ML25008A053

Comment (23) of Robert Sarvey on Pacific Gas and Electric Company; Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2; Draft Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement

ML25008A053
Person / Time
Site:	Diablo Canyon
Issue date:	12/16/2024
From:	Sarvey R - No Known Affiliation
To:	Office of Administration
References
NRC-2023-0192, 89FR87433 00023
Download: ML25008A053 (1)

Text

PUBLIC SUBMISSION As of: 1/8/25, 7:01 AM Received: December 16, 2024 Status: Pending_Post Tracking No. m4r-cdae-aq7i Comments Due: December 16, 2024 Submission Type: Web Docket: NRC-2023-0192 Pacific Gas and Electric Company; Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 Comment On: NRC-2023-0192-0013 Pacific Gas and Electric Company; Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2; Draft Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement Document: NRC-2023-0192-DRAFT-0032 Comment on FR Doc # 2024-25444 Submitter Information Name: Robert Sarvey Address:

LosOsos, CA, 93402 Email:sarveybob@aol.com Phone:2098360277 General Comment See attached file(s)

Comment File is attached Attachments Diablo Canyon Comments on NRC's DEIR.docx 12-16-24 1/8/25, 7:02 AM blob:https://www.fdms.gov/a21ea813-0373-4fe8-b145-85b4589fdac7 blob:https://www.fdms.gov/a21ea813-0373-4fe8-b145-85b4589fdac7 1/1 SUNSI Review Complete Template=ADM-013 E-RIDS=ADM-03 ADD: Kim Conway, Antoinette Walker-Smith, Mary Neely Comment (23)

Publication Date:

11/1/2024 Citation: 89 FR 87433

Robert Sarvey Los Osos, Ca. 93402 sarveybob@aol.com Comments on the SEIS for the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant.

Introduction Thank you for the opportunity to comment on SEIS for the Diablo Canyon License Renewal Application. There are several reasons to deny the license renewal beginning with the criminal status of the applicant PG&E. Has the NRC ever issued a nuclear facility operating license to a convicted felon? In most states a convicted felon cannot even vote much less operate a nuclear power plant. PG&Es criminal history is chronicled in Appendix A including nuclear handling violations and felony convictions for negligence in its utility operations.

The SEIS begins by stating that, The NRC staffs preliminary recommendation is that the adverse environmental impacts of license renewal for Diablo Canyon are not so great that preserving the option of license renewal for energy-planning decision-makers would be unreasonable. But the SEIS fails to adequately describe the environmental impacts as required by The Nuclear Regulatory Commission August 2024 Report entitled "Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants--Final Report."1 The SEIS fails to account for the GHG and air quality impacts from the mining and processing of the uranium fuel. The SEIS GHG analysis does not follow NRC guidance on estimating GHG emissions from nuclear plant operation as directed in its Staff Guidance for Greenhouse Gas and Climate Change Impacts for New Reactor Environmental Impact Statements.2 1 https://energycentral.com/news/nrc-generic-environmental-impact-statement-license-renewal-nuclear-plants-final-report 2 Staff Guidance for Greenhouse Gas and Climate Change Impacts for New Reactor Environmental Impact Statements https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1410/ML14100A157.pdf

The SEIS fails to conduct a proper alternative analysis. A proper alternatives analysis would have identified that Load Serving Entities in California have already procured the zero carbon resources necessary to meet their procurement obligations required by the CPUC and enough to retire the DCPP. The mixed renewable projects alternative is the superior alternative and the projects have already been procured with a planned excess of 2,182 megawatts needed to retire Diablo Canyon. Unlike Diablo Canyon the renewable resources procured by load serving entities in California do not have the environmental impacts of the nuclear fuel cycle.

The SIES does not consider two important upgrade projects that will be required for extended operations of 20 years. Diablo Canyon has an unusual requirement not encountered by other Nuclear Power Plants that occurs during the relicensing period that is a Site-Specific Issue (Category 2) which the SEIS fails to recognize or analyze. If PG&E operates DCPP beyond 2030 PG&E will be required to retrofit the existing once-through cooling system at Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) with closed-cycle wet cooling towers.

The SEIS fails to recognize that the ISFSI will need to be expanded to accommodate and additional 227 tons of spent fuel and also to store the with its associate impacts to land air and water must be analyzed in the SEIS.

. The SEIS fails to account for the serious seismic issues that have been presented by the IPRP, San Luis Mothers for Peace and the Coastal Commission. These issues must be resolved before an approval of extended operations.

Seismic issues

. This relicensing permit cannot be issued until the seismic issues surrounding the relicensing have been adjudicated. The NRC Review board has accepted on August 27, 2024 a petition to review the contentions that the Dr. Bird and SLO Mothers for Peace have raised.3 The review board agreed to adjudicate the following issues:

3 NRC ADAMS ML24205A066

SUBJECT:

2.206 PETITION REGARDING SEISMIC CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY FOR DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 (EPID L-2024-CRS-0000)

1. Thrust faulting is neglected by Pacific Gas & Electric Companys (PG&E) 2012 Seismic Source Characterization (SSC) model because the model assumes that a majority of large earthquakes affecting Diablo Canyon are strike-slip and disregards the significant contribution of thrust faulting earthquake sources under the Diablo Canyon site and the adjacent Irish Hills. In addition, PG&E did not use a hanging-wall term for the modeling of potential ground motions from the Los Osos and San Luis Bay thrust faults.

2. The January 2024 magnitude 7.5 (moment magnitude) earthquake centered in the Noto Peninsula (Japan), with an average slip of 2 meters on the fault, is analogous to future potential thrust mechanism earthquakes beneath Diablo Canyon. Based on the slip rate of the Irish Hills adjacent to Diablo Canyon and the slip of the Noto earthquake, large D. Curran, et al. thrust fault earthquakes will occur, on average, every 715 years near the Diablo Canyon site.

3. PG&Es 2012 SSC model does not account for an inferred offshore thrust fault that has a slip rate of 2.8 millimeters per year (mm/yr) and the potential for producing a magnitude 7.5 earthquake.

4. Seismic core damage frequency, estimated by PG&E in 2018 to be 3x10-5, should be 1.4x10-3 per year (about once every 715 years) based on this higher recurrence rate for thrust earthquakes.4 The Independent Peer Review Panel has also raised concerns in the IPRP filed Report Number 16 to the commission entitled, Initial Review of PG&Es Updated Seismic Assessment February 2024 by the Independent Peer Review Panel for Seismic Studies of the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant.5 The IPRP listed the following issues with PG&Es SB 846 seismic report.

The Hosgri Fault is the primary source for Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) and the slip rate has been increased in the hazard model based on several peer-reviewed studies of the Cross-Hosgri slope (CHS) that now provide a high degree of confidence in the 2.6 mm/yr rate. We agree with PG&E that this rate represents the hazard. However, because other 4 NRC ADAMS ML24205A066

SUBJECT:

2.206 PETITION REGARDING SEISMIC CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY FOR DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 (EPID L-2024-CRS-0000) Page 1,2 5 Initial Review of PG&Es Updated Seismic Assessment February 2024 by the Independent Peer Review Panel for Seismic Studies of the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant.5 https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/-/media/cpuc-website/divisions/energy-division/documents/electric-costs/diablo-canyon-independent-peer-review-panel-reports/iprp-report-16-pge-dcsa-update-review.pdf

slip rate sites along the Hosgri fault are unrepresentative of the current rates of tectonic deformation it is our opinion that the CHS slip rate should receive full (100%) weight in the seismic hazard models.

Though PG&E reduced the estimated rate of uplift for the Irish Hills, the fault geometry models for the faults that bound the Irish Hills remain uncertain and warrants further geological investigation to characterize these seismic sources.

New data that was not addressed in the PG&E update. A 2021 study that concluded that the slip rate doe the Casmalia fault, is a magnitude higher than previously assessed in 2015, at a 5.6 to 6.7 mm/yr. This has important implications for onshore deformation models as the nearby Casmalia Hills may represent an analog to the Irish Hills in addition to a seismic source and potential kinematic connections with the Hosgri Fault and other faults in the vicinity of the DCPP. Additionally, a Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) -commissioned study based on offshore seismic data reports Hosgri default slip rates have increased during the past million years, suggesting that rates older than Holocene are not representative of the current seismic hazard.

The IPRP requests that PG&E conduct a comprehensive review that includes all fault studies in the region since the previous assessment (PG&E,2015). That review should address the implications for the seismic hazard at the DCPP, including the newly developed slip rates on faults in the region that may inform deformation rates of faults in the vicinity of diablo Canyon.

Our review of the methodologies used to estimate ground motions for the DCPP site indicates those methods are appropriate. We also find PG&Es evaluation of new data and new ground motion models adequate.

However, the results of site-specific ground motion hazard should be recalculated with the recommended changes to the seismic source characterization inputs.

We continue to encourage efforts to improve the characterization of the site condition in terms of Vs profile and kappa estimates. We suggest the more traditional approach of site response analysis be carried out to supplement existing analyses. We further encourage PG&Es continuing effort to reduce uncertainty in empirical site factors, including further improving the non-ergodic ground motion modeling approach and data.

Finally, we would like to see an updated analysis of seismic hazard model inputs ranking sensitivity of ground motion hazard to uncertainties in revised input parameters.

The Coastal Commission also expressed seismic concerns in its September 14, 2024 letter from Tim Luster to PG&E entitled, Incomplete Consistency Certification for Pacific Gas & Electric Companys (PG&Es) Requested Nuclear Regulatory Commission License Renewal for Diablo Canyon Power Plant, San Luis Obispo County.6 The Coastal Commission expressed concerned about the seismic issues surrounding the proposed extended operations at the DCPP. The Coastal commission letter stated:

As you know, the Diablo Canyon Independent Peer Review Panel (IPRP) reviewed PG&Es 2024 Diablo Canyon Updated Seismic Hazard Assessment, Response to Senate Bill 846. The IPRP prepared peer review comments that focused on seismic source characterization and ground motion estimates, which are summarized in an August 2024 IPRP report. That peer review report identified several information needs regarding seismic issues related to Diablo Canyons geologic stability during its proposed extended operations. Those issue areas included better assessing fault slip rates used in PG&Es analyses, better weighting and accounting for recent increases in slip rate estimates for some of the faults that could affect Diablo Canyons geologic stability, and addressing uncertainties in the models used in the analyses. The IPRP recommended that PG&E conduct additional geologic investigations to better characterize some of the potential seismic sources and to reduce uncertainties about their possible effects on Diablo Canyon. The IPRP also recommended that PG&E conduct a comprehensive study of all fault studies conducted in the region subsequent to those referenced in its 2015 seismic hazard report, and that PG&E identify how those more recent studies affect its current Diablo Canyon seismic hazard assessment. The IPRP also recommended that PG&E recalculate its ground motion hazards using results of these updated seismic source characterization analyses.7 2.2.2 Refurbishment and Other Activities Associated with License Renewal According to the SEIS, PG&E performed an evaluation of the SSCs, in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21 (TN4878), to identify the need to undertake any major refurbishment activities that would be necessary to support the continued operation of 6 ADAMS Ascension # ML24260A122 7 ADAMS Accession # ML24260A122 Pages 2,3

Diablo Canyon during the proposed 20-year period of extended operation. As a result of its evaluation of SSCs, PG&E did not identify the need to undertake any major refurbishment or replacement activities associated with LR to support the continued operation of Diablo Canyon beyond the end of the existing operating licenses.

Therefore, refurbishment activities are not discussed under the proposed action in Chapter 3 of this SEIS.8 Diablo Canyon has an unusual requirement not encountered by other Nuclear Power Plants that occurs during the relicensing period that is a Site-Specific issue (Category 2) which the SEIS fails to recognize or analyze. If PG&E operates DCPP beyond 2030 PG&E will be required to retrofit the existing once-through cooling system at Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) with closed-cycle wet cooling towers. This is a major refurbishment that has an estimated cost of 4.6 billion dollars.9 PG&E estimates the following activities and costs for the retrofit of the DCPP to closed-cycle wet colling towers.

In Millions by Category of Work:

$325 Site Work - excavation, retaining walls

$316 Demolition, replacement of buildings, roads, parking

$298 Recirculating water/make-up water pumps, tunnels

$269 Permitting, engineering, project management, security

$242 Cooling Towers

$199 Electrical systems, process/instrumentation, utility relocation

$189 Worker transportation, commute wages, parking

$131 Upgrades - condensers, sewage treatment, SCW

$ 56 Blowdown water treatment, mixing station, diffuser

$ 50 Plant shutdown and start-up

$2,075 Total Direct Costs

$ 614 Project Indirect Costs and Contingency

$2,689 Total Capital Costs

$1,800 Replacement Power (at $70 MWh)

$4,500 TOTAL PROJECT COSTS10 8 SEIS Page 2-11 9 PG&E Diablo Canyon Once Through Cooling analysis https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1604/ML16048A207.pdf Page 9 10 ID at Page 10

While the SEIS indicates that the refurbishment impacts would be small the SEIS ignores the large impacts that will occur in 2030 when the DCPP will be required to mitigate its extreme entrainment impacts as identified by the California Regional Water Board even though the SEIS considers entrainment a small impact requiring no mitigation.

Expansion of the ISFSI One of the upgrade projects that the SEIS fails to recognize or analyze is the expansion of the ISFSI. PG&E has estimated that if the upgrades are approved PG&E will need to store an additional 227 metric tons of spent fuel.11 The problem is the spent fuel storage pads are not large enough to accommodate the additional 227 tons of additional spent fuel.

As PG&E reported to the NRC in PG&E Letter DIL-18-019, to support the plan for plant decommissioning, in addition to the spent fuel casks located on the ISFSI pad after shutdown, additional casks are expected to be used for greater than-Class-C (GTCC) waste storage. The present ISFSI was not sized for both spent fuel and GTCC waste casks when licensed. Remedies include an additional partial storage pad or changes made to the current storage system that will be subject to updated licensing with the NRC12 PG&E further states in the letter that, The Diablo Canyon ISFSI design consists of 7 storage pads containing space for 20 fuel storage casks each. The quantity of fuel to fill these casks is the authorized limit as defined in Materials License No. SNM-2511, namely 2100 metric tons of uranium of intact spent fuel assemblies, damaged fuel assemblies and fuel debris. No changes to this limit are planned during the plant operating period. To support the plant decommissioning period, a license amendment to incorporate storage of GTCC waste is expected.13 According to Coastal Commission staff, The ISFSI was designed to hold 140 Holtec canisters/casks and currently holds 58 of those canisters/casks, which 11 https://adams.nrc.gov/wba/view Ascension Number ML23076A093 Diablo Canyon email Estimate of Spent Fuel in Tons.

12 PG&E Letter DIL 18-019 https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1835/ML18351A368.pdf Page 5 of 13 13 PG&E Letter DIL 18-019 https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1835/ML18351A368.pdf Page 5 of 13

collectively store a total of 1,856 fuel assemblies. The spent fuel pools currently store about 1,800 assemblies and PG&E estimates that by the end of the current August 2025 license period, there will be a total of 2,542 assemblies in the pools. If PG&Es current permit amendment request is approved, it would be able to transfer these assemblies from the pools to the proposed Orano storage units within the existing ISFSI. It could also continue to use the current Holtec storage system or a combination of both systems. With those final 2,542 assemblies, the ISFSI would reach its remaining capacity for storage of fuel associated with power plant operations. 14 With extended operations the concrete pad for the ISFSI will need to be expanded to accommodate the additional 227 metric tons of spent fuel from extended operations.15 2.3 Alternatives 2.3.2 Replacement Power Alternatives The SEIS states, To ensure that alternatives are consistent with State or regional energy policies, the NRC staff reviewed energy-related statutes, regulations, and policies within the region of influence. Alternatives that would conflict with these requirements were eliminated from further consideration.16 Californias 100 Percent Clean Energy Act of 2018 requires all energy generation to be renewable and zero-carbon after 2045.17 According to the SEIS PG&E did not consider any renewable energy generation source or combination of energy sources reasonable alternatives for replacing Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2 based on the criteria that the replacement energy alternatives must be viable prior to the expiration of the current operating licenses.18 14 PG&E estimates that the new Orano units can hold a total of 2,553 fuel assemblies and that there will be 2,542 assemblies needing storage by August 2025. This would allow for storage of 11 additional assemblies; however, each refueling cycle at Diablo Canyon generates several dozen spent fuel assemblies so would exceed the amount that could be stored at the ISFSI. California Coastal Commission STAFF REPORT: ISFSI PERMIT AMENDMENT Application No.: A-3-SLO-04-035-A1 https://documents.coastal.ca.gov/reports/2023/5/F9a/F9a-5-2023-report.pdf Page 15 of 30 15 https://adams.nrc.gov/wba/view Ascension Number ML23076A093 Diablo Canyon email Estimate of Spent Fuel in Tons.

16 Draft Report Page 2-13 17 Draft Report Page 2-14 18 SEIS Page 2-14

The CPUC ordered Load Serving Entities (LSEs) to procure 11,500 MW NQC of new resources between August 2023 and June 2026 via an order in the Integrated Resource Planning (IRP) proceeding, D.21-06-035.19 All of those resources are to be renewable and zero carbon. Of the 11,500 MW, 2,500 MW NQC must be from zero-emitting generation, generation paired with storage, or demand response resources for Diablo Canyon Replacement (DCR).20 The CPUCs latest report on progress with the CPUCs procurement authorizations is entitled, Summary of Compliance with Integrated Resource Planning (IRP) Order D.19-11-016 and Mid Term Reliability (MTR)

D.21-06-035 Procurement.21 That report analyzes data submitted by the load serving entities as of December 31, 2023 over a year ago. That report as illustrated below states that as of the December 1, 2023 the load serving entities will have procured all of the zero carbon resources needed to retire Diablo Canyon with a surplus of 2,182 MW.22 19 For more details see Summary of Compliance with Integrated Resource Planning (IRP) Order D.19-11-016 and Mid Term Reliability (MTR) D.21-06-035 Procurement https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/-/media/cpuc-website/divisions/energy-division/documents/integrated-resource-plan-and-long-term-procurement-plan-irp-ltpp/irp12123compliancereport.pdf Page 5 20 Summary of Compliance with Integrated Resource Planning (IRP) Order D.19-11-016 and Mid Term Reliability (MTR) D.21-06-035 Procurement Page 20 https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/-/media/cpuc-website/divisions/energy-division/documents/integrated-resource-plan-and-long-term-procurement-plan-irp-ltpp/irp12123compliancereport.pdf 21 https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/-/media/cpuc-website/divisions/energy-division/documents/integrated-resource-plan-and-long-term-procurement-plan-irp-ltpp/irp12123compliancereport.pdf 22 Summary of Compliance with Integrated Resource Planning (IRP) Order D.19-11-016 and Mid Term Reliability (MTR) D.21-06-035 Procurement Page 20 https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/-/media/cpuc-website/divisions/energy-division/documents/integrated-resource-plan-and-long-term-procurement-plan-irp-ltpp/irp12123compliancereport.pdf Page 44

23 The SEIS states that solar technology was considered as an alternative but eliminated. The SEIS states, Solar generators are considered an intermittent electrical power resource because their availability depends on exposure to the sun, also known as solar insolation. To be viable, a utility-scale solar power alternative must replace the amount of electrical power that Diablo Canyon currently provides. Assuming a capacity factor of 32.8 percent, approximately 7,000 MW of additional solar energy capacity would need to be installed to replace the 2,285 MW of electricity generated by Diablo Canyon (NREL 2022-TN9823).24 Since the CPUC authorized 11,500 MW of zero carbon emitting resources load serving entities in California have procured over 7,333 MW of solar generation.25 That amount of solar will eliminate any need for Diablo Canyon.

23 Summary of Compliance with Integrated Resource Planning (IRP) Order D.19-11-016 and Mid Term Reliability (MTR) D.21-06-035 Procurement Page 20 https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/-/media/cpuc-website/divisions/energy-division/documents/integrated-resource-plan-and-long-term-procurement-plan-irp-ltpp/irp12123compliancereport.pdf Page 44 24 SEIS Page 2-15 25 Tracking Energy Development October 2024 tracking data https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/-/media/cpuc-website/divisions/energy-division/documents/summer-2021-reliability/tracking-energy-development/resource -

tracking-data-october-2024-release.pdf Page 5 2025 Forecasted Diablo Canyon Replacement Procurement Reported by LSE Type LSE Type Cumulative MTR Tranche 3 Obligation Collective Forecasted MTR 2025 Online by 6/1/2025 Collective Forecasted MTR Tranche 3 Excess or Shortfall IOU 1,483 3,351 1,868 CCA 773 1,098 325 ESP 242 233

-9 Total 2,500 4,682 2,182 As of the 12/1/2023 Compliance filings, collectively LSEs are forecast to exceed Diablo Canyon Replacement obligations by 2,182 MW NQC.

LSEs progress towards Diablo Canyon Replacement is pending the necessary compliance documentation verification to be filed by 6/1/2025.

• Note Column 3 and 4 figures include sum of excess and deficiencies.

[Note: These are LSE reported MWs that have not yet been validated by staff and only track capacity not energy procurement,

Diablo Canyon is not needed for reliability and its replacement projects are expected to be complete by June 1,2025 In enacting SB 846 the Legislature declared that continued operations of Diablo Canyon through 2030 may be necessary to improve statewide energy system reliability and continue reduction of greenhouse gases until new renewable energy and zero-carbon resources come online and can meet demand. (Pub. Res. Code, § 25548(b)). New reliability information provided by the Joint Agency Reliability Planning Assessment - SB 846 Combined Second and Third Quarterly Report 2024 issued on August 5, 2024 sheds new light on the reasonableness of continued operations at Diablo Canyon. As stated in the report, Throughout the state, over 20,000 MW of new nameplate capacity have come online from January 2020 to May 2024. In this year alone, as shown by Table 1, California continues to experience rapid growth in renewable resources, particularly solar photovoltaics (PV) and energy storage. In 2023 alone, over 5,000 MW of solar PV and energy storage nameplate capacity were added to the electric grid. The CPUC staff estimates that new generation and storage investments represent approximately $7 billion in new infrastructure investment in California in 2022 and 2023. 26 Under a 2020 equivalent event, the September surplus is 2,200 MW. In a 2022 equivalent event, the September projected shortfall turns into a surplus of 655 MW. Under similar extreme conditions, this summer could likely be managed with contingency resources and additional real-time market procurements projected for July through September.27 26 Joint Agency Reliability Planning Assessment - SB 846 Combined Second and Third Quarterly Report 2024 Page 9 of 28 https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/-/media/cpuc-website/divisions/energy-division/documents/summer-2021-reliability/tracking-energy-development/joint-agency-reliability-planning-assessment--sb-846-combined-second-and-third-quarterly-report-2024.pdf CARE-02 Page 2 27 Joint Agency Reliability Planning Assessment - SB 846 Combined Second and Third Quarterly Report 2024 Page 8 of 28 https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/-/media/cpuc-website/divisions/energy-division/documents/summer-2021-reliability/tracking-energy-development/joint-agency-reliability-planning-assessment--sb-846-combined-second-and-third-quarterly-report-2024.pdf CARE-02 Page 3

We currently have the resources available without Diablo Canyon operating to meet grid operational needs so reliability is not a factor in determining whether the continued operation of the DCPP is needed.

The SEIS relies on a flawed study by the CEC. As stated in the SEIS, Analyses conducted by the CEC also concluded that adequate renewable energy resources could not be brought online before the operating licenses for Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2 expire (CEC 2023-TN10081).28 The CEC analysis was dead wrong as the Summary of Compliance with Integrated Resource Planning (IRP) Order D.19-11-016 and Mid Term Reliability (MTR) D.21-06-035 Report mentioned above issued on October 9, 2024 details the procurement of adequate renewable resources to retire Diablo Canyon by June 2025. The October 9,2024 IRP Report details that LSE procurement will exceed the Diablo Canyon replacement procurement requirement by over 2,182 MW. 29 The SEIS concludes that, If the NRC does not renew the Diablo Canyon operating licenses energy-planning decision-makers would have to choose a replacement power alternative similar to the ones evaluated in this SEIS.30 As can be seen from above energy planning decision makers in California have already chosen the renewables combination energy alternative and have succeeded in procuring the Diablo Canyon replacement generation so there is no need to renew the operating license for the DCPP. Since Diablo Canyon is not a zero-carbon resource due to its mining and processing of nuclear fuel and the operation of the back-up generators the renewables combination alternative is superior.

AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES, AND MITIGATING ACTIONS GHG Emissions NRC provides guidance on estimating GHG emissions from nuclear plant operation in its Staff Guidance for Greenhouse Gas and Climate Change Impacts 28 SEIS Page 2-14 29 Summary of Compliance with Integrated Resource Planning (IRP) Order D.19-11-016 and Mid Term Reliability (MTR) D.21-06-035 Procurement Page 44.

30 SEIS Page 2-20

for New Reactor Environmental Impact Statements.31 The guidance document estimates that the lifetime GHG emissions for a 1,000 MW reactor are approximately 10,500,000 MT CO2E or about 37.5 g CO2eq/kWh.32 Over a 20 year license extension the two units at Diablo Canyon could produce up to 10,500,000 MT CO2E.

The plants fuel cycle and operational requirements not only emit large amounts of GHG emissions DCPP has other significant environmental impacts. The NRCs June 2023 Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants (GEIS) includes Table S-3 from 10 CFR 51.51 which provides environmental impacts on Uranium Fuel Cycle Data.33 The GEIS states that, Every environmental report prepared for the construction permit stage of a lightwater-cooled nuclear power reactor, and submitted on or after September 4, 1979, shall take Table S-3, Table of Uranium Fuel Cycle Environmental Data, as the basis for evaluating the contribution of the environmental effects of uranium mining and milling, the production of uranium hexafluoride, isotopic enrichment, fuel fabrication, reprocessing of irradiated fuel, transportation of radioactive materials and management of low level wastes and high level wastes related to uranium fuel cycle activities to the environmental costs of licensing the nuclear power reactor. Table S-3 shall be included in the environmental report and may be supplemented by a discussion of the environmental significance of the data.

Table S-3 details the maximum environmental impacts from the fuel cycle that should be considered in the environmental report.34 According to Table S-335 The Maximum Annual Emissions of criteria pollutants from the nuclear fuel cycle for one year for a 1,000 MW reactor would be 4,400 metric tons a year of SOX, 1,190 metric tons a year of NOx and 1,154 metric tons of particulate matter.36 These estimates can change depending on quality of the uranium ore, the source of electricity, 31 Staff Guidance for Greenhouse Gas and Climate Change Impacts for New Reactor Environmental Impact Statements https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1410/ML14100A157.pdf 32 32 Staff Guidance for Greenhouse Gas and Climate Change Impacts for New Reactor Environmental Impact Statements https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1410/ML14100A157.pdf Page 7 of 16 33 Attachment a NRCs June 2023 Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1310/ML13106A241.pdf Page 516-518 of 677 34 Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants Main Report NRC February 2023 35 Appendix 1 to these comments 36 Exhibit A NRCs June 2023 Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1310/ML13106A241.pdf Page 516 of 677

and the uranium processing methods. Regardless of other variables uranium mining produces an estimated 240,000 metric tons of tailings and 91,000 metric tons of solids per year to provide fuel for one year for a 1,000 MW reactor. The mining of uranium ore has significant environmental and health impacts to Indian tribes located near the mines.

Diablo Canyon operations also produce a large waste stream. According to PG&Es responses to the NRC inquiries the Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP)

Sewage Treatment Facility disposed an average of 198,000 gallons of sludge offsite per year.37 Diablo Canyon disposed of 12,682 pounds of batteries and electronic waste per year over a three year period.38 PG&E ships off about 100,000 pounds per year of Class A radioactive waste to off-site processors for volume reduction and disposal excluding large projects (e.g., steam generator replacement, reactor vessel head replacement).39 Other Class A waste 200 - 300 square feet a year is shipped directly to low level radioactive waste disposal in Clive Utah.40 Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) currently stores Class B and C onsite. DCPP has three 88-foot containers of Class C cement encapsulated cartridge filters and two 92-foot containers of polymer solidified Class B/C resin in the DCPP Radwaste Storage Building. The Radwaste storage building can hold 180 such containers. DCPP's generation rate for Class B and C is projected to be two containers per year (one of filters and one of resin).41 Diablo Canyons average annual production of nuclear fuel 37 37https://adams.nrc.gov/wba/ PG&E Letter DCL 081 ML102580254 August 2, 2010 Response to NRC Environmental Audit Information Request for the Applicant's Environmental Report - Operating License Renewal Stage ML102580254 Page 8 of 26 38https://adams.nrc.gov/wba/ PG&E Letter DCL 081 ML102580254 August 2, 2010 Response to NRC Environmental Audit Information Request for the Applicant's Environmental Report - Operating License Renewal Stage Page 5 of 26 39 https://adams.nrc.gov/wba/ PG&E Letter DCL 081 ML102580254 August 2, 2010 Response to NRC Environmental Audit Information Request for the Applicant's Environmental Report - Operating License Renewal Stage Page 6 of 26 40 https://adams.nrc.gov/wba/view PG&E Letter DCL-10-081 ML102580254 August 2, 2010 Response to NRC Environmental Audit Information Request for the Applicant's Environmental Report - Operating License Renewal Stage Page 6 of 26 41 https://adams.nrc.gov/wba/ PG&E Letter DCL 081 ML102580254 August 2, 2010 Response to NRC Environmental Audit Information Request for the Applicant's Environmental Report - Operating License Renewal Stage Page 6 of 26

is approximately 47 metric tons. 42 If DCPP operates until 2025 it will have produced 1,857 tons of spent fuel.

Diablo Canyon has significant impacts to water resources. According to PG&Es website the Diablo Canyons average fresh water use in the three-year period of 2018 to 2020 was 422-acre feet of well water per year.43 Diablo Canyon releases 24,000,000 gallons of brine per month on average to the ocean.44 Diablo Canyon has a maximum discharge of 2.5 billion gallons per day, set by the facilitys Clean Water Act permit. The Regional Quality Water Board found that Diablo Canyon discharge resulted in major reductions in species populations and assemblages in Diablo Cove, including almost complete loss of foliose algae and intertidal fish.45 Millions of larvae are sucked into the once through cooling system. The California Regional Water Quality Control Board Central Coast Region staff estimates the following entrainment losses due to Diablo Canyons water withdrawal.

42 https://adams.nrc.gov/wba/view Ascension Number ML23076A093 Diablo Canyon email Estimate of Spent Fuel in Tons.

43 https://www.pgecorp.com/corp_responsibility/reports/2021/pl04_water.html 44 https://www.dcisc.org/download/events/41_1-f-diablo-canyon-independent-safety-committee-20230628-agenda-packet.pdf Page 66 of 135 45https://www.waterboards.ca.gov/centralcoast/water_issues/programs/diablo_canyon/docs/07_10_03_hearing/

testimony/071003dcpptestimonyfinal.pdf Page 4 of 21

46 46https://www.waterboards.ca.gov/rwqcb3/water_issues/programs/diablo_canyon/docs/2000_07_13_diablo_staf f_report.pdf Page 3

Table S-3 from 10 CFR 51.51 on Uranium Fuel Cycle Data

3.2.1.2 Coastal Zone The SEIS recognizes that the California Coastal Commission has authority over the Coastal Zone management. The draft EIS also reports that PG&E has not received a coastal zone permit for extended operations and is now operating beyond its CCC permit.47 PG&E submitted a Federal consistency certification to the NRC and to the California Coastal Commission (CCC) stating its position that continued operation of [Diablo Canyon] complies with Californias coastal management program and will be conducted in a manner consistent with such program. In response, on December 7, 2023, the CCC informed PG&E that it needs more information before it can consider the Diablo Canyon license renewal consistency certification. Discussions between PG&E and the CCC are ongoing; to date, the CCC has not notified the NRC and PG&E whether it concurs with or objects to the consistency certification.48 Since this document was issued on October 25, 2024 surely the NRC staff must know that the Coastal Commission has docketed in the ADAMS website a September 14, 2024 letter from Tim Luster to PG&E entitled, Incomplete Consistency Certification for Pacific Gas & Electric Companys (PG&Es) Requested Nuclear Regulatory Commission License Renewal for Diablo Canyon Power Plant, San Luis Obispo County.49 The letter informed PG&E that, At this point in our review, however, your application remains incomplete, for the reasons provided below. Pursuant to the Coastal Zone Management Acts (CZMA) implementing regulations at 15 CFR 930.58, we will need the information requested herein and in those previous letters to allow the Coastal Commission to adequately consider any likely coastal effects of the proposed federal action. Accordingly, and pursuant to 15 CFR 930.60(a), the Commissions six-month review period has not commenced and will not commence until we receive the missing necessary data and information.

47SEIS Page 3-7 48SEIS Page 3-7 49 ADAMS Ascension # ML24260A122

Despite not having the Coastal Commission permit PG&E has already completed many of the upgrades that the Coastal Commission permit is adjudicating in violation of the law. The Coastal Commission was also concerned about the seismic issues surrounding the proposed extended operations at the DCPP. The Coastal commission letter stated:

As you know, the Diablo Canyon Independent Peer Review Panel (IPRP) reviewed PG&Es 2024 Diablo Canyon Updated Seismic Hazard Assessment, Response to Senate Bill 846. The IPRP prepared peer review comments that focused on seismic source characterization and ground motion estimates, which are summarized in an August 2024 IPRP report. That peer review report identified several information needs regarding seismic issues related to Diablo Canyons geologic stability during its proposed extended operations. Those issue areas included better assessing fault slip rates used in PG&Es analyses, better weighting and accounting for recent increases in slip rate estimates for some of the faults that could affect Diablo Canyons geologic stability, and addressing uncertainties in the models used in the analyses. The IPRP recommended that PG&E conduct additional geologic investigations to better characterize some of the potential seismic sources and to reduce uncertainties about their possible effects on Diablo Canyon. The IPRP also recommended that PG&E conduct a comprehensive study of all fault studies conducted in the region subsequent to those referenced in its 2015 seismic hazard report, and that PG&E identify how those more recent studies affect its current Diablo Canyon seismic hazard assessment. The IPRP also recommended that PG&E recalculate its ground motion hazards using results of these updated seismic source characterization analyses.50 NPDES Permit Diablo Canyon Clean Water Violations On June 18, 2021 the Central Coast Regional Water Quality Control Board and the Pacific Gas and Electric Company reached a $5.9 million settlement to resolve alleged violations of PG&Es National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit from discharges of once-through cooling water into the Pacific Ocean from its Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant. The settlement funds will be used for water quality projects that benefit the region.

50 ADAMS Accession # ML24260A122 Pages 2,3

Regulators alleged releases of once-through cooling water from Diablo Canyon into the Pacific Ocean constituted violations of PG&Es National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit. PG&E agreed to the settlement following a Central Coast water board investigation of alleged permit violations associated with the thermal component of the plants discharge since it first began releasing once-through cooling water in 1985.

PG&E still does not have a current valid NPDES permit.

Fire Events The DCISC August Fact Finding Report shows that DCPP Fire Equipment performance is inadequate51 for the following reasons:

1) A total of 120 maintenance fire protection work orders greater than 120 days old

2) Three impairments over 180 days old

3) Incipient fire detection reliability not meeting risk targets This report shows negligence in Diablo Canyons fire protections systems. This is a serious issue as Diablo Canyon has a history of fire related incidents.

On May 15, 2000, Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, had a fire. The sampling process indicated that approximately 1.1 curies of tritium gas were released over the 64 hours7.407407e-4 days <br />0.0178 hours <br />1.058201e-4 weeks <br />2.4352e-5 months <br /> following the event.52 On Dec. 12, 2006 Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant's unit 2 reactor shut down after a cooling pump exploded and caused a small fire at approximately 1:30 p.m.

On Thursday evening, Jan. 25, 2018, a fire erupted at the Diablo Canyon Power Plant on the facilitys water intake valve. PG&E Media Relations Representative John Lindsey blamed the episode on an overheated pump used to clean kelp and ocean 51 DCISC Fact-Finding Meeting at DCPP on August 27 and September 24-25, 2024 https://www.dcisc.org/download/events/45_4-f-diablo-canyon-independent-safety-committee-20241009-august-27-september-24-25-2024-draft-fact-finding-report.pdf Page 17 of 23 52 NRC Letter https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ml0037/ML003728179.pdf&ved=2ahUKEwjNvoqE0KyKAxXrFTQIHVFmDNQ4FBAWegQIKBAB&usg=AOvVaw1sFIlLlextchWGDyD tRMWf

debris from incoming water. The fire was put out on-location by the plants own fire crew though Cal Fire was called out and assisted with cleanup.53 On Jul 27, 2018 Pacific Gas & Electric reported a fire at the Diablo Canyon nuclear power station.54 On September 12, 2018 another fire occurred at the DCPP.55In the early hours of Sunday, August 17, 2008, the Unit 2 reactor at the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant near San Luis Obispo, California automatically tripped from 100 percent power due to a fire at main transformer C. Diablo Canyon has also experienced a fire in a transformer it was trying to dispose of. On November 20, 1996, workers using acetylene torches to cut up a spare main transformer for salvage ignited about 20 gallons of residual oil in the transformer.

3.11.6.3.2 Severe Accidents Initiated by Terrorist Events According to the SEIS, The potential for a severe accident initiated by terrorist events is usually analyzed generically for LR; however, the NRC has stated that licensing actions for facilities subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit will include an analysis of the environmental impacts of a terrorist attack (San Luis Obispo Peace v. Nuclear Regulatory 2006-TN6959: 17 449 F.3d 1016

[9th Cir. 2006]; NRC 2007-TN6957). Consistent with this requirement, the NRC staff considered site-specific information for Diablo Canyon. The analysis concludes that there is no new and significant information specific to Diablo Canyon that would change the generic determination.56 The SEIS ignores the new and significant advance of drone warfare and the ease at which a drone operator could explode ordinance that damages the spent fuel storage facility leading to a catastrophic zirconium fire. The Ukrainians have demonstrated that even simple over the counter drones can be used to drop ordinance with extreme precision and significant damage.

53 https://www.environews.tv/012718-fire-rickety-diablo-canyon-nuclear-plant-gives-california-scare-shutdown-slated-2025/

54 https://www.marinij.com/2018/01/26/pge-small-fire-at-diablo-canyon-didnt-affect-safety/

55 https://www.santacruzsentinel.com/2018/01/26/pge-small-fire-at-diablo-canyon-didnt-affect-safety/

56 SEIS Page 3-177

Large California Tsunamis From Central Coast Historians And Central Coast Newspaper Records57 A compilation of historic tsunamis was presented at the American Geophysical Union, Fall Meeting 2009 by E.L. Blank. The report cites a tsunami On November 22, 1878, produced tsunamis that broke over the 58Morro Bay sand spit (current quad sheet high elevations 66 to 97 feet N to S), destroyed Avila & Pt. Sal piers, damaging Cayucos pier.

Since it appears 4 much larger tsunamis occurred in the Central Coast area in 1812, 1878, 1907 and 1913; it appears we may have become complacent during this recent period of tsunami quiescence. Emergency planning for Central Coast tsunamis should be anticipating tsunami waves in the 50 to 100 feet elevation range.59 Backup Generators The backup generators at the Diablo Canyon Power Plant have a long history of operational issues which should require PG&E to purchase new diesel generators and relocate them separately. In May of 2021 an NRC audit determined that, The plants six emergency diesel generators were located in the same plant area, and thus vulnerable to a common mode failure.60 This creates an easy target for terrorists all they have to do is use drones like the Ukrainians use to damage the emergency generators and simultaneously damage the 230kV and 500kV offsite power sources and boom we have a meltdown. The Emergency generators should be relocated in separate areas to avoid a common failure.

Diablo Canyons emergency generators are a safety issue that must be resolved for extended operations.

Diablo Canyon has an array of six emergency generators. (EDGs) The EDGs are safety-related pieces of equipment that are supposed to furnish sufficient electric 57https://ui.adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2009AGUFMNH31B1113B/abstract#:~:text=On%20November%2022%2C%20 1878%2C%20turbulent,Sal%20piers%2C%20damaging%20Cayucos%20pier.

58https://ui.adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2009AGUFMNH31B1113B/abstract#:~:text=On%20November%2022%2C%20 1878%2C%20turbulent,Sal%20piers%2C%20damaging%20Cayucos%20pier.

59https://ui.adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2009AGUFMNH31B1113B/abstract#:~:text=On%20November%2022%2C%20 1878%2C%20turbulent,Sal%20piers%2C%20damaging%20Cayucos%20pier.

60 https://calcoastnews.com/2011/05/safety-violations-at-diablo-canyon-nuclear-plant/

power to mitigate a design basis accident in one unit and safely bring the other unit to cold shutdown when both the 230kV and 500kV offsite power sources are unavailable.

The EDGs are designed to act as a backup source of power to enable the reactor to continue to produce power for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> whenever there is no accident condition, but one of the two offsite power sources is inoperable. The EDGs are also supposed to be available to furnish power sufficient for an emergency shutdown of the plant whenever the offsite power sources are not available.

The six emergency generators are a critical part of the safety system at DCPP and have a long history of performance issues. In June and September 2010, NRC inspectors reported that theyand plant operatorsfound problems associated with Diablos emergency diesel generating systems. Inspectors found air compressor lines that werent tested to see if they would work in an earthquake. The inspectors said the problem was very low risk but a line failure during an earthquake could impact the safety function of the emergency diesel generators. If the compressor lines fail, plant operators would be unable to start the backup diesels in an emergency.

Inspectors also discovered that the plants operators failed to find and correct design issues associated with the diesel generators that amounted to a performance deficiency. These included the possibility of running the diesels to a level that would exceed load limits, a condition that could damage the motors. Inspectors found that two cooling water loops were inoperable for 14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br /> and that a degraded voltage protection scheme could have hindered the switch to the backup diesels if there were a power outage. PG&E was further cited for the failure of its engineering staff to tell plant operators about many of these problems.61 The DCISC last reviewed the emergency generator system in July 2021 (Reference 6.5), when it concluded the following: The health of DCPPs Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) was rated as Green (Healthy) on Unit 1 and Red (Unhealthy) on Unit 2. The Red (Unhealthy) rating was driven by a fuel oil leak that occurred during maintenance testing. The leak was repaired, and health of the Unit 2 EDGs was expected to soon return to Green. According to DCISCs fact finding report, A significant fuel oil leak occurred on EDG 2-3 during a maintenance activity in June 2021, and the 61https://www.newtimesslo.com/sanluisobispo/devils-in-the-details/Content?oid=2937720

EDG was shut down to repair the leak. The size of the leak was judged to have rendered the EDG unable to run for the duration of time needed in the accident analyses, and the failure was therefore classified as a Maintenance Rule Functional Failure and a Critical Equipment Clock Reset.

Corrective actions have been completed, and system performance was being monitored across all six EDGs. Recently, unexpected low torque readings were discovered on subsequent checks of the fuel oil fittings. The cause of the low torque readings was postulated to be a change in design for lock washers on the fittings, and DCPP planned to return to using an older design lock washer along with improved procedures for torquing the fittings.62 Additionally the fact finding report also found that, The current design of EDG Fuel Oil Day Tank level switches results in frequent failures during testing. Alternative designs were recommended but have not been approved. Testing procedures are being revised to reduce the likelihood of failure during testing. The report also stated that, The EDG Local Control Panel alarm relay modules are obsolete with limited replacement modules available. A design change has been initiated to facilitate future replacements with a newer module design on an as-needed basis.63 Despite all these issues on these critical safety components DCISC made no recommendations for improvement and concluded that, The White (Needing Improvement) rating on Unit 2 EDG was driven by continuing actions being taken in response to a fuel oil leak that occurred during maintenance testing in 2021. EDG reliability and availability have been good over the past two years.

Unit 2, emergency diesel generator 3 lost surveillance on January 12, 2021.64 Unit 2 emergency diesel generator 2-3 had a fuel oil leak on April 12, 2021.65 On July 22, 2021, with Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) Unit 2, operating at 100 percent power, DCPP personnel determined that since June 30, 2021, Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 2-3 would not have 62 DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE Report on Fact-Finding Meeting at DCPP on November 8, 9 and 10, 2022 Page 17 of 40 file:///C:/Users/sarve/Documents/Diablo%20Canyon%20DCISC%20Report%20on%20Fact%20finding%20Novembe r%208,9,%2010,12.PDF 63 DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE Report on Fact-Finding Meeting at DCPP on November 8, 9 and 10, 2022 Page 18 of 40 file:///C:/Users/sarve/Documents/Diablo%20Canyon%20DCISC%20Report%20on%20Fact%20finding%20Novembe r%208,9,%2010,12.PDF 64 https://adams.nrc.gov/wba/view ML21118A017 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 -

INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000275/2021001 AND 05000323/2021001 AND INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION INSPECTION REPORT 07200026/2021001 Page 9 of 24 65 https://adams.nrc.gov/wba/view ML20218A053 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 - A017

been able to attain Technical Specification (TS) minimum frequency when started in automatic. Manual control of diesel frequency was not affected.

This condition was discovered via a routine surveillance test which evaluates, in part, EDG frequency during standby and loading conditions.66 Unit 2, LER 2021-001-00, was submitted on 9/20/2021, which documented that Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 2-3 operated at less than the required Technical Specification minimum alternating current frequency of 60 Hertz (60 cycles per second) when started in automatic. Manual operation was not affected. Subsequent Engineering evaluation determined that EDG 2-3 had remained capable of performing its safety function during the event.67 In June of 2022 NRC issued a safety violation because DCPP did not provide an adequate procedural guidance to control tightening of emergency Generator 2-3 fuel oil system bolts resulted in a fuel oil leak.

The issue was extensively reviewed by the DCISC in June 2022.

Procedures were modified concerning the tightening of the banjo bolts to ensure the torque is verified after maintenance. 68 The March 22, 23, 2022 Fact finding Team found that Unit 1 and Unit 2 emergency generators were in red status.69 The Unit 2 stator closed cooling water system was in red status also.

But the fuel oil leaks and safety violations continue to exist in the emergency backup generators. The same back-up generator problems continue to exist as recently as March 14, 2023 the NRC inspection reported that Unit 1 emergency diesel generator 1-1 had a fuel leak.70 These critical safety system malfunction have been underplayed both by the NRC and the DCISC. If extended operations are approved the emergency backup generators should be replaced in the entirety as PG&E cannot resolve issue with these critical safety components.

66 https://adams.nrc.gov/wba/view ML21263A062 Unit 2 Licensee Event Report 2021-01-00, Emergency Diesel Generator Declared lnoperable due to Low Frequency Condition Discovery during Routine Surveillance Page 2 of 4 67 Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee Report Thirty Second annual Report Page 219 of 932 https://www.dcisc.org/download/library/annual-reports/32nd-annual-report-51.pdf 68 https://www.dcisc.org/download/events/40_1-f-diablo-canyon-independent-safety-committee-20230215-agenda-packet.pdf Page 62 of 103 69 Agenda Packet September 15,2022 https://www.dcisc.org/download/events/39_1-f-diablo-canyon-independent-safety-committee-20220928-agenda-packet.pdf Page 61 of 133 70 https://adams.nrc.gov/wba/view ADAMS ACCESSION NUMBER: ML23121A139 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000275/2023001 AND 05000323/2023001 Page 7 of 11

In 2021 NRC inspectors found that, The plant had a single diesel-driven pump to provide emergency cooling water to a single reactor in case an earthquake cut off normal water flow. The pump could not have serviced both of the plants reactors if they lost normal water supply simultaneously, the NRC staff said.71 3.7 Aquatic Resources 2024 Dredging According to the SEIS Dredging results in the direct removal of bottom habitats along with infaunal and epifaunal organisms of limited mobility inhabiting the affected substrates. Dredging also creates sediment plumes that increase water turbidity. Thus, dredging affects both the quantity and quality of fish habitat. The direct removal of substrates, sediments, and benthic organisms represent effects to habitat quantity. The resulting short-term reductions in biomass of benthic organisms and increased water turbidity represent effects on habitat quality. PG&E conducted dredging of the Intake Cove in summer 2024. In support of this effort, PG&E obtained a CWA Section 404 22 permit from the USACE prior to conducting dredging. Details on the dredging effort at the potential impacts to EFH can be found in PG&Es EFH assessment (Stantec 2023-TN10661). PG&E has no plans to dredge during the proposed license renewal period.

Therefore, there would be no impacts to EFH in the affected area associated with dredging.

The SEIS ignores the fact that the dredging that was done in 2024 was necessary for extended operations and therefore a direct impact of the relicensing. As the Coastal Commission letter to PG&E states, Our letter and subsequent phone conversations between Commission and PG&E staff also identified several elements of PG&Es proposed relicensing that would constitute development under 71 https://calcoastnews.com/2011/05/safety-violations-at-diablo-canyon-nuclear-plant/

the Coastal Act1 and that result in the proposed relicensing being subject to the Coastal Commissions review and approval of an application from PG&E for a coastal development permit (CDP).72 The Coastal Commission letter continued to state, The December 7th letter identifies several components of the proposed relicensing that would constitute known or potential development requiring the Commissions approval of a CDP application. The letter notes that these were not exhaustive, but include.

Dredging within the Diablo Canyon intake cove;2

• Construction of a new or expanded spent fuel facility; and,

• Installing new or expanded structural components, equipment, or infrastructure as part of extended operations.

According to the Federal Register, A two-page excerpt from a fact-finding report approved by the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee at its September 13, 2023, meeting identifies a contemplated ocean dredging project for accumulated sediment in the Diablo Canyon Intake Cove necessitated by potential extended operation of the power plant. The area of concern was originally designed to have an average (base) depth of 36 to 38 feet. Over nearly 40 years of operations, about 16 to 20 feet of sand have accumulated in that area, significantly reducing the depth and increasing the velocity of seawater being drawn into the intake bays. The higher amount of sand and increased velocity of seawater makes it more difficult for divers to keep the intake racks and bays clear of debris. These conditions also make it more likely for kelp to be drawn into the intake and foul the racks or condensers. Kelp ingestion has the potential to cause the circulating water system to trip, which stops cooling of the steam turbine condensers and can place significant stress on plan systems, and possibly a turbine/reactor trip, due to inability to dump steam to the condensers. Concern about the potential to have the circulating water system trip due to kelp ingestion is the reason that the plant will reduce power during some winter storms. The attached document is inadequately evaluated by DOE/EIS- 0555.73 72 California Coastal Commission May 2024 letter to PG&E, Coastal Development Permit needed for PG&Es proposed relicensing of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Page 1,2 https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2412/ML24127A204.pdf 73 Federal Register January 2, 2024 https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2024-01/GDOCivilNuclearCreditProgramDiabloCanyonRecordOfDecision.pdf Page 76

Appendix A 1.10 Status of Compliance According to the SEIS, PG&E is responsible for complying with all NRC regulations and other applicable Federal, State, and local requirements. PG&E has not followed all applicable requirements as it is currently a convicted felon who is constructing improvements at the DCPP without an approved permit form the California coastal commission.

PG&E is a convicted felon who has violated nuclear material handling laws and other important NRC regulations.

On December 20, 2005, a Severity Level II Notice of Violation, with a proposed $96,000 Civil Penalty, was issued to the Pacific Gas and Electric Company as a result of the licensee's failure to: (1) keep adequate records of special nuclear material (SNM) inventory, transfer or disposal, (2) establish adequate procedures for control and accounting of SNM, and (3) conduct adequate physical inventories of SNM at the Humboldt Bay Power Plant (HBPP).

PG&E's records failed to account for the whereabouts of three 18-inch fuel rod segments after they were cut from a single fuel rod in 1968. Likewise, PG&E's records failed to account for incore detectors after some were cut in 1973.74 During an NRC special inspection, which concluded on August 16, 2005, three violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, the NRC proposes to impose a civil penalty pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act), 42 U.S.C.

2282 and 10 CFR 2.205. The particular violation and associated civil penalty are set forth below:

1. Federal Regulation 10 CFR 74.19(a)(1), formerly in 10 CFR 70.51, requires, in part, that the licensee shall keep records showing the receipt, inventory (including location and unique identity), acquisition, transfer, and disposal of all special nuclear material (SNM) in its possession regardless of its origin or method of acquisition. Contrary to the above, from October 1968 (the approximate date when the fuel pin was known to have been 74 https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/enforcement/actions/materials/p.html

segmented into three 18-inch pieces) to July 16, 2004 (date when PG&E determined that the segments were missing), PG&E failed 'to keep records showing the inventory, transfer or disposal of three segments of irradiated fuel, each approximately 18-inches in length, containing approximately 22.5 grams of SNM. In addition, from June 25, 1973, to February 4, 2005, PG&E failed to keep records including location and unique identity showing the inventory, transfer or disposal of one complete and three partial incore detectors containing a total of approximately 0.035 grams of SNM.

2. Federal Regulation 10 CFR 74.19(b), formerly in 10 CFR 70.51, requires that each licensee that is authorized to possess SNM in a quantity exceeding one effective kilogram at any one time shall establish, maintain, and follow written material control and accounting procedures that are sufficient to enable the licensee to account for the SNM in its possession under license. The licensee shall retain these procedures until the Commission terminates the license that authorizes possession of the material and retain any superceded portion of the procedures for 3 years after the portion is superceded. Contrary to the above, from October 1968 (the approximate date when the fuel pin was known to have been segmented into three 18-inch pieces) to July 16, 2004 (date when PG&E determined that the segments were missing), PG&E, authorized by NRC License DPR-7 to possess SNM in a quantity exceeding one effective kilogram, failed to establish, maintain, and follow written material control and accounting procedures sufficient to account for the SNM in its possession under license DPR-7. Specifically, PG&E failed to account for SNM located in the HBPP spent fuel pool (SFP) consisting of a quantity of 111 grams of uranium-235, 27 grams of plutonium contained in the remnants from Type 1 damaged fuel assemblies (fuel fragments and SNM waste), and incore detectors.

3. Federal Regulation 10 CFR 74.19(c), formerly in 10 CFR 70.51, requires each licensee who is authorized to possess SNM, at any one time and site location, in a quantity greater than 350 grams of contained uranium-235, uranium-233, or plutonium, or any combination thereof, shall conduct a physical inventory of all SNM in its possession under license at intervals not to exceed 12 months. Contrary to the above, PG&E, a licensee authorized to possess SNM at the HBPP in quantities greater than 350 grams of contained uranium-235, uranium-2:33, or plutonium failed to conduct a physical inventory of all SNM in its possession at intervals not to exceed 12 months. Specifically, inventories performed by PG&E from October 1968 (the approximate date when the fuel pin was known 1o have been segmented into three 18-inch pieces), to February 4, 2005, with the exception of periods when the sealed SFP cover was in place, did not include fuel fragments and other SNM remnants from Type 1 damaged fuel assemblies and all incore detectors.

April 10, 1997 15 workers were evacuated as a result of radioactive exposure from Unit 2 during refueling. Radiation escapes outside and 30 gallons of coolant spills inside. The loss of residual heat removal (RHR) system capability for a period of approximately one and one-half hours at the Diablo Canyon, Unit 2 reactor facility on April 10, 1987. This event occurred while the Diablo Canyon, Unit 2, a pressurized water reactor, was shutdown with the reactor coolant system (RCS) water level drained to approximately mid-level of the hot leg piping. ~ The reactor containment building i, l equipment hatch was removed at the time of the event, and plant personnel were I in the process of removing the primary side manways to gain access into the steam generator channel head areas.

Thus, two fission product barriers were breached throughout the event.

The RCS temperature increased from approximately 87 F to bulk boiling conditions without RCS temperature indication, available to the plant operators. The RCS was subsequently pressurized to approximately 7-10 psig. The NRC AIT members concluded that the Diablo Canyon, Unit 2 plant was, at the time of the event, in a condition not previously analyzed by the NRC- <staff. The AIT findings from this event appear significant and generic 4.0 other pressurized water reactor facilities licensed by the NRC.;75 In 2006 PG&E was issued an NOV for allowing a contractor on the DCPP site without a background check. This is a violation of 10 CFR 73.56(a)(4) which requires in part, that if a licensee accepts an access authorization program used by its contractor, the licensee is responsible for granting, denying, or revoking unescorted site access authorization to employees of that contractor. On October 5, 1995, the licensee granted a contract employee unescorted access to the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant without evaluating all pertinent background information developed. Specifically, the licensee granted unescorted access to an employee of the Westinghouse Electric Corporation (Westinghouse), a licensee contractor whose access authorization program had been accepted by the licensee, based on an October 2, 1995 request for unescorted access authorization that stated that the individual's background investigation met the requirements of the Westinghouse access authorization program, and that a full 5-year background investigation had been satisfactorily completed. In fact, as of October 2, 1995, Westinghouse had verified substantial derogatory information about the individual (alcohol use/abuse; previous employment terminations for cause; trustworthiness issues from previous employers; and 75https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2023/

ML20234B468.pdf&ved=2ahUKEwj0u76foKqKAxXCGTQIHc0uDpsQFnoECBcQAQ&usg=AOvVaw3WoUyUBizq0Yaa3

_PcyT-A

derogatory credit information) and this derogatory information was not provided to the licensee until October 9, 1995, during a telephone call.76 This is a Severity Level III violation (Supplement III).

On December 28, 2016, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding to Pacific Gas and Electric Company (the licensee), for a violation involving the licensee's failure to develop adequate instructions for the installation of external limit switches on safety-related motor-operated valves as required by Technical Specification 5.4.1.a "Procedures," at the Diablo Canyon Power Plant. Specifically, Procedure MP E-53.10R, "Augmented Stem Lubrication for Limitorque Operated Valves," Revision 4, used to perform maintenance on safety-related equipment, failed to provide instructions to establish and check the travel of external switches installed on motor-operated valves are within vendor established criteria. Consequently, the limit switch for valve RHR-2-8700B was installed, such that, it was operated repeatedly beyond overtravel tolerances resulting in its failure on May 16, 2016. Additionally, the licensee also violated Technical Specification 3.5.2 because train B of the emergency core cooling system was determined to be inoperable for greater than the technical specification allowed outage time of 14 days.77 On78 February 11, 2015, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to Pacific Gas and Electric Company for a Severity Level III violation of 10 CFR 50.54(q), "Conditions of Licenses" involving the failure to apply and receive approval from the Commission for a proposed change that decreased the effectiveness of the approved emergency plan. In addition, a White Significance Determination finding was issued. This White finding, an issue with low to moderate significance to safety, will require additional NRC inspections. The finding involves a change to the emergency plan which decreased its effectiveness. Specifically, on November 4, 2005, without approval from the NRC, the licensee removed instructions in emergency plan implementing procedures for making protective action recommendations for members of the public on the ocean within the 10-mile emergency planning zone, decreasing the plan's effectiveness.

On May 4, 2012, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) for a violation of 10 CFR 50.9, "Completeness and Accuracy of Information," associated with a Severity Level III violation involving PG&E's failure to provide information to the Commission that was complete and accurate in all material respects, related to its NRC Generic Letter 2003-01 response. Specifically, in a letter dated April 22, 2005, PG&E stated that: (1) test results confirmed that no unfiltered 76 https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/enforcement/actions/reactors/ea96123.html 77 https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/enforcement/actions/reactors/d.html 78 https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/enforcement/actions/reactors/d.html

control room in-leakage existed; and (2) tracer gas in-leakage testing was performed in the alignment that results in the greatest consequence to the control room operator. This information was inaccurate because control room ventilation testing conducted prior to PG&E's response to Generic Letter 2003-01 indicated that the unfiltered in-leakage was greater than the value assumed in the design basis radiological analyses, and the system test was not performed in an alignment that resulted in the greatest consequence to the control room operator.79 In 2016 the NRC cited PG&E for an emergency cooling system at Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant may have been inoperable for a period of a year and half, according to a Nuclear Regulatory Commission finding. The NRC slapped PG&E with a citation over the matter. During a test conducted in May, workers discovered a maintenance problem that rendered one of Diablo Canyons Unit 2 cooling systems inoperable. The cooling system had been inoperable for an extended prior of time, possibly dating back to Oct. 2014, an NRC press release states.80 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued a violation, but no fine, to Pacific Gas & Electric for maintaining a faulty warning system for a potential radioactive emergency at Diablo Canyon Power Plant.81 The NRC staff issued a Notice of Violation (NOV) against the Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) in fiscal year 1990 because of noncompliance with license conditions imposed on operation of the Diablo Canyon (Cal.) nuclear plant.82 DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1--MARCH 7, 1991 suffered a loss of offsite power when, while the unit was shut down for refueling with 35 feet of water above the core, the boom of a mobile crane came too close to the 500 kV transformer lead, shorting it and tripping the transformer. Electrical power for Unit 1 operations was being back-fed through the main transformer to the unit auxiliary transformers. The main generator had been disconnected from the main transformer, so that the backfeed was possible. The Unit 1 standby startup transformer, the normal source of had power during a shutdown, been taken out of service for maintenance.

When the main transformer tripped and no longer supplied power, the unit's three emergency diesel generators started automatically and picked up emergency loads as designed. Offsite power was restored to the Unit 1 auxiliary buses five hours after the initiating event by cross-tying the Unit 2 standby startup transformer into the Unit 1 startup bus. The mobile crane 79 https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/enforcement/actions/reactors/d.html 80 https://calcoastnews.com/2016/12/pge-cited-cooling-system-failure-diablo-canyon/

81 https://calcoastnews.com/2015/02/nrc-tags-pge-diablo-canyon-safety-breach/

82 ANNUAL REPORT 1991 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 41

was improperly brought to within 2 or 3 feet from the power lines, permitting arc-over. The licensee's Accident Prevention Rules indicate that 27 feet is the minimum required clearance between mobile cranes and 500 kV transmission lines.83 Pacific Gas and Electric Company, Diablo Canyon (EA 98-185)

On November 16, 1998, an Exercise of Enforcement Discretion letter was issued stating that the NRC intended to exercise enforcement discretion pursuant to Section VII.B.6 of the Enforcement Policy and not issue a Notice of Violation or propose a civil penalty for a Severity Level III violation that involved the simultaneous inoperability of the Unit 2 Train A safety injection pump, the Train A residual heat removal pump, and Valve 8923A, the Train A safety injection suction from refueling water storage tank. This condition occurred for 14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br /> 30 minutes in November 1989 and rendered both trains of safety injection inoperable for the long-term recirculation cooling mode. This condition also existed during the maintenance of these components and resulted from a then-unrecognized interdependency of cold leg recirculation suction flow paths between the emergency core cooling system trains. The condition was identified through review of historical records several years after occurrence when licensee engineers were evaluating new industry information. Discretion was warranted because of: the age of the issue, its isolated occurrence, the fact that it is not likely to be identified by routine licensee efforts, and the initiative demonstrated by the licensee to identify and promptly correct the potential condition.84 An NRC inspection determined that several procedures were violated when PG&E personnel failed to remove an electrical grounding device called a ground buggy before restoring power to a Unit 1 electrical bus. A bus is an assembly of conductors that distributes electricity to various loads, and a ground buggy is a temporary grounding device designed to protect workers from electrocution during electrical maintenance. The ground buggy caused a short and resultant surge of electrical current to an auxiliary transformer, which blew apart and caught fire.85 83 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 91-22: FOUR PLANT OUTAGE EVENTS INVOLVING LOSS OF AC POWER OR COOLANT SPILLS Page 1,2 of 4 84 NRC OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENTANNUAL REPORT Fiscal Year 1999Page 87 https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0036/ML003672370.pdf 85 https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ml0037/ML003706170.pdf

July 16, 1996 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff has issued a Notice of Violation and Notice of Deviation to the Pacific Gas & Electric Co., operator of the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant. The action does not carry a civil penalty. The company was cited for two Severity Level IV violations and one deviation from a written commitment.86 PG&E has a history of deceiving regulators including the NRC.

The Commission has directed the NRC staff to issue a Notice of Violation with regard to statements made by representatives of Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (PG&E) at a public meeting with the NRC staff on November 3, 1981. These statements concerned PG&E's review of a report prepared by its consultant, R. L. Cloud Associates, Inc., addressing the ongoing seismic reverification program for Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant. On the basis of the Report of the Special Investigation by the NRC staff (NUREG-0862, Issue 2), the Commission has concluded that statements made at that meeting and PG&E's subsequent failure to correct those statements constitute material false statements in violation of Section 186a of is troubling that a company which seeks permission to operate nuclear power plants should be so insensitive to its obligation to inform federal regulators and the public. The issue is not the circulation of the reports but the false portrayal of PG&E's relationship with Dr. Cloud's firm. When we grant a utility the authority to operate a nuclear power plant we must be confident that its officials will be forthright with us.

That is why the Commission's finding that PG&E had made a material false statement is so important.

On February 11, 1982: The NRC votes 3-2 to issue a notice of violation to PG&E for making a Material False Statement; The Nuclear Regulatory Commission cited Pacific Gas & Electric Co. for 'material false statements' regarding the issue of earthquake design flaws at its new Diablo Canyon I reactor.87 The citation stemmed from statements made by company officials to the commission staff at a meeting last Nov. 3 at which the officials indicated a consultant report on the reactor's seismic design was an entirely independent piece of work.

PG&E has also been fined for obstructing an agency proceeding that was included in a superseding indictment filed July 29, 2014. The evidence at 86 https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0037/ML003705305.pdf 87 https://www.upi.com/Archives/1982/02/10/The-Nuclear-Regulatory-Commission-cited-Pacific-Gas-Electric/1511382165200/

trial demonstrated that during the course of the NTSBs investigation, PG&E provided a version of a policy outlining the way in which PG&E addressed manufacturing threats on its pipelines, and then sought to withdraw the document. According to PG&Es letter, the policy was produced in error and was an unapproved draft. In finding PG&E guilty of obstructing an agency proceeding, the jury concluded PG&E intentionally and corruptly tried to influence, obstruct, or impede the NTSB investigation, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1505. 88 Investigators discovered PG&E attempted to mislead the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) during its investigation. The evidence at trial demonstrated that, between 2007 and 2010, PG&E willfully failed to address recordkeeping deficiencies concerning its larger natural gas pipelines knowing that its records were inaccurate or incomplete. The evidence further demonstrated that PG&E willfully failed to identify threats to its larger natural gas pipelines and to take appropriate actions to investigate the seriousness of threats to pipelines when they were identified. In addition, PG&E willfully failed to adequately prioritize as high risk and properly assess threatened pipelines after they were over pressurized, as the PSA and its regulations required. These charges were filed in an indictment on April 1, 2014. In finding PG&E guilty, the jury concluded the company knowingly and willfully violated the PSA and its regulations between 2007 and 2010. The jury found PG&E guilty of six felony countsfive willful violations of the PSA and one count of corruptly obstructing the federal investigation into the 2010 fatal pipeline explosion in San Bruno, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1505.89 A CPUC Safety and Enforcement Division (SED) staff investigation report alleges that PG&E falsified locate and mark records from 2012 to 2017. Specifically, the report finds that PG&E: lacked sufficient staffing to locate and mark natural gas pipelines in compliance with law; pressured supervisors and locators to complete the work resulting in PG&E staff falsifying data so requests for pipeline locating and marking would not appear as late; had common knowledge among its supervisors that locators falsified data; and received input from external parties that there were discrepancies in its late locate and mark reporting."90 88 https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndca/pr/pge-ordered-develop-compliance-and-ethics-program-part-its-sentence-engaging-criminal 89 https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndca/pr/pge-ordered-develop-compliance-and-ethics-program-part-its-sentence-engaging-criminal 90 https://www.npr.org/2018/12/14/677003961/pg-e-falsified-gas-pipeline-safety-records-regulators-say

NRC Oversight over Diablo Canyon is inconsistent.

Correspondence from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission released by Sen. Boxer in a recent hearing and reported Sunday on Page 1 of the San Francisco Chronicle shows that since Diablo Canyons first reactor came online in 1984, PG&E failed to use updated seismic and loss-of-coolant-accident data, known as LOCA loads, for replacement equipment. Failure of such equipment in an earthquake could lead to a catastrophic release of radiation. PG&E should have used new data after a previously unknown fault, the Hosgri, was discovered during initial construction, but violated its federal operating license by failing to use the updated data in conjunction with loss of cooling accident data in designing and constructing replacement steam generators and reactor vessel heads for the reactors.

In 2011, PG&E notified the NRC of its decades-long negligence, the NRC failed to cite PG&E for any infraction. Instead NRC and PG&E worked together to secretly and illegally alter the plants operating license in September 2013. Friends of the Earth has a case pending in the U.S.

Court of Appeals asking that the illegal license revision be thrown out and that Diablo Canyon be shut pending public review to determine whether or not the reactors can withstand the forces of newly identified earthquake faults that surround the plant.91 July 10, 1987 The House of Representatives holds hearings on the NRC's licensing of unit 1. Chairman Markey states that the secret transcripts "reminded me of the Watergate tapes." The committee takes testimony from the NRC and opponents. A committee investigation is done finding the NRC guilty of: deliberately attempting to avoid public hearings on evacuation planning; 2. considering off the record materials from PG&E that had not been adjudicated; and 3. refusing hearings because it would entail further delays and increased costs to PG&E; In September of 1986 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that NRC had violated its regulations in approving the amendment to PG&Es Spent Fuel racking proposal prior to holding hearings. On September 11, 1986, the Ninth Circuit Court ruled that (1) NRC had violated its own regulations in approving the license application prior to holding hearings and (2) although PG&E could continue reracking the Diablo Canyon Unit 1 pool, it could not place any spent fuel in that pool or begin reracking Unit 2 until NRC held hearings on the proposed amendment.92 91https://foe.org/news/2015-03-diablo-pge-secretly-used-wrong-data-for-safety-equipment/

92 United States General accounting Office Information on the Reracking of the Diablo Canyon Spent Fuel Storage Pools

PG&E is currently breaking the law.

PG&E is currently breaking the law by constructing improvements at the DCPP without a Coastal Commission permit.93 The Coastal Commission has docketed in the ADAMS website a September 14, 2024 letter from Tim Luster to PG&E entitled, Incomplete Consistency Certification for Pacific Gas & Electric Companys (PG&Es) Requested Nuclear Regulatory Commission License Renewal for Diablo Canyon Power Plant, San Luis Obispo County.94 The letter informed PG&E that, At this point in our review, however, your application remains incomplete, for the reasons provided below. Pursuant to the Coastal Zone Management Acts (CZMA) implementing regulations at 15 CFR 930.58, we will need the information requested herein and in those previous letters to allow the Coastal Commission to adequately consider any likely coastal effects of the proposed federal action. Accordingly, and pursuant to 15 CFR 930.60(a), the Commissions six-month review period has not commenced and will not commence until we receive the missing necessary data and information.

Despite not having the Coastal Commission permit PG&E has already completed many of the upgrades that the Coastal Commission permit is adjudicating.

PG&E negligence in its utility operations Because of its negligence in its utility operations in 2016 PG&E was ordered by the Department of Justice To Develop a Compliance And Ethics Program As Part Of Its Sentence For Engaging In Criminal Conduct On August 9, 2016, after a 5 1/2 week trial, a federal jury found PG&E guilty of multiple willful violations of the PSA and obstructing an agency proceeding. The PSA-related charges stem from PG&Es record keeping and pipeline integrity management practices and were uncovered in the course of the San Bruno investigation. These charges were filed in an indictment on April 1, 2014. In finding PG&E guilty, the jury concluded the company knowingly and willfully violated the https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://www.gao.gov/assets/rce d-88-79fs.pdf&ved=2ahUKEwjEiv-wvKqKAxV2ATQIHTu5Kq8QFnoECBsQAQ&usg=AOvVaw3hxSpF1FIrB14XbQOb6SJo Page 20 93 ADAMS Accession # ML24260A122 September 94 ADAMS Ascension # ML24260A122

PSA and its regulations between 2007 and 2010. The jury found PG&E guilty of six felony countsfive willful violations of the PSA and one count of corruptly obstructing the federal investigation into the 2010 fatal pipeline explosion in San Bruno, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1505.95 2010 San Bruno explosion In 2016, PG&E was convicted of six felony charges related to a natural gas explosion that killed eight people. The charges included five counts of criminal safety violations and one count of obstruction of justice. PG&E was sentenced to five years of probation and a $3 million fine.

2 018 Camp Fire PG&E pleaded guilty to 84 felony counts of involuntary manslaughter for the Camp Fire, which destroyed the town of Paradise. PG&E was fined the maximum penalty of $4 million.

2020 Zogg Fire PG&E settled criminal charges related to the Zogg Fire for $50 million. The settlement also included community work commitments, such as undergrounding electrical wires and adding weather stations.

Since 2000 PG&E has been fined over 19 billion dollars for safety related offenses. PG&E has been fined over 543 million dollars for environmental related offenses. PG&E has been fined over 158 million dollars for consumer protection offenses and over 22 million for employment related expenses.96 Safety-related offenses

$19,273,544,139 81 environment-related offenses

$543,277,600 15 consumer-protection-related offenses $158,761,147 36 employment-related offenses

$22,837,749 4

95 https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndca/pr/pge-ordered-develop-compliance-and-ethics-program-part-its-sentence-engaging-criminal 96 https://violationtracker.goodjobsfirst.org/?parent=pg-and-e-corp&page=2

A CPUC Safety and Enforcement Division (SED) staff investigation report alleges that PG&E falsified locate and mark records from 2012 to 2017.

Specifically, the report finds that PG&E: lacked sufficient staffing to locate and mark natural gas pipelines in compliance with law; pressured supervisors and locators to complete the work resulting in PG&E staff falsifying data so requests for pipeline locating and marking would not appear as late; had common knowledge among its supervisors that locators falsified data; and received input from external parties that there were discrepancies in its late locate and mark reporting."97 97 https://www.npr.org/2018/12/14/677003961/pg-e-falsified-gas-pipeline-safety-records-regulators-say