ML24337A010
| ML24337A010 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 12/02/2024 |
| From: | Blind A - No Known Affiliation |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| SECY RAS | |
| References | |
| RAS 57206, 50-255-LA-3, ASLBP 24-986-01-LA-BD01 | |
| Download: ML24337A010 (0) | |
Text
Submittal Date: 12/2/2024 50-255-LA-3 of 1
37 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC, and Holtec Palisades, LLC (Docket No. 50-255-LA-3)
Supplement Filing, Harm Linkage Explanation: Joint Petitioners Brief on Representation, Consolidation of Petitions, and Standing of Our Appointed Consolidated Point of Contact, Alan Blind Prepared By: Alan Blind, Proposed Petitioner and Joint Petitioners Elected representative.
The ASLB Order and Rationale for This Supplemental Brief The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB), in its Memorandum and Order dated November 14, 2024, addressed various procedural matters, including representation issues and briefing deadlines for Joint Petitioners.
As part of this order, the ASLB permitted Joint Petitioners to file briefs to address representation issues. This supplemental brief, due by December
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37 5, 2024, complies with the ASLBs directives and is intended solely to clarify the original brief presented previously to the docket. This supplement introduces no new arguments or requests but serves to expand on and provide additional detail to a specific point raised in the original filing. Joint Petitioners anticipated that this clarification might arise during future oral evidentiary hearings and have proactively addressed the issue in this submission.
Why This Supplemental Brief is Necessary This supplemental brief is submitted to expand on a statement included in Joint Petitioners initial filing of our brief, in part as part of our brief for standing based on proximity and linkage to radiological release:
"This assertion is supported by the NRC Safety Determination Process, which employs probabilistic assessments to compare scenarios with lower and higher remaining margins to safety limits.
These safety margins, determined by the plant-specific NRC-approved licensing and design basis, form the foundation challenged by the Joint Petitioners Contentions."
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37 The decision to write this supplemental brief was driven by observations of Joint Petitioners reading other examples of evidentiary hearings. From these readings, a recurring challenge raised by the NRC and license attorneys was the lack of a detailed description of the actual linkage between petitioners contentions and their claims of harm. While petitioners initial brief outlined the linkage, this supplemental brief aims to provide a more comprehensive explanation of how petitioners contentions directly relate to public safety risks and harm under the NRCs regulatory framework.
Purpose of This Brief The purpose of this supplemental brief is threefold:
1.
Addressing Challenges to Linkage:
By detailing how the unresolved issues in petitioners contentions increase the probability of radiological releases through reduced safety margins, this brief solidifies the causal relationship between alleged deficient regulatory actions and potential harm to petitioners.
2.
Expanding on the Use of the NRC Safety Determination Process:
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37
This brief elaborates on how the NRCs probabilistic metrics, including Core Damage Frequency (CDF) and Large Early Release Frequency (LERF), highlight the risks of degraded conditions, particularly under Palisades outdated design and licensing basis, in force at the time of 50.82 certifications.
3.
Providing Real-World, Actual, Context:
Referencing a 2011 Palisades incident as a case study, this brief demonstrates that these risks are not hypothetical. It provides evidence of how reliance on the Revision 35 FSAR licensing basis and reliance on manual operator actions nearly led to a significant safety event. Joint Petitioners note, proposed petitioner and elected representative, Alan Blind, was Engineering Director at the time of this event, and presented the licensee SDP to the NRC.
This supplemental brief addresses key challenges raised during hearings, supports petitioners arguments with detailed analyses of regulatory frameworks, and uses real-world evidence to validate the linkage between petitioners contentions and petitioner harm. By doing so, it fulfills the ASLBs allowance for additional briefing and strengthens the case for affirming petitioners arguments for standing, including new petitioner, Alan
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37 Blind, due to a direct linkage from Joint Petitioners Contentions to increased probability and consequence of off site radiological releases and thus harm to Joint Petitioners.
Full Statement From the Brief:
The linkage between Mr. Blinds potential harm and the Contentions is clear. First, NRC Staff presented legal based arguments for linkage noted earlier, In addition, specific to linkage of harm, from Joint Petitioners petition, the unresolved issues raised in Contentions One through Five demonstrate that Holtecs reliance on an outdated licensing basis and quality assurance manuals, if permitted to use it proposed regulations, the subject of petitioners contentions, will reduce safety margins, thereby increasing the probability and consequences of radiological releases. This risk stems from the diminished margin to NRC-defined safety limits, which are designed to prevent failure of the three barriers, fuel cladding, coolant pressure boundary, and the containment building, preventing the offsite release of radiological materials in the event of a design basis accident. This assertion is supported by the NRC Safety
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37 Determination Process, which employs probabilistic assessments to compare scenarios with lower and higher remaining margins to safety limits. These safety margins, determined by the plant specific NRC-approved licensing and design basis, form the foundation challenged by the Joint Petitioners Contentions.
Summary of This Supplemental Brief This supplemental brief demonstrates, in more detail, how the unresolved issues raised in the petitioners contentions are directly linked to public harm by highlighting Holtecs reliance on an outdated licensing basis and quality assurance manuals. If these deficiencies are allowed to persist under proposed regulatory processes, they will reduce safety margins and increase the probability and severity of radiological releases. The NRCs Significance Determination Process (SDP) provides an important quantitive framework to assess and compare these risks through metrics such as Core Damage Frequency (CDF) and Large Early Release Frequency (LERF), which rely on a plant's licensing and design basis to establish baseline safety margins.
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37 The brief begins by explaining the foundational role of the SDP in identifying safety risks tied to degraded conditions and deficiencies in licensee performance. It emphasizes how the outdated pre-General Design Criteria (GDC) deterministic design basis at Palisades, contained in the FSAR, reduces Defense in Depth by shifting reliance from engineered safeguards to manual operator actions, which carry significantly higher failure probabilities.
The brief then highlights the concerns of Holtecs proposal, and NRC allowing, to use the Palisades Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR),
currently based on a 50-year-old grandfathered licensing basis, as addressed in petitioners Contentions. If the petitioners requested actions are affirmed, the NRC would have the legal basis to require a comprehensive FSAR update, including the licensing basis and QAPD, informed by modern GDC and Standard Review Plan (SRP) standards.
Such an update would enhance Defense in Depth, improving baseline safety margins and future SDP baseline evaluations. The differences in SDP baselines quantifies the argument presented in this briefing for linking the petition contentions to petitioners harm.
Finally, the brief ties these arguments to a real-world example: the 2011 Palisades electrical fault, for which petitioner, Alan Blind was present,
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37 which the NRC classified as a "Yellow" finding due to its substantial safety significance. This event demonstrated the real outcome of shifting reliance on manual operator actions and outdated safety systems. It validates the petitioners concerns and highlights the need for regulatory action to ensure public health and safety.
By linking actual events, regulatory frameworks, and real-world consequences, this brief underscores the necessity of addressing the contentions and requested actions raised by the petitioners to enhance Defense in Depth and protect against future failures along with providing the necessary linkage necessary for standing.
My Experience Using SDP and Palisades FSAR Revision 35:
Contrasting SDP Inspection Finding Review Board (IFRB) and NRC Restart Panel Conclusions Note: I, Alan Blind, do not have access to the full FSAR Revision 35.
However, I reviewed the change log included in ML21125A285, which documents the submittal of Revision 35 Computer Disk files, in April 2021. Based on this review, I found no indications of changes to the base design basis as it was utilized for the 2011 Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP) evaluations. Therefore, I will refer to
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37 Revision 35 as the current FSAR containing the 1970 era original design basis, including all Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP) considerations and pre-General Design Criteria (GDC) deviation allowances.
==
Introduction:==
Professional Experience and its Relevance to Joint Petitioners Contentions My professional background includes managing NRC significant findings including yellow and red findingsrare occurrences that signify substantial safety significancethrough the NRC Significance Determination Process (SDP). These included the 2000 Indian Point Steam Generator Tube Rupture, red (ML24267A296) and the 2011 Palisades, yellow, significant electrical fault, (ML12039A123) which nearly challenged the pressure boundary safety limit. This experience provides firsthand knowledge of how regulatory tools like Palisades FSAR Revision 35 are applied in real-world safety analyses.
This section contrasts the NRCs 2011 response to the Palisades Yellow finding with its current, 2024, stance on FSAR Revision 35 in the context of the restart process. It highlights how the unresolved issues in Joint
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of 10 37 Petitioners contentions directly link to increased risks for petitioners and validates the linkage of harm posed by the reliance on an outdated FSAR.
The 2011 Palisades Electrical Fault: A Case Study in SDP Application Following the electrical fault at Palisades in 2011 (ML113330802), I supervised the licensees response to the NRCs request for submitting a Significance Determination. Our evaluation used the design basis that is contained in the current FSAR Revision 35 and credited the operator actions allowed by this licensing document (ML12023A188).
Key Findings from the Licensees SDP Analysis:
The SDP analysis credited operator actions as sufficient to mitigate the fault without breaching the pressure boundary.
Based on this evaluation, the licensee concluded that the finding was White, indicating low to moderate safety significance.
NRCs Rejection of the Licensees
Conclusion:
The NRCs Inspection Finding Review Board (IFRB) rejected the licensees conclusion, determining that reliance on operator actions while allowed under design basis that is contained in the current FSAR Revision 35was insufficient for safety margin credit.
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of 11 37 The IFRB concluded that the finding was Yellow, signifying a significant reduction in safety margins due to the proximity of breaching the pressure boundary.
Acknowledgment of Operator Excellence:
In this case, it must be emphasized that the operator actions were excellent, preventing the situation from escalating to a breach of the primary pressure boundary. However, within the framework of the SDP, the requirements are to not depend on operator performance but on the base deterministic design of the plant as documented in the FSAR design basis.
The NRC SDP process reflected the at the time, (2011) regulatory view that operator actions cannot substitute for engineered safeguards and Defense in Depth.
The Connection Between FSAR Revision 35 and Joint Petitioners Contentions FSAR Revision 35 is the foundation of Palisades outdated design basis, which lacks modern General Design Criteria (GDC) standards. This reliance on pre-GDC design principles perpetuates safety gaps by:
1.
Allowing Credit for Operator Actions:
FSAR Revision 35 permits operator actions as part of the approved licensing
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of 12 37 basis, reducing reliance on deterministic safeguards like automated systems and redundant designs.
As demonstrated in the 2011 electrical fault, this reliance increases the risk of failure during time-critical events.
2.
Shifting Away from Defense in Depth:
GDC safety principles prioritize engineered safeguards and redundancy, minimizing the need for operator actions. FSAR Revision 35s continued use is inconsistent with this approach.
3.
Lack of Single-Failure Criterion Compliance:
The multiple failures of safety-related equipment, following the failed maintenance activity to replace a circuit breaker in 2011, were a direct result of the plants failure to meet GDC requirements for active single-failure design criteria. These deficiencies were explicitly permitted under Revision 35 of the FSAR design basis.
This demonstrates a significant safety gap in the plant's foundational design basis, perpetuated by continued reliance on pre-GDC
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of 13 37 allowances.
4.
Regulatory Inaction on FSAR Updates:
Joint Petitioners contend that the NRC has the authority to require Holtec to update FSAR Revision 35, being informed by current GDC, but has not exercised this authority. Without an updated FSAR, the plants baseline safety margins remain deficient, increasing risks for nearby communities and, in particular, Joint Petitioners. This is the direct linkage required for Joint Petitioners standing.
Contrasting NRC Positions: Restart Panel vs. IFRB Conclusions The NRCs current (2024) acceptance of FSAR Revision 35 for the restart process contrasts sharply with the IFRBs (2011) conclusion, using FSAR Revision 35, regarding the SDP analysis:
IFRBs Rejection of FSAR Reliance:
In 2011, the IFRB dismissed operator actions as high risk of failure, despite being permitted by FSAR Revision 35, and upheld a Yellow finding due to the reduced safety margins.
Restart Panels Acceptance of FSAR Reliance:
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of 14 37
In 2024, the NRC Staffs defense and endorsing Holtecs use of FSAR Revision 35 under the 50.59 process, effectively accepts the same safety framework that the IFRB previously deemed high risk.
This inconsistency highlights the consequences of continuing to use a licensing basis that prioritizes operator actions over Defense in Depth. It further validates Joint Petitioners contention that the FSAR must be updated to be informed by modern safety standards and operational experience.
==
Conclusion:==
Linking Experience to Petitioners Harm My firsthand experience with the SDP process and the design bias contained in FSAR Revision 35 underscores the validity of Joint Petitioners concerns and linkage. The 2011 Palisades Yellow finding exemplifies the adverse impacts of relying on outdated licensing bases and operator actions. By affirming Joint Petitioners requested actions, the ASLB can address these deficiencies, reduce risks, and enhance safety margins at Palisades. This link between outdated safety frameworks, petitioner harm, and the need for ASLB intervention is clear and compelling.
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of 15 37 The NRC Significance Determination Process provides the linkage to identify and link Palisades Degraded Conditions to Petitioners Harm Through Radiological Release of Materials By Using Core Damage Frequency and Early Release Frequency Metrics.
==
Introduction:==
The Role of the NRC Significance Determination Process (SDP)
The NRCs Significance Determination Process (SDP) is a framework for quantifying the safety significance of inspection findings and degraded plant conditions. Central to this process are metrics such as Core Damage Frequency (CDF) and Large Early Release Frequency (LERF), which measure the risk posed by deficiencies in licensee performance. These metrics enable stakeholders to objectively assess how degraded conditions impact the risk profile of a nuclear facility relative to its licensing basis and design basis.
The Licensing Design Basis as the Foundation for Risk Metrics
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of 16 37 The SDP relies on a plant's design basisits deterministic design descriptionto establish the baseline for evaluating changes in CDF and LERF. This licensing basis defines the physical and operational characteristics of the plant, for example; the number and redundancy of pumps, the reliability of active and passive safety systems, and the need for operator actions during malfunctions. These elements collectively form the safety margins designed to prevent radiological releases during accidents, natural disasters, and malfunctions.
Linkage Between Degraded Conditions and Increased Risk As outlined in the SDP manual, the significance of degraded conditions and malfunctions arises from their impact on a plants baseline risk profile.
According to section 03.02, the SDP identifies the proximate cause of degraded conditions, emphasizing that licensee performance deficiencies often underlie safety issues. This causal relationship is critical, as it allows the SDP to estimate the increased risk (CDF and LERF) stemming from these deficiencies. Specifically, section 04.02 clarifies that the SDP calculates the difference between the nominal CDF or LERF and the risk levels associated with degraded conditions, thereby quantifying the reduction in safety margins from plant malfunctions.
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of 17 37 Impact on the Three Safety Barriers The SDP underscores the relationship between degraded conditions and the plant's three safety barriers: fuel cladding, coolant pressure boundary, and containment building. Deficiencies affecting these barriers directly contribute to higher probabilities of core damage and radiological releases.
For instance, failures in the containment building could elevate LERF, increasing the likelihood of offsite consequences. These connections demonstrate how degraded conditions linked to deficient licensee performance and malfunctions, and the baseline deterministic design basis, amplify the potential harm to public health and safety.
Probabilistic Risk Assessments as a Communication Tool Section 02.02 of the SDP highlights its role in providing all stakeholders an objective and common framework for communicating the potential safety or security significance of inspection findings. By using probabilistic risk assessments, the SDP enables clear communication of how degraded conditions translate into increased risks of core damage and early release.
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of 18 37 These insights directly inform stakeholders about the safety implications of unresolved issues like those raised in Contentions One through Five.
==
Conclusion:==
The Linkage Between the SDP and Petitioners Harm The SDPs integration of plant-specific licensing and design basis with probabilistic metrics like CDF and LERF demonstrates its utility in linking degraded conditions to potential harm. For Palisades, the reliance on outdated licensing and quality assurance manuals reduces safety margins, as outlined in the petitioners contentions. This increases the likelihood of radiological releases, directly impacting public safety and justifying the petitioners linkage for standing. The SDPs systematic approach underscores the importance of resolving these issues to uphold safety standards and protect public health.
The Role of Defense in Depth in Ensuring Safety Margins The concept of Defense in Depth is central to the safe operation of nuclear facilities. It emphasizes multiple layers of protective measuresredundant systems, safety barriers, and procedural controlsto safeguard public health and the environment from radiological risks. For the Palisades Nuclear Plant, which operated on a pre-General Design Criteria (GDC)
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of 19 37 licensing basis, the foundation for Defense in Depth is tied directly to its deterministic design basis and alternate means for meeting NRC General Design Criteria. This baseline defines the physical characteristics and operational expectations of the plant, ensuring that all safety margins are accounted for through engineered safeguards and risk assessment protocols.
The Pre-GDC Licensing Basis: Deterministic Design Underpinning Safety The Palisades Nuclear Plant was licensed before the implementation of the GDC, which standardizes safety requirements for newer plants. As a result, Palisades licensing basis did not rely on deterministic principles that describe specific physical attributes and operational constraints. Key aspects not considered in Palisades pre 1970 design include:
1.
System Redundancy and Diversity:
The deterministic design emphasizes redundancy in critical safety systems, such as pumps and emergency cooling systems, ensuring that a backup remains available in the event of a single failure (GDC 17, "Electric Power Systems").
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Diversity is incorporated through active and passive systems to guard against common-mode failures, enhancing reliability during accident scenarios (Regulatory Guide 1.75, "Criteria for Independence of Electrical Safety Systems").
2.
Single-Failure Proof Design:
Systems are designed to withstand the failure of any single component without compromising overall safety (GDC 4, "Environmental and Dynamic Effects Design Bases"). This deterministic approach ensures continued functionality of essential barriers, such as the primary coolant system and containment.
Modern regulatory expectations for single-failure proof design are reinforced in NUREG-0800, Section 3.5.1.1, "Protection Against Dynamic Effects Associated with the Postulated Rupture of Piping."
These deterministic principles provide the baseline for assessing safety margins, including the limits of Core Damage Frequency (CDF) and Large Early Release Frequency (LERF), as detailed in the SDP framework.
Reduced Defense in Depth at Palisades
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of 21 37 As a pre-GDC facility, Palisades inherently lacks some of the standardized enhancements found in post-GDC plants. This reduction in Defense in Depth is documented in the 1985 Systematic Evaluation Process (SEP) report. (NUREG-0820):
1.
Limited Redundancy in Key Systems:
The deterministic design at Palisades was developed under older safety philosophies, potentially leaving some systems without the robust redundancy required in modern designs. This is contrary to the redundancy requirements outlined in GDC 17, which ensures independence and reliability of safety systems.
2.
Increased Reliance on Operator Actions:
While procedural controls are integral to Defense in Depth, the pre-GDC design basis and allowed in the SEP, NUREG-0820, assumes a greater dependence on timely and effective operator actions, which introduces additional risk during rapid accident progression. The SEP allowed operator actions as a substitute for the design not meeting GDC requirements, most notably single active and passive failure design criteria (GDC 1,
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of 22 37 "Quality Standards and Records," and GDC 21, "Protection System Reliability and Testability").
Modern Regulatory Requirements for Operator Actions:
Operator actions that replace automated or passive systems are treated as changes to the method of performing or controlling a design function under 10 CFR 50.59.
Changes that increase reliance on manual actions must be evaluated against the eight criteria in 10 CFR 50.59(c)
(2), including potential impacts on accident mitigation response times and system reliability.
If the evaluation determines significant impacts on safety margins or technical specifications, NRC approval via a license amendment is required.
3.
These modern requirements highlight the inadequacy of allowing operator actions to substitute for deterministic design features, as was permitted under the 1985 based SEP license basis and present in FSAR Revision 35. NRC was not able to require a new review of these operator actions due to the backfit rule.
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of 23 37 Note; I, Alan Blind, often observed directly, during NRC Design Basis and Margin inspections of Palisades, NRC inspectors unable to address these design differences in their findings.
Conclusion By relying on SEP-era justifications to allow operator actions in place of robust GDC-based design features, Palisades would be allowed, if petitioners contentions are not upheld, to operate with diminished Defense in Depth. This approach stands in direct contrast to current NRC regulatory practices, which prioritize engineered safeguards over procedural,
operator action reliance. Current regulatory requirements, including those in 10 CFR 50.59, GDC 17, GDC 21, and associated guidance documents like Regulatory Guide 1.75, emphasize the need for redundancy, independence, and single-failure proof designs to ensure public health and safety.
The Role of the Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP)
The SEP, conducted in the 1970s and approved in the 1980s, sought to evaluate and upgrade pre-GDC plants like Palisades to align with contemporary safety expectations. However, referencing language from NUREG-0820, including ACRS member statements:
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of 24 37 1.
Selective Application of Upgrades:
SEP recommendations led to piecemeal improvements but did not mandate full compliance with GDC standards, leaving critical safety gaps.
2.
Limited Defense in Depth Enhancements:
The SEP primarily focused on analyzing risks and making incremental modifications rather than rebuilding foundational safety systems to meet modern criteria.
3.
Regulatory Constraints on Backfitting:
The NRCs inability to enforce full GDC compliance as part of the SEP process further perpetuated the reduced safety margins at Palisades.
Linking Design Limitations to SDP Risk Metrics The SDPs reliance on CDF and LERF metrics underscores the heightened risks posed by Palisades outdated licensing basis. These risks are amplified by:
1.
Baseline Risk Profile:
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Palisades deterministic design establishes a higher baseline risk due to reduced redundancy and lack of single-failure proof engineered safeguard systems, which are factored into the SDPs evaluation of CDF and LERF.
2.
Implications of Degraded Conditions:
Deficiencies linked to manual operator actions and aging infrastructure further increase risk, as demonstrated by higher CDF and LERF values for degraded conditions.
3.
Cascading Failures:
The lack of robust deterministic features makes Palisades more vulnerable to cascading failures, significantly impacting safety margins.
==
Conclusion:==
Addressing the Legacy Design Challenges The reliance on a fifty-year-old licensing basis, compounded by alternate methods that prioritize manual operator actions over deterministic safeguards, has left Palisades with reduced Defense in Depth. The SDPs metrics highlight how these deficiencies elevate risk, necessitating
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of 26 37 comprehensive reevaluations of safety strategies. To ensure public health and safety.
The FSAR and the 50-Year-Old Licensing Basis The Joint Petitioners petition challenges Holtecs proposed use of the 50.59 process, and the NRC staffs agreement, to implement Version 35 of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), based on the plants outdated licensing basis established during the Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP). The SEP provided method to transition the plants safety framework but now, relies heavily on grandfathered design criteria rather than modern General Design Criteria (GDC) and Standard Review Plans (SRPs). This reliance results in:
1.
Reduced Defense in Depth:
The 50-year-old FSAR underestimates safety risks by prioritizing manual operator actions over automated safeguards.
Deterministic safety margins, such as redundancy and single-failure proof systems, remain underdeveloped compared to GDC-compliant plants.
2.
Increased Subjectivity in Regulatory Decisions:
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of 27 37
The petition underscores Holtecs selective application of the regulatory framework, relying on the outdated FSAR, revision 35, to justify system restoration activities without a comprehensive review of modern safety standards.
The Petitioners Contentions and Their Relevance to Defense in Depth The petitions contentions directly address the limitations of the current regulatory framework and propose actions that would enhance Defense in Depth:
1.
Contention Two:
Challenge: Holtecs proposed use of the 50.59 process to reinstate Version 35 of the FSAR fails to incorporate 50 years of nuclear accident experience and lessons learned from modern GDC and SRPs.
Requested Action: Require a new FSAR review and update informed by current safety standards and operational insights.
Impact on Defense in Depth: A revised FSAR would shift reliance from manual operator actions to deterministic design
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of 28 37 features, such as automated systems and robust containment structures, improving baseline SDP metrics.
2.
Contention Four:
Challenge: The NRC is allowing Holtec to proceed with system restoration activities without an NRC-approved FSAR and Quality Assurance Program Description (QAPD).
Requested Action: Suspend restoration activities until the FSAR and QAPD are formally reviewed and approved by the NRC.
Impact on Defense in Depth: Delaying activities to incorporate modern standards would ensure that restoration activities are aligned with enhanced safety margins and deterministic safety principles.
Linking Petitioners Requested Actions to SDP Metrics The petitioners requested actions aim to provide NRC staff the authority and imperative to require Holtec to establish a new regulatory design basis for the Palisades Nuclear Plant, which would directly impact SDP metrics:
1.
Core Damage Frequency (CDF):
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Strengthening Defense in Depth through deterministic design improvements reduces the likelihood of core damage during operational anomalies or accidents.
Enhanced automated safeguards and updated safety analyses decrease reliance on high-failure-probability operator actions, improving CDF metrics.
2.
Large Early Release Frequency (LERF):
Modernizing the FSAR and QAPD reduces containment vulnerabilities, mitigating the risk of radiological releases in the event of a failure.
Improved design features and quality assurance standards enhance the plants ability to maintain containment integrity, directly benefiting LERF metrics.
==
Conclusion:==
Enhancing Regulatory Oversight and Safety Margins The petitioners contentions and requested actions provide a clear linkage and path to strengthen Defense in Depth at Palisades. By affirming these concerns, the ASLB would empower the NRC to require a comprehensive FSAR review and update, informed by the last 50 years of operational and regulatory advancements. As a minimum, there would be some sort of of
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of 30 37 gap analysis. These improvements would establish a more robust baseline for SDP analyses, reducing risks associated with future failures and ensuring public health and safety.
An Actual Palisades Failure Demonstrates the Petition's Relevance and the Need for Defense in Depth Enhancements As the Engineering Director at the time of the 2011 Palisades loss of DC Power Event event (ML113330802), I, Alan Blind, managed the licensee's response and managed the preparation of the licensee's Significance Determination Process (SDP) assessment presented to the NRC. My unique involvement in this event and my direct interaction with NRC inspectors provide critical insights into how the outdated design basis and reliance on operator actions contributed to this near-significant safety event. The NRCs final SDP evaluation of this incident as a Yellow finding (ML12039A090) demonstrates substantial safety significance, underscoring the risks posed by the plants 50-year-old licensing basis and reduced Defense in Depth. This event is a real-world example that provides linkage from Joint Petition's contentions to tangible petitioner harm and validates the petitioners' standing.
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of 31 37 Summary of the 2011 Palisades Event (ML113330802)
On September 25, 2011, an electrical fault occurred in the DC Distribution Panel D11-2 during maintenance activities, causing the complete loss of the left train of the 125-Volt DC power system and two preferred alternating current (AC) buses. This in itself, was a result of total failure of meeting GDC active failure criteria. This failure led to a reactor trip and turbine trip, accompanied by multiple safety actuation signals, including:
Safety Injection Actuation Signal, Main Steam Isolation Signal, Containment High Radiation Signal, and Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation Signal.
The event caused critical systems, including reactor coolant pumps and atmospheric steam dump valves, to fail or operate in unintended configurations. Of note, none of these systems met the single active failure design GDC criteria, further complicating the event. Reactor operators narrowly prevented the breach of the second safety barrier, the pressure boundary, which would have escalated the situation significantly. Only through the prompt and expert actions by the control room operators, this
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of 32 37 failure did not result in failure of the second safety barrier, the pressure boundary.
The NRCs Yellow Finding and the Role of Operator Actions The NRCs final SDP evaluation classified this event as a Yellow finding, indicating substantial safety significance. A Yellow finding corresponds to a condition that results in a significant reduction in safety margins.
Specifically:
1.
Operator Actions as a Critical Weakness:
The NRC emphasized the increased risk posed by reliance on operator actions to mitigate the loss of DC power and preferred AC buses. Manual responses under high-stress conditions, including complex emergency procedures, introduced significant uncertainties and increased the likelihood of failure.
2.
Proximity to Pressure Boundary Breach:
During the event, the primary coolant system's pressurizer level reached 98%, leaving the system only minutes away from transitioning into a solid condition. A breach of the pressure
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of 33 37 boundary would have resulted in radiological release and escalated the incident into a design basis accident.
==
Conclusion:==
The 2011 Event Validates Petitioners Claims The 2011 Palisades failure demonstrates the real-world consequences of operating under an outdated licensing basis with reduced Defense in Depth. The NRCs Yellow finding highlights the unacceptable risks posed by reliance on manual operator actions. Affirming the petitioners requested actions would not only address these risks but also improve the plants safety framework, benefiting future SDP evaluations and public safety. This incident underscores the critical need for a comprehensive FSAR update informed by modern regulatory standards and decades of operational experience and provides the standing linkage of harm from Joint Petitioners contentions to release of radiological materials to the environment.
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of 34 37 References 1.
NRC Significance Determination Process Manual
Reference:
"Inspection Manual Chapter 0609: Significance Determination Process"
NRC Document ID: ML18187A187
==
Description:==
Provides the framework for evaluating the safety significance of inspection findings and degraded conditions using metrics such as Core Damage Frequency (CDF) and Large Early Release Frequency (LERF).
2.
Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP) Analysis
Reference:
"Palisades SEP and NUREG-0820 Review Summary"
==
Description:==
Details the safety evaluations performed for pre-GDC plants like Palisades, highlighting design limitations and the reliance on manual operator actions over deterministic safeguards.
3.
Petition for Hearing by Joint Petitioners
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of 35 37
Reference:
"Joint Petitioners Petition for Hearing: Holtec Palisades Restart Amendment Proceeding"
==
Description:==
Outlines the contentions raised by petitioners, specifically challenging the use of Revision 35 of the FSAR and advocating for a comprehensive review to align with modern safety standards.
5.
NRC Report on the 2011 Palisades Event
Reference:
"Loss of DC Power at Palisades: NRC Inspection Report"
NRC Document ID: ML113330802
==
Description:==
Provides an account of the September 2011 event, detailing the electrical fault, operator actions, and the NRCs final determination of the event as a "Yellow" finding.
6.
ASLB Memorandum and Order
Reference:
"ASLB Memorandum and Order (Concerning Oral Argument Scheduling and Joint Petitioners Representation)"
Submittal Date: 12/2/2024 50-255-LA-3
of 36 37
==
Description:==
Addresses procedural matters, including representation issues and briefing deadlines, providing the basis for this supplemental brief.
Submittal Date: 12/2/2024 50-255-LA-3
of 37 37 Declaration of Alan Blind