NEI 15-03, Licensee Actions to Address Nonconservative Technical Specifications
Licensee Actions to Address Nonconservative Technical Specifications
- Rev 2: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1727/ML17276A642.pdf
- Rev 3: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2010/ML20100G903.pdf
text
NEI 15-03, Revision 3
Licensee Actions to
Address
Nonconservative
Technical Specifications
March 2020
NEI 15-03, Revision 3
Nuclear Energy Institute
Licensee Actions to
Address
Nonconservative
Technical Specifications
March 2020
Nuclear Energy Institute, 1201 F Street N. W., Suite 1100, Washington D.C. 20004 (202.739.8000)
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This guidance was developed by the Pressurized Water Reactor Owners Group (PWROG)
Licensing Committee, the Boiling Water Reactor Owners' Group (BWROG) Licensing
Committee, the joint Owners Group Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF), and the NEI
Regulatory Issues Task Force (RITF). The dedicated and timely effort of the many participants,
including management support of the effort, is greatly appreciated. Finally, we thank the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission for providing feedback during several public meetings.
Revision 1 Changes:
• Removed revision numbers and dates from the report references.
• Revised the document to discuss the TS Bases as well as the UFSAR, consistent with the
definition of a nonconservative TS. Added an example of an NCTS with respect to the TS Bases.
• Section 3.2 is clarified by replacing "operating license" with "TS".
• Section 3.3 is clarified that final resolution is an approved license amendment or licensing
basis change.
Revision 2 Changes:
• The reference to ISFSI TS was eliminated.
• The definition of a nonconservative TS was replaced with a description of the document
purpose and clarified to emphasize that the guidance encompasses the scope of
Administrative Letter 98-10.
• Section 3.3, "NCTS Entry into the Corrective Action Process," was updated to reference NEI 16-07.
• Various wording clarifications were made to address NRC comments.
Revision 3 Changes:
• Section 3.3, NCTS Entry into the CAP was updated to remove reference to NEI 16-07,
“Improving the Effectiveness of Issue Resolution to Enhance Safety and Efficiency” as it is
not endorsed by the NRC and should not be contained in a document seeking NRC
endorsement. Reference to CAP remains as required IAW 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI.
• Section 3.6, Implementation of Final Corrective Action revised removing unnecessary
clarification on the timeliness of final corrective action the multiple examples when licensees
failed to correct an NCTS in a timely manner.
• Section 4, References, removed reference to NEI 16-07, “Improving the Effectiveness of
Issue Resolution to Enhance Safety and Efficiency”
FOREWORD
This guidance describes actions that may be taken by nuclear utilities to address an operating
license technical specification that is nonconservative (i.e., a nonconservative technical
specification or "NCTS"). In 1998, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued Administrative
Letter 98-10 (AL 98-10), "Dispositioning of Technical Specifications that are Insufficient to
Assure Plant Safety." Since issuance of AL 98-10, industry operating and regulatory experience
has indicated the need to provide additional guidance to licensees. This guidance does not
establish any new regulatory requirements, but provides a process to ensure appropriate steps are
taken when an NCTS is identified.
1 INTRODUCTION
Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), section 50.36(b), requires each license
authorizing operation of a power plant to include technical specifications (TS). Because they are
included in the facility operating license issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC),
TS are not licensee-controlled documents; however, upon identification of a TS that is
nonconservative, licensees must take prompt action to verify and maintain acceptable plant
conditions, comply with license and regulatory requirements, and communicate the details of the
condition appropriately. Following prompt completion of these actions, licensees initiate license
actions as necessary to resolve the non-conservatism.
In 1998, the NRC issued Administrative Letter 98-10 (AL 98-10), “Dispositioning of Technical
Specifications that are Insufficient to Assure Plant Safety” (Reference 1). This document
provides additional guidance that licensees may use to meet the objectives discussed above. This
guidance does not establish any new regulatory requirements but suggests a process to ensure the
appropriate steps are taken.
2 PURPOSE
This document provides guidance to licensees to address an existing operating license TS that is
nonconservative (e.g., determined to be insufficient to protect the assumptions or conclusions of
the UFSAR or TS Bases for the applicable TS), referred to herein as a nonconservative technical
specification (NCTS). This document is intended to fully encompass the subject of AL 98-10,
which addresses "specific values or required actions in TS (that) may not assure safety," and may
further include other NCTS requirements such as surveillance requirements, applicability
statements, design features, and administrative controls.
The scope of the document is consistent with 10 CFR 50.36(a)(1) and (b), which requires an
applicant for an operating license to propose TS and provide a summary statement of the bases or
reasons for such specifications, and further requires the inclusion of TS in the license issued by
the NRC. Such TS are to be “…derived from the analyses and evaluations included in the safety
analysis report, and amendments thereto…”
The reference to "an existing TS requirement" clarifies that the absence of a TS requirement is
not by itself an NCTS. Additionally, specific licensee TS that are less restrictive than standard
TS or TS of other licensees are not considered nonconservative on that basis alone. Such issues
require further analysis before application of these guidelines or any other action to address a
perceived TS inadequacy.
3 CONSIDERATIONS FOR NCTS RESOLUTION
The following sections address the most significant considerations for the resolution of NCTS.
Licensees should place the highest priority on the immediate verification of plant safety,
conformance to the safety analysis, and compliance with regulatory requirements. Management
of interim and final corrective actions, documentation and communication recommendations
should be given the appropriate priority as the situation develops.
3.1 IDENTIFICATION OF AN NCTS
If a potentially inadequate TS is identified, it is the responsibility of the licensee to determine if
such an inadequacy presents an NCTS.
Most often, an NCTS is the result of a previously unidentified inconsistency with the existing
safety analysis. In such cases, the requirements of the approved TS are inadequate. For example,
a TS allowable value for actuation of an instrument channel that would fail to protect an
assumption in the analysis in the UFSAR may have been in effect since the issuance of the
original license, or may have been the result of analysis supporting a previous licensing action.
A TS can also become nonconservative due to a correction of an error in the analysis described
in the UFSAR or TS bases. For example, revision of a fuel consumption calculation to correct an
error can result in the TS required volume of fuel oil being insufficient for a diesel generator to
perform its specified safety function.
A TS action can be nonconservative if it is discovered that the action will not provide the
intended compensatory action described in the TS bases. For example, the TS bases state that a
TS action to reduce reactor power to a specified level ensures that, in the case of an event, the
Reactor Coolant System is not over pressurized. If it is discovered that the reactor power level
reduction in the TS action is insufficient to prevent over pressurization, the TS action is
nonconservative, even if the supporting analysis does not appear in the UFSAR.
A difference between the TS, the analyses in the UFSAR, or the description in the TS Bases in
which the TS is more conservative than necessary (i.e., plant safety is protected, with excess
margin, when following the TS) may not be addressed using licensee controls. TS compliance
must be maintained and a less conservative TS limit may not be administratively applied.
3.2 VERIFICATION OF SPECIFIED SAFETY FUNCTIONS
Upon identification of an NCTS, immediate verification of plant safety and conformance with
appropriate limits is necessary to ensure that the protection intended by the TS is provided.
For TSs that require operability of structures, systems, or components (SSCs), compliance with
the requirements of an NCTS would not by itself constitute failure to meet a limiting condition
for operation (LCO). However, because the NCTS is not adequate, SSC operability should be
evaluated in accordance with licensee programs and procedures. If it is determined that the
affected SSC is inoperable, the LCO is not met and the applicable required action(s) must be
followed.
If the non-conservatism is due to inadequate TS limits, parameters, or requirements, the issue
should be evaluated to determine if more restrictive values or requirements are necessary.
Actions should be taken to ensure the plant satisfies these more restrictive values or
requirements.
In either of the above situations, prompt action may be required to ensure plant safety and
regulatory compliance. As necessary, licensees may institute administrative controls that instruct
operators to maintain more restrictive parameter values or to take more conservative required
actions. All such actions must be implemented without violating existing TS requirements or
approved plant procedures.
3.3 NCTS ENTRY INTO THE CORRECTIVE ACTION PROCESS
Licensee processes need to be effectively applied to ensure that actions taken to address an
identified NCTS provide visibility, traceability and review for continued effectiveness. Licensees
should utilize the Corrective Action Process (CAP) to document identification of an NCTS,
along with both short-term treatment (initial corrective measures, implementation of
administrative controls, and evaluation of reporting requirements) and final resolution (approved
licensing actions or licensing basis change). The determination of the cause and extent of
condition of the NCTS, and the implementation of both interim and final corrective action should
be completed and documented in accordance with licensee-specific processes.
Entering the condition into the CAP typically provides visibility to internal stakeholders, and
gains management attention necessary to ensure plant safety and timely resolution of the
discrepancy. Additionally, because CAP activities are closely monitored by NRC resident
inspectors, CAP documentation can provide the basis for initial and follow-up communication
with the NRC staff.
Initial actions taken to address the NCTS, which include determination of SSC operability,
compliance with proposed or revised limits, and determination of notification requirements,
should be appropriately documented. The establishment of administrative controls to preserve
these initial actions can be driven by CAP processes. The determination of the cause and extent
of condition of the NCTS, and the implementation of both interim and final corrective action
should be completed and documented in accordance with licensee-specific processes.
3.4 EVALUATION OF 10 CFR 50.72 AND 50.73 AND OTHER REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
In and of itself, identification of an NCTS is not subject to the notification and reporting
requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 and 10 CFR 50.73 or other reporting requirements. However,
plant operation in compliance with an NCTS may have resulted in current or past operational
conditions subject to these requirements. Examples include the following:
- A review of plant operation prompted by identification of an NCTS indicates operational
conditions that are insufficient to support operability of an SSC required to be operable by a
TS LCO. If an SSC was inoperable and the associated actions were not met, the plant
condition or operation may have been a condition prohibited by the plant’s TS, and therefore
reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B). If the TS LCO requires an SSC to be operable,
compliance with nonconservative surveillance requirements is not sufficient to consider the
SSC operable and the LCO to have been met.
- A review of plant operation prompted by identification of an NCTS indicates that the plant
has operated outside of the conditions required to ensure consistency with the safety
analyses. Such a condition may be an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant
safety, requiring NRC notification under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and a follow-up written
report under 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(ii)(B).
- A review of plant operation prompted by identification of an NCTS indicates that SSC
inoperability could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function, requiring NRC
notification under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) and a follow-up written report under
These examples are provided for illustrative purposes only, and the guidance is not intended to
replace that in NUREG-1022, Event Reporting Guidelines, 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73 (Reference
2).
Note that in all cases it is the actual plant condition that is subject to notification and reporting
considerations, not the deficiency in the TS.
If a 50.72 or 50.73 report is made for a condition directly caused by compliance with an NCTS,
the licensee should include that information in the resulting notification or report.
3.5 IMPLEMENTATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS
As discussed in Section 3.2, on discovery of an NCTS, immediate verification of plant safety and
conformance with appropriate limits must be accomplished to provide the protection intended by
the TS.
Administrative controls, in the context of addressing an NCTS, are those follow-up measures
taken, as necessary, by the licensee to ensure that the conditions established by initial
compensatory actions are preserved.
Administrative control measures and other compensatory actions must be implemented in
accordance with regulatory requirements. The fact that the changes are being implemented to
appropriately address an NCTS does not relieve the licensee of other regulatory obligations.
Although not required, it is advisable to establish measures to ensure that NCTS are easily
identified until they are resolved. For example, some licensees insert a colored page in the TS to
identify the NCTS and the associated administrative controls.
If a TS is identified to be nonconservative with the plant in a Mode or other specified condition
for which the TS LCO is not applicable (e.g., a TS LCO is applicable in Mode 1 and the plant is
currently in Mode 5), administrative controls should be implemented prior to entering the
condition or Mode in which the TS LCO is applicable.
Once any necessary administrative control measures are implemented, the safety concern will
have been addressed, but the NCTS remains to be corrected. Until final corrective action is in
place, licensees should ensure the administrative controls remain implemented and effective.
3.6 IMPLEMENTATION OF FINAL CORRECTIVE ACTION
Continued plant operation prior to final corrective action is predicated on implementation of any
necessary administrative controls adequate to ensure safe plant operation; however, final
resolution of the NCTS cannot rely on administrative controls as a permanent solution. Final
resolution of an NCTS typically requires a license amendment, revising the TS to reflect the
safety analysis. Revision of the safety analysis to be consistent with the current TS may be an
alternative resolution, provided that the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59 are satisfied. Other cases
may require a combination of both approaches.
10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Actions,” establishes the requirements for
prompt identification and correction of conditions adverse to quality. In addressing an NCTS, a
licensee should determine the cause and take timely corrective action consistent with its quality
assurance program. An appropriate timeline for correction must be commensurate with the safety
significance of the issue. In determining priority, consideration should be given to the fact that
compliance with the operating license would not necessarily assure plant safety.
Identification of an NCTS may have generic implications, in that the non-conservatism affects
the applicable TS for multiple licensees. Accordingly, final resolution of the NCTS may involve
a generic solution. Licensees may plan to use generic industry approaches (e.g., topical reports,
TS Task Force travelers) to support final corrective actions. However, industry generic resolution
involves the cooperative efforts of both the licensees and the NRC, and, pursuit of a generic
approach does not change the fact that individual licensee's TS are deficient. Licensees should
closely monitor generic resolution activities to ensure timely and effective resolution of the issue
as it applies to their facility. Additionally, it should be recognized that as generic solutions
evolve they may no longer satisfy the licensee-specific final corrective action. Resolution on a
plant-specific basis should also be considered.
As with other planned licensing activities that will require NRC staff review, licensees should
provide timely notification to the NRC Project Manager when an NCTS is identified and keep
the PM informed of the schedule for final resolution. Effective communication as to the status of
resolution efforts including documented justification of corrective action extensions can help
avoid a perception that the licensee has not taken timely corrective action.
4 REFERENCES
1. Administrative Letter 98-10, Dispositioning of Technical Specifications that are Insufficient to Assure Plant Safety, December 29, 1998, ADAMS Accession No. ML031110108.
2. NRC NUREG-1022, Event Reporting Guidelines, 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73.