DCL-25-078, Supplement to License Amendment Request 24-05 Revision to Technical Specifications to Adopt Risk-Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b

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Supplement to License Amendment Request 24-05 Revision to Technical Specifications to Adopt Risk-Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b
ML25335A205
Person / Time
Site: Diablo Canyon  
(DPR-080, DPR-082)
Issue date: 11/26/2025
From: Rogers J
Pacific Gas & Electric Co
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Document Control Desk
References
DCL-25-078, EPID L-2024-LLA-0177
Download: ML25335A205 (0)
v • d • e


Text

Pacific Gas and Electric Company" Justin E. Rogers Slalion Direclor Diablo Canyon Power Plan!

Mail code 104/5/502 P.O. Box 56 Avila Beach, CA 93424 805.545.3088 Juslin.Rogers@pge.com PG&E Letter DCL-25-078 10 CFR 50.90 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2 Docket No. 50-275, OL-DPR-80 Docket No. 50-323, OL-DPR-82 Supplement to License Amendment Request 24-05 Revision to Technical Specifications to Adopt Risk-Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, "Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times -

RITSTF Initiative 4b" Reference 1: PG&E Letter DCL-24-111, "License Amendment Request 24-05 Revision to Technical Specifications to Adopt Risk-Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, 'Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b,' for TS 3.3.1 and 3.3.2" dated December 24, 2024 (ADAMS Accession No. ML24359A002) 2: NRC Letter Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 AND 2 -

Regulatory Audit Plan in Support of License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt Risk-Informed Completion Times for Technical Specifications 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 (EPID L-2024-LLA-0177), dated April 9, 2025

Dear Commissioners and Staff:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) submitted Reference 1 that requested approval of a proposed amendment to the Technical Specifications (TS) for Diablo Canyon Power Plant Units 1 and 2 to implement risk-informed Completion Times for TS 3.3.1 and 3.3.2. In Reference 2, the staff informed PG&E of a virtual regulatory audit to support staff review of the Reference 1 request. In support of the audit, the staff provided questions and PG&E provided responses that were discussed in an audit teleconference call on July 31, 2025. The staff requested PG&E submit the response to several of the staff audit questions to support the staff safety evaluation.

The response in the Enclosure does not impact the significant hazards evaluation or environment evaluation contained in Reference 1.

A member o f the STARS (Strategic Teaming and Reso urce Sharing)

Al liance Cal l awa y, Diablo Canyon,

Palo Verde,

Wol f Creek

Document Control Desk Page 2 PG&E Letter DCL-25-078 PG&E makes no regulatory commitment (as defined by NEI 99-04) in this letter.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.91, PG&E is sending a copy of this letter to the California Department of Public Health.

If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact James Morris, Regulatory Services Manager, at 805-545-4609.

I state under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Sincerely, Justin E. Rogers Station Director

./11..-rrue w 13, a 1t tf" t_

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Ju.Jr/,-J

(.}.. c. <l, (:' /t.)

kjse/ SAPN 51263068-02 Enclosure cc:

Diablo Distribution

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Date cc/enc:

Anthony Chu, Branch Chief, California Dept of Public Health Mahdi 0. Hayes, NRC Senior Resident Inspector Samson S. Lee, NRR Project Manager John D. Monninger, NRC Region IV Deputy Administrator A

member of the STARS (Strategic Teaming and Resource Sharing)

Alliance Cal la way

  • Dlablo Canyon
  • Pa l o Verde
  • Wolf Creek

Enclosure PG&E Letter DCL-25-078 Supplement to License Amendment Request 24-05 "Revision to Technical Specifications to Adopt Risk-Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, 'Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times -

RITSTF Initiative 4b' for TS 3.3.1 and 3.3.2" Pursuant to 1 0 CFR 50.90, Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) submitted PG&E Letter DCL-24-111, "License Amendment Request 24-05 Revision to Technical Specifications to Adopt Risk-Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2,

'Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b,' for TS 3.3.1 and 3.3.2" dated December 24, 2024, (hereafter referred to as: DCPP TSTF-505 Instrumentation LAR) that requested approval of a proposed amendment to the Technical Specifications (TS) for Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) Units 1 and 2 to implement Risk-Informed Completion Times (RICT) for TS 3.3.1 and 3.3.2. In support of the staff regulatory audit, the staff provided questions and PG&E provided responses that were discussed on July 31, 2025. The staff requested PG&E submit the response to several of the staff audit questions to support the staff's safety evaluation for the requested License Amendment Request (LAR). The response to the audit questions is contained in this Enclosure.

NRC Instrumentation and Control Branch Question 1 Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF) traveler TSTF-505 Revision 2 (ML18183A493) PDF page 113 of 850 states:

The description of proposed changes to the protective instrumentation and control features in TS [Technical Specification] Section 3.3, "Instrumentation,"

should confirm that at least one redundant or diverse means (other automatic features or manual action) to accomplish the safety functions (for example, reactor trip, SI [safety injection], containment isolation, etc.) remains available during use of the RICT [risk-informed completion time], consistent with the defense-in-depth philosophy as specified in RG [Regulatory Guide] 1.174. (Note that for each application, the staff may selectively audit the licensing basis of the most risk-significant functions with proposed RICTs to verify that such diverse means exist.)

The LAR does not seem to include an evaluation to address the above. Please provide response.

PG&E Response:

The DCPP TSTF-505 Instrumentation LAR relies on the TS required Reactor Trip System (RTS) and Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) redundancy to support the use of a RICT Program and does not rely on diverse means for actuation.

The redundancy for the RTS is described in the DCPP TS 3.3.1 Bases, which states:

1

Enclosure PG&E Letter DCL-25-078 "Generally, if a parameter is used only for input to the protection circuits, three channels with a two-out-of-three logic are sufficient to provide the required reliability and redundancy. If one channel fails in a direction that would not result in a partial Function trip, the Function is still OPERABLE with a two-out-of-two logic. If one channel fails, such that a partial Function trip occurs, a trip will not occur and the Function is still OPERABLE with a one-out-of-two logic.

Generally, if a parameter is used for input to the Solid State Protection System (SSPS) and a control function, four channels with a two-out-of-four logic are sufficient to provide the required reliability and redundancy. In the case of the Digital Feedwater Control System (DFWCS), the median/signal select (MSS) feature prevents control/protection interaction even though there are only three inputs and 2-out-of-3 logic. The circuit must be able to withstand both an input failure to the control system, which may then require the protection function actuation, and a single failure in the other channels providing the protection function actuation. Again, a single failure will neither cause nor prevent the protection function actuation. These requirements are described in IEEE-279-1971 (TS Bases Ref. 4 ). The actual number of channels required for each unit parameter is specified in Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR),

Chapter 7.

Two logic channels are required to ensure no single random failure of a logic channel will disable the RTS. The logic channels are designed such that testing required while the reactor is at power may be accomplished without causing a trip. The process Protection System is designed to permit any one channel to be tested and maintained at power in a bypass mode. If a channel has been bypassed for any purpose, the bypass is continuously indicated in the control room as required by applicable codes and standards. As an alternative to testing in the bypass mode, testing in the trip mode is also possible and permitted."

The redundancy for the SSPS equipment that supports the RTS is described in the DCPP TS 3.3.1 Bases, which states:

"The SSPS equipment is used for the decision logic processing of outputs from the signal processing equipment bistables. To meet the redundan cy requirements, two trains of SSPS, each performing the same functions, are provided. If one train is taken out of service for maintenance or test purposes, the second train will provide reactor trip and/or ES FAS actuation for the unit. If both trains are taken out of service or placed in test, a reactor trip will result.

Each train is packaged in its own cabinet for physical and electrical separation to satisfy separation and independence requirements. The system has been designed to trip in the event of a loss of power, directing the unit to a safe shutdown condition."

2

Enclosure PG&E Letter DCL-25-078 The redundancy for the ESFAS equipment is described in the DCPP TS 3.3.2 Bases, which states:

"Signal Processing Equipment Generally, three or four channels of process control equipment are used for the signal processing of unit parameters measured by the field instruments. The process control equipment provides signal conditioning, comparable output signals for instruments located on the main control board, and comparison of measured input signals with setpoints established by safety analyses. These setpoints are defined in UFSAR, Chapter 6 (TS Bases Ref. 1 ), Chapter 7 (TS Bases Ref. 2), and Chapter 15 (TS Bases Ref. 3). If the measured value of a unit parameter exceeds the predetermined setpoint, an output from a bistable is forwarded to the SSPS for decision evaluation. Channel separation is maintained up to and through the input bays. However, not all unit parameters require four channels of sensor measurement and signal processing. Some unit parameters provide input only to the SSPS, while others provide input to the SSPS, the main control board, the unit computer, and one or more control systems.

Generally, if a parameter is used only for input to the protection circuits, three channels with a two-out-of-three logic are sufficient to provide the required reliability and redundancy. If one channel fails in a direction that would not result in a partial Function trip, the Function is still OPERABLE with a two-out-of-two logic. If one channel fails such that a partial Function trip occurs, a trip will not occur and the Function is still OPERABLE with a one-out-of-two logic.

Generally, if a parameter is used for input to the SSPS and a control function,

four channels with a two-out-of-four logic are sufficient to provide the required reliability and redundancy. In the case of the DFWCS, the median/signal select (MSS) feature prevents control/protection interaction even though there are only three inputs and 2-out-of-3 logic. The circuit must be able to withstand both an input failure to the control system, which may then require the protection function actuation, and a single failure in the other channels providing the protection function actuation. Again, a single failure will neither cause nor prevent the protection function actuation."

The DFWCS MSS feature, which prevents control/protection interaction with only three inputs by a 2-out-of-3 logic, was approved by the NRC in Amendments 56 and 55 on July 12, 1990.

Table E1-1 in Enclosure 1 of the DCPP TSTF-505 Instrumentation LAR provides the number of RTS and ESFAS channels/trains that exists for each function in the column 3

Enclosure PG&E Letter DCL-25-078 "SSCs Covered by TS LCO/ Condition" and the number of channels/trains that are needed to provide the RTS and ESFAS actuation in the "Design Success Criteria" column. For all RTS and ESFAS functions in Table E1-1, the number of channels/trains needed for "design success" is less than the number of channels/trains required by the TS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) Condition, except for RTS Function 16.b, Turbine Trip - Turbine Stop Valve Closure, which will not and is not required to operate in the presence of a single channel failure.

The basis for why RTS Function 16.b, Turbine Trip - Turbine Stop Valve Closure, is not required to operate in the presence of a single channel failure is provided in the TS 3.3.1 Bases which states:

"Turbine Trip-Turbine Stop Valve Closure. This trip Function will not and is not required to operate in the presence of a single channel failure. The unit is designed to withstand a complete loss of load and not sustain core damage or challenge the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure limitations. Core protection is provided by the Pressurizer Pressure-High trip Function, and RCS integrity is ensured by the pressurizer safety valves. This trip Function is diverse to the Turbine Trip-Low Auto Stop Oil Pressure trip Function. Each turbine stop valve is equipped with one limit switch that inputs to the RTS. If all four limit switches indicate that the stop valves are all closed, a reactor trip is initiated above P-9. The Limiting Safety System Setting for this Function is set to assure channel trip occurs when the associated stop valve is completely closed. The LCO requires four Turbine Trip-Turbine Stop Valve Closure channels, one per valve, to be OPERABLE in MODE 1 above P-9. All four channels must trip to cause reactor trip."

NRC Instrumentation and Control Branch Question 2 The explanation of technical variations (see attachment 4 of the LAR, page 5 of 5 -

PDF page 80 of 160): (a) TS 3.3. 1 Condition X, and {b) TS 3. 3.2 Condition M, does not state that there is no loss of function. Please explain why there is no loss of function, or if there is a loss of function, please provide adequate justification or propose a NOTE restricting use of the RICT to only one channel inoperable. Provide a Table for the UFSAR Chapter 15 accidents that provides the primary and backup RTS and ESFAS functions that provide protection.

4

PG&E Response:

Enclosure PG&E Letter DCL-25-078 The TS 3.3.1 Condition X (One or more SG Water Level Low - Low Trip Time Delay channel(s) inoperable) and TS 3.3.2 Condition M (One or more SG Water Level - Low Low Trip Time Delay channel(s) inoperable) functions each have four channels, and require two out of four channels to actuate the function as described in the DCPP TSTF-505 LAR Table E1-1, and thus there is no loss of function if one channel is inoperable.

Other plant instrument functions (e.g., Anticipated Transient Without Scram Mitigation System Actuation Circuitry) could be credited to provide diversity for these functions if two or more instrument channels are inoperable, however the diversity cannot be credited over the full range of TS Applicability for these functions.

The following Note described in the NRC safety evaluation for TSTF-505 Revision 2 dated November 21, 2018, is being added to TS 3.3.1 Condition X and TS 3.3.2 Condition M: "NOTE: Not applicable when two or more required channels are inoperable."

This NOTE is included in order to ensure there is no loss of function for use of the proposed RICT when more than one channel is inoperable. The addition of this NOTE is the only change to TS 3.3.1 Condition X and TS 3.3.2 Condition M, when compared to the DCPP TSTF-505 Instrumentation LAR.

The revised TS pages 3.3-7 and 3.3-23 are contained in Attachment 1 to the Enclosure of this letter. These two pages supersede the corresponding pages previously provided in Attachment 2 of the DCPP TSTF-505 Instrumentation LAR.

The Table 1 below tabulates all the DCPP UFSAR Chapter 15 events and identifies which primary RTS and ESFAS functions are credited in the third column. The diverse (i.e., backup) RTS or ESFAS instrumentation functions in the fifth column represent a diverse means of performing the protective action but are not analyzed as providing the same function. For accidents designated as "historical" after the event description, these accidents are no longer specifically analyzed as part of the design basis, but remain in the UFSAR for historical purposes. For the third and fifth columns with an N/A, the event analysis does not model or credit an RTS or ESFAS function. This Table 1 supplements the information provided in the DCPP TSTF-505 Instrumentation LAR,.

5

UFSAR Section 15.2.1 15.2.2 15.2.3 15.2.4 Enclosure PG&E Letter DCL-25-078 Table 1 - Primary and Diverse Means of Mitigating UFSAR Chapter 15 Events Event Description RTS or ESFAS Signal(s) Actuated Loss Diverse RTS or ESFAS of Instrumentation Power UNCONTROLLED Power Range High Neutron Flux Reactor N/A Source Range High Neutron ROD CLUSTER Trip (Low Setting)

Flux Reactor Trip CONTROL Intermediate Range High ASS EMBLY BANK Neutron Flux Reactor Trip WITHDRAWAL FROM Power Range High Neutron A SUBCRITICAL Flux Reactor Trip (High Setting)

CONDITION Power Range High Positive Neutron Flux Rate Trip UNCONTROLLED Power Range High Neutron Flux Reactor N/A Overpower 6T Reactor Trip ROD CLUSTER Trip (High Setting)

High Pressurizer Pressure CONTROL Overtemperature 6T Reactor Trip Reactor Trip ASSEMBLY BANK High Pressurizer Water Level WITHDRAWAL AT Reactor Trip POWER Power Range High Positive Neutron Flux Rate Trip ROD CLUSTER Operator action credited to mitigate this event.

N/A Manual Reactor Trip CONTROL ASSEMBLY MISOPERATION UNCONTROLLED During startup - Source Range High N/A Overpower 6T Reactor Trip BORON DILUTION Neutron Flux Reactor Trip High Pressurizer Pressure

High Pressurizer Water Level At Power - Overtemperature 6T Reactor Reactor Trip Trip 6

UFSAR Event Description RTS or ESFAS Signal(s) Actuated Section 15.2.5 PARTIAL LOSS OF Reactor Coolant Flow-Low Reactor Trip FORCED REACTOR COOLANT FLOW (Historical) 15.2.6 STARTUP OF AN Reactor Coolant Flow-Low Reactor Trip INACTIVE REACTOR when the power range neutron flux (two-COOLANT LOOP out-of-four channels) exceeds the P-8 (Historical) setpoint 15.2.7 LOSS OF EXTERNAL High Pressurizer Pressure Reactor Trip ELECTRICAL LOAD Steam Generator (SG) Water Level-Low AND/OR TURBINE Low Reactor Trip TRIP Overtemperature LlT Reactor Trip 15.2.8 LOSS OF NORMAL Steam Generator (SG) Water Level-Low FEEDWATER Low Reactor Trip Auxiliary Feedwater actuated by SG Water Level-Low Low 15.2.9 LOSS OF OFFSITE

Loss of Power N/A N/A N/A N/A Yes N/A Enclosure PG&E Letter DCL-25-078 Diverse RTS or ESFAS Instrumentation Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP)

Breaker Position Manual Reactor Trip High Pressurizer Water Level Reactor Trip Overpower C:.T Reactor Trip Turbine Trip - Reactor Trip High Pressurizer Water Level Reactor Trip Undervoltage RCP Trip High Pressurizer Water Level Reactor Trip

UFSAR Event Description RTS or ESFAS Signal(s) Actuated Section 15.2.1 1 SUDDEN None required.

FEEDWATER TEMPERATURE REDUCTION 15.2.12 EXCESSIVE LOAD None required.

INCREASE INCIDENT 15.2.13 ACCIDENTAL Overtemperature LiT Reactor Trip DEPRESSURIZATION OF THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 15.2.14 ACCIDENTAL Safety Injection (SI) Input from Engineered DEPRESSURIZATION Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)

OF THE MAIN STEAM Pressurizer Pressure - Low SYSTEM 15.2.15 SPURIOUS Operator Action - Terminate SI OPERATION OF THE SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM AT POWER 8

Loss of Power N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Enclosure PG&E Letter DCL-25-078 Diverse RTS or ESFAS Instrumentation Power Range High Neutron Flux Reactor Trip (High Setting)

Power Range High Neutron Flux Reactor Trip (Low Setting)

Overtemperature LH Reactor Trip Overpower 6T Reactor Trip Power Range High Neutron Flux Reactor Trip (High Setting)

Power Range High Neutron Flux Reactor Trip (Low Setting)

Overpower 6T Reactor Trip Overtemperature LiT Reactor Trio Pressurizer Pressure Low Reactor Trip

  • Safety Injection (SI) Input from Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)

Steam Line Pressure - Low

UFSAR Event Description RTS or ESFAS Signal(s) Actuated Section 15.3.1 LOSS OF REACTOR See Section 15.4.1 COOLANT FROM SMALL RUPTURED PIPES OR FROM CRACKS IN LARGE PIPES THAT ACTUATE EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM 15.3.2 MINOR SECONDARY See Section 15.4.2 SYSTEM PIPE BREAKS 15.3.3 INADVERTENT Fuel assembly loading errors are prevented by LOADING OF A FUEL administrative procedures implemented during ASSEMBLY INTO AN core loading.

IMPROPER POSITION 15.3.4 COMPLETE LOSS OF Reactor Coolant Flow-Low Reactor Trip FORCED REACTOR COOLANT FLOW 15.3.5 SINGLE ROD Overtemperature L'IT Reactor Trip CLUSTER CONTROL ASSEMBLY WITHDRAWAL AT FULL POWER 15.4.1 MAJOR REACTOR Pressurizer Pressure Low Reactor Trip COOLANT SYSTEM Safety Injection - Pressurizer Pressure -

PIPE RUPTURES Low (LOCA) 9 Loss of Power N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Yes Enclosure PG&E Letter DCL-25-078 Diverse RTS or ESFAS Instrumentation See Section 15.4.1 See Section 15.4.2 N/A Undervoltage RCPs Underfrequency RCPs RCP Breaker Position Power-Range High Neutron Flux Reactor Trip (High Setting)

Power-Range Flux Positive Neutron Flux Rate Reactor Trip Feedwater Isolation - Safety Injection Auxiliary Feedwater - Safety Injection Containment Spray -

Containment Pressure High-Hiah

UFSAR Event Description RTS or ESFAS Signal(s) Actuated Section 15.4.2.1 MAJOR SECONDARY

  • Safety Injection from any of the following:

SYSTEM PIPE 0

Pressurizer Pressure - Low RUPTURE 0

Steam Line Pressure - Low (Rupture of a Main 0

Containment Pressure - High Steam Line at Hot Zero

  • Power Range High Neutron Flux Reactor Power)

Trip (High Setting)

Overtemperature 6T Reactor Trip Overpower 6T Reactor Trip Feedwater Isolation - Safety Injection 15.4.2.2 MAJOR SECONDARY

0 Steam Line Pressure - Low 0

Containment Pressure -

High -High 0

Steam Line Pressure -

Negative Rate-High Pressurizer Pressure - High Reactor Trip Overtemperature 6T Reactor Trip Safety Injection (SI) Input from Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS):

0 Steam Line Pressure - Low 0

Containment Pressure -

High Auxiliary Feedwater - Safety Injection Containment Phase A Isolation

- Safet~jection Pressurizer Pressure Low Reactor Trip Safety Injection - Pressurizer Pressure - Low Feedwater Isolation - Safety Injection

UFSAR Event Description RTS or ESFAS Signal(s) Actuated Section 15.4.4 SINGLE REACTOR Reactor Coolant Flow Low Trip COOLANT PUMP LOCKED ROTOR 15.4.5 FUEL HANDLING N/A ACCIDENT 15.4.6 RUPTURE OF A Power Range High Neutron Flux Reactor CONTROL ROD Trip (High Setting)

DRIVE MECHANISM Power Range High Neutron Flux Reactor HOUSING (ROD Trip (Low Setting)

CLUSTER CONTROL ASSEMBLY EJECTION) 11 Loss of Power N/A N/A N/A Enclosure PG&E Letter DCL-25-078 Diverse RTS or ESFAS Instrumentation Pressurizer Pressure - High Reactor Trip Overtemperature.0.T Reactor Trip N/A Power Range Neutron Flux Rate High Positive Rate Reactor Trip

Remove Page 3.3-7 3.3-23 Enclosure PG&E Letter DCL-25-078 Revised Technical Specification Pages Insert Page 3.3-7 3.3-23

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION X.

One or more SG Water Level Low - Low Trip Time Delay channel(s) inoperable.

Y.

Required Action and associated Completion Time of Conditions B, D, E, Q, R, U, and X not met.

z.

Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition M not met.

AA. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Conditions O or P not met.

DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 REQUIRED ACTION

NO TE------------------

For function 14.b, the inoperable TTD channel (processor) and/or one additional TTD channel (processor) may be surveillance tested with the affected steam generator low-low water level channels for one TTD channel (processor) in bypass and the affected SG low-low water level channels for the other TTD channel (processor) in trip for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. This note is not intended to allow simultaneous testing of multiple TTD channels (processors) on a routine basis.

X.1 Set the Trip Time Delay to zero seconds.

OR X.2 Place the affected SG Water Level Low - Low channel(s) in trip.

Y.1 Be in MODE 3.

Z.1 Reduce THERMAL POWER to< P-7.

AA.1 Reduce THERMAL POWER to< P-9.

RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 COMPLETION TIME 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> 72 hours OR

NOTE----------

Not applicable when two or more required channels are inoperable.

In accordance with the RICT Program 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> 6 hours 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> 3.3-7 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 4-Je, 4-+-J, 4+9, Unit 2 - Amendment No. 4Je, 4--7-a, 4-&i,

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION L.

One or more channels or trains inoperable.

M. One or more SG Water Level - Low Low Trip Time Delay channel(s) inoperable.

DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 REQUIRED ACTION L.1 Verify interlock is in required state for existing unit condition.

OR L.2.1 Be in MODE 3.

AND L.2.2 Be in MODE 4.

NOTE-----------------

The inoperable TTD channel (processor) and/or one additional TTD channel (processor) may be surveillance tested with the affected steam generator low-low water level channels for one TTD channel (processor) in bypass and the affected SG low-low water level channels for the other TTD channel (processor) in trip

  • for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. This note is not intended to allow simultaneous testing of multiple TTD channels (processors) on a routine basis.

M.1 Set the Trip Time Delay to zero seconds.

OR M.2 Place the affected SG Water Level - Low Low channel(s) in trip.

ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 COMPLETION TIME 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 7 hours 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br /> 72 hours 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> OR

NO TE----------

Not applicable when two or more required channels are inoperable.

In accordance with the RICT Program (continued) 3.3-23 Unit 1 - Amendment No. ~

..m, 4+9, Unit 2 -Amendment No.~. 47-a, 4-&i,

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