ND-18-0016, Notice of Uncompleted ITAAC 225-days Prior to Initial Fuel Load Item 2.2.01.08 (Index Number 1091)
| ML18019A181 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 01/18/2018 |
| From: | Yox M Southern Nuclear Operating Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of New Reactors |
| References | |
| ITAAC 2.2.01.08, ND-18-0016 | |
| Download: ML18019A181 (8) | |
Text
Michael J. Yox 7825 River Road Regulatory Affairs Director Waynesboro, GA 30830 Southern Nuclear Vogtle 3 & 4 706-848-6459 tel 410-474-8587 cell myox@soutfiernco.com JAN t 8 2018 Docket Nos.: 52-025 52-026 ND-18-0016 10CFR 52.99(c)(3)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Southern Nuclear Operating Company Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit 3 and Unit 4 Notice of Uncompleted ITAAC 225-davs Prior to Initial Fuel Load Item 2.2.01.08 [Index Number 1091 Ladies and Gentlemen:
Pursuant to 10 CFR 52.99(c)(3), Southern Nuclear Operating Company hereby notifies the NRC that as of January 16, 2018, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Unit 3 and Unit 4 Uncompleted Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) Item 2.2.01.08 [Index Number 109] has not been completed greater than 225-days prior to initial fuel load. The Enclosure describes the plan for completing this ITAAC. Southern Nuclear Operating Company will, at a later date, provide additional notifications for ITAAC that have not been completed 225-days prior to initial fuel load.
Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) previously submitted, via letter ND-16-2179
[ML16314A034], a Unit 3 Notice of Uncompleted ITAAC 225-days Prior to Initial Fuel Load for Item 2.2.01.08 [Index Number 109]. This resubmittal supersedes the previous Unit 3 notice in its entirety.
This notification is informed by the guidance described in NEI 08-01, Industry Guideline for the ITAAC Closure Process Under 10 CFR Part 52, which was endorsed by the NRC in Regulatory Guide 1.215. In accordance with NEI 08-01, this notification includes ITAAC for which required inspections, tests, or analyses have not been performed or have been only partially completed. All ITAAC will be fully completed and all Section 52.99(c)(1) ITAAC Closure Notifications will be submitted to NRC to support the Commission finding that all acceptance criteria are met prior to plant operation, as required by 10 CFR 52.103(g).
This letter contains no new NRC regulatory commitments.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-18-0016 Page 2 of 4 If there are any questions, please contact Tom Petrak at 706-848-1575.
Respectfully submitted, Michael J. Yox /
Regulatory Affairs Director Vogtle 3 &4
Enclosure:
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Unit 3 and Unit 4 Completion Plan for Uncompleted ITAAC 2.2.01.08 [Index Number 109]
MJY/LBP/amw
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-18-0016 Page 3 of 4 To:
Southern Nuclear Operating Company/ Georgia Power Company M D. A. Bost (w/o enclosures)
M M. D. Rauckhorst (w/o enclosures)
M M. D. Meier M D. H. Jones (w/o enclosures)
M D. L. McKlnney M M. J. Vox M D. L. Fulton M J. D. Williams M F. H. Willis Ms. A. L. Pugh M A. 8. Parton M . W. A. Sparkman M C. E. Morrow Ms. K. M. Stacy M . M. K. Washington M . J. P. Redd Ms. A. 0. Chamberlain Mr. D. R. Culver Mr. R. L. Beiike Mr. T. G. Petrak Document Services RTYPE: VND.LI.L06 File AR.01.02.06 cc:
Nuclear Reaulatorv Commission Mr. W. Jones (w/o enclosures)
Ms. J. M. Heisserer Mr. C. P. Patel Mr. M. E. Ernstes Mr. G. J. Khouri Mr. T. E. Chandler Ms. S. E. Temple Ms. P. Braxton Mr. T. C. Brimfield Mr. A. J. Lerch Mr. C. J. Even Mr. F. D. Brown Mr. B. J. Kemker Ms. A. E. Rivera-Varona Oalethoroe Power Corporation Mr. R. B. Brinkman Municipal Electric Authoritv of Georgia Mr. J. E. Fuller Mr. S. M. Jackson
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-18-0016 Page 4 of 4 Dalton Utilities Mr. T. Bundros Westinqhouse Electric Company. LLC Dr. L. Oriani (w/o enclosures)
Mr. D. 0. Durham (w/o enclosures)
Mr. M. M. Corletti Ms. L. G. Iller Mr. D. Hawkins Ms. 8. DiTommaso Mr. J. L. Coward Ms. N. E. Deangelis Other Mr. J. E. Hosier, Bechtel Power Corporation Ms. L. Matis, Tetra Tech NUS, Inc.
Dr. W. R. Jacobs, Jr., Ph.D., GDS Associates, Inc.
Mr. 8. Roetger, Georgia Public Service Commission Ms. 8. W. Kernizan, Georgia Public Service Commission Mr. K. C. Greene, Troutman Sanders Mr. 8. Blanton, Balch BIngham
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-18-0016 Enclosure Page 1 of 4 Southern Nuclear Operating Company ND-18-0016 Enclosure Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Unit 3 and Unit 4 Completion Plan for Uncompleted ITAAC 2.2.01.08 [Index Number 109]
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-18-0016 Enclosure Page 2 of 4 ITAAC Statement Desion Commitment
- 8. Containment electrical penetration assemblies are protected against currents that are greater than the continuous ratings.
Insoections/Tests/Analvses An analysis for the as-built containment electrical penetration assemblies will be performed to demonstrate (1) that the maximum current of the circuits does not exceed the continuous rating of the containment electrical penetration assembly, or (2) that the circuits have redundant protection devices in series and that the redundant current protection devices are coordinated with the containment electrical penetration assembly's rated short circuit thermal capacity data and prevent current from exceeding the continuous current rating ofthe containment electrical penetration assembly.
Acceptance Criteria Analysis exists for the as-built containment electrical penetration assemblies and concludes that the penetrations are protected against currents which are greater than their continuous ratings.
iTAAC Completion Description An analysis for the as-built containment electrical penetration assemblies is performed to demonstrate (1) that the maximum current of the circuits does not exceed the continuous rating of the containment electrical penetration assembly, or (2) that the circuits have redundant protection devices in series and that the redundant current protection devices are coordinated with the containment electrical penetration assembly's rated short circuit thermal capacity data and prevent current from exceeding the continuous current rating of the containment electrical penetration assembly.
Most low voltage instrumentation and communication circuits are self-limiting inthat circuit resistance limits the fault current to a level that does not damage the penetration. The energy levels in the instrumentation and communication systems are such that damage cannot occur to the containment penetration. Forcircuits that are not self-limiting, an analysis is performed to verify the as-built containment electrical penetration assemblies are protected against currents that are greaterthan the manufacturer's continuous ratings. The analysis demonstrates that the maximum current of the circuits does not exceed the continuous rating of the containment electrical penetration assembly, or in circuits with high short circuit current, that each circuit has redundant protection devices in series, and that the redundant current protection devices are coordinated with the containment electrical penetration assembly rated short circuit thermal capacity curves, and the fault current does not exceed the penetration assembly rated short circuit thermal capacity curve in the continuous current time range. Each circuit that requires redundant protective devices is identified in the applicable protection coordination calculations.
The containment electrical penetration assemblies analyzed are listed in Attachment A. Spare penetrations or penetrations containing low voltage instrumentation and communication circuits which are excluded from the analysis are noted in Attachment A.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-18-0016 Enclosure Page 3 of 4 The electrical penetrations are designed in accordance with IEEE Standard 317 (Reference 1).
Qualification testing of the electrical penetrations is performed in accordance with IEEE Standard 317 and IEEE Standard 323 (Reference 2). The analysis of the as-built containment electrical penetration assemblies is performed in accordance with section 5.4 of IEEE Standard 741 (Reference 3). Analysis of Class 1E circuits is documented in APP-IDS-EOC-014, (Reference 4). Analysis of Non-Class 1E circuits is documented in APP-ECS-EOC-016, (Reference 5). The analysis results are summarized in APP-CNS-ZOR-001, (Reference 6).
The analysis results exist for the as-built containment electrical penetration assemblies and conclude that the penetrations are protected against fault currents which are greater than their continuous current ratings.
The Electrical Penetration Assemblies (EPA) Protection Analysis is availabie for NRC inspection as part of the ITAAC Completion Package (Reference 7).
List of ITAAC Findings In accordance with plant procedures for ITAAC completion, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) performed a review of all findings pertaining to the subject ITMC and associated corrective actions. This reviewfound there are no relevant ITAAC findings associated with this ITAAC.
References favailable for NRC inspection)
- 1. IEEE Standard 317-1983, "IEEE Standard for Electrical Penetration Assemblies in Containment Structures for Nuclear Power Generating Stations"
- 2. IEEE Standard 323-1974, "IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations"
- 3. IEEE Standard 741-1997, "IEEE Standard Criteria for the Protection of Class 1E Power Systems and Equipment in Nuclear Power Generating Stations
- 4. APP-IDS-EOC-014, Rev. 0, "Verification of IDS Low Voltage Class 1E-Safety Related Electrical Penetrations"
- 5. APP-ECS-EOC-016, Rev. 0, "Verification of Primary and Backup Electrical Protection ofthe Low Voltage and Medium Voltage Non-Safety Related Power and Control Containment Electrical Penetrations."
Protection Analysis"
- 7. ITAAC 2.2.01.08 Completion Package
- 8. NEI 08-01, "Industry Guideline for the ITAAC Closure Process Under 10 CFR Part 52"
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-18-0016 Enclosure Page 4 of 4 Attachment A Containment System Electrical Penetration Assemblies (EPAs)*
Tag No. EPA Description - Equipment Name DAS-EY-P03Z ** Electr cal Penetration P03 ECS-EY-P01X Electr cal Penetration P01 ECS-EY-P02X Electr cal Penetration P02 ECS-EY-P06Y Electr cal Penetration P06 ECS-EY-P07X Electr cal Penetration P07 ECS-EY-P09W Electr cal Penetration P09 ECS-EY-P10W Electr cal Penetration P10 IDSA-EY-P11Z** Electr cal Penetration P11 IDSA-EY-P12Y Electr cal Penetration PI 2 IDSA-EY-P13Y Electr cal Penetration PI 3 IDSD-EY-P14Z ** Electr cal Penetration PI4 IDSD-EY-P15Y Electr cal Penetration PI 5 IDSD-EY-P16Y Electr cal Penetration PI6 ECS-EY-P17X Electr cal Penetration PI 7 ECS-EY-P18X Electr cal Penetration PI 8 ECS-EY-P19Z ** Electr cal Penetration PI 9 ECS-EY-P20Z ** Electr cal Penetration P20 EDS-EY-P21Z ** Electr cal Penetration P21 ECS-EY-P22X Electr cal Penetration P22 ECS-EY-P23X Electr cal Penetration P23 ECS-EY-P24 (Spare) ** Electr cal Penetration P24 ECS-EY-P25W Electr cal Penetration P25 ECS-EY-P26W Electr cal Penetration P26 IDSC-EY-27Z ** Electr cal Penetration P27 IDSC-EY-28Y Electr cal Penetration P28 IDSC-EY-29Y Electr cal Penetration P29 IDSB-EY-30Z ** Electr cal Penetration P30 IDSB-EY-31Y Electr cal Penetration P31 IDSB-EY-32Y Electr cal Penetration P32
- Excerpt from COL Table 2.2.1-1
- Denotes a spare or a penetration containing low voltage instrumentation/communication circuits which are excluded from analysis.