NL-09-055, Report on Inoperable Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Gross Failed Fuel Detector, Radiation Monitors R63A/B

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Report on Inoperable Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Gross Failed Fuel Detector, Radiation Monitors R63A/B
ML091330249
Person / Time
Site: Indian Point Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 05/06/2009
From: Robert Walpole
Entergy Nuclear Operations
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NL-09-055, R63A/B
Download: ML091330249 (2)


Text

Indian Point Energy Center 450 Broadway, GSB P.O. Box 249 En Buchanan, N.Y. 10511-0249 Tel (914) 734-6710 Robert Walpole Manager Licensing NL-09-055 May 6, 2009 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Mail Stop 0-PI-17 Washington, DC 20555-0001

Subject:

Report on Inoperable Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Gross Failed Fuel Detector, Radiation Monitors R63A/B Indian Point Unit No. 3 Docket No. 50-286 License No. DPR-64

Dear Sir or Madam:

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Entergy) hereby submits a report for gross failed fuel detector (radiation monitor R63A/B) in accordance with Technical Specification (TS) 5.6.7. Condition F of TS 3.3.3 requires submittal of a report within 14 days of exceeding the completion time of Condition C for specified Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) instrumentation. Pursuant to TS 5.6.7, the report is to outline the preplanned alternate method of monitoring, the cause of the inoperability, and the plans and schedule for restoring the instrument channels to operable status.

TS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.3.3 requires that the PAM Instrumentation for gross failed fuel detector, listed in TS Table 3.3.3-1 as Function 23, be operable in Modes 1, 2, and 3. For the gross failed fuel detector, this LCO is satisfied by two operable channels. Both channels were determined to be inoperable for greater than seven days on April 23, 2009.

When the gross failed fuel detector is inoperable, the alternate method of monitoring is to take a reactor coolant system (RCS) sample during the first four hours of every shift for detection of gross gamma activity.

The cause for both channels of gross failed fuel detector instrumentation being inoperable was due to a single supply valve SP-FCV-505 that had degraded internals.

This valve is the only means for controlling water flow rate to the radiation monitors R63AIB and failure resulted in unstable flow. On April 30, 2009, the gross failed fuel detector was declared operable after repair of SP-FCV-505. The repair took longer then seven days due to time to acquire the repair parts, problems with the isolation valves, and subsequent valve repair time.

NL-09-055 Docket No. 50-286 Page 2 of 2 There are no new commitments contained in this letter.

If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mr. Robert Walpole, Manager, Licensing at 914-734-6710.

Sincerely, RW/mb cc: Mr. Samuel J. Collins, Regional Administrator, NRC Region 1 Mr. John P. Boska, Senior Project Manager, NRC NRR DORL NRC Resident Inspectors Office, Indian Point Mr. Paul Eddy, NYS Department of Public Service Mr. Francis J. Murray, Jr., President and CEO, NYSERDA