ML26063A393

Commission Memorandum and Order (CLI-26-1)

ML26063A393
Person / Time
Site:	North Anna
Issue date:	03/04/2026
From:	Carrie Safford NRC/SECY
To:	Beyond Nuclear, Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, Sierra Club
SECY RAS
References
RAS 57629, 50-338-SLR-2, 50-339 SLR-2, CLl-26-1
Download: ML26063A393 (0)

Text

COMMISSIONERS:

Ho K. Nieh, Chairman David A. Wright Bradley R. Crowell Matthew M. Marzano Douglas W. Weaver In the Matter of UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY Docket Nos. 50-338-SLR-2 50-339-SLR-2 (North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2)

CLl-26-1 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER This order addresses the appeal of Beyond Nuclear, Inc. and Sierra Club, Inc. of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board's decision denying their petition to intervene and request for a hearing in this subsequent license renewal proceeding.1 For the reasons set forth below, the appeal is denied and the Board's decision is affirmed.

I.

BACKGROUND The NRG issued the original operating licenses for North Anna Units 1 and 2 on April 1, 1978, and August 21, 1980, respectively. 2 In 2003, the licenses were renewed for an initial 1 Brief by Beyond Nuclear and the Sierra Club on Appeal of LBP-24-07 (Aug. 5, 2024) (Appeal);

see also Notice of Appeal of LBP-24-07 by Beyond Nuclear and the Sierra Club (Aug. 5, 2024);

LBP-24-7, 100 NRC 52 ( 2024).

2 See "Site-Specific Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants, Supplement 7a, Second Renewal, Regarding Subsequent License Renewal for North Anna twenty-year period, extending them to April 1, 2038, and August 21, 2040.3 And in August 2020, Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO) and Old Dominion Electric Cooperative (together, "Applicants") applied for a second twenty-year renewal of the operating licenses for North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2.4 Litigation followed that is not part of this appeal but is relevant to it. In December 2020, a group of petitioners, including the two petitioners here, requested a hearing along with a rule waiver to allow them to challenge the August 2020 application's environmental report with respect to certain Category 1 (generic) issues.5 The 2020 Petition proposed a single contention that a 2011 earthquake near North Anna (known as the "Mineral earthquake") had altered the assumptions underlying the plant's design basis, changed the risk assessment of a potential severe accident, and therefore called for a site-specific analysis of the environmental effects of license renewal as it pertained to a potential seismically induced severe accident. 6 In March 2021, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board denied the waiver request and found the Power Station Units 1 and 2" (Draft Report for Comment), NUREG-1437 (Dec. 2023), at§ 2.1.2 (ADAMS accession no. ML23339A047) (DEIS).

3 See Letter from Omid Tabatabai, NRC, to David A. Christian, Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO) (Mar. 20, 2003) (ML030710581), Encl. 1, Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-4; Encl. 2, Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-7.

4 See Letter from Mark D. Sartain, VEPCO, to NRC Document Control Desk (Aug. 24, 2020)

(ML20246G703 (package)) (Application).

5 Hearing Request and Petition to Intervene by Beyond Nuclear, Sierra Club, and Alliance for Progressive Virginia and Petition for Waiver of 10 C.F.R. §§ 51.53(c)(3)(i), 51. 71(d), and 51.95(c)(1) to Allow Consideration of Category 1 NEPA Issues (Dec. 14, 2020) (ML20349D952)

(2020 Petition).

6 See id. at 13-14.

contention inadmissible.7 Petitioners appealed. 8 In August 2021, the Staff prepared a Draft Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (2021 DSEIS) to address the site-specific issues that were not already addressed generically as Category 1 issues in the 2013 Generic Environmental Impact Statement (2013 GEIS) for License Renewal of Nuclear Power Plants.9 In February 2022, we dismissed the appeal following a separate legal decision that applied to all then pending subsequent license renewal applications (including this one). In that separate decision, we ruled that the Staff may not solely rely on the 2013 GEIS when determining the environmental effects of Category 1 issues for a subsequent license renewal term because 10 C.F.R. § 51.53(c)(3) only applies to an initial license renewal applicant's preparation of an environmental report, and the 2013 GEIS did not address subsequent license renewal. 10 We terminated the pending subsequent license renewal proceedings and determined that the agency should issue no further licenses for subsequent renewal periods until the Staff I

had completed an adequate review under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).11 We 7 Virginia Electric and Power Co. (North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-21-4, 93 NRC 179 (2021).

8 See Notice of Appeal of LBP-21-04 by Beyond Nuclear, Sierra Club, and Alliance for Progressive Virginia (Apr. 23, 2021) (ML21113A316); Brief on Appeal of LBP-21-04 by Beyond Nuclear, Sierra Club, and Alliance for Progressive Virginia (Apr. 23, 2021) (ML21113A317).

9 "Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants, Supp. 7, Second Renewal Regarding Subsequent License Renewal for North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2" (Draft Report for Comment), NUREG-1437 (Aug. 2021) (ML21228A084) (2021 DSEIS).

10 See Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3), CLl-22-3, 95 NRC 40, 41 (2022); see also Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Units 3 and 4), CLl-22-2, 95 NRC 26 (2022), rev'g CLl-20-3, 91 NRC 133 (2020). The decision in CLl-20-3, which was reversed by CLl-22-2, had determined that the 2013 GEIS could apply to subsequent license renewals. See "Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants, Main Report" (Final Report), NUREG-1437, vol. 1, rev. 1 (June 2013) (ML13106A241) (2013 GEIS).

11See Oconee, CLl-22-3, 95 NRC at 41. In accord with CLl-22-3, the Staff has since updated the 2013 GEIS to consider the environmental impacts of initial and subsequent license renewals, but that update was not completed before the Staff issued its revised Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) in this action or the Board ruled on the hearing request.

then clarified that the applicants could either supplement their application with a site-specific environmental analysis, or wait until the Staff updated the 2013 GEIS to ensure that it also addresses environmental effects during the subsequent renewal period.12 Accordingly, VEPCO supplemented its application in September 2022 to include site-specific analyses of the issues previously addressed generically. 13 The Staff published its Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) for this proposed subsequent license renewal in December 2023.14 In the proceeding now under appeal, Petitioners challenged the DEIS for failure to consider updated information concerning the impacts of earthquake-induced accidents, failure to adequately evaluate accident risks from various external events, and failure to consider how climate change increases the likelihood of a severe accident. 15 Although the Board found that Petitioners had demonstrated standing, a majority of the Board found none of Petitioners' three See "Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants, Main Report" (Final Report) NUREG-1437, rev. 2 (Aug. 2024) (ML24087A133 (package)) (2024 GEIS).

12 Oconee, 95 NRC at 41. In CLl-22-3, we held that adjudications with contentions that did not pertain to either the 2013 GEIS or site-specific environmental analyses could proceed. Id. We also stated in that opinion that petitioners in the various proceedings would have the opportunity to petition for a hearing "after the site-specific environmental review is complete" and that petitioners would not have to meet the heightened pleading standards normally associated with contentions filed after the initial deadline. Id. at 42, see 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(c).

13 Letter from James E. Holloway, VEPCO, to NRC Document Control Desk (Sept. 28, 2022)

(ML22272A041).

14 See DEIS.

15 See Hearing Request and Petition to Intervene by Beyond Nuclear and the Sierra Club (Mar.

28, 2024). Petitioners filed a corrected petition April 8, 2024, which slightly altered the page numbers but not the substance of the March 28, 2024, pleading. See Hearing Request and Petition to Intervene by Beyond Nuclear and the Sierra Club (Apr. 8, 2024) (Petition); see also NRG Staff Answer in Opposition to Petition for Leave to Intervene Filed by Beyond Nuclear Inc.

and Sierra Club, Inc. (May 6, 2024) (Staff Answer); Applicants' Answer to the Hearing Request and Petition to Intervene and Motion for Leave to Amend Contention 3 Filed by Beyond Nuclear and Sierra Club (May 6, 2024) (Applicants Answer); Reply by Beyond Nuclear and the Sierra Club to Oppositions to Their Hearing Request and Petition to Intervene (May 20, 2024) (Reply).

contentions to be admissible. In a partial dissent, however, Judge Gibson wrote that he would have admitted a narrowed version of Contention 3. 16 Petitioners have appealed with respect to all three contentions.17 II.

DISCUSSION A.

Legal Standards Petitioners are entitled to appeal because their hearing request was wholly denied. 18 We afford substantial deference to the Board on threshold decisions such as contention admissibility, and we will not disturb the Board's ruling on contention admissibility unless an appeal demonstrates an error of law or abuse of discretion.19 B.

License Renewal Reviews Whether an initial or subsequent license renewal, license renewal reviews consist of a safety review governed by 10 C.F.R. Part 54 and an environmental review under 10 C.F.R. Part

51.,

The safety review ensures that the licensee has plans in place to manage the detrimental effects of aging for specified plant structures, systems, and components during the period of extended operations; the regulatory focus is to ensure that the licensee can manage 16 See LBP-24-7, 100 NRC at 75 (Gibson, J., dissenting in part) (Dissent).

17 See Appeal; see also NRG Staff Brief in Response to the Appeal Filed by Beyond Nuclear Inc. and Sierra Club, Inc. from the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board's Decision In LBP-24-07 (Aug. 30, 2024) (Staff Brief); Applicants' Answer and Brief in Opposition to the Appeal of LBP-24-07 Filed by Beyond Nuclear and the Sierra Club (Aug. 30, 2024) (Applicants Brief).

18 10 C.F.R. § 2.311(c).

19 See, e.g., Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. (License Amendment Application), CLl-23-3, 98 NRC 33, 36 (2023); Crow Butte Resources, Inc. (Marsland Expansion Area), CLl-14-2, 79 NRC 11,

26 (2014) (giving "substantial deference" to Board's decision to admit contention even where it may consider support "weak" or the issue a "close question"); Pacific Gas and Electric Co.

(Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLl-11-11, 74 NRC 427, 431, 434-45 (2011) (reversing Board's admission of contention that was outside scope of license renewal proceeding for error of law).

the effects of aging on certain long-lived, passive components that are important to safety.20 The license renewal safety review is not intended to duplicate the ongoing oversight of operating reactors or to re-examine a plant's current licensing basis. 21 The purpose of the environmental review in license renewal is to analyze the reasonably foreseeable environmental impacts of an additional twenty years of extended operation. It is not intended as a second forum to examine safety issues. As explained in the 2013 GEIS, Since NEPA regulations do not provide for a safety review, the license renewal process includes an environmental review that is distinct and separate from the safety review. Since the two reviews are separate, operational safety issues and safety issues related to nuclear power plant aging are considered outside the scope of the environmental review.... 22 If the environmental review uncovers information that may present a plant safety issue, that information would be forwarded to the appropriate NRC organization for consideration and appropriate action. 23 Consistent with NEPA's requirement that the effects of continued operation be described and considered, the environmental consequences of both design-basis and severe accidents 20 See Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point, Units 2 and 3), CLl-15-6, 81 NRC 340, 347 (2015). Federal courts have also recognized the limited scope of NRC license renewal proceedings. See, e.g., New Jersey Environmental Federation v. NRG, 645 F.3d 220, 224 (3d Cir. 2011) (recognizing statutory and regulatory framework that focuses license renewal safety review on detrimental effects of aging).

21 See 10 C.F.R. § 54.30; Indian Point, CLl-15-6, 81 NRC at 347. A plant's current licensing basis is an "evolving set of requirements" consisting of all license requirements, including license conditions, technical specifications, the plant-specific design basis information reflected in its updated Final Safety Analysis Report, and any docketed orders, exemptions, and license commitments. Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), CLl-01-17, 54 NRC 3, 9 (2001).

22 2013 GEIS at 1-8.

23 See 2024 GEIS at 1-9 ("The NEPA process for license renewal under 10 CFR Part 51 focuses on environmental impacts rather than on issues related to safety.... Safety issues that are raised during the environmental review are forwarded to the appropriate NRC organization for consideration and appropriate action.").

are considered in the NRC's NEPA documents.24 It is the NRC's longstanding position that the environmental impacts from design-basis accidents are small for all plants (i.e., it is a generic issue).25 This is because, as the name suggests, a plant is designed to withstand such accidents without significant offsite consequences. In addition, the probability-weighted consequences of severe accidents-accidents which may exceed a plant's design basis-have also been found to be small for all plants. 26 This is because although the consequences could be severe, the extreme unlikelihood of such an accident occurring results in reduced expected environmental impacts during an additional twenty years of extended operation.

Because the generic conclusions regarding design-basis and severe accidents from the 2013 GEIS do not apply to the subsequent license renewal term, the North Anna DEIS discusses, on a site-specific basis, the effects of both design-basis and severe accidents in Appendix F. The Staff considered whether there was any new and significant information relating to design-basis accidents, severe accidents, and prior site-specific analyses of potential mitigation measures for severe accidents.27 Based on its review, the Staff continues to conclude that the environmental impacts of design-basis and severe accidents will be small during the subsequent renewal term.28 24 Limerick Ecology Action, Inc. v. NRG, 869 F.2d 719, 729-30 (3d Cir. 1989) (finding that requirements of the Atomic Energy Act and NEPA are not mutually exclusive).

25 See 2013 GEIS, vol. 3, app. B, at B-29, app. E, at E-1 to E-3 (ML13106A244); see also "Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants" (Final Report), NUREG-1437, vol. 1 (Apr. 1996), §§ 5.3.2, 5.5.1 (ML040690705) (1996 LR GEIS).

26 See 2013 GEIS, vol. 3, app. E, at E-47.

27 VEPCO provided a site-specific analysis of severe accident mi~igation alternatives (SAMAs) for North Anna when it applied for the initial license renewal in 2001. See DEIS, app. F, § F.2.1; see also Virginia Electric and Power Company, "Appendix E - Applicant's Environmental Report, Operating License Renewal Stage, North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2" (May 2001 ), app. G. (ML011500475).

28 See DEIS, app. F at F-2.

C.

Contentions

1.

Contention 1: Draft EIS Fails to Address Environmental Significance of the 2011 Mineral Earthquake

a.

Petitioners' Claims Petitioners argued in Contention 1 that the DEIS violated NEPA because it failed to account for the environmental significance of the 2011 Mineral earthquake, which occurred near the North Anna site and produced ground motions exceeding the design-basis levels for both Units 1 and 2.29 Petitioners reasoned that the Mineral earthquake "disproved the assumption...

that the reactors could be operated safely and without significant adverse environmental impacts" because they were designed to withstand all "likely earthquakes."30 Petitioners additionally claimed that the DEIS should "explain the fundamental difference between a finding of no significant or small impact that is based on a deterministic analysis and a finding of no significant impact that is based on a probabilistic analysis."31 Petitioners provided a declaration and a second document, titled Technical NAPS Review," by their expert, Jeffrey T. Mitman, who opined that because the Mineral earthquake exceeded the design-basis earthquake, North Anna "has not been maintained with its [design basis] or [current licensing basis]."32 Petitioners 29 Petition at 9. The "spectral and peak ground accelerations for the Operating Basis and Design Basis Earthquakes... for [North Anna] were exceeded at certain frequencies for a short period of time." "Technical Evaluation by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Related to Plant Restart after the Occurrence of an Earthquake Exceeding the Level of the Operating Basis and Design Basis Earthquakes, Virginia Electric and Power Company, North Anna Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2" (Nov. 11, 2011 }, Executive Summary at 1 (ML113088406) (NRR Technical Evaluation).

30 Petition at 10.

31 Id.; see also id., Attach. 1, Declaration of Jeffrey T. Mitman (Mar. 27, 2024), 1'[ 27 (Mitman Declaration).

32 See Petition, Attach., "Technical Review of U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Draft Site-Specific Environmental Impact Statement for Subsequent License Renewal of North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2 with Respect to Accident Analysis" (Feb. 22, 2024), at 2 (Technical NAPS Review).

also argued that the NRC directed "seismic upgrades" to the design of a proposed third reactor to be built at North Anna but required minimal "seismic upgrades" to Units 1 and 2, and the DEIS must explain the "disparate result" between the requirements for the existing reactors and the proposed reactor. 33 Petitioners concluded that the NRC does not have a "reasonable basis for concluding that the environmental impacts of re-licensing [North Anna] are 'SMALL' or insignificant with respect to earthquake risks."34

b.

DEIS Discussion of Seismic Issues DEIS section 3.4.4 states that when the Mineral earthquake struck in August 2011, both North Anna units were operating at full power; they were safely shut down; and, following the earthquake, North Anna personnel performed inspections, tests, and analyses to verify that there had been "no functional damage" to the units. 35 The DEIS further explains that the NRC Staff concluded that the licensee had adequately inspected and tested the plant so as to ensure that no safety-related structures, systems, and components had been adversely affected by the earthquake. 36 In short, the licensee's inspections and the Staffs review concluded that the Mineral earthquake did not damage any safety-related equipment at the plant and that it caused 33 Petition at 11, Mitman Declaration,r 28.

34 See Mitman Declaration,r 30.

35 DEIS § 3.4.4 at 3-24. Chapter 3 of the DEIS discusses the "Affected Environment, Environmental Consequences, and Mitigating Actions," and section 3.4 discusses the "Geological Environment."

.3s Id.

no releases to the environment. 37 There is nothing in Mr. Mitman's declaration or technical review that contradicts these conclusions.38 Appendix F of the DEIS discusses how the licensee reevaluated the seismic hazards at the site in response to the Mineral earthquake. 39 Because the "reevaluated seismic hazard for North Anna, as characterized by the ground motion response spectrum, was not bounded by the current nuclear power plant design-basis SSE (safe-shutdown earthquake)," Dominion performed a seismic probabilistic risk assessment at NRC's request. 40 The Staff reviewed the risk assessment and concluded that no further response or regulatory action was required. 41 Appendix F also describes the Staffs review of the licensee's response to the recommendations of the NRC's Near-Term Task Force on Fukushima Dai-ichi. That review, completed in 2019, identified no plant modifications that would result in a substantial reduction of seismic core damage frequency, a substantial safety improvement, or that would be considered necessary for adequate protection. 42 37 See NRR Technical Evaluation, Executive Summary at 2. As the Applicants argued in response to the hearing request, "[a]s a practical matter, if the 2011 Mineral earthquake demonstrates anything, it is that North Anna can be operated safely and without adverse environmental impacts even under beyond-design-basis circumstances-in other words, the exact opposite of what Petitioners are claiming.... " See Applicants Answer at 19 (emphasis in original).

38 Mr. Mitman cites the NRR Technical Evaluation in his declaration. See Mitman Declaration at

,r 12 n.9.

39 Measures taken in response to the Mineral earthquake include implementing a long-term seismic margin management plan, which includes qualification of new and replacement equipment. DEIS § 3.4.4 at 3-24; see also Letter from William M. Dean, NRC, to David A.

Heacock, VEPCO, "Closure of Confirmatory Action Letter Regarding North Anna Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (CAC Nos. MF1807 and MF1808)" (Dec. 24, 2015), (ML15015A575), Attach.,

"Commitment Closure for Confirmatory Action Letter No. NRR-2011-002."

40 See DEIS, app. F, at F-11.

41 See id.

42 See Letter from Louise Lund, NRC, to Daniel G. Stoddard, Dominion, "North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2 - Staff Review of Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment Associated with

c.

Board Ruling The Board rejected Contention 1, finding that it fell short of the contention admissibility requirements in 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(1) in several respects. First, the Board said that although the contention was phrased as a "contention of omission," the DEIS did discuss the Mineral earthquake in section 3.4.4. 43 Therefore, the Board held that to the extent the contention claimed there was no discussion of the earthquake, it failed to establish a "genuine dispute" with the DEIS on a material issue as required by 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(1)(vi).44 The Board additionally found that the contention was too "vague and unparticularized" to meet the requirement of 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(1)(i) and that it sought to raise "safety instead of environmental concerns."45 The Board also observed that the safety risk of accidents caused by seismic hazards at nuclear power plants is evaluated on an "ongoing basis as a part of the plant's current licensing basis," and is therefore not a matter considered during license renewal. 46

d.

Petitioners' Appeal Does Not Demonstrate Error Petitioner's appeal does not show any reversible Board error with respect to Contention 1, and we agree with the Board that Contention 1 did not present a litigable dispute with the DEIS.

Reevaluated Seismic Hazard Implementation of the Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 (EPID No. L-2018-JLD-0003)" (Apr. 25, 2019), at 5 (ML19052A522).

43 LBP-24-7, 100 NRC at 65. The Board found that the DEIS discussed the probability-weighted consequences of a severe accident and confirmed that the probabilistic modeling took the Mineral earthquake into account. Id.

44 Id.

45 Id. at 65-66.

46 Id. at 66.

Petitioners first dispute the Board's ruling that Contention 1 failed as a "contention of omission" and argue that their contention addressed the adequacy of the Staffs analysis.47 However, the contention clearly stated that the DEIS "does not address the environmental significance of the 2011 Mineral [e]arthquake,"48 and the Board correctly observed that the DEIS does discuss the significance of the Mineral earthquake.49 We find no error in this aspect of the Board's ruling.

Petitioners next reiterate arguments asserted in Contention 1 but do not confront the Board's reasons for rejecting them. First, Petitioners argue that the DEIS must "explain what the NRC Staff has done to evaluate the potential that safety systems... will be able to perform their safety functions when the next earthquake occurs."50 But, as the Board found, the DEIS Chapter 3 and Appendix F provide this discussion, including an overview of the actions the agency required of the licensee following the Mineral earthquake and of all licensees following the 2011 Tohoku earthquake in Japan.51 Petitioners also claim that the DEIS is inadequate because it "relies" on an "assumption" that North Anna will operate "within its design basis," and the Mineral earthquake somehow proved that "assumption" to be false.52 But Petitioners do not explain how North Anna is operating "outside" its design basis simply because an earthquake 47 See Appeal at 17.

48 Petition at 9.

49 LBP-24-7, 100 NRC at 65.

50 Appeal at 16-17.

51 Sections 3.4.4 and 3.4.5 of the DEIS explain why, given the actions the licensee has taken in response to the 2011 earthquakes, the NRC expects that the probability-weighted consequences of an earthquake occurring during the period of extended operation to be "small."

Appendix F of the DEIS includes a description of the actions required to ensure that the reactors will safely survive future earthquakes, along with citations to the correspondence and analyses supporting the Staffs findings, which are publicly available and extensive.

52 Appeal at 16-18; see Petition at 9-10.

occurred that exceeded design-basis "spectral and peak ground accelerations for... a short period of time."53 And they do not confront the discussion in DEIS section 3.4.4, which "summarizes the NRC Staff's conclusion... reached prior to restarting the reactors, that North Anna would continue to operate within its design basis following the 2011 Mineral earthquake."54 Nor do they explain how, or cite any evidence that, the Mineral earthquake changed the expected consequences of either design-basis accidents or severe accidents. 55 The Board reasonably found these generalized assertions insufficient to admit the contention.

Next, Petitioners contest the Board's ruling that Contention 1 failed to set forth its dispute with particularity, and they argue that, to the contrary, their requests for additional analysis and information were quite specific. 56 Petitioners do not confront the Board's reasoning that Petitioners had not shown that the DEIS is legally required to provide the specific information they sought. 57 Petitioners did not show a legal requirement that the Staff's seismic safety 53 NRR Technical Evaluation, Executive Summary at 1. If North Anna were operating in violation of its current licensing basis or design basis, it would be a matter for potential enforcement, not the NRC's NEPA review. Our regulations allow any person with information suggesting noncompliance with design or operating requirements to petition for enforcement action. See 1 O C.F.R. § 2.206.

54 Applicants Brief at 12; see DEIS § 3.4.4.

55 The Staff points out that Petitioners' expert, Mr. Mitman, did not provide any analysis that would demonstrate that the occurrence of the Mineral earthquake has increased the likelihood of an earthquake so severe that it will damage the facility sufficiently to cause a radiological release to the environment. See Staff Brief at 18 n.94 ("For example, Mr. Mitman opined that some type of deterministic analysis should be performed - but he did not perform his own deterministic analysis, did not show that such an analysis would produce results different from those relied upon in the DEIS, and did not show how a deterministic analysis would apply to the Staff's customary probabilistic evaluation of severe accident mitigation alternatives.").

56 Appeal at 18. Specifically, Petitioners claim that the DEIS must 1) explain the difference between "deterministic assumptions and probabilistic analyses," 2) discuss the "implications of the disproval of the deterministic assumption by the Mineral [e]arthquake," and 3) explain why the Staff "employed radically different risk reduction measures" between the existing Units 1 and 2 and the proposed Unit 3.

57 LBP-24-7, 100 NRC at 65.

analysis must be set forth with more detail in the DEIS either before the Board, or now on appeal. 58 Therefore, we see no error in the Board's ruling that Contention 1 lacked specificity as required by 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(1)(i).

Finally, Petitioners dispute the Board's reasoning rejecting the contention for raising "safety" rather than "environmental" concerns, and argue that these issues "overlap."59 Petitioners reason that if the DEIS relies on a safety determination for a finding that environmental impacts will be small, then they should be able to challenge that safety determination to show that the environmental impacts are larger than described.60 But, as explained above, Petitioners disputed none of the inspections, analyses, or safety measures taken since the occurrence of the Mineral earthquake more than 13 years ago. Moreover, the Board's ruling was consistent with the agency's longstanding views on the scope of license renewal and the environmental review.61 Contention 1 sought to raise unsupported safety issues that were outside the scope of both the environmental review and of the license renewal proceeding, and the Board did not err in so finding.

58 Petitioners cite New York v. NRC, 681 F.3d 471 (D.C. Cir. 2012) for the proposition that the EIS must discuss harms that are reasonably foreseeable even if they are unlikely. But that case does not hold that an agency must provide a "deterministic" analysis or disregard probabilities in assessing the significance of posited environmental harms. In fact, New York holds that "an agency may find no significant impact if the probability is so low as to be 'remote and speculative' or if the probability of harms is sufficiently minimal." Id. at 478-79.

59 Appeal at 19.

60 See id. at 19-20.

61 Final Rule, Nuclear Power Plant License Renewal, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,943, 64,946 (Dec. 13, 1991); Indian Point, CLl-15-6, 81 NRC at 347.

2.

Contention 2: Draft EIS Does Not Contain a Complete Or Adequately Rigorous Evaluation of Accident Risks

a.

Petitioners' Claims Petitioners argued in Contention 2 that the DEIS does not contain a "complete or adequately rigorous evaluation of accident risks" and therefore "lacks an adequate basis for concluding that the environmental impacts of accidents during [the] license renewal term are

'SMALL."'62 Petitioners cited Mr. Mitman's declaration to argue that the accident risk analysis is incorrect in nine specific ways (identified in bullet points), including that: the DEIS incorrectly extrapolates external event core damage frequency (CDF) from internal event CDF; the NRC "ignores its own data" regarding seismic and fire CDF that indicates that such impacts are "significant"; the DEIS incorrectly states that there has been a "substantial decrease in internal event CDF"; the DEIS "fails to demonstrate consideration of external flooding risk with subsequent ingress of water into the turbine building" and that "flooding poses a significant accident risk that has not been addressed"; and the analysis of severe accident mitigation alternatives (SAMAs) is deficient in multiple respects, including failure to consider SAMAs that meet criteria for consideration."63

b.

Board Ruling The Board found Contention 2 inadmissible because it did not set forth with particularity the issues sought to be raised and because it did not show a genuine dispute with the DEIS. 64 First, the Board found that Petitioners did not meet their burden to set forth their contention with the particularity required by regulation because they had incorporated by reference Mr. Mitman's declaration "without providing any further explanation as to the significance or 62 Petition at 13.

63 /d. at-13-14.

64 LBP-24-7, 100 NRC at 66.

relevance of the nine bullet points."65 The Board held that "the Commission prohibits this kind of wholesale incorporation of documents as alleged support" for contentions, and it pointed to our recent decision in Palisades and Big Rock Point and an older decision in Seabrook. 66 Next, the Board found that Mr. Mitman's statements were largely conclusory and could not support a contention because the Board was unable "to make the necessary, reflective assessment of [Mr. Mitman's] opinion."67 The Board reasoned that Petitioners had not articulated "any reason why the [DEIS] falls short of any legal or regulatory obligations" or is "materially inadequate."68 Finally, the Board considered each of the contention's nine bullet points and found that each was either too vague, unsupported, failed to dispute relevant portions of the DEIS, or a combination of these shortcomings.69

c.

Petitioners' Appeal Does Not Show Reversible Error Petitioners first argue that the Board rejected the contention "for relying on Mr. Mitman's declaration" and because the support was found in Mr. Mitman's declaration rather than the text of the contention itself. 70 Petitioners state that the nine bullet points set forth in the contention itself summarize five pages of Mr. Mitman's declaration (which in turn cited to specific pages within the Technical NAPS Review). Petitioners contend that their pleading did not attempt to 65 Id., see also 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(1).

66 LBP-24-7, 100 NRC at 66 & n.83; Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Palisades Nuclear Plant and Big Rock Point Site), CLl-22-8, 96 NRC 1, 100 (2022); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), CLl-89-3, 29 NRC 234, 240-41 (1989).

• 67 LBP-24-7, 100 NRC at 67 (quoting USEC Inc. (American Centrifuge Plant), CLl-06-10, 63 NRC 451,472 (2006)).

68 Id.

69 Id. at 67-69.

70 Appeal at 21.

incorporate "massive documents," and therefore Seabrook does not support the Board's ruling here.71 To the extent that the Board suggested in its ruling on Contention 2 (and also with Contention 3 below) that it would not consider Mr. Mitman's declaration because it was incorporated by reference, we find the Board erred. In Palisades and Big Rock Point, we rejected a petitioner's attempt to simply point to "other parties' contentions" as support for its own. 72 In contrast, Petitioners here offered a declaration drafted specifically to support their petition. Mr. Mitman's declaration consisted of about seventeen pages, broken down into labeled sections and subsections and numbered paragraphs.73 The portion of the declaration devoted to Contention 2 is no more than six pages, which in turn cites six pages of his Technical NAPS Review. 74 Contentions 2 and 3 also cite to specific numbered paragraphs in the declaration. These are not the "sizeable" or "massive documents" that we stated in Seabrook may not be "simply" incorporated by reference.75 In our view, Mr. Mitman's declaration generally supported Petitioners' contentions. Although we find the Board erred, we also find the error harmless with respect to Contention 2.

71 Id.

72 CLl-22-8, 96 NRC at 100.

73 See generally Mitman Declaration.

74 See Mitman Declaration at 9-14. The portion of Mr. Mitman's declaration devoted to Contention 3 is three pages, which in turn cites to three pages of his Technical NAPS Review, which are also labeled with headings titled "Climate Change," "Accident risk evaluations for climate change must be site-specific," and "Effects of climate change considerations on Probabilistic Analysis."

75 See Seabrook, 29 NRC at 240-41. Although Seabrook did not describe how "massive" the referenced documents were, the decision cited for support a Board decision, Tennessee Valley Authority (Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-76-10, 3 NRC 209, 216 (1976),

wherein the Board rejected a petitioner's attempt to incorporate by reference 3,000 pages into his pleading.

The Board's error was harmless because Petitioners did not explain how Mr. Mitman's opinions would demonstrate that the DEIS falls short of legal requirements, and thus the contention failed to show a genuine dispute with the DEIS. The Board gave as an example Mr.

Mitman's statement that the DEIS is inadequate "for making broad generalizations about external event [CDF] based on extrapolations from internal event CDF values," rather than using plant-specific values. 76 As the Board pointed out, although Mr. Mitman makes this same assertion in both his declaration and his Technical NAPS Review, Petitioners provide no further explanation about why such data is legally required to be considered or how the information presented in the DEIS might be legally insufficient.77 Of the various bullet points supporting Contention 2, Petitioners' appeal addresses only one specifically. 78 In bullet point four, Petitioners argued that the DEIS does not consider external flooding risk and the "subsequent ingress of water into the turbine building" and that "flooding poses a significant accident risk that has not been addressed in the [DEIS]."79 Although Petitioners did not cite to Mr. Mitman's declaration specifically, his declaration in section C.2 includes three paragraphs that discuss flooding from an external event. 80 But the Board rejected this bullet point because it did not dispute the specific portions of the DEIS that discussed external flooding risk. 81 76 LBP-24-7, 100 NRC at 67 (citing Petition at 13).

77 Id. See Mitman Declaration at,r 31; Technical NAPS Review at 7-8.

78 See Appeal at 23.

79 Petition at 13-14.

80 See Mitman Declaration,r,r 34-36.

81 Flooding is discussed in DEIS§ 3.5.1 at 3-24 to 3-26 and app. F § 4.3 at F-21 (concerning post-Fukushima seismic and fooding reevaluations); § 3.5.1.1 at 3-28 (discussing FEMA-delineated flood hazard areas and measures to protect structures, systems, and components important to safety from the probable maximum flood); and app. F §§ 1.4, 3.2 (discussing the effects of external events on accident hazards, including earthquakes and flooding).

On appeal, Petitioners argue that Mr. Mitman's declaration supports bullet point four, but we agree with the Board that the few paragraphs of the declaration relating to this claim fall short of providing the required support.82 First, Mr. Mitman argues that the only external events Appendix F "explicitly" considers are seismic events, to the exclusion of other external events such as flooding, external fires, and tornadoes.83 But these other events are discussed; Appendix F explains that they do not contribute significantly to risk.84 Next, Mr. Mitman provides a single example to support his argument that the DEIS omits significant analyses. He points to a 2013 evaluation performed by VEPCO that showed that a "local intense precipitation event" could create a flooding risk in the turbine building and the Staffs response to that evaluation requesting additional information. 85 But Mr. Mitman ignores the licensee's 2017 response to the information request and the NRC Staffs 2017 conclusion that the licensee had demonstrated effective flood protection for local intense precipitation, streams and river flooding, and dam failure. 86 In short, this risk was investigated and resolved more than seven years ago with a finding that the licensee had effective flood protection in place. Petitioners provide no reason why NEPA would require this particular evaluation to be discussed specifically in the DEIS.

We therefore affirm the Board's decision to reject this contention.

82 Appeal at 23 (citing Mitman Declaration at,m 33-36).

83 See Mitman Declaration at,i 33.

84 See DEIS at F-8 lines 4-12, F-10 at lines 24-37, F-11 at lines 39-41.

85 Mitman Declaration,i,i 34-35. Mr. Mitman cites to a 2013 post-Fukushima analysis from the licensee that raised this issue and to a 2015 information request from the NRC Staff requiring additional analysis to address the "reevaluated flood hazards." See Letter from Eugene Grecheck, VEPCO, to NRC Document Control Desk (Mar. 11, 2013), Attach. 1, Flooding Hazard Reevaluation Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Flooding (Mar. 2013) (ML13318A090 (package)); Letter from Victor Hall, NRC, to David Heacock, VEPCO (Sept. 25, 2015) (ML15238A844).

86 See Letter from Mark Sartain, VEPCO, to NRC Document Control Desk, Attach. 1, Flooding Focused Evaluation Summary (June 29, 2017) (ML17186A084); Letter from Frankie Vega, NRC, to Daniel Stoddard, VEPCO (Dec. 15, 2017) (ML17325B644).

3.

Contention 3: Failure to Consider Impacts of Climate Change

a.

Petitioners' Claims Petitioners' third contention claimed that the DEIS is defective because it does not consider the effects of climate change on accident risk. On April 11, 2024, Petitioners moved to amend Contention 3 to include as support a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report that recommended that the NRC "fully consider the potential effects of climate change" in its decision making.87 Petitioners' Amended Contention 3, as set forth in their motion to amend, stated:

The [DEIS] fails to satisfy NEPA or NRC implementing regulation 10 C.F.R.

§ 51. 71 because it does not address the effects of climate change on accident risk. No such discussion can be found in Section 3.11.6.9 or Appendix F. To the contrary, the NRC asserts that "the effects of climate change are outside the scope of the NRC staff's SLR review."... Only if the NRC can say that the effects of climate change are so small as to be "remote and speculative" can it avoid addressing those effects in its environmental review. And the Executive Branch of the U.S. government, including [Council on Environmental Quality] and other federal agencies, has stated in no uncertain terms that climate change poses a current and future threat to critical infrastructure that should be addressed now in NEPA reviews and all other decision-making processes.

[T]he [DEIS's] failure to address climate change impacts on accident risk constitutes a significant deficiency because climate change demonstrably affects the frequency and intensity of some external events and therefore has the potential to significantly increase accident risks. Moreover, the frequency and intensity of climate change effects are increasing over time. 88 Petitioners argued in Contention 3 that the NRC does not use climate projections data to assess changes in accident risk.89 According to Petitioners, the GAO report supported their claim that 87 Motion by Beyond Nuclear and the Sierra Club to Amend Their Contention 3 Regarding Failure to Consider Environmental Impacts of Climate Change (Apr. 11, 2024) (Contention 3);

see also Contention 3, Attach. A, GAO-106326, "Nuclear Power Plants: NRC Should Take Actions to Fully Consider the Potential Effects of Climate Change" (Apr. 2024) (GAO Report).

88 Contention 3 at 2-3 (footnote references to corrected hearing request omitted).

89 Id. at 5.

the NRC does not systematically address the effects of climate change in its license renewal decisions. 90 In his declaration, Mr. Mitman argued that the DEIS must address how changing climate conditions affect accident risk over the entire renewal period.91 He stated that climate change has already started to increase the frequency and intensity of external events that could increase risk to the facility, such as flooding, wildfires, and tornadoes.92 He opined that in addition to increasing the frequency and intensity of initiating events, climate change can also "increase the probability of failure of design features or mitigation equipment."93 Finally, Mr.

Mitman stated that the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration has sponsored "a project to modernize the probable maximum precipitation (PMP) methodology," including "approaches for estimating PMP in a changing climate" and that the NRC has participated in at least one of the workshops. 94

b.

NRC's Consideration of Climate Change and the GAO Report In a 2009 decision, we directed the Staff to consider greenhouse gas emissions in its NEPA reviews.95 Accordingly, the Staff considers climate change in its environmental review, but it focuses on how continuing operations of the plant, and the alternatives, will affect or contribute to climate change.

90 Id. at 4-5.

91 See Technical NAPS Review at 7.

92 Id. ; see also Mitman Declaration,-r 49.

93 Technical NAPS Review at 9; see also Mitman Declaration,-r 57.

94 Technical NAPS Review at 9; see also Mitman Declaration,-r 59.

95 See Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (William States Lee Ill Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2),

CLl-09-21, 70 NRC 927, 931 (2009). We directed that the Staff consider emissions from the uranium fuel cycle and from construction and operation of the facility to be licensed.

DEIS section 3.14 discusses impacts common to all alternatives, and section 3.14.3.1 discusses greenhouse gas emissions both from the continued operation of North Anna and from replacement power alternatives and how these could contribute to climate change. For example, the DEIS discusses how continued operation of North Anna will contribute to greenhouse gas emissior,s through workforce commuting.96 Further, section 3.14.3.2 discusses how climate has changed, and is projected to change, worldwide and in the vicinity of North Anna.

But consistent with our prior decisions that NEPA does not mandate safety reviews, the DEIS states that the "effects of climate change on North Anna structures, systems and components are outside the scope of the NRC staffs SLR environmental review."97 The DEIS reiterates that its purpose is to document "the potential effects from the continued nuclear power plant operation on the environment" and that environmental hazards to the facility are considered through ongoing safety reviews and oversight programs.98 The GAO report that Petitioners cite recommended ways that NRC could "fully consider" climate change in its safety reviews but, notably, made no recommendations regarding the agency's approach to its environmental reviews.99 The GAO report emphasized that many of the expected effects of climate change, including heat, drought, wildfires, flooding, hurricanes, sea level rise, and extreme cold weather events, can be expected to affect operations at nuclear power plants. 100 The GAO report noted that current regulations require power plant operators to ensure that their plants are protected against natural hazards, that the NRC conducts regular inspections, and that the NRC "ensures that the licensee is operating in accordance with its 96 See DEIS, tbl. 3-32, at 3-191.

91 DEIS at 3-194.

9s Id.

99 See GAO Report.

100 Id. at 13.

license."101 The report acknowledged that NRC regulations include limiting conditions of operation, which require the licensee to take appropriate actions if external conditions-such as an extreme weather event-exceed the limiting conditions for operation.102 The report also recognized the NRC's approach of using conservatism, safety margins, defense-in-depth, inspections, and probabilistic risk assessments to prevent and mitigate accidents.103 The report further described actions the agency took in response to the recommendations of the NRC's Near-Term Task Force on Fukushima Dai-ichi, including the creation of the Process for the Ongoing Assessment of Natural Hazard lnformation.104 The bulk of the report focused on the number of existing plants that are likely to face challenges from each category of extreme weather event. 105 The report recommended that the NRC Chair direct the Staff to: 1) "assess whether its licensing and oversight processes adequately address the potential for increased risks... from climate change," 2) "develop, finalize, and implement a plan to address any gaps identified in its assessment of existing processes," and 3) "develop and finalize guidance on incorporating climate projections data into relevant processes."106 In short, all of GAO's recommendations concerned how the NRC could use climate projections to enhance our safety reviews and oversight; none concerned changing our environmental reviews.

101 Id. at 10.

102 Id. (citing 10 C.F.R. § 50.36(c)(2)(i)). In such a situation, the licensee "shall shut down the reactor," or take remedial actions allowed by its license. See 10 C.F.R. § 50.36(c)(2)(i).

103 See GAO Report at 10-12, 27-29.

104 Id. at 29-34.

105 Id. at 13-26.

106 Id. at 40.

The NRC responded to the GAO report, stating "considering the conservatisms, safety margins, and defense-in-depth policies described in the report, the NRC does not agree with the conclusion that the agency does not address the impacts of climate change."107 The response also affirmed that the NRC Staff will assess the safety significance of any gaps in existing processes, if identified, when reviewing the recent climate assessment. In addition, the response noted that the Staff will determine whether any regulatory guides need updating, and whether formulation of new guidance is warranted.108

c.

Board Ruling A majority of the Board rejected Contention 3 for a variety of reasons. It found that the contention was out of scope of the license proceeding because it was not based on "new" information; 109 that the contention was speculative because it did not show that climate change risks would be sufficient to "actually affect North Anna accident risk;"110 and neither the petition nor the expert declaration "engages with the climate change projections provided in section 3.14.3.2."111 107 See Letter from Christopher T. Hanson, NRC, to Frank Rusco, U.S. Government Accountability Office (Sept. 27, 2024) (ML24256A078 (package)) (NRC Response to GAO). The response to the GAO's first recommendation affirmed that the NRC Staff will review the Fifth National Climate Assessment under its Process for the Ongoing Assessment of Natural Hazards Information. Id., Attach. at 1. See U.S. Global Change Research Program, Fifth National Climate Assessment (2023).

108 NRC Response to GAO, Attach. at 1.

109 LBP-24-7, 100 NRC at 70-71.

110 Id. at 71-72.

111 Id. at 71. The Board also found that the contention lacked specificity because it referred generally to Mr. Mitman's declaration to support it, but as stated above, we disagree with that rationale.

Judge Gibson dissented, arguing that the contention identifies a genuine dispute with the DEIS.112 Judge Gibson observed that DEIS section 3.11.6.9, "Postulated Accidents" and DEIS, Appendix F, contain no discussion of climate change. He states that the DEIS "simply notes" that precipitation has increased in Virginia and "says nothing else of consequence with respect to how these events will impact North Anna itself."113 Judge Gibson also would have found that Petitioners provided an adequate explanation of the basis of their contention in Mr. Mitman's declaration and technical review. 114 With respect to scope, Judge Gibson argued that the majority accepted an erroneous argument advanced by the Staff that CLl-22-3 precludes Petitioners from challenging any information that previously appeared in the 2021 DSEIS.115 Judge Gibson also rejected what he perceived to be a presumption by the Staff that the impacts of climate change on the plant itself are "per se" out of scope of the environmental review. 116 Judge Gibson opined that this presumption so tightly circumscribes the permissible scope of the environmental review for license renewal so as to confine consideration of climate change to nothing more than review of a plant's impact on climate change.117

d.

Petitioners Show No Reversible Error with Contention 3 We defer to the Board majority's conclusion that the contention failed to establish a genuine dispute on a material issue. We have long held that when a proposed contention 112 Dissent, 100 NRC at 78.

113 Id. at 5.

114 Id. at 6-7.

115 Id. at 9-10.

116 Id. at 11. Judge Gibson noted that at oral argument the Staff stated "the effects of climate change on North Anna... structures, systems and components are outside the *scope of the

[S]taff s SLR environmental review.... [The Staff does not] look at the effect on plant systems here in this EIS that is caused by climate change." Id. (citing Tr. at 189-92).

117 Id. at 15-16.

challenges an accident risk analysis, "the proper question is not whether there are plausible alternative choices for use in the analysis, but whether the analysis that was done is reasonable under NEPA."118 Because "it will always be possible to envision and propose some alternate approach, some additional detail to include, [or] some refinement," licensing boards must consider whether the analysis that has been done is reasonable. 119 "Unless a petitioner sets forth a supported contention pointing to an apparent error or deficiency that may have significantly skewed the environmental conclusions, there is no genuine material dispute for hearing."120 In finding that the contention failed to raise a genuine material dispute, the Board majority found that although Petitioners had provided "reasonable support for the proposition that climate change effects can alter accident risk," they had not supported the assertion that climate change would affect accident risk in a way that provides a "seriously different picture" of environmental impacts.121 The Board majority noted that the two paragraphs of Mr. Mitman's declaration that Petitioners cite "only provide speculation" that climate change could impact accident risk.122 That is, Mr. Mitman stated that climate change will increase the frequency and severity of events such as flooding, and that "turbine building flooding resulting from a [locally 118 NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC (Seabrook Station, Unit 1), CLl-12-5, 75 NRC 301, 323 (2012). An admissible contention "must point to a deficiency in the application" and not be a mere '"suggestion[]' of other ways an analysis could have been done." Id.; see also FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co. (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLl-12-8, 75 NRC 393, 406-07 (2012).

119 Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2),

CLl-16-11, 83 NRC 524, 532 (2016) (quoting Seabrook, CLl-12-5, 75 NRC at 323).

120 Davis-Besse, CLl-12-8, 75 NRC at 407.

121 LBP-24-7, 100 NRC at 72.

122 Id. at 72 n.119; see Mitman Declaration at,r,r 48, 51.

intense precipitation] event... will be significantly exacerbated."123 But Mr. Mitman does not explain where this information comes from-that is, whether there is a specific study or climate projection showing that locally intense precipitation will increase at North Anna. Nor does Mr.

Mitman discuss whether a locally intense precipitation event would overwhelm the measures the licensee took to address this issue in 2017 (discussed above). 124 Therefore, we agree with the Board majority that Mr. Mitman's declaration on these points is speculative. 125 Petitioners' assertion that climate change may cause heavier rains or other weather events is insufficient to call into question the environmental impacts that are already described in the DEIS. This is because severe accident risk is not determined simply by the likelihood of an initiating event such as heavier rains, rather, it is determined by a complex analysis of how a plant would perform in an accident. An integrated risk analysis entails the combination of constituent analyses of accident (i.e., initiating event) frequency; accident progression, containment loading, and structural response; transport of radioactive material; and offsite consequences. 126 And although they dispute the magnitude of the reduction, Petitioners acknowledge the DEIS finding that upgrades to North Anna have further reduced severe 123 Mitman Declaration at,I 51.

124 See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.

125 We observe that the Board majority did not adopt the position that climate change impacts to the plant are "per se" out of scope of the license renewal environmental review. And Judge Gibson's point that the impacts of a changing climate could (at least plausibly) affect a plant's accident risk is well taken. See Dissent, 100 NRC at 88.

126 See, e.g., "Severe Accident Risks: An Assessment for Five U.S. Nuclear Power Plants,"

NUREG-1150, vol. 1 (Dec. 1990), at 2-1 (ML100780066). NUREG-1150 provides the results of the integrated risk analyses for five individual operating plants. NUREG-1150, Volume 2, Appendix A provides an overview of how each of these analyses is performed. See generally id., vol. 2, app. A (ML100780067). Volume 2, Appendix B follows an example calculation from initiating event in the accident frequency analysis to the offsite risk. Id., vol. 2, app. B. Volume 2, Appendix C, discusses issues important to quantification of risk. Id., vol. 2, app. C. Volume 3, Appendices D and E, responds to comments. Id., vol. 3, apps. D and E (ML100780063).

accident risk since the time of the plant's initial license renewal-when the environmental impacts associated with severe accidents were found to be small. 127 Further, the GAO report that Petitioners cite does not bolster their claim that climate change has or will alter the severe accident impacts from extended operations at North Anna.

The GAO report only made recommendations for how the agency could use climate change projections-as opposed to historical climate data-in its safety oversight programs. The GAO report did not assume-as Petitioners seem to do here-that an increase in extreme weather events will inevitably lead to an increase in releases to the environment. As we affirmed in our response to the GAO report, the NRC's reactor oversight is dynamic and takes into account emergent safety issues that may develop as a result of climate change. Therefore, we find no reversible error and affirm the Board majority's decision to reject this contention.

127 See Technical NAPS Review at 5 (citing DEIS at F-18); see also 1996 LR GEIS§ 5.5.2. The NRC generically determined the environmental impacts of severe accidents to be small in 1996.

Id. Subsequent analyses using updated plant information show that severe accident risk from external events at North Anna has decreased since then. See DEIS at F-10 to F-12.

Ill.

CONCLUSION For the reasons described above, we affirm the Board's decision denying the hearing.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 4th day of March 2026 For the Commission

~M~

Carrie M. Safford Secretary of the Commission

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of

)

)

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY

)

Docket Nos. 50-338-SLR-2

)

50-339-SLR-2 (North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2)

)

)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing COMMISSION MEMORANDUM AND ORDER (CLI-26-1) have been served upon the following by Electronic Information Exchange.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Commission Appellate Adjudication Mail Stop: O-16B33 Washington, DC 20555-0001 E-mail: ocaamail.resource@nrc.gov U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of the Secretary of the Commission Mail Stop: O-16B33 Washington, DC 20555-0001 E-mail: hearingdocket@nrc.gov U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Mail Stop: T-3F23 Washington, DC 20555-0001 Michael M. Gibson, Chair, Administrative Judge Nicholas G. Trikouros, Administrative Judge Dr. Gary S. Arnold, Administrative Judge E-mail: michael.gibson@nrc.gov nicholas.trikouros@nrc.gov gary.arnold@nrc.gov U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of the General Counsel Mail Stop - O-14A44 Washington, DC 20555-0001 David E. Roth, Esq.

Sherwin E. Turk, Esq.

Susan H. Vrahoretis, Esq.

Anne Fream, Paralegal Georgiann Hampton, Paralegal E-mail: david.roth@nrc.gov sherwin.turk@nrc.gov susan.vrahoretis@nrc.gov Anne.Fream@nrc.gov Georgiann.Hampton@nrc.gov Counsel for Virginia Electric and Power Company Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLC 1111 Pennsylvania Ave NW Washington, DC 20004 Paul Bessette, Esq.

Scott Clausen, Esq.

Ryan K. Lighty, Esq.

E-mail: paul.bessette@morganlewis.com scott.clausen@morganlewis.com ryan.lighty@morganlewis.com

Virginia Electric and Power Company (North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2, Docket Nos. 50-338-SLR-2 and 50-339-SLR-2)

COMMISSION MEMORANDUM AND ORDER (CLI-26-1) 2 Counsel for Beyond Nuclear and Sierra Club Harmon, Curran, Spielberg, &

Eisenberg, LLP 1725 DeSales Street, N.W.

Suite 500 Washington, DC 20036 Diane Curran E-mail: dcurran@harmoncurran.com Beyond Nuclear Reactor Oversight Project 7304 Carroll Avenue #182 Takoma Park, MD 20912 Paul Gunter E-mail: paul@beyondnuclear.org Office of the Secretary of the Commission Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 4th day of March 2026.

CLARA SOLA Digitally signed by CLARA SOLA Date: 2026.03.04 11:37:04 -05'00'