functions is no t reestab li s h ed within (site-specific number of minute s). ree sta bli s hed within 1 5 minut es.
- Reactivity control
- Reactivity contro l
- Core cooling [PWR] I RPV water level [BWR]
- Co r e coo lin g
- RCS h eat removal
- RCS heat removal Difference I Deviation I Ju s t i fication Difference:
S ite specific information provided. 44 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HS7: INITIATING C O NDIT IO NS NE I 99-01 Rev 6 Vog tl e Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the emergency director warran t declaration of a S ite Area E mergency. warran t declaration ofa Site Area Emerge nc y. Differenc e I De v iation I Justification No ne THRESHOLDS NE I 99-01 Rev 6 Vog tle (I) Other conditions exis t which in the j ud gment of the E mergenc y (I) Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the emergency Director indicate that events are in progress or have occ urr ed which director i n dicate th a t eve n ts are in progres s or have occur r ed w hi ch involve actual or lik ely major failures of plant functio n s needed for involve actua l or likel y major failu r es of plant functions needed for protection of the public or HOSTILE ACT I ON that results in protection of the publi c or HOSTILE ACTION that result s in int e nti onal damage or ma l icious acts , (1) t oward s ite personnel or intentional damage or maliciou s acts , (I) toward site per so nn e l or equipment that could lead to the likely fai lure of or , (2) that prevent equipment th at co uld lead to the likely fai lur e of or , (2) that prevent effective access to eq u i pment needed for the protection of the public. effective acce ss to eq uipm ent needed for the protection of th e public. Any releases are not expected to resu lt in exposure levels w h ich Any releases are not expected to re s ult in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action G uid e lin e expos ur e leve l s beyond the exceed EPA Protective Action G uide l ine exposure levels beyond the site boundary. s ite boundary. Diffe r e n ce I Deviation I Justifi ca tion No n e 45 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EA LS HAL: I NITIATING C O NDITIONS EI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogt l e HOST I LE ACT I ON w ithin the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA or airborne HOSTILE ACTION wit hin th e OWNER CONTROLLED AREA or airborne attack th reat within 30 minut es. attack thre at withi n 30 minut es. Differe n ce I Deviatio n I Ju st ifi ca ti o n N one THRESHOLDS NE I 99-0 I Rev 6 Vogtle (I) A HOSTIL E ACT I ON is occu rrin g or ha s occ urred wi thin the (I) A HO TIL E ACT I ON is occu rring or ha s occurred within the OWNER CONT ROLLED AREA as r epo rt ed by the (s it e-s pecific OWNER CO NTROLL ED AREA as reported by s ec ur i ty s hi ft sec urit y shift s upervi s i on). s u pervi s ion. (2) A va l idated notification from NRC of an a ir craft attack thr ea t within (2) A va l idated notification from NRC of a n aircraft a ttack t hreat within 30 minut es of the s ite. 30 minute s of the site. Difference I Deviation I Ju s t i fi c at io n Differe n ce: Site specific information provided. 46 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HAS: I NITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle Gaseo u s r e l ease impe din g access to equi pm e nt n ecessary for n o rm a l pl a nt Gas e o u s r elease i m ped in g access to e quipm e nt n ecessary for n o rm a l pl a n t o p e rati o n s, coo l down o r s hu t d own. o p era t io n s , cool down o r s hut down. Difference I Deviation I Justification N one THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogt l e 4 7 HA ZA RDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT S A FETY ICS/EALS (I) a. Release o f a toxic , corrosive , asphyxiant or flammable gas (I) a. Release of a t oxic , co r rosive , asph yx ia nt or flammabl e gas into a n y o f the following p l ant room s or a rea s: into any able HI plant room s or areas: (si te-specific li s t of plant rooms or areas wit h entry-related AN O mode app li cability identified)
- b. Entry int o the room o r a re a is prohibited or i mpeded. A 0 b. E nt ry into the room or area i s prohibit ed or impeded. Tab l e HI B u ildin g Room Nu mbe r Ap pli cab l e Mode I C6-226 , I C6-A45 , B QC 6-223 , 2C6-A22 IC6-A77 , I C6-66!f I C 6-67 6, I C6-6 79 B 2C 6-A79 , 2C6-601 Control Building e CB-604 , 2C 6-618 I C 6-226 , I C 6-A45 I C6-684 , 2C6-6 85 4 , 2CB-223 , 2C6-A22 IC6-A48 , IC6-A 50 Q C6-A l 5, 2C6-A l 6 AFW Pump AFW Pump H o u se Operation and I 2 3 standby Readines s I A6-A28 , 2A6-A 72 A-level demm vesse l '3 va l v e I en es I AB-A24 , 2A6-A 77 B u x 1hary IAB-A08 , Q A6-AIO U Building IAB-C85 , IAB-C8 9 4 2A6-C38 , 2A6-C44 IA6-Bl5 MEZZ IAB-Bl9MEZZ e AB-B 117 MEZ:il '2A6-B 11 9 MEZ:il Diffe r ence I Deviation I Justification Difference
- S ite specific i n formation provided. 48 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HA6: INITIATING CONDITIONS NE I 99-01Rev6 Vog lle Co ntrol Room evacuation re s ulting in transfer of p l ant control to a lt ernate Co ntrol Room evac u ation r es ult ing in tran sfer of plant co ntro l t o a lt ernate l ocations. location s. Difference I Deviation I Justification No ne THRESHOLDS NE I 99-01 Rev 6 Vog tle (I) An event has r es ulted in p l a nt co ntrol b e in g transferred from the (I) An event ha s re s ulted in p l an t co n tro l bein g transferred from the Control Ro o m to (site-specific remote s h utdown panel s and l oca l con trol room to the remote shutdown panels due to a control room co ntrol s tation s). evacuation. Differe n ce I Deviation I Justifiration Difference:
S it e s pecific info rma tion provided. 49 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS H A 7: I N ITI A TI N G C O N DI T IO NS NE I 9 9-01 R ev 6 Vog tl e Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Dire c tor O ther conditions exist which in th e judgment of th e emerge n cy dir ector wa rr a nt decl ara t ion of a n A l ert. wa rr a nt d ec l ara ti on of an Alert. Diff e r e n ce I D ev i at i o n I Ju s t i fi c ati o n No n e THR ES HOLD S NE I 99-0 1 R ev 6 Vog tl e (I) Other con dition s exist w h ich , in the judgment of the E merge n cy (I) Other co nditions exist which , in th e jud g ment of the emergency Dire c t o r , indicate that events are in pro g re ss or h ave occ urr e d which director , indicate th a t events a r e in pro g r ess or have occurred which inv o lve a n ac tu al or p o t e nti a l s ub s t a ntia l degrad a tion of t h e le ve l of involve an ac tual or potenti a l s ub s t a ntia l degradation of t h e l evel of safe t y of the pla n t or a sec uri ty event that i n volves probab l e life safety of the pl a nt or a security event th a t involves probable li fe threatening risk t o si t e p e r so nnel or dam ag e to site eq uipment threatening ri sk to s ite per so nn e l o r dama ge t o si te equipment b eca u se of HOST I LE ACTION. Any r e l eases a re expected to be because of HOST! L E ACTION. A n y releases a re expected t o be limit e d to sma ll fractions of the E PA Prote c ti ve Action Guideline limit ed to s m a ll fractions of t h e E PA Prote ctive Action G uid e lin e ex po s ur e l eve l s. exposure l eve l s. Difftr e n ce I D ev i atio n I Ju s tifi c ation No n e 50 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HUI: I NIT I AT I NG CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle Confirmed SECUR ITY CONDITION or threat. Co nfirm ed SECURITY CONDITION or threat. Differt n ce I Deviation I Justification one T HR ESH O L D S El 99-0 1 Rev 6 Vog tl e (I) A SECUR ITY CONDIT I ON that does not involve a HOSTILE (I) A SECURITY COND I T I ON that does n ot involve a HOSTILE ACTION as reported by the (site-spec ifi c sec urit y shift supervision). ACTION as reported by sec urity s h ift s u pe r vision. (2) Notification ofa credib l e security threat directed at the site. (2) Notification ofa c r edible security threat directed at VEGP. (3) A validated notification from the NRC providing information of an (3) A validated notification from the NRC providing infonnation of an aircraft thr eat. a ir craft threat. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: EA L Thresho l d (2); replaced 't h e site' with VEGP. Justification: Editorial change -clearly identifies that threat is directed against the Vogtle s ite. Diffe r ence: Site specific information provided. 51 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HU2: INITIATING CONDJTIONS NE I 99-01 Re v 6 Vogt le Seis mic eve n t greater tha n OB E l evels. Seis mi c event greate r than OBE l eve l s. Difference I Deviation I Ju s tification No n e THRESHOLDS NE I 99-01Rev6 Vogtle (I) Seismic event grea t er th a n Operating Ba s i s Earthquake (O B E) a s (I) Seismic event g r eate r th a n Opera tin g Ba s i s Ea rth q u ake (QBE) as i ndi cated by: indic a t e d by the Seismic Monitorin g System (Red OBI I ' (site-specific indicatio n th a t a seis mic event met or exceeded OBE lnd1cator) rnt!1eat111g greeter theA Q.12 g aeeelerel1en. lim its) Difference I Deviation I Ju s tifica t i o n Difference
- S ite spec ifi c information provided. See¥-!-+-\ 16 SeisHlie lnt!ie11tie11stA111rH1s
\lonitor S)'tem Pline! 52 [ Commented [JRB38]: RAI 23 revision Commented [JRB39]: V&V Reference change due 1 0 RAI 11 r evision Commented [JRB40): RAJ 23 revision HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EA LS HU3: I N I T I AT I NG CON DI TIONS El 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle Hazardous event. Hazardous event. Differe n ce I Deviation I Justification one THRESH O L D S EI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogt l e (1) A tornado st rike with in the PROTECTED AREA. (1) A tornado s trike with in th e PROTECTED AREA. (2) Internal room o r a r ea floodin g ofa magnitude s ufficient to requ ir e (2) Internal room or a r ea flooding of a magnitude s ufficient to require manual or automatic e l ect r i cal i so lation ofa SAFETY SYSTEM manual or auto matic e le ctrical isolat i on ofa SAFETY SYSTEM co mp onent needed for th e cu rr ent operating mode. component needed for the current opera tin g mode. (3) Movement of per so nnel w ithin the PROTECTED AREA i s impeded (3) Movement of pe r so nnel within th e PROTECTED AREA (P A) i s due to an offsite event inv o l v in g hazardou s m aterials (e.g., an offsite impeded due to a n off s ite event invo l ving ha za rdous materi a l s (e.g., c hemi ca l spill or toxic gas r e l ease). an off s ite che mi ca l s pill or t oxic gas rel ease). (4) A h azardous event that re s ul ts in on-si te con dition s sufficient to (4) A h aza rd ous event that re s ult s in on-si t e conditions s ufficient to prohibit the plant staff from access ing the site via per so nal vehicles. prohibit the pl a nt s taff from accessing th e site via per so n al vehicles. (5) (Site-s pecifi c li s t of natural or technolo g ical h azard events) (5) Sustained hurric ane force winds g r ea ter than 74 mph fo rec as t t o be at the pl a nt s it e in th e ne x t four h ou r s. Difference I Deviation I Ju s tificHtion Difference: Site specific informa t ion provided. 53 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SA FET Y ICS/E A LS HU4: I N I T I AT I NG C O N DI TIONS EI 99-0 I Re v 6 Vog tle F IRE potentially degradi n g the l eve l of safety of the plant. F I RE potentiall y degrading th e l evel of safety of th e plant. Differe n ce I Deviation I Justification one T HR ESHOLDS EI 99-0 1 Rev 6 Vogt l e (I) a. A FIRE is NOT extinguis h ed w ithin I S-minut es of ANY of (I) a. A F I RE i s NOT extinguished wi th in ! S-min ut es of ANY of the following FIRE detection indications
- t he follow in g F I RE detectio n indications
- Report from th e fie ld (i.e., v i s ual observatio n)
- Report from the fie ld (i.e., vis u al observat i on)
- Receipt o f mul t ipl e (mo r e th a n I) fire a l arms or
- Receipt of multiple (more th an I) fire alarms or indicatio n s indica t ions
- Fie ld ve rifi cation ofa sing le fire a l arm
- Fie l d ver ifi cation ofa si n g l e fire a l arm AND A D b. The F I RE i s l ocated within ANY of the if ab l e 1-1 2 plant b. The FIRE is l ocated wi thin A Y of the following plant rooms or areas. rooms or areas: (2) a. Receipt of a s ingle fire a l arm (i.e., no o th er ind i ca tion s of a (site-specific li s t of p lant rooms or a re as) F I RE). (2) a. Receipt ofa si n g l e fire a l arm (i.e., no o th er indications ofa A D F I RE). b. The F I RE is l ocated within ANY of the Tab l e H 2 p lant A D rooms or areas. b. T h e FIR E is located within ANY of the following plant AND rooms or areas: c. The existe n ce ofa FIRE is not ver ifi ed within 30-mi nut es (s it e-specific list of plant rooms o r a r eas) of a l arm receip t. A D (3) A F I RE w ithin the plant PR O T EC T E D A RE A p eH£F£l c. The existence ofa F I RE is not verifie d wit hin 30-minutes PROTl<CTeD AReA not exti n guished wit hin 60-minutes of the of a l arm receipt. init i al r epo rt , alarm o r indi ca ti o n. (Co mmented [JRB4 1]: RAJ 22 revi s ion (3) A FIRE w ithin the p l a nt o r I SFSI [f or plants w ith an !SFS I outs id e (4) A F I RE within the p l a nt PROT ECTE D AR E A the p l ant Protec t ed A r ea] PR OTECTED AREA n ot exti n guishe d PROTIOCTIOD AReA that r eq uir es firefighti ng s upp ort by an offsite within 60-mi nut es of the initia l repo rt , a l arm or indication. fire response agency to exti n guish. ( Comm e nt ed [JRB42]: RAI 22 revision 54 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS (4) A F I RE within t h e plant or /SFS/ [for plams with an I SFS I outside 'fab l e H 2 th e p l ant Protec t ed Area] PROTECTED AREA that r eq uir es Contamment firefighting support by an offsite fire response agency to ex tin guish. NSCW Cooling 'Towers Diese l Generator Bu1ldtn1.Z:
Aux1 h arv Bulldm!r! Fuel Handlm.11. Build ml.?. Contro l Buildm.u.. Diesel Fuel 01! Tank Pumphouse Auxil i ary Feedwater Pumphouse Difft r e n ce I Deviation I Justification Differe n ce: EAL Thres h o l ds (l)b and (2)b-added reference to Tab l e H2 in s tead of li s ting a rea s s eparatel y for each threshold. Justification: Human factors consideration -applicable rooms are the sa me for each threshold. Placin g these rooms into one table and referencing that table simplifies the process for identif y ing applicable rooms. Difference
- EAL T hre s h o l d s (3) and (4)-ad d ed PROTE C TED A REA (P A) after plant. Justification:
C larifies plant areas that are applicable to these threshold s. Diff e rence: A dd ed Ta b l e H2 w i th applicab l e s ite s pecific room li st ing. 55 ..--------------
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HU7: INITI ATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vog tle Other conditions exist w hich in the judgmen t of the Emergency Director Other conditions exist which in the judgmen t of the emergency director warrant declaration ofa (NO)UE. warrant declaration of a (NO)UE. Difference I Deviation I Ju s tifica t ion No ne THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogt l e (I) Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emerge n cy (I) Other co ndition s exist which in the judgment of the emergency Director indicate th at events are in pro g re ss or h ave occu rred which director indicate that events are in progre ss or h ave occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a potential degradati o n of the l evel of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to facility protection ha s been initiated. No indicate a secu rity threat to facility protection has been initia ted. No releases of radioactive mate ria l requirin g offsite respon se o r re l eases of radioactive materi a l requiring offsite re spo n se or monitorin g are expected unl ess further degradation of safety sys tems monitorin g are expec t ed unle ss further degradation of safety sys tem s occurs. occurs. Difference I Deviation I Ju s tification one 56 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS S GI: I N I T I AT I NG C O N DI T IO NS El 99-0 1 R ev 6 Vog tl e Prolo n ged l oss of all offs i te and all onsite AC p ower to e m e r ge n cy b u ses. Pro l o n ge d l oss of a ll offs i te a nd all onsi t e AC power to emerge n cy b u ses. D i ffe r e n ce I D ev i a t io n I Justifiration N o n e THR ES HOLD S E I 99-0 1 R ev 6 Vog tl e (I) a. Loss of ALL offs it e a nd A LL o n s it e AC powe r to (s i t e-(I) a. Loss of A LL offs ite a nd A LL o n s it e AC power t o B O T H specific e m erge n cy b u ses). 1(2)AA02 AN D 1(2 BA 03. A N D A N D b. E I TH E R of th e fo ll owi n g: b. E I TH E R of th e fo ll owing: . Restoratio n of at l east o n e AC e m e r ge n cy b u s i n l ess . Res t orat i o n of at l east o n e AC e m ergency b u s in l ess th a n (si t e-s p ec i fic ho ur s) is n o t l i ke l y. t han 4 hour s i s n o t l ike l y. . (Site-spec i fic indic atio n of a n i n ab ili ty t o adeq u a t e l y
- CORE COO LI NG CSF -RED cond it ions me t. remove h ea t fro m th e co r e) Diff e r ence I D ev i a t io n I Ju s tification Di ff e r ence: ite s p ecific i n fo rm a ti on p r ov id e d. See f\l-l.l..\'12 E m e r ge n c y B u s e s Drawi n g 15 CS F S T In for m ation. 57 Comment e d [JR843]: V&V Refe r e n ce c h a n ge du e t o RAJ I I r ev i s i o n ;...== -===-Commented
[JRB44): V&V R efere n ce c h a n ge du e t o RAJ I I r e vi s i o n SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS SGS: IN I TIATING CON DI TIONS EI 99-0 I Rev 6 Vogtle Loss of a ll AC a nd Vital DC powe r so ur ces fo r 15 minute s or lon ge r. Loss of a ll AC a nd Vital D C power sou r ces for 1 5 m inutes or l o n ger. Differe n ce I Deviatio n I J u st i fication one THRESHOLDS EI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle (I) a. Loss of AL L offsite a nd ALL onsite AC pow e r to (site-(I) a. Loss of ALL offsite a nd ALL onsite AC p owe r to BO TH spec ifi c emergency buses) for 15 minute s or lon ge r. I 2 AA 0 2 AND 1 Q)BA03 for 1 5 minutes or lon ger. AN D AND b. Indi ca ted vo lt age is le ss than (site-speci fie bus voltage b. Indi ca ted voltage is l ess than I 05 VD C on ALL 1 2 5 VD C val u e) on A LL (site-specific Vit a l D C busses) for 15 bu ss e s I 2 ADI , I 2 BDI , 1(2)CDI , I 2 DD! for 15 minutes o r l onger. minutes or l o n ger. Difference I Deviation I J u s tifi c ation Difference: S ite s pecific information provided. 12 Emergency Buses Drawin g and 1¥14-\ IJ DC Syste m Inform ation. 58 Commented [JRB45): V&V Reference change due lo RAJ 11 r evis i o n Com m e nt ed [J RB4 6): V&V Reference change due to RAJ 11 revi s ion SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS SSl: I N I T I ATING CONDITIONS E l 99-01 Rev 6 V oglle Loss of all offsite and all o n s i te AC power to e m e r ge n cy b u ses for 1 5 mi n utes Loss of a ll offsite and a ll ons it e AC power t o e m e r gency buse s for 1 5 o r longer. m i nu tes or l onger. Difference I De v iation I Ju s tifi ca t io n N o n e THRESHOLDS NE l 99-01 Rev 6 Vogt l e (1) Loss of ALL offsite and A L L onsite AC power to (site-specific (1) Loss of ALL offsi t e and ALL onsite AC power to BOTH 1 2 AA02 emergency buses) fo r 1 5 minutes or l o n ger. AND 1 2 BA03 for 1 5 minutes or l o n ger. Differe n ce I Deviation I Ju s tific a ti o n Difference: S ite s pe c ific information pro v ided. S e e !\£.B-.\ 12 E mer g enc y Bu s e s Drawin g. 59 Co m mented [JRB47]: V&V Reference change due to RAJ 1 1 revision SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS SSS: IN I T I ATING CONDITIONS NE I 99-01 Rev 6 V o g t l e In ability to s hut down th e r eactor ca u si ng a c hallen ge t o (co re coo lin g [P WR] In a bi li ty to s hut down th e r eactor causi n g a cha ll enge t o co r e coo li n g or R CS I RPV wa t er l evel [BWR]) o r RCS he a t r e moval. h eat removal. Difference I De v iation I J u s ti fica ti o n o ne THRESHOLDS NE I 99-01 Re v 6 Vog t l e (I) a. A n auto m a ti c or m anua l (trip (PWR] I scra m [BW R]) d i d I t-i orr llc<lt Sm!.; (SI should not he cons 1 dcml R l*D 1ftotal i n ilil<1blr l n ot s hutd own the r eactor. feed\\.tlcr 1hm kS> than 535 gpm due to onc*iltor act1 or AND (I) a. An a ut o m atic or m a nu al trip did not s hu tdown t he re ac t or. b. All m a nual actions t o sh ut down th e r eacto r hav e A D been un s u c ce ss ful. b. All m a nual actions to s hutd ow n the reactor h ave be e n AND un s uc cess f ul. c. EITHE R of th e fo ll owing co nditi ons exist: * (Si te-s pe cific indicatio n of an in a bili ty t o adeq u ate l y AND r e move h eat fr o m the co r e) ---(Site-spec i fi c indication of a n inabilit y to adeq u ately c. E ITH E R of the fo ll owing co ndi tions exist: remove h eat from th e RCS)
- Core Cooling CSF -RED condition s me . Heat Sink CSF -RED condition s me Difference I Deviation I Ju s tifi ca t io n Difference:
Si te speci fic informati o n pro v ided. See ;\l.M-\'15 CSFST Inform atio n. 60 (Commented [J RB48]: RA1 25 revi s i o n Commented [JRB49): V & V R e f e renc e c h a nge due RAJ 11 r evis i o n SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS SSS: I N I TIAT I NG C O ND I TIONS E I 99-01 Re v 6 V o g tle Loss of all Vital DC powe r for 15 minutes or longer. Loss of all Vital DC powe r for 15 minutes or l onger. Differe n c e I De v iati o n I Ju s tifi c ati o n N one TH R ESH O LDS NE I 99-0 1 Re v 6 V o g t l e (I) In dicated vo l tage i s l ess than (si t e-spec i fic bu s vo l tage va l u e) o n (I) I n di cated voltage is l es s than 1 05 VD C o n ALL 1 25 VD C bu sses A L L (site-specific Vita l DC busses) for 1 5 minutes or longer. I 2 A DI , 1 (2)BDI , I Q)C DI , I 2 DDI for 15 minutes or longer. Difference I D ev iation I Ju s tific a tion Difference
- S ite s pecific information p r ovided. S e e ¥.M-\ 13 D C Sys t e m I n formation.
6 1 I. ( Formatt ed Ta bl e C o mme n ted [JR BS O]: V&V Refe r ence change due to RN 11 revisio n
* -------------
SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS SAi: INITIATING CONDITIONS E l 99-01 Re v 6 V ogtle Loss of a ll but one AC power source to emerge n cy b u ses for 1 5 min utes or Loss of a ll but one AC power source to emergency buses for 15 minutes or longer. longer. Differ e n ce I De v iation I Ju s tifi c ati o n one THRESHOLDS E l 9 9-01 R ev 6 V ogt l e (I) a. AC power capab i lit y to (si t e-specific emergency buses) is (I) a. AC power capability to BOTll 1(2)AA02 AND IQ)BA03 reduced to a s ingle power so ur ce for 15 minutes o r l onger. is r educe d to a s i ng l e power so ur ce ( I able '>I fo r 1 5 AN D min u tes or l o n ger. [C o mme nt ed [JRB 51): RAJ 13.b revisio n AN D b. Any add iti o n al single power so ur ce fai l u r e wi ll r es ult i n a b. Any addi t io n a l single power so u rce failure wi ll resu lt in a loss of all AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS. lo ss of all AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS. ff ab l e S I U nit I U n it 2 Unit Auxiliary Transformer Unit Auxiliary Transformer INXAA i2NXAA Unit Auxiliary Transformer Unit Auxiliary Transformer INXAB 2NXAB Re serve Aux ili ary Tran sfor mer Reserve Auxiliary Transformer INXRA 2NXRA Re serve Auxiliary Tran sfor mer Reserve Auxiliary Transformer INXRB '2NXRB Diesel Generator I A Diesel Generator 2A Diesel Generator I B Die se l Generator 2 B Standby Auxiliary Transformer S t andby Auxiliary Tran s former ANXRA ANXRB 62 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS Differ,nc' I D'viation I Ju st ification DiffHence: S ite s p,cific information provided. See ¥-H-\'12 Emergenc y Buse s Drawin g. 63 Commented [JRB52): V&V R efere n ce c h a n ge du e t o RA I 1 1 revisio n SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS SA2: I N I TIAT I NG C O N DI T IO NS NE I 99--01 Rev 6 Vogtle UNPLANNED loss of Control Room indications for 1 5 minutes or lon ger UN PLANNED loss of Co ntrol Room indications for 15 minute s or l onger with a significant transient in progress. with a significant transient in progress. Difference I Deviation I Ju s t i fi ca t io n one TH R ESH O LDS NEI 99--01 Re v 6 Vogtle (1) a. An UNPLANNED event results in the inability to monitor ( 1) a. An UNPLANNED eve n t re s ult s in the inabi li ty to monitor o ne or m ore of the followi n g parameter s from wi th in the o ne or more of the fo l l owing parameter s from within the Co ntrol Ro om for 1 5 minutes or l onger. Co ntrol Room for 15 minutes or longer. F BWR paramet e r list] FPWR parameter list] Reactor Power Reactor Power Reactor Power RC S Level RCS Pressure RPV Water Level RCS Level In-Core/Core Exit Temperature RPV Pre ssu r e RCS Pre ssu re Wide R an ge Level in at l east one s team ge n erator Primary Containment In-Core/Core Exit Steam Generator Main or Auxiliary Feed Water F l ow Pressure Tern perature Suppression Pool Level Levels in at lea s t (s ite-A D specific number) steam b. ANY of the following transient events in progres s. generators Suppression P ool Steam Generator Auxiliary
- Automatic or manual runb ack grea ter t h an 25% Temperature o r E m ergency Feed Water F l ow therm a I reactor power
- Electrical load rejection greater than 25% f ull e l ectrical AN D lo ad
- Reactor trip b. ANY of the following transient events in progress.
- ECCS actuation 64 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS
- Automa ti c or manual runback greater than 25% therma 1 reactor power
- E l ect ri cal load rejection g r eate r th an 25% full electrical load
- Reactor scram [BWR] I trip [P WR]
- ECCS (SI) a ctuation
- Therm a l power osci ll a ti ons greater than 1 0% [BWR] Difference I Deviation I Justifi c ation Difference
- EI 99-01 Re v 6 does not s pecify s team generator level tran s mitter (wide or narrow range). Vog t l e s pecifie s use of Wide Range Level indication.
Ju s tification
- S ite determinat i on that Wide Ran ge Leve l indication i s applifable to thi s EAL thr es hold. Difference
- NE l 99-0 1 Re v 6 does not speci fi y S t eam Generator Main Feed Water F l ow. Vogtle specifies use of Main Feed Water or Auxi l iar y Feed Water Flow indications.
Ju s tification
- S ite determin a ti o n that Main fe e d water fl ow i s al s o applicable to thi s EA L thr es hold. Differe n ce: NE I 99-0I Rev 6 includes (SI) after ECCS. Vogtle does not include (Sf) after ECCS. Ju s tification
- S ite preferenc e, doe s not detract or affect EA L determinati o n. 65 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS SAS: I NITIATING COND ITIO NS NE I 99-0 1 Rev 6 V o g tle Automatic or manual (trip [PWR] I scra m [BWR]) fails to sh ut down the Automatic or manual trip fa il s to shut down the reactor , and s u bsequent reactor , a nd s ub sequent manu a l actions taken at th e reactor control conso l es manua l actions taken at the reactor contro l consoles are not successfu l in are not s u ccessful in shutti n g down the reactor. shutt in g down the reactor. Difference I Deviation I Justification No ne TH RE SHOLDS E l 99-01 Re v 6 Vog tle (I) a. An automa tic or manual (trip [PWR] I scram [BWR]) did (I) a. An automatic or manual trip did not shutdown the reactor. not s hutdown the reactor. AND A D b. Manual actions taken at the reactor control conso l es are not b. Manual ac ti ons taken at the reactor control con s oles are n ot successf ul in s huttin g down the reactor. s uccessful in s hutting down the reactor. Difference I Deviation I Justification No ne 66 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS SA9: INITIAT I NG C O NDITIONS NEI 99-0 1 Rev 6 Vogt l e Hazardous event affecting a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the curre nt Hazardous event affecti ng a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the c urr ent operating mode. operating mode. Difference I Deviation I Justification No n e THRESHOL D S NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle (I) a. The occu rr e nc e of ANY of the fo l l owing hazardous eve nt s: (I) a. The occurre n ce of ANY of th e following hazardous events:
- Seismic event (earthquake)
- Seismic event (earthq u ake)
- Int ernal or external flooding event
- Int e rn al or externa l flooding event
- High winds or tornado str ik e
- High w ind s or tornado st rik e
- FIRE
- F I RE
- EXPLOS I O
- EXPLOSION
- (site-specific hazards)
- Ot h e r events with sim il ar h azard characteristics a s
- Other events with simi lar hazard characteristics as determined by the Shift Manager determined by the Shift Manager AND AND b. EITHER of the following: b. EITHER of the following: . Event damage has caused indications of degraded I. Eve nt damage has caused indications of degraded performance in at least one train ofa SAFETY performance in at least o n e train ofa SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode. SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode.
- The event has caused VISIBLE DAMAGE to a OR SAFETY SYSTEM compo n ent or struct ur e needed for 2. The even t has caused VISIBLE DAMAGE to a the current operating mode. SAFETY SYSTEM co mpon ent or structure n eeded for the curre nt operating mod e. Difference I Deviation I Justificat i on 67 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS Difference
- No additional site specific ha zards identified.
Justification: Site personnel have determined that no additional site specific hazards are applicable to this EAL threshold. Difference
- NEI 99-01 Re v 6 EAL T hre s hold (J)b uses numbers to identify the two threshold condition s. Vogtle EAL Threshold (l)b use s bullets. Justification:
Editorial change for darity. This change does not affect the EAL threshold. 68 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS SU I: I N I T I AT I NG CONDIT I ONS EI 99-01 Re v 6 Vog t l e Loss of a ll offsite AC power ca p a bili ty to e m ergency bu ses for 15 minute s or Loss of a ll offs it e AC power capability t o emergency buses for 1 5 minute s or longer. lo n ge r. Difference I Deviation I Justification one THRESHOL D S NE I 99-0 1 Rev 6 Vogtle (I) Loss of ALL offsite AC pow e r ca pability to (site-specific (I) Lo ss of ALL off s ite AC power capabi li ty (!able <;2) to B OT H emer ge n cy buses) for 1 5 minut es or lon ge r. 1{2 AA02 AN D !Q)BA03 fo r 1 5 minut es or longer. )f a b l e S2 U n i t I U nit 2 Reserve Auxilia Tran sfo nner Re s erve Auxiliary Transfonnefi JNXRA 2NXRA Reserve Auxiliary Transformer Reserve Auxiliary Tran s fonne fi I NXRB !2.NXRB Standby Auxiliary Transformer Standb y Auxiliary Tran sfo nner ANXRA ANXRB Differe n ce I Deviation I Justifiration Difference
- Site s p eci fic i n fo r mation provided. 12 E merge n cy Buse s Drawi n g. 69 [ Com me n te d [JRB53): RAJ 1 3.b revision Co m m e n ted [J R B5 4): V&V Refere n ce c h a n ge due to RAJ 11 revision SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS SU2: I N I T I AT I NG C O NDITIONS El 99-0 I Rev 6 Vogtle UNPLANNED loss of Co ntro l Room indications for 15 minutes or l onger. UNPLANNED l oss of Control R oom indications for 15 minutes or l onger. Difference I Deviation I Justification one THRESH O L D S NEI 99-0 1 Rev 6 Vogtle (1) a. An UNPLANNED event result s in the inability to monitor ( 1) a. An UNPLANNED even t re s ult s in the i n abi li ty to monit or one or m o re of the following parameters from within the one or more of the following parameters from within the Contro l Room for 15 minutes or longer. Control Room for 15 minute s or lon ger. f BWR parame1er
/isl] f PWR parame1er /isl] Reactor Power Reactor Po wer Reactor Power RCS Level RCS Pres s ure RPV Water Level RCS Level In-Co re/Core Exit Temperature RPV Pre ss u r e RCS Pressure Wid e R a n ge Level in at least o n e stea m generator Primary Con t a i nment I n-Core/Core Exit Steam Generator M a in or Aux ili ary Feed Water Flow Pressure Temperature Sup pre ssio n Pool Level Levels in at le ast (site-s pecific number) s team ge ne rators Suppression Pool Steam Generator Temperature Auxiliary o r Emerge nc y Feed Water Flow Difference I Deviation I Ju s tificati o n 70 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS Diffe r e n ce: EI 99-0 I Rev 6 doe s not s p eci f y steam ge ner ato r le vel transmitter (wide or narrow range). Vog tle spec ifi es use of W ide Range Level indicatio n. Justification: Site delermination lhal Wide Range Level indiration i s applicable to this EAL threshold. Difference: NE I 99-01 Re v 6 doe s not speci fi y Steam Ge ner ator Main Feed Water Flow. Vog tle specifies u se of Main Feed Water or A uxiliar y Feed Water Flow indications. Justification: Site determination that Main feed water now is also applicable to this EAL threshold. 71 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS SU3: INITIATING CONDITIONS EI 99-01 Rev 6 Vog tle Reactor coo l ant ac tivity grea t e r t han Tech ni ca l Specification a ll owable lim its. Re ac tor coo l ant act ivity g r ea t er than T ec hnic a l Specification a llo wab l e limit s. Difference I Deviation I Justification one THRESHOLDS El 99-01 R ev 6 Vog tle (1) (Si te-specific rad i at ion monitor) readin g g r eater than (site-specific (I) R E-48000 reading g r eater than 5.0 µCi/g m. val u e). (2) R CS coo l a nt sa mp l e ac ti v i ty va l ue indi ca ting f u e l c l ad d eg rad a t ion (2) Sa mpl e analysis indi cates th at a reactor coo l ant activity va lu e i s g r ea t er th a n Tec hni ca l S p ec i fica ti o n a ll owab l e l i mit s as i nd i ca t e d b)'. greater th an an al l owab l e lim it s pecified in Technical Specifications. A NY of th e fo ll o wi n g: D ose Eq ui va l e n t 1-1 3 1 g r ea t e r th a n I p C i/g m for g r ea t er th a n 48 h o ur s ose Eq u iva l e nt 1-1 3 1 grea t er t han T ec h n i cal S ecificat i o n 1 g1Jfe 3.4.1 6-1 l i m i t s R CS specific ac ti v i ty greater t h a n I 00/t: µCi/gm gross ra d ioactiv i ty Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: EA L T hre s hold (2)-R ev i s ed wording including table with co ndition s that meet the EAL thre s h o ld. Justification: E ditorial change to clearl y indicate Technical S pecification limits to plant per so nnel. Intent ofNEI 99-01Rev6 EAL T hr es hold (2) is s till met with thi s change. Difference: S ite s pecific information provided for EAL T hr es hold s (I) and (2). S ee VJ.3-\ 1 7 Rad Monitor C alculation (RE-48000) IS TS 3.4.1.6 R CS Act ivit y. 72 Commented [JRBSS]: V&V Refere n ce change due lo RA J 11 revision Commented [JRB56]: V&V Reference change due to RAJ 11 revision SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS SU4: IN I TIATING CONDITIONS N EI 99-01 Rev 6 V o g tle RCS leakage for 15 m inut es or l o n ger. RCS l eakage for 1 5 minut es o r longer. Differ e nce I De v iation I Justification o ne THRESHOLDS NE I 99-0 1 R ev 6 V o g t l e (I) RCS unidentified or pre s sure boundary l eakage greater t h a n (site-(I) RCS unidentified or pres s ure boundary leakage greater t han I 0 gp m specific value) fo r 1 5 min u tes or l onge r. for 1 5 minutes or l o n ger. (2) RCS identified leakage greater than (site-specific value) for 1 5 (2) RCS identified l eakage greater than 25 gpm for 15 minutes or m i nu tes or longer. l onger. (3) Leakage from the R CS to a locat i o n o u tsi d e co n tainment grea t er (3) Leakage from the RCS to a location outside containmen t greater than 25 gpm for 15 min u tes o r longer. than 25 gpm for 15 minutes or longer. Differ e n ce I Deviation I Justifiration Differen c e: S ite s p e cific va l ue i s not u se d for E A L T hre s ho l d s (I) and (2). 19 T S 3.4.13 R CS Op e r a tiona l Leak ag e. Ju s tification
- VEGP Tech Spe c leak rate i s le ss than identified thre s hold value s. Per Developer ole s the identified value s are u s ed. 73 C o mmente d [JR B57): V&V Refere n ce change due to RAJ 1 1 revision SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS SUS: I N I TIAT I NG CON DI TIONS NE I 99-01 Rev 6 Vog t l e Au t o matic o r manual (trip [PWR] I scram [BWR]) fa il s to shu td own the Automa ti c or manual trip fai l s to shutdown the reactor. reactor. D i ffere n ce I Deviation I Just i fication No ne THRESHOL D S NE I 99-01 Rev 6 Vog tl e (I) a. An automa ti c (trip (PWR] I sc r a m (BWR]) did n o t {I) a. An a utomat ic trip did not s hutd own the reactor. shutdown the r eactor. A D AN D b. A s ub seq u en t manual act i on t aken at the r eac t or co n trol b. A s ubsequen t manual action take n at the reactor control co n soles is s u ccessfu l in s hu tting down the reactor. con s oles i s successful in s huttin g down the reactor. (2) a. A manua l trip ((PWR] I scram [BWR]) did not shutdown (2) a. A manual tr ip did not s hutd own the reactor. the reactor. A D AND b. EITHE R of the following: b. E ITHER of t he following: . A subsequent manual actio n taken at the reactor control I. A s ub sequent manual ac ti o n taken at the reac t or con s o l es i s succe s sf ul in s huttin g down th e reactor. c o ntrol co n s ole s is successful in shutting down the . A subsequent automatic trip i s successfu l i n s huttin g reactor. down th e r eactor. OR 2. A sub s equent automat i c (tri p (PWR] I s cra m (BWR]) is successfu l in shutting down the reactor. Differe n ce I Deviation I Justification Difference:
E l 99-0 1Rev 6 EAL Thresho l d (2)h u s e s number s to identif y the two thre s hold co ndition s. Vog tle EAL Thre s hold (2)b u ses b ull ets. Justification: Editorial change for clarity. This change does not affect the EAL threshold. 7 4 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS SU6: I NITIATING CONDITIONS NE I 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle Loss of all onsite or offsi t e comm uni catio n s ca p abi litie s. Loss of all onsite or offsite communica ti ons capabilities. Difference I Deviation I Ju s t i fi r ati o n one T HR ESHOL D S EI 99-0 1 Rev 6 Vogtle (I) Loss of A LL of the following onsite comm un ication method s: (I) Loss of ALL of the following onsite comm un ication m ethods: (site-specific l ist of comm un ica ti o n s m et h o d s) I In plant telephone s I (2) Loss of ALL of the follow in g ORO co mmuni ca t io n s method s: I Public address sys tem I (site-specific list of comm uni catio n s meth ods) I Plant radio sys tem s I (3) Loss of ALL of th e follow i n g NRC communications m e thod s: (site-specific list of communications methods) (2) Loss of ALL of the following ORO co mmun icatio n s m et hod s: I ENN (Eme r g enc y Notification Network) I I Commercia l phone s I (3) Loss of ALL of the fo ll owing NRC co mmuni catio n s m ethods: I ENS on Federal Telecommunication s System (FTS) I I Comme r cia l phone s I Differe n ce I Deviation I Ju s tifi c a tio n No ne 75 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS SU7: INITIATING CONDITIONS E I 99-01 Rev 6 Vogt le Failure to i so lat e co ntainment o r l oss of con tainm e nt pre ss ure control. [PWR] Failure to i s olate containment or lo ss of containment pressure control. Diff e rence I D ev iation I Ju s tifi c ation one THRESHOLDS NE I 99-01 Rev 6 Vog lle (I) a. Failure of con tainment to iso l a te when required b y an (I) a. F a ilur e of co ntainment to i so l a te when required b y an ac tuation s ign a l. actuatio n s ign a l. AND AN D b. ALL required penetrations are not c lo sed wi thin 1 5 b. ALL required penetrations a r e not closed within 1 5 minute s of the actuation s ignal. minut es of th e ac tuation s ignal. (2) a. Contai nment pres s ure g r ea ter t h a n (s it e-specific pressure). (2) a. Co ntainm e n t pre ss ure g r ea ter than 5 ps i g. AND AN D b. Le ss than one full train of(s ite-s pecific sys tem or b. Le ss than 4 CTMT fa n coo l e r s and o n e f ull train ofCTM11 equip ment) i s operating per desi g n for 1 5 minutes o r spray is operatin g per design for 1 5 minutes or longer. lon ge r. Difference I De v iation I Ju s tificati o n Difference: NE I 99-0 1Re v6 re fer s to only one train ofa s ite s pecific sys tem. Vog tle EAL threshold includ es ad ditional components (fou r CTMT fan coo ler s) that s upp o rt CTMT s pra y to m eet thi s thre s hold entry co ndition. Ju s tification
- Plant de s i g n Difference:
S ite s pecific information provided. S e e Co ntainment i!FeSSllFe lnl'eFmlltien Spra) Initiation 76 ( Commented [JRB58]: RAJ 28 revision Commented [JRB59]: V&V Reference change due lo RAJ J J revision (C o;;;;;,ented [JRB60]: RAJ 28 r evis ion Southern Nuclear Operating Company Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2; Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2; Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 1 and 2; License Amendment Request for Changes to Emergency Action Level Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant Responses to Requests for Additional Information ENCLOSURE 2 EAL DEVIATIONS AND DIFFERENCES MATRIX CLEAN COPIES Southern Nuclear Operating Company License Amendment Request for Changes to Emergency Action Level Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant Responses to Requests for Additional Information JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT EAL DEVIATIONS AND DIFFERENCES MATRIX CLEAN COPIES NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Deviations and Differences Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant -Units 1 and 2 Table of Contents Generic Differences ...................................................................................... 1 HG7: Initiating Conditions ........................................................................ 41 RGI : Initiating Conditions ........................................................................... 2 HS 1: Initiating Conditions ......................................................................... 42 RG2: Initiating Conditions ........................................................................... 3 HS6: Initiating Conditions ......................................................................... 43 RS 1: Initiating Conditions ........................................................................... .4 HS7: Initiating Conditions ......................................................................... 44 RS2: Initiating Conditions ............................................................................ 5 HA 1: Initiating Conditions ........................................................................ 45 RAI: Initiating Conditions ........................................................................... 6 HA5: Initiating Conditions ........................................................................ 46 RA2: Initiating Conditions ........................................................................... 7 HA6: Initiating Conditions ........................................................................ 47 RA3: Initiating Conditions ........................................................................... 8 HA 7: Initiating Conditions ........................................................................ 48 RU!: Initiating Conditions ......................................................................... 10 HU 1: Initiating Conditions ........................................................................ 49 RU2: Initiating Conditions ......................................................................... 12 HU2: Initiating Conditions ........................................................................ 50 CG I : Initiating Conditions ......................................................................... 13 HU3: Initiating Conditions ........................................................................ 51 CS I: Initiating Conditions .......................................................................... 16 HU4: Initiating Conditions ........................................................................ 52 CA I: Initiating Conditions ......................................................................... 18 HU7: Initiating Conditions ........................................................................ 54 CA2: Initiating Conditions ......................................................................... 19 SG I: Initiating Conditions ......................................................................... 5 5 CA3: Initiating Conditions ......................................................................... 20 SGS: Initiating Conditions ......................................................................... 56 CA6: Initiating Conditions ......................................................................... 22 SS I: Initiating Conditions .......................................................................... 57 CUI: Initiating Conditions ......................................................................... 24 SS5: Initiating Conditions .......................................................................... 58 CU2: Initiating Conditions ......................................................................... 25 SSS: Initiating Conditions .......................................................................... 59 CU3: Initiating Conditions ......................................................................... 26 SA I: Initiating Conditions ......................................................................... 60 CU4: Initiating Conditions ......................................................................... 27 SA2: Initiating Conditions ......................................................................... 61 CU5: Initiating Conditions ......................................................................... 28 SA5: Initiating Conditions ......................................................................... 63 E-HUI: Initiating Conditions .................................................................... .29 SA9: Initiating Conditions ......................................................................... 64 PWR Fission Product Barriers Matrix -Initiating Conditions/Thresholds .. 3 I SUI: Initiating Conditions ......................................................................... 65 I. RCS or SG Tube Leakage ...................................................... 31 2. Inadequate Heat Removal ...................................................... 33 3. RCS Activity I Containment Radiation .................................. 35 4. Containment Integrity or Bypass ........................................... 36 5.. Other Indications ................................................................... 38 6. Emergency Director Judgment .............................................. 39 SU2: Initiating Conditions ......................................................................... 66 SU3: Initiating Conditions ......................................................................... 67 SU4: Initiating Conditions ......................................................................... 68 SU5: Initiating Conditions ......................................................................... 69 SU6: Initiating Conditions ......................................................................... 70 SU7: Initiating Conditions ......................................................................... 71 HG I: Initiating Conditions ........................................................................ .40 GENERIC DIFFERENCES NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley References B WRs Deleted BWR references as appropriate Uses A for the radiological effluent/radiation level !Cs Uses R for the radiological effluent/radiation level ICs Emergency Classification ICs are presented in ascending order (NOUE -GE) Emergency Classification ICs are presented in descending order (GE -NOUE) GENERAL NOTES Instrument setpoint readings used as threshold values to determine emergency classifications have been verified by Farley personnel as being within the range of the instrument and clearly and consistently read within the scale of the instrument. This verification is documented on SNC Form 312-F03, Initiation Condition/Emergency Action Level Validation and Verification Worksheet. Site specific information is highlighted in yellow. RPV used instead of common PWR terminology of RCS. ODCM is the controlling Radiation Effluent Document. WOG CSFSTs are used for EAL thresholds as allowed by NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Developer Notes. EPFAQ 2015-013 guidance was reviewed and considered for implementation. No revisions to HGl were made as a result of this review. EPFAQ 2015-015 guidance was reviewed and determined to be not applicable to FNP. Alternative power sources at FNP are not permanently installed and are only used to supply power to specific loads (i.e., DC Inverters) and are not capable of supplying the full load of the essential buses. Appendix A -Deleted BWR Acronyms and Abbreviations. Added additional acronyms as needed. Appendix B -Incorporated Site Specific definitions as appropriate. 1 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS RGl: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley Release of gaseous radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 1,000 Release of gaseous radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 1,000 mrem TEDE or 5,000 mrem thyroid CDE. mrem TEDE or 5,000 mrem thyroid CDE. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley (I) Reading on ANY of the following radiation monitors greater than (I) Reading on ANY of the following radiation monitors greater than the reading shown for 15 minutes or longer: the reading shown for 15 minutes or longer: (site-specific monitor list and threshold values) \ Steam Jet Air Eiector RE-15C 1 130 uCi/cc (130 R/hr) \ (2) Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses greater I Plant Vent Stack RE-29B (NG) I 0.8 µCi/cc I than 1,000 mrem TEDE or 5,000 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond (2) Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses greater (site-specific dose receptor point). than 1,000 mrem TEDE or 5,000 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond (3) Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond the site boundary. (site-specific dose receptor point): (3) Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond
- Closed window dose rates greater than 1,000 mR/hr expected to the site boundary:
continue for 60 minutes or longer.
- Closed window dose rates greater than 1,000 mR/hr expected to
- Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE greater continue for 60 minutes or longer . than 5,000 mrem for one hour of inhalation.
- Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE greater than 5,000 mrem for one hour of inhalation.
Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. See V2 Rad Monitor Calculation and V3 ODCM Site Boundary Drawing. 2 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS RG2: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley Spent fuel pool level cannot be restored to at least (site-specific Level 3 Spent fuel pool level cannot be restored to at least 131 feet for 60 minutes or description) for 60 minutes or longer. longer. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. See V4 SFP Level 3 and 2 Indication. THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley (I) Spent fuel pool level cannot be restored to at least (site-specific (I) Spent fuel pool level cannot be restored to at least 131 feet for 60 Level 3 value) for 60 minutes or longer. minutes or longer. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. See V4 SFP Level 3 and 2 Indication. Although this value is above the Level 3 indication of 130 feet 1 Yz inches identified in V4, it has been determined that this value can be used by the decision makers to accurately perform an assessment of the EAL threshold. 3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS RSl: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01Rev6 Farley Release of gaseous radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than I 00 Release of gaseous radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem thyroid CDE. mrem TEDE or 500 mrem thyroid CDE. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley (!) Reading on ANY of the following radiation monitors greater than (1) Reading on ANY of the following radiation monitors greater than the reading shown for 15 minutes or longer: the reading shown for 15 minutes or longer: (site-specific monitor list and threshold values) I Steam Jet Air Ejector RE-15C I 13 µCi/cc (13 R/hr) I (2) Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses greater I Plant Vent Stack RE-29B (NG) I 0.08 µCi/cc I than 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond (site-(2) Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses greater specific dose receptor point). than 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond the (3) Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond site boundary. (site-specific dose receptor point): (3) Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond
- Closed window dose rates greater than I 00 mR/hr expected to the site boundary:
continue for 60 minutes or longer.
- Closed window dose rates greater than 100 mR/hr expected to
- Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE greater continue for 60 minutes or longer. than 500 mrem for one hour of inhalation.
- Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE greater than 500 mrem for one hour of inhalation.
Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. See V2 Rad Monitor Calculation and V3 ODCM Site Boundary Drawing. 4 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS RS2: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley Spent fuel pool* level at (site-specific Level 3 description). Spent fuel pool level at 131 feet. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. See V4 SFP Level 3 and 2 Indication. THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley (1) Lowering of spent fuel pool level to (site-specific Level 3 value). (1) Lowering of spent fuel pool level to 131 feet. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. See V 4 SFP Level 3 and 2 Indication. Although this value is above the Level 3 indication of 130 feet 1 Y, inches identified in V 4, it has been determined that this value can be used by the decision makers to accurately perform an assessment of the EAL threshold. 5 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS RAl: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE. than I 0 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley (I) Reading on ANY of the following radiation monitors greater than (I) Reading on ANY of the following radiation monitors greater than the reading shown for 15 minutes or longer: the reading shown for 15 minutes or longer: (site-specific monitor list and threshold values) / Steam Jet Air Ejector RE-15C I 1.3 µCi/cc (1.3 R/hr) / (2) Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses greater / Plant Vent Stack RE-29B (NG) I 0.008 µCi/cc I than I 0 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond (site-(2) Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses greater specific dose receptor point). than I 0 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond the site (3) Analysis of a liquid effluent sample indicates a concentration or boundary. release rate that would result in doses greater than I 0 mrem TEDE (3) Analysis of a liquid effluent sample indicates a concentration or or 50 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond (site-specific dose receptor release rate that would result in doses greater than I 0 mrem TEDE point) for one hour of exposure. or 50 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond the site boundary for one (4) Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond hour of exposure. (site-specific dose receptor point): (4) Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond
- Closed window dose rates greater than I 0 mR/hr expected to the site boundary:
continue for 60 minutes or longer.
- Closed window dose rates greater than 10 mR/hr expected to
- Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE greater continue for 60 minutes or longer . than 50 mrem for one hour of inhalation.
- Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE greater than 50 mrem for one hour of inhalation.
Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. See V2 Rad Monitor Calculation and V3 ODCM Site Boundary Drawing. 6 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS RA2: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley Significant lowering of water level above, or damage to, irradiated fuel. Significant lowering of water level above, or damage to, irradiated fuel. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley (I) Un co very of irradiated fuel in the REFUELING PATHWAY. (I) Uncovery of irradiated fuel in the REFUELING PATHWAY. (2) Damage to irradiated fuel resulting in a release of radioactivity from (2) Damage to irradiated fuel resulting in a release of radioactivity from the fuel as indicated by ANY of the following radiation monitors: the fuel as indicated by alarms on ANY of the following radiation (site-specific listing ofradiation monitors, and the associated monitors: readings, setpoints and/or alarms) Spent Fuel Pool Ventilation Monitor RE-25A ORB (3) Lowering of spent fuel pool level to (site-specific Level 2 value). Spent Fuel Radiation Monitor RE-5 [See Developer Notes] Containment Purge Ventilation Monitor RE-24A ORB (3) Lowering of spent fuel pool level to 140 feet (Level 2). Difference I Deviation I .Justification Difference: Farley EAL Threshold (2) specifies that alarms on identified radiation monitors are required to satisfy the EAL threshold. See VS FNP-1(2)-ARP-l.6. Justification: Use of the alarm indiciations for the radiation monitors provides site personnel with a clear indication that fuel has been damaged and a release of radioactivity is occurring as a result. Difference: Site specific information provided for Farley EAL Threshold (3). See V4 SFP Level 3 and 2 Indication. 7 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS RA3: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley Radiation levels that impede access to equipment necessary for normal plant Radiation levels that impede access to equipment necessary for normal plant operations, cooldown or shutdown. operations, cooldown or shutdown. Difference I Deviation I Justification THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley {I) Dose rate greater than 15 mR/hr in ANY of the following areas: (1) Dose rate greater than I 5 mR/hr on RE-I A, Control Room Radiation
- Control Room Monitor
- Central Alarm Station (2) An UNPLANNED event results in radiation levels that prohibit or * (other site-specific areas/rooms) impede access to any Table HI plant rooms or areas: (2) An UNPLANNED event results in radiation levels that prohibit or impede access to any of the following plant rooms or areas: Table Hl (site-specific list of plant rooms or areas with entry-related mode Mode Room Name Room Number applicability identified)
Electrical Penetration 334,333,347/ Room 2334,2333,2347 Hallway Outside Filter 312,332/ 3 Room 2312,2332 1A.2A MCC areas Sample Room and 323, 324/ Primary CHM labs 2323,2324 Sample Room and 323, 324/ 4 Primary CHM labs 2323,2324 RHRHxRoom 128/ 2128 Difference I Deviation I Justification 8 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS Differences: Farley Threshold (1)-CAS is located in the CR envelope; no additional areas identified. See V6 Alarm Response -FNP-l-ARP-1.6 (Control Room Rad Monitor). Justification: No additional rooms applicable to this EAL threshold. CAS is included in the Control Room envelope. Difference: Farley Threshold (2) provides site specific information. 9 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS RUl: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity greater than 2 times the (site-Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity greatre than 2 times the ODCM specific effluent release controlling document) limits for 60 minutes or imits for 60 minutes or longer. longer. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley (!) Reading on ANY effluent radiation monitor greater than 2 times the (1) Reading on ANY effluent radiation monitors greater than 2 times the (site-specific effluent release controlling document) limits for 60 ODCM limits for 60 minutes or longer: minutes or longer: Liquid Effluents (site-specific monitor list and threshold values corresponding to 2 Steam Generator Blowdown Effluent Line RE-23B 2.80 x 10 3 cpm times the controlling document limits) Gaseous Effluents (2) Reading on ANY effluent radiation monitor greater than 2 times the Steam Jet Air Ejector RE-15 3.5 x 10 2 cpm alarm setpoint established by a current radioactivity discharge Plant Vent Gas permit for 60 minutes or longer. R-14 3.2 x 10 4 cpm (3) Sample analysis for a gaseous or liquid release indicates a RE-22 4.0 x 10 2 cpm concentration or release rate greater than 2 times the (site-specific RE-29B (NG) 8.90 x 10 4 µCi/cc effluent release controlling document) limits for 60 minutes or longer. (2) Reading on ANY effluent radiation monitor greater than 2 times the alarm septpoint established by the current radioactivity discharge permit for 60 minutes or longer. Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line RE-18 2x release permit setpoint (planned release) Plant Vent Gas R-14 2x release permit setpoint (planned release) (3) Sample analysis for a gaseous or liquid release indicates a concentration or release rate greater than 2 times the ODCM limits for 60 minmutes or longer. 10 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. See V2 Rad Monitor Calculation. 11 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS RU2: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley UNPLANNED loss of water level above irradiated fuel. UNPLANNED loss of water level above irradiated fuel. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley (1) a. UNPLANNED water level drop in the REFUELING (!) a. UNPLANNED water level drop in the REFUELING PATHWAY as indicated by ANY of the following: PATHWAY as indicated by ANY of the following: (site-specific level indications). AND Personnel report of low water level b. UNPLANNED rise in area radiation levels as indicated by Annunciator EH2 "SFP L VL HI/LO" ANY of the following radiation monitors. (site-specific list of area radiation monitors) AND b. UNPLANNED rise in area radiation levels as indicated by ANY of the following radiation monitors. RE-5 in the fuel building RE-2 in containment RE-27 A ORB in containment Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Farley Threshold (l)a -site specific information provided. See V7 Alarm Response -FNP-1(2)-ARP-1.5 (SFP Level). Difference: Farley Threshold (l)b -site specific information provided. See V8 Rad Monitor Information (FSAR). 12 COLD SHUTDOWN/REFUELING SYSTME MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS CGl: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley Loss of(reactor vessel/RCS [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) inventory affecting fuel Loss of RPV inventory affecting fuel clad integrity with containment clad integrity with containment challenged. challenged. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: NEI 99-01 Rev 6 refers to reactor vessel/RCS inventory for PWRs. Farley uses RPV inventory. Justification: Site use of terminology differs from NEI guidance. THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley 13 COLD SHUTDOWN/REFUELING SYSTME MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS (1) a. (Reactor vessel/RCS [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) level less than (1) a. RPV level less than ANY of the following for 30 minutes (site-specific level) for 30 minutes or longer. or longer. AND
- 0%RVLIS (Mode 5) b. ANY indication from the Containment Challenge Table
- 119' Temporary Level Indicator (Mode 6) (see below). AND (2) a. (Reactor vessel/RCS
[PWR] or RPV [BWR]) level cannot b. ANY indication from the Containment Challenge Table Cl. be monitored for 30 minutes or longer. AND (2) a. Reactor vessel level cannot be monitored for 30 minutes b. Core uncovery is indicated by ANY of the following: or longer. * (Site-specific radiation monitor) reading greater than AND (site-specific value) b. Core uncovery is indicated by ANY of the following:
- Erratic source range monitor indication
[PWR]
- Containment High Range Radiation Monitor RE27 A
- UNPLANNED increase in (site-specific sump and/or or 27B reading greater than or equal to I 00 R/Hr tank) levels of sufficient magnitude to indicate core
- Erratic source range monitor indication uncovery
- UNPLANNED increase in Containment Sump, or * (Other site-specific indications)
Reactor Coolant Drain Tank (RCDT), or Waste Holdup Tank (WHT) levels of sufficient magnitude to AND indicate core uncovery c. ANY indication from the Containment Challenge Table AND (see below). c. ANY indication from the Containment Challenge Table Cl. Containment Challenge Table
- CONTAINMENT CLOSURE not established*
Containment Challem!e Table Cl * (Explosive mixture) exists inside containment
- CONTAINMENT CLOSURE not established*
- UNPLANNED increase in containment pressure
- Greater than or equal to 6 % Hz exists inside containment
- Secondary containment radiation monitor reading above (site-* UNPLANNED increase in containment pressure specific value) [BWR]
- If CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is re-established prior to exceeding
- If CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is re-established prior to exceeding the 30-the 30-minute time limit, then declaration ofa General Emergency is minute time limit, then declaration of a General Emergency is not required.
not required. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided for EAL Threshold (l)a. See V9 RVLIS/RPV Level Information. 14 COLD SHUTDOWN/REFUELING SYSTME MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS Difference: NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Threshold {2)b, last bullet, refers to Other site-specific indications of core uncovery. No Other site-specific indications are used at Farley. Justification: Farley does not use any other site-specific indications of core uncovery than those already identified in FNP TIH"eshold (2)b. Difference: Table designator Cl assigned to Containment Challenge Table. Justification: Editorial change to clearly identify tables within the document. Difference: Site specific information provided. See V2 Rad Monitor Calculation, Vl 1 Cont Sump-RCDT-WHT FSAR Reference, and V12 H 2 Concentration. 15 COLD SHUTDOWN/REFUELING SYSTME MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS CSl: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley Loss of(reactor vessel/RCS [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) inventory affecting core Loss ofRPV inventory affecting core decay heat removal capability. decay heat removal capability. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: NEI 99-01 Rev 6 refers to reactor vessel/RCS inventory for PWRs. Farley uses RPV inventory. Justification: Site use of terminology differs from NEI guidance. THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley (!) a. CONTAINMENT CLOSURE not established. (!) a. CONTAINMENT CLOSURE not established. AND AND b. (Reactor vessel/RCS [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) level less than b. RVLIS (Mode5) level less than 121 '0" (6" below bottom (site-specific level). ID of RCS loop). (2) a. CONTAINMENT CLOSURE established. (2) a. CONTAINMENT CLOSURE established. AND AND b. (Reactor vessel/RCS [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) level less than b. RPV level less than ANY of the following: (site-specific level).
- 0% RVLIS (Mode 5) (3) a. (Reactor vessel/RCS
[PWR] or RPV [BWR]) level cannot
- 119' Temporary Level Indicator (Mode 6) be monitored for 30 minutes or longer. (3) a. RPV level cannot be monitored for 30 minutes or longer. AND AND b. Core uncovery is indicated by ANY of the following:
- b. Core uncovery is indicated by ANY of the following:
- (Site-specific radiation monitor) reading greater than
- Containment High Range Radiation Monitor RE27 A (site-specific value) or 27B reading greater than or equal to 100 R/Hr
- Erratic source range monitor indication
[PWR]
- Erratic source range monitor indication
- UNPLANNED increase in (site-specific sump and/or
- UNPLANNED increase Containment Sump, or tank) levels of sufficient magnitude to indicate core Reactor Coolant Drain Tank (RCDT), or Waste uncovery Holdup Tank (WHT) levels of sufficient magnitude to * (Other site-specific indications) indicate core uncovery 16 COLD SHUTDOWN/REFUELING SYSTME MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference:
NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Threshold (l)b refers to reactor vessel/RCS level for PWRs. Farley uses RVLIS (Mode 5) level. See V9 RVLIS/ RPV Level and VlO RPV Level Calculation. Justification: RVLIS (Mode 5) level is used since it can be monitored by control room personnel at Farley. Difference: Site specific information provided for Farley EAL Threshold 2(b). See V9 RVLIS/RPV Level. Difference: NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Threshold (3)b, last bullet, refers to Other site-specific indications of core uncovery. No Other site-specific indications are used at Farley. Justification: Farley does not use any other site-specific indications of core uncovery than those already identified in FNP Threshold (3)b. Difference: Site specific information provided for Farley EAL Threshold 2(b). See V2 Rad Monitor Calculation and V11 Cont WHT FSAR Reference. 17 COLD SHUTDOWN/REFUELING SYSTME MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS CAl: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley Loss of(reactorvessel/RCS [PWR] orRPV [BWR]) inventory. Loss ofRPV inventory. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: NEI 99-01 Rev 6 refers to reactor vessel/RCS inventory for PWRs. Farley uses RPV inventory. Justification: Site use of terminology differs from NE1 guidance. THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01Rev6 Farley (I) Loss of(reactor vessel/RCS [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) inventory as (1) Loss ofRPV inventory as indicated by level less 122'11". indicated by level less than (site-specific level). (2) a. RPV.level cannot be monitored for 15 minutes or longer (2) a. (Reactor vessel/RCS [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) level cannot AND be monitored for 15 minutes or longer b. UNPLANNED increase in Conainment Sump, Reactor AND Coolant Drain Tank (RCDT) or Waste Holdup Tank b. UNPLANNED increase in (site-specific sump and/or tank) (WHT) levels due to a loss ofRPV inventory. levels due to a loss of(reactor vessel/RCS [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) inventory. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: NEI 99-01 Rev 6 refers to reactor vessel/RCS inventory for PWRs. Farley uses RPV inventory. Justification: Site use of terminology (RPV vs RCS) differs from NEI guidance. Difference: Site specific information provided for Threshold (1). See V9 RVLIS/RPV Level. Justification: The 122'1 I" level specified in EAL threshold (I) is the minimum RCS level for RHR operation provided in procedure for mid loop operntions. Difference: Site specific information provided for Threshold (2)b. See Vll Cont Sump-RCDT-WHT FSAR Reference. 18 COLD SHUTDOWN/REFUELING SYSTME MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS CA2: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to emergency buses for 15 minutes Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to emergency buses for 15 or longer. minutes or longer. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley (1) Loss of ALL offsite and ALL onsite AC Power to (site-specific (1) Loss of ALL offsite and ALL onsite AC Power (Table S 1) to emergency buses) for 15 minutes or longer. BOTH 4160V ESP busses 1(2)F A@ 1(2)G for 15 minutes or longer. Table Sl Unit 1 Unit2 Start-up Aux XFMR I A Start-up Aux XFMR 2A Start-up Aux XFMR lB Start-up Aux XFMR 2B Diesel Generator l-2A Diesel Generator l-2A Diesel Generator I B Diesel Generator 2B Diesel Generator IC Diesel Generator IC Diesel Generator 2C Diesel Generator 2C Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. See Vl3 ESF Busses Drawing. 19 COLD SHUTDOWN/REFUELING SYSTME MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS CA3: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley Inability to maintain the plant in cold shutdown. Inability to maintain the plant in cold shutdown. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01Rev6 Farley (I) UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature to greater than (site-(I) UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature to greater than 200 °F specific Technical Specification cold shutdown temperature limit) for greater than the duration specified in Table C2. for greater than the duration specified in the following table. Table C2: RCS Heat-nu Duration Thresholds Table: RCS Heat-nu Duration Thresholds RCS Status Containment Closure Heat-up Containment Closure Heat-up Status Duration RCS Status Status Duration Not intact Not Established 0 minutes Intact (but not at reduced (or at reduced inventory) Established 20 minutes* inventory [PWRl) Not applicable 60 minutes* Intact Not applicable 60 minutes* Not intact (or at reduced Established 20 minutes* (but not at reduced inventory) inventory [PWR]) Not Established 0 minutes *!fan RCS heat removal system is in operation within this time frame and *!fan RCS heat removal system is in operation within this time frame and RCS temperature is being reduced, the EAL is not applicable. RCS temperature is being reduced, the EAL is not applicable. (2) UNPLANNED RCS pressure increase greater than 10 psig. (This (2) UNPLANNED RCS pressure increase greater than (site-specific EAL does not apply during water-solid plant conditions.) pressure reading). (This EAL does not apply during water-solid plant conditions. [PWR]) Difference I Deviation I .Justification Difference: Table designator C2 assigned to RCS Heat-up Duration Thresholds. Justification: Editorial change to clearly identify tables within the document. Difference: Information included in RCS Heat-up Duration Thresholds Table for Farley is inverted from the presentation in NEI 99-01 Rev 6. Information is the same. 20 COLD SHUTDOWN/REFUELING SYSTME MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS Justification: Editorial change for Human Factors consideration -worst case is presented first. Difference: Site specific information provided. See VI TS Table 1.1-1 Modes. 21 COLD SHUTDOWN/REFUELING SYSTME MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS CA6: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley Hazardous event affecting a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current Hazardous event affecting a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode. operating mode. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01Rev6 Farley (1) a. The occurrence of ANY of the following hazardous events: (1) a. The occurrence of ANY of the following hazardous events:
- Seismic event (earthquake)
- Seismic event (earthquake)
- Internal or external flooding event
- Internal or external flooding event
- High winds or tornado strike
- High winds or tornado strike
- FIRE
- FIRE
- EXPLOSION
- EXPLOSION
- (site-specific hazards)
- Other events with similar hazard characteristics as
- Other events with similar hazard characteristics as determined by the Shift Manager determined by the Shift Manager AND AND b. EITHER of the following:
- b. EITHER of the following:
- Event damage has caused indications of degraded I. Event damage has caused indications of degraded performance in at least one train of a SAFETY performance in at least one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode. SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode.
- The event has caused VISIBLE DAMAGE to a OR SAFETY SYSTEM component or structure needed for 2. The event has caused VISIBLE DAMAGE to a the current operating mode. SAFETY SYSTEM component or structure needed for the current operating mode. Difference I Deviation I Justification 22 COLD SHUTDOWN/REFUELING SYSTME MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS Difference:
NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Threshold (l)a, next to the last bullet, refers to site-specific hazards. No additional site specific hazards are identified for Farley. Justification: Farley has not identified any additional site-specific hazards applicable to this EAL threshold. 23 COLD SHUTDOWN/REFUELING SYSTME MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS CUl: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley UNPLANNED loss of(reactorvessel/RCS [PWR] orRPV [BWR]) inventory UNPLANNED loss ofRPV inventory for 15 minutes or longer. for 15 minutes or longer. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: NEI 99-01 Rev 6 refers to reactor vessel/RCS inventory for PWRs. Farley uses RPV inventory. Justification: Site use of terminology differs from NEI guidance. THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley (I) UNPLANNED loss ofreactor coolant results in (reactor vessel/RCS (I) UNPLANNED loss of reactor coolant results in RPV level less than [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) level less than a required lower limit for 15 a required lower limit for 15 minutes or longer. minutes or longer. (2) a. RPV level cannot be monitored. (2) a. (Reactor vessel/RCS [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) level cannot AND be monitored.
- b. UNPLANNED increase in Containment Sump, Reactor AND Coolant Drain Tank, or Waste Holdup Tank levels. b. UNPLANNED increase in (site-specific sump and/or tank) levels. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference:
NEI 99-01 Rev 6 refers to reactor vessel/RCS level for PWRs. Farley uses RPV level. Justification: Site use of terminology (RPV \'S RCS) differs from NEI guidance. Difference: Site specific information provided. See V11 Cont Sump-RCDT-WHT FSAR Reference. 24 COLD SHUTDOWN/REFUELING SYSTME MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS CU2: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley Loss of all but one AC power source to emergency buses for 15 minutes or Loss of all but one AC power source to emergency buses for 15 minutes or longer. longer. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01Rev6 Farley (I) a. AC power capability to (site-specific emergency buses) is (1) a. AC power capability to BOTH 4 l 60V ESF busses I (2)F reduced to a single power source for 15 minutes or longer. 1(2)G is reduced to a single power source (Table SI) AND for 15 minutes or longer. b. Any additional single power source failure will result in AND loss of all AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS. b. Any additional single power source failure will result in loss of all AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS. Table St Unit 1 Unit2 Start-up Aux XFMR IA Start-up Aux XFMR 2A Start-up Aux XFMR 1B Start-up Aux XFMR 2B Diesel Generator l-2A Diesel Generator l-2A Diesel Generator 1B Diesel Generator 2B Diesel Generator 1 C Diesel Generator 1 C Diesel Generator 2C Diesel Generator 2C Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. See V13 ESF Busses Drawing. 25 COLD SHUTDOWN/REFUELING SYSTME MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS CU3: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature. UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley (1) UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature to greater than (site-(1) UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature to greater than 200 °F. specific Technical Specification cold shutdown temperature limit). (2) Loss of ALL RCS temperature and RPV level indication for 15 (2) Loss of ALL RCS temperature and (reactor vessel/RCS [PWR] or minutes or longer. RPV [BWR]) level indication for 15 minutes or longer. Difference I Deviation I ,Justification Difference: NEI 99-01 Rev 6 EAL Threshold (2) refers to reactor vessel/RCS level for PWRs. Farley uses RPV level. Justification: Site use of terminology (RPV vs RCS) differs from NEI guidance. Difference: Site specific information provided. See Vl TS Table 1.1-1 Modes. 26 COLD SHUTDOWN/REFUELING SYSTME MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS CU4: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley Loss of Vital DC power for 15 minutes or longer. Loss of Vital DC power for 15 minutes or longer. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley (1) Indicated voltage is less than (site-specific bus voltage value) on (1) Indicated voltage is less than 105VDC on Technical Specification required Vital DC buses for I 5 minutes or longer. required I 25 VDC vital busses for I 5 minutes or longer. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. See V14 DC Voltage Reference. 27 COLD SHUTDOWN/REFUELING SYSTME MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS CUS: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley Loss of all onsite or offsite communications capabilities. Loss of all onsite or offsite communications capabilities. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01Rev6 Farley (1) Loss of ALL of the following onsite communication methods: (1) Loss of ALL of the following onsite communication methods: (site-specific list of communications methods) In plant telephones (2) Loss of ALL of the following ORO communications methods: Public address system (site-specific list of communications methods) Plant radio systems (3) Loss of ALL of the following NRC communications methods: (site-specific list of communications methods) (2) Loss of ALL of the following ORO communications methods: ENN (Emergency Notification Network) Commercial phones (3) Loss of ALL of the following NRC communications methods: ENS on Federal Telecommunications System (FTS) Commercial phones Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. 28 INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI) ICS/EALS *, E.;,HUl: INITIATING CONDI,TIONS ' .. .; ' NEI 99-01Rev6 ' Farley Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY . Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY. . Difference I Deviation I Justification '*µ'." None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01Rev6 Farl.ey (1) Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY as (1) Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY as indicated by an on-contact radiation reading greater than (2 times the indicated by. an on-contact radiation reading greater than A:r-JX_O:fiiie site-specific cask specific technical specification allowable radiation valueslisted:in Jabfe'El:. level) on the surface of the spent fuel cask. l)bleE'l of Dose *Rate Total DoseJfate _Galnma TRAC:J25 Mid* Height B60 T .. op 260 HI-STORM 100 --* Side'-' 340 *side 350 Side_::-60inclies. afoyt: mjd_*\lejght 170 oflid 50 Middel.bft9p_.liq
- 60. Top_(outiet)_
duc.t Mo Bottom (inlet) :ciuct 469 29 INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI) ICS/EALS Difference /'Deviation I Justification Difference: Added new Table El to Farley EAL Threshold (1). Site specific information provided. See VIS ISFSI TS/Dose Reading Calculation. Justification: Utilized table to display ISFSI technical specification radiation levels for the different ISFSI modules. Intent of NEI 99-0 I ReY 6 EAL threshold remains satisfied. 30 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EALS PWR FISSION PRODUCT BARRIERS MATRIX -INITIATING CONDITIONS/THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01Rev6 FAl -Any Loss or any Potential Loss of either FSl -Loss or Potential Loss of any two barriers. FG 1 -Loss of any two barriers and Loss or Potential Loss the Fuel Clad or RCS barrier. of the third barrier. Farley FG 1 -Loss of any two barriers and Loss or FSl -Loss or Potential Loss of any two barriers. FA 1 -Any Loss or any Potential Loss of either the Fuel Potential Loss of the third barrier. Clad or RCS barrier. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: I C's listed in descending order (GE -Alert) instead of ascending order used by NEI 99-01 Rev 6. Fuel Clad Barrier RCS Barrier Containment Barrier Loss Potential Loss Loss Potential Loss Loss Potential Loss NEI 99-01 Rev 6 1. RCS or SG Tube Leakage 1. RCS or SG Tube Leakage 1. RCS or SG Tube Leakage Not Applicable A. RCS/reactor A. An automatic or A. Operation of a standby A. A leaking or Not Applicable vessel level less manual ECCS (SI) charging (makeup) RUPTURED SG is than (site-specific actuation is required pump is required by FAULTED outside of level). by EITHER of the EITHER of the containment. following: following:
- UNISOLABLE I. UNISOLABLE RCS leakage RCS leakage OR OR
- SG tube 2. SG tube leakage. RUPTURE. OR B. RCS cooldown rate greater than (site-specific pressurized thermal shock 31 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EALS criteria/limits defined by site-specific indications).
Farley Not Applicable A. CORE COOLING A. An automatic or A. Operation of a standby A. A leaking or Not Applicable CSP-ORANGE manual ECCS charging pump is RUPTURED SG is entry conditions actuation is required required by EITHER FAUL TED outside of met by EITHER of the of the following: containment. following:
- UNISOLABLE
- UNI SO LAB LE RCS leakage RCS leakage
- SG tube leakage .
- SG tube OR RUPTURE. B. RCS INTEGRITY CSF -RED entry conditions met Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference:
RCS Barrier Loss EAL Threshold 1.A -NEI 99-01 Rev 6 includes (SI) as clarifier for ECCS. Farley threshold I.A does not include this clarifier. J ustifica ti on: Terminology difference Difference: RCS Barrier Potential Loss EAL Threshold I.A -NEI 99-01 Rev 6 clarifies a charging pump as a makeup pump. Farley threshold I.A does not include this clarifier. J ustifica ti on: Terminology difference -Farley does not refer to charging pumps as makeup pumps. Difference: Site Specific information provided. See Vl6 CSFST Information. 32 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EALS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 2. Inadequate Heat Removal 2. Inadequate Heat Removal 2. Inadequate Heat Removal A. Core exit A. Core exit Not Applicable A. Inadequate RCS heat Not Applicable A. 1. (Site-specific thermocouple thermocouple removal capability via criteria for entry readings greater readings greater steam generators as into core cooling than (site-specific than (site-specific indicated by (site-restoration temperature temperature specific indications). procedure) value). value). AND OR 2. Restoration B. Inadequate RCS heat removal procedure not capability via effective within steam generators 15 minutes. as indicated by (site-specific indications). Farley 33 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EALS A. CORE COOLING A. CORE COOLING Not Applicable A. HEAT SINK CSF -Not Applicable A. CORE COOLING CSF -RED entry CSF-ORANGE RED entry condition CSF -RED entry conditions met. entry conditions met. conditions met for met 15 minutes or longer. OR NOTE: Heat Sink CSF B. HEAT SINK CSF should not be -RED entry considered RED if total conditions met. AFW flow is less than 395 gpm due to NOTE: Heat Sink operator action. CSF should not be considered RED if total AFW flow is less than 395 gpm due to operator action. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. See VI6 CSFST Information. Added NOTE to Fuel Clad and RCS Potential Loss EAL Thresholds related to validity of HEAT SINK CSF indications. Justification: Site specific difference/consideration. FNP has determined that Heat Sink CSF Red is not applicable if AFW flow is less than 395 gpm due to operator action. NEI 99-01 Rev 6 34 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EALS 3. RCS Activity I Containment Radiation
- 3. RCS Activity I Containment Radiation
- 3. RCS Activity I Containment Radiation A. Containment Not Applicable A. Containment radiation Not Applicable Not Applicable A. Containment radiation monitor monitor reading radiation monitor reading greater greater than (site-reading greater than than (site-specific specific value). (site-specific value). value). OR B. (Site-specific indications that reactor coolant activity is greater than 300 µCi/gm dose equivalent I-131). Farley A. Containment Not Applicable A. Containment radiation Not Applicable Not Applicable A. Containment radiation monitor monitor RE-2 greater radiation monitor RE-27AorB than I R/hr OR RE-27 A or B greater greater than 600 Containment radiation than 8000 R/hr. R/hr. monitor RE-7 greater OR than 500 mR/hr. B. Indications that reactor coolant activity is greater than 300 µCi/gm dose equivalent I-I 3 I. Difference I Deviation I .Justification Difference:
Fuel Clad Barrier Loss EAL Threshold 3.B-NEI 99-01 Rev 6 directs use of site specific indiciations of dose equivalent 1-131. Farley threshold uses the term Indications. Justification: Various methods for determining when this EAL threshold is met. Difference: Site specific information provided. See V2 Rad Monitor Calculation. 35 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EALS NEI 99-01Rev6
- 4. Containment Integrity or Bypass 4. Containment Integrity or Bypass 4. Containment Integrity or Bypass Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable A. Containment isolation A. Containment pressure is required greater than (site-AND specific value) EITHER of the OR following:
B. Explosive mixture I. Containment exists inside integrity has been containment lost based on OR Emergency
- c. 1. Containment Director judgment.
pressure greater OR than (site-specific
- 2. UNI SO LAB LE pressure setpoint) pathway from the AND containment to the 2. Less than one environment exists. full train of (site-OR specific system B. Indications of RCS or equipment) is leakage outside of operating per containment.
design for I 5 minutes or longer. Farley 36 Not Applicable Not Applicable Difference I Deviation I Justification FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EALS Not Applicable Not Applicable A. Containment isolation is required AND EITHER of the following:
- Containment integrity has been lost based on Emergency Director judgment.
- UNISOLABLE pathway from the containment to the environment exists. OR B. Indications of RCS leakage outside of containment as indicated by alarms -on any of the following instruments:
- RE-10
- RE-14 * .RE-21
- RE-22 Note: Increases in sump levels, temperatures, pressures, flow rates and/or radiation level readings outside containment may indicate that the RCS mass is being lost outside of containment A. CONTAINMENT CSF -RED entry conditions met OR B. Containment Hydrogen concentration greater than 6% OR C. 1. Containment pressure greater than 27psig AND 2. Less than one CTMTfan coolers and one full train of CTMT spray is operating per design for 15 minutes or longer. Difference:
Loss EAL Threshold 4.B -NEI 99-01 Rev 6 refers to generic indications of RCS leakage outside containment. Farley threshold specifies specific indications using identified rad monitors. See Vl 7 Rad Monitor Reference (ARP). 37 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EALS Justification: Human factors consideration, use of specific measurable and recognizable indications facilitates the determination that EAL threshold has been met. Difference: Potential Loss EAL Threshold 4.B -NEI 99-01 Rev 6 refers to Explosive mixture exists inside containment. Farley threshold specifies the hydrogen concentration that is considered an explosive mixture in containment. See V12 H2 Concentration. Justification: Human factors consideration, use of a specific measurable and recognizable concentration facilitates the determination that EAL threshold has been met. Difference: Site specific information provided for Potential Loss EAL Threshold 4.C.l. See V21 Containment Spray Initiation Setpoint. Difference: Potential Loss EAL Threshold 4.C.2 -NEI 99-01 Rev 6 refers to only one train of a site specific system. Farley threshold includes additional components (one CTMT fan coolers) that support CTMT spray to meet this entry condition. Justification: Plant design difference. NEI 99-01 Rev 6 5. Other Indications
- 5. Other Indications
- 5. Other Indications A. (site-specific as A. (site-specific as A. (site-specific as A. (site-specific as A. (site-specific as A. (site-specific as applicable) applicable) applicable) applicable) applicable) applicable)
Farley Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: No additional EAL Thresholds identified for Farley. Justification: No additional EAL Thresholds identified. NEI 99-01 Rev 6 38 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EALS 6. Emergency Director Judgment 6. Emergency Director Judgment 6. Emergency Director Judgment A. ANY condition in A. ANY condition in A. ANY condition in the A. ANY condition in the A. ANY condition in the A. ANY condition in the the opinion of the the opinion of the opinion of the opinion of the opinion of the opinion of the Emergency Emergency Emergency Director Emergency Director Emergency Director Emergency Director Director that Director that that indicates Loss of that indicates Potential that indicates Loss of that indicates indicates Loss of indicates Potential the RCS Barrier. Loss of the RCS the Containment Potential Loss of the the Fuel Clad Loss of the Fuel Barrier. Barrier. Containment Barrier. Barrier. Clad Barrier. Farley A. ANY condition in A. ANY condition in A. ANY condition in the A. ANY condition in the A. ANY condition in the A. ANY condition in the the opinion of the the opinion of the opinion of the opinion of the opinion of the opinion of the emergency emergency emergency director emergency director that emergency director that emergency director director that director that that indicates loss of indicates potential loss indicates loss of the that indicates indicates loss of indicates potential the RCS Barrier. of the RCS Barrier. containment barrier. potential loss of the the fuel clad loss of the fuel containment barrier. barrier. clad barrier. Difference I Deviation I Justification None 39 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HGl: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley HOSTILE ACTION resulting in loss of physical control of the facility. HOSTILE ACTION resulting in loss of physical control of the facility. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley (I) a. A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within (1) a. A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the PROTECTED AREA as reported by the (site-specific the PROTECTED AREA as reported by the on shift security shift supervision). Security Captain or designee. AND AND b. EITHER of the following has occurred:
- b. EITHER of the following has occurred:
I. ANY of the following safety functions cannot be I. ANY of the following safety functions cannot be controlled or maintained. controlled or maintained.
- Reactivity control
- Reactivity control
- Core cooling [PWR] I RPV level [BWR]
- Core cooling
- RCS heat removal
- RCS heat removal OR OR 2. Damage to spent fuel has occurred or is 2. Damage to spent fuel has occurred or is IMMINENT.
IMMINENT. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. 40 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HG7: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director warrant declaration ofa General Emergency. Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the emergency director warrant declaration of a General Emergency. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley (I) Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency (I) Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the emergency Director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or IMMINENT substantial core degradation or involve actual or IMMINENT substantial core degradation or melting melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or HOSTILE with potential for loss of containment integrity or HOSTILE ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the facility. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA facility. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area. immediate site area. Difference I Deviation I Justification None 41 L_ HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HSl: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01Rev6 Farley HOSTILE ACTION within the PROTECTED AREA. HOSTILE ACTION within the PROTECTED AREA. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley (1) A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the (1) A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the PROTECTED AREA as reported by the (site-specific security shift PROTECTED AREA as reported by the on shift Security Captain or supervision). designee. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. 42 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HS6: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley Inability to control a key safety function from outside the Control Room. Inability to control a key safety function from outside the Control Room. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley (I) a. An event has resulted in plant control being transferred (I) a. An event has resulted in plant control being transferred from the Control Room to (site-specific remote shutdown from the control room to the remote shutdown panel. panels and local control stations). AND AND b. Control of ANY of the following key safety functions is not b. Control of ANY of the following key safety functions is not reestablished within 15 minutes reestablished within (site-specific number of minutes).
- Reactivity control
- Reactivity control
- Core cooling
- Core cooling [PWR] I RPV water level [BWR]
- RCS heat removal
- RCS heat removal Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided. 43 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HS7: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01Rev6 Farley Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the emergency director warrant declaration of a Site Area Emergency. warrant declaration of a Site Area Emergency. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley (1) Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency (1) Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the emergency Director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public or HOSTILE ACTION that results in protection of the public or HOSTILE ACTION that results in intentional damage or malicious acts, (1) toward site personnel or intentional damage or malicious acts, (1) toward site personnel or equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or, (2) that prevent equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or, (2) that prevent effective access to equipment needed for the protection of the public. effective access to equipment needed for the protection of the public. Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels which Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the site boundary. site boundary. Difference I Deviation I Justification None 44 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HAl: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley HOSTILE ACTION within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA or airborne HOSTILE ACTION within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA or airborne attack threat within 30 minutes. attack threat within 30 minutes. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley (1) A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the (1) A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA as reported by the (site-specific OWNER CONTROLLED AREA as reported by the on shift security shift supervision). Security Captain or designee. (2) A validated notification from NRC of an aircraft attack threat within (2) A validated notification from NRC of an aircraft attack threat within 30 minutes of the site. 30 minutes of the site. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. 45 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HAS: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley Gaseous release impeding access to equipment necessary for normal plant Gaseous release impeding access to equipment necessary for normal plant operations, cool down or shutdown. operations, cool down or shutdown. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley (1) a. Release of a toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gas (1) a. Release of a toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gas into any of the following plant rooms or areas: into any Table HI plant rooms or areas: (site-specific list of plant rooms or areas with entry-related Table Hl mode applicability identified) Mode Room Name Room Number AND Electrical Penetration Room 334,333,347/
- b. Entry into the room or area is prohibited or impeded. 2334,2333,2347 3 Hallway Outside Filter Room 312,332/ 1A.2A MCC areas 2312,2332 Sample Room and Primary CHM labs 323, 324/ 2323,2324 Sample Room and Primary CHM labs 323, 324/ 4 2323,2324 RHRHxRoom 128/ 2128 AND b. Entry into the room or area is prohibited or impeded. Difference I Deviation I .Justification Differences:
Site specific information provided. 46 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HA6: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley Control Room evacuation resulting in transfer of plant control to alternate Control Room evacuation resulting in transfer of plant control to alternate locations. locations. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01Rev6 Farley (I) An event has resulted in plant control being transferred from the (1) An event has resulted in plant control being transferred from the Control Room to (site-specific remote shutdown panels and local control room to the remote shutdown panel. control stations). Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. 47 L HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HA7: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01Rev6 Farley Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the emergency director warrant declaration of an Alert. warrant declaration of an Alert. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01Rev6 Farley (I) Other conditions exist which, in the judgment of the Emergency (1) Other conditions exist which, in the judgment of the emergency Director, indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which director, indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or a security event that involves probable life safety of the plant or a security event that involves probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of HOSTILE ACTION. Any releases are expected to be because of HOSTILE ACTION. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels. exposure levels. Difference I Deviation I Justification None 48 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HUl: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01Rev6 Farley Confirmed SECURITY CONDITION or threat. Confirmed SECURITY CONDITION or threat. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01Rev6 Farley (1) A SECURITY CONDITION that does not involve a HOSTILE (I) A SECURITY CONDITION that does not involve a HOSTILE ACTION as reported by the (site-specific security shift supervision). ACTION as reported by the on shift Security Captain or designee. (2) Notification of a credible security threat directed at the site. (2) Notification of a credible security threat directed at FNP. (3) A validated notification from the NRC providing information of an (3) A validated notification from the NRC providing information of an aircraft threat. aircraft threat. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: EAL Threshold (2); replaced 'the site' with FNP. Justification: Editorial change -clearly identifies that threat is directed against the Farley site. Difference: Site specific information provided. 49 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HU2: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley Seismic event greater than OBE levels. Seismic event greater than OBE levels. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley (1) Seismic event greater than Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) as (1) Seismic event greater than Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) as indicated by: indicated by seismic switch activation with the seismic system (site-specific indication that a seismic event met or exceeded OBE computer indicating EITHER of the following: limits)
- Cumulative Absolute Velocity (CAV) greater than 0.160 g-sec AND Spectral Accelaration greater than 0.200g
- Cumulative Absolute Velocity (CAV) greater than 0.160 g-sec AND Spectral Velocity greater than 15 .240 cm/sec Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided. See VIS Seismic ARP -FNP-1(2)-ARP-1.12. 50 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS!EALS HU3: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley Hazardous event. Hazardous event. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley (!) A tornado strike within the PROTECTED AREA. (1) A tornado strike within the PROTECTED AREA. (2) Internal room or area flooding of a magnitude sufficient to require (2) Internal room or area flooding of a magnitude sufficient to require manual or automatic electrical isolation of a SAFETY SYSTEM manual or automatic electrical isolation ofa SAFETY SYSTEM component needed for the current operating mode. component needed for the current operating mode. (3) Movement of personnel within the PROTECTED AREA is impeded (3) Movement of personnel within the PROTECTED AREA is impeded due to an offsite event involving hazardous materials (e.g., an offsite due to an offsite event involving hazardous materials (e.g., an offsite chemical spill or toxic gas release). chemical spill or toxic gas release). (4) A hazardous event that results in on-site conditions sufficient to (4) A hazardous event that results in on-site conditions sufficient to prohibit the plant staff from accessing the site via personal vehicles. prohibit the plant staff from accessing the site via personal vehicles. (5) (Site-specific list of natural or technological hazard events) (5) Sustained hurricane force winds greater than 74 mph forecast to be at the plant site in the next four hours. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided for EAL Threshold (5). 51 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HU4: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley FIRE potentially degrading the level of safety of the plant. FIRE potentially degrading the level of safety of the plant. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley (1) a. A FIRE is NOT extinguished within 15-minutes of ANY of (1) a. A FIRE is NOT extinguished within 15-minutes of ANY of the following FIRE detection indications: the following FIRE detection indications:
- Report from the field (i.e., visual observation)
- Report from the field (i.e., visual observation)
- Receipt of multiple (more than 1) fire alarms or
- Receipt of multiple (more than 1) fire alarms or indications indications
- Field verification of a single fire alarm
- Field verification of a single fire alarm AND AND b. The FIRE is located within ANY Table H2 rooms or areas. b. The FIRE is located within ANY of the following plant (2) a. Receipt of a single fire alarm (i.e., no other indications of a rooms or areas: FIRE). (site-specific list of plant rooms or areas) AND (2) a. Receipt of a single fire alarm (i.e., no other indications of a b. The FIRE is located within ANY of the Table H2 rooms or FIRE). areas. AND AND b. The FIRE is located within ANY of the following plant c. The existence of a FIRE is not verified within 30-minutes rooms or areas: of alarm receipt. (site-specific list of plant rooms or areas) (3) A FIRE within the plant PROTECTED AREA not extinguished AND within 60-minutes of the initial report, alarm or indication.
- c. The existence of a FIRE is not verified within 30-minutes (4) A FIRE within the plant PROTECTED AREA that requires of alarm receipt. firefighting support by an offsite fire response agency to extinguish.
(3) A FIRE within the plant or ISFSI [for plants with an ISFSI outside the plant Protected Area] PROTECTED AREA not extinguished within 60-minutes of the initial report, alarm or indication. I Table H2 I : Auxilia!)'. Building 52 I_ HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS (4) A FIRE within the plant or ISFSI [for plants with an ISFSI outside Diesel Generator Building the plant Protected Area] PROTECTED AREA that requires Service* Water Intake Structure (SWIS) firefighting support by an offsite fire response agency to extinguish. Containment RWST CST Difference I Deviation I Justification Differences: EAL Thresholds (l)b and (2)b -added reference to Table H2 instead of listing areas separately for each threshold. Justification: 1-1 uman factors consideration -applicable rooms are the same for each threshold. Placing these rooms into one table and referencing the table simplifies the process for identifying applicable rooms. Differences: EAL Thresholds (3) and (4)-added PROTECTED AREA after plant. Justification: Clarifies plant areas that are applicable to these EAL thresholds. Differences: Added Table H2 with applicable site specific room listing. 53 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HU7: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director warrant declaration of a (NO)UE. Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the emergency director warrant declaration of a NOUE. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01Rev6 Farley (1) Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency (1) Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the emergency Director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to facility protection has been initiated. No indicate a security threat to facility protection has been initiated. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs. occurs. Difference I Deviation I Justification None 54 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SG1: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley Prolonged loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to emergency buses. Prolonged loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to emergency buses. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley (1) a. Loss of ALL offsite and ALL onsite AC power to (site-(1) a. Loss of ALL offsite and ALL onsite AC power to BOTH specific emergency buses). 4160V ESF busses 1(2)F AND 1(2)G. AND AND b. EITHER of the following:
- b. EITHER of the following:
- Restoration of at least one AC emergency bus in less
- Restoration of at least one AC emergency bus in less than (site-specific hours) is not likely. than 4 hours is not likely. * (Site-specific indication of an inability to adequately
- CORE COOLING CSF -RED conditions met remove heat from the core) Difference I Deviation I .Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided. See Vl3 ESF Busses Drawing and Vl6 CSFST Information. 55 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SGS: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley Loss of all AC and Vital DC power sources for 15 minutes or longer. Loss of all AC and vital DC power sources for 15 minutes or longer. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01Rev6 Farley (1) a. Loss of ALL offsite and ALL onsite AC power to (site-(1) a. Loss of ALL offsite and ALL onsite AC power to BOTH specific emergency buses) for 15 minutes or longer. 4160V ESF busses 1(2)F AND 1(2)G for 15 minutes or AND longer. b. Indicated voltage is less than (site-specific bus voltage AND value) on ALL (site-specific Vital DC busses) for 15 b. Indicated voltage is less than 105 VDC on ALL 125 VDC minutes or longer. vital busses for 15 minutes or longer. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. See V13 ESF Russes Drawing and V14 DC Voltage Reference. 56 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SSl: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to emergency buses for 15 minutes Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to emergency buses for 15 or longer. minutes or longer. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley (1) Loss of ALL offsite and ALL onsite AC power to (site-specific (1) Loss of ALL offsite and ALL onsite AC power to BOTH 4160V emergency buses) for 15 minutes or longer. ESF busses 1(2)F A@ 1(2)G for 15 minutes or longer. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. See V13 ESF Busses Drawing. 57 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SSS: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley Inability to shut down the reactor causing a challenge to (core cooling [ P WR] Inability to shutdown the reactor causing a challenge to core cooling or RCS I RPV water level [BWR]) or RCS heat removal. heat removal. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01Rev6 Farley (1) a. An automatic or manual (trip [PWR] I scram [BWR]) did (1) a. An automatic or manual trip did not shutdown the reactor. not shutdown the reactor. AND AND b. All manual actions to shutdown the reactor have been b. All manual actions to shut down the reactor have unsuccessful. been unsuccessful. AND AND c. EITHER of the following conditions exist: c. EITHER of the following conditions exist: * (Site-specific indication of an inability to adequately
- Core Cooling CSF -RED conditions met remove heat from the core)
- Heat Sink CSP -RED conditions met * (Site-specific indication of an inability to adequately . remove heat from the RCS) Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided. See V16 CSFST Information. 58 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SSS: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley Loss of all Vital DC power for 15 minutes or longer. Loss of all vital DC power for 15 minutes or longer. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01Rev6 Farley (I) Indicated voltage is less than (site-specific bus voltage value) on (1) Indicated voltage is less than l05 VDC on ALL 125 VDC vital ALL (site-specific Vital DC busses) for 15 minutes or longer. busses for 15 minutes or longer. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. See V14 DC Voltage Reference. 59 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SAl: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley Loss of all but one AC power source to emergency buses for 15 minutes or Loss of all but one AC power source to emergency buses for 15 minutes or longer. longer. Difference I Deviation I Justification THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01Rev6 Farley (1) a. AC power capability to (site-specific emergency buses) is (1) a. AC power capability to BOTH 4160V ESF busses 1(2)F reduced to a single power source for 15 minutes or longer. AND 1(2)G is reduced to a single power source (Table Sl) AND for 15 minutes or longer. AND b. Any additional single power source failure will result in a loss of all AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS. b. Any additional single power source failure will result in a loss of all AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS. Table Sl Unit 1 Unit2 Start-up Aux XFMR IA Start-up Aux XFMR 2A Start-up Aux XFMR 1B Start-up AuxXFMR 2B Diesel Generator l -2A Diesel Generator l-2A Diesel Generator IB Diesel Generator 2B Diesel Generator lC Diesel Generator IC Diesel Generator 2C Diesel Generator 2C Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. See Vl3 ESF Busses Drawing. 60 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SA2: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley UNPLANNED loss of Control Room indications for 15 minutes or longer UNPLANNED loss of Control Room indications for 15 minutes or longer with a significant transient in progress. with a significant transient in progress. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01Rev6 Farley (1) a. An UNPLANNED event results in the inability to monitor (1) a. An UNPLANNED event results in the inability to monitor one or more of the following parameters from within the one or more of the following parameters from within the Control Room for 15 minutes or longer. Control Room for 15 minutes or longer. [BWRparameter list] [PWR parameter list] Reactor Power Reactor Power Reactor Power RCS Level RCS Pressure RPV Water Level RCS Level In-Core/Core Exit Temperature RPV Pressure RCS Pressure Wide Range Level in at least one steam generator Primary Containment In-Core/Core Exit Steam Generator Auxiliary Feed Water Flow Pressure Temperature Suppression Pool Level Levels in at least (site-AND specific number) steam generators
- b. ANY of the following transient events in progress.
Suppression Pool Steam Generator Auxiliary
- Automatic or manual runback greater than 25% Temperature or Emergency Feed Water thermal reactor power Flow
- Electrical load rejection greater than 25% full electrical load AND
- Reactor trip
- ECCS actuation
- b. ANY of the following transient events in progress.
61 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS
- Automatic or manual runback greater than 25% thermal reactor power
- Electrical load rejection greater than 25% full electrical load
- Reactor scram [BWR] I trip [PWR]
- ECCS (SI) actuation
- Thermal power oscillations greater than I 0% [BWR] Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference:
NEI 99-01Rev6 does not specify steam generator level transmitter (wide or narrow range). Farley specifies use of Wide Range Level indication. Justification: Site determination that Wide Range Level indication is applicable to this EAL threshold. Difference: NEI 99-01 Rev 6 includes (SI) after ECCS. Farley does not include (SI) after ECCS. Justification: Site preference, does not detract or affect EAL determination. 62 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SAS: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley Automatic or manual (trip [PWR] I scram [BWR]) fails to shut down the Automatic or manual trip fails to shutdown the reactor, and subsequent reactor, and subsequent manual actions taken at the reactor control consoles manual actions taken at the reactor control consoles are not successful in are not successful in shutting down the reactor. shutting down the reactor. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley (1) a. An automatic or manual (trip [PWR] I scram [BWR]) did (1) a. An automatic or manual trip did not shutdown the reactor. not shutdown the reactor. AND AND b. Manual actions taken at the reactor control consoles are not b. Manual actions taken at the reactor control consoles are not successful in shutting down the reactor. successful in shutting down the reactor. Difference I Deviation I Justification None 63 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SA9: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01Rev6 Farley Hazardous event affecting a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current Hazardous event affecting a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode. operating mode. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01Rev6 Farley (I) a. The occurrence of ANY of the following hazardous events: (1) a. The occurrence of ANY of the following hazardous events:
- Seismic event (earthquake)
- Seismic event (earthquake)
- Internal or external flooding event
- Internal or external flooding event
- High winds or tornado strike
- High winds or tornado strike
- FIRE
- FIRE
- EXPLOSION
- EXPLOSION
- (site-specific hazards)
- Other events with similar hazard characteristics as
- Other events with similar hazard characteristics as determined by the Shift Manager determined by the Shift Manager AND AND b. EITHER of the following:
- b. EITHER of the following:
- Event damage has caused indications of degraded 1. Event damage has caused indications of degraded performance in at least one train of a SAFETY performance in at least one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode. SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode.
- The event has caused VISIBLE DAMAGE to a OR SAFETY SYSTEM component or structure needed for 2. The event has caused VISIBLE DAMAGE to a the current operating mode. SAFETY SYSTEM component or structure needed for the current operating mode. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference:
No additional site specific hazards identified. Justification: Site. personnel have determined that no additional site specific hazards are applicable to this EAL threshold. 64 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SUl: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01Rev6 Farley Loss of all offsite AC power capability to emergency buses for 15 minutes or Loss of all offsite AC power capability to emergency buses for 15 minutes or longer. longer. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley (1) Loss of ALL offsite AC power capability to (site-specific (I) Loss of ALL offsite AC power capability (Table S2) to BOTH emergency buses) for 15 minutes or longer. 4160V ESF busses 1(2)F AND 1(2)G for 15 minutes or longer. TableS2 Unit 1 Unit2 Start-up Aux XFMR IA Start-up Aux XFMR 2A Start-up Aux XFMR lB Start-up Aux XFMR 2B Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. See Vl3 ESF Busses Drawing. 65 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SU2: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley UNPLANNED loss of Control Room indications for 15 minutes or longer. UNPLANNED loss of Control Room indications for 15 minutes or longer. Difference I Deviation I Justification THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 (I) a. An UNPLANNED event results in the inability to monitor one or more of the following parameters from within the Control Room for 15 minutes or longer. [BWR varameter listl Reactor Power RPV Water Level RPV Pressure Primary Containment Pressure Suppression Pool Level Suppression Pool Temperature [PWR varameter listl Reactor Power RCS Level RCS Pressure In-Core/Core Exit Temperature Levels in at least specific number) steam generators Steam Generator Auxiliary or Emergency Feed Water Flow Difference I Deviation I Justification Farley (I) a. An UNPLANNED event results in the inability to monitor one or more of the following parameters from within the Control Room for 15 minutes or longer. Reactor Power RCS Level RCS Pressure In-Core/Core Exit Temperature Wide Range Level in at least one steam generator Steam Generator Auxiliary Feed Water Flow Difference: NEI 99-01Rev6 does not specify steam generator level transmitter (wide or narrow range). Farley specifies use of Wide Range Level indication. Justification: Site determination that Wide Range Lc\'el indication is applicable to this EAL threshold. 66 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SU3: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley Reactor coolant activity greater than Technical Specification allowable limits. Reactor coolant activity greater than Technical Specification allowable limits. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley (I) (Site-specific radiation monitor) reading greater than (site-specific (1) RCS coolant sample activity value indicating fuel clad degradation value). greater than Technical Specification allowable limits as indicated by ANY of the following: (2) Sample analysis indicates that a reactor coolant activity value is greater than an allowable limit specified in Technical Specifications. Dose Equivalent I-131 greater than 0.5 µCi/gm for greater than 48 hours Dose Equivalent 1-131 greater than Technical Specification figure 3.4.16-1. IF less than 20% power, THEN use the Dose Equivalent I-131 20% power limit on Technical Specification figure 3.4.16-1 RCS gross specific activity greater than 100/E µCi/gm. Difference I Deviation I .Justification Difference: NEI 99-01 Rev 6 EAL Threshold (1) is not included in the Farley EAL scheme. Justification: Plant design difference. Farley does not have radiation monitors that survey reator coolant system. Difference: Renumbered NEI 99-01 Rev 6 EAL Threshold (2) to (1) for Farley and revised wording including table with conditions that meet the EAL threshold. See V19 RCS Activity Tech Spec. J ustifica ti on: Editorial change to clearly indicate Technical Specification limits to plant personnel. 67 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SU4: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley RCS leakage for 15 minutes or longer. RCS leakage for 15 minutes or longer. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley (!) RCS unidentified or pressure boundary leakage greater than (site-(1) RCS unidentified or pressure boundary leakage greater than 10 gpm specific value) for 15 minutes or longer. for 15 minutes or longer. (2) RCS identified leakage greater than (site-specific value) for 15 (2) RCS identified leakage greater than 25 gpm for 15 minutes or minutes or longer. longer. (3) Leakage from the RCS to a location outside containment greater (3) Leakage from the RCS to a location outside containment greater than 25 gpm for 15 minutes or longer. than 25 gpm for 15 minutes or longer. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific value is not used for EAL Threshlds (1) and (2). See V20 RCS Leakage Tech Spec. Justification: FNP Tech Spec leak rate is less than identified EAL threshold values. Per Developer Notes the identified values are used. 68 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SUS: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley Automatic or manual (trip [PWR] I scram [BWR]) fails to shutdown the Automatic or manual trip fails to shutdown the reactor. reactor. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley (1) a. An automatic (trip [PWR] I scram [BWR]) did not (I) a. An automatic trip did not shutdown the reactor. shutdown the reactor. AND AND b. A subsequent manual action taken at the reactor control b. A subsequent manual action taken at the reactor control consoles is successful in shutting down the reactor. consoles is successful in shutting down the reactor. (2) a. A manual trip did not shutdown the reactor. (2) a. A manual trip ([PWR] I scram [BWR]) did not shutdown AND the reactor. b. EITHER of the following: AND
- A subsequent manual action taken at the reactor control b. EITHER of the following:
consoles is successful in shutting down the reactor.
- A subsequent automatic trip is successful in shutting I. A subsequent manual action taken at the reactor control down the reactor. consoles is successful in shutting down the reactor. OR 2. A subsequent automatic (trip [PWR] I scram [BWR]) is successful in shutting down the reactor. Difference I Deviation I Justification None 69 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SU6: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley Loss of all onsite or offsite communications capabilities.
Loss of all onsite or offsite communications capabilities. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley (1) Loss of ALL of the following onsite communication methods: (1) Loss of ALL of the following onsite communication methods: (site-specific list of communications methods) In plant telephones (2) Loss of ALL of the following ORO communications methods: Public address system (site-specific list of communications methods) Plant radio systems (3) Loss of ALL of the following NRC communications methods: (site-specific list of communications methods) (2) Loss of ALL of the following ORO communications methods: ENN (Emergency Notification Network) Commercial phones (3) Loss of ALL of the following NRC communications methods: ENS on Federal Telecommunications System (FTS) Commercial phones Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. 70 SU7: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Farley Failure to isolate containment or loss of containment pressure control. [PWR] Failure to isolate containment or loss of containment pressure control. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-0 6 Farley (1) a. Failure of containment to isolate when required by an (1) a. Failure of containment to isolate when required by an actuation signal. actuation signal. AND AND b. ALL required penetrations are not closed within 15 b. ALL required penetrations are not closed within 15 minutes of the actuation signal. minutes of the actuation signal. (2) a. Containment pressure greater than (site-specific pressure). (2) a. Containment pressure greater than 27 psig. AND AND b. Less than one full train of (site-specific system or b. Less than one CTMT fan cooler and one full train of equipment) is operating per design for 15 minutes or CTMT spray is operating per design for 15 minutes or longer. longer. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided for EAL threshold (2)a. See V21 Containment Spray Initiation Setpoint. Difference: NEI 99-01 Rev 6 EAL threshold (2)b. refers to only one train of a site specific system. Farley EAL threshold includes additional components (one CTMT fan cooler) that support CTMT spray to meet this threshold entry condition. Justification: Plant design difference. 71 Southern Nuclear Operating Company License Amendment Request for Changes to Emergency Action Level Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 Responses to Requests for Additional Information EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT EAL DEVIATIONS AND DIFFERENCES MATRIX CLEAN COPIES NEI 99*01 Rev 6 Deviations and Differences Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant -Units 1 and 2 Table of Contents Generic Differences ..................................................................................... 1 HG7: Initiating Conditions ........................................................................ 39 RG 1: Initiating Conditions .......................................................................... 2 HS 1: Initiating Conditions ......................................................................... 40 RG2: Initiating Conditions .......................................................................... 3 HS6: Initiating Conditions ......................................................................... 41 RS 1: Initiating Conditions ........................................................................... 4 HS7: Initiating Conditions ......................................................................... 42 RS2: Initiating Conditions ........................................................................... S HA 1: Initiating Conditions ........................................................................ 43 RA 1 : Initiating Conditions .......................................................................... 6 HAS: Initiating Conditions ........................................................................ 44 RA2: Initiating Conditions .......................................................................... 8 HA6: Initiating Conditions ........................................................................ 4S RA3: Initiating Conditions ........................................................................ 10 HA 7: Initiating Conditions ........................................................................ 46 RUl: Initiating Conditions ........................................................................ 11 HU 1: Initiating Conditions ........................................................................ 4 7 RU2: Initiating Conditions ........................................................................ 12 HU2: Initiating Conditions ........................................................................ 48 CG 1 : Initiating Conditions ........................................................................ 13 HU3: Initiating Conditions ........................................................................ 49 CS 1: Initiating Conditions ......................................................................... 16 HU4: Initiating Conditions ........................................................................ SO CA I: Initiating Conditions ........................................................................ 19 HU7: Initiating Conditions ........................................................................ S2 CA2: Initiating Conditions ........................................................................ 20 SG 1: Initiating Conditions ......................................................................... S 3 CA3: Initiating Conditions ........................................................................ 21 SG8: Initiating Conditions ......................................................................... S4 CA6: Initiating Conditions ........................................................................ 23 SS 1: Initiating Conditions .......................................................................... SS CUI: Initiating Conditions ........................................................................ 2S SSS: Initiating Conditions .......................................................................... S6 CU2: Initiating Conditions ........................................................................ 26 SSS: Initiating Conditions .......................................................................... S7 CU3: Initiating Conditions ........................................................................ 27 SA 1: Initiating Conditions ......................................................................... S 8 CU4: Initiating Conditions ........................................................................ 28 SA2: Initiating Conditions ......................................................................... S9 CUS: Initiating Conditions ........................................................................ 29 SAS: Initiating Conditions ......................................................................... 61 E-HUl: Initiating Conditions .................................................................... 30 SA9: Initiating Conditions ......................................................................... 62 BWR Fission Product Barrier Matrix -Initiating Conditions/Thresholds .. 32 SUI: Initiating Conditions ......................................................................... 64 1. RCS Activity ......................................................................... 32 SU2: Initiating Conditions ......................................................................... 6S 2. RPV Water Level .................................................................. 33 SU3: Initiating Conditions ......................................................................... 66 3. Not Applicable ...................................................................... 34 SU4: Initiating Conditions ......................................................................... 67 4. Primary Containment Radiation ........................................... 36 SUS: Initiating Conditions ......................................................................... 68 S. Other Indications .................................................................. 36 SU6: Initiating Conditions ......................................................................... 69 6. Emergency Director Judgment ............................................. 37 HG 1: Initiating Conditions ........................................................................ 3 8 l_ GENERIC DIFFERENCES NEl99-01 Rev 6 Hatch References PWRs Deleted PWR references as appropriate Uses A for the radiological effluent/radiation level ICs Uses R for the radiological effluent/radiation level I Cs Emergency Classification ICs are presented in ascending order (NODE -GE) Emergency Classification ICs are presented in descending order (GE -NODE) BWROG EPG/SAG Revision 3 guidance not included Incorporated EP FAQ 2015-003 and 2015-004 guidance in EALs and Basis 'Direct' release to the environment is not defined in FPB Matrix Basis Incorporated EP FAQ 2015-006 guidance in FPB Matrix Basis GENERAL NOTES Instrument setpoint readings used as threshold values to determine emergency classifications have been verified by Hatch personnel as being within the range of the instrument and clearly and consistently read within the scale of the instrument. This verification is documented on SNC Form 312-F03, Initiation Condition/Emergency Action Level Validation and Verification Worksheet. Site specific information is highlighted in yellow. Grey text items to be provided once instrumentation installed. Site specific information will be added using 50.54(q) process. ODCM is the controlling Radiation Effluent Document. EPFAQ 2015-013 guidance was reviewed and considered for implementation. No revisions to HGl were made as a result of this review. EPFAQ 2015-015 guidance was reviewed and determined to be not applicable to HNP. Alternative power sources at HNP are not permanently installed and are only used to supply power to specific loads (i.e., DC Inverters) and are not capable of supplying the full load of the emergency buses. Appendix A -Deleted PWR Acronyms and Abbreviations. Added additional acronyms as needed. Appendix B -Incorporated Site Specific definitions as appropriate. 1 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS RGl: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch Release of gaseous radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 1,000 Release of gaseous radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 1,000 mrem TEDE or 5,000 mrem thyroid CDE. mrem TEDE or 5,000 mrem thyroid CDE. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01Rev6 Hatch (1) Reading on ANY of the following radiation monitors greater than (1) Reading on ANY of the following radiation monitors greater than the reading shown for 15 minutes or longer: the reading shown for 15 minutes or longer: (site-specific monitor list and threshold values) Reactor Building Vent Accident Range Monitor: (2) Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses greater lDl l-P601 (feeding lDl l-R631, Rx Bldg 2.6 µCi/cc than 1,000 mrem TEDE or 5,000 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond Vent Wide Range) (site-specific dose receptor point). 2D 1 l-P601 (feeding 2D 11-R63 l, Rx Bldg 2.6 µCi/cc (3) Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond Vent Wide Range) (site-specific dose receptor point): Main Stack Accident Range Monitor:
- Closed window dose rates greater than 1,000 mR/hr expected to lDl l-P007 (feeding 1Dll-R631, Main Stack 8.1 X 10 3 µCi/cc continue for 60 minutes or longer. Wide Range)
- Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE greater (2) Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses greater than 5,000 mrem for one hour of inhalation.
than 1,000 mrem TEDE or 5,000 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond the site boundary. (3) Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond the site boundary:
- Closed window dose rates greater than 1,000 mR/hr expected to continue for 60 minutes or longer.
- Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE greater than 5,000 mrem for one hour of inhalation.
Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. See V2 Rad Monitor Calculation and V3 ODCM Site Boundary Reference. 2 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS RG2: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch Spent fuel pool level cannot be restored to at least (site-specific Level 3 Spent f'uel pool level cannot be n:storecl to a! lc;1sl Lev\'! 3 for 60 minutes or description) for 60 minutes or longer. lunger. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) Spent fuel pool level cannot be restored to at least (site-specific (I) c;pent li1el pool lcH:I cannot be restored lo at lcasl Level J for()() Level 3 value) for 60 minutes or longer. minutes or longer. Difference I Deviation I Justification None 3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS RSl: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01Rev6 Hatch Release of gaseous radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than I 00 Release of gaseous radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than I 00 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem thyroid CDE. mrem TEDE or 500 mrem thyroid CDE. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (I) Reading on ANY of the following radiation monitors greater than (I) Reading on ANY of the following radiation monitors greater than the reading shown for 15 minutes or longer: the reading shown for 15 minutes or longer: (site-specific monitor list and threshold values) Reactor Building Vent Accident Range Monitor: (2) Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses greater 1Dll-P601 (feeding lDI 1-R63 I, Rx Bldg 2.6 x 10-1 µCi/cc than 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond (site-Vent Wide Range) specific dose receptor point). 2Dq-P601(feeding2Dll-R631, Rx Bldg 2.6x16-1 µCi/cc (3) Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond Vent Wide Range) (site-specific dose receptor point): Main Stack Accident Range Monitor:
- Closed window dose rates greater than I 00 mR/hr expected to lDI l-P007 (feeding lDl l-R63 I, Main Stack 8.1 X 10 2 µCi/cc continue for 60 minutes or longer. -Wide Range)
- Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE greater (2) Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses greater than 500 mrem for one hour of inhalation.
than 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond the site boundary. (3) Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond the site bounda_ry:
- Closed window dose rates greater than I 00 mR/hr expected to continue for 60 minutes or longer.
- Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE greater than 500 mrem for one hour of inhalation.
Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. See V2 Rad Monitor Calculation and V3 ODCM Site Boundary Reference. 4 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS RS2: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01Rev6 Hatch Spent fuel pool level at (site-specific Level 3 description). Spent Cuc! pool level at Level 3. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01Rev6 Hatch (1) Lowering of spent fuel pool level to (site-specific Level 3 value). ( l ) Lowering of spent li.1el pool level lo ') ,) ' Difference I Deviation I Justification None 5 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS RAl: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01Rev6 Hatch Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE. than 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) Reading on ANY of the following radiation monitors greater than (1) Reading on ANY of the following radiation monitors greater than the reading shown for 15 minutes or longer: the reading shown for 15 minutes or longer: (site-specific monitor list and threshold values) Reactor Building Vent Accident Range Monitor: (2) Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses greater 1Dll-P601(feeding1Dll-R631, Rx Bldg 2.6 x 10-2 µCi/cc than 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond (site-Vent Wide Range) specific dose receptor point). 2Dl l-P601 (feeding 2Dl l-R63 l, Rx Bldg 2.6 x 10-2 µCi/cc (3) Analysis of a liquid effluent sample indicates a concentration or Vent Wide Range) release rate that would result in doses greater than 10 mrem TEDE Main Stack Accident Range Monitor: or 50 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond (site-specific dose receptor IDI l-P007 (feeding IDl l-R63 l, Main 8.1X10 1 µCi/cc point) for one hour of exposure. Stack Wide Range) (4) Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond (2) Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses greater (site-specific dose receptor point): than 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond the site
- Closed window dose rates greater than 10 mR/hr expected to boundary . continue for 60 minutes or longer. (3) Analysis of a liquid effluent sample indicates a concentration or
- Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE greater release rate that would result in doses greater than 10 mrem TEDE than 50 mrem for one hour of inhalation.
or 50 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond the site boundary for one hour of exposure. (4) Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond the site boundary:
- Closed window dose rates greater than 10 mR/hr expected to continue for 60 minutes or longer.
- Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE greater than 50 mrem for one hour of inhalation.
6 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS Difference./ Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. See V2 Rad Monitor Calculation and V3 ODCM Site Boundary Reference. 7 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS RA2: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01Rev6 Hatch Significant lowering of water level above, or damage to, irradiated fuel. Significant lowering of water level above, or damage to, irradiated fuel. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (I) Uncovery of irradiated fuel in the REFUELING PATHWAY. (I) Uncovery of irradiated fuel in the REFUELING PATHWAY. (2) Damage to irradiated fuel resulting in a release of radioactivity from (2) Damage to irradiated fuel resulting in a release ofradioactivity from the fuel as indicated by ANY of the following radiation monitors: the fuel as indicated by alarms on ANY Table RI monitors: (site-specific listing of radiation monitors, and the associated Table R1 readings, setpoints and/or alarms) Refuel Floor Area Radiation Monitors (3) Lowering of spent fuel pool level to (site-specific Level 2 value). Unit 1 Unit2 1D21-K601 A-Rx Head Laydown Area 2D21-K601 A-Rx Head Laydown Area *1D21-K601 B-Refueling Floor Stairway 2D21-K601 M -Spent Fuel/Fuel Pool Areas 1D21-K601 D -Refuel Floor 2D21-K601 E -Dryer/Separator Pool 1D21-K601 E -Drywell Shield Plug 2D21-K611 K-RPV Refuel Floor 228' 1D21-K601 M -Spent Fuel Pool and New Fuel 2D21-K611 L -RPV Refuel Floor 228' Storage area Refuel Floor Ventilation Monitors Unit 1 Unit2 1D11-K609 A-D -Rx Bldg. Potential 2D11-K609 A-D -Rx Bldg. Potential Contaminated Area Vent Exhaust Rad Monitor Contaminated Area Vent Exhaust Rad Monitor 1D11-K611 A-D -Refuel Floor Vent Exhaust 2D11-K611 A-D -Refuel Floor Vent Exhaust 2D11-K634 A-D -Refuel Floor Rx Well Vent. Exhaust 2D11-K635 A-D -Refuel Floor OW/Sep. Vent Exhaust (3) Lowering of SJ)l:n1 fuel pool level lo Level 2. 8 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Hatch EAL Threshold (2) incorporates Table RI to identify applicable site specific monitors. Justification: Editorial change -Human Factors consideration. Difference: Site specific information provided. See V4 Alarm Response Procedure Reference. 9 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS RA3: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01Rev6 Hatch Radiation levels that impede access to equipment necessary for normal plant Radiation levels that impede access to equipment necessary for normal plant operations, cooldown or shutdown. operations, cooldown or shutdown. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (I) Dose rate greater than 15 mR/hr in ANY of the following areas: (I) Dose rate greater than 15 mR/hr in ANY of the following areas:
- Control Room I Control Room area radiation monitor ID21-K600 B or C I
- Central Alarm Station I Central Alarm Station (by survey) I * (other site-specific areas/rooms)
(2) An UNPLANNED event results in radiation levels that prohibit or (2) An UNPLANNED event results in radiation levels that prohibit or impede access to any of the following plant rooms or areas: impede access to any Table HI plant rooms or areas: TableHl (site-specific list of plant rooms or areas with entry-related mode Buildin2 Rooms Annlicable Modes applicability identified) Diesel generator building All All Unit 1/2 130' All Reactor building Unit 1/2 SE Diagonals (RHR) All Unit 1/2 NE Diagonals (RHR) All Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: NEI 99-01 Rev 6 EAL Threshold (1) includes applicable areas as bullets and identifies other site-specific areas/rooms. Hatch Threshold (1) includes applicable areas in table format. In addition, no additional site-specific areas/rooms, other than those identified in first two bullets ofNEI 99-01 Rev 6 EAL Threshold (1) are included. Site specific information provided. See VS Alarm Response Procedure Reference -Control Room Rad Monitor. .Justification: Editorial change -table format used instead of bullets. Hatch personnel have determined that no additional site-specific areas/rooms are applicable to EAL Threshold (1). Difference: Site specific information provided. Hatch EAL Threshold (2) incorporates Table Hl to identify applicable site specific rooms/areas. 10 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS RUl: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity greater than 2 times the (site-Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity greater than 2 times the ODCM specific effluent release controlling document) limits for 60 minutes or limits for 60 minutes or longer. longer. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01Rev6 Hatch (1) Reading on ANY effluent radiation monitor greater than 2 times the (1) Reading on ANY effluent radiation monitor greater than 2 times the (site-specific effluent release controlling document) limits for 60 ODCM limits for 60 minutes or longer: minutes or longer: Reactor Building Vent Normal Range Monitor: (site-specific monitor list and threshold values corresponding to 2 !DI l-K619 A(B) times the controlling document limits) 2Dl 1-K636 A(B) (2) Reading on ANY effluent radiation monitor greater than 2 times the Main Stack Normal Range Monitor: alarm setpoint established by a current radioactivity discharge 1Dl 1-K600 A(B) permit for 60 minutes or longer. Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line Monitor: (3) Sample analysis for a gaseous or liquid release indicates a 1Dl 1-K604 2Dl l-K604 concentration or release rate greater than 2 times the (site-specific Service Water System Effluent Line Monitor: effluent release controlling document) limits for 60 minutes or IDI l-K605 longer. 2Dl 1-K605 (2) Reading on ANY effluent radiation monitor greater than 2 times the alarm setpoint established by a current radioactivity discharge permit for 60 minutes or longer. (3) Sample analysis for a gaseous or liquid release indicates a concentration or release rate greater than 2 times ODCM limits for 60 minutes or longer. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. See V2 Rad Monitor Calculation. 11 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS RU2: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01Rev6 Hatch UNPLANNED loss of water level above irradiated fuel. UNPLANNED loss of water level above irradiated fuel. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 *Hatch (1) a. UNPLANNED water level drop in the REFUELING (1) a. UNPLANNED water level drop in the REFUELING PATHWAY as indicated by ANY ofthe following: PATHWAY as indicated by ANY of the following: (site-specific level indications). Personnel report oflow water level AND SFP low level alarm annunciator -Spent Fuel Storage Pool b. UNPLANNED rise in area radiation levels as indicated by Low 654-022-1/2 ANY of the following radiation monitors. AND (site-specific list of area radiation monitors)
- b. UNPLANNED rise in area radiation levels as indicated by ANY of the following radiation monitors.
ID21-K601 A-Rx Head Laydown Area ID21-K601 D -Refuel Floor 1D2 l-K601 E -Drywell Shield Plug 1D21-K60.1 M -Spent Fuel Pool and New Fuel Storage area 2D21-K601 A-Rx Head Laydown Area 2D21-K601 M -Spent Fuel/Fuel Pool Areas 2D21-K601 E -Dryer/Separator Pool 2D21-K6l1 K -RPV Refuel Floor 228' 2D21-K611 L -RPV Refuel Floor 228' Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. See V6 SFP Level Low Annunciator and V2 Rad Monitor Calculation. 12 COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS CGl: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01Rev6 Hatch Loss of(reactor vessel/RCS [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) inventory affecting fuel Loss ofRPV inventory affecting fuel clad integrity with containment clad integrity with containment challenged. challenged. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch 13 COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS (1) a. (Reactor vessel/RCS [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) level less than (1) a. RPV level less than -155" (TAF) for 30 minutes or longer. (site-specific level) for 30 minutes or longer. AND AND b. ANY indication from the Containment Challenge Table Cl. b. ANY indication from the Containment Challenge Table (2) a. RPV level cannot be monitored for 30 minutes or longer. (see below). AND (2) a. (Reactor vessel/RCS [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) level cannot b. Core uncovery is indicated by ANY of the following: be monitored for 30 minutes or longer.
- A reading greater than 9 .5 x 10 3 mR/hr on ANY of the AND following radiation monitors:
- b. Core uncovery is indicated by ANY of the following:
Unit 1 Unit2 * (Site-specific radiation monitor) reading greater than ID21-K601 A-Rx Head Laydown 2D2l-K601 A -Rx Head Laydown (site-specific value) Area Area
- Erratic source range monitor indication
[PWR] ID! l-K601 D-Refuel Floor 2D2l-K601 M -Spent Fuel/Fuel Pool
- UNPLANNED increase in (site-specific sump and/or Areas tank) levels of sufficient magnitude to indicate core ID21-K601 E-Drywell Shield Plug 2D21-K601 E-Dryer/Separator Pool ID2l"K601 M-Spent Fuel Pool and 2D21-K61 l K-RPV Refuel Floor 228' uncovery New Fuel Storage Area 2D21-K611 L-RPV Refuel Floor 228' * (Other site-specific indications)
AND
- UNPLANNED level increase in any of the following
- c. ANY indication from the Containment Challenge Table of sufficient magnitude to indicate core uncovery (see below). Drywell Floor Drain Sumps Reactor Building Floor Drain Sumps Containment Challenge Table Drvwell Equioment Drain Sumps Turbine Building Floor Drain Sumps
- CONTAINMENT CLOSURE not established*
Torus Rad Waste Tanks * (Explosive mixture) exists inside containment Torus Room Sumps
- UNPLANNED increase in containment pressure AND
- Secondary containment radiation monitor reading above (site-c. ANY indication from the Containment Challenge Table Cl. specific value) [BWR] *If CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is re-established prior to exceeding the 30-Containment Challem!e Table Cl minute time 1 imit, then declaration of a General Emergency is not required.
Containment fu greater than or equal to 6% AND 02 greater than or equal to 5% UNPLANNED increase in Primary Containment Pressure Secondarv CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY NOT established* Secondary Containment radiation monitors greater than Max Safe values (SC EOP -Table 6)
- If Secondary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is re-established prior to exceeding the 30-minute time limit, then declaration of a General Emergency is not required.
Difference I Deviation I Justification 14 Difference: .Justification: Difference: Justification: COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS Site specific information provided for EAL Threshold 2(b). See V2 Rad Monitor Calculations. Since the calculated value for these monitors is offscale high, a reading of 95°/., full range was selected .. NEI 99-01 Rev 6 EAL Threshold (2)b uses levels as a clarifier after the listed site specific components. Hatch EAL Threshold (2)b places level before increase and includes the applicable components in table format. Human factors consideration -an increase in any of the identified components continues to satisfy the EAL threshold. Listing the applicable components in table format facilitates identification (rather than being included in a list). Difference: NEI 99-01 Rev 6 EAL Threshold (2)b, last bullet refers to Other site-specific indications of core uncovery. No Other site-specific indications are used at Hatch . .Justification: Hatch does not use any other site-specific indications of core uncovery that those already identified in EAL Threshold (2)b. Difference: Table designator (Cl) assigned to Containment Challenge Table . .Justification: Editorial change to clearly identify tables within the document. Difference: NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Containment Challenge Table lists items in bullet format. Hatch Containment Challenge Table lists items in table format. Justilication: Editorial change -table format does not affect use of the Containment Challenge Table. Difference: NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Containment Challenge Table identifies CONTAINMENT CLOSURE not established as a containment challenge. Hatch identifies Secondary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY NOT established as a containment challenge. Justification: Hatch considers Secondary Containment Integrity not established to be equivalent to Containment Closure not established. Use of this terminology does not affect the EAL threshold where this condition would be used. Difference: Site specific information provided. See V7 RPV Level Indications/Display, V9 Component/System References, VlO Hz and 02 Concentration, and V12 Secondary Containment Rad Monitors. 15 COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS CSl: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch Loss of (reactor vessel/RCS [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) inventory affecting core Loss ofRPV inventory affecting core decay heat removal capability. decay heat removal capability. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch 16 COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS (1) a. CONTAINMENT CLOSURE not established. (1) a. Secondary CONT A!NMENT. INTEGRITY not established. AND AND b. (Reactor vessel/RCS [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) level less than b. RPV level less than -41" (6"'below the. Level 2 actuation (site-specific level). setpoint). (2) a. CONTAINMENT CLOSURE established. (2) a. Secondary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY established. AND AND b. (Reactor vessel/RCS [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) level less than b. RPV level less than -155" (TAF). (site-specific level). (3) a. RPV level cannot be monitored for 30 minutes or longer. (3) a. (Reactor vessel/RCS [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) level cannot AND be monitored for 30 minutes or longer. b. Core uncovery is indicated by ANY of the following: AND
- A reading greater than 9.5 x f0 3 mR/hr on ANY of the b. Core uncovery is indicated by ANY of the following:
following radiation monitors:
- (Site-specific radiation monitor) reading greater than Unit 1 Unit2 (site-specific value) lD21-K601 A -Rx Head Laydown 2D21-K601 A -Rx Head Laydown'
- Erratic source range monitor indication
[PWR] Area Area
- UNPLANNED increase in (site-specific sump and/or 1Dll-K601 D-Refuel Floor 2D21-K601 M-Spent Fuel/Fuel Pool tank) levels of sufficient magnitude to indicate core Areas 1D21-K601 E-Drywell Shield Plug 2D21-K601 E-Dryer/Separator Pool uncovery 1D21-K601 M -Spent Fuel.Pool and 2D2 l-K6 l l K -RPV Refuel Floor 228' * (Other site-specific indications)
New Fuel Storage Area 2D21-K61 l L-RPV Refuel Floor 228'
- UNPLANNED level increase in any of the foll()wing of sufficient magnitude to indicate core uncovery:
Drywell Floor Drain Sumps Reactor Building Floor Drain Sumps Drvwell Equipment Drain Sumos Turbirie Building Floor Drain Sumps Torus Rad Waste Tanks Torus Room Sumps Difference I Deviation I Justification 17 COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS Difference: NEI 99-01Rev6 EAL Thresholds (l)a and (2)a use the term CONTAINMENT CLOSURE. Hatch EAL Thresholds (l)a and (2)a use the term Secondary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY. Justification: Hatch considers Secondary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY to be equivalent to CONTAINMENT CLOSURE. Use of this terminology does not affect the threshold for these EA Ls. Difference: NEI 99-01 Rev 6 EAL Threshold (3)b uses levels as a clarifier after the listed site specific components. Hatch EAL Threhsold (3)b places level before increase and includes the applicable components in table format. Justification: 1-luman factors consideration -a level increase in any of the identified components continues to satisfy the EAL threshold. Listing the applicable components in table format facilitates identification (rather than being included in a list). Difference: Site specific information provided for EAL Threshold (3)b. See V2 Rad Monitor Calculations. Justification: Since the calculated value for these monitors is offscale high, a reading of95% full range was selected. Difference: NEI 99-01 Rev 6 EAL Threshold (3)b, last bullet refers to Other site-specific indications of core uncovery. No Other site-specific indications are used at Hatch. Justification: Hatch does not use any other site-specific indications of core uncovery that those already identified in EAL Threshold (3)b. Difference: Site specific information provided. See VS Level 2 Actuation Setpoint Information, V7 RPV Level Indications/Display, and V9 Component/System Reference. 18 COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS CAl: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01Rev6 Hatch Loss of (reactor vessel/RCS [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) inventory. Loss ofRPV inventory. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01Rev6 Hatch (1) Loss of(reactor vessel/RCS [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) inventory as (1) Loss ofRPV inventory as indicated by level less than -35" (Level 2 indicated by level less than (site-specific level). actuation setpoint). (2) a. (Reactor vessel/RCS [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) level cannot (2) a. RPV level cannot be monitored for 15 minutes or longer be monitored for 15 minutes or longer AND AND b. UNPLANNED level increase in any of the following due to b. UNPLANNED increase in (site-specific sump and/or tank) a loss of RPV inventory: levels due to a loss of (reactor vessel/RCS [ P WR] or RPV Drywell Floor Drain Sumps Reactor Building Floor Drain Sumps [BWR]) inventory. Drvwell Equipment Drain Sumps Turbine Building Floor Drain Sumps Torus Rad Waste Tanks Torus Room Sumps Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: NEI 99-01 Rev 6 EAL Threshold (2)b uses levels as a clarifier after the listed site specific components. Hatch EAL Threshold (2)b places level before increase and includes the applicable components in table format. Justification: Human factors consideration -a level increase in any of the identified components continues to satisfy the EAL threshold. Listing the applicable components in table format facilitates identification (rather than being included in a list). Difference: Site specific information provided. See VS Level 2 Actuation Setpoint Information and V9 Component/System Reference. 19 COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS CA2: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to emergency buses for 15 minutes Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to emergency buses for 15 or longer. minutes or longer. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (!) Loss of ALL offsite and ALL onsite AC Power to (site-specific (1) Loss of ALL offsite and ALL onsite AC Power (Table SI) to 4160 emergency buses) for 15 minutes or longer. VAC Emergency Buses I/2E, 1/2F, and l/2G for 15 minutes or longer. Table Sl Unit 1 Unit2 Start-up Aux XFMR 1 C Start-up Aux XFMR 2C Start-up Aux XFMR lD Start-up Aux XFMR 2D Diesel Generator 1 A Diesel Generator 2A Diesel Generator lB Diesel Generator lB Diesel Generator 1 C Diesel Generator 2C Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. See V13 4160 VAC Emergency Buses Information. 20 COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS CA3: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch Inability to maintain the plant in cold shutdown. Inability to maintain the plant in cold shutdown. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature to greater than (site-(1) UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature to greater than 212 °F specific Technical Specification cold shutdown temperature limit) for greater than the duration specified in Table C2. for greater than the duration specified in the following table. Table C2: RCS Heat-up Duration Thresholds Table: RCS Heat-up Duration Thresholds Secondary Heat-up Containment Closure Heat-up RCS Status CONTAINMENT RCS Status Duration Status Duration INTEGRITY Status Intact (but not at reduced Not intact Not Established 0 minutes* inventorv rPWRl) Not applicable 60 minutes* Established 20 minutes Not intact (or at reduced Established 20 minutes* Intact Not applicable 60 minutes* inventory [PWR]) Not Established 0 minutes
- lfRHR is in operation within this time frame and RCS temperature is
- If an RCS heat removal system is in operation within this time frame and being reduced, the EAL is not applicable.
RCS temperature is being reduced, the EAL is not applicable. (2) UNPLANNED RCS pressure increase greater than I 0 psig. (2) UNPLANNED RCS pressure increase greater than (site-specific pressure reading). {This EAL does not apply during water-solid plant conditions. [PWR]) Difference I Deviation I Justification 21 COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS Difference: Table designator C2 assigned to RCS Heat-up Duration Thresholds Table. Justification: Editorial change to clearly identify tables within the document. Difference: Information included in RCS Heat-up Duration Thresholds Table for Hatch is inverted from the presentation in NEI 99-01 Rev 6. Information is the same. Justification: Editorial change for Human Factors considerations -worst case is presented first. Difference: NEI 99-01 Rev 6 RCS Heat-up Duration Threaholds Table refers to RCS heat removal system. Hatch table uses RHR. Justification: Site t.ermoniology difference from NEI 99-01 Rev 6; RHR is equivalent to RCS heat removal system. Difference: Site specific information provided. See Attachment Vl TS Table 1.1-1 Modes and V14 RCS Pressure Indications. 22 COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS CA6: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01Rev6 Hatch Hazardous event affecting a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current Hazardous event affecting a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode. operating mode. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) a. The occurrence of ANY of the following hazardous events: (1) a. The occurrence of ANY of the following hazardous events:
- Seismic event (earthquake)
- Seismic event (earthquake)
- Internal or external flooding event
- Internal or external flooding event
- High winds or tornado strike
- High winds(> 35 mph sustained) or tornado strike
- FIRE
- FIRE
- EXPLOSION
- EXPLOSION
- (site-specific hazards)
- Other events with similar hazard characteristics as
- Other events with similar hazard characteristics as determined by the Shift Manager determined by the Shift Manager AND AND b. EITHER of the following:
- b. !EITHER of the following:
- 1. Event damage has caused indications of degraded
- Event damage has caused indications of degraded performance in at least one train of a SAFETY performance in at least one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode. SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode. OR
- The event has caused VISIBLE DAMAGE to a 2. The event has caused VISIBLE DAMAGE to a SAFETY SYSTEM component or structure needed for SAFETY SYSTEM component or structure the current operating mode. needed for the current operating mode. Difference I Deviation I Justification 23 COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS Difference:
NEI 99-01 Rev 6 EAL Threshold (1 )a, next to the last bullet, refers to site-specific hazards. No additional site specific hazards are identified for Hatch. Justification: Hatch has not identified any additional site-specific hazards applicable to this EAL. Difference: NEI 99-01Rev6 EAL Threshold (l)b uses numbers and a conditional OR. Hatch uses bullets to separate the two conditions. Justification: Editorial change -doesnot impact the ability to classify the event. 24
COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS CUl: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch UNPLANNED Joss of(reactor vessel/RCS [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) inventory UNPLANNED Joss ofRPV inventory for 15 minutes or longer. for 15 minutes or longer. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01Rev6 Hatch (1) UNPLANNED Joss ofreactor coolant results in (reactor vessel/RCS (1) UNPLANNED Joss of reactor coolant results in RPV level Jess than [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) level less than a required lower limit for 15 the lower limit of the controlling level band for 15 minutes or minutes or longer. longer. (2) a. (Reactor vessel/RCS [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) level cannot (2) a. RPV level cannot be monitored. be monitored. AND AND b. UNPLANNED level increase in any of the fo.Jlowing:
- b. UNPLANNED increase in (site-specific sump and/or tank) Dryweel Floor Drain Sumps Reactor Building Floor Drain Sumps levels. Drywell Equipment Drain Sumps Turbine Building Floor Drain Sumps Torus Rad Waste Tanks Torus Room Sumps Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided for EAL Threshold (1). Difference: NEI 99-01 Rev 6 EAL Threshold (2)b uses levels as a clarifier after the listed site specific components. Hatch EAL Threshold (2)b places level before increase and includes the applicable components in table format. See V9 Component System Reference. Justification: l-luman factors consideration -a level increase in any of the identified components continues to satisfy the EAL threshold. Listing the applicable components in table format facilitates identification (rather than being included in a list). 25 COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS CU2: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01Rev6 Hatch Loss of all but one AC power source to emergency buses for I5 minutes or Loss of all but one AC power source to emergency buses for I5 minutes or longer. longer. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (I) a. AC power capability to (site-specific emergency buses) is (1) a. AC power capability to 4 I 60 V AC Emergency Buses 1/2E, reduced to a single power source for I 5 minutes or longer. I/2F, and 1/2G is reduced to a single power source (Table AND SI) for I 5 minutes or longer. b. Any additional single power source failure will result in AND loss of all AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS. b. Any additional single power source failure will result in loss of all AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS. Table Sl Unit 1 Unit2 Start-up Aux XFMR IC Start-up Aux XFMR 2C Start-up Aux XFMR ID Start-up Aux XFMR 2D Diesel Generator IA Diesel Generator 2A Diesel Generator 1B Diesel Generator 1B Diesel Generator IC Diesel Generator 2C Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. See Attachment V13 4160 V AC Emergency Buses Information. 26 COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS CU3: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01Rev6 Hatch UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature. UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01Rev6 Hatch (1) UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature to greater than (site-(1) UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature to greater than 212 °F. specific Technical Specification cold shutdown temperature limit). (2) Loss of ALL RCS temperature and (reactor vessel/RCS [PWR] or (2) Loss of ALL RCS temperature and RPV level indication for 15 RPV [BWR]) level indication for 15 minutes or longer. minutes or longer. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. See Attachment Vl TS Table 1.1-1 Modes. 27 COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS CU4: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01Rev6 Hatch Loss of Vital DC power for 15 minutes or longer. Loss of Vital DC power for 15 minutes or longer. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01Rev6 Hatch (1) Indicated voltage is less than (site-specific bus voltage value) on (1) Indicated voltage is less than 105/210VDC on Technical required Vital DC buses for 15 minutes or longer. Specificat"ion required 125/250VDC buses l/2R22-S016_ OR l/2R22-SO 17 for 15 minutes or longer. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: NEI 99-01 Rev 6 EAL Threshold (1) refers to Vital DC buses. Hatch EAL Threshold (1) identifies the specific DC buses applicable to this EAL. J ustific11tion: Editorial change -Human Factors considemtion that does not affect EAL. Difference: Site specific information provided. See Attachment VlS DC System Information. 28 COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS CUS: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch Loss of all onsite or offsite communications capabilities. Loss of all onsite or offsite communications capabilities. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) Loss of ALL of the following onsite communication methods: (1) Loss of ALL of the following onsite communication methods: (site-specific list of communications methods) (2) Loss of ALL of the following ORO communications methods: Plant telephones (Includes hardwired and wireless) (site-specific list of communications methods) Plant page (3) Loss of ALL of the following NRC communications methods: Plant radio systems (site-specific list of communications methods) (2) Loss of ALL of the following ORO communications methods: ENN (Emergency Notification Network) I Commercial phones I (3) Loss of ALL of the following NRC communications methods: ENS on Federal Telecommunications System (FTS) I Commercial phones I Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. 29 INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE FACILITY (ISFSI) ICS/EALS E-HUl: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY. Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY as (1) Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY as indicated by an on-contact radiation reading greater than (2 times the indicated by an on-contact radiation reading greater than ANY value site-specific cask specific technical specification allowable radiation listed in Table El. level) on the surface of the spent fuel cask. Table El Location of Dose Rate Total Dose Rate (Neutron + Gamma mR/hr) HI-TRAC 125 Side-Mid-height 450 Top I IO HI-STAR 100 or HI-STORM 100 Side::-60 inches below mid-height 80 Side -Mid-height 80 Side -60 inches above mid-height 30 Center ofl id IO Middle of top lid 20 Top (outlet) duct 40 Bottom (inlet) duct 140 Difference I Deviation I Justification 30 INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE FACILITY (ISFSI) ICS/EALS Difference: Added new Table E2 to Hatch EAL Threshold (1). Site specific information provided. See Attachment V16 ISFSI TS/Dose Reading Calculation. Justification: Utilized table to display ISFSI technical specification radiation levels for the different ISFSI modules. Intent of NEI 99-01 Rev 6 EAL threshold remains satisfied. 31 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EALS BWR FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX -INITIATING CONDITIONS/THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 F Al -Any loss or any Potential Loss of either the Fuel FSl -Loss or Potential Loss of any two barriers. FG 1 -Loss of any two barriers and Loss or Potential Clad or RCS barrier. Loss of the third barrier. Hatch : ' FG 1 -Loss of any two barriers and Loss or Potential FSl -Loss or Potential Loss of any two barriers. F Al -Any loss or any Potential Loss of either the Fuel Loss of the third barrier. Clad or RCS barrier. Difference I Deviation I Justification None Fuel Clad Barrier RCS Barrier Containment Barrier Loss Potential Loss Loss Potential Loss Loss Potential Loss NEI 99-01 Rev 6 1. RCS Activity 1. Primary Containment Pressure 1. Primary Containment Conditions A. (Site-specific Not Applicable A. Primary containment Not Applicable A. UNPLANNED rapid A. Primary indications that pressure greater than drop in primary containment reactor coolant (site-specific value) containment pressure pressure greater activity is greater due to RCS leakage. following primary than (site-specific than 300 µCi/gm containment pressure value) dose equivalent I-rise OR 131). OR B. (site-specific B. Primary containment explosive mixture) pressure response not exists inside consistent with primary LOCA conditions. containment OR c. HCTL exceeded. 32 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EALS Hatch A. Activity of 300 Not Applicable A. Primary containment Not Applicable A. UNPLANNED rapid A. Primary µCi/gm DEim pressure greater than drop in primary containment 1.85 psig due to RCS containment pressure pressure greater leakage. following primary than 56 psig containment pressure OR nse B. Greater than or OR equal to 6% H2 B. Primary containment 5% 02 exists pressure response not inside primary consistent with containment LOCA conditions. OR C. HCTL exceeded. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. See VlO H2 and 02 Concentration Calculation/Reference, Vll Primary Containment Pressure Reference (> 56 psig), and Vl 7 Primary Containment Pressure Reference (1.85 psig). NEI 99-01Rev6
- 2. RPV Water Level 2. RPV Water Level 2. RPV Water Level A. Primary containment A. RPV water level A. RPV water level Not Applicable Not Applicable A. Primary containment flooding required.
cannot be restored cannot be restored flooding required. and maintained above and maintained above (site-specific RPV (site-specific RPV water level water level corresponding to the corresponding to the top of active fuel) or top of active fuel) or cannot be determined. cannot be determined. Hatch 33 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EALS A. SAG entry is required. A. RPV water level cannot be restored and maintained above -155 inches or cannot be determined. Difference I Deviation I Justification A. RPV water level cannot be restored and maintained above -155 inches or cannot be determined. Not Applicable Difference: Fuel Clad Barrier Loss EAL Threshold 2.A-added "SAG entry is required". Justification: Revised EAL threshold based on EP FAQ 2015-004 guidance. Difference: Containment Barrier Potential Loss EAL Threshold 2.A-added "SAG entry is required". Justification: Revised EAL threshold based on EP FAQ 2015-004 guidance. Not Applicable A. SAG entry is required_. Difference: Site specific information provided for Fuel Clad Barrier Potential Loss EAL Threshold 2.A and RCS Barrier Loss EAL Threshold 2.A. See Attachment V7 RPV Level Indication/Display. NEI 99-01 Rev 6 3. Not Applicable
- 3. RCS Leak Rate 3. Primary Containment Isolation Failure Not Applicable Not Applicable A. UNISOLABLE break A. UNISOLABLE A. UNISOLABLE direct Not Applicable in ANYofthe primary system downstream pathway following: (site-leakage that results to the environment specific systems with in exceeding exists after primary potential for high-EITHER of the containment isolation energy line breaks) following:
signal OR I. Max Normal OR B. Emergency RPV Operating B. Intentional primary Depressurization. Temperature containment venting OR per EOPs 2. Max Normal OR Operating Area C. UNISOLABLE Radiation Level. primary system leakage that results in exceeding EITHER of the following: 34 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EALS 1. Max Safe Operating Temperature. OR 2. Max Safe Operating Area Radiation Level. Hatch Not Applicable Not Applicable A. UNISOLABLE break A. UNISOLABLE A. UNISOLABLE direct Not Applicable in Main Steamline, primary system downstream pathway HPCI, Feedwater, leakage that results to the environment RWCU, or RCIC in exceeding exists after primary OR EITHER of the containment isolation B. Emergency RPV following: signal Depressurization.
- 1. Max Normal OR Operating B. Intentional primary Temperature containment venting OR per EOPs 2. Max Normal OR Operating Area C. UNISOLABLE Radiation Level. primary system leakage that results in exceeding EITHER of the following:
- 1. Max Safe Operating Temperature.
OR 2. Max Safe Operating Area Radiation Level. Difference I Deviation I Justification 35 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EALS Difference: Site specific listing of systems provided. See V12 Secondary Containment Rad Monitors and Vl 8 Secondary Containment Temperature for Max Safe/Normal Rad and Operating Temperature values. NEI 99-01 Rev 6 4. Primary Containment Radiation
- 4. Primary Containment Radiation
- 4. Primary Containment Radiation A. Primary containment Not Applicable A. Primary containment Not Applicable Not Applicable A. Primary containment radiation monitor radiation monitor radiation monitor reading greater than reading greater than reading greater than (site-specific value). (site-specific value). (site-specific value). Hatch A. DWRRM greater Not Applicable A. DWRRM greater Not Applicable Not Applicable A. DWRRM greater than 1.400 R/hr. than 40 R/hr. than 26,000 R/hr. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference:
EAL Threshold 4.A for Loss of Fuel Clad and RCS Barriers and Potential Loss of Containment Barrier does not include the following wording -"Primary containment radiation monitor reading ... ". Justification: Human factors consideration -DWRRM is the site designator for the Primary Containment radiation monitor. Difference: Site specific informsation provided. See Attachment V2 Rad Monitor Calculation. NEI 99-01 Rev 6 5. Other Indications
- 5. Other Indications
- 5. Other Indications A. (site-specific as A. (site-specific as A. (site-specific as A. (site-specific as A. (site-specific as A. (site-specific as applicable) applicable) applicable) applicable) applicable) applicable)
Hatch A. Not Applicable Not Applicable A. Drywell Fission Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Product Monitor reading 5.0 x 10 5 cpm. 36 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EALS Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. See Attachment V2 Rad Monitor Calculation. NEI 99-01 Rev 6 6. Emergency Director Judgment 6. Emergency Director Judgment 6. Emergency Director Judgment A. ANY condition in the A. ANY condition in the A. ANY condition in the A. ANY condition in the A. ANY condition in the A. ANY condition in the opinion of the opinion of the opinion of the opinion of the opinion of the opinion of the Emergency Director Emergency Director Emergency Director Emergency Director Emergency Director Emergency Director that indicates Loss of that indicates that indicates Loss of that indicates that indicates Loss of that indicates the Fuel Clad Barrier. Potential Loss of the the RCS Barrier. Potential Loss of the the Containment Potential Loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier. RCS Barrier. Barrier. Containment Barrier. Hatch A. ANY condition in the A. ANY condition in the A. ANY condition in the A. ANY condition in the A. ANY condition in the A. ANY condition in the opinion of the opinion of the opinion of the opinion of the opinion of the opinion of the emergency director emergency director emergency director emergency director emergency director emergency director that indicates loss of that indicates that indicates loss of that indicates that indicates loss of that indicates the fuel clad barrier. potential loss of the the RCS Barrier. potential loss of the the Containment potential loss of the fuel clad barrier. RCS Barrier. Barrier. Containment Barrier. Difference I Deviation I Justification None 37 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HGl: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01Rev6 Hatch HOSTILE ACTION resulting in loss of physical control of the facility. HOSTILE ACTION resulting in loss of physical control of the facility. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (I) a. A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within (I) a. A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the PROTECTED AREA as reported by the (site-specific the PROTECTED AREA (PA) as reported by the on shift security shift supervision). Security' Captain or designee. AND AND b. EITHER of the following has occurred:
- b. EITHER of the following has occurred:
I. ANY of the following safety functions cannot be I. ANY of the following safety functions cannot be controlled or maintained. controlled or maintained.
- Reactivity control
- Reactivity control
- Core cooling [PWR] I RPV water level [BWR]
- RPV water level
- RCS heat removal
- RCS heat removal OR OR 2. Damage to spent fuel has occurred or is 2. Damage to spent fuel has occurred or is IMMINENT.
IMMINENT. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. 38 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HG7: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the emergency director warrant declaration ofa General Emergency. warrant declaration ofa General Emergency. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency (1) Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the emergency Director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or IMMINENT substantial core degradation or involve actual or IMMINENT substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or HOSTILE melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or HOSTILE ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the facility. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA facility. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than immediate site area. the immediate site area. Difference I Deviation I .Justification None 39 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HSl: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01Rev6 Hatch HOSTILE ACTION within the PROTECTED AREA. HOSTILE ACTION within the PROTECTED AREA. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the (1) A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the PROTECTED AREA as reported by the (site-specific security shift PROTECTED AREA (PA) as reported by the on shift Security supervision). Captain or designee*. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. 40 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HS6: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01Rev6 Hatch Inability to control a key safety function from outside the Control Room. Inability to control a key safety function from outside the Control Room. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (I) a. An event has resulted in plant control being transferred (1) a. An event has resulted in plant control being transferred from the Control Room to (site-specific remote shutdown from the control room to remote shutdown panels. panels and local control stations). AND AND b. Control of ANY of the following key safety functions is not b. Control of ANY of the following key safety functions is not reestablished within 15 minutes. reestablished within (site-specific number of minutes).
- Reactivity control
- Reactivity control
- RPV water level
- Core cooling [PWR] I RPV water level [BWR]
- RCS heat removal
- RCS heat removal Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided. 41 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HS7: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01Rev6 Hatch Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the emergency director warrant declaration ofa Site Area Emergency. warrant declaration ofa Site Area Emergency. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01Rev6 Hatch (1) Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency (1) Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the emergency Director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public or HOSTILE ACTION that results in protection of the public or HOSTILE ACTION that results in intentional damage or malicious acts, (1) toward site personnel or intentional damage or malicious acts, (I) toward site personnel or equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or, (2) that prevent equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or, (2) that prevent effective access to equipment needed for the protection of the public. effective access to equipment needed for the protection of the public. Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels which Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the site boundary. site boundary. Difference I Deviation I Justification None 42 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HAl: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch HOSTILE ACTION within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA or airborne HOSTILE ACTION within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA or airborne attack threat within 30 minutes. attack threat within 30 minutes. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the (1) A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA as reported by the (site-specific OWNER CONTROLLED AREA (OCA) as reported by the on shift security shift supervision). Security Captain or designee. (2) A validated notification from NRC of an aircraft attack threat within (2) A validated notification from NRC of an aircraft attack threat within 30 minutes of the site. 30 minutes of the site. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. 43 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HA5: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01Rev6 Hatch Gaseous release impeding access to equipment necessary for normal plant Gaseous release impeding access to equipment necessary for normal plant operations, cool down or shutdown. operations, cooldown or shutdown. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) a. Release of a toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gas (!) a. Release of a toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gas into any of the following plant rooms or areas: into any Table Hl plant rooms or areas: (site-specific list of plant rooms or areas with entry-related mode applicability identified) Table Ht AND Rooms Annlicable Modes b. Entry into the room or area is prohibited or impeded. Diesel generator building All All Unit 112 130' All Reactor building Unit 1/2 SE Diagonals (RHR) All Unit 1/2 NE Diagonals (RHR) All AND b. Entry into the room or area is prohibited or impeded. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. Hatch EAL Threshold (l)a incorporates Table Hl to identify applicable site specific rooms/areas. 44 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HA6: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch Control Room evacuation resulting in transfer of plant control to alternate Control Room evacuation resulting in transfer of plant control to alternate locations. locations. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) An event has resulted in plant control being transferred from the (I) An event has resulted in plant control being transferred from the Control Room to (site-specific remote shutdown panels and local control room to remote shutdown panels. control stations). Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. 45 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HA7: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the emergency director warrant declaration of an Alert. warrant declaration of an Alert. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (!) Other conditions exist which, in the judgment of the Emergency (1) Other conditions exist which, in the judgment of the emergency Director, indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which director, indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or a security event that involves probable life safety of the plant or a security event that involves probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of HOSTILE ACTION. Any releases are expected to be because of HOSTILE ACTION. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels. exposure levels. Difference I Deviation I Justification None 46 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS .. ,, HUl: **INITIA.TINGCONDITIONS .,.,_<>_ .. ' . ' . . ' .... NEI 99-01 Rev 6 ., " 'Hatch* " . Confirmed SECURITY CONDITION or threat. Confirmed SECURITY CONDITION or threat. Difference/ Deviation/ Justification .'. None ,, ., THRESHOLDS . ' 1'[EI 99-01Rev6
- ,. Hatch *' (1) A SECURITY CONDITION that does not involve a HOSTILE (1) A SECURITY CONDITION that does not involve a HOSTILE ACTION as reported by the (site-specific security shift supervision).
ACTION as reported by the on-Shif(S:e6.urity (2) Notification of a credible security threat directed at the site. (2) Notification of a credible security threat directed (3) A validated notification from the NRC providing information of an (3) A validated notification from the NRC providing information of an aircraft threat. aircraft threat. ' Difference I Deviation I Justification
- Difference:
EAL Threshold (2); replaced 'the site' with HNP. Justification: Editorial change -clearly identifies that threat is directed against the Hatch site. Difference: Site specific information provided. 47 I _ HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HU2: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch Seismic event greater than OBE levels. Seismic event greater than OBE levels. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01Rev6 Hatch (I) Seismic event greater than Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) as (I) Seismic event greater than Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) as indicated by: indicated by ANY of the following: (site-specific indication that a seismic event met or exceeded OBE
- Unit One "Seismic Peak Shock Recorder High G Level" limits) (657-066) alarm
- Unit Two "Seismic Instrumentation Triggered" (657-048) alarm
- A 12.7 Hz amber light illuminated in the N/S OR E/W column on panel IHI 1-P701
- A 12.7 Hz red light illuminated in the N/S OR E/W column on panel IHI l-P701 Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided. See V19 Seismic Indications. 48 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HU3: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch Hazardous event. Hazardous event. *Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) A tornado strike within the PROTECTED AREA. (I) A tornado strike within the PROTECTED AREA (PA). (2) Internal room or area flooding of a magnitude sufficient to require (2) Internal room or area flooding of a magnitude sufficient to require manual or automatic electrical isolation of a SAFETY SYSTEM manual or automatic electrical isolation of a SAFETY SYSTEM component needed for the current operating mode. component needed for the current operating mode. (3) Movement of personnel within the PROTECTED AREA is impeded (3) Movement of personnel within the PROTECTED AREA (PA) is due to an offsite event involving hazardous materials (e.g., an offsite impeded due to an offsite event involving hazardous materials (e.g., chemical spill or toxic gas release). an offsite chemical spill or toxic gas release). (4) A hazardous event that results in on-site conditions sufficient to (4) A hazardous event that results in on-site conditions sufficient to prohibit the plant staff from accessing the site via personal vehicles. prohibit the plant staff from accessing the site in personal vehicles. (5) (Site-specific list of natural or technological hazard events) (5) Sustained hurricane force winds greater than 74 mph forecast to be at the plant site in the next four hours. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: EAL Threshold (4) -replaced "via" with "in". Justification: Editorial change. Difference: Site specific information provided for EAL Threshold (5). 49 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HU4: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch FIRE potentially degrading the level of safety of the plant. FIRE potentially degrading the level of safety of the plant. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01Rev6 Hatch (1) a. A FIRE is NOT extinguished within 15-minutes of ANY of (1) a. A FIRE is NOT extinguished within 15-minutes of ANY of the following FIRE detection indications: the following FIRE detection indications:
- Report from the field (i.e., visual observation)
- Report from the field (i.e., visual observation)
- Receipt of multiple (more than 1) fire alarms or
- Receipt of multiple (more than 1) fire alarms or indications indications
- Field verification of a single fire alarm
- Field verification of a single fire alarm AND AND b. The FIRE is located within ANY of the following plant b. The FIRE is located within ANY Table H2 rooms or areas. rooms or areas: (site-specific list of plant rooms or areas) (2) a. Receipt of a single fire alarm (i.e., no other indications of a (2) a. Receipt of a single fire alarm (i.e., no other indications of a FIRE}. FIRE). AND AND b. The FIRE is located within ANY Table H2 rooms or areas. b. The FIRE is located within ANY of the following plant AND rooms or areas: c. The existence of a FIRE is not verified within 30-minutes (site-specific list of plant rooms or areas) of alarm receipt. AND (3) A FIRE within the plant PROTECTED AREA (PA) or ISFSI c. The existence of a FIRE is not verified within 30-minutes PROTECTED AREA not extinguished within 60-minutes of the of alarm receipt. initial report, alarm or indication.
(3) A FIRE within the plant or ISFS/ [for plants with an JSFSI outside (4) A FIRE within the plant PROTECTED AREA (PA) or ISFSI the plant Protected Area] PROTECTED AREA not extinguished PROTECTED AREA that requires firefighting support by an offsite within 60-minutes of the initial report, alarm or indication. fire response agency to extinguish. 50 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS (4) A FIRE within the plant or JSFSI [for plants with an JSFSI outside TableH2 the plant Protected Area] PROTECTED AREA that requires Buildine: Rooms firefighting support by an offsite fire response agency to extinguish. Control Building CB 147' Cable Spreading Room Ul/2 CB 112' Station Battery Rooms A,B Diesel generator building All Primary Containment All Unit l/2 130' Unit l/2 SE Diagonals (RHR) Reactor building Unit 1/2 NE Diagonals (RHR) Unit I SW Diagonals (RCIC) Unit 2 NW Diagonals (RCIC) Unit 1/2 HPClRooms Intake structure All Difference I Deviation I Justification Differences: EAL Thresholds (l)b and (2)b -added reference to Table H2 instead of listing areas separately for each EAL. Justification: Human factors consideration -applicable rooms are the same for each EAL. Placing these rooms into one table and referencing that table in the EAL simplifies the process for identifying applicable rooms. Differences: EAL Thresholds (3) and (4)-added PROTECTED AREA (PA) after plant. Justification: Clarifies plant areas that are applicable to these EA Ls. Differences: Site specific information provided -added Table H2 with applicable room listing. See V20 Table H2 Basis. Justification: Human factors consideration. 51 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HU7: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01Rev6 Hatch Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the emergency director warrant declaration of a (NO)UE. warrant declaration ofa Notification ofUnusual Event (NOUE). Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Editorial change that does not change IC. THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency (1) Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the emergency Director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to facility protection has been initiated. No indicate a security threat to facility protection has been initiated. No releases ofradioactive material requiring offsite response or releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs. occurs. Difference I Deviation I Justification None 52 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SGl: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch Prolonged loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to emergency buses. Prolonged loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to emergency buses. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (I) a. Loss of ALL offsite and ALL onsite AC power to (site-(I) a. Loss of ALL offsite and ALL onsite AC power to 4160, specific emergency buses). VAC Emergency Buses 1/2E, 1/2F, and 1/20. AND AND b. EITHER of the following:
- b. EITHER of the following:
- Restoration of at least one AC emergency bus in less
- Restoration of at least one AC emergency bus in less than (site-specific hours) is not likely. than 4 hours is not likely. * (Site-specific indication of an inability to adequately
- Reactor vessel water level cannot be restored and remove heat from the core) maintained above Minimum Steam Cooling RPV Water Level. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided. See Vl3 4160 VAC Emergency Buses Information and V21 Minimum Steam Cooling RPV Water Level. 53 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SGS: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch Loss ofall AC and Vital DC power sources for 15 minutes or longer. Loss of all AC and vital DC power sources for 15 minutes or longer. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) a. Loss of ALL offsite and ALL onsite AC power to (site-(1) a. Loss of ALL offsite and ALL onsite AC power to 4160 specific emergency buses) for 15 minutes or longer. VAC Emergency Buses 1/2E, 1/2F, and 1/2G for 15 AND minutes or longer. b. Indicated voltage is less than (site-specific bus voltage AND value) on ALL (site-specific Vital DC busses) for 15 b. Indicated voltage is less than 105/210 VDC on ALL minutes or longer. 125/250 VDC Bus l/2R22-S016 and 1/2R22-S017 for 15 minutes or longer. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. See V13 4160 V AC Emergency Buses Information, VIS DC System Information. 54 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SSl: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01Rev6 Hatch Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to emergency buses for 15 minutes Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to emergency buses for 15 or longer. minutes or longer. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (I) Loss of ALL offsite and ALL onsite AC power to (site-specific (1) Loss of ALL offsite and ALL onsite AC power to 4160 VAC emergency buses) for 15 minutes or longer. Emergency Buses I/2E, 1/2F, and l/2G for 15 minutes or longer. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. See V13 4160 V AC Emergency Buses Information. 55 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SSS: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch Inability to shut down the reactor causing a challenge to (core cooling [PWR] Inability to shutdown the reactor causing a challenge to RPV water level or I RPV water level [BWR]) or RCS heat removal. RCS heat removal. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) a. An automatic or manual (trip [PWR] I scram [BWR]) did (1) a. An automatic or manual scram did not shutdown the not shutdown the reactor. reactor. AND AND b. All manual actions to shut down the reactor have b. All manual actions to shutdown the reactor have been been unsuccessful. unsuccessful. AND AND c. EITHER of the following conditions exist: c. EITHER of the following conditions exist: * (Site-specific indication of an inability to adequately
- Reactor vessel water level cannot be restored and remove heat from the core) maintained above Minimum Steam Cooling RPV * (Site-specific indication of an inability to adequately Water Level remove heat from the RCS)
- Exceeding the Heat Capacity Temperature Limit (HCTL) Curve (EOP Graph 2) Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided. See V21 Minimum Steam Cooling RPV Water Level and V22 Heat Capacity Temperature Limit (HCTL) Curve. 56 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SSS: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch Loss of all Vital DC power for 15 minutes or longer. Loss of all vital DC power for 15 minutes or longer. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) Indicated voltage is less than (site-specific bus voltage value) on (1) Indicated voltage is less than 105/210 VDC on ALL 125/250 VDC ALL (site-specific Vital DC busses) for 15 minutes or longer. Bus l/2R22-S016 and l/2R22-S017 for 15 minutes or longer. Difference I Deviation I .Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. See V15 DC System Information. 57 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SAl: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01Rev6 Hatch Loss of all but one AC power source to emergency buses for 15 minutes or Loss of all but one AC power source to emergency buses for 15 minutes or longer. longer. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) a. AC power capability to (site-specific emergency buses) is (1) a. AC power capability to 4160 V AC Emergency Buses 1/2E, reduced to a single power source for 15 minutes or longer. l/2F, and l/2G is reduced to a single power source (Table AND S 1) for 15 minutes or longer. b. Any additional single power source failure will result in a AND loss of all AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS. b. Any additional single power source failure will result in a loss of all AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS. Table Sl Unit 1 Unit2 Start-up Aux XFMR IC Start-up Aux XFMR 2C Start-up Aux XFMR ID Start-up Aux XFMR 2D Diesel Generator IA Diesel Generator 2A Diesel Generator IB Diesel Generator 1B Diesel Generator IC Diesel Generator 2C Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. See V13 4160 V AC Emergency Buses Information. 58 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SA2: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch UNPLANNED loss of Control Room indications for 15 minutes or longer UNPLANNED loss of Control Room indications for 15 minutes or longer with a significant transient in progress. with a significant transient in progress. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch 59 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS (I) a. An UNPLANNED event results in the inability to monitor (I) a. An UNPLANNED event results in the inability to monitor one or more of the following parameters from within the one or more of the following parameters from within the Control Room for 15 minutes or longer. Control Room for 15 minutes or longer. [BWR parameter list] [PWR parameter list] Reactor Power Reactor Power Reactor Power RPV Water Level RPV Pressure RPV Water Level RCS Level Primary Containment Pressure RPV Pressure RCS Pressure Suppression Pool Level Primary Containment In-Core/Core Exit Suppression Pool Temperature Pressure Temperature Suppression Pool Level Levels in at least (site-AND specific number) steam generators
- b. ANY of the following transient events in progress.
Suppression Pool Steam Generator Auxiliary Temperature or Emergency Feed Water
- Automatic or manual runback greater than 25% Flow thermal reactor power
- Electrical load rejection greater than 25% full electrical AND load
- Reactor scram b. ANY of the following transient events in progress.
- ECCS actuation
- Thermal power oscillations greater than I 0%
- Automatic or manual runback greater than 25% thermal reactor power
- Electrical load rejection greater than 25% full electrical load
- Reactor scram [BWR] I trip [PWR]
- ECCS (SI) actuation
- Thermal power oscillations greater than 10% [BWR] Difference I Deviation I Justification None 60 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SA5: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch Automatic or manual (trip [PWR] I scram [BWR]) fails to shut down the Automatic or manual scram fails to shutdown the reactor, and subsequent reactor, and subsequent manual actions taken at the reactor control consoles manual actions taken at the reactor control consoles are not successful in are not successful in shutting down the reactor. shutting down the reactor. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (I) a. An automatic or manual (trip [PWR] I scram [BWR]) did (1) a. An automatic or manual scram did not shutdown the not shutdown the reactor. reactor. AND AND b. Manual actions taken at the reactor control consoles are not b. Manual actions taken at the reactor control consoles are not successful in shutting down the reactor. successful in shutting down the reactor. Difference I Deviation I Justification None 61 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SA9: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch Hazardous event affecting a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current Hazardous event affecting a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode. operating mode. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) a. The occurrence of ANY of the following hazardous events: (1) a. The occurrence of ANY of the following hazardous events:
- Seismic event (earthquake)
- Seismic event (earthquake)
- Internal or external flooding event
- Internal or external flooding event
- High winds or tornado strike
- High winds{> 35 mph sustained) or tornado strike
- FIRE
- FIRE
- EXPLOSION
- EXPLOSION
- (site-specific hazards)
- Other events with similar hazard characteristics as
- Other events with similar hazard characteristics as determined by the Shift Manager determined by the Shift Manager AND AND b. EITHER of the following:
- b. EITHER of the following:
- 1. Event damage has caused indications of degraded
- Event damage has caused indications of degraded performance in at least one train of a SAFETY performance in at least one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode. SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode. OR
- The event has caused VISIBLE DAMAGE to a 2. The event has caused VISIBLE DAMAGE to a SAFETY SYSTEM component or structure needed for SAFETY SYSTEM component or structure the current operating mode. needed for the current operating mode. Difference I Deviation I Justification 62 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Difference:
NEI 99-01 Rev 6 EAL Threshold (l)a, next to the last bullet, refers to site-specific hazards. No additional site specific hazards are identified for Hatch. Justification: Hatch has not identified any additional site-specific hazards applicable to this threshold. Difference: NEI 99-01 Rev 6 EAL Threshold (l)b uses numbers and a conditional OR. Hatch uses bullets to separate the two conditions. Justification: Editorial change -doesnot impact the ability to classify the event. 63 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SUl: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch Loss of all offsite AC power capability to emergency buses for 15 minutes or Loss of all offsite AC power capability to emergency buses for 15 minutes or longer. longer. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01Rev6 Hatch (I) Loss of ALL offsite AC power capability to (site-specific (I) Loss of ALL offsite AC power capability (Table S2) to 4160 VAC emergency buses) for 15 minutes or longer. Emergency Buses 1/2E, l/2F, and 1/2G for 15 minutes or longer. Table S2 Unit 1 Unit2 Start-up Aux XFMR 1 C Start-up Aux XFMR 2C Start-up Aux XFMR ID Start-up Aux XFMR 2D Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. See V13 4160 VAC Emergency Buses Informaton. 64 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SU2: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01Rev6 Hatch UNPLANNED loss of Control Room indications for 15 minutes or longer. UNPLANNED loss of Control Room indications for 15 minutes or longer. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) a. An UNPLANNED event results in the inability to monitor (1) a. An UNPLANNED event results in the inability to monitor one or more of the following parameters from within the one or more of the following parameters from within the Control Room for 15 minutes or longer. Control Room for 15 minutes or longer. [BWR parameter list] [PWR parameter list] Reactor Power Reactor Power Reactor Power RPV Water Level RPV Pressure RPV Water Level RCS Level Primary Containment Pressure RPV Pressure RCS Pressure Suppression Pool Level Primary Containment In-Core/Core Exit Suppression Pool Temperature Pressure Temperature Suppression Pool Level Levels in at least (site-specific number) steam generators Suppression Pool Steam Generator Temperature Auxiliary or Emergency Feed Water Flow Difference I Deviation I Justification None 65 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SU3: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch Reactor coolant activity greater than Technical Specification allowable limits. Reactor coolant activity greater than Technical Specification allowable limits. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 (I) (2) (Site-specific radiation monitor) reading greater than (site-specific value). Sample analysis indicates that a reactor coolant activity value is greater than an allowable limit specified in Technical Specifications. Difference I Deviation I Justification Hatch Note: Use the Unit I or Unit 2 Pretreatment (Flow vs mR/hr) Graphs to determine if the Pretreatment Radiation Monitor exceeds the TV of 240,000 µCi/sec. (1) Pretreatment Radiation Monitor I (2)Dl I K60 I I (2)Dl I K602 reading greater than 240,000 µCi/sec for greater than 60 minutes. (2) Sample analysis indicates that the reactor coolant specific activity is EITHER: -*--*-* Greater than 0.2 µCi/gm and less than or equal to 2.0 µCi/gm dose equivalent Im for greater than 48 hours
- Greater than 2.0 µCi/gm dose equivalent Irn. Difference:
NEI 99-01 Rev 6 EAL Threshold (1) does not include a Note box. Hatch EAL Threshold (1) includes a Note box. Justification: Editorial change to provide guidance on use of Unit 1 or lJnit 2 Pretreatment Graphs to determine if threshold has been exceeded. Difference: Site specific information provided for Threshold (1). See V23 TS 3.7.6 Pretreatment Radiation Monitor Reading. Difference: NEI 99-01 Rev 6 EAL Threshold (2) does not specify a Technical Specification value. Hatch EAL Threshold (2) identifies the coolant activity values that satisfy the EAL threshold. See V24 TS 3.4.6 RCS Sample Activity. Justification: Editorial change to clearly indicate Technical Specification limits to plant personnel. 66 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SU4: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch RCS leakage for 15 minutes or longer. RCS leakage for 15 minutes or longer. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) RCS unidentified or pressure boundary leakage greater than (site-(1) RCS unidentified or pressure boundary leakage greater than 10 gpm specific value) for 15 minutes or longer. for 15 minutes or longer. (2) RCS identified leakage greaterthan (site-specific value) for 15 (2) RCS identified leakage greater than 25 gpm for 15 minutes or minutes or longer. longer. (3) Leakage from the RCS to a location outside containment greater (3) Leakage from the RCS to a location outside containment greater than 25 gpm for 15 minutes or longer. than 25 gpm for 15 minutes or longer. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific value is not used for EAL Thresholds (1) and (2). See V25 TS 3.4.4 RCS Operational Leakage. Justification: HNP Tech Spec leak rate is less than identified EAL threshold values. Per Developer Notes the identified values are used. 67 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SUS: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch Automatic or manual (trip [PWR] I scram [BWR]) fails to shutdown the Automatic or manual scram fails to shutdown the reactor. reactor. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (I) a. An automatic (trip [PWR] I scram [BWR]) did not (I) a. An automatic scram did not shutdown the reactor. shutdown the reactor. AND AND b. A subsequent manual action taken at the reactor control consoles is successful in shutting down the reactor. b. A subsequent manual action taken at the reactor control (2) a. A manual trip ([PWR] I scram [BWR]) did not shutdown consoles is successful in shutting down the reactor. the reactor. (2) a. A manual scram did not shutdown the reactor. AND b. EITHER of the following: AND I. A subsequent manual action taken at the reactor control consoles is successful in shutting down the b. EITHER of the following: reactor.
- A subsequent manual action taken at the reactor control OR consoles is successful in shutting down the reactor. 2. A subsequent automatic (trip [PWR] I scram [BWR])
- A subsequent automatic scram is successful in shutting is successful in shutting down the reactor. down the reactor. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference:
NEI 99-01 Rev 6 EAL Threshold (2)b uses numbers and a conditional OR. Hatch uses bullets to separate the two conditions. Justification: Editorial change -docsnot impact the ability to classify the event. 68 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SU6: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch Loss of all onsite or offsite communications capabilities. Loss of all onsite or offsite communications capabilities. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Hatch (1) Loss of ALL of the following onsite communication methods: (1) Loss of ALL of the following onsite communication methods: (site-specific list of communications methods) (2) Loss of ALL of the following ORO communications methods: Plant telephones (Includes hardwired and wireless) (site-specific list of communications methods) Plant page (3) Loss of ALL of the following NRC communications methods: Plant radio systems (site-specific list of communications methods) (2) Loss of ALL of the following ORO communications methods: ENN (Emergencv Notification Network) Commercial phones (3) Loss of ALL of the following NRC communications methods: ENS Federal Telecommunications System (FTS) Commercial phones Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. 69 Southern Nuclear Operating Company License Amendment Request for Changes to Emergency Action Level Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 Responses to Requests for Additional Information VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 EAL DEVIATIONS AND DIFFERENCES MATRIX CLEAN COPIES NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Deviations and Differences Vogtle Electric Generating Plant -Units 1 and 2 Table of Contents Generic Differences .................................................................................. 1 RG 1 : Initiating Conditions ....................................................................... 2 RG2: Initiating Conditions ....................................................................... 3 RS 1: Initiating Conditions ...................................................................... .4 RS2: Initiating Conditions ....................................................................... 5 RA 1: Initiating Conditions ....................................................................... 6 RA2: Initiating Conditions ....................................................................... 7 RA3: Initiating Conditions ....................................................................... S RUI : Initiating Conditions ..................................................................... 10 RU2: Initiating Conditions ..................................................................... 12 CG l: Initiating Conditions ..................................................................... 13 CS l: Initiating Conditions ..................................................................... 16 CA I : Initiating Conditions ..................................................................... 1 S CA2: Initiating Conditions ..................................................................... 19 CA3: Initiating Conditions ..................................................................... 20 CA6: Initiating Conditions ..................................................................... 21 CU l: Initiating Conditions ..................................................................... 23 CU2: Initiating Conditions ..................................................................... 24 CU3: Initiating Conditions ..................................................................... 26 CU4: Initiating Conditions ..................................................................... 27 CU5: Initiating Conditions ..................................................................... 2S E-HUI: Initiating Conditions ................................................................. 29 PWR Fission Product Barriers Matrix -Initiating Conditions/Thresholds ............................................................................ 31 1. RCS or SG Tube Leakage ...................................................... 31 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Inadequate Heat Removal ...................................................... 33 RCS Activity I Containment Radiation .................................. 35 Containment Integrity or Bypass ........................................... 37 Other Indications ................................................................... 39 Emergency Director Judgment .............................................. 39 HG 1: Initiating Conditions ................................................................... .41 HG7: Initiating Conditions .................................................................... 42 HS 1: Initiating Conditions .................................................................... 43 HS6: Initiating Conditions .................................................................... 44 HS7: Initiating Conditions .................................................................... 45 HA I: Initiating Conditions .................................................................... 46 HA5: Initiating Conditions .................................................................... 47 HA6: Initiating Conditions .................................................................... 49 HA7: Initiating Conditions .................................................................... 50 HUI: Initiating Conditions .................................................................... 51 HU2: Initiating Conditions .................................................................... 52 HU3: Initiating Conditions .................................................................... 53 HU4: Initiating Conditions .................................................................... 54 HU7: Initiating Conditions .................................................................... 56 SG 1: Initiating Conditions .................................................................... 57 SGS: Initiating Conditions .................................................................... 5S SS I: Initiating Conditions ..................................................................... 59 SS5: Initiating Conditions ..................................................................... 60 SSS: Initiating Conditions ..................................................................... 61 SA 1: Initiating Conditions .................................................................... 62 SA2: Initiating Conditions .................................................................... 64 SA5: Initiating Conditions .................................................................... 66 SA9: Initiating Conditions .................................................................... 67 SU 1: Initiating Conditions .................................................................... 69 SU2: Initiating Conditions .................................................................... 70 SU3: Initiating Conditions .................................................................... 72 SU4: Initiating Conditions .................................................................... 73 SU5: Initiating Conditions .................................................................... 74 SU6: Initiating Conditions .................................................................... 75 SU7: Initiating Conditions .................................................................... 76 GENERIC DIFFERENCES NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vo2(1e References BWRs Deleted BWR references as appropriate Uses A for the radiological effluent/radiation level ICs Uses R for the radiological effluent/radiation level ICs Emergency Classification ICs are presented in ascending order (NOUE -GE) Emergency Classification ICs are presented in descending order (GE -NOUE) GENERAL NOTES Instrument setpoint readings used as threshold values to determine emergency classifications have been verified by Vogtle personnel as being within the range of the instrument and clearly and consistently read within the scale of the instrument. This verification is documented on SNC Form 312-F03, Initiation Condition/Emergency Action Level Validation and Verification Worksheet. Site specific information is highlighted in yellow. RPV used instead of common PWR terminology of RCS. ODCM is the controlling Radiation Effluent Document. WOG CSFSTs are used for EAL thresholds as allowed by NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Developer Notes. EPFAQ 2015-013 guidance was reviewed and considered for implementation. No revisions to HG 1 were made as a result of this review. EPFAQ 2015-015 guidance was reviewed and determined to be not applicable to VEGP. Alternative power sources at VEGP are not permanently installed and are only used to supply power to specific loads (i.e., DC Inverters) and are not capable of supplying the full load of the emergency buses. Appendix A -Deleted BWR Acronyms and Abbreviations. Added additional acronyms as needed. Appendix B -Incorporated Site Specific definitions as appropriate. 1 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/ RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS RGl: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 . Vogtle Release of gaseous radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 1,000 Release of gaseous radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 1,000 mrem TEDE or 5,000 mrem thyroid CDE. mrem TEDE or 5,000 mrem thyroid CDE. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01Rev6 Vogtle (1) Reading on ANY of the following radiation monitors greater than (1) Reading on ANY of the following radiation monitors greater than the reading shown for 15 minutes or longer: the reading shown for 15 minutes or longer: (site-specific monitor list and threshold values) (2) Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses greater I Plant Vent I 50 uCi/cc I than 1,000 mrem TEDE or 5,000 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond I Turbine Building Vent (SJAE) RE-12839E I 2.1 x 10 3 µCi/cc I (site-specific dose receptor point). (3) Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond (2) Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses greater (site-specific dose receptor point): than 1,000 mrem TEDE or 5,000 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond
- Closed window dose rates greater than 1,000 mR/hr expected to the site boundary.
continue for 60 minutes or longer. (3) Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond
- Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE greater the site boundary:
than 5,000 mrem for one hour of inhalation.
- Closed window dose rates greater than 1,000 mR/hr expected to continue for 60 minutes or longer.
- Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE greater than 5,000 mrem for one hour of inhalation.
Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. See V2 Rad Monitor Calculations and V3 ODCM Site Boundary Reference. 2 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/ RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS RG2: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle Spent fuel pool level cannot be restored to at least (site-specific Level 3 Spent fuel pool level cannot be restored to at least 195 foot level for 60 description) for 60 minutes or longer. minutes or longer. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle (I) Spent fuel pool level cannot be restored to at least (site-specific (1) Spent fuel pool level cannot be restored to at least 195 foot level for Level 3 value) for 60 minutes or longer. 60 minutes or longer. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. See V 4 SFP Level 3&2 Indications. Although this value is above the Level 3 indication of 194 feet and 'Is inches identified in V 4, it has been determined that this value can be used by the decision makers to accurately perform an assessment of the EAL threshold. 3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/ RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS RSl: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle Release of gaseous radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 100 Release of gaseous radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem thyroid CDE. mrem TEDE or 500 mrem thyroid CDE. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle (1) Reading on ANY of the following radiation monitors greater than (1) Reading on ANY of the following radiation monitors greater than the reading shown for 15 minutes or longer: the reading shown for 15 minutes or longer: (site-specific monitor list and threshold values) (2) Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses greater I Plant Vent RE-12444E I 5.0 µCi/cc I than 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond (site-I Turbine Building Vent (SJAE) RE-12839E I 2.1 x 10 2 µCi/cc I specific dose receptor point). (3) Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond (2) Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses greater (site-specific dose receptor point): than I 00 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond the
- Closed window dose rates greater than 100 mR/hr expected to site boundary.
continue for 60 minutes or longer. (3) Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond
- Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE greater the site boundary:
than 500 mrem for one hour of inhalation.
- Closed window dose rates greater than I 00 mR/hr expected to continue for 60 minutes or longer.
- Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE greater than 500 mrem for one hour of inhalation.
Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. See V2 Rad Monitor Calculations and V3 ODCM Site Boundary Reference. 4 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/ RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS RS2: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle Spent fuel pool level at (site-specific Level 3 description). Spent fuel pool level at 195 foot level. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle (I) Lowering of spent fuel pool level to (site-specific Level 3 value). (1) Lowering of spent fuel pool level to 195 foot level. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. See V 4 SFP Level 3&2 Indications. Although this value is above the Level 3 indication of 194 feet and Ys inches identified in V4, it has been determined that this value can be used by the deCision makers to accurately perform an assessment of the EAL threshold. 5 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/ RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS RAl: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01Rev6 Vogtle Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE. than 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle (1) Reading on ANY of the following radiation monitors greater than (1) Reading on ANY of the following radiation monitors greater than the reading shown for 15 minutes or longer: the reading shown for 15 minutes or longer: (site-specific monitor list and threshold values) I Plant Vent RE-12444E I 0.50 µCi/cc I (2) Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses greater I Turbine Building Vent (SJAE) RE-12839D I 2.1 x 10 1 uCi/cc I than 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond (site-(2) Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses greater specific dose receptor point). than 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond the site (3) Analysis of a liquid effluent sample indicates a concentration or boundary. release rate that would result in doses greater than 10 mrem TEDE (3) Analysis of a liquid effluent sample indicates a concentration or or 50 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond (site-specific dose receptor release rate that would result in doses greater than 10 mrem TEDE point) for one hour of exposure. or 50 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond the site boundary for one (4) Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond hour of exposure. (site-specific dose receptor point): (4) Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond
- Closed window dose rates greater than 10 mR/hr expected to the site boundary:
continue for 60 minutes or longer.
- Closed window dose rates greater than 10 mR/hr expected to
- Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE greater continue for 60 minutes or longer. than 50 mrem for one hour of inhalation.
- Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE greater than 50 mrem for one hour of inhalation.
Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. See V2 Rad Monitor Calculations and V3 ODCM Site Boundary Reference. 6 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/ RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS RA2: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle Significant lowering of water level above, or damage to, irradiated fuel. Significant lowering of water level above, or damage to, irradiated fuel. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle (1) Uncovery of irradiated fuel in the REFUELING PATHWAY. (1) Uncovery of irradiated fuel in the REFUELING PATHWAY. (2) Damage to irradiated fuel resulting in a release ofradioactivity from (2) Damage to irradiated fuel resulting in a release of radioactivity from the fuel as indicated by ANY of the following radiation monitors: the fuel as indicated by a HIGH Alarm on ANY of the following (site-specific listing of radiation monitors, and the associated radiation monitors: readings, setpoints and/or alarms) (3) Lowering of spent fuel pool level to (site-specific Level 2 value). Fuel Handling Building RE-008 CNMT BLDG Low Range** RE-002/003
- Mode 6 only during fuel movement Fuel Handling BLDG EFFL. ARE-2532 A/B Fuel Handling BLDG EFFL. ARE-2533 A/B (3) Lowering of spent fuel pool level to 204 feet (Level 2). Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided. See V4 SFP Level 3&2 Indications and VS Annunciator Response Procedure. 7 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/ RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS RA3: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle Radiation levels that impede access to equipment necessary for normal plant Radiation levels that impede access to equipment necessary for normal plant operations, cooldown or shutdown. operations, cooldown or shutdown. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle (1) Dose rate greater than 15 mR/hr in ANY of the following areas: (1) Dose rate greater than 15 mR/hr in ANY of the following areas:
- Control Room
- Control Room (RE-001)
- Central Alarm Station
- Central Alarm Station (Survey Only) * (other site-specific areas/rooms)
(2) An UNPLANNED event results in radiation levels that prohibit or (2) An UNPLANNED event results in radiation levels that prohibit or impede access to any Table HI plant rooms or areas: impede access to any of the following plant rooms or areas: (site-specific list of plant rooms or areas with entry-related mode Table HI applicability identified) Building Room Number Applicable Mode ICB-226, ICB-A45, 3 2CB-223, 2CB-A22 !CB-A77, ICB-B61, I CB-B76, I CB-B79 3 2CB-A 79, 2CB-BO I Control Building 2CB-B04, 2CB-Bl8 lCB-226, lCB-A45 I CB-B84, 2CB-B85 4 2CB-223, 2CB"A22 I CB-A48, I CB-A50 4 2CB-AI5, 2CB-Al6 AFWPump AFWPump Operation and I, 2, 3 House standby Readiness 8 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/ RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS IAB-A28, 2AB-A72 A-level demin vessel I, 2, 3 valve galleries IAB-A24, 2AB-A77 3 IAB-A08, 3 Auxiliary 2AB-Al01 Building IAB-C85, IAB-C89 4 2AB-C38, 2AB-C44 IAB-815 MEZZ IAB-819 MEZZ 4 2AB-Bl 17 MEZZ 2AB-Bl 19 MEZZ Difference I Deviation I .Justification Difference: EAL Threshold (1)-NEI 99-01 Rev 6 has bullet for other site-specific areas/rooms. Vogtle does not identify other areas/rooms applicable to this threshold. Site specific information provided. See V6 Annuciator Response Procedure (Control Room) Reference. Justification: No additional rooms at Vogtle have been determined to be applicable to this EAL threahold. Difference: Vogtle EAL Threshold (2) provides site specific room listing in tabular format (Table Hl). Justification: Editorial change -Human Factors considen1tion. 9 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/ RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS RUl: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01Rev6 Vogtle Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity greater than 2 times the (site-Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity greater than 2 times the ODCM specific effluent release controlling document) limits for 60 minutes or limits for 60 minutes or longer. longer. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle (1) Reading on ANY effluent radiation monitor greater than 2 times the (1) Reading on ANY effluent radiation monitor greater than 2 times the (site-specific effluent release controlling document) limits for 60 ODCM limits for 60 minutes or longer: minutes or longer: SG Blowdown Effluent Line (RE-0021) 2 x release permit setpoint (site-specific monitor list and threshold values corresponding to 2 Turbine Bldg Effluent Line (RE-0848) 2 x release permit setpoint times the controlling document limits) Plant Vent (RE-12442C) 2 x release permit setpoint (2) Reading on ANY effluent radiation monitor greater than 2 times the Plant Vent (RE-12444C) 2 x release permit setpoint alarm setpoint established by a current radioactivity discharge Turbine Bldg Vent, SJAE (RE-12839C) permit for 60 minutes or longer. No Confirmed Primarv-Secondary Leakage 1.6 x I 0-3 µCi/cc (3) Sample analysis for a gaseous or liquid release indicates a Confirmed Primary-Secondary Leakage 2 x release permit setpoint concentration or release rate greater than 2 times the (site-specific (2) Reading on ANY effluent radiation monitor greater than 2 times the effluent release controlling document) limits for 60 minutes or alarm setpoint established by a current radioactivity discharge longer. permit for 60 minutes or longer. Liquid Rad waste Effluent Line (RE-0018) 2 x release permit setpoint Gaseous Radwaste (ARE-0014) 2 x release permit setpoint (3) Sample analysis for a gaseous or liquid release indicates a concentration or release rate greater than 2 times ODCM limits for 60 minutes or longer. Difference I Deviation I Justification 10 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/ RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS Difference: Site specific information provided. See V2 Rad Monitor Calculations. Difference: A value of 1.6 x 10-3 µCi/cc is used for the setpoint of RE-12839C whenever there is No Confirmed Primary-Secondary Leakage. Justification: This value differs from the calculated value and is used due to the scale of the instrument. The intent of the EAL threshold continues to be met. 11 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/ RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS RU2: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle UNPLANNED loss of water level above irradiated fuel. UNPLANNED loss of water level above irradiated fuel. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle (I) a. UNPLANNED water level drop in the REFUELING (I) a. UNPLANNED water level drop in the REFUELING PATHWAY as indicated by ANY ofthe following: PATHWAY as indicated by ANY of the following: (site-specific level indications). I Personnel report of low water level I AND I LSHL-0625 SFP low level Alarm (ALB05 E02) I b. UNPLANNED rise in area radiation levels as indicated by AND ANY of the following radiation monitors.
- b. UNPLANNED rise in area radiation levels as indicated by (site-specific list of area radiation monitors)
ANY of the following radiation monitors. RE-0008 in the spent fuel pool building RE-0002, -0003, -0004 in containment
- RE-0011 at the seal table* RE-0005, -0006 in containment
- Not applicable in Modes 1-4 Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided. See V7 Annunciator Response Procedure (SFP Level) Reference and VS Rad Monitor Information. 12 COLD SHUTDOWN/ REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS CGl: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle Loss of(reactor vessel/RCS [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) inventory affecting fuel Loss ofRPV inventory affecting fuel clad integrity with containment clad integrity with containment challenged. challenged. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: NEI 99-01 Rev 6 refers to reactor vessel/RCS inventory for PWRs. Vogtle uses RPV inventory. Justification: Site use of terminology differs from N El guidance. THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle 13 (I) (2) COLD SHUTDOWN/ REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS a. (Reactor vessel/RCS [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) level less than (I) (site-specific level) for 30 minutes or longer. a. RP\f Ieyel less than
- oiil.{_virs fofi: range} for 30 minutes or longer. AND AND b. ANY indication from the Containment Challenge Table b. ANY indication from the Containment Challenge Table CL (see below). (2) a. Ri>Y,leve}
cannot be monitored for 30 minutes or longer .. a. b. (Reactor vessel/RCS [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) level cannot be monitored for 30 minutes or longer. AND Core uncovery is indicated by ANY of the following:
- (Site-specific radiation monitor) reading greater than (site-specific value)
- Erratic source range monitor indication
[PWR]
- UNPLANNED increase in (site-specific sump and/or tank) levels of sufficient magnitude to indicate core uncovery * (Other site-specific indications)
AND c. ANY indication from the Containment Challenge Table (see below). Containment Challen11:e Table
- CONTAINMENT CLOSURE not established*
- (Explosive mixture) exists inside containment
- UNPLANNED increase in containment pressure
- Secondary containment radiation monitor reading above soecific value) [BWR] AND b. Core uncovery is indicated by ANY of the following:
OR 006 I >*40 REM/hr Erratic Source Range monitor indication UNPLANNED increase in Contaillmertt Sump, 'Reactor (;oolant brain Tartk (Rti:H) 'or* Waste Holdup Tanks (WHT) levels of to indicate ' ' AND c. ANY indication from the Containment Challenge Table ,Ci'. Containment Challen11:e Table Cl CONTAINMENT CLOSURE NOT established* Explosive mixture inside containment -greater than OR equal to 6')/o H2 UNPLANNED increase in containment oressure
- If CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is re-established prior to exceeding the 30-minute time limit, then declaration ofa General Emergency is not required.
- If CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is re-established prior to exceeding the 30-minute time limit, then declaration of a General Emergency is not required.
14 COLD SHUTDOWN/ REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: NEI 99-01 Rev 6 refers to reactor vessel/RCS level for PWRs. Vogtle uses RPV level. Site specific information provided. See V9 RPV Level/RVLIS Information. Justification: Site use of terminology (RPV vs RCS) differs from NEI guida nee. Difference: EAL Threshold (2)b-NEI 99-01 Rev 6 illustrates thresholds in bullet format. Vogtle threshold (2)b illustrates these thresholds using table format. Site specific information provided. See V2 Rad Monitor Calculations and Vt 0 Containment Sump, RCDT, WHT Reference. Justification: Editorial change -Human Factors consideration. Difference: EAL Threshold (2)b, last bullet, refers to Other site-specific indications of core uncovery. No Other site-specific indications are used at Vogtle. Justification: Vogtle does not use any other site-specific indications of core uncovery than those already identified in EAL Threshold (2)b. Difference: Table designator Cl assigned to Containment Challenge Table. Justificat.ion: Editorial change to clearly identify tables within the document. Difference: NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Containment Challenge Table identifies an UNPLANNED increase in containment pressure. Vogtle Table Cl identifies specific containment pressures for specific conditions. Justification: Editorial change to clearly specify conditions when containment is challenged by pressure increase. Difference: Site specific information provided. See Vl l H2 Concentration. 15 COLD SHUTDOWN/ REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS CSl: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01Rev6 Vogtle Loss of(reactor vessel/RCS [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) inventory affecting core Loss ofRPV inventory affecting core decay heat removal capability. decay heat removal capability. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: NEI 99-01 Rev 6 refers to reactor vessel/RCS inventory for PWRs. Vogtle uses RPV inventory. Justification: Site use of terminology differs from N El guidance. THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01Rev6 Vogtle (I) a. CONTAINMENT CLOSURE not established. (!) a. CONTAINMENT CLOSURE not established. AND AND b. (Reactor vessel/RCS [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) level less than b. RPV level less than 185 '-4" [ 6" below Bottom ID of loop] (site-specific level). (72% on Full Range RVLIS). (2) a. CONTAINMENT CLOSURE established. (2) a. CONTAINMENT CLOSURE established. AND AND b. (Reactor vessel/RCS [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) level less than b. RPV level less than 181 '-10" [TOAF] (63% on RVLIS full (site-specific level). range). (3) a. (Reactor vessel/RCS [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) level cannot (3) a. RPV level cannot be monitored for 30 minutes or longer. be monitored for 30 minutes or longer. AND AND b. Core uncovery is indicated by ANY of the following:
- b. Core uncovery is indicated by ANY of the following:
RE-005 OR 006 I :0::40 REM/hr * (Site-specific radiation monitor) reading greater than Erratic Source Range monitor indication (site-specific value) UNPLANNED increase in Containment Sump, Reactor Coolant
- Erratic source range monitor indication
[PWR] Drain Tank (RCDT) or Waste Holdup Tanks (WHT) levels of
- UNPLANNED increase in (site-specific sump and/or sufficient magnitude to indicate core uncovery tank) levels of sufficient magnitude to indicate core uncovery * (Other site-specific indications)
Difference I Deviation I .Justification 16 COLD SHUTDOWN/ REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS Difference: EAL Thresholds (l)b and (2)b -NEI 99-01 Rev 6 refers to reactor vessel/RCS level for PWRs. Vogtle uses RPV level. Site specific information provided. See V9 RPV LeveVRVLIS Indications. Justification: Site use of terminology (RPV \'S RCS) differs from NEI guidance. Difference: EAL Threshold (3)b -NEI 99-01 Rev 6 illustrates thresholds in bullet format. Vogtle EAL Threshold (3)b illustrates these thresholds using table format. Site specific information provided. See V2 Rad Monitor Calculations and VlO Containment SUimp, RCDT, WHT Reference. Justification: Editorial change -Human Factors consideration. Difference: EAL Threshold (3)b, last bullet, refers to Other site-specific indications of core uncovery. No Other site-specific indications are used at Vogtle. Justification: Vogtle does not use any other site-specific indications of core uncovery than those already identified in EAL Threshold (3)b. 17 l COLD SHUTDOWN/ REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS CAl: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle Loss of (reactor vessel/RCS [ P WR] or RPV [ B WR]) inventory. Loss ofRPV inventory. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: NEI 99-01 Rev 6 refers to reactor vessel/RCS inventory for PWRs. Vogtle uses RPV inventory. Justification: Site use of terminology differs from NEI guidance. THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle (!) Loss of(reactor vessel/RCS [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) inventory as (I) Loss ofRPV inventory as indicated by level less than elevation indicated by level less than (site-specific level). 185'-10" (73% on Full Range RVLIS). (2) a. (Reactor vessel/RCS [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) level cannot (2) a. RPV level cannot be monitored for 15 minutes or longer be monitored for 15 minutes or longer AND AND b. UNPLANNED increase in Containment Sump, Reactor b. UNPLANNED increase in (site-specific sump and/or tank) Coolant Drain Tank (RCDT) or Waste Holdup Tanks levels due to a loss of(reactor vessel/RCS [PWR] or RPV (WHT) levels due to a loss ofRPV inventory. [BWR]) inventory. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: EAL Thresholds (1) and (2)a -NEI 99-01 Rev 6 refers to reactor vessel/RCS for PWRs. Vogtle uses RPV. Justification: Site use of terminology (RPV vs RCS) differs from NEI guidance. Difference: Site specific information provided. See V9 RPV Level/RVLIS Indicatons and VlO Containment Sump, RCDT, WHT Reference. 18 COLD SHUTDOWN/ REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS CA2: INITIATING CONDITIONS .. . NEl99-01Rev 6 . . .. -*.' .. ' ... Vogtle .**** . .. Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to emergency buses for I 5 minutes Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to emergency buses for I5 or longer. minutes or longer. I DeviatiOnfJustification .*. None , ...*. ' .. THRESHOLDS ... mfr 99*01 Rev 6. Vogtle (I) Loss of ALL offsite and ALL onsite AC Power to (site-specific (I) Loss of ALL offsite and ALL onsite AC Power (Table SI) to emergency buses) for I5 minutes or longer. for I5 minutes or longer. Table St: Unitt l:Jnit2 .Unit AuxiliaryTfansformer D n:it Auxiliary Transforn}er )NXAA 2NXAA Unit.Auxiliary Transformer .. . ... 2NX4B f\uxilfary T!imsfo1111er: Reser\re.;:\uxiliary_'.fritnsform_ei: lNXRA 2NXRA: . Reser\ie ;Auxiliary '.fransfcfrmer Reser\ie .Auxil.iary Tran_sforme!
- i:NXRB. 2NXRB Piese!Generatot. -IA Diesel'Generator 2A Diesel Generatoi:
lB Diesel Generator 2B StaridbY, AtixiliarfTransforqier ANXRA. . . . . .. Standby Auxiliary
- ANXRB Difference I Deviation I Justificati<m
., Difference: Site specific information provided in Table Sl. See V12 Emergency Buses Drawing. 19 COLD SHUTDOWN/ REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS CA3: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01Rev6 Vogtle Inability to maintain the plant in cold shutdown. Inability to maintain the plant in cold shutdown. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle (1) UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature to greater than (site-(1) UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature to greater than 200 'F specific Technical Specification cold shutdown temperature limit) for greater than the duration specified in the following table. for greater than the duration specified in the following table. Table C2: RCS Heat-no Duration Thresholds Table: RCS Heat-no Duration Thresholds RCS Status Containment Closure Heat-up Containment Closure Heat-up Status Duration RCS Status Status Duration Not intact Not Established 0 minutes Intact (but not at reduced (or at reduced inventory) Established 20 minutes* inventory f PWRl) Not applicable 60 minutes* Intact Not applicable 60 minutes* Not intact (or at reduced Established 20 minutes* (but not at reduced inventory) inventory f PWR]) Not Established 0 minutes
- If an RCS heat removal system is in operation within this time frame *If an RCS heat removal system is in operation within this time frame and andRCS temoerature is being reduced, the EAL is not applicable.
RCS temoerature is being reduced, the EAL is not aoolicable. (2) UNPLANNED RCS pressure increase greater than 10 psig. (This (2) UNPLANNED RCS pressure increase greater than (site-specific EAL does not apply during water-solid plant conditions.) pressure reading). (This EAL does not apply during water-solid plant conditions. [PWR]) Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Information included in RCS Heat-up Duration Thresholds Table for Vogtle is inverted from the presentation in NEI 99-01 Rev 6. Information is the same. Added Table C2 as designator for table. Justification: Editorial change for Human Factors considerations -worst case is presented first; clearly identify tables used in document. Difference: Site specific information provided. See VI TS Table 1.1-1 Modes. 20 COLD SHUTDOWN/ REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS CA6: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle Hazardous event affecting a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current Hazardous event affecting a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode. operating mode. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01Rev6 Vogtle (I) a. The occurrence of ANY of the following hazardous events: (1) a. The occurrence of ANY of the following hazardous events:
- Seismic event (earthquake)
- Seismic event (earthquake)
- Internal or external flooding event
- Internal or external flooding event
- High winds or tornado strike
- High winds or tornado strike
- FIRE
- FIRE
- EXPLOSION
- EXPLOSION
- (site-specific hazards)
- Other events with similar hazard characteristics as
- Other events with similar hazard characteristics as determined by the Shift Manager determined by the Shift Manager AND AND b. EITHER of the following:
- b. EITHER of the following:
- Event damage has caused indications of degraded I. Event damage has caused indications of degraded performance in at least one train of a SAFETY performance in at least one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode. SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode.
- The event has caused VISIBLE DAMAGE to a OR SAFETY SYSTEM component or structure needed for 2. The event has caused VISIBLE DAMAGE to a the current operating mode. SAFETY SYSTEM component or structure needed for the current operating mode. Difference I Deviation I Justification 21 COLD SHUTDOWN/
REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS Difference: NEI 99-01 Rev 6 EAL Threshold (l)a, next to the last bullet, refers to site-specific hazards. No additional site specific hazards are identified for Vogtle. Justification: Vogtle has not identified any additional site-specific hazards applicable to this threshold. Difference: NEI 99-01 Rev 6 EAL Threshold (l)b uses numbers to identify the two threshold conditions. Vogtle EAL Threshold (l)b uses bullets. Justification: Editorial change for clarity. This change does not affect the EAL threshold. 22 COLD SHUTDOWN/ REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS CUl: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01Rev6 Vogtle UNPLANNED loss of(reactor vessel/RCS [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) inventory UNPLANNED loss ofRPV inventory for 15 minutes or longer. for 15 minutes or longer. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: NEI 99-01 Rev 6 refers to reactor vessel/RCS inventory for PWRs. Vogtle uses RPV inventory. Justification: Site use of tenninology differs from N El guidance. THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01Rev6 Vogtle (1) UNPLANNED loss ofreactor coolant results in (reactor vessel/RCS (1) UNPLANNED loss ofreactor coolant results in RPV level less than [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) level less than a required lower limit for 15 a required lower limit for 15 minutes or longer. minutes or longer. (2) a. RPV level cannot be monitored. (2) a. (Reactor vessel/RCS [PWR] or RPV [BWR]) level cannot AND be monitored.
- b. UNPLANNED increase in Containment sump, Reactor AND Coolant Drain Tank (RCDT), or WaS!e Holdup Tank b. UNPLANNED increase in (site-specific sump and/or tank) (WHT) levels. levels. Difference
/Deviation I Justification Difference: NEI 99-01Rev6 refers to reactor vessel/RCS level for PWRs. Vogtle uses RPV level. Justification: Site use of terminology (RPV vs RCS) differs from NEI guidance. Difference: Site specific information provided. See VlO Containment Sump, RCDT, WHT Reference. 23 COLD SHUTDOWN/ REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS CU2: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle Loss of all but one AC power source to emergency buses for 15 minutes or Loss of all but one AC power source to emergency buses for 15 minutes or longer. longer. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle (I) a. AC power capability to (site-specific emergency buses) is {I) a. AC power capability to BOTH 1(2)AA02 AND 1(2)BA03 reduced to a single power source for 15 minutes or longer. is reduced to a single power source (Table SI) for 15 AND minutes or longer. b. Any additional single power source failure will result in AND loss of all AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS. b. Any additional single power source failure will result in loss ofall AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS. Table Sl Unit 1 Unit2 Unit Auxiliary Transformer Unit Auxiliary Transformer INXAA 2NXAA Unit Auxiliary Transformer Unit Auxiliary Transformer INXAB 2NXAB Reserve Auxiliary Transformer Reserve Auxiliary Transformer INXRA 2NXRA Reserve Auxiliary Transformer Reserve Auxiliary Transformer INXRB 2NXRB Diesel Generator IA Diesel Generator 2A Diesel Generator IB Diesel Generator 2B Standby Auxiliary Transformer Standby Auxiliary Transformer ANXRA ANXRB 24 COLD SHUTDOWN/ REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. See Attachment V12 Emergency Buses Drawing. 25 COLD SHUTDOWN/ REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS CU3:-*INITIATING CONDITIONS
- . . NEI 99-01.Rev 6: vofitle . UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature.
UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature . . *Difference /Deviation I Justification None "'" . THRESHOLDS .. . . ' ...... Vogtle --.. . (I) UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature to greater than (site-(1) UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature to greater than io0.°F. specific Technical Specification cold shutdown temperature limit). (2) Loss of ALL RCS temperature and ,u>V level indication for 15. (2) Loss of ALL RCS temperature and (reactor vessel/RCS [PWR] or minutes or longer. RPV [BWR]) level indication for 15 minutes or longer. Difference I Deviation I Justification "oo -. Difference: NEI 99-01Rev6 refers to reactor vessel/RCS level for PWRs. Vogtle uses RPV level. Justification: Site use of terminology (RP\' vs RCS) differs from NEI guidance. Difference: Site specific information provided. See Vl TS Table 1.1-1 Modes. 26 COLD SHUTDOWN/ REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS CU4: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01Rev6 Vogtle Loss of Vital DC power for 15 minutes or longer. Loss of Vital DC power for 15 minutes or longer. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle (!) Indicated voltage is less than (site-specific bus voltage value) on (!) Indicated voltage is less than 105 VDC on required 125 VDC buses required Vital DC buses for 15 minutes or longer. 1(2)ADI, 1(2)BD1, 1(2)CDI, 1(2)DDI for 15 minutes or longer. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: NEI 99-01 Rev 6 EAL Threshold (1) refers to Vital DC buses. Vogtle EAL threshold (1) identifies the specific DC buses. Justification: Editorial change -Human Factors consideration that docs not affect threshold. Difference: Site specific information provided. See Vl3 DC System Information. 27 COLD SHUTDOWN/ REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS CUS: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01Rev6 Vogtle Loss of all onsite or offsite communications capabilities. Loss of all onsite or offsite communications capabilities. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle (1) Loss of ALL of the following onsite communication methods: (1) Loss of ALL of the following onsite communication methods: (site-specific list of communications methods) In plant telephones (2) Loss of ALL of the following ORO communications methods: Public address system (site-specific list of communications methods) Plant radio systems (3) Loss of ALL of the following NRC communications methods: (site-specific list of communications methods) (2) Loss of ALL of the following ORO communications methods: ENN (Emergency Notification Network) Commercial phones (3) Loss of ALL of the following NRC communications methods: ENS on Federal Telecommunications System (FTS) Commercial phones Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. 28 INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE FACILITY (ISFSI) ICS/EALS E-HUl: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY. Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle (I) Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY as (I) Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY as indicated by an on-contact radiation reading greater than (2 times the indicated by an on-contact radiation reading greater than ANY of the site-specific cask specific technical specification allowable radiation values listed in Table E 1. level) on the surface of the spent fuel cask. Table El Location of Dose Rate Total Dose Rate (Neutron+ Gamma mR/hr) HI-TRAC 125 Side -Mid-height 950 Top 200 HI-STORM 100 Side -60 inches below mid-height 170 Side -Mid-height 180 Side -60 inches above mid-height 110 Center of lid* 50 Middle of top lid** 60 Top (outlet) duct 130 Bottom (inlet) duct 360
- The center of the top lid represents a 6 in. radius. ** The middle of the top lid represents an approximately 4 in. wide cvlindrical "strin" located about mid-distance of the lid. 29 INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE FACILITY (ISFSI) ICS/EALS Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided. See Attachment Vl4 ISFSI TS/Dose Reading Calculation. 30 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EALS PWR FISSION PRODUCT BARRIERS MATRIX -INITIATING CONDITIONS/THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 FAl -Any Loss or any Potential Loss of either FSl -Loss or Potential Loss of any two barriers. FGl -Loss of any two barriers and Loss or Potential the Fuel Clad or RCS barrier. Loss of the third barrier. Vogtle FGl -Loss of any two barriers and Loss or FSl -Loss or Potential Loss of any two barriers. FAl -Any loss or any Potential Loss of either the Fuel Potential Loss of the third barrier. Clad or RCS barrier Difference I Deviation I .Justification None Fuel Clad Barrier RCS Barrier Containment Barrier Loss Potential Loss Loss Potential Loss Loss Potential Loss NEI 99-01Rev6
- 1. RCS or SG Tube Leakage 1. RCS or SG Tube Leakage 1. RCS or SG Tube Leakage Not Applicable A. RCS/reactor A. An automatic or A. Operation of a standby A. A leaking or Not Applicable vessel level less manual ECCS (SI) charging (makeup) RUPTURED SG is than (site-specific actuation is required pump is required by FAUL TED outside of level). by EITHER of the EITHER of the containment.
following: following:
- UNISOLABLE
- 1. UNISOLABLE RCS leakage RCS leakage OR OR
- SG tube 2. SG tube leakage. RUPTURE. OR B. RCS cooldown rate 31 Not Applicable A. CORE COOLING CSP-ORANGE entry conditions met. Difference I Deviation I Justification FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EALS A. An automatic or manual ECCS actuation is required by EITHER of the following:
- UNISOLABLE RCS leakage OR
- SG tube RUPTURE. greater than specific pressurized thermal shock criteria/limits defined by site-specific indications).
Vogtle A. Operation of a standby charging pump is required by EITHER of the following: I. UNISOLABLE RCS leakage OR 2. SG tube leakage. OR B. RCS INTEGRITY CSF -RED entry conditions met A. A leaking or RUPTURED SG is FAULTED outside of containment. Not Applicable Difference: RCS Barrier Loss EAL Threshold 1.A-NEI 99-01 Rev 6 includes (SI) as clarifier for ECCS. Vogtle EAL Threshold 1.A does not include this clarifier. Justification: Terminology difference Difference: RCS Barrier Potential Loss EAL Threshold 1.A-NEI 99-01 Rev 6 clarifies a charging pump as a makeup pump. Vogtle EAL Threshold 1.A does not include this clarifier. Justification: Terminology difference -Vogtle does not refer to charging pumps as makeup pumps. Difference: Site specific information provided. See VIS CSFST Information. 32 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EALS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 2. Inadequate Heat Removal 2. Inadequate Heat Removal 2. Inadequate Heat Removal A. Core exit A. Core exit Not Applicable A. Inadequate RCS heat Not Applicable A. I. (Site-specific thermocouple thermocouple removal capability via criteria for readings greater readings greater steam generators as entry into core than (site-specific than (site-specific indicated by (site-cooling temperature temperature specific indications). restoration value). value). procedure) OR AND B. Inadequate RCS 2. Restoration heat removal procedure not capability via effective within steam generators 15 minutes. as indicated by (site-specific indications). Vogtle 33 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EALS A. CORE COOLING A. CORE COOLING Not Applicable A. HEAT SINK CSF -Not Applicable A. CORE COOLING CSF -RED entry CSF-ORANGE RED entry conditions CSF -RED entry conditions met entry conditions met. conditions met for met 15 minutes or OR NOTE: Heat Sink CSF longer B. HEAT SINK CSF should not be considered -RED entry RED if total available conditions met feedwater flow is less than 535 gpm due to operator NOTE: Heat Sink CSF action. should not be considered RED if total available feedwater flow is less than 535 gpm due to operator action. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. See V15 CSFST Information. 34 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EALS NEI 99-01Rev6
- 3. RCS Activity I Containment Radiation
- 3. RCS Activity I Containment Radiation
- 3. RCS Activity I Containment Radiation A. Containment Not Applicable A. Containment radiation Not Applicable Not Applicable A. Containment radiation monitor monitor reading radiation monitor reading greater greater than (site-reading greater than than (site-specific specific value). (site-specific value). value). OR B. (Site-specific indications that reactor coolant activity is greater than 300 µCi/gm dose equivalent I-131). Vogtle A. Containment Not Applicable A. Containment radiation Not Applicable Not Applicable A. Containment radiation monitor monitor RE-005 OR radiation monitor RE-005 OR 006 006 2: 8.7E+2 mR/hr. RE-OOS OR 006 2: 2.6E+5 mR/hr. 2: l.3E+7 mR/hr. OR B. Indications that reactor coolant activity is greater than 300 µCi/gm dose equivalent I-131. Difference I Deviation I Justification 35 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EALS Difference:
Fuel Clad Barrier Loss EAL Threshold 3.B-NEI 99-01Rev6 directs use of site specific indiciations of dose equivalent 1-131. Vogtle EAL Threshold uses generic indications. Justification: It is implied that this EAL is satisfied by analysis of an RCS Sample. The\' ogtle EAL basis document provides the user with additional guidance. IDifference: Site specific information provided. See V2 Rad Monitor Calculations. 36 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EALS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 4. Containment Integrity or Bypass 4. Containment Integrity or Bypass 4. Containment Integrity or Bypass Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable A. Containment isolation is A. Containment required pressure greater than AND (site-specific value) EITHER of the OR following: B. Explosive mixture I. Containment exists inside integrity has been containment lost based on OR Emergency
- c. 1. Containment Director judgment.
pressure greater OR than (site-2. UNISOLABLE specific pressure pathway from the setpoint) containment to the AND environment exists. 2. Less than one OR full train of B. Indications of RCS (site-specific leakage outside of system or containment. equipment) is operating per design for 15 minutes or longer. 37 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EALS Vogtle Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable A. B. Difference I Deviation I Justification Containment isolation is required AND EITHER of the following:
- 1. Containment integrity has been lost based on Emergency Director judgment.
OR 2. UNlSOLABLE pathway from the containment to the environment exists. OR Indications of RCS leakage outside of containment. A. CONTAINMENT CSF RED entry conditions met. OR B. CTMT hydrogen concentration greater than 6% OR C. 1. Containment pressure greater than 21.5 psig AND 2. Less than Four CTMT fan coolers and one full train of CTMT Spray is operating per design for 15 minutes or longer. Difference: Potential Loss EAL Thresholds 4.A and 4.C.l -Site specific information provided. See V15 CSFST Information and V20 Containment Spray Initiation Setpoint. Difference: Potential Loss EAL Threshold 4.B -NEI 99-01 Rev 6 refers to Explosive mixture exists inside containment. Vogtle threshold specifies the hydrogen concentration that is considered an explosive mixture in containment. See Vl 1 H2 Concentration. Justification: 11 uman factors consideration, use of a specific measurable and recognizable concentrntion facilitates the determination that EAL threshold has been met. Difference: Potential Loss EAL Threshold 4.C.2 -NEI 99-01 Rev 6 refers to only one train of a site specific system. Vogtle threshold includes additional components (four CTMT fan coolers) that support CTMT spray to meet this entry condition. Justification: Plant design difference. 38 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EALS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 5. Other Indications
- 5. Other Indications
- 5. Other Indications A. (site-specific as A. (site-specific as A. (site-specific as A. (site-specific as A. (site-specific as A. (site-specific as applicable) applicable) applicable) applicable) applicable) applicable)
Vogtle Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: No additional EALs identified for Vogtle. Justification: No additional EALs identified. NEI 99-01 Rev 6 6. Emergency Director Judgment 6. Emergency Director Judgment 6. Emergency Director Judgment A. ANY condition in A. ANY condition in A. ANY condition in the A. ANY condition in the A. ANY condition in the A. ANY condition in the opinion of the the opinion of the opinion of the opinion of the opinion of the the opinion of the Emergency Emergency Emergency Director Emergency Director Emergency Director that Emergency Director Director that Director that that indicates Loss of that indicates Potential indicates Potential Loss that indicates Loss of indicates Loss of indicates Potential the RCS Barrier. Loss of the RCS of the Containment the Containment the Fuel Clad Loss of the Fuel Barrier. Barrier. Barrier. Barrier. Clad Barrier. Vogtle A. ANY condition in A. ANY condition in A. ANY condition in the A. ANY condition in the A. ANY condition in the A. ANY condition in the opinion of the the opinion of the opinion of the opinion of the opinion of the the opinion of the emergency emergency emergency director emergency director that emergency director that emergency director director that director that that indicates loss of indicates potential loss indicates loss of the that indicates indicates loss of indicates potential the RCS Barrier. of the RCS Barrier. containment barrier. potential loss of the the fuel clad loss of the fuel containment barrier. barrier. clad barrier. 39 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EALS Difference I Deviation I Justification None 40 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HGl: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle HOSTILE ACTION resulting in loss of physical control of the facility. HOSTILE ACTION resulting in loss of physical control of the facility. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle (I) a. A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within (1) a. A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the PROTECTED AREA as reported by the (site-specific the PROTECTED AREA as reported by security shift security shift supervision). supervision. AND AND b. EITHER of the following has occurred:
- b. EITHER of the following has occurred:
- 1. ANY of the following safety functions cannot be I. ANY of the following safety functions cannot be controlled or maintained.
controlled or maintained.
- Reactivity control
- Reactivity control
- Core cooling [PWR] I RPV water level [BWR]
- Core cooling
- RCS heat removal
- RCS heat removal OR OR 2. Damage to spent fuel has occurred or is 2. Damage to spent fuel has occurred or is IMMINENT.
IMMINENT. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. 41 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HG7: INITIATING CONDITIONS '. NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle ._., .. Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the emergency director warrant declaration of a General Emergency. warrant declaration ofa General Emergency. Difference I Dev'iation I Justification .* .. None ., THRESHOLDS
- ' ' :,. NEI 99-01Rev6
', .. Vogtle <' (1) Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency (I) Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the emergency Director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or IMMINENT substantial core degradation or involve actual or IMMINENT substantial core degradation or melting melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or HOSTILE with potential for loss of containment integrity or HOSTILE ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the facility. Releases can be Justificationably expected to exceed EPA facility. Releases can be Justificationably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area. immediate site area . .Difference I Deviation I Justification " None 42 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HSl: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle HOSTILE ACTION within the PROTECTED AREA. HOSTILE ACTION within the PROTECTED AREA. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle (I) A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the (I) A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the PROTECTED AREA as reported by the (site-specific security shift PROTECTED AREA as reported by security shift supervision. supervision). Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. 43 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HS6: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle Inability to control a key safety function from outside the Control Room. Inability to control a key safety function from outside the Control Room. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle (1) a. An event has resulted in plant control being transferred (1) a. An event has resulted in plant control being transferred from the Control Room to (site-specific remote shutdown from the control room to the remote shutdown panels due panels and local control stations). to a control room evacuation. AND AND b. Control of ANY of the following key safety functions is not b. Control of ANY of the following key safety functions is not reestablished within (site-specific number of minutes). reestablished within 15 minutes.
- Reactivity control
- Reactivity control
- Core cooling [PWR] I RPV water level [BWR]
- Core cooling
- RCS heat removal
- RCS heat removal Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided. 44 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HS7: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the emergency director warrant declaration of a Site Area Emergency. warrant declaration of a Site Area Emergency. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle (1) Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency (1) Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the emergency Director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public or HOSTILE ACTION that results in protection of the public or HOSTILE ACTION that results in intentional damage or malicious acts, (1) toward site personnel or intentional damage or malicious acts, (1) toward site personnel or equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or, (2) that prevent equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or, (2) that prevent effective access to equipment needed for the protection of the public. effective access to equipment needed for the protection of the public. Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels which Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the site boundary. site boundary. Difference I Deviation I .Justification None 45 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HAl: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle HOSTILE ACTION within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA or airborne HOSTILE ACTION within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA or airborne attack threat within 30 minutes. attack threat within 30 minutes. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle (1) A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the (1) A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA as reported by the (site-specific OWNER CONTROLLED AREA as reported by security shift security shift supervision). supervision. (2) A validated notification from NRC of an aircraft attack threat within (2) A validated notification from NRC of an aircraft attack threat within 30 minutes of the site. 30 minutes of the site. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. 46 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HAS: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle Gaseous release impeding access to equipment necessary for normal plant Gaseous release impeding access to equipment necessary for normal plant operations, cool down or shutdown. operations, cool down or shutdown. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle 47 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS (I) a. Release of a toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gas (1) a. Release of a toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gas into any of the following plant rooms or areas: into any Table HI plant rooms or areas: (site-specific list of plant rooms or areas with entry-related AND mode applicability identified)
- b. Entry into the room or area is prohibited or impeded. AND b. Entry into the room or area is prohibited or impeded. Table HI Building Room Number Applicable Mode ICB-226, ICB-A45, 3 2CB-223, 2CB-A22 ICB-A77, !CB-B61, ICB-B76, ICB-B79 3 2CB-A79, 2CB-BOI Control Building 2CB-B04, 2CB-B 18 ICB-226, ICB-A45 I CB-884, 2CB-B85 4 2CB-223, 2CB-A22 ICB-A48, ICB-A50 4 2CB-Al5, 2CB-Al6 AFWPump AFWPump Operation and 1, 2, 3 House standby Readiness IAB-A28, 2AB-A72 A-level demin vessel 1,2, 3 valve galleries IAB-A24, 2AB-A77 3 IAB-A08, 3 Auxiliary 2AB-AIOI Building IAB-C85, IAB-C89 4 2AB-C38, 2AB-C44 !AB-BIS MEZZ IAB-Bl9 MEZZ 4 2AB-B 117 MEZZ 2AB-Bl 19 MEZZ Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided. 48 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HA6: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle Control Room evacuation resulting in transfer of plant control to alternate Control Room evacuation resulting in transfer of plant control to alternate locations. locations. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle (1) An event has resulted in plant control being transferred from the (1) An event has resulted in plant control being transferred from the Control Room to (site-specific remote shutdown panels and local control room to the remote shutdown panels due to a control room control stations). evacuation. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. 49 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HA7: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the emergency director warrant declaration of an Alert. warrant declaration of an Alert. Difference I Deviation I .Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle (I) Other conditions exist which, in the judgment of the Emergency (1) Other conditions exist which, in the judgment of the emergency Director, indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which director, indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or a security event that involves probable life safety of the plant or a security event that involves probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of HOSTILE ACTION. Any releases are expected to be because of HOSTILE ACTION. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels. exposure levels. Difference I Deviation I Justification None 50 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HUl: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle Confirmed SECURITY CONDITION or threat. Confirmed SECURITY CONDITION or threat. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle (1) A SECURITY CONDITION that does not involve a HOSTILE (1) A SECURITY CONDITION that does not involve a HOSTILE ACTION as reported by the (site-specific security shift supervision). ACTION as reported by security shift supervision. (2) Notification of a credible security threat directed at the site. (2) Notification of a credible security threat directed at VEGP. (3) A validated notification from the NRC providing information of an (3) A validated notification from the NRC providing information of an aircraft threat. aircraft threat. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: EAL Threshold (2); replaced 'the site' with VEGP. Justification: Editorial change -clearly identifies that threat is directed against the Vogtle site. Difference: Site specific information provided. 51 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HU2: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle Seismic event greater than OBE levels. Seismic event greater than OBE levels. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01Rev6 Vogtle (1) Seismic event greater than Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) as (1) Seismic event greater than Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) as indicated by: indicated by the Seismic Monitoring System (Red OBE Exceedance (site-specific indication that a seismic event met or exceeded OBE Indicator). limits) Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. See V16 Seismic Monitor System Panel Display. 52 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HU3: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle Hazardous event. Hazardous event. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle (I) A tornado strike within the PROTECTED AREA. (I) A tornado strike within the PROTECTED AREA. (2) Internal room or area flooding of a magnitude sufficient to require (2) Internal room or area flooding of a magnitude sufficient to require manual or automatic electrical isolation ofa SAFETY SYSTEM manual or automatic electrical isolation of a SAFETY SYSTEM component needed for the current operating mode. component needed for the current operating mode. (3) Movement of personnel within the PROTECTED AREA is impeded (3) Movement of personnel within the PROTECTED AREA (PA) is due to an offsite event involving hazardous materials (e.g., an offsite impeded due to an offsite event involving hazardous materials (e.g., chemical spill or toxic gas release). an offsite chemical spill or toxic gas release). (4) A hazardous event that results in on-site conditions sufficient to (4) A hazardous event that results in on-site conditions sufficient to prohibit the plant staff from accessing the site via personal vehicles. prohibit the plant staff from accessing the site via personal vehicles. (5) (Site-specific list of natural or technological hazard events) (5) Sustained hurricane force winds greater than 74 mph forecast to be at the plant site in the next four hours. Difference I Deviation I .Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. 53 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HU4: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01Rev6 Vogtle FIRE potentially degrading the level of safety of the plant. FIRE potentially degrading the level of safety of the plant. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01Rev6 Vogtle (1) a. A FIRE is NOT extinguished within IS-minutes of ANY of (1) a. A FIRE is NOT extinguished within IS-minutes of ANY of the following FIRE detection indications: the following FIRE detection indications:
- Report from the field (i.e., visual observation)
- Report from the field (i.e., visual observation)
- Receipt of multiple (more than I) fire alarms or
- Receipt of multiple (more than I) fire alarms or indications indications
- Field verification of a single fire alarm
- Field verification of a single fire alarm AND AND b. The FIRE is located within ANY of the Table H2 plant b. The FIRE is located within ANY of the following plant rooms or areas. rooms or areas: (2) a. Receipt of a single fire alarm (i.e., no other indications of a (site-specific list of plant rooms or areas) FIRE). (2) a. Receipt of a single fire alarm (i.e., no other indications of a AND FIRE). b. The FIRE is located within ANY of the Table H2 plant AND rooms or areas. b. The FIRE is located within ANY of the following plant AND rooms or areas: c. The existence of a FIRE is not verified within 30-minutes (site-specific list of plant rooms or areas) of alarm receipt. AND (3) A FIRE within the plant PROTECTED AREA (PA) not c. The existence of a FIRE is not verified within 30-minutes extinguished within 60-minutes of the initial report, alarm or of alarm receipt. indication.
(3) A FIRE within the plant or ISFSI [for plants with an JSFSI outside (4) A FIRE within the plant PROTECTED AREA (PA) that requires the plant Protected Area] PROTECTED AREA not extinguished firefighting support by an offsite fire response agency to extinguish. within 60-minutes of the initial report, alarm or indication. I Table JU I 54 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS (4) A FIRE within the plant or ISFSJ [for plants with an JSFSJ outside Containment Buildim! the plant Protected Area] PROTECTED AREA that requires NSCW Cooling Towers Diesel Generator Building firefighting support by an offsite fire response agency to extinguish. Auxiliarv Building Fuel Handling Building Control Building Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank Pumnhouse Auxiliarv Feedwater Pumphouse Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: EAL Thresholds (l)b and (2)b -added reference to Table H2 instead of listing areas separately for each threshold. Justification: Human factors consideration -applicable rooms are the same for each threshold. Placing these rooms into one table and referencing that table simplifies the process for identifying applicable rooms. Difference: EAL Thresholds (3) and (4)-added PROTECTED AREA (PA) after plant. Justification: Clarifies plant areas that arc applicable to these thresholds. Difference: Added Table H2 with applicable site specific room listing. 55 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS HU7: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the emergency director warrant declaration ofa (NO)UE. warrant declaration ofa (NO)UE. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle (1) Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency (1) Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the emergency Director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to facility protection has been initiated. No indicate a security threat to facility protection has been initiated. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or releases of radioactive material requiring off site response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs. occurs. Difference I Deviation I Justification None 56 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS SGl: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle Prolonged loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to emergency buses. Prolonged loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to emergency buses. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle (I) a. Loss of ALL offsite and ALL onsite AC power to (site-(1) a. Loss of ALL offsite and ALL onsite AC power to BOTH specific emergency buses). 1(2)AA02 AND 1(2)BA03. AND AND b. EITHER of the following:
- b. EITHER of the following:
- Restoration of at least one AC emergency bus in less
- Restoration of at least one AC emergency bus in less than (site-specific hours) is not likely. than 4 hours is not likely. * (Site-specific indication of an inability to adequately
- CORE COOLING CSF -RED conditions met. remove heat from the core) Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided. See V12 Emergency Buses Drawing and VIS CSFST Information. 57 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS SGS: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle Loss of all AC and Vital DC power sources for 15 minutes or longer. Loss ofall AC and Vital DC power sources for 15 minutes or longer. Difference I Deviation I .Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle (I) a. Loss of ALL offsite and ALL onsite AC power to (site-(1) a. Loss of ALL offsite and ALL onsite AC power to BOTH specific emergency buses) for 15 minutes or longer. 1(2)AA02 AND 1 (2)BA03 for 15 minutes or longer. AND AND b. Indicated voltage is less than (site-specific bus voltage b. Indicated voltage is less than 105 VDC on ALL 125 VDC value) on ALL (site-specific Vital DC busses) for 15 busses 1(2)AD1, 1(2)BD1, 1(2)CDI, 1(2)DDI for 15 minutes or longer. minutes or longer. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. See V12 Emergency Buses Drawing and V13 DC System Information. 58 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS SSl: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01Rev6 Vogtle Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to emergency buses for 15 minutes Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to emergency buses for 15 or longer. minutes or longer. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle (1) Loss of ALL offsite and ALL onsite AC power to (site-specific (1) Loss of ALL offsite and ALL onsite AC power to BOTH 1(2)AA02 emergency buses) for 15 minutes or longer. AND 1(2)BA03 for 15 minutes or longer. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. See Vl2 Emergency Buses Drawing. 59 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS SSS: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle Inability to shut down the reactor causing a challenge to (core cooling [PWR] Inability to shut down the reactor causing a challenge to core cooling or RCS I RPV water level [BWR]) or RCS heat removal. heat removal. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle (I) a. An automatic or manual (trip [PWR] I scram [BWR]) did I NOTE: Heat Sink CSF should not be considered RED if total available I not shutdown the reactor. feedwater flow is less than 535 gpm due to operator action. AND (1) a. An automatic or manual trip did not shutdown the reactor. b. All manual actions to shut down the reactor have AND been unsuccessful.
- b. All manual actions to shutdown the reactor have been AND unsuccessful.
- c. EITHER of the following conditions exist: * (Site-specific indication of an inability to adequately AND remove heat from the core) (Site-specific indication of an inability to adequately remove heat from the c. EITHER of the following conditions exist: RCS)
- Core Cooling CSF -RED conditions met
- Heat Sink CSF -RED conditions met Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference:
Site specific information provided. See VIS CSFST Information. 60 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS SSS: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle Loss of all Vital DC power for 15 minutes or longer. Loss of all Vital DC power for 15 minutes or longer. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle (1) Indicated voltage is less than (site-specific bus voltage value) on (1) Indicated voltage is less than 105 VDC on ALL 125 VDC busses ALL (site-specific Vital DC busses) for 15 minutes or longer. 1(2)ADI, 1(2)BDI, 1(2)CD1, 1(2)DDI for 15 minutes or longer. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. See V13 DC System Information. 61 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS SAl: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle Loss of all but one AC power source to emergency buses for 15 minutes or Loss of all but one AC power source to emergency buses for 15 minutes or longer. longer. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle (I) a. AC power capability to (site-specific emergency buses) is (I) a. AC power capability to BOTH 1(2)AA02 AND 1(2)BA03 reduced to a single power source for 15 minutes or longer. is reduced to a single power source (Table S 1) for 15 AND minutes or longer. AND b. Any additional single power source failure will result in a b. Any additional single power source failure will result in a loss of all AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS. loss of all AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS. Table Sl Unit 1 Unit2 Unit Auxiliary Transformer Unit Auxiliary Transformer INXAA 2NXAA Unit Auxiliary Transformer Unit Auxiliary Transformer INXAB 2NXAB Reserve Auxiliary Transformer Reserve Auxiliary Transformer INXRA 2NXRA Reserve Auxiliary Transformer Reserve Auxiliary Transformer lNXRB 2NXRB Diesel Generator IA Diesel Generator 2A Diesel Generator lB Diesel Generator 2B Standby Auxiliary Transformer Standby Auxiliary Transformer ANXRA ANXRB 62 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. See V12 Emergency Buses Drawing. 63 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS SA2: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle UNPLANNED loss of Control Room indications for 15 minutes or longer UNPLANNED loss of Control Room indications for 15 minutes or longer with a significant transient in progress. with a significant transient in progress. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01Rev6 Vogtle (I) a. An UNPLANNED event results in the inability to monitor (!) a. An UNPLANNED event results in the inability to monitor one or more of the following parameters from within the one or more of the following parameters from within the Control Room for 15 minutes or longer. Control Room for 15 minutes or longer. [BWR parameter list] [PWR parameter list] Reactor Power Reactor Power Reactor Power RCS Level RCS Pressure RPV Water Level RCS Level In-Core/Core Exit Temperature RPV Pressure RCS Pressure Wide Range Level in at least one steam generator Primary Containment In-Core/Core Exit Steam Generator Main or Auxiliary Feed Water Flow Pressure Temperature Suppression Pool Level Levels in at least (site-AND specific number) steam b. ANY of the following transient events in progress. generators Suppression Pool Steam Generator Auxiliary
- Automatic or manual runback greater than 25% Temperature or Emergency Feed Water Flow thermal reactor power
- Electrical load rejection greater than 25% full electrical AND load
- Reactor trip b. ANY of the following transient events in progress.
- ECCS actuation 64 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS
- Automatic or manual runback greater than 25% thermal reactor power
- Electrical load rejection greater than 25% full electrical load
- Reactor scram [BWR] I trip [PWR]
- ECCS (SI) actuation
- Thermal power oscillations greater than 10% [ B WR] Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference:
NEI 99-01 Rev 6 does not specify steam generator level transmitter (wide or narrow range). Vogtle specifies use of Wide Range Level indication. Justification: Site determination that Wide Range Level indication is applicable to this EAL threshold. Difference: NEI 99-01 Rev 6 does not specifiy Steam Generator Main Feed Water Flow. Vogtle specifies use of Main Feed Water or Auxiliary Feed Water Flow indications. Justification: Site determination that Main feed water flow is also 11pplicable to this EAL threshold. Difference: NEI 99-01 Rev 6 includes (SI) after ECCS. Vogtle does not include (SI) after ECCS. Justific:1tion: Site preference, does not detract or affect EAL determination. 65 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS SAS: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle Automatic or manual (trip [PWR] I scram [BWR]) fails to shut down the Automatic or manual trip fails to shut down the reactor, and subsequent reactor, and subsequent manual actions taken at the reactor control consoles manual actions taken at the reactor control consoles are not successful in are not successful in shutting down the reactor. shutting down the reactor. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle (1) a. An automatic or manual (trip [PWR] I scram [BWR]) did (I) a. An automatic or manual trip did not shutdown the reactor. not shutdown the reactor. AND AND b. Manual actions taken at the reactor control consoles are not b. Manual actions taken at the reactor control consoles are not successful in shutting down the reactor. successful in shutting down the reactor. Difference I Deviation I Justification None 66 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS SA9: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle Hazardous event affecting a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current Hazardous event affecting a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode. operating mode. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01Rev6 Vogtle (1) a. The occurrence of ANY of the following hazardous events: (1) a. The occurrence of ANY of the following hazardous events:
- Seismic event (earthquake)
- Seismic event (earthquake)
- Internal or external flooding event
- Internal or external flooding event
- High winds or tornado strike
- High winds or tornado strike
- FIRE
- FIRE
- EXPLOSION
- EXPLOSION
- (site-specific hazards)
- Other events with similar hazard characteristics as
- Other events with similar hazard characteristics as determined by the Shift Manager determined by the Shift Manager AND AND b. EITHER of the following:
- b. EITHER of the following:
- Event damage has caused indications of degraded 1. Event damage has caused indications of degraded performance in at least one train of a SAFETY performance in at least one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode. SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode.
- The event has caused VISIBLE DAMAGE to a OR SAFETY SYSTEM component or structure needed for 2. The event has caused VISIBLE DAMAGE to a the current operating mode. SAFETY SYSTEM component or structure needed for the current operating mode. Difference I Deviation I Justification 67 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS Difference:
No additional site specific hazards identified. Justification: Site personnel have determined that no additional site specific hazards ar*e applicable to this EAL threshold. Difference: NEI 99-01Rev6 EAL Threshold (l)b uses numbers to identify the two threshold conditions. Vogtle EAL Threshold (l)b uses bullets .
- Justification:
Editorial change for clarity. This change does not affect the EAL threshold. 68 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS SUl: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle Loss of all offsite AC power capability to emergency buses for 15 minutes or Loss of all offsite AC power capability to emergency buses for 15 minutes or longer. longer. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle (1) Loss of ALL offsite AC power capability to (site-specific (1) Loss of ALL offsite AC power capability (Table S2) to BOTH emergency buses) for 15 minutes or longer. 1(2)AA02 AND 1(2)BA03 for 15 minutes or longer. Table S2 Unit 1 Unit2 Reserve Auxiliary Transformer Reserve Auxiliary Transformer INXRA 2NXRA Reserve Auxiliary Transformer Reserve Auxiliary Transformer INXRB 2NXRB Standby Auxiliary Transformer Standby Auxiliary Transformer ANXRA ANXRB Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: Site specific information provided. See V12 Emergency Buses Drawing. 69 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS SU2: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle UNPLANNED loss of Control Room indications for 15 minutes or longer. UNPLANNED loss of Control Room indications for 15 minutes or longer. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle (1) a. An UNPLANNED event results in the inability to monitor (1) a. An UNPLANNED event results in the inability to monitor one or more of the following parameters from within the one or more of the following parameters from within the Control Room for 15 minutes or longer. Control Room for 15 minutes or longer. [BWR parameter list] f PWR parameter list] Reactor Power Reactor Power Reactor Power RCS Level RCS Pressure RPV Water Level RCS Level In-Core/Core Exit Temperature RPV Pressure RCS Pressure Wide Range Level in at least one steam generator Primary Containment In-Core/Core Exit Steam Generator Main or Auxiliary Feed Water Flow Pressure Temperature Suppression Pool Level Levels in at least (site-specific number) steam generators Suppression Pool Steam Generator Temperature Auxiliary or Emergency Feed Water Flow Difference I Deviation I Justification 70 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS Difference: NEI 99-01Rev6 does not specify steam generator level transmitter (wide or narrow range). Vogtle specifies use of Wide Range Level indication. Justification: Site determination that Wide Range Level indication is applicable to this EAL threshold. Difference: NEI 99-01Rev6 does not specifiy Steam Generator Main Feed Water Flow. Vogtle specifies use of Main Feed Water or Auxiliary Feed Water Flow indications. Justification: Site determination that Main feed water flow is also applicable to this EAL threshold. 71 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS SU3: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle Reactor coolant activity greater than Technical Specification allowable limits. Reactor coolant activity greater than Technical Specification allowable limits. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle (1) (Site-specific radiation monitor) reading greater than (site-specific (I) RE-48000 reading greater than 5.0 µCi/gm. value). (2) RCS coolant sample activity value indicating fuel clad degradation (2) Sample analysis indicates that a reactor coolant activity value is greater than Technical Specification allowable limits as indicated by greater than an allowable limit specified in Technical Specifications. ANY of the following: Dose Equivalent I-131 greater than 1 µCi/gm for greater than 48 hours Dose Equivalent 1-131 greater than Technical Specification figure 3 .4.16-1 limits RCS specific activity greater than 100/E µCi/gm gross radioactivity Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference: EAL Threshold (2)-Revised wording including table with conditions that meet the EAL threshold. Justification: Editorial change to dearly indicate Technical Specification limits to plant personnel. Intent of NEI 99-01 Rev 6 EAL Threshold (2) is still met with this change. Difference: Site specific information provided for EAL Thresholds (1) and (2). See V17 Rad Monitor Calculation (RE-48000) and VIS TS 3.4.1.6 RCS Activity. 72 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS SU4: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle RCS leakage for 15 minutes or longer. RCS leakage for 15 minutes or longer. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle (I) RCS unidentified or pressure boundary leakage greater than (site-(I) RCS unidentified or pressure boundary leakage greater than 10 gpm specific value) for 15 minutes or longer. for 15 minutes or longer. (2) RCS identified leakage greater than (site-specific value) for 15 (2) RCS identified leakage greater than 25 gpm for 15 minutes or minutes or longer. longer. (3) Leakage from the RCS to a location outside containment greater (3) Leakage from the RCS to a location outside containment greater than 25 gpm for 15 minutes or longer. than 25 gpm for 15 minutes or longer. Difference I Deviation I Justificntion Difference: Site specific value is not used for EAL Thresholds (1) and (2). See V19 TS 3.4.13 RCS Operational Leakage. Justification: YEGP Tech Spec leak rnte is less than identified threshold values. Per Developer Notes the identified values are used. 73 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS SUS: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle Automatic or manual (trip [PWR] I scram [BWR]) fails to shutdown the Automatic or manual trip fails to shutdown the reactor. reactor. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle (1) a. An automatic (trip [PWR] I scram [BWR]) did not (1) a. An automatic trip did not shutdown the reactor. shutdown the reactor. AND AND b. A subsequent manual action taken at the reactor control b. A subsequent manual action taken at the reactor control consoles is successful in shutting down the reactor. consoles is successful in shutting down the reactor. (2) a. A manual trip ([PWR] I scram [BWR]) did not shutdown (2) a. A manual trip did not shutdown the reactor. the reactor. AND AND b. EITHER of the following:
- b. EITHER of the following:
- A subsequent manual action taken at the reactor control 1. A subsequent manual action taken at the reactor consoles is successful in shutting down the reactor. control consoles is successful in shutting down the
- A subsequent automatic trip is successful in shutting reactor. down the reactor. OR 2. A subsequent automatic (trip [PWR] I scram [BWR]) is successful in shutting down the reactor. Difference I Deviation I Justification Difference:
NEI 99-01 Rev 6 EAL Threshold (2)b uses numbers to identify the two threshold conditions. Vogtle EAL Threshold (2)b uses bullets. J ustifica ti on: Editorial change for clarity. This change does not affect the EAL threshold. 74 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS SU6: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle Loss of all onsite or offsite communications capabilities. Loss of all onsite or offsite communications capabilities. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle (1) Loss of ALL of the following onsite communication methods: (1) Loss of ALL of the following onsite communication methods: (site-specific list of communications methods) In plant telephones (2) Loss of ALL of the following ORO communications methods: Public address system (site-specific list of communications methods) Plant radio systems (3) Loss of ALL of the following NRC communications methods: (site-specific list of communications methods) (2) Loss of ALL of the following ORO communications methods: ENN (Emergency Notification Network) Commercial phones (3) Loss of ALL of the following NRC communications methods: ENS on Federal Telecommunications System (FTS) Commercial phones Difference I Deviation I Justification None 75 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ICS/EALS SU7: INITIATING CONDITIONS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle Failure to isolate containment or loss of containment pressure control. [PWR] Failure to isolate containment or loss of containment pressure control. Difference I Deviation I Justification None THRESHOLDS NEI 99-01 Rev 6 Vogtle (1) a. Failure of containment to isolate when required by an (1) a. Failure of containment to isolate when required by an actuation signal. actuation signal. AND AND b. ALL required penetrations are not closed within 15 b. ALL required penetrations are not closed within 15 minutes of the actuation signal. minutes of the actuation signal. (2) a. Containment pressure greater than (site-specific pressure). (2) a. Containment pressure greater than 21.5 psig. AND AND b. Less than one full train of (site-specific system or b. Less than 4 CTMT fan coolers and one full train of CTMT equipment) is operating per design for 15 minutes or spray is operating per design for 15 minutes or longer. longer. Difference I Deviation I .Justification Difference: NEI 99-01 Rev 6 refers to only one train of a site specific system. Vogtle EAL threshold includes additional components (four CTMT fan coolers) that support CTMT spray to meet this threshold entry condition. Justification: Plant design difference. Difference: Site specific information provided. See V20 Containment Spray Initiation Setpoint. 76}}