ML24310A235

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NRC Saltstone Disposal Facility Monitoring Plan, Rev. 2
ML24310A235
Person / Time
Site: PROJ0734
Issue date: 11/05/2024
From:
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
To:
US Dept of Energy (DOE)
References
Download: ML24310A235 (1)


Text

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Plan for Monitoring Disposal Actions Taken by the U.S. Department of Energy at the Savannah River Site Saltstone Disposal Facility in Accordance with the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Revision 2 MAY - 2025 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Washington, DC 20555-0001

(Intentionally Left Blank)

ii TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION PAGE FIGURES... iii TABLES..... iv ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS....

v DEFINITIONS AND DESCRIPTIONS..... vii EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

..... x

1.0 INTRODUCTION

.......... 1-1 2.0 MONITORING TO ASSESS COMPLIANCE WITH 10 CFR 61.40... 2-1 3.0 MONITORING TO ASSESS COMPLIANCE WITH 10 CFR 61.41.......... 3-1 4.0 MONITORING TO ASSESS COMPLIANCE WITH 10 CFR 61.42....... 4-1 5.0 MONITORING TO ASSESS COMPLIANCE WITH 10 CFR 61.43... 5-1 6.0 MONITORING TO ASSESS COMPLIANCE WITH 10 CFR 61.44....... 6-1

7.0 REFERENCES

...... 7-1 8.0 LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS.. 8-1

iii FIGURES FIGURE PAGE Figure 1-1: Partial Organizational Chart for SCDES Bureau of Land & Waste Management.. 1-5 Figure 1-2: Partial Organizational Chart for SCDES Bureau of Water.... 1-6 Figure 1-3: Types of Non-Compliance 1-11 Figure 3-1: SDF Conceptual Closure Cap Design Configuration. 3-7 Figure 3-2: Surface and Subsurface Water Balance Components...... 3-8

iv TABLES TABLE PAGE Table ES-1: Overall Structure of SDF Monitoring Plan, Rev. 2.... xi Table ES-2: Monitoring Areas in SDF Monitoring Plan, Rev. 2..... xiv Table ES-3: Monitoring Factors in SDF Monitoring Plan, Rev. 2.... xv Table 1-1: List of Periodic DOE Documents. 1-7 Table 1-2: Examples of Upcoming DOE Activities and Unscheduled Events. 1-8 Table 1-3: Types of Notification Letters. 1-9 Table 1-4: Overall Structure of SDF Monitoring Plan, Rev. 2..... 1-13 Table 1-5: Monitoring Areas in SDF Monitoring Plan, Rev. 2.. 1-16 Table 1-6: Monitoring Factors in SDF Monitoring Plan, Rev. 2... 1-16 Table 1-7: NRC Prioritization of Monitoring Factors for Monitoring Areas 1 through 7.... 1-17 Table 1-8: NRC Prioritization of Monitoring Factors for Monitoring Areas 8 through 14...... 1-18

v ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS Acronym or Abbreviation Meaning Am-241 Americium-241 ATM Aquifer Transport Model CERCLA Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act Cf-249 Californium-249 Cf-251 Californium-251 CFR Code of Federal Regulations CLSM Controlled Low Strength Material Cm-245 Curium-245 Cm-247 Curium-247 DOE United States Department of Energy DCFs Dose Conversion Factors EPA United States Environmental Protection Agency FEPs Features, Events, and Processes FFA Federal Facility Agreement Ft Feet FUAI Follow-Up Action Item GCL Geosynthetic Clay Liner g

Gram GSA General Separations Area HDPE High Density Polyethylene HLW High-Level Waste I-129 Iodine-129 Kd Distribution Coefficient LLDL Lower Lateral Drainage Layer LLW Low-Level Waste m

Meter MA Monitoring Area MCC Moisture Characteristic Curve MF Monitoring Factor mL Millilitres mrem Millirem mSv MilliSievert NDAA Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 NRC United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission OOV Onsite Observation Visit PA Performance Assessment PGA Peak Horizontal Ground Acceleration Pu-239 Plutonium-239 Pu-240 Plutonium-240 PMP Probable Maximum Precipitation PO Performance Objective QA Quality Assurance QC Quality Control Ra-226 Radium-226 RAI Request for Additional Information RCRA Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

vi RSI Request for Supplemental Information RUSLE Revised Universal Soil Loss Equation SCDES South Carolina Department of Environmental Services SDF Saltstone Disposal Facility SDS Saltstone Disposal Structure SDU Saltstone Disposal Unit Sn-126 Tin-126 SRS Savannah River Site SWPF Salt Waste Processing Facility TCCZ Tan Clay Confining Zone Tc-99 Technetium-99 TEDE Total Effective Dose Equivalent TER Technical Evaluation Report Th-230 Thorium-230 TRR Technical Review Report U-234 Uranium-234 ULDL Upper Lateral Drainage Layer USDA United States Department of Agriculture UTRA-LAZ Upper Three Runs Aquifer-Lower Aquifer Zone UTRA-UAZ Upper Three Runs Aquifer-Upper Aquifer Zone WIR Waste Incidental to Reprocessing Yr Year

vii DEFINITIONS AND DESCRIPTIONS As Low As (Is) Reasonably Achievable: From 10 CFR 20.1003 - Making every reasonable effort to maintain exposures to radiation as far below the dose limits as practical, consistent with the purpose for which the licensed activity is undertaken, taking into account the state of technology, the economics of improvements in relation to state of technology, the economics of improvements in relation to benefits to the public health, and safety, and other societal and socioeconomic considerations, and in relation to utilization of nuclear energy, and licensed materials in the public interest.

Closed Monitoring Area: State of a monitoring area after the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) determines that the monitoring area is no longer appliable or all the monitoring factors under that monitoring area were Closed. Note that the NRC can Open that monitoring area again in the future if circumstances change.

Closed Monitoring Factor: State of a monitoring factor after the NRC determines and documents that the monitoring factor is no longer applicable or the technical issue or uncertainty has been resolved. Note that the NRC can Open that monitoring factor again in the future if circumstances change.

Disposal Structure: In the context of the Saltstone Disposal Facility, the NRC uses the term disposal structure to mean a self-enclosed entity used to contain saltstone and isolate it from the environment. A disposal structure could have more than one cell. The term disposal structure also refers to the disposal entities that Department of Energy (DOE) refers to as Vaults and can be used to refer to any new potential disposal entity design that meets this definition. The designation of a Saltstone Disposal Structure (SDS) is only used to refer to a specific disposal structure (e.g., SDS 1, SDS 4, SDS 2A, SDS 2B, SDS 3A, SDS 3B, SDS 5A, SDS 5B, SDS 6, SDS 7, SDS 8, SDS 9, SDS 10, SDS 11, SDS 12). The DOE uses the designation Saltstone Disposal Unit (SDU) to denote something that contains one or more disposal structures. For example, the DOE designation of SDU 4, also referred to by DOE as Vault 4, is a disposal structure. For example, the DOE designation of SDU 2, also referred to by DOE as SDU 2A/2B, includes two disposal structures (i.e., SDS 2A, SDS 2B).

DOE 2020 Performance Assessment (PA): This refers to the DOE 2020 PA for the Saltstone Disposal Facility with all its associated documents, which includes the DOE: (1) references, (2) responses to the NRC Requests for Supplemental Information Comments, and (3) responses to the NRC Requests for Additional Information Questions.

DOE Final Basis for Waste Determination (or DOE Final Basis for Non-High-Level Waste Determination): The DOE documentation required by NDAA Section 3116, which will or will not demonstrate that a specific waste stream is not High-Level Waste.

DOE Waste Determination: The DOE document signed by the Secretary of Energy with their decision whether or not the specific waste stream is High-Level Waste. If the Secretary of Energy decision is that the specific waste stream is not High-Level Waste, then the specific waste stream can be managed as Low-Level Waste and both the DOE and the NRC refer to it as Waste Incidental to Reprocessing.

Follow-Up Action Item (FUAI): Item identified during monitoring that requires additional effort by the DOE or the NRC to resolve. Examples include the DOE providing answers to questions

viii generated during technical reviews, the DOE providing the results of a particular experiment after it becomes available, or the NRC setting up a future meeting on a technical topic. A DOE FUAI is generally less risk-significant than an Open Issue. The DOE FUAI can become an Open Issue if the FUAI is related to a technical issue that is later found to be risk-significant or if insufficient progress is being made by the DOE in addressing a risk-significant technical issue.

High-Level Radioactive Waste (HLW): (1) irradiated reactor fuel; (2) liquid wastes resulting from the operation of the first cycle solvent extraction system, or equivalent, and the concentrated wastes from subsequent extraction cycles, or equivalent, in a facility for reprocessing reactor fuel; and (3) solids into which such liquids have been converted.

Highly Radioactive Radionuclide (or Key Radionuclide): One of the radionuclides that contribute most significantly to risk to the public, workers, and the environment. In the context of the NDAA, the NRC considers Highly Radioactive Radionuclides, to be equivalent to Key Radionuclides used in the current DOE Manual 435.1 for the current DOE Order 435.1, the West Valley Policy Statement, and in some NRC reviews of DOE Draft Basis for Waste Determinations. In the context of an NRC review of a DOE Draft Basis for Waste Determination conducted under the NDAA, Highly Radioactive Nuclides are not (in general) limited to radionuclides with high specific activity.

Land Disposal Facility: From 10 CFR 61.2 - The land, building, and structures, and equipment, which are intended to be used for the disposal of radioactive wastes.

Monitoring Area: General feature or aspect of the disposal action identified by the NRC as being important to the DOE ability to meet the 10 CFR Part 61, Subpart C Performance Objectives. The designation of MA ## (e.g., MA 12) is used when referring to a specific monitoring area. A monitoring area may be associated with one or more performance objectives, is further divided into one or more specific monitoring factors, and is tracked as either Open or Closed.

Monitoring Factor: A specific feature or aspect of the disposal facility, site, or disposal action (e.g., conceptual model, mathematical model, selected parameter values, closure strategy) that the DOE used in the demonstration that the NRC has determined to be important to demonstrating compliance with the 10 CFR Part 61, Subpart C Performance Objectives. The designation of a MF ##.## (e.g., MF 14.12) is used when referring to a specific monitoring factor. The NRC typically identifies a monitoring factor through the review of a DOE Draft Waste Determination, a DOE Performance Assessment, information that the DOE generated during monitoring (e.g., technical report on laboratory or field experiment), or other information collected during monitoring (e.g., during an NRC Onsite Observation Visit). A monitoring factor may be associated with one or more performance objectives, may be associated with one or more monitoring areas, is numbered separately for each associated monitoring area; but, is counted as only one monitoring factor when counting the total number of monitoring factors in a monitoring plan, and is tracked as either Open or Closed.

Onsite: Area of the DOE site where monitoring activities will be carried out. That may include areas that have some relationship to, but are outside of, the physical boundaries of a particular Waste Incidental to Reprocessing (WIR)-related facility.

Onsite Observation Visit (OOV): A formal, pre-announced NRC visit to a DOE-WIR Location during monitoring for the purpose of observing the DOE facilities, activities, processes, or experiments related to compliance with 10 CFR Part 61, Subpart C Performance Objectives.

ix Open Issue: A concern that the NRC staff identifies during monitoring activities, which requires additional information from the DOE to address. Examples include a monitoring factor that the DOE has not taken sufficient action to address or an instance where data collected by the DOE are not consistent with assumptions (e.g., conceptual model assumptions, mathematical assumptions, parameter values) that the DOE made in the current Performance Assessment.

An Open Issue is generally more risk-significant than a DOE FUAI. An Open Issue could lead to an NRC finding that the DOE disposal actions are not in compliance with the 10 CFR Part 61, Subpart C Performance Objectives.

Performance Assessment (PA): A type of systematic risk analysis that addresses the following four questions: (1) what can happen?, (2) how likely is that to happen?, (3) what are the resulting impacts of that happening?, and (4) how do those impacts compare to defined standards?

Performance Objective (PO): One of five 10 CFR Part 61, Subpart C, requirements for low-level waste disposal facilities, which are: (1) General Requirement (§61.40), (2) Protection of the General Population from Releases of Radioactivity (§61.41), (3) Protection of Individuals from Inadvertent Intrusion (§61.42), (4) Protection of Individuals during Operations (§61.43), and (5) Stability of the Disposal Site after Closure (§61.44).

Savannah River Site DOE-WIR Location: This is either the Savannah River Site Saltstone Disposal Facility (SDF) or the Savannah River Site Tank Farms (i.e., F-Tank Farm, H-Tank Farm).

Technical Review: The NRC staff review of reports, studies, analyses, experiments, and other information prepared by the DOE; South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control; the public or other stakeholders; or Native American Tribal Governments that may be used by the NRC staff in determining the DOE ability to meet the 10 CFR Part 61, Subpart C Performance Objectives for DOE disposal actions.

Worker: The DOE, including staff or contractors, who carry out operational activities at the land disposal facility.

x EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

Under Section 3116(a) of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (NDAA), the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) must consult with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) prior to the Secretary of Energy making the Waste Determination whether or not certain radioactive waste related to the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel is not high-level waste (HLW). If so, then it can be managed as low-level waste (LLW) and both the DOE and the NRC refer to it as Waste Incidental to Reprocessing (WIR).

The NDAA applies specifically to DOE-WIR locations in the states of Idaho and South Carolina.

The NDAA does not apply to DOE-WIR locations in other states.

If the Secretary of Energy signs a Waste Determination that certain radioactive waste related to the reprocessing of spent fuel is not HLW, then NDAA Section 3116(b) requires the NRC to coordinate with the NDAA-Covered State (i.e., Idaho, South Carolina) to monitor the DOE disposal actions to assess compliance with the five Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)

Part 61, Subpart C, Performance Objectives (POs).

Those five POs are: (1) General Requirement (the §61.40 PO), (2) Protection of the General Population from Releases of Radioactivity (the §61.41 PO), (3) Protection of Individuals Against Inadvertent Intrusion (the §61.42 PO), (4) Protection of Individuals During Operations (the

§61.43 PO), and (5) Stability of the Disposal Site after Closure (the §61.44 PO).

For the DOE Savannah River Site (SRS) Saltstone Disposal Facility (SDF) under NDAA Section 3116(a), the DOE Consulted with the NRC in 2005, the NRC issued the SDF Technical Evaluation Report (TER), Rev. 0, in 2005, and the Secretary of Energy signed the DOE SDF Waste Determination that the SDF can be managed as LLW in 2006.

For the DOE SRS SDF under NDAA Section 3116(b), after the Secretary of Energy signed the SDF Waste Determination, the NRC, in coordination with the NDAA-Covered State of South Carolina, began monitoring the DOE disposal actions against the 10 CFR Part 61, Subpart C, POs in 2006. Based on the NRC 2005 SDF TER and the DOE 2006 Final Basis for Waste Determination, the NRC issued the SDF Monitoring Plan, Rev. 0, in 2007. The DOE updated the SDF Performance Assessment (PA) in 2009. The NRC reviewed the DOE 2009 SDF PA and issued the SDF TER, Rev. 1, in 2012. Based on the NRC 2012 TER, the NRC issued the SDF Monitoring Plan, Rev. 1, in 2013.

For the DOE SDF under NDAA Section 3116(b), the DOE updated the SDF PA in 2020. The NRC reviewed the DOE 2020 SDF PA and issued the SDF TER, Rev. 2, in 2023. In the NRC 2023 SDF TER, the NRC stated that if the DOE Closure Cap design and implementation achieve the DOE expected performance, as described in the DOE 2020 SDF PA, then the NRC concluded that it had reasonable assurance that the DOE disposal actions at the SDF met or would meet all the POs, including the §61.40 PO. Based on the six NRC Letters from 2017 to 2021 supplementing the NRC SDF Monitoring Plan, Rev. 1; the NRC WIR Periodic Monitoring Report, Rev. 6; and the NRC 2023 SDF TER, the NRC is issuing this NRC SDF Monitoring Plan, Rev. 2. Highlights of this NRC SDF Monitoring Plan, Rev. 2, include:

Same as in the NRC SDF Monitoring Plan, Rev. 1:

o provides the process for how the NRC will conduct monitoring activities at the SRS SDF

xi o

the structure/organization is: (1) from each PO to one or more monitoring areas; and (2) from each monitoring area to one or more monitoring factors o

if a monitoring factor applies to more than one monitoring area, then for the subsequent PO the detail of the monitoring factor that is the same will be stated as the same and the detail of the monitoring factor that is different will be fully described o

each monitoring area will be tracked as either Open or Closed o

each monitoring factor will be tracked as either Open or Closed o

the possible Priority of each monitoring factor is: High, Medium, Low, or Periodic o

if an NRC staff concern arises related to a monitoring factor, then the NRC staff may develop a Follow-Up Action Item or Open Issue to document that concern prior to the NRC sending a Notification Letter Changes from the NRC SDF Monitoring Plan, Rev. 1:

o there are only two types of monitoring activities, either a Technical Review or an Onsite Observation Visit, which means that a Data Review will be under either a Technical Review or an Onsite Observation Visit, which is how the NRC previously implemented Data Reviews o

except for Monitoring Area (MA) 8 (Environmental Monitoring), all the monitoring factors in a monitoring area relate to the same PO(s) o the NRC technical information about both the monitoring areas and the monitoring factors are different because the information was based on the DOE 2020 SDF PA rather than the DOE 2009 SDF PA The NRC information for MA 1 (Inventory), MA 8 (Environmental Monitoring), and MA 9 (Site Stability) changed since issuance of the NRC 2023 SDF TER; but, those changes did not affect the NRC Conclusions in the NRC 2023 SDF TER.

The Tables ES-1, ES-2, and ES-3 below update the Tables A-4, A-5, and A-6 in the NRC 2023 SDF TER Appendix to represent the status of the monitoring areas and monitoring factors as of when this SDF Monitoring Plan, Rev. 2 was issued.

Table ES-1: Overall Structure of SDF Monitoring Plan, Rev. 2 MONITORING AREA MONITORING FACTOR PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE(S)

PRIORITY MA 1: Inventory 0 Closed monitoring factors MF 1.01: Inventory in Disposal Structures

§61.41 & §61.42 Periodic MF 1.02: Methods Used to Assess Inventory

§61.41 & §61.42 Medium MA 2: Infiltration and Erosion Control 0 Closed monitoring factors

xii MONITORING AREA MONITORING FACTOR PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE(S)

PRIORITY MF 2.01: Hydraulic Performance of Closure Cap

§61.41, §61.42

& §61.44 Medium MF 2.02: Erosion Control of the SDF Engineered Surface Cover and Adjacent Area

§61.41, §61.42

& §61.44 High MF 2.03: Confidence in QA/QC for HDPE/GCL Composite Barrier and Drainage Layer Installation

§61.41, §61.42

& §61.44 High MF 2.04: Long-Term HDPE/GCL Composite Barrier and Drainage Layer Degradation

§61.41, §61.42

& §61.44 High MF 2.05: Potential Confined Conditions in the ULDL

§61.41, §61.42

& §61.44 High MF 2.06: Long-Term Erosion Barrier Performance

§61.41, §61.42

& §61.44 Medium MF2.07: Shallow Infiltration

§61.41, §61.42

& §61.44 Medium MA 3: Waste Form Hydraulic Performance 3 Closed monitoring factors: MF 3.01, MF 3.02, and MF 3.04 MF 3.03: Applicability of Laboratory Data to Field-Emplaced Saltstone

§61.41 & §61.42 Medium MA 4: Waste Form Physical Degradation 0 Closed monitoring factors MF 4.01: Waste Form Matrix Degradation

§61.41 & §61.42 High MF 4.02: Waste Form Macroscopic Fracturing

§61.41 & §61.42 High MF 4.03: Moisture Characteristic Curves for Saltstone

§61.41 & §61.42 Low MA 5: Waste Form Chemical Degradation 1 Closed monitoring factor: MF 5.05 MF 5.01: Radionuclide Release from Field-Emplaced Saltstone

§61.41 & §61.42 Low MF 5.02: Chemical Reduction of Tc by Saltstone

§61.41 & §61.42 Low MF 5.03: Reducing Capacity of Saltstone

§61.41 & §61.42 Low MF 5.04: Kd Values and Solubility Limits for Saltstone

§61.41 & §61.42 Medium MA 6: Disposal Structure Performance 1 Closed monitoring factor: MF 6.02 MF 6.01: Kd Values in Disposal Structure Concrete

§61.41 & §61.42 Medium

xiii MONITORING AREA MONITORING FACTOR PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE(S)

PRIORITY MF 6.03: Performance of Disposal Structure Roofs and HDPE/GCL Layers

§61.41 & §61.42 Medium MF 6.04: Disposal Structure Concrete Fracturing

§61.41 & §61.42 Medium MF 6.05: Integrity of Non-Cementitious Materials

§61.41 & §61.42 Medium MF 6.06: Localized Contaminant Release

§61.41 & §61.42 Medium MF 6.07: Moisture Characteristic Curves for Disposal Structure Concrete

§61.41 & §61.42 Low MA 7: Subsurface Flow and Transport 1 Closed monitoring factor: MF 7.01 MF 7.02: Kd Values for SRS Soil

§61.41 & §61.42 Low MF 7.03: Confidence in GSA Modeling Results

§61.41 & §61.42 Medium MF 7.04: Confidence in Local SDF Modeling Results

§61.41 & §61.42 Medium MF 7.05: Impact of Calcareous Zones on Contaminant Flow and Transport

§61.41 & §61.42 Low MA 8: Environmental Monitoring 0 Closed monitoring factors MF 8.01: Leak Detection

§61.41, §61.42,

& §61.43 Periodic MF 8.02: Groundwater Monitoring

§61.41, §61.42,

& §61.43 Periodic MF 8.03: Identification and Monitoring of Groundwater Plumes in the SRS Z-Area

§61.41, §61.42 High MA 9: Site Stability 0 Closed monitoring factors MF 9.01: Settlement Due to Static-Loading and Seismic Loading

§61.41, §61.42,

& §61.44 Medium MF 9.02: Settlement Due to Dissolution of Calcareous Sediment

§61.41, §61.42,

& §61.44 Medium MF 9.03: Gullying of the Closure Cap

§61.41, §61.42,

& §61.44 Medium MF 9.04: Sheet and Rill Erosion of the Closure Cap

§61.41, §61.42,

& §61.44 Medium MF 9.05: Slope Stability of the SDF Closure Cap

§61.41, §61.42,

& §61.44 High MF 9.06: Flow through the ULDL

§61.41, §61.42,

& §61.44 High

xiv MONITORING AREA MONITORING FACTOR PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE(S)

PRIORITY MF 9.07: Degradation of the Erosion Barrier

§61.41, §61.42,

& §61.44 Medium MF 9.08: Settlement Due to Waste Bags in SDS 4

§61.41, §61.42,

& §61.44 Medium MA 10: CLOSED -

Obsolete with Rev. 2 14 Closed monitoring factors with 12 of those monitoring factors incorporated into other monitoring factors MA 11: Radiation Protection Program 0 Closed monitoring factors MF 11.01: Dose to Individuals During Operations

§61.43 Periodic MF 11.02: Air Monitoring

§61.43 Periodic MA 12: Biosphere 0 Closed monitoring factors MF 12.01: Ingestion Pathway Parameters

§61.41 & §61.42 Medium MF 12:02: Inhalation Pathway Parameters

§61.41 & §61.42 Low MA 13: Inadvertent Intrusion 0 Closed monitoring factors MF 13.01: Intrusion Source Terms

§61.42 Low MF 13.02: Intrusion Exposure Pathways

§61.42 Medium MA 14: Future Scenarios and Conceptual Models 0 Closed monitoring factors MF 14.01: Scenario Development and Defensibility

§61.41 & §61.42 Medium MF 14.02: Defensibility of Conceptual Models

§61.41 & §61.42 High MF 14.03: Implementation of Conceptual Models

§61.41 & §61.42 Medium MF 14.04: Identification and Screening of FEPs

§61.41 & §61.42 Medium MF 14.05: Future Designs and Analyses as They Pertain to Potential Degradation Processes and Performance

§61.41 & §61.42 High MF 14.06: Groundwater Yield of the UTRA-UAZ in the SRS Z-Area

§61.41 & §61.42 High Table ES-2: Monitoring Areas in SDF Monitoring Plan, Rev. 2 TOTAL # of Monitoring Areas 14

  1. of OPEN Monitoring Areas 13
  1. of CLOSED Monitoring Areas 1

xv Table ES-3: Monitoring Factors in SDF Monitoring Plan, Rev. 2 TOTAL # of Monitoring Factors 70

  1. of OPEN Monitoring Factors 50
  1. of CLOSED Monitoring Factors 20 This NRC SDF Monitoring Plan, Rev. 2, will be used by both the NRC and the NDAA-Covered State of South Carolina to continue to assess the DOE compliance with the POs in 10 CFR Part 61, Subpart C, under NDAA Section 3116(b) at the SRS SDF. The NRC may later send a letter to the DOE supplementing this monitoring plan prior to the NRC issuing a revision to this monitoring plan. The NRC issues a revised SDF monitoring plan only after: (1) the NRC reviews an updated DOE SDF PA; and (2) the NRC issues a revised SDF TER.

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1-1

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (NDAA)

(https://www.congress.gov/108/plaws/publ375/PLAW-108publ375.pdf) allows the Secretary of Energy to determine whether radioactive waste resulting from the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel is not high-level waste (HLW). If so, then it can be managed as low-level waste (LLW) and both the DOE and the NRC refers to it as Waste Incidental to Reprocessing (WIR). The NDAA-Covered States are currently Idaho and South Carolina. The citation for the full text of NDAA Section 3116 is: U.S. Congress, Public Law 108-375, Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Section 3116, Defense Site Acceleration Completion, October 2004.

The NDAA Section 3116(a) process includes that the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Consult with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on the DOE non-HLW determinations and plans. The NDAA Section 3116(a) process begins when the DOE issues a Draft Basis for Waste Determination along with other DOE documents, including the Performance Assessment (PA) for a proposed DOE-WIR Location. The NRC reviews the DOE information and the NRC review process may include meetings and/or technical calls with the DOE. During the review process, the NRC may issue Request for Supplemental Information (RSI) Comments and/or Request for Additional Information (RAI) Questions to the DOE and if so, then the DOE provides the NRC with Response to RSI Comments and/or Responses to RAI Questions. At the end of the NRC review process, the NRC issues a publicly available Technical Evaluation Report (TER) that may include: (1) conclusions about whether the DOE meets the NDAA-WIR Criteria, and (2) NRC recommendations to the DOE.

The NDAA Section 3116(a) process ends when the Secretary of Energy signs the Waste Determination and the DOE issues the associated Waste Determination along with the supporting Final Basis for Waste Determination. When the Waste Determination for a DOE-WIR Location is signed and, if it includes that the waste stream is not HLW, then the NDAA Section 3116(b) process begins. As of when this monitoring plan was issued, the DOE completed the NDAA-WIR Consultation process under NDAA Section 3116(a) with the NRC four times and each time the Secretary of Energy Waste Determination was that the waste stream was not HLW.

The NDAA Section 3116(b) process includes that the NRC, in coordination with the NDAA-Covered State, monitor the DOE disposal actions to assess compliance with the NRC regulations in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 61, Licensing Requirements for Land Disposal of Radioactive Waste, Subpart C, Performance Objectives (POs). Note that NDAA-WIR Monitoring at a DOE-WIR Location continues in perpetuity; but, how that monitoring occurs may change over time. Besides the NRC reviews resulting in issuing TERs, the two major NRC and NDAA-Covered State monitoring activities of the DOE disposal actions at the DOE-WIR Location are: (1) a Technical Review of the DOE work products, experiments, and analysis, including collection of environmental data - followed by the NRC issuing a publicly available Technical Review Report (TRR); and (2) an Onsite Observation Visit (OOV) of aspects of the DOE disposal actions, and as appropriate related experiments -

followed by the NRC issuing a publicly available OOV Report.

During NDAA-WIR Monitoring, the NRC communicates either separately or together with the DOE and an NDAA-Covered State, including by: (1) email, (2) calls, (3) meetings, and (4) letters. For example, the NRC holds monthly calls with both DOE Headquarters and the DOE sites with both NDAA-WIR and non-NDAA-WIR Locations to share information regarding WIR activities at those DOE sites. For example, the NRC holds monthly calls with the South

1-2 Carolina Department of Environmental Services (SCDES), specifically about NDAA-WIR Monitoring activities at the Savannah River Site (SRS). Note that under South Carolina state law, on July 1, 2024, the NDAA-WIR responsibilities performed by the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control were transferred to the SCDES.

The major DOE and NRC documents related to both the DOE NDAA-WIR Consultation with the NRC and the NRC NDAA-WIR Monitoring of the DOE disposal actions can be found at the NRC Public Website: https://www.nrc.gov/waste/incidental-waste.html and then clicking on the specific DOE-WIR Location on the top-right under Key Topics Also, when the NRC issues WIR documents, the NRC sends an email with links to the WIR documents to whoever signed up for the NRC WIR ListServ. To sign up for the WIR ListServ: (1) go to https://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/listserver.html, (2) type the email address in the box in the middle of the webpage, (3) select the box next to Waste Incidental to Reprocessing at the bottom of the webpage, and (4) click on the Subscribe button that will then appear at the bottom of the webpage.

1.1 Background

The DOE SRS is an 802 square kilometer (km) (310 square mile (mi)) facility located in south-central SC, which began operation in 1951 producing nuclear materials for national defense, research, medical, and space programs. Waste produced at the facility from spent nuclear fuel reprocessing for defense purposes has been commingled with non-reprocessing waste resulting from the production of targets for nuclear weapons and production of material for space missions. Significant quantities of radioactive waste are currently stored onsite in large underground waste storage tanks, which were placed in operation between 1954 and 1986. The waste stored in the tanks is a mixture of insoluble metal hydroxide solids, referred to as sludge, and soluble salt supernate. The supernate volume has been reduced by evaporation, which also concentrates the soluble salts to their solubility limits. The resultant solution crystallizes as salts and the resulting solid is referred to as saltcake. The saltcake and supernate combined are referred to as salt waste. The DOE removes the salt waste, treats it to remove highly radioactive radionuclides to the maximum extent practical, and disposes of the low-activity fraction onsite in the Saltstone Disposal Facility (SDF). The SDF is located in the SRS Z-Area, which is approximately 10 km (6.2 mi) from the nearest SRS site boundary on a local topographic high.

Under NDAA Section 3116(a), the NDAA Section 3116(a) Consultation for the DOE SRS SDF was completed when the Secretary of Energy issued the Waste Determination (ML17136A069),

which included the following:

Section 3116 of the NDAA authorizes the Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the NRC, to determine that certain waste from reprocessing is not high-level waste if it meets the criteria set forth in that Section: (1) that it does not require disposal in a deep geologic repository, (2) that it has had highly radioactive radionuclides removed to the maximum extent practical, (3) that it meets concentration limits and/or dose-based performance objectives for near-surface disposal of radioactive waste, and (4) that it will be disposed of pursuant to a State-issued permit or State-approved closure plan. In this document, the Secretary is determining that the treated, solidified low-activity salt waste from the tanks meets all of those criteria. Accordingly, the Secretary is determining that this material is not high-level waste and will be disposed in SDF.

Under NDAA Section 3116(b), the NRC, in coordination with the NDAA-Covered State of South Carolina, started monitored the DOE disposal actions before the NRC issued the SDF Monitoring Plan, Rev. 0 (ML070730363). The DOE issued an update to the SDF PA in 2009.

The NRC issued the TER, Rev. 1 (ML121170309) based on its review of the DOE 2009 SDF PA

1-3 (with associated documents). In the 2012 SDF TER, the NRC concluded that it did not have reasonable assurance that DOE salt waste disposal at the SDF would meet the POs, specifically the §61.41 PO. In the 2012 SDF TER, the NRC concluded that it did have reasonable assurance that the DOE will meet the §61.42 PO, §61.43 PO, and §61.44 PO.

When the NRC issued the 2012 SDF TER, it also issued an NRC Type-IV Notification Letter of Concern (ML120650576) to both the DOE and State of South Carolina with the NRC concerns about the DOE meeting the POs. The NRC, in coordination with the NDAA-Covered State of South Carolina, began monitoring the DOE disposal actions using the SDF Monitoring Plan, Rev. 1 (ML13100A113) when it was issued.

The DOE issued an update to the SDF PA in 2020 (ML20190A056). The NRC issued the SDF TER, Rev. 2 (ML23024A099) based on its review of the DOE 2020 SDF PA (and associated documents). Note that in the Acknowledgement Letter (ML20148M201) for the NRC staff review of the DOE 2020 SDF PA, the NRC Administratively Closed the NRC 2012 Type-IV Notification Letter of Concern because the DOE 2020 SDF PA, including the informational and design changes since the DOE 2009 SDF PA, represented a significant departure from the natural and engineered system that formed the basis for the NRC 2012 Type-IV Notification Letter of Concern. In the 2023 SDF TER (ML23024A099), the NRC concluded that if the DOE Closure Cap design and implementation achieve the DOE expected performance as described in the DOE 2020 SDF PA, then the NRC concluded that it had reasonable assurance that the DOE disposal actions at the SDF met or would meet all the POs, including the §61.40 PO.

1.2 Objective This SDF Monitoring Plan, Rev. 2 details the NRC, in coordination with the NDAA-Covered State of South Carolina, path forward in assessing the DOE compliance with the POs for the DOE SRS SDF. After this SDF Monitoring Plan, Rev. 2 document is issued, the NRC will follow it instead of SDF Monitoring Plan, Rev. 1, as supplemented by six NRC Letters from June 5, 2017 to October 18, 2021 (ML17097A351, ML18033A071, ML18107A161, ML18219B035, ML19150A295, and ML21279A173).

1.3 Roles and Responsibilities 1.3.1 Federal Facility Agreement Roles and Responsibilities for SRS The SRS Federal Facility Agreement (FFA) is a formal agreement between the DOE, the U.S.

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the State of South Carolina with only those three entities having roles and responsibilities under the FFA. The EPA is a party to the FFA pursuant to its authority in accordance with the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), also known as Superfund, under which the EPA has been tasked to protect citizens from the dangers posed by abandoned or uncontrolled hazardous wastes. While Congress writes environmental laws, the EPA writes regulations to implement those laws, enforces the regulations, and sets national standards. The EPA role in the FFA is to provide oversight of any actions taken at SRS to ensure adherence with CERCLA, the FFA, and other guidance. The EPA is also responsible for providing technical and procedural assistance, information, and training as needed. More specifically, the EPA involvement with the State is focused on ensuring that proper disposal actions are taken, assisting the State with the design and installation of those actions, and monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of those actions. The Executive Order 12580 delegates the responsibility to implement the provisions in CERCLA to the DOE and the U.S. Department of Defense. The CERCLA also names the DOE and the U.S. Department of Defense as the lead agencies for their respective areas. The DOE has several facilities in EPA Region IV. The SRS was added to the Superfund National Priorities

1-4 List in December of 1989, which was also the year that the SRS was required to have an FFA with the State of South Carolina and the EPA. The SCDES is the primary regulator of the DOE closure activities at the SRS. The State of South Carolina has authority for approval of wastewater treatment facility operational closure under Chapter 61, Articles 67 and 82 of the South Carolina Regulations.

1.3.2 The DOE NDAA-WIR Monitoring Roles and Responsibilities Under the NDAA, only the DOE, the NRC, and the NDAA-Covered States, including South Carolina for the SRS, have roles and responsibilities.

The DOE will, pursuant to its authority, perform saltstone disposal actions and monitor its activities to ensure compliance with all requirements. The DOE relevant authority stems from the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the applicable DOE orders, manuals, and policies. Furthermore, the DOE uses a documented process to review and resolve any disposal questions and develop any mitigation measures, as appropriate. The DOE roles and responsibilities under NDAA with respect to monitoring are to respond to the NRC and the SCDES monitoring activities. Examples of those DOE NDAA roles and responsibilities include (1) providing fact check input on the NRC Monitoring Plans, OOV Reports, Call Summaries, and Meeting Summaries; (2) participating in the NRC OOVs, Calls, and Meetings; and (3) in a timely manner, communicating to the NRC and the SCDES any concerns about DOE disposal or monitoring actions.

1.3.3 The NRC NDAA-WIR Monitoring Roles and Responsibilities While the NRC is not given a formal regulatory role, the NDAA requires that the NRC monitor, in coordination with the SCDES, the DOE disposal actions to assess compliance with the 10 CFR Part 61, Subpart C, Performance Objectives.

Examples of NRC NDAA roles and responsibilities include: (1) drafting and issuing the NRC Monitoring Plans, including incorporating the SCDES input and the DOE Fact Check input; (2) drafting and issuing the NRC OOV Guidance emails, including incorporating the SCDES input; (3) performing the NRC OOVs; (4) drafting and issuing the NRC OOV Reports, including incorporating the SCDES input and the DOE Fact Check input; (5) performing the NRC technical reviews; (6) drafting and issuing the NRC TRRs; (7) leading Calls and Meetings; (8) drafting and issuing Call Summaries and Meeting Summaries, including incorporating the SCDES input and the DOE Fact Check input; (9) in a timely manner, communicating to the DOE and the SCDES any NRC concerns about the DOE not meeting the POs; and (10) notifying Congress if the NRC determines that the DOE is not in compliance with the POs.

The NRC will keep the SCDES informed of the status of NDAA-WIR Monitoring activities at the SRS SDF including any potential findings of the DOE non-compliance that require a Letter to Congress. At least two business days prior to the release and dissemination of such a Letter, the SCDES will be briefed by the NRC on the reason(s) for the Letter.

1.3.4 The SCDES NDAA-WIR Monitoring Roles and Responsibilities The SCDES is the primary State of South Carolina regulator of disposal activities at the SRS, including at the SDF. The NRC staff periodically meets with SCDES to discuss monitoring activities that the SCDES undertakes to monitor the DOE disposal actions at the SDF. Those discussions enabled the SCDES to gain a better understanding of the NRC monitoring activities.

1-5 The NRC continues to coordinate with the SCDES throughout the NDAA-WIR Monitoring process, including using documents generated by the SCDES Environmental Surveillance and Oversight Program as a source of information to supplement this monitoring plan. The SCDES uses a holistic monitoring approach with regard to the overall performance and safety of SRS.

The NRC NDAA-WIR Monitoring Program assesses the DOE disposal actions at a very small portion of the SRS. Ultimately, the NRC and the SCDES are concerned with the potential for environmental contamination in groundwater, surface water, air, crops, milk, and meat. While it is unlikely that any contribution to such contamination from the SDF could manifest itself offsite in the foreseeable future, it is important to consider and evaluate, to the extent practicable, the utility of environmental monitoring in assessing the DOE disposal actions at the SDF against the POs. To the extent that the SCDES resources allow, the NRC will request assistance in following up on certain monitoring activities that require a local or onsite presence.

The SCDES roles and responsibilities under NDAA-WIR Monitoring are to perform activities under the South Carolina Environmental Surveillance and Oversight Program and to coordinate with the NRC. Examples of those roles and responsibilities include: (1) providing input to the NRC Monitoring Plans, OOV Guidance emails, OOV Reports, Call Summaries, and Meeting Summaries; (2) participating in NRC OOVs, Calls, and Meetings; and (3) in a timely manner, communicate to the DOE and the NRC any concerns about the DOE not meeting the POs.

There are five organizations at SCDES that the NRC coordinates with to implement NDAA-WIR Monitoring at the DOE SRS SDF. Within the SCDES Environmental Affairs Administration, the NRC interacts with the Bureau of Land & Waste Management, the Bureau of Water, and the Bureau of Regional & Laboratory Services. Four organizations (i.e., sections) that the NRC coordinates with are located at the SCDES Headquarters in Columbia, South Carolina. The SCDES Bureau of Land & Waste Management has three of those sections (see Figure 1-1 below for a partial organizational chart of that bureau). The SCDES Bureau of Water has one of those sections (see Figure 1-2 below for a partial organizational chart of that bureau). The last organization that the NRC coordinates with is the Midlands Aiken Office that is located in Aiken, South Carolina under the Bureau of Regional & Laboratory Services.

Figure 1-1: Partial Organizational Chart for SCDES Bureau of Land & Waste Management Bureau of Land &

Waste Management Division of Waste Management RCRA Federal Facilities Section Division of Site Assessment, Remediation &

Revitalization Federal Remediation Section Division of Mining &

Solid Waste Management Solid Waste Permitting

& Monitoring Section

1-6 (NRC staff developed from SCDES public information)

Figure 1-2: Partial Organizational Chart for SCDES Bureau of Water (NRC staff developed from SCDES public information) 1.4 The NDAA-WIR Monitoring Process The NDAA-WIR Monitoring is an ongoing process consisting of technical reviews and OOVs at the SRS SDF. The NRC uses the information gathered from DOE and other publicly available sources to continuously assess the DOE compliance with the POs at the SDF. Many of the DOE documents, including the PA and environmental monitoring reports, are written to satisfy the DOE internal requirements or other regulatory requirements for the DOE regulators (i.e., EPA, SCDES). The NRC will continue to leverage those already created documents and analyses to assist the NRC in assessing the DOE compliance with the POs at the SDF.

1.4.1 Technical Reviews Technical reviews by the NRC include the review and evaluation of analyses conducted by the DOE or others that address one or more aspects of the SRS SDF performance. Technical reviews may be used to assess model support for assumptions made by the DOE in the PA that are considered important to the DOE compliance demonstration. The NRC will document each technical review in a publicly available TRR. Data reviews are a subset of technical reviews.

Data reviews focus on real-time monitoring data that may indicate future system performance or a review of records or reports that can be used to directly assess compliance with the POs (e.g., review of radiation records). The result of a Data Review may be included in either a TRR or an OOV Report.

1.4.2 Onsite Observation Visits OOVs are first-hand observations by the NRC staff or a representative of a specific activity that could be used to assess an aspect of current or future SRS SDF performance. An OOV is generally performed to: (1) ensure that data collected for a technical review are of sufficient Bureau of Water Division of Water Facilities Permitting Industrial Wastewater Permitting Section

1-7 quality; or (2) observe key DOE disposal actions that are important to the DOE compliance demonstration.

Prior to each OOV, the NRC will prepare an OOV Guidance email that discusses the scope and specific activities that will be monitored during the OOV in more detail than is described in this monitoring plan. The activities will be based on many aspects, such as completion of the DOE technical reports, emergent issues, timely DOE actions related to a monitoring factor, availability of staff (i.e., NRC, SCDES, DOE), availability of locations at the SRS SDF, length of time since reviewing an item in a monitoring factor, scheduled FUAIs to previous OOVs, and available NRC resources. The NRC will coordinate with the SCDES in development of the OOV Guidance email to consider areas that the SCDES is interested in and availability of the SCDES experts in those areas of interest. The OOV Guidance email will be publicly available. During an OOV, the agenda may change based on what happens during the OOV (e.g., new areas of interest are identified) or unforeseen circumstances (e.g., weather). The NRC will document each OOV in a publicly available OOV Report.

1.4.3 The NRC Interest in Periodic DOE Documents and Upcoming DOE Activities/Events The DOE documents, including the PA and environmental monitoring, are written for the DOE or other regulatory requirements for the DOE regulators (i.e., DOE, EPA, SCDES) and the NRC is leveraging those already created documents and analyses to assist the NRC in assessing the DOE compliance with the POs. At the SRS SDF, the NRC has been performing monitoring activities since 2006. Based on that experience, both the NRC and the DOE agreed that it would be beneficial if the DOE were to provide to the NRC in a timely basis the following two sets of information:

certain original and updated DOE documents that are relevant to the NRC in performing its monitoring responsibilities (e.g., documents may be reviewed by the NRC at the NRC or during an OOV) that the NRC would periodically review timely notification that certain upcoming DOE activities/unscheduled events that will be occurring in the near-or long-term future (i.e., no surprises to the NRC, allowing enough time for the NRC to understand the DOE activities and let the DOE know if the NRC has any concerns about those activities) as well as timely notification when certain events happen Table 1-1 lists the periodic topical area, specific technical document(s), and the DOE expected availability of those documents used in NDAA-WIR Monitoring activities.

Table 1-1: List of Periodic DOE Documents Topical Area Document Approximate Availability/Frequency Groundwater

  • SDF Annual Groundwater Report
  • SDF Midyear Groundwater Report
  • SDF Performance Assessment Annual Review
  • SRS Annual Environmental Report January July March September Air Monitoring
  • SRS Annual Environmental Report September

1-8 Topical Area Document Approximate Availability/Frequency Inventory

  • SDF Performance Assessment Annual Review and Key Supporting Inventory References
  • Quarterly Composite Samples for Performance Assessment Sensitive Radionuclides
  • Salt Waste Processing Facility Decontaminated Salt Solution Semi-Annual Sample Analysis March Quarterly May and November Performance Assessment Maintenance
  • SRS Liquid Waste Facilities Performance Assessment Maintenance Annual Implementation Plan
  • SDF Performance Assessment Annual Review (includes the following):

- Inventory

- Unreviewed Waste Management Question Evaluations Performed

- Research and Development Performed

- Research and Development Planned March March Research and Development Testing/Studies Various Reports As issued (typically, September through December)

NOTE: The DOE adds the Annual Environmental Report and Summaries when issued to the following website: https://www.srs.gov/general/pubs/ERsum/index.html Table 1-2 provides examples of categories with specific DOE activities or unscheduled events that the NRC would like the DOE to keep the NRC informed about.

Table 1-2: Examples of Upcoming DOE Activities and Unscheduled Events Category Activity/Event General

  • DOE determines that an SDF special analysis will be performed
  • DOE starts saltstone disposal into a new disposal structure
  • Major work stoppages or unusual events occur (e.g., spills, disposal structure wall seeps)
  • Significant changes are made to the salt waste treatment processes that could affect treated salt waste composition (e.g., radionuclide inventories, aluminate concentration)

Environmental Monitoring

  • Unusual volumes of water are removed from a disposal structure sump
  • Unusual radionuclide concentrations are encountered in water removed from a disposal structure sump
  • Unexpected radionuclide concentrations, conductivity measurements, or nitrate concentrations are encountered in groundwater samples from SRS Z-Area wells Inventory
  • Changes are made to the methods used to assess the inventory of radionuclides disposed of at the SDF
  • Significant changes are made to the estimated inventory of Technitium-99 (Tc-99), Tin-126 (Sn-126), Iodine-129 (I-129), Radium-226 (Ra-226),

Thorium-230 (Th-230), Plutonium-239 (Pu-239), Plutonium-240 (Pu-240), or Americium-241 (Am-241) in a disposal structure Waste Form Changes are made to the saltstone formulation, including changes to admixtures

1-9 Category Activity/Event Disposal Structure Performance

  • DOE decides to use a new design of a disposal structure or significant changes are made to the design of a disposal structure
  • Major delays or unexpected events (e.g., unexpected hydrotest results) occur during construction of a disposal structure
  • Major construction stages of a disposal structure are about to begin:

- placing HDPE/GCL on a lower mud mat in a disposal structure

- pouring an upper mud mat on a lower mud mat in a disposal structure

- placing a floor in a disposal structure

- placing wall panels in a disposal structure

- constructing columns in a disposal structure

- placing roof panels in a disposal structure 1.5 Notification Letters The following updates the information in the NRC WIR Periodic Monitoring Report, Rev. 6 (ML19058A272), which updated the information in the NRC guidance document NUREG-1854

- NRC Staff Guidance for Activities Related to U.S. DOE Waste Determinations - Draft Final Report for Interim Use (ML072360184):

At times during the NDAA-WIR Monitoring, the NRC may decide to send a Notification Letter concerning the DOE non-compliance or the potential for the DOE non-compliance with the 10 CFR Part 61 POs. There are five types of Notification Letters. Three of the letters are non-compliance letters (i.e., Type-I, Type-II, Type-III) that the NRC developed to implement the authority it has inferred from the statutory language in NDAA Section 3116(b). The NRC may issue the other two letters (i.e., Type-IV, Type-V) as an interim step.

The NRC expects to issue a Letter of Concern (i.e., Type-IV) to allow the DOE sufficient time to respond to the NRC concern before issuance of one of the three non-compliant Notification Letters (i.e., Type-I, Type-II, Type-III). However, that may not be possible or appropriate in all situations. For example, if a worker were overexposed in an accident (i.e., received greater than 0.01 Sievert (5 rem) exposure) and therefore, the NRC was going to issue a Type-I Notification Letter of Evidence PO Not Met, then the NRC may decide to send that Type-I Notification Letter to Congress, the DOE, and the NDAA-Covered State, rather than first sending a Type-IV Notification Letter of Concern to the DOE and the NDAA-Covered State. The NRC would use other means of notification (e.g., calls, meetings) with both the DOE and the NDAA-Covered State before sending the Type-I Notification Letter. Table 1-3 below describes each type of Notification Letter, including the NRC conclusion for issuing the Notification Letter, the NRC basis for issuing the Notification Letter, who at the NRC signs the Notification Letter, and who receives the Notification Letter. Figure 1-3 below provides a graphic of the three non-compliance Notification Letters along with example reasons for each of those Notification Letters.

Table 1-3: Types of Notification Letters Typ e

Notification Signature Distribution Non-Compliance Notification Letters I

Basis - Evidence PO Not Met: The NRC concludes that direct evidence (e.g.,

environmental sampling data) exists that indicates the DOE disposal actions do not The NRC Chairman The DOE, the NDAA-Covered State, and Congress

1-10 Typ e

Notification Signature Distribution meet one or more POs in 10 CFR Part 61, Subpart C.

Notification: If the DOE cannot demonstrate that executed disposal actions currently meet the requirements specified in the PO, then the NRC will issue a Type-I Letter of Non-Compliance.

II Basis - Lack of Compliance Demonstration: The NRC concludes that indirect evidence (e.g., data regarding key modeling assumptions) exists that indicates the DOE disposal actions do not meet one or more POs in 10 CFR Part 61, Subpart C.

Notification: If the DOE cannot adequately address the NRC technical concerns, then the NRC will issue a Type-II Letter of Non-Compliance.

The NRC Chairman The DOE, the NDAA-Covered State, and Congress III Basis - Insufficient Information: The NRC concludes that insufficient information is available to assess whether the DOE disposal actions meet the POs in 10 CFR Part 61, Subpart C. It is not clear to the NRC that either the DOE: (1) has plans to, or (2) is able to provide the information in a reasonable timeframe to allow the NRC to assess compliance.

Notification: If the DOE cannot adequately address the NRC technical concerns, then the NRC will issue a Type-III Letter of Non-Compliance.

The NRC Chairman The DOE, the NDAA-Covered State, and Congress Other Notification Letters IV Basis - Concern: The NRC concludes that there are concerns with the DOE demonstration of meeting the POs in 10 CFR Part 61, Subpart C.

Notification: If the DOE cannot adequately address the NRC concerns, then the NRC will issue a Type-IV Letter of Concern.

The NRC Management or the NRC Staff The DOE and the NDAA-Covered State V

Basis - Resolution: The NRC concludes that the DOE has provided sufficient information to resolve the concerns in the Type-IV Letter of Concern regarding the DOE demonstration of meeting the POs in 10 CFR Part 61, Subpart C.

The NRC Management or the NRC Staff The DOE and the NDAA-Covered State

1-11 Typ e

Notification Signature Distribution Notification: If the DOE adequately addresses the NRC concerns in a Type-IV Letter of Concern, then the NRC will issue a Type-V Letter of Resolution.

Figure 1-3: Types of Non-Compliance

1-12 1.6 The Monitoring Plan This SDF Monitoring Plan, Rev. 2 is structured from each PO, to a monitoring area, to monitoring factor(s), including the priority of monitoring factor(s). Each monitoring area is supported by one or more monitoring factor. Each monitoring area will be tracked as either Open or Closed. Each monitoring factor is a smaller, more specific item that will be monitored in more detail. Each monitoring factor will be tracked as either Open or Closed. If the NRC staff concerns arise related to a monitoring factor, then the NRC staff may develop an FUAI or Open Issue to document those concerns. Thus, the NRC has a mechanism to communicate to DOE early of the need for corrective action, prior to issuance of a Notification Letter.

This SDF Monitoring Plan, Rev. 2 is organized by PO with a chapter devoted to each of the five POs. Each chapter has the associated monitoring areas and their associated monitoring factors.

Each monitoring area supports one or more POs. If a monitoring area supports multiple POs, then this monitoring plan indicates whether or not the monitoring area is an exact duplicate of a previously listed monitoring area (i.e., whereby the details of the monitoring area and its associated monitoring factors will be referenced rather than repeated) or if there are unique aspects of the monitoring area or associated monitoring factors that pertain to that PO. At the end of each monitoring factor, there is specific information that provides the NRC staff expectations of how and/or when the monitoring factor will be closed. When this monitoring plan mentions the DOE 2020 PA, this refers to the DOE 2020 PA with all its associated documents, including the DOE: (1) references; (2) Responses to the NRC RSI Comments; and (3) Responses to the NRC RAI Questions.

The NRC information for Monitoring Area (MA)) 1 (Inventory), MA 8 (Environmental Monitoring), and MA 9 (Site Stability) changed since issuance of the NRC 2023 TER; but, those changes did not affect the NRC Conclusions in the NRC 2023 TER. For Monitoring Factor (MF) 1.01, the DOE changed the periodic sampling of treated salt waste, which changed the NRC information in this monitoring plan from the information in the TER. For MF 8.03, in this monitoring plan, the NRC decided to clarify the NRC information from what was in the TER. In this monitoring plan, the NRC combined MF 9.08 with MF 9.01 from the NRC 2023 TER Appendix and then renumbered MF 9.09 from the TER Appendix to be MF 9.08.The Tables ES-1, ES-2, and ES-3 below update the Tables A-4, A-5, and A-6 in the 2023 NRC SDF TER Appendix to represent the status of the monitoring areas and monitoring factors as of when this SDF Monitoring Plan, Rev. 2 was issued.

1-13 Table 1-4: Overall Structure of SDF Monitoring Plan, Rev. 2 MONITORING AREA MONITORING FACTOR PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE(S)

PRIORITY MA 1: Inventory 0 Closed monitoring factors MF 1.01: Inventory in Disposal Structures

§61.41 & §61.42 Periodic MF 1.02: Methods Used to Assess Inventory

§61.41 & §61.42 Medium MA 2: Infiltration and Erosion Control 0 Closed monitoring factors MF 2.01: Hydraulic Performance of Closure Cap

§61.41, §61.42

& §61.44 Medium MF 2.02: Erosion Control of the SDF Engineered Surface Cover and Adjacent Area

§61.41, §61.42

& §61.44 High MF 2.03: Confidence in QA/QC for HDPE/GCL Composite Barrier and Drainage Layer Installation

§61.41, §61.42

& §61.44 High MF 2.04: Long-Term HDPE/GCL Composite Barrier and Drainage Layer Degradation

§61.41, §61.42

& §61.44 High MF 2.05: Potential Confined Conditions in the ULDL

§61.41, §61.42

& §61.44 High MF 2.06: Long-Term Erosion Barrier Performance

§61.41, §61.42

& §61.44 Medium MF2.07: Shallow Infiltration

§61.41, §61.42

& §61.44 Medium MA 3: Waste Form Hydraulic Performance 3 Closed monitoring factors: MF 3.01, MF 3.02, and MF 3.04 MF 3.03: Applicability of Laboratory Data to Field-Emplaced Saltstone

§61.41 & §61.42 Medium MA 4: Waste Form Physical Degradation 0 Closed monitoring factors MF 4.01: Waste Form Matrix Degradation

§61.41 & §61.42 High MF 4.02: Waste Form Macroscopic Fracturing

§61.41 & §61.42 High MF 4.03: Moisture Characteristic Curves for Saltstone

§61.41 & §61.42 Low MA 5: Waste Form Chemical Degradation 1 Closed monitoring factor: MF 5.05 MF 5.01: Radionuclide Release from Field-Emplaced Saltstone

§61.41 & §61.42 Low MF 5.02: Chemical Reduction of Tc by Saltstone

§61.41 & §61.42 Low

1-14 MONITORING AREA MONITORING FACTOR PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE(S)

PRIORITY MF 5.03: Reducing Capacity of Saltstone

§61.41 & §61.42 Low MF 5.04: Kd Values and Solubility Limits for Saltstone

§61.41 & §61.42 Medium MA 6: Disposal Structure Performance 1 Closed monitoring factor: MF 6.02 MF 6.01: Kd Values in Disposal Structure Concrete

§61.41 & §61.42 Medium MF 6.03: Performance of Disposal Structure Roofs and HDPE/GCL Layers

§61.41 & §61.42 Medium MF 6.04: Disposal Structure Concrete Fracturing

§61.41 & §61.42 Medium MF 6.05: Integrity of Non-Cementitious Materials

§61.41 & §61.42 Medium MF 6.06: Localized Contaminant Release

§61.41 & §61.42 Medium MF 6.07: Moisture Characteristic Curves for Disposal Structure Concrete

§61.41 & §61.42 Low MA 7: Subsurface Flow and Transport 1 Closed monitoring factor: MF 7.01 MF 7.02: Kd Values for SRS Soil

§61.41 & §61.42 Low MF 7.03: Confidence in GSA Modeling Results

§61.41 & §61.42 Medium MF 7.04: Confidence in Local SDF Modeling Results

§61.41 & §61.42 Medium MF 7.05: Impact of Calcareous Zones on Contaminant Flow and Transport

§61.41 & §61.42 Low MA 8: Environmental Monitoring 0 Closed monitoring factors MF 8.01: Leak Detection

§61.41, §61.42,

& §61.43 Periodic MF 8.02: Groundwater Monitoring

§61.41, §61.42,

& §61.43 Periodic MF 8.03: Identification and Monitoring of Groundwater Plumes in the SRS Z-Area

§61.41, §61.42 High MA 9: Site Stability 0 Closed monitoring factors MF 9.01: Settlement Due to Static-Loading and Seismic Loading

§61.41, §61.42,

& §61.44 Medium MF 9.02: Settlement Due to Dissolution of Calcareous Sediment

§61.41, §61.42,

& §61.44 Medium

1-15 MONITORING AREA MONITORING FACTOR PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE(S)

PRIORITY MF 9.03: Gullying of the Closure Cap

§61.41, §61.42,

& §61.44 Medium MF 9.04: Sheet and Rill Erosion of the Closure Cap

§61.41, §61.42,

& §61.44 Medium MF 9.05: Slope Stability of the SDF Closure Cap

§61.41, §61.42,

& §61.44 High MF 9.06: Flow through the ULDL

§61.41, §61.42,

& §61.44 High MF 9.07: Degradation of the Erosion Barrier

§61.41, §61.42,

& §61.44 Medium MF 9.08: Settlement Due to Waste Bags in SDS 4

§61.41, §61.42,

& §61.44 Medium MA 10: CLOSED -

Obsolete with Rev. 2 14 Closed monitoring factors with 12 of those monitoring factors incorporated into other monitoring factors MA 11: Radiation Protection Program 0 Closed monitoring factors MF 11.01: Dose to Individuals During Operations

§61.43 Periodic MF 11.02: Air Monitoring

§61.43 Periodic MA 12: Biosphere 0 Closed monitoring factors MF 12.01: Ingestion Pathway Parameters

§61.41 & §61.42 Medium MF 12:02: Inhalation Pathway Parameters

§61.41 & §61.42 Low MA 13: Inadvertent Intrusion 0 Closed monitoring factors MF 13.01: Intrusion Source Terms

§61.42 Low MF 13.02: Intrusion Exposure Pathways

§61.42 Medium MA 14: Future Scenarios and Conceptual Models 0 Closed monitoring factors MF 14.01: Scenario Development and Defensibility

§61.41 & §61.42 Medium MF 14.02: Defensibility of Conceptual Models

§61.41 & §61.42 High MF 14.03: Implementation of Conceptual Models

§61.41 & §61.42 Medium MF 14.04: Identification and Screening of FEPs

§61.41 & §61.42 Medium MF 14.05: Future Designs and Analyses as They Pertain to Potential Degradation Processes and Performance

§61.41 & §61.42 High

1-16 MONITORING AREA MONITORING FACTOR PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE(S)

PRIORITY MF 14.06: Groundwater Yield of the UTRA-UAZ in the SRS Z-Area

§61.41 & §61.42 High Table 1-5: Monitoring Areas in SDF Monitoring Plan, Rev. 2 TOTAL # of Monitoring Areas 14

  1. of OPEN Monitoring Areas 13
  1. of CLOSED Monitoring Areas 1

Table 1-6: Monitoring Factors in SDF Monitoring Plan, Rev. 2 TOTAL # of Monitoring Factors 70

  1. of OPEN Monitoring Factors 50
  1. of CLOSED Monitoring Factors 20 The NRC staff expects that the identification, description, and status (i.e., Open or Closed) of each of the monitoring areas and each of the monitoring factors will evolve as NDAA-WIR Monitoring activities continue in the future at the SRS SDF. New monitoring areas are possible and new monitoring factors are expected to be included in a future SDF monitoring plan as more information is known about the future DOE disposal actions and experiments at the SDF.

Each publicly available OOV Guidance email will include the monitoring factor(s) that the NRC expects to observe during that OOV. After each OOV, the NRC will issue a publicly available OOV Report that will include what was observed, new FUAIs, and the status of both the monitoring factors and FUAIs after the OOV. The NRC expects to issue revisions to the current SDF Monitoring Plan in the future only after reviewing a revised DOE SDF PA and issuing a revised SDF TER. The NRC may issue letters supplementing SDF Monitoring Plan, Rev. 2 based on recommendations from NRC staff. In addition, the major DOE and NRC documents related to both DOE NDAA Consultation with the NRC at the SDF and the NRC NDAA-WIR Monitoring of the DOE disposal actions at the SDF can be found at the NRC Public Website:

https://www.nrc.gov/waste/incidental-waste/wir-process/wir-locations/saltstone.html

1-17 Tables 1-7 and 1-8 below provide graphical representations of priorities of monitoring factors.

Table 1-7: NRC Prioritization of Monitoring Factors for Monitoring Areas 1 through 7 MA1 Inventory MA 2 Infiltration and Erosion Control MA 3 Waste Form Hydraulic Performance MA 4 Waste Form Physical Degradation MA 5 Wasteform Chemical Degradation MA 6 Disposal Structure Performance MA 7 Subsurface Flow and Transport 0 Closed monitoring factors 0 Closed monitoring factors 3 Closed monitoring factors (3.01, 3.02, & 3.04) 0 Closed monitoring factors 1 Closed monitoring factor (5.05) 1 Closed monitoring factor (6.02) 1 Closed monitoring factor (7.01)

MF 1.01 Inventory in Disposal Structures§ MF 2.01 Hydraulic Performance of Closure Cap MF 3.03 Applicability of Laboratory Data to Field-Emplaced Saltstone MF4.01 Waste Form Matrix Degradation+/-

MF 5.01 Radionuclide Release from Field-Emplaced Saltstone MF 6.01 Kd Values in Disposal Structure Concrete MF 7.02 Kd Values for SRS Soil MF 1.02 Methods Used to Assess Inventory MF 2.02 Erosion Control of the SDF Engineered Surface cover and Adjacent Area+/-

MF4.02 Waste Form Macroscopic Fracturing+/-

MF 5.02 Chemical Reduction of Tc by Saltstone MF 6.03 Performance of Disposal Structure Roofs and HDPE/GCL Layers MF 7.03 Confidence in GSA Modeling Results MF 2.03 Confidence in QA/QC for HDPE/GCL Composite Barrier and Drainage Layer Installation+/-

MF4.03 Moisture Characteristic Curves for Saltstone MF 5.03 Reducing Capacity of Saltstone MF 6.04 Disposal Structure Concrete Fracturing MF 7.04 Confidence in Local SDF Modeling Results MF 2.04 Long-Term HDPE/GCL Composite Barrier and Drainage Layer Degradation+/-

MF 5.04 Kd Values and Solubility Limits for Saltstone MF 6.05 Integrity of Non-Cementitious Materials MF 7.05 Impact of Calcareous Zones on Contaminant Flow and Transport MF 2.05 Potential Confined Conditions in ULDL+/-

MF 6.06 Localized Contaminant Release MF 2.06 Long-Term Erosion Barrier Performance MF 6.07 Moisture Characteristic Curves for Disposal Structure Concrete MF 2.07 Shallow Infiltration

§ Periodic Monitoring Factors (i.e., monitoring factors related to data that the NRC staff expects to review periodically)

Low Priority Medium Priority

+/- High Priority

1-18 Table 1-8: NRC Prioritization of Monitoring Factors for Monitoring Areas 8 through 14 MA 8 Environmental Monitoring MA 9 Site Stability MA 10 Performance Assessment Maintenance

[CLOSED]

MA 11 Radiation Protection Program MA 12 Biosphere MA 13 Inadvertent Intrusion MA 14 Future Scenarios and Conceptual Models 0 Closed monitoring factors 0 Closed monitoring factors 0 Closed monitoring factors 0 Closed monitoring factors 0 Closed monitoring factors 0 Closed monitoring factors MF 8.01 Leak Detection§ MF 9.01 Settlement Due to Static-Loading and Seismic Loading MF 11.01 Dose to Individuals During Operations§ MF 12.01 Ingestion Pathway Parameters MF 13.01 Intrusion Source Terms MF 14.01 Scenario Development and Defensibility MF 8.02 Groundwater Monitoring§ MF 9.02 Settlement Due to Dissolution of Calcareous Sediment MF 11.02 Air Monitoring§ MF 12.02 Inhalation Pathway Parameters MF 13.02 Intrusion Exposure Pathways MF 14.02 Defensibility of Conceptual Models+/-

MF 8.03 Identification and Monitoring of Groundwater Plumes in the SRS Z-Area+/-

MF 9.03 Gullying of the Closure Cap MF 14.03 Implementation of Conceptual Models MF 9.04 Sheet and Rill Erosion of the Closure Cap MF 14.04 Identification and Screening of FEPs MF 9.05 Slope Stability of the SDF Closure Cap+/-

MF 14.05 Future Designs and Analyses as They Pertain to Potential Degradation Processes and Performance+/-

MF 9.06 Flow through the ULDL+/-

MF 14.06 Groundwater Yield of the UTRA-UAZ in the SRS Z-Area+/-

MF 9.07 Degradation of the Erosion Barrier MF 9.08 Settlement Due to Waste Bags in SDS 4 All MA 10 monitoring factors were Closed and some were Opened as more specific monitoring factors or merged with other monitoring factors

§ Periodic Monitoring Factors (i.e., monitoring factors related to data that the NRC staff expects to review periodically)

Low Priority Medium Priority

+/- High Priority

1-19 1.6.1 Closed Monitoring Areas When all monitoring factors under a monitoring area are Closed, the monitoring area is also Closed. In the future, when a new monitoring factor is opened under a Closed monitoring area, the monitoring area is opened-again rather than the NRC opening a new monitoring area covering the same technical issue. If that happens, then the next number in sequence is used for the new monitoring factor under the newly opened-again monitoring area. For example, if the MA 22 became Closed with MF 22.11 as the last monitoring factor before MA 22 was Closed, then when MA 22 would be newly opened-again the next monitoring factor under MA 22 would be MA 22.12.

1.6.2 Closed Monitoring Factors In general, a monitoring factor is Closed by the NRC when the NRC determines that the specific technical concern associated with that monitoring factor is resolved or the technical issue identified in the monitoring factor will not significantly affect the ability the DOE to meet the PO.

In addition, the NRC closing a monitoring factor does not imply that the DOE disposal actions met the PO related to that monitoring factor. At the end of each monitoring factor section in SDF Monitoring Plan, Rev. 2, there is text that provides the current NRC expectations of how and/or when the NRC expects that the monitoring factor will be Closed. There is no way to partially close a monitoring factor; however, that monitoring factor can be Closed at the same time that a new monitoring factor is Opened with the part of the previous monitoring factor that was not Closed.

Closing a monitoring factor is directly related to whether or not the NRC concluded in a TER or other document (e.g., OOV Report) that the DOE disposal actions were in compliance with the PO related to that monitoring factor. Although the NRC may find in the future that other general conditions exist to close a monitoring factor, the following are general conditions that the NRC expects to use to close a monitoring factor under this monitoring plan.

If the NRC did conclude that the DOE demonstrated compliance with meeting a PO, then the NRC expects to close a monitoring factor related to that PO if at least one of the following four conditions exists:

the NRC concludes that appropriate assumptions or parameters were consistent with the related assumptions in the PA the NRC concludes that appropriate conservative assumptions were made the NRC concludes that experimental values are well-supported and additional measurements would be unlikely to result in a different estimate (i.e., the NRC would be satisfied that additional DOE work on the monitoring factor would be unnecessary)

If the NRC did not conclude that the DOE demonstrated compliance with meeting a PO, then the NRC expects to close a monitoring factor related to that PO if at least one of the following two conditions exists:

the NRC concludes that appropriate conservative assumptions were made (i.e., the NRC expects that this would need both a new DOE PA and a new NRC TER) the NRC concludes that experimental values are well-supported and additional

1-20 measurements would be unlikely to result in a different estimate (i.e., the NRC would be satisfied that additional DOE work on the monitoring factor would be unnecessary)

(Intentionally Left Blank)

2-1 2.0 MONITORING TO ASSESS COMPLIANCE WITH 10 CFR 61.40 The §61.40 PO - General Requirement Land disposal facilities must be sited, designed, operated, closed, and controlled after closure so that reasonable assurance exists that exposures to humans are within the limits established in the performance objectives in §§61.41 through 61.44.

The NRC does not define in its regulations or guidance the term, reasonable assurance. The

§61.40 PO is a general requirement in the regulation rather than a specific requirement.

Therefore, if the NRC concludes with reasonable assurance that the DOE will meet the other four POs (i.e., §61.41 through §61.44), then the NRC concludes with reasonable assurance that the DOE will meet the §61.40 PO. Otherwise, the NRC cannot conclude with reasonable assurance that the DOE will meet the §61.40 PO. Therefore, there are no specific monitoring areas or monitoring factors for the §61.40 PO in this monitoring plan and it will not be mentioned further in this monitoring plan.

(Intentionally Left Blank)

3-1 3.0 MONITORNG TO ASSESS COMPLIANCE WITH 10 CFR 61.41 The §61.41 PO - Protection of the General Population from Releases of Radioactivity Concentrations of radioactive material which may be released to the general environment in ground water, surface water, air, soil, plants, or animals must not result in an annual dose exceeding an equivalent of 25 millirems to the whole body, 75 millirems to the thyroid, and 25 millirems to any other organ of any member of the public.

Reasonable effort should be made to maintain releases of radioactivity in effluents to the general environment as low as is reasonably achievable.

The term as low as is reasonably achievable is defined in the Definitions section of SDF Monitoring Plan, Rev. 2. As described in NUREG-1854, NRC Staff Guidance for Activities Related to U.S. DOE Waste Determinations - Draft Final Report for Interim Use (ML072360184), the NRC will evaluate the DOE compliance with the §61.41 PO by using a dose limit of 0.25 milliSieverts/year (mSv/yr) (25 millirem/year (mrem/yr)) Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE). That approach is consistent with the approach described in the final rule for 10 CFR Part 63 (66 FR 55752):

Because each of the organs had the same limit under the older system even though each had a different level of radiosensitivity, it is very difficult to directly compare the old standards with the new standards. As noted in the proposed rule, the Commission considers 0.25 mSv/yr (25 mrem/yr) TEDE as the appropriate dose limit to compare with the range of potential doses represented by the older limits that had whole body dose limits of 0.25 mSv/yr (25 mrem/yr).

The DOE 2020 PA (ML20190A056) used dose conversion factors (DCFs) to project the TEDE to a member of the general population. In the NRC 2023 TRR entitled, Dose and Exposure Pathways Model for the U.S. Department of Energy 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A113), the NRC staff found that the DOE DCFs were acceptable. The DOE projection of a TEDE was consistent with Commission direction in SRM-SECY-01-0148, Processes for Revision of 10 CFR Part 20 Regarding Adoption of International Commission on Radiological Protection Recommendations on Occupational Dose Limits and Dosimetric Models and Parameters (ML021050104). The dose assessment in the DOE 2020 PA for the member of the public evaluated well water, surface water, and air pathways. Groundwater was assumed to be withdrawn from a well at the point of maximum exposure 100 meters (m)

(~328 feet (ft)) from the SDF. In the 2023 TER, the NRC concluded that the scenarios and pathways considered by the DOE were appropriate based on the regional practices near SRS.

The objective of the NDAA-WIR Monitoring activities related to the §61.41 PO is to assess whether the DOE disposal of salt waste at the SDF meets the PO. The monitoring areas related to the §61.41 PO are the following: Inventory (MA 1); Infiltration and Erosion Control (MA 2);

Waste Form Hydraulic Performance (MA 3); Waste Form Physical Degradation (MA 4); Waste Form Chemical Degradation (MA 5); Disposal Structure Performance (MA 6); Subsurface Flow and Transport (MA 7); Environmental Monitoring (MA 8); Site Stability (MA 9); Biosphere (MA 12); and Future Scenarios and Conceptual Models (MA 14). Those monitoring areas are important to the §61.41 PO because:

Inventory (MA 1) - The DOE assumed radionuclide release is limited by sorption and the

3-2 DOE does not take credit for potential limits on radionuclide solubility for all radionuclides other than Tc-99, which means that Inventory is linearly related to potential dose from those radionuclides.

Infiltration and Erosion Control (MA 2) - Infiltrating water reaching the waste could transport radionuclides outside of the disposal site and because erosion control slows the degradation of barriers that slow or divert water from infiltrating into the waste. The performance of the closure cap affects the overall performance of the SDF because the closure cap is designed to: (1) provide physical stabilization using erosion control; (2) limit infiltration; and (3) act as an intruder deterrent. Results of the 2020 SDF PA showed that the DOE expects that most of the rainwater will be diverted away from the waste by the closure cap before it reaches the engineered layers above the individual disposal structures.

Waste Form Hydraulic Performance (MA 3) - The hydraulic properties of saltstone directly affect the rate of radionuclide release into groundwater. The rate of radionuclide release into groundwater affects the projected dose to a hypothetical member of the public 100 m (~328 ft) from the SDF boundary or an inadvertent intruder who uses groundwater at the site, and therefore are important to SDF performance.

Waste Form Physical Degradation (MA 4) - The physical integrity of saltstone plays an important role in both: (1) limiting water infiltration, which affects the release of all radionuclides; and (2) limiting saltstone oxidation, which has a significant effect on Tc-99 release.

Waste Form Chemical Performance (MA 5), Disposal Structure Performance (MA 6),

and Subsurface Flow and Transport (MA 7) - The critical importance of radionuclide sorption in controlling the magnitude and the timing of the peak dose. In general, more sorption in the source material limits the peak dose by lowering the radionuclides annual fractional release rate (i.e., higher sorption coefficient in the source reduces the quantity of a radionuclide released in any one year). Sorption in downstream areas, such as the disposal structure or vadose zone, delays radionuclide transport to the receptor site, which can reduce the peak dose from short-lived radionuclides and result in attenuation of pulse-like releases.

Disposal Structure Performance (MA 6) - In addition to the importance of sorption in the disposal structure described above, MA 6 is important to the projected dose to an offsite member of the public because the disposal structure limits water flow to saltstone, which limits radionuclide releases from saltstone. The disposal structure also is important to the projected dose to an inadvertent intruder because the DOE intrusion model credits the steel-reinforced concrete in the disposal structure roofs with deterring intrusion until the roof is degraded.

Subsurface Flow and Transport (MA 7) - In addition to the importance of sorption in the disposal structure described above, MA 7 is important to the projected dose to an offsite member of the public because subsurface flow affects the spreading of contaminant plumes under the SDF and thereby affects the radionuclide concentrations an offsite receptor could be exposed to.

Environmental Monitoring (MA 8) - The radionuclide and relevant chemical

3-3 concentrations in a variety of environmental media (e.g., soil, air, surface water, animal meat, groundwater) are important. Of the DOE monitoring measurements for those radionuclides and concentrations, the NRC staff expects groundwater monitoring to be most important to the demonstration of compliance with the §61.41 PO because the potential dose from the SDF to an offsite receptor will be dominated by groundwater pathways. Groundwater monitoring also includes measurements of other parameters that may serve as early indicators of releases from the SDF (e.g., groundwater nitrate concentrations, pH). Environmental Monitoring includes monitoring of data from the leak detection system that the DOE has informed NRC has been installed under Saltstone Disposal Structure (SDS) 3A and SDS 6 through SDS 12 structures.

Site Stability (MA 9) - The physical stability of the disposal site is important in limiting the infiltration through the SDF limiting water flow is a key barrier to radionuclide release to an offsite receptor.

Biosphere (MA 12) - The biosphere represents the last stage of radionuclide transport between the source and potential human receptors. For example, the biosphere includes radionuclide uptake by plants that humans could consume, animals that produce meat or milk humans could ingest, and surface soil humans could inhale, among other pathways.

Future Scenarios and Conceptual Models (MA 14) - Future site scenarios determine the environment that a hypothetical receptor is living and working in (e.g., livelihood as agricultural farmer or cattle rancher), and conceptual site models determine how the hypothetical receptor could come into contact with radionuclides (i.e., exposure pathway) that have been released from the disposal site. Those assumptions affect the projected performance of the SDF because they form the basis for the PA equations that project radionuclides concentrations in environmental media and hypothetical receptor exposure to those radionuclides.

3.1 MA 1 - Inventory The NRC staff reviewed the technical bases for the DOE projected inventory for the SDF in the NRC 2023 TRR entitled, Inventory for the Department of Energy 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site" (ML23017A087). As described in that TRR, the NRC staff evaluated the DOE bases for three sets of radionuclides:

(1) currently in the SDF; (2) currently in salt waste in the SRS Tank Farms; and (3) in SRS H-Canyon that the DOE expects to add to the SRS Tank Farms in the future that will be disposed of in the SDF. In that TRR, the NRC staff determined that the largest source of uncertainty in the inventory for most radionuclides was in radionuclides in the second set (i.e., currently in salt waste in the SRS Tank Farms). That TRR also included historical information about MA 1 (Inventory).

As described in that TRR, in the DOE 2020 PA model, the DOE implemented a new solubility-based model for Technetium (Tc) release under chemically reducing conditions. Because of that change to the DOE SDF model from 2009, the projected dose to a member of the public outside of the boundary of the SDF was not directly proportional to the Tc inventory. However, the Tc inventory still affected the projected peak dose because the Tc release rate from chemically oxidized saltstone was not solubility limited and was proportional to the Tc inventory. The Tc inventory also affected the projected duration of the Tc release from saltstone.

3-4 As waste continues to be disposed at the SDF, the NRC will continue to monitor the inventory on a radionuclide-specific basis in each disposal structure. The NRC staff will also continue to review the methods used by the DOE to quantify the inventory to confirm that the inventories of risk-significant radionuclides are assessed adequately. Although a risk-informed NRC review is expected to focus on the radionuclides that were identified as most risk-significant, the NRC staff will review the inventories of the other radionuclides to confirm that they do not increase to risk-significant levels.

3.1.1 MF 1.01: Inventory in Disposal Structures Under MF 1.01, the NRC staff historically monitored periodic DOE reports on radionuclide concentrations in the SDF feed tank (i.e., Tank 50), which the DOE issued to document compliance with the SDF Waste Acceptance Criteria. As stated in Section 1.6 above, after the NRC issued the 2023 TER (ML23024A099), the DOE updated the NRC staff on changes to the periodic sampling of treated salt waste (Meeting Summary - ML23122A207). The changes introduced sampling directly from the Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF) as described in the DOE presentation entitled, SRMC-CWDA-2023-00042 - Saltstone Inventory: Salt Waste Processing Characterization Update (ML23122A208). Based on that information, the NRC staff will monitor DOE reports on quarterly composite samples taken from the SWPF in addition to the semi-annual samples taken from Tank 50 (see below in Table 1-1). If the DOE changes its process to take samples exclusively from the SWPF, which the DOE indicated was a possibility, then the NRC staff will appropriately adapt its monitoring under MF 1.01. In addition, the NRC staff will continue to monitor radionuclide inventories in SDF PA-related documents, such as the SDF PA Annual Reviews (see below in Table 1-1).

In addition to the total radionuclide inventories in the SDF, the radionuclide inventories in an individual disposal structure are relevant to the projected dose for a member of the general public because a small number of disposal structures can dominate the radionuclide released to an offsite location. Groundwater plumes of radionuclides from individual disposal structures can have a significant effect on the projected dose because the DOE and the NRC expect human exposure outside the SDF to be dominated by the groundwater-dependent pathways. The location of the projected peak dose can change with changing assumptions about far-field groundwater flow because those assumptions affect the modeled radionuclide dispersion and plume overlap. The NRC staff will monitor inventories of all radionuclides in each disposal structure. The NRC staff will place additional focus on the distribution of I-129 among the disposal structures because, as described in the NRC 2023 TRR entitled, Inventory for the Department of Energy 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site" (ML23017A087), the DOE 2020 PA indicated that the physical distribution of I-129 activity among the disposal structures could have a significant effect on the projected dose to an offsite member of the public.

The NRC will monitor the inventory in each disposal structure in comparison to the values in the DOE 2020 PA (ML20190A056) Table 3.306 entitled, [Most Probable and Defensible] SDF Radionuclide Inventory Estimate (Ci) at Closure. If the inventory of a radionuclide in a particular disposal structure is higher than the value in that table, then the NRC staff expects that the DOE would perform an analysis to understand the effect of the increased inventory on the projected dose. For radionuclides that are not significant contributors to the total dose, a simple calculation may be sufficient to demonstrate that the dose from the radionuclide remains low.

However, a large increase in the inventory of a radionuclide that was not projected to be a significant contributor to the dose in the DOE 2020 PA may result in that radionuclide becoming risk-significant.

3-5 In performing the assessment of the dose implications, it is important to consider both the inventory in the disposal structure in question as well as the inventory in neighboring disposal structures. That is important because if the inventory in nearby disposal structures is lower than was assumed in the DOE 2020 PA, then the overall effect of the cumulative dose may not be significant. Alternatively, if adjacent disposal structures also have inventory that exceeds the DOE 2020 PA Table 3.3-6 inventory, then the total dose may be higher than was projected in the DOE 2020 PA with the associated DOE analyses.

In that TRR (ML23017A087), the NRC staff determined that the inventories of Th-229, Cm-245, Cm-247, Cf-249, and Cf-251 had already reached levels near the values that the DOE used in the 2020 PA. The NRC staff will monitor whether the inventory of any of those radionuclides exceeds the values the DOE used in the model for the 2020 PA and assess the impact on the projected dose.

As described in the NRC 2023 TER, the NRC kept MF 1.01 Open as periodic priority under the POs of both §61.41 and §61.42.

The NRC expects to Close MF 1.01 (Inventory in Disposal Structures) under the PO of §61.41 after the DOE has completed waste disposal at the SDF and the NRC has determined that there is adequate support for the final inventory in each disposal structure.

3.1.2 MF 1.02: Methods used to Assess Inventory The NRC will monitor the methods that the DOE uses to assess radionuclide inventories because of the considerable uncertainty in inventory estimates and the importance of radionuclide inventory to dose to an offsite member of the public. The NRC will monitor the approach for sampling the waste, the measurement of radionuclides in the waste samples, the methods used to estimate the concentration of radionuclides present at levels below the detection limit, and the methods used to track the inventory in disposal structures. The NRC will focus on radionuclides that are currently identified as risk-significant (e.g., Tc-99, I-129), but will consider radionuclides that could become more risk-significant if the inventory increases significantly or if the DOE modeling assumptions change. For example, as described in the NRC 2023 TRR entitled, Inventory for the Department of Energy 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site" (ML23017A087), the NRC staff will continue to monitor inputs of thorium-bearing waste to the SDF to ensure additions of Th-230 are small compared to the ingrowth of Th-230 from Uranium-234 (U-234).

In that TRR, the NRC staff described historical information about when the DOE and NRC staff discussed the methods used to quantify and track the inventory of radionuclides in liquid waste that is transferred to the SDF, the NRC staff reviewed the procedures that the DOE used for obtaining samples and the analytical procedures used for quantifying the constituents in the samples, and the NRC concluded that the methods used to assess the inventory disposed of at the SDF appeared to be appropriate. The NRC will continue to monitor any changes to the methods used to assess the inventory (e.g., changes to take samples directly from the SWPF) as described in the DOE presentation SRMC-CWDA-2023-00042 (ML23122A208) from the NRC/DOE Meeting (Meeting Summary - ML23122A207) that took place after the NRC issued the 2023 TER.

Because the inventory in salt waste in the SRS Tank Farms represents future disposals to the SDF, the NRC staff will assess the agreement between the DOE SDF inventory projections and

3-6 the DOE additions to the SDF from the SRS Tank Farms by monitoring periodic reports the DOE produces related to SDF inventory (see below in Table 1-1). The NRC staff will evaluate whether the concentrations of radionuclides in decontaminated liquid salt waste are consistent with or less than the concentrations the DOE assumed in the calculation of SRS Tank Farms contributions to the SDF in the 2020 PA. If radionuclide concentrations are significantly greater than the concentrations the DOE used in the 2020 PA, then the NRC staff will assess whether the differences significantly affect the DOE conclusions in the 2020 PA.

In that TRR (ML23017A087), the NRC staff determined that the inventory values did not appear to account for the uncertainty in future H-Canyon transfer volumes and radionuclide concentrations. Therefore, the NRC staff will monitor significant changes in waste characteristics and annual volumes of waste sent from H-Canyon to the SRS Tank Farms to assess the potential effects on I-129 and Tc-99 inventory.

As described in the NRC 2023 TER (ML23024A099), the NRC kept MF 1.02 Open as medium priority under the POs of both §61.41 and §61.42.

The NRC expects to Close MF 1.02 (Methods Used to Assess Inventory) under the PO of

§61.41 after the DOE has completed waste disposal at the SDF and the NRC has determined that there is adequate support for the final inventory in each disposal structure.

3.2 MA 2 - Infiltration and Erosion Control The performance of the closure cap affects the overall performance of the SDF because the closure cap is designed to: (1) provide physical stabilization, (2) limit infiltration, and (3) act as an intruder deterrent. In the NRC 2023 TRR entitled, Percolation Through and Potential Erosion near the Closure Cap for the 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A083), the NRC described the DOE relationship between infiltration and erosion control and the DOE SDF closure cap (see Figure 3-1 below).

3-7 Figure 3-1: SDF Conceptual Closure Cap Design Configuration (NRC staff modified from Figure 3.2-29 in the DOE 2020 PA)

In the DOE 2020 PA (ML20190A056), the DOE projected that the closure cap performance would be risk-significant to dose. That was because the water is diverted inside the closure cap before it reaches the engineered layers above the individual disposal structures. One of the main components responsible for diverting modeled water away from the waste is the upper High Density Polyethylene and Geosynthetic Clay Liner (HDPE/GCL) composite barrier in combination with the Upper Lateral Drainage Layer (ULDL). The composite barrier impedes, and the ULDL diverts, the vast majority of water away from the disposal structures in the DOE 2020 PA. Consequently, the simulated rate of shallow infiltration is orders of magnitudes higher than that of deep infiltration. Figure 3.2-3 showed the difference between shallow and deep infiltration in addition to the various processes that can reduce the percolation rate between ground surface and the waste.

3-8 Figure 3-2: Surface and Subsurface Water Balance Components for an Engineered Surface Cover (NRC staff drawing - not to scale)

The NRC will monitor the development of specific designs for the closure cap (e.g., the selected fill material between the stones of the erosion barrier) and will determine if those designs are likely to significantly alter the projected closure cap performance in the DOE 2020 PA. Prior to any construction activities, the NRC staff should review the specifications for cover construction materials and the quality assurance/quality control procedures for ensuring that those materials meet the specifications. During construction, the NRC staff should observe the placement of those materials and the quality control testing to determine whether or not the as-built cover meets the design specifications.

3.2.1 MF 2.01: Hydraulic Performance of Closure Cap The NRC staff reviewed the DOE projection of the hydraulic performance of the closure cap in Sections 3.1 and 4.1 in the NRC 2023 TRR entitled, Percolation Through and Potential Erosion near the Closure Cap of the U.S. Department of Energy 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A083).

As described in that TRR, components of engineered surface covers have the ability to minimize infiltration and limit groundwater recharge. The DOE simulation results have shown that, as currently designed, the upper part of the SDF planned engineered cover (i.e., the closure cap) limits the amount of water interacting with the saltstone wasteform. In the DOE 2020 PA (ML20190A056), significant hydraulic performance of the closure cap, specifically the ability to minimize water infiltration and wasteform contact, was largely dependent on: the performance of the HDPE/GCL composite layer and the ULDL. In the NRC 2023 TER

3-9 (ML23024A099), the NRC staff described the need for additional model support for the assumed long-term performance of the closure cap.

Based on the current closure cap design and model results, the NRC staff should focus on the assumed performance of the HDPE/GCL composite layer, the ULDL, and the interactions between the two. Model support for the closure cap may include pilot-scale testing of the closure cap design; laboratory results and literature reviews related to the performance of closure cap components; studies of analog sites to estimate long-term infiltration; and revised simulations of closure cap performance.

As described in the NRC 2023 TER, the NRC kept MF 2.01 Open as medium priority under the POs of both §61.41 and §61.42 and the NRC will start to monitor it under the PO of §61.44 as medium priority.

The NRC expects to Close MF 2.01 (Hydraulic Performance of Closure Cap) under the PO of

§61.41 after the NRC has determined that the DOE support for the assumed hydraulic performance of the as-built closure cap is adequate. Given the importance of construction activities on the performance of the closure cap, this monitoring factor will not be closed prior to construction of the closure cap.

3.2.2 MF 2.02: Erosion Control of the SDF Engineered Surface Cover and Adjacent Area The NRC staff reviewed the DOE plans for erosion control of the SDF engineered surface Cover and adjacent area in the NRC 2023 TRR entitled, Hydrogeology, Groundwater Monitoring, and Far-Field Modeling of the U.S. Department of Energy 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A084). In addition, more detailed information on erosion control of the SDF engineered surface cover and adjacent area is in Sections 3.2 and 4.2 in the NRC 2023 TRR entitled, Percolation Through and Potential Erosion near the Closure Cap of the U.S. Department of Energy 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A083).

As described in those two TRRs, in general, the ability of the engineered surface cover at the SDF to resist erosion is important in maintaining the barriers to infiltration within the closure cap and the layers below. The design of the erosion barrier in the closure cap is intended to help ensure a minimum of 3 m (10 ft) of clean material is maintained above the disposal structures to deter inadvertent intrusion. The NRC will monitor and evaluate the DOE: (1) erosion protection designs (i.e., design changes, implementation, rock source); (2) calculations of soil loss rates due to erosion; (3) information related to the physical stability of the vegetative and topsoil layers; (4) information related to the ability of the cover layers to withstand the effects of high frequency/low intensity rainfall events, which can dominate long-term erosion; and (5) projected impacts of degradation (e.g., due to fire or drought) on the stability of the vegetative cover. Due to the possibility of undermining the stability of the engineered cover, potential erosion in the adjacent area surrounding the future cover will be evaluated by the NRC staff.

As described in the NRC 2023 TRR related to Percolation and Potential Erosion, the NRC staff found the DOE projections of gully erosion for areas adjacent to SDF closure cap to be incomplete because the results for wetter and drier climate conditions were not presented by the DOE. In that TRR, although the NRC staff found the DOE projections of sheet and rill erosion for areas adjacent to SDF closure cap were acceptable, the NRC staff found the results for wetter and drier climate conditions for the SRS Z-Area hilltops and Z-Area hill slopes were not presented.

3-10 As described in the NRC 2023 TER (ML23024A099), the NRC kept MF 2.02 Open and increased the priority of it to high due under the POs of both §61.41 and §61.42 due to the importance of the closure caps role in isolating the waste below from the environment above.

The NRC will also start to monitor it as high priority under the PO of §61.44.

The NRC expects to Close MF 2.02 (Erosion Control of the SDF Engineered Surface Cover and Adjacent Area) under the PO of §61.41 after the NRC has determined that the projected level of erosional degradation of the SDF closure caps and the area adjacent to the SDF closure caps will not be significant enough to affect the DOE ability to meet the PO of §61.41 at the SDF under the DOE Central Scenario climate conditions as well as plausible future wetter and drier climate states. Given the importance of construction activities on the performance of the final engineered surface cover, this monitoring factor will not be closed prior to construction of the cover.

3.2.3 MF 2.03: Confidence in QA/QC for HDPE/GCL Composite Barrier and Drainage Layer Installation The NRC staff reviewed the potential for defects during the DOE installation of HDPE/GCL composite barrier and drainage layers at the SDF, as well as the QA/QC installation procedures, in Sections 3.3.2 through 3.3.6, 4.1.2, and 4.1.4 through 4.1.6 in the NRC 2023 TRR entitled, Performance of the Composite Barrier Layers and Lateral Drainage Layers of the U.S.

Department of Energy 2020 Performance Assessment for the Savannah River Site Saltstone Disposal Facility (ML23017A089).

As described in that TRR, the NRC staff found that the upper HDPE/GCL composite barrier and the ULDL are some of the most risk-significant components of the SDF. That strong performance was dependent on quality material, good workmanship, and construction and installation that follows procedures and guidance. Poor quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) during construction and installation of those components can result in significant consequences for performance. Due to the importance that those critical components will keep performing as intended in the long-term future, the NRC staff will observe and monitor certain aspects of the HDPE/GCL composite barrier and drainage layer installation. That will include observing and monitoring the repairs to cuts and defects in the HDPE, the cutting of the HDPE geomembrane to remove wrinkles and waves, implementation of the QA/QC procedures and guidance, and monitoring that the initial GCL hydraulic conductivity value used in the PA modeling are analogous with an independently validated GCL value originally defined by the manufacturer once that information is definitively known. In addition, if the NRC staff deems them to be risk-significant, the NRC staff will observe the installation of the composite barrier layers above the roof and the lower mud mat, including HDPE repairs carried out on defects and cuts, and of the lower lateral drainage layer (LLDL).

The NRC staff will monitor that the initial GCL hydraulic conductivity value used in the DOE PA modeling is comparable to the given value of the GCL manufacturer after that information is definitively known and independently verified.

As described in the NRC 2023 TER (ML23024A099), the NRC Opened a new high priority monitoring factor entitled Confidence in Quality Assurance and Quality Control for HDPE/GCL Composite Barrier and Drainage Layer Installation under MA 2 (Infiltration and Erosion Control) under the POs of §61.41, §61.42, and §61.44 due to the importance of proper composite barrier and drainage layer installation in the closure cap.

3-11 The NRC expects to Close MF 2.03 (Confidence in QA/QC for HDPE/GCL Composite Barrier and Drainage Layer Installation) under the POs of §61.41 after the NRC has determined that the DOE installation of the upper HDPE/GCL composite barrier and the ULDL in the planned SDF closure caps is adequate.

3.2.4 MF 2.04: Long-Term HDPE/GCL Composite Barrier and Drainage Layer Degradation The NRC staff reviewed the DOE projection of long-term HDPE/GCL composite barrier and drainage layer degradation in Sections 3.3.3., 3.3.7, 3.3.9, 4.1.3, 4.1.7, and 4.1.9 in the NRC 2023 TRR entitled, Performance of the Composite Barrier Layers and Lateral Drainage Layers of the U.S. Department of Energy 2020 Performance Assessment for the Savannah River Site Saltstone Disposal Facility(ML23017A089).

As described in that TRR, the NRC staff found that the upper HDPE/GCL composite barrier and the ULDL are some of the most risk-significant components of the SDF. Long-term performance is dependent on the material and installation maintaining its properties for the long-term. Due to the importance that these critical components will keep performing as intended in the long-term future, the NRC staff will monitor for additional information relevant to HDPE degradation in the heat-affected zones near welded seams and at edges, HDPE degradation due to root penetration, GCL degradation due to HDPE defects, and drainage layer degradation due to diminishing hydraulic conductivity. Also, the NRC staff will monitor for additional information associated with fine-particle transport and deposition within the ULDL.

In the DOE 2020 PA (ML20190A056), the LLDL barrier was not a risk-significant barrier because the performance of the ULDL barrier was such that risk significance of the LLDL performance was low. The NRC staff will monitor future DOE PAs for increasing simulated flow rates to the LLDL (thereby indicating an increase in importance of the LLDL) in order to determine if the LLDL modeling approach within the Vadose Zone Flow Model needs to be monitored in a new monitoring factor.

As described in the NRC 2023 TER (ML23024A099), the NRC Opened a new high priority monitoring factor entitled Long-Term HDPE/GCL Composite Barrier and Drainage Layer Degradation under MA 2 (Infiltration and Erosion Control) under the POs of §61.41, §61.42, and §61.44 due to the importance of long-term composite barrier and drainage layer performance.

The NRC expects to Close MF 2.04 (Long-Term HDPE/GCL Composite Barrier and Drainage Layer Degradation) under the PO of §61.41 after both are met: (1) the NRC has confidence that HDPE degradation in the heat-affected zones near welded seams and at edges, HDPE degradation due to root penetration, GCL degradation due to HDPE defects, and drainage layer degradation due to diminishing hydraulic conductivity will not be significant enough to affect the DOE ability to meet the PO of §61.41 at the SDF; and (2) the NRC has determined that modeled flow rates through the LLDL barrier will not be increasing, so as to become significant enough to affect the DOE ability to meet the PO §61.41 at the SDF.

3.2.5 MF 2.05: Potential Confined Conditions in the ULDL The NRC staff reviewed potential confined conditions in the ULDL in Sections 3.3.9 and 4.1.9 in the NRC 2023 TRR entitled, Performance of the Composite Barrier Layers and Lateral

3-12 Drainage Layers of the U.S. Department of Energy 2020 Performance Assessment for the Savannah River Site Saltstone Disposal Facility (ML23017A089).

As described in that TRR, the NRC staff found that the ULDL is one of the most risk-significant components of the SDF. In addition, the NRC staff determined that the future occurrence of confined conditions in some portion of the ULDL is plausible. If the ULDL becomes confined (i.e., the depth of flow completely fills the drainage layer) before reaching the outlet at the edge of the closure cap, then the constriction pressurizes the ULDL drainage layer. Pressurization may increase flow through a composite barrier defect and perched water in the middle backfill would limit flow to this layer and the drainage layer below, thereby increasing runoff and closure cap erosion. In addition to the processes creating potential confined conditions within the closure cap, the NRC staff will also monitor variations in the modeled infiltration rates between the center and the edges of the closure cap since confined conditions in the ULDL may cause discrepancies to occur between the deep infiltration rates of covers center compared to the edges of the cover.

As described in the NRC 2023 TER (ML23024A099), the NRC Opened a new high priority monitoring factor entitled Potential Confined Conditions in the ULDL under MA 2 (Infiltration and Erosion Control) under the POs of §61.41, §61.42, and §61.44 due to the risk significance of the ULDL.

The NRC expects to Close MF 2.05 (Potential Confined Conditions in the ULDL) under the PO of §61.41 after the NRC has confidence that confined conditions in the ULDL will not occur.

Alternatively, the NRC may determine that, if confined conditions do occur, then they will not become significant enough to affect the DOE ability to meet the PO of §61.41 at the SDF.

3.2.6 MF 2.06: Long-Term Erosion Barrier Performance The NRC staff reviewed the DOE modeling of long-term erosion barrier performance in Sections 3.1.3, 3.1.4, 4.1.3, and 4.1.3 in the NRC 2023 TRR entitled, Percolation Through and Potential Erosion near the Closure Cap of the U.S. Department of Energy 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A083) and in Section 4.2.5 in the NRC 2023 TRR entitled, Site Stability at the U.S. Department of Energy Savannah River Site Saltstone Disposal Facility (ML23017A114).

As described in those two TRRs, the NRC staff found that the erosion barrier was one of the more risk-significant components of the SDF. The DOE 2020 PA included that the thickness of the middle backfill layer is insignificant hydraulically because the erosion barrier acts as a choke in the closure cap profile due to its low porosity, forcing water redistribution to occur almost exclusively in the upper backfill layer and the topsoil. Further, the rate at which water can flow through the erosion barrier is limited by its saturated hydraulic conductivity. Thus, the modeled erosion barrier plays an important role in determining water redistribution and the shallow infiltration rates.

Due to the importance of the long-term performance of the erosion barrier in the closure cap, the NRC staff will monitor the simulated erosion barrier in the SDF PAs and the technical basis for the assumptions and parameters associated with the modeled erosion barrier. Further, NRC staff will monitor information related to the design and simulated performance of the erosion barrier (i.e., the simulated flow rate through the erosion barrier and the potential erosion and stability of the layers above the erosion barrier).

3-13 As described in the NRC 2023 TER (ML23024A099), the NRC Opened a new medium priority monitoring factor entitled Long-Term Erosion Barrier Performance under MA 2 (Infiltration and Erosion Control) under the POs of §61.41, §61.42, and §61.44.

The NRC expects to Close MF 2.06 (Long-Term Erosion Barrier Performance) under the PO of

§61.41 after the erosion barrier has been constructed by the DOE and the NRC has determined that there is a sufficiently strong technical basis to support the simulated hydraulic performance above, below, and through the erosion barrier. Alternatively, the NRC may determine that any effect due to the DOE assumptions and properties of the erosion barrier will not be significant enough to affect the DOE ability to meet the PO of §61.41 at the SDF.

3.2.7 MF 2.07: Shallow Infiltration The NRC staff reviewed the DOE simulated shallow infiltration rates in Sections 3.1.3 and 4.1.3 in the NRC 2023 TRR entitled, Percolation Through and Potential Erosion near the Closure Cap of the U.S. Department of Energy 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A083).

In that TRR, the NRC staff found that shallow infiltration was a risk-significant process that will affect the performance of the SDF. As described in that TRR, in general, shallow infiltration is that part of the rainwater that infiltrates into the ground surface. Once in the ground, the shallow infiltrating water will either undergo evapotranspiration, subsurface runoff (out of the closure cap), or continue as deep infiltration into the cover.

In that TRR, the NRC staff found the implementation of the shallow infiltration rate abstraction for the probabilistic SDF Closure Cap Model was not acceptable for multiple reasons. For example, there is a large uncertainty regarding the long-term performance of the erosion barrier and it is possible that the erosion barrier can have a large impact on the stability of the closure cap and on shallow infiltration rates. The possibility also exists that the tap roots of many future longleaf pines may extend into to the erosion barrier and affect its cohesion over time.

Further, the DOE claim that more water was being removed from the system as the soil storage capacity of the topsoil and upper backfill was decreasing did not have a strong technical basis.

For example, while PA results showed transpiration is decreasing with decreasing soil thickness, the rate of evaporation remained steady, even when the topsoil and upper backfill were completely removed. As described in that TRR, it was not clear to the NRC staff what the driving factors were for the constant evaporation rates considering that there is less soil to hold the water from which the evaporation process would be able to remove the water and prevent it from percolating downward.

As described in that TRR, although the features and processes that control the shallow infiltration rate were not as critically significant as the features and processes that control deep infiltration, they were sufficiently risk-significant to warrant further observation.

The NRC staff will monitor the DOE method for calculating shallow infiltration, including the risk-significant processes and features that determine shallow infiltration rates. The NRC staff will review the DOE conceptual model determining shallow infiltration rates, including the DOE understanding of the interrelationships and interdependencies between the processes that influence shallow infiltration rates. For example, the NRC will monitor support for the DOE modeling of evaporation, transpiration, runoff, and precipitation, as well as relevant features

3-14 such as the vegetation, topsoil, erosion barrier, middle backfill, and upper backfill, including the impact the upper backfill and its thickness has on shallow infiltration rates.

As described in the NRC TER (ML23024A099), the NRC Opened a new medium priority monitoring factor entitled, Shallow Infiltration under MA 2 (Infiltration and Erosion Control) under the POs of §61.41, §61.42, and §61.44.

The NRC expects to Close MF 2.07 (Shallow Infiltration) under the PO of §61.41 after the NRC has determined that there is a sufficiently strong technical basis to support the DOE method for estimating shallow infiltration rates. Alternatively, the NRC may determine that shallow infiltration rates will not affect the DOE ability to meet the PO of §61.41 at the SDF.

3.3 MA 3 - Waste Form Hydraulic Performance As described in the NRC 2023 TER (ML23024A099) and the NRC 2023 TRR entitled, Near Field Flow and Transport for the 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A086), in Section 7.1 of the DOE 2020 PA (ML20190A056), the hydraulic properties of saltstone are important to SDF performance because of their effects on the rate of radionuclide release into the groundwater. The NRC staff is concerned with the saltstone saturated hydraulic conductivity, moisture characteristic curves controlling the unsaturated hydraulic conductivity, and the diffusivity. The hydraulic conductivity is important because water flow through saltstone is limited in part by saltstone hydraulic conductivity. The water flow through saltstone directly affects radionuclide release into groundwater. The diffusivity is important for two reasons: (1) depending on the nature of long-term saltstone degradation, radionuclide release may be limited by diffusion of radionuclides from the saltstone matrix; and (2) diffusivity affects the rate of saltstone oxidation, which directly affects the rate of Tc and iodine release.

3.3.1 MF 3.03: Applicability of Laboratory Data to Field-Emplaced Saltstone MF 3.03 addresses potential differences between laboratory and field conditions of field-emplaced saltstone. As described in an NRC 2017 TRR entitled Saltstone Waste Form Hydraulic Performance (ML17018A137), the DOE performed several experiments to compare the hydraulic and chemical properties of laboratory-made and field-emplaced saltstone. Based on those experiments, the NRC narrowed the scope of this monitoring factor to focus on short term (i.e., within the first several pore volumes) changes in the hydraulic conductivity between laboratory-prepared and field-emplaced saltstone samples.

As described in further detail in the NRC 2023 TRR entitled, Near Field Flow and Transport for the 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A086), in Section 7.1 of the DOE 2020 PA, the PA model Compliance Case projected that only 0.32 pore volumes of the saltstone grout will be exchanged within 10,000 years.1 Therefore, differences in the hydraulic conductivity between laboratory-prepared and field-emplaced saltstone during the first few pore volumes could significantly affect projected SDF performance. Based on that information, the NRC staff will continue to monitor differences between the hydraulic properties of laboratory-made and filed-emplaced saltstone in the first few pore volume exchanges. The NRC staff will monitor the DOE representing the hydraulic properties of field-emplaced saltstone with the hydraulic properties of laboratory-produced 1 The NRC staff notes that the rate of pore-volume exchanges could increase significantly if the assumptions of key barriers, such as the closure cap and saltstone grout, are revised by the DOE.

3-15 samples, which should account for the range of expected disposal conditions of field-emplaced saltstone as well as effects of scale. More detailed information on applicability of laboratory data to field-emplaced saltstone is in Sections 8.3 and 8.6 of the NRC 2023 TRR related to Near Field Flow and Transport.

As described in the NRC 2023 TER (ML23024A099), the NRC kept MF 3.03 Open and reduced the priority of it to medium under the POs of both §61.41 & §61.42.

The NRC expects to Close MF 3.03 (Applicability of Laboratory Data to Field-Emplaced Saltstone) under the PO of §61.41 after the NRC has determined that the DOE representation of the hydraulic properties of field-emplaced saltstone with the hydraulic properties of laboratory-produced samples is adequate. Alternately, the NRC may determine that the DOE appropriately based the hydraulic properties of saltstone on the properties of an appropriate range of samples of field-emplaced saltstone, rather than on measurements of laboratory-produced samples.

3.4 MA 4 - Waste Form Physical Degradation The NRC staff reviewed the technical bases for the DOE projected waste form physical degradation in the NRC 2023 TRR entitled, Near Field Flow and Transport for the 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A086). As described in that TRR, the physical degradation of saltstone is important in large part due to the effects of degradation on the saltstone hydraulic properties. The NRC staff expects that physical degradation will lead to increased water flow through both the saltstone matrix and macroscopic fractures, which will increase the projected dose. The increased water flow can increase the rate of subsequent saltstone degradation. The NRC staff expects that physical degradation will increase both radionuclide diffusion from saltstone and oxygen diffusion into saltstone. The NRC staff expects that faster radionuclide diffusion out of saltstone will affect dose directly by increasing the annual fractional release rate of radionuclides into groundwater. The NRC staff expects that faster oxygen diffusion into saltstone will increase the dose from certain redox-sensitive radionuclides (e.g., Tc-99), which is more mobile when oxidized, and could decrease the release of other redox-sensitive radionuclides (e.g., I-129).

In the DOE 2020 PA (ML20190A056), the DOE assumed that the saltstone would not degrade until the disposal structure roofs are degraded for all disposal structures, except SDS 4. As described in further detail in Section 8.3.2 of that TRR, the NRC staff did not find the DOE assumed delay to saltstone degradation to be well-supported. However, the NRC staff found that the assumed delay to saltstone degradation would not have significantly impacted the Compliance Case results, because the DOE assumed that degradation does not appreciably increase the saturated hydraulic conductivity of saltstone until approximately 100,000 years after closure. However, changes to modeling assumptions in future analyses could increase the risk significance of early degradation, and therefore early release. Accordingly, the NRC staff recommended monitoring information related to the delay in degradation of saltstone.

The distinction between matrix degradation and macroscopic fracturing is important largely because different experiments and measurement methods may be used to quantify the bulk hydraulic properties of the matrix, as compared to the formation of macroscopic fractures. Also, matrix degradation and macroscopic fracture formation are often represented separately in the DOE PA model.

3-16 MA 4 (Waste Form Physical Degradation) is closely related to MA 3 (Waste Form Hydraulic Performance) because matrix degradation is expected to be quantified primarily through its effects on saltstone hydraulic conductivity and diffusivity. The main difference between MA 4 and MA 3 is that MA 4 focuses on the changes in matrix properties and macroscopic fractures with time, while MA 3 focuses primarily on the initial properties.

3.4.1 MF 4.01: Waste Form Matrix Degradation In the DOE 2020 PA (ML20190A056), the DOE assumed that the saltstone grout would degrade by decalcification as water flows through saltstone. With extremely limited water flow through the closure cap (i.e., infiltration is reduced by approximately three orders of magnitude from natural infiltration for over 10,000 years after SDF closure), the LLDL, and underlying composite barrier, the DOE projected that saltstone would not degrade appreciably within 100,000 years of SDF closure. That is because of the combination of the long time to the projected complete degradation of saltstone (i.e., 17 million years) and the use of a geometric average to calculate the effective hydraulic conductivity of saltstone.

As described in the NRC 2023 TER (ML23024A099), in the NRC 2023 TRR entitled, Near Field Flow and Transport for the 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A086), the NRC staff found that the DOE conceptual model of degradation was not well-supported. In that TRR, the NRC staff described the concern that:

(1) decalcification could occur more quickly than projected due to potentially greater than assumed infiltration, as described in the NRC 2023 TRR entitled, Percolation Through and Potential Erosion near the Closure Cap of the U.S. Department of Energy 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A083);

(2) additional and coupled degradation mechanisms could result in more rapid degradation of saltstone than the DOE assumed in the PA; and (3) the use of a geometric average is not adequately supported, which could significantly underestimate the effective hydraulic conductivity and effective diffusion coefficient of degraded saltstone.

The SDF performance is also sensitive to the rate of increase of saltstone hydraulic conductivity and diffusivity because sudden degradation of saltstone can result in pulse-like releases that would cause a higher annual dose than a more gradual release. Sudden hydraulic degradation may be particularly detrimental if it occurs many thousands of years after site closure, after significant oxidation has occurred. The NRC will monitor the development of the DOE model support for projected changes in waste form hydraulic conductivity and diffusivity during the 10,000 year Performance Period. That model support may include the results of mechanistic modeling, the results of laboratory experiments intended to simulate accelerated aging, and analog studies of similar materials.

As described in the NRC 2023 TER, the NRC kept MF 4.01 Open as high priority under the POs of both §61.41 and §61.42.

The NRC expects to Close MF 4.01 (Waste Form Matrix Degradation) under the PO of §61.41 after the NRC has determined that the DOE support for modeled changes in the saturated hydraulic conductivity and diffusivity during the 10,000 year Performance Period is sufficient.

3.4.2 MF 4.02: Waste Form Macroscopic Fracturing Saltstone fracturing is important to site performance because it increases water flow through the saltstone, shortens diffusive pathways for radionuclide release, and provides additional surface

3-17 area for the progression of saltstone oxidation, which increases Tc release. As described in the NRC 2019 TRR entitled, Saltstone Waste Form Physical Degradation (ML19031B221), the DOE did not provide sufficient information to justify the assumed degradation mechanisms at the time the NRC staff issued that TRR. In the NRC 2023 TRR entitled, Near Field Flow and Transport for the 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A086), the NRC staff found that the DOE did not provide additional support for the assumed formation of macroscopic fractures in saltstone. The DOE hypothetical fast flow paths sensitivity analysis described in Section 5.8.8.2 of the DOE 2020 PA (ML20190A056) did not provide sufficient information for the NRC staff to evaluate the risk associated with macroscopic fracturing because of the extremely low percolation assumed by the DOE through the Closure Cap. Accordingly, the timing, rate, and extent of saltstone fracturing was not clear to the NRC staff.

In the DOE 2020 PA, the DOE assumed that the saltstone would not degrade until the overlying disposal structure roofs were degraded. In the NRC 2023 TRR related to Near Field Flow and Transport, the NRC staff found that the DOE assumed delay to saltstone degradation was not well-supported because of the potential for additional degradation mechanisms to impact saltstone. For the DOE Compliance Case, the delay in wasteform degradation did not significantly impact the dose results because the DOE assumed that degradation did not appreciably increase the saturated hydraulic conductivity of saltstone until approximately 100,000 years after closure. However, changes to modeling assumptions in future analyses could increase the risk significance of early degradation, and therefore early release.

Accordingly, the NRC staff will monitor information related to the delay in degradation of saltstone.

The NRC will monitor the development of model support for the assumed degree of saltstone fracturing and the rate of saltstone fracture formation within the 10,000 year Performance Period. Although fracturing may be represented non-mechanistically, the NRC staff should evaluate whether or not the assumed fracture rate is likely to adequately represent saltstone fracturing during the Performance Period. If the uncertainty is large, then it would be appropriate to evaluate a range of potential fracture rates. The NRC staff should closely monitor the DOE model support for long-term saltstone fracturing, including research addressing the NRC staff technical concerns. That model support may include the results of formal expert elicitation (e.g., NUREG-1563 entitled, Branch Technical Position on the Use of Expert Elicitation in the High-Level Waste Program (ML033500190)) because of the lack of physical evidence to support projections of saltstone fracturing for thousands of years after emplacement. That model support may include mechanistic modeling and the results of laboratory experiments intended to simulate accelerated aging.

As described in the NRC 2023 TER (ML23024A099),the NRC kept MF 4.02 Open as high priority under the POs of both §61.41 and §61.42.

The NRC expects to Close MF 4.02 (Waste Form Macroscopic Fracturing) under the PO of

§61.41 after the NRC has determined that the DOE model support for the assumed formation of macroscopic fractures during the 10,000 year Performance Period is sufficient.

3.4.3 MF 4.03: Moisture Characteristic Curves for Saltstone As described in the NRC 2023 TRR entitled, Near Field Flow and Transport for the 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A086), the NRC staff found the support for the assumed moisture characteristic

3-18 curves (MCCs) for cementitious materials in Section 7.1 of the DOE 2020 PA (ML20190A056) were adequate because the assumed MCCs were similar to literature values and the MCCs are of limited risk significance in the DOE 2020 PA. However, the NRC staff determined that potential future DOE revisions to the modeling assumptions could result in the MCCs becoming more risk-significant. Therefore, the NRC staff will monitor the development of support for MCCs in saltstone.

As described in the NRC 2023 TER (ML23024A099), the NRC kept MF 4.02 Open as low priority under the POs of both §61.41 and §61.42.

The NRC expects to Close MF 4.03 (Moisture Characteristic Curves for Saltstone) under the PO of §61.41 after the NRC has determined that the DOE model support for the assumed moisture characteristic curves for saltstone is adequate, if the MCCs or risk significance of the MCCs changes in future revisions.

3.5 MA 5 - Waste Form Chemical Degradation As described in the NRC 2023 TER (ML23024A099) and in further detail in the NRC 2023 TRR entitled, Near Field Flow and Transport for the 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A086), the saltstone waste form is a cementitious material made by mixing treated salt waste solutions with a dry mixture of blast furnace slag and fly ash, with or without cement. Chemically, saltstone is initially alkaline and reducing. Those chemical properties of saltstone are expected to change over time as infiltrating groundwater depletes the reductive and buffering capacity of the saltstone matrix. That will cause the Eh to rise (i.e., it becomes less reducing) and the pH to fall (i.e., become more acidic).

The initial chemical conditions and the evolution of those conditions over time can strongly affect the ability of the waste form to retain radionuclides. That will ultimately influence the release of contaminants from the waste form into the environment. For example, the release of redox-sensitive elements, most notably Tc and iodine, are strongly influenced by Eh conditions.

Tc is less soluble and mobile under reducing conditions and more soluble and mobile under oxidizing conditions. In contrast, iodine is less mobile under oxidizing conditions.

3.5.1 MF 5.01: Radionuclide Release from Field-Emplaced Saltstone It is important to measure the release rates of radionuclides from field-emplaced saltstone because of the importance of radionuclide release rates to the projected dose. MF 5.01 is closely related to MF 5.02 and MF 5.04. MF 5.01 focuses on measuring the release rates from field-emplaced saltstone. Both MF 5.02 and MF 5.04 focus on the expected chemical conditions, sorption coefficients, and radionuclide solubility limits in saltstone, which may be addressed using lab simulated saltstone.

As described in further detail in Sections 7.3, 7.7, 8.3, and 8.5 of the NRC 2023 TRR entitled, Near Field Flow and Transport for the 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A086), in the DOE 2020 PA (ML20190A056), the DOE based sorption coefficients for iodine and technetium, as well as solubility limits for technetium, on data that the DOE collected from cores of field-emplaced saltstone and saltstone simulants. Those measurements applied to chemically reduced young and aged cementitious material (also called reduced Region I and Region III conditions). The DOE also provided an experimental basis for projected duration of Region I (i.e., very young conditions). In contrast, comparable results were not available to support oxidized conditions.

Although the DOE did not expect the entire saltstone monolith to become oxidized during the

3-19 10,000 year Performance Period in the Compliance Case, the DOE vadose zone transport model projected an oxidized rind to develop around saltstone during the Performance Period.

That rind affected the modeled release of iodine and technetium during the Performance Period because of the shrinking core model the DOE used to project iodine and technetium release.

As described in the NRC 2023 TER (ML23024A099), the NRC kept MF 5.01 Open and reduced the priority of it to low under the POs of both §61.41 & §61.42 because additional support was needed to support modeled iodine and technetium release under oxidized Region III conditions and because the DOE provided experimental evidence supporting the release of technetium and iodine under chemically reducing Region I and Region II conditions.

The NRC expects to Close MF 5.01 (Radionuclide Release from Field-Emplaced Saltstone) under the PO of §61.41 after the NRC has determined that the DOE measurements of radionuclide release rates from field-emplaced saltstone used in the SDF PA are reliable.

3.5.2 MF 5.02: Chemical Reduction of Tc by Saltstone The chemical reduction of Tc by saltstone affects the release of Tc from the SDF and the projected dose to an offsite member of the public because Tc is released more slowly from saltstone when it is in a chemically reduced state. The NRC staff reviewed the DOE experimental support for Tc release rates in a 2018 TRR entitled, Update on Projected Technetium Release from Saltstone (ML18095A122). In that TRR, the NRC staff described a shift in the DOE conceptual model of Tc release that placed greater importance on Tc release from chemically reduced saltstone than previous DOE models had, although the DOE still expected Tc to be more mobile in chemically oxidized saltstone.

As described in further detail in Sections 7.2 through 7.8 of the NRC 2023 TRR entitled, Near Field Flow and Transport for the 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A086), in the DOE 2020 PA (ML20190A056) the DOE addressed Tc reduction by saltstone.

As described in the NRC 2023 TER (ML23024A099), the NRC kept MF 5.02 Open and reduced the priority of it to low under the POs of both §61.41 & §61.42 because, although the DOE had not provided evidence that oxidized Tc would be re-reduced when flowing through reduced areas of the saltstone wasteform, the DOE attributed increased importance to Tc releases from chemically reduced areas.

The NRC expects to Close MF 5.02 (Chemical Reduction of Tc by Saltstone) under the PO of

§61.41 after the NRC has determined that the DOE has adequate model support for the chemical reduction of Tc(VII) to Tc(IV) as it is transported through saltstone.

3-20 3.5.3 MF 5.03: Reducing Capacity of Saltstone The NRC staff reviewed the DOE experimental support for reducing capacity of saltstone in the 2018 TRR entitled, Update on Projected Technetium Release from Saltstone (ML18095A122).

In that TRR, the NRC staff indicated that the dissolution of sulfur in saltstone and reducing concrete had the potential to affect the applicability of the cerium method of measuring reducing capacity. In that TRR, the NRC staff indicated that it could also affect the projected evolution of the reducing capacity of those materials in saltstone. In the DOE 2020 PA (ML20190A056), the DOE did not directly address the potential effects of sulfur dissolution.

As described in the NRC 2023 TER (ML23024A099), the NRC kept MF 5.03 Open and reduced the priority of it to low under the POs of both §61.41 & §61.42 because the DOE provided appropriate sensitivity analyses.

The NRC expects to Close MF 5.03 (Reducing Capacity of Saltstone) under the PO of §61.41 after the NRC has determined that the DOE information for the initial reducing capacity of saltstone and the expected evolution of redox conditions over time is adequate.

3.5.4 MF 5.04: Kd Values and Solubility Limits for Saltstone The DOE switched to a cement-free saltstone formula (ML23055A095). As described in further detail in Sections 5.1 and 7.8 of the NRC 2023 TRR entitled, Near Field Flow and Transport for the 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A086), the NRC staff reviewed the DOE support for modeling parameters related to the hydraulic properties of cement-free saltstone. In that TRR, the NRC staff found that changing to a cement-free saltstone formula would be unlikely to significantly change iodine or technetium releases from diffusive transport because the measured effective diffusion coefficients of iodine and technetium in simulated cement-free saltstone samples were within the ranges of diffusivities for those elements observed simulated saltstone made with the older formulation.

In that TRR, the NRC staff did not find adequate DOE support for two parameters related to advective releases: (1) iodine Kd value of 4 millilitres/gram (mL/g) in oxidized cement-free saltstone because the literature values the DOE based the value on did not include cement-free samples; and (2) technetium solubility in chemically reduced grout because the DOE did not report measurements of technetium solubility in cement-free saltstone. In that TRR, the NRC staff did find adequate support for the DOE Kd value of 0.5 mL/g for technetium in oxidized Region III saltstone because the DOE demonstrated that the value is sufficiently low that reasonable alternatives do not significantly affect the projected technetium flux.

The NRC will monitor the development of information about iodine sorption in chemically oxidized cement-free saltstone and technetium solubility in chemically reduced cement-free saltstone.

As described in the NRC 2023 TER (ML23024A099), the NRC expanded MF 5.04 to all radionuclides and kept it Open as medium priority under the POs of both §61.41 & §61.42.

The NRC expects to Close MF 5.04 (Kd Values and Solubility Limits for Saltstone) under the PO of §61.41 after the NRC has determined that the DOE model support for the sorption coefficients and solubility limits used to model radionuclide transport in saltstone is adequate.

3-21 3.6 MA 6 - Disposal Structure Performance As described in the NRC 2023 TER (ML23024A099) and in further detail in the NRC 2023 TRR entitled, Near Field Flow and Transport for the 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A086), disposal structure performance is important to the DOE conceptual model for SDF performance for two primary reasons. The first reason is that the large difference in hydraulic conductivity between the LLDL and the disposal structure roofs (i.e., for SDS 1 and SDS 4) or the HDPE/GCL composite layer (i.e., for the other disposal structures) diverts most of the infiltrating water around the disposal structures. This diversion significantly reduces water flow through and radionuclide release from the disposal structures. The second reason is that the DOE modeled release of most radionuclides into the natural environment can be affected by retention in disposal structure concrete.

The NRC staff expects that sorption of all radionuclides in disposal structure concrete will be limited as fast flow paths develop during the 10,000 year Performance Period. Fast pathways are expected to be important not only because of their potential effect on water flow, but also because radionuclides are expected to encounter significantly fewer sorption sites in fast pathways than they are in a cementitious matrix. The NRC staff should evaluate the projected changes in sorption with time in response to disposal structure fracturing and degradation of non-cementitious materials.

The NRC monitored the performance of both SDS 1 and SDS 4 as well as stages of the construction of SDS 2A, SDS 2B, SDS 6, SDS 7, SDS 8, and SDS 9 during many OOVs, as documented in the OOV Reports and photographs. The NRC staff should be familiar with the following specific topics:

SDS 4 fracturing and contaminated seeps (October 2007 - ML073461038, March 2008

- ML081290367, and March 2009 - ML091320439)

SDS 2A and SDS 2B floor construction (June 2009 - ML092170006)

Disposal structure construction photographs (February 2010 - ML100550095)

Deviations from the design of SDS 2A and SDS 2B wall joint closure strips with resulting increased potential for fast pathways (April 2010 - ML101460044)

SDS 2A and SDS 2B damp spots prior to hydrostatic test and photographs (July 2010 -

ML102180254)

Repairs and design changes made in response to the SDS 2A and SDS 2B hydrostatic test results (January 2011 - ML110670458 and April 2011 - ML111890319)

Aspects of the construction of SDS 6, including forms for pouring concrete wall panels and columns, placement of bearing pads under wall panels, and placement of water stops (February 2015 - ML15041A562, July 2015 - ML15236A299, and April 2016 -

ML16147A197)

Aspects of the floor, wall, and roof of partially constructed SDS 7 (July 2018 -

ML18219B859 and September 2019 - ML19289A525)

3-22 Lower mud mat and HDPE weld locations for SDS 8 (September 2019 - ML19289A525 and August 2021 - ML21242A509)

Details of upper mud mat and floor construction for SDS 9, including fabric used during wet curing, use of a plastic layer to reduce friction from floor shrinkage, placement of water stops, rebar placement, epoxy filling, and floor drains (February 2023 -

ML23080A284)

As the DOE prepares to construct and then constructs additional disposal structures, the NRC will monitor any changes that DOE makes to disposal structure designs.

3.6.1 MF 6.01: Kd Values in Disposal Structure Concrete Radionuclide sorption in disposal structure concrete is important to the DOE 2020 PA model because, in the DOE model, disposal structure concrete can delay and slow (i.e., reduce the peak of) radionuclide release to the environment. The risk significance of modeled sorption coefficients for various radionuclides can change when the DOE revises a PA because changes in all parts of a PA (e.g., infiltration and erosion control, sorption in site soil, uptake by plants) can affect the relative risk significance of modeled sorption of various radionuclides in the near field. Therefore, the NRC staff should reevaluate the risk significance of sorption coefficients for all radionuclides in any PA review.

As described in Section 8.5 of the NRC 2023 TRR entitled, Near Field Flow and Transport for the 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A086), the NRC staff found that the DOE did not provide support for the assumption that iodine would be chemically oxidized as it flowed through chemically oxidized sections of cementitious material. In addition, the NRC staff found that, although the DOE described the expected mobility of different iodine species, it did not address the speed of iodine oxidation in cementitious materials compared to the expected amount of time iodine would be in the lower mud mat. Therefore, the NRC staff will monitor the development of information about the sorption of iodine in oxidized mud mats. The NRC staff should consider the potential for fast pathways that could limit the ability of the mud mats to chemically oxidize iodine as it flows through the mud mats. The NRC staff should monitor the DOE information about sorption in disposal structure concrete, which should address the extent to which redox-sensitive radionuclides change oxidation state as they move through disposal structure concrete, including through fractures.

As described in the NRC 2023 TER (ML23024A099), the NRC kept MF 6.01 Open as medium priority under the POs of both §61.41 & §61.42.

The NRC expects to Close MF 6.01 (Kd Values in Disposal Structure Concrete) under the PO of

§61.41 after the NRC has determined that the DOE information about sorption in disposal structure concrete is acceptable.

3.6.2 MF 6.03: Performance of Disposal Structure Roofs and HDPE/GCL Layers In the DOE 2020 PA (ML20190A056), the DOE assumed that the LLDL above each disposal structure was a secondary barrier as the overlying Closure Cap layers were primarily responsible for limiting nearly all of the precipitation from percolating through the cover.

However, the DOE provided a Soil-Only Case where the DOE assumed that there was no Closure Cap. In that case with no ULDL or HDPE/GCL composite barrier, the LLDL and

3-23 HDPE/GCL composite barrier was still assumed to perform. For that Soil-Only Case, the LLDL and HDPE/GCL composite barrier shed the overwhelming majority of the percolation. Even at 10,000 years, the LLDL and HDPE/GCL composite barrier was assumed by the DOE to shed almost 98 percent (%) of the percolation. That increased percolation would likely result in a higher dose to an offsite member of the public because an increase in the amount of percolation will increase the amount of leaching from-and the rate of degradation of the waste form.

As described in Section 8.1 of the NRC 2023 TRR entitled, Near Field Flow and Transport for the 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A086), the NRC staff determined that there is insufficient support for the performance of the drainage layers and composite barriers. Because of the limited support of the LLDL and HDPE/GCL composite barrier and the potential risk significance, the NRC will monitor model support for the long-term performance of the LLDL. More detailed information on the performance of disposal structure roofs and HDPE/GCL layers is in subsections of Section 8 of that TRR.

MF 6.03 involves the NRC monitoring for all of the layers involved because the long-term performance of the LLDL depends on the contrast between high and low conductivity layers.

The NRC staff should evaluate information about processes that could reduce the conductivity of the highly permeable LLDL (e.g., clogging of the high-conductivity sand layer) and processes that could increase the assumed low hydraulic conductivity of the disposal structure roofs or HDPE/GCL layers overlying the disposal structures (i.e., for disposal structures other than SDS 1 and SDS 4).

As described in the NRC 2023 TER (ML23024A099), the NRC kept MF 6.03 Open as medium priority under the POs of both §61.41 & §61.42.

The NRC expects to Close MF 6.03 (Performance of Disposal Structure Roofs and HDPE/GCL Layers) under the PO of §61.41 after the NRC has determined that the DOE model support for the amount of water that DOE expects to be diverted by the LLDL, including support for the hydraulic conductivity of the relevant engineered layers, is sufficient. Alternatively, the NRC may determine that the DOE conservatively assumes less diversion around the disposal structures in the SDF PA model.

3.6.3 MF 6.04: Disposal Structure Concrete Fracturing Radionuclides that flow through fast pathways are not expected to experience as much sorption as radionuclides moving through an unfractured cementitious matrix because they are expected to encounter fewer sorption sites. Also, Tc sorption is expected to be further lessened in fractured saltstone (as compared to Tc sorption through an unfractured and chemically reducing saltstone) because fast pathways are likely to be more oxidizing than the matrix, due to increased contact with soil gas and dissolved oxygen in infiltrating water. The NRC will monitor the development of model support regarding the long-term fracturing of disposal structure concrete because of the potential importance of radionuclide sorption in the disposal structure floors and walls to SDF performance.

In the DOE 2020 PA (ML20190A056), the DOE assumed that the disposal structures beneath the HDPE/GCL composite layer will not significantly affect the magnitude or timing of the peak dose. Accordingly, the NRC staff risk-informed the review of disposal structure concrete performance by focusing on initial hydraulic properties, concrete degradation, and fast flow paths.

3-24 In the NRC 2023 TRR entitled, Near Field Flow and Transport for the 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A086), the NRC staff found the values for the initial hydraulic conductivity and diffusivity values for disposal structure concrete were acceptable because of: (1) the projected limited risk significance of the disposal structure concrete performance, (2) the use of laboratory studies to support the assumed values, and (3) consistency with the range of values observed in the literature for intact concrete.

In the DOE 2020 PA, the DOE evaluated three disposal structure degradation mechanisms -

sulfate attack, carbonation-induced steel corrosion, and decalcification. The DOE analysis indicated that sulfate attack would be the rate-determining degradation mechanism for disposal structure concrete. The saturated hydraulic conductivity of the disposal structure concrete was assumed by the DOE to increase by several orders of magnitude to that of the surrounding soils within hundreds to several thousand years. As described in further detail in Section 8.2 of that TRR, the NRC described that the technical basis for determining degradation due to sulfate attack was inadequate. In addition, the increase in hydraulic conductivity with time of the disposal structure concrete due to degradation was based on a geometric average of the intact and degraded materials as function of time. As described in more detail in Section 8.3.2 of that TRR, the NRC staff determined that there was insufficient support for the use of a geometric average for averaging intact and degraded materials.

Degradation modeling and the use of different averaging schemes for the disposal structure concrete does not have as significant of an effect on overall SDF performance as it does for saltstone. However, if the DOE relies more heavily on disposal structure performance in the future, then the NRC staff will review the impacts of degradation assumptions on overall SDF performance.

As described in the NRC 2023 TER (ML23024A099), the NRC kept MF 6.04 Open as medium priority under the POs of both §61.41 & §61.42.

The NRC expects to Close MF 6.04 (Disposal Structure Concrete Fracturing) under the PO of

§61.41 after the NRC has determined that the DOE support for the amount of fracturing of each of the disposal structures floor and walls expected to occur during the 10,000 year Performance Period is adequate. Alternately, the NRC may determine that the estimate of the amount of fracturing in the SDF PA model is conservative.

3.6.4 MF 6.05: Integrity of Non-cementitious Materials In the NRC 2023 TRR entitled, Near Field Flow and Transport for the 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A086), the NRC staff found the DOE inclusion of fast pathways through the disposal structures in the vadose zone flow and the vadose zone transport models were acceptable because the presence of fast pathways is consistent with observations of fast pathways and contaminant transport through the SDS 4 walls and hydrotests on the 46 m (150 ft) and 114 m (375 ft) diameter disposal structures. However, the risk significance of those features will depend on the performance of other non-cementitious material key barriers (e.g., closure cap, LLDL and HDPE/GCL composite layer, saltstone). As the DOE continues to develop information related to the closure cap, the NRC staff will continue to evaluate the impact of those features on SDF performance. Impacts due to preferential pathways include: higher flow rates, earlier releases, and decreased attenuation. In contrast, preferential pathways could also result in potential

3-25 bypass of water around the saltstone grout, which could reduce radionuclide release by diverting water from the radioactive inventory. The degradation processes the DOE modeled for the columns in the cylindrical disposal structures results in earlier modeled degradation for the columns than for saltstone. Accordingly, the columns can act as pathways for infiltrating water to migrate around the saltstone grout. Because of the potential for modeled bypass to affect the projected dose, the NRC staff will continue to review information related to the performance of non-cementitious materials and bypass flow. More detailed information on the integrity of non-cementitious materials is in Sections 8.2 and 8.6 of that TRR.

As described in the NRC 2023 TER (ML23024A099), the NRC kept MF 6.05 Open as medium priority under the POs of both §61.41 & §61.42.

The NRC expects to Close MF 6.05 (Integrity of Non-cementitious Materials) under the PO of

§61.41 after the NRC has determined that DOE support for the assumed performance of non-cementitious materials used in the disposal structures is adequate. For example, the DOE may perform accelerated testing to estimate long-term performance. Alternately, the DOE may be able to use a conservative estimate of long-term performance in the SDF PA model.

3.6.5 MF 6.06: Localized Contaminant Release As described in Section 8.2 of the NRC 2023 TRR entitled, Near Field Flow and Transport for the 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A086), in the DOE 2020 PA (ML20190A056), the DOE assumed that contaminant release from the disposal structures would be spread across the nodes beneath the footprint of the disposal structures. However, the DOE observed leakage at a discrete layer/interface during the hydrotest of SDS 6. Accordingly, it is not clear to the NRC staff what impact certain layers or a combination of layers may have on the areal extent of contaminant release. In addition, the results of a sensitivity analysis conducted by the DOE demonstrated the risk significance of the assumed distribution of contaminant release from the disposal structures.

Therefore, the NRC staff will monitor the development of information related to localized contaminant release.

As described in the NRC 2023 TER (ML23024A099), the NRC kept MF 6.07 Open as medium priority under the POs of both §61.41 & §61.42.

The NRC expects to Close MF 6.06 (Localized Contaminant Release) under the PO of §61.41 after the NRC has determined that the DOE assumptions about the physical distribution of contaminants release from disposal structures is realistic or conservative.

3.6.6 MF 6.07: Moisture Characteristic Curves for Disposal Structure Concrete As described in the NRC 2023 TRR entitled, Near Field Flow and Transport for the 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A086), the NRC staff found the support for the assumed MCCs for cementitious materials in the DOE 2020 PA (ML20190A056) was adequate because the assumed MCCs were similar to literature values and the MCCs are of limited risk significance in the DOE 2020 PA. However, in that TRR, the NRC staff determined that potential future DOE revisions to the modeling assumptions could result in the MCCs becoming more risk-significant. Therefore, the NRC staff will monitor the development of support for MCCs in disposal structure concrete.

3-26 As described in the NRC 2023 TER (ML23024A099), the NRC kept MF 6.07 Open as low priority under the POs of both §61.41 & §61.42.

The NRC expects to Close MF 6.07 (Moisture Characteristic Curves for Disposal Structure Concrete) under the PO of §61.41 after the NRC has determined that the DOE model support for the assumed moisture characteristic curves for disposal structure concrete is adequate, if the MCCs or risk significance of the MCCs changes in future revisions.

3.7 MA 7 - Subsurface Flow and Transport As described in the NRC 2023 TRR entitled, Hydrogeology, Groundwater Monitoring, and Far-Field Modeling for the 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A084), subsurface flow and transport modeling can significantly affect the projected dose. For example, modeled dilution and plume overlap affect projected groundwater radionuclide concentrations, which directly affect projected dose. Subsurface transport modeling can also affect the modeled radionuclide travel time. That can affect the projected dose, especially for short-to moderate-half-life radionuclides that may be retained long enough to experience significant decay prior to reaching the point of compliance of 100 m

(~328 ft). In addition, the sorption coefficient (Kd value) that is assumed for subsurface soils can have a significant effect on the modeled transport time and dose.

Because the SRS SDF and the SRS Tank Farms are both located at the SRS, the regional General Separations Area (GSA) groundwater flow models have been and are used to construct local far-field models for each of those locations. The DOE 2020 PA (ML20190A056) incorporated those parts of the GSA model that cover the SDF and the area assessed. The Aquifer Transport Model (ATM) is such a local model for the SDF using many aspects of the fully calibrated threedimensional GSA model. Specifically, the ATM was constructed by extracting a smaller grid from the GSA model using only those model nodes relevant to the SDF and then refining the GSA model to generate localized flow fields and finally implementing the actual contaminant transport modeling. Because both regional and local models can significantly affect the projected dose, the NRC staff needs to have confidence in the results from both models and will monitor risk-significant aspects related to both models.

3.7.1 MF 7.02: Kd Values for SRS Soil In the DOE 2020 PA (ML20190A056), the DOE represented the sorption of radionuclides to soil with linear coefficients (Kd values). Those sorption coefficients affect both the: (1) modeled rate of radionuclide transport in groundwater and (2) relative amounts of a radionuclide that sorbs to soil particles versus being dissolved in groundwater. For those two reasons, modeled sorption coefficients can affect the modeled dose to an individual who drinks the groundwater, ingests plants exposed to the groundwater, or consumes products from animals that ingest the groundwater.

As described in the NRC 2023 TRR entitled, Hydrogeology, Groundwater Monitoring, and Far-Field Modeling for the 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A084), the NRC staff identified the importance of the modeled Kd values in the DOE 2020 PA to the projected dose to an individual at the boundary of the SDF. In that TRR, the NRC staff determined that there did not appear to be sufficient support for the DOE assumption that the same Kd values could accurately represent radionuclide sorption to surface soil and subsurface soil. In that TRR, the NRC staff indicated that certain natural processes (e.g., the accumulation of organic material on the soil surface), agricultural processes

3-27 (e.g., application of fertilizer or compost), or differences in soil properties at different elevations (e.g., content of sand and clay) could cause differences in radionuclide sorption in surface and subsurface soils. Although the NRC staff determined in that TRR that the differences were unlikely to be risk-significant in the context of the DOE 2020 PA, the differences could become more important if assumptions about groundwater flow or the radionuclide inventories in certain disposal structures changed. Therefore, the NRC staff will monitor any new information relevant to the differences between sorption of Tc-99 and I-129 in surface and subsurface soil at SRS to assess whether the differences could significantly affect the projected dose to an offsite individual as a low priority monitoring factor.

As described in the NRC 2023 TER (ML23024A099), the NRC kept MF 7.02 Open as low priority under the POs of both §61.41 & §61.42.

The NRC expects to Close MF 7.02 (Kd Values for SRS Soil) under the PO of §61.41 after the NRC has determined that the DOE support for surface and subsurface Kd values is acceptable and adequately accounts for SDF characteristics and physical processes that could cause a difference between surface and subsurface Kd values.

3.7.2 MF 7.03: Confidence in GSA Modeling Results In the NRC 2023 TRR, entitled, Hydrogeology, Groundwater Monitoring, and Far-Field Modeling for the 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A084), the NRC staff found that the far-field model calibration of the GSA model, particularly in the area near the SDF, was not adequate. In addition to baseflow data from the local area not being available as a calibration target, in that TRR, the NRC staff found that the number of other calibration targets in the area of interest was insufficient. In that TRR, the NRC staff found that additional monitoring wells screened in the SRS Z-Area were needed. In particular, monitoring wells were needed that are screened in the Upper Three Runs Aquifer-Upper Aquifer Zone (UTRA-UAZ) and located in the northern part of the SRS Z-Area to provide additional data and therefore provide NRC staff with confidence in the hydraulic conductivity results. While the DOE made significant improvements in the calibration process through re-evaluation of calibration targets, in that TRR, the NRC staff found that additional support for the approach used to develop the calibration targets was needed.

In that TRR, the NRC staff identified several technical issues associated with the GSA model results that the NRC staff determined needed to be monitored. One issue was that the GSA modeled water particles flowing downward in the unsaturated zone from disposal structures do not come in contact with the water table and saturated zone immediately below the disposal structure, but rather a considerable distance downgradient. That is in comparison to the contaminant flux for the local ATM, which is directly below each disposal structure (i.e., no lateral movement in the unsaturated zone). Another issue was the large uncertainty associated with the hydraulic conductivity of the UTRA-UAZ given the large multiplier range indicating that multiple sets of parameters are available to match calibration targets. Additional calibration targets local to the waste disposal facility area of interest could improve model performance.

Additional issues include the NRC staff concerns about a constant recharge rate applied to the region surrounding the SDF and the NRC staff determination that the technical basis for the DOE assumed modeled depth of the unsaturated zone (i.e., obtained from the GSA model and used in the local SDF ATM) was weak.

The NRC staff will continue to review and evaluate information related to the differences in the local velocity fields and the velocity fields from the GSA model (possibly due to unsaturated

3-28 lateral flow in the GSA model) in addition to the DOE modeled unsaturated thicknesses below the disposal structures, the local recharge rates, and the far-field model calibration, particularly in the area near the SDF. More detailed information on confidence in GSA modeling results is in Sections 3.3.1 and 4.3.1 in that TRR.

As described in the NRC 2023 TER (ML23024A099), the NRC Opened a new medium priority monitoring factor entitled Confidence in GSA Modeling Results under MA 7 (Subsurface Flow and Transport) under the POs of both §61.41 and §61.42. Note that the previous MF 10.10 (Far-Field Calibration) was Closed; but the technical issues from it were incorporated into the new MF 7.03.

The NRC expects to Close MF 7.03 (Confidence in GSA Modeling Results) under the PO of

§61.41 after the NRC has determined that the DOE modeled unsaturated thicknesses below the disposal structures, the local recharge rates, and the far-field model calibration, particularly in the area near the SDF, are adequate. Alternately, the NRC may determine that the differences in the local velocity fields and the velocity fields from the GSA model are not significant to dose.

3.7.3 MF 7.04: Confidence in Local SDF Modeling Results In the NRC 2023 TRR, entitled, Hydrogeology, Groundwater Monitoring, and Far-Field Modeling for the 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A084), the NRC staff found that the DOE analysis to determine the effect of reduced groundwater recharge due to engineered surface covers by simulating reduced groundwater recharge rates provided useful insights. The current DOE plan for the SDF includes engineered surface covers that are expected to considerably reduce the groundwater recharge below the cover and disposal structures. However, until the closure caps have been constructed and the actual hydraulic conditions have been established, the reduction in groundwater recharge under the closure caps and the potential effects of that reduction are uncertain and the NRC staff will continue to review and monitor information on this topic.

Another technical issue associated with the local SDF model results identified by NRC staff in that TRR, included a concern about differences in local velocity fields between the local SDF model and the velocity fields from the GSA model, possibly due to unsaturated lateral flow in the GSA model. More detailed information on confidence in local SDF modeling results is in Sections 3.3.2 and 4.3.2 of that TRR.

As described in the NRC 2023 TER (ML23024A099), the NRC Opened a new medium priority monitoring factor entitled Confidence in Local SDF Modeling Results under MA 7 (Subsurface Flow and Transport) under the POs of both §61.41 and §61.42.

The NRC expects to Close MF 7.04 (Confidence in Local SDF Modeling Results) under the PO of §61.41 after the DOE has constructed the closure caps and the NRC has determined that the modeled future flow conditions underneath the SDF are adequately reflected in the local SDF groundwater model. Alternatively, the NRC may determine that any effect of reduced groundwater recharge due to the closure caps will not be significant enough to affect the DOE ability to meet the PO of §61.41 at the SDF.

3-29 3.7.4 MF 7.05: Impact of Calcareous Zones on Contaminant Flow and Transport As described in Section 4.3.2.3 of the NRC 2023 TRR, entitled, Hydrogeology, Groundwater Monitoring, and Far-Field Modeling for the 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A084), the NRC staff did not receive updated information or review new information related to the impact of calcareous zones on contaminant flow and transport. In the DOE 2020 PA (ML20190A056), many of the contaminant pathways were modeled by the DOE as traversing the lower zone of the UTRA where calcareous materials are more pervasive in the subsurface at SRS. If the DOE identifies calcareous zone seeps, then tracer studies using innocuous tracers in the lower zone of this aquifer could be conducted to better understand the effect of those zones on contaminant flow and transport. The NRC will monitor the development of data and information to evaluate the potential impact of calcareous zones on contaminant flow and transport.

More detailed information on the impact of calcareous zones on contaminant flow and transport is in Sections 3.10.13 and 4.10.13 of the NRC 2013 SDF Monitoring Plan, Rev. 1 (ML13100A113).

As described in the NRC 2023 TER (ML23024A099), the NRC Opened a new low priority monitoring factor entitled Impact of Calcareous Zones on Contaminant Flow and Transport under MA 7 (Subsurface Flow and Transport) under the POs of both §61.41 and §61.42. Note that the previous MF 10.13 (Impact of Calcareous Zones on Contaminant Flow and Transport) was Closed; but, the technical issues from it were incorporated into the new MF 7.05.

The NRC expects to Close MF 7.05 (Impact of Calcareous Zones on Contaminant Flow and Transport) under the PO of §61.41 after the NRC has determined that the DOE appropriately investigated potential preferential pathways due to subsurface calcareous zones. Alternatively, the NRC may determine that any impact of calcareous zones will not be significant enough to affect the DOE ability to meet the PO of §61.41 at the SDF.

3.8 MA 8 - Environmental Monitoring As described in Section 1.5.2.4 of the NRC 2023 TER (ML23024A099), the DOE conducts an effluent monitoring and environmental surveillance program on an ongoing basis at SRS. The data obtained through that program are summarized in two environmental reports each year. A variety of environmental media, including groundwater, surface water, rainwater, air, vegetation, deer meat, hog meat, and soil, are monitored through that program. In assessing compliance with the §61.41 PO, the most useful environmental data to monitor are the groundwater data from the SRS Z-Area because the NRC staff expects that groundwater pathways will dominate long-term radionuclide releases from the SDF.

Increased concentrations of radionuclides or other saltstone indicators (e.g., nitrate) in groundwater samples obtained near the SDF may indicate that radionuclides are leaching from the disposal structures and that the SDF is not performing as expected. Sumps installed beneath some of the disposal structures will also provide important information regarding the early performance of the saltstone waste form and disposal structures. The usefulness of other environmental data is somewhat limited because most of those samples are not obtained directly in the vicinity of the SDF and there are other potential sources of radioactivity at SRS, which makes it difficult to determine whether any observed concentration increases are attributable to the waste disposed of at the SDF. Therefore, the NRC will focus on monitoring information from the disposal structure leak detection systems and groundwater monitoring.

3-30 3.8.1 MF 8.01: Leak Detection In the DOE 2020 PA (ML20190A056), the DOE indicated that it would install four sumps in the floors of each large disposal structure (i.e., SDS 6 through SDS 12). When the DOE wrote the 2020 SDF PA, the DOE had already installed sumps in SDS 3B. No new information on water pumped from the SDS 3B was available for the NRC staff review of the DOE 2020 PA. As described in the NRC 2023 TRR entitled, Near Field Flow and Transport for the 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A086), the NRC staff reviewed information about water pumped from SDS 6 sumps.

The NRC staff expects that information on the volume of water pumped from the sumps in SDS 6 through SDS 12, as well as the chemical and radionuclide concentrations in sump water, will be useful early indicators of disposal structure performance.

As described in the NRC 2023 TER (ML23024A099), the NRC kept MF 8.01 Open as periodic priority under the §61.41, §61.42, and §61.43 POs.

The NRC expects to Close MF 8.01 (Leak Detection) under the PO of §61.41 after the DOE stops pumping water from sumps installed in disposal structures, which the NRC expects to occur after DOE final waste disposal is completed, and the NRC has determined that it has sufficient information to evaluate the potential for early releases from the disposal structures.

3.8.2 MF 8.02: Groundwater Monitoring As described in the NRC 2023 TRR, entitled, NRC Technical Review: Hydrogeology, Groundwater Monitoring, and Far-Field Modeling for the 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A084), the NRC staff will monitor the DOE groundwater monitoring program. A key aspect of the DOE groundwater monitoring program is the placement of the wells. For the wells to provide useful information, they must be located downgradient of the disposal structures and must be screened at appropriate elevations to intersect aquifers and aquifer zones where radionuclide transport could occur. Also, the wells must be close enough to the disposal structures to see radionuclides or other indicators that may leach from the saltstone waste form. Similarly, it is important for the wells used to obtain information regarding the natural groundwater composition (i.e., background wells) to be upgradient of the disposal structures. The groundwater divide on the SDF may complicate the assessment of the well locations, especially because there is some uncertainty in the location of the divide and the location can change with changes to infiltration.

Other aspects of the groundwater monitoring program that the NRC staff should consider include the sampling method and frequency and the analytical methods used for the samples.

The NRC staff will evaluate the groundwater monitoring program in detail as new disposal structures and wells are constructed or if there is evidence that the performance is worse than expected (e.g., if environmental data shows that saltstone leaching is occurring or extensive waste form cracking is observed).

In addition, the NRC staff will monitor the groundwater monitoring data to provide information regarding release of contaminants from saltstone. The groundwater concentrations of radionuclides and saltstone indicators should be tracked by the NRC staff over time to determine whether there are any trends in the data. Any observations of increased radioactivity, nitrate, pH, alkalinity, or other saltstone indicators should be followed up with additional sampling and analysis, and the source of these increased levels should be determined. The

3-31 NRC staff should consider existing historical concentrations measured in the groundwater and measured concentrations in upgradient wells when establishing background levels. Without adequately knowing background levels in the SRS Z-Area, it may be difficult to determine whether any increases in measured radioactivity or nitrate are due to leaching from saltstone.

As described in the NRC 2023 TER (ML23024A099), the NRC kept MF 8.02 Open as periodic priority under the §61.41, §61.42, and §61.43 POs.

The NRC does not expect to Close MF 8.02 (Groundwater Monitoring) under the PO of §61.41 because the NRC will monitor groundwater data in perpetuity at the SDF.

3.8.3 MF 8.03: Identification and Monitoring of Groundwater Plumes in the SRS Z-Area The NRC staff expects that groundwater monitoring data may provide information regarding early release of radionuclides from saltstone and, therefore, potential information relevant to public health and safety. The DOE groundwater monitoring program is the framework under which information from subsurface water is obtained. The NRC staff monitors the DOE groundwater monitoring program and the obtained data in perpetuity under MF 8.02.

As described in the NRC 2023 TRR, entitled, NRC Technical Review: Hydrogeology, Groundwater Monitoring, and Far-Field Modeling for the 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A084), the NRC staff found that the current groundwater monitoring system for the SRS Z-Area was not adequate due to the lack of monitoring wells in the UTRA-UAZ. That was consistent with previous NRC reviews, such as in the NRC 2018 TRR, entitled, Technical Review of Groundwater Monitoring at and Near the Planned Saltstone Disposal Facility (ML18117A494).

The disposal structures SDS 3A, SDS 3B, SDS 5A, SDS 5B, SDS 6, SDS 7, SDS 8, SDS 9, SDS 11, and SDS 12 cannot be adequately monitored for contaminants in the UTRA-UAZ because no monitoring wells downgradient from those disposal structures are screened in the UTRA-UAZ. In the DOE 2020 PA (ML20190A056), the DOE dose estimates from the disposal structures were all influenced by flow and transport within the UTRA-UAZ with the possible exception of the SDS 1, SDS 2A, SDS 2B, SDS 4, and SDS 10. Figure CC-7.6 and Table CC-7.3 in the DOE document, SRR-CWDA-2021-00072, Rev. 1(ML21321A087) show that influence with Table CC-7.3 grouping the above listed disposal structures in the slowest range of flow rates (colored in green) due to a shorter more vertical path through the UTRA-UAZ relative to other groupings. In addition, it is important for some wells to obtain information regarding the natural groundwater composition (i.e., background wells upgradient of the disposal structures). In the NRC 2023 TRR related to Hydrogeology, Groundwater Monitoring, and Far-Field Monitoring, the NRC staff determined that the number of upgradient background monitoring wells in the UTRA-Lower Aquifer Zone (LAZ) was not adequate. The NRC staff will monitor that issue.

Due to the lack of DOE monitoring wells screened in the UTRA-UAZ, any present-day leaks from most of the disposal structures would not be detected until contaminants had traveled through the tan clay confining zone (TCCZ) to the UTRA-LAZ, where most monitoring wells are located. More detailed information on the identification and monitoring of groundwater plumes in the SRS Z-Area is in Sections 3.1 and 4.1 in the NRC 2023 TRR related to Hydrogeology, Groundwater Monitoring, and Far-Field Monitoring.

3-32 As stated in Section 1.6 above, after the NRC issued the 2023 TER (ML23024A099), the NRC staff determined that the DOE could not identify new plumes in a timely manner nor adequately monitor either the current SDS 4 plume or potential future plumes in the UTRA-UAZ. As such, the NRC decided to change the priority of MF 8.03 to high and decided to change which POs MF 8.03 is related to both the §61.41 and §61.42 PO. The NRC did that by adding specific issues related to the current groundwater monitoring system in the SRS Z-Area to MF 8.03.

Those changes in NRC priority and POs for MF 8.03 are reflected in this monitoring plan.

The NRC expects to Close MF 8.03 (Identification and Monitoring of Groundwater Plumes in the SRS Z-Area) under the PO of §61.41 after the NRC has determined that the DOE demonstrated that the groundwater monitoring system in the SRS Z-Area can: (1) identify whether saltstone contaminants are in the groundwater at no more than 46 m (150 ft) from a disposal structure in both the UTRA-UAZ and the UTRA-LAZ; (2) obtain background concentration measurements from monitoring wells in the UTRA-UAZ and the UTRA-LAZ upgradient of the SDF; and (3) track the movements of the SDS 4 groundwater plume (e.g., know the horizontal and vertical extent of the plume; be able to follow the approximate path of the peak of the plume).

3.9 MA 9 - Site Stability As described in the NRC 2023 TRR entitled Site Stability for the 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A114), the NRC staff reviewed stability of the SDF. In addition to being directly applicable to maintaining compliance with the §61.44 PO, site stability is important in limiting the infiltration through the SDF, which is important to SDF performance under the POs of both §61.41 and §61.42 because of the importance of the hydraulic isolation of saltstone to radionuclide concentrations in groundwater. Also, maintaining site stability hinders or slows gaseous waste release while the mere physical thickness of the cover, if resistive to erosion and instabilities, provides protection in various ways usually by preventing direct exposure from radiation. Engineered surface covers with an appropriate thickness are expected to deter future inadvertent intrusion at LLW disposal sites if memory of a disposal site and its location are forgotten in the future.

3.9.1 MF 9.01: Settlement Due to Static-Loading and Seismic Loading As described in the NRC 2023 TRR entitled Site Stability for the 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A114), the NRC staff found that the DOE analysis of settlement did not provide a sufficient basis for making a determination about site stability because the sensitivity analyses the DOE relied on to bound the effects of static-loading induced settlement were insufficiently representative or were inconclusive. Although the DOE concluded that settlement would be expected to occur uniformly over the entire closure cap area and differential settlement would be negligible in the DOE 2020 PA (ML20190A056), in that TRR, the NRC staff found that the DOE did not provide sufficient bases to support that position. Also, in that TRR, the NRC staff found that the DOE did not demonstrate how much settlement key layers in the closure cap and on top of the disposal structures (e.g., lateral sand drainage layers and HDPE/GCL composite layers) can withstand before performance degrades. In addition, the DOE relied on the same sensitivity cases to address potential impacts of seismic-induced liquefaction and settlement.

The NRC staff will monitor settlement due to increased overburden because of the potential for increased settlement to increase infiltration into the site. The NRC staff will review information related to the technical parameters and the methodology used in sensitivity analyses that the DOE will rely on to bound the effects of settlement induced by static and seismic loading. More

3-33 detailed information on settlement due to static-loading and seismic loading is in Sections 3.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.3.1, and 4.3.2 of that TRR.

As stated in Section 1.6 above, after the NRC issued the 2023 TER (ML23024A099), the NRC expanded the topic of MF 9.01 to include that dynamic or seismic-induced liquefaction and settlement are the same as with static-loading induced settlement change and kept MF 9.01 Open as medium priority under the POs of §61.41, §61.42, and §61.44 to verify that impacts of settlement on the closure cap, saltstone, and disposal structure concrete will not adversely affect SDF performance.

The NRC expects to Close MF 9.01 (Settlement Due to Static-Loading and Seismic Loading) under the PO of §61.41 after the NRC has determined that the DOE settlement projections are consistent with the values assumed in the SDF PA. Alternatively, the NRC may determine that the impacts of settlement on the closure cap, saltstone, and disposal structure concrete will not adversely affect SDF performance enough to affect the DOE ability to meet the PO of §61.41 at the SDF.

3.9.2 MF 9.02: Settlement Due to Dissolution of Calcareous Sediment Site instability due to dissolution of calcareous sediment (in association with soft zones) could affect the infiltration of water through the closure cap, disposal structures, and saltstone waste.

As described in the NRC 2023 TRR entitled, Site Stability at the U.S. Department of Energy Savannah River Site Saltstone Disposal Facility (ML23017A114), the NRC staff reviewed evidence of calcareous sediment, soft zones, and carbonate dissolution from the DOE subsurface investigations. Based on the potential for soft zone consolidation to affect the disposal structures, saltstone grout, and the closure cap, the NRC staff will continue to monitor information related to the potential impacts from soft zones. More detailed information on settlement due to dissolution of calcareous sediment is in Sections 3.3.3 and 4.3.3 of that TRR.

As described in the NRC 2023 TER (ML23024A099), the NRC kept MF 9.02 Open as medium priority under the POs of §61.41, §61.42, and §61.44.

The NRC expects to Close MF 9.02 (Settlement Due to Dissolution of Calcareous Sediment) under the PO of §61.41 after the NRC has determined that any future impacts due to dissolution of calcareous sediment or sink formations (including site stability) will not be significant enough to affect the DOE ability to meet the PO of §61.41 at the SDF.

3.9.3 MF 9.03: Gullying of the Closure Cap As described in the NRC 2023 TRR entitled, Site Stability at the U.S. Department of Energy Savannah River Site Saltstone Disposal Facility (ML23017A114), the NRC staff found that the DOE analysis of gully erosion did not allow the NRC staff to make a determination about site stability because: (1) the NRC staff calculations indicated that gully erosion could occur on the SDF Closure Cap top surfaces and side slopes, (2) the DOE probable maximum precipitation studies should have accounted for the effects of climate change, and (3) the DOE projected hydraulic head buildup on top of geomembranes and composite barriers could affect the likelihood of gully erosion of the closure cap. Note that in the DOE 2020 PA (ML20190A056),

the DOE indicated that the closure cap design and implementation plans had not yet been finalized.

3-34 The NRC staff review of information related to gully erosion will include the assumed probable maximum precipitation, the effects of climate change, and the effects of saturated conditions on gully erosion calculations. More detailed information on gullying of the closure cap is in Sections 3.2.1 and 4.2.1 of that TRR.

As described in the NRC TER (ML23024A099), the NRC Opened a new medium priority monitoring factor entitled Gullying of the Closure Cap under MA 9 (Site Stability) under the POs of §61.41, §61.42, and §61.44 The NRC expects to Close MF 9.03 (Gullying of the Closure Cap) under the PO of §61.41 after the NRC has determined that gullying of the closure cap will not adversely affect SDF performance enough to affect the DOE ability to meet the PO of §61.41 at the SDF.

3.9.4 MF 9.04: Sheet and Rill Erosion of the Closure Cap General erosion, or sheet and rill erosion, will occur, but the rate and impact of that erosion is susceptible to change. In the NRC 2023 TRR entitled, Site Stability at the U.S. Department of Energy Savannah River Site Saltstone Disposal Facility (ML23017A114), the NRC staff found that the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Revised Universal Soil Loss Equation (RUSLE) approach to calculate average annual soil loss was acceptable. However, the NRC staff was concerned that the analysis could underpredict erosion because in the DOE 2020 PA (ML20190A056), the DOE assumed significantly less deep infiltration than the NRC staff expected could occur. Significant hydraulic head buildup above the HDPE/GCL composite barrier could affect several of the RUSLE parameters, including soil erodibility and cover management (e.g., plant growth). In the DOE 2020 PA, the DOE indicated that the closure cap design and implementation plans had not yet been finalized.

The NRC staff review of information related to sheet and rill erosion will include monitoring the closure cap design and the implementation of its construction and the predicted shallow infiltration rates effect on hydraulic head buildup above the HDPE/GCL composite barrier. More detailed information on sheet and rill erosion of the closure cap is in Sections 3.2.2 and 4.2.2 of that TRR.

As described in the NRC 2023 TER (ML23024A099), the NRC Opened a new medium priority monitoring factor entitled Sheet and Rill Erosion of the Closure Cap under MA 9 (Site Stability) under the POs of §61.41, §61.42, and §61.44 to verify that soil loss will not adversely affect SDF performance.

The NRC expects to Close MF 9.04 (Sheet and Rill Erosion of the Closure Cap) under the PO of §61.41 after the NRC has determined that soil loss due to sheet and rill erosion of the closure cap will not adversely affect SDF performance enough to affect the DOE ability to meet the PO of §61.41 at the SDF.

3.9.5 MF 9.05: Slope Stability of the SDF Closure Cap As described in the NRC 2023 TRR entitled, Site Stability at the U.S. Department of Energy Savannah River Site Saltstone Disposal Facility (ML23017A114), the NRC staff did not find that the DOE slope stability analysis allowed the NRC staff to make a determination about site stability because the DOE analysis used an unsupported value of the peak horizontal ground acceleration (PGA) and the DOE analysis did not address the effects of closure cap saturation.

3-35 In that TRR, the NRC staff found that the saturated soil conditions and the PGA value used by the DOE did not meet the slope stability requirements.

In the NRC 2018 TRR entitled, Hydraulic Performance and Erosion Control of the Planned Saltstone Disposal Facility Closure Cap and Adjacent Area (ML18002A545), the NRC staff identified concerns about the potential for slumping of the closure cap (i.e., mass wasting of a coherent, saturated mass of loosely consolidated materials or a rock layer moving down slope).The 3%-sloped upper backfill/erosion barrier or the 4%-sloped ULDL/HDPE layer in the DOE 2020 PA (ML20190A056) are potential interfaces of concern for the NRC staff. In the DOE 2020 PA, the DOE indicated that the closure cap design and implementation plans had not yet been finalized. More detailed information on slope stability of the SDF closure cap is in Sections 3.2.3 and 4.2.3 of the NRC 2023 TRR related to Site Stability.

The NRC staff review of information related to slope stability will include the assumed PGA, the stability of the interface between the geosynthetics and engineered soils layers, and the effects of saturated conditions on slope stability.

As described in the NRC 2023 TER (ML23024A099), the NRC Opened a new high priority monitoring factor entitled Slope Stability of the SDF Closure Cap under MA 9 (Site Stability) under the POs of §61.41, §61.42, and §61.44 to provide confidence that a relatively impermeable closure cap in a humid environment under saturated conditions can remain stable for the 10,000 year Performance Period.

The NRC expects to Close MF 9.05 (Slope Stability of the SDF Closure Cap) under the PO of

§61.41 after the NRC has confidence that a relatively impermeable closure cap in a humid environment under saturated conditions can remain stable for the 10,000 year Performance Period. Alternatively, the NRC may determine that any closure cap instability will not be significant enough to affect the DOE ability to meet the PO of §61.41 at the SDF.

3.9.6 MF 9.06: Flow Through the ULDL As described in the NRC 2023 TRR entitled, Site Stability at the U.S. Department of Energy Savannah River Site Saltstone Disposal Facility (ML23017A114), the NRC staff did not find that the DOE analysis of the subsurface sand drainage layers allowed the NRC staff to make a determination about future SDF performance because the DOE analysis did not address the effects of enhanced flow through the drainage layers due to closure cap saturation. Due to the DOE assumed reduction in leakage through the composite barrier, the DOE projected increased infiltrated water to be impeded by the upper composite barrier and ultimately drained to the side slopes via the ULDL. Significant flow through the ULDL could impact the performance of the drainage layer. Although the DOE projected ULDL flow rates were five orders of magnitude below the maximum permissible velocity, the NRC staff described that the DOE analysis did not appear to account for hydraulic head in that evaluation and there is potential for channeling and focused flow. Also, the DOE did not describe whether the flows through the ULDL could mobilize the sand in the ULDL. In the DOE 2020 PA (ML20190A056), the DOE indicated that the closure cap design and implementation plans had not yet been finalized.

More detailed information on flow through the upper lateral sand drainage layer is in Section 4.2.4 of that TRR. The NRC staff will review information related to the effects of saturation and hydraulic head on flow rates in the ULDL.

3-36 As described in the NRC 2023 TER (ML23024A099), the NRC Opened a new high priority monitoring factor entitled, Flow through the ULDL under MA 9 (Site Stability) under the POs of

§61.41, §61.42, and §61.44 to provide confidence that loss of sand from the ULDL due to flow and entrainment will not adversely affect SDF performance.

The NRC expects to Close MF 9.06 (Flow through the ULDL) under the PO of §61.41 after the NRC has determined that that loss of sand from the ULDL due to flow and entrainment will not adversely affect SDF performance enough to affect the DOE ability to meet the PO of §61.41 at the SDF.

3.9.7 MF 9.07: Degradation of the Erosion Barrier As described in the NRC 2023 TRR entitled, Site Stability at the U.S. Department of Energy Savannah River Site Saltstone Disposal Facility (ML23017A114), the NRC staff did not find that the DOE analysis of the erosion barrier allowed the NRC staff to make a determination about site stability because the DOE indicated that the design choice for a material to fill voids in the erosion barrier had not yet been made. The choice of fill material impacts barrier erodibility. In that TRR, the NRC staff found that it could not base a determination on the results of the DOE non-mechanistic sensitivity analyses that were to bound the effects of erosion barrier degradation. In that TRR, the NRC staff found that the DOE assumptions made regarding the LLDL, HDPE, and GCL were too optimistic.

The DOE has not yet determined the material to be used to fill the voids in the erosion barrier.

Currently, sandy soil and controlled low strength material (CLSM) are being considered by the DOE to fill the voids, in addition to coarse-grained sand. As described in the NRC 2023 TRR entitled, Percolation Through and Potential Erosion near the Closure Cap of the U.S.

Department of Energy 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A083), for sandy soil, the NRC staff found that the DOE had not demonstrated how root growth (e.g., from longleaf pine) could impact barrier performance. An erosion barrier filled with CLSM would be more resistant to root growth; however, it would increase the chance of lateral flow occurring on top of the erosion barrier due to the lower hydraulic conductivity of the CLSM, thereby potentially decreasing the stability of the closure cap. The NRC staff expects that the volume of lateral flow that would exit at the upper reaches of the side slope above the erosion barrier could impact the closure cap and affect SDF performance. The DOE indicated in the DOE 2020 PA (ML20190A056) that none of the nominal saturations listed pose a problem to plant health in terms of root drowning. However, in the 2018 TRR entitled, Hydraulic Performance and Erosion Control of the Planned Saltstone Disposal Facility Closure Cap and Adjacent Area (ML18002A545), the NRC staff found that the DOE position had no references or supporting calculations.

In the DOE 2020 PA, the DOE indicated that the closure cap design and implementation plans had not yet been finalized. However, the closure cap is the key barrier to slowing radionuclide release. Accordingly, the NRC staff needs to understand the anticipated conditions to determine if there is reasonable assurance that a safe design can be constructed to accommodate the expected flow rates through and on top of the erosion barrier.

More detailed information on degradation of the erosion barrier is in Section 4.2.5 of the NRC 2023 TRR related to Site Stability and in Sections 3.1.3, 3.1.4, 4.1.3 and 4.1.4 of the NRC 2023 TRR related to Percolation and Partial Erosion.

3-37 The NRC staff will review information related to the degradation of the erosion barrier that will include the material the DOE choses to fill voids in the erosion barrier with and the interrelationship between closure cap saturation and root growth.

As described in the NRC 2023 TER (ML23024A099), the NRC Opened a new medium priority monitoring factor entitled Degradation of the Erosion Barrier under MA 9 (Site Stability) under the POs of §61.41, §61.42, and §61.44 to provide confidence that potential degradation of the erosion barrier will not adversely affect SDF performance.

The NRC expects to Close MF 9.07 (Degradation of the Erosion Barrier) under the PO of

§61.41 after the NRC has determined that that potential degradation of the erosion barrier will not adversely affect SDF performance enough to affect the DOE ability to meet the PO of

§61.41 at the SDF.

3.9.8 MF 9.08: Settlement Due to Waste Bags in SDS 4 As described in the NRC 2023 TRR entitled, Site Stability at the U.S. Department of Energy Savannah River Site Saltstone Disposal Facility (ML23017A114), the NRC staff did not find that the DOE analysis of settlement due to waste bags in SDS 4 allowed the NRC staff to make a determination about site stability because the sensitivity analysis the DOE used appeared to underestimate water flow into cells affected by SDS 4 waste bag consolidation and saltstone degradation in those cells. Despite the results of sensitivity analyses provided by the DOE, the NRC staff remain concerned about the presence of the waste bags due to the potential for increased deep infiltration into disposal cells and the potential for greater than assumed degradation of saltstone grout.

One DOE analysis showed the importance of saltstone as a secondary barrier. The NRC staff is concerned that if saltstone grout degradation is greater than assumed in the DOE 2020 PA (ML20190A056), then doses could be significantly greater than projected in the DOE sensitivity analysis. As described in that TRR, the NRC staff found that risk-significant deep infiltration values may be greater than assumed in that analysis and settlement/collapse could also result in funneling of water into this waste bag disposal zone, which could further increase the deep infiltration rate into this zone.

The NRC staff will review and monitor verification of the amount of grout pumped into SDS 4 Cell C and SDS 4 Cell I relative to the volume of those cells and any dose analyses if void space remains. More detailed information on settlement due to waste bags in SDS 4 is in Sections 3.3.4 and 4.3.4 of that TRR.

As described in the NRC 2023 TER (ML23024A099), the NRC Opened a new medium priority monitoring factor entitled Settlement Due to Waste Bags in SDS 4 under MA 9 (Site Stability) under the POs of §61.41, §61.42, and §61.44 to provide confidence that settlement due to waste bags in SDS 4 will not adversely affect SDF performance.

The NRC expects to Close MF 9.08 (Settlement due to Waste Bags in SDS 4) under the PO of

§61.41 after the final amount of grout pumped into SDS 4 Cell C and Cell I, relative to the volume of those cells, has been verified by the NRC and the NRC has determined that the projected settlement of SDS 4 had been modeled adequately. Alternatively, the NRC could determine that the settlement in SDS 4 will not be significant enough to affect the DOE ability to meet the PO of §61.41 at the SDF.

3-38 3.10 MA 12 - Biosphere As described in the 2023 TRR entitled, Dose and Exposure Pathways Model for the U.S.

Department of Energy 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A113), the term biosphere generally refers to parts of an environmental system that a potential human dose receptor typically would interact with. For example, surface soil, plants, animals, surface water, and groundwater pumped to the surface for domestic, agricultural, or other uses are all part of the biosphere. In the DOE 2020 PA (ML20190A056), the DOE represented radionuclide transport through the biosphere and the resulting projected dose to a hypothetical human receptor with the DOE Dose and Environmental Pathways model. The NRC staff reviewed that model in that TRR.

3.10.1 MF 12.01: Ingestion Pathway Parameters In the DOE model for the DOE 2020 PA (ML20190A056), the peak projected dose to a hypothetical human receptor outside of the SDF was mostly attributable to ingestion of groundwater (72%) and ingestion of plants irrigated with groundwater (22%). Because of the importance of those ingestion pathways to the projected dose to an offsite individual, the NRC staff will monitor DOE support for several assumptions related to those pathways.

In general, when evaluating ingestion pathway parameters, the NRC staff will evaluate whether the parameters are consistent with the DOE definition of the critical group. For example, in one deterministic case in the DOE PA model (i.e., the case the DOE called the most probable and defensible case), the DOE adjusted the amount of drinking water an offsite receptor was assumed to drink to account for the influences of geographic region, agricultural occupation, and relatively active recreational choices. As described in the 2023 TRR entitled, Dose and Exposure Pathways Model for the U.S. Department of Energy 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A113), the NRC staff found that those adjustment factors were appropriate because they were consistent with the DOE definition of the critical group. In that TRR, the NRC staff found that the DOE should apply those factors in the probabilistic analyses and the case the DOE identified as the realistic case.

Similarly in the DOE 2020 PA model, the DOE estimated plant consumption rates based on the assumption that the average member of the critical group would grow crops onsite. The NRC staff will evaluate sources of data for intake rates of homegrown or locally produced food.

Specifically, the NRC staff will monitor the consistency of the modeled produce ingestion rate with the rates of homegrown produce recommended in Chapter 13 of the 2011 EPA Exposure Factors Handbook (ML14007A666).

Although consumption of dairy products was not a dominant exposure pathway in the DOE 2020 PA model, in that TRR, the NRC staff noted the potential importance of dairy product consumption to the projected dose to an offsite receptor if the DOE modeling assumptions changed. The NRC staff will monitor the consistency of the modeled dairy ingestion rate with the rate of ingestion of homegrown dairy products recommended in Chapter 13 of the 2011 EPA Exposure Factors Handbook, including ingestion of non-liquid dairy products.

As described in the NRC 2023 TER (ML23024A099), the NRC Opened a new medium priority monitoring factor entitled Ingestion Pathway Parameters under MA 10 (Biosphere) under the POs of both §61.41 and §61.42. Note that the previous MF 10.08 (Consumption Factors and

3-39 Uncertainty Distributions for Transfer Factors) was Closed; but the technical issues from it were incorporated and expanded into the new MF 12.01.

The NRC expects to Close MF 12.01 (Ingestion Pathway Parameters) under the PO of §61.41 after the NRC has determined that there is adequate DOE support for the ingestion pathway parameters in the SDF PA model.

3.10.2 MF 12.02: Inhalation Pathway Parameters As described in the NRC 2023 TRR entitled, Dose and Exposure Pathways Model for the U.S.

Department of Energy 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A113), the NRC staff found that that the basis for the inhalation rate the DOE used in the model in the DOE 2020 PA (ML20190A056) was inconsistent with the average member of the critical group because the DOE applied an annual average rate to the inhalation pathways; but, only modeled the inhalation dose during specified activities that would have had a higher inhalation rate. In the DOE 2020 PA, the DOE modeled dust inhalation only while a human receptor was working with crops or in a garden; or, for an inadvertent intruder, when a human receptor was drilling a well. Similarly, the DOE modeled inhalation of suspended water while a human receptor was irrigating crops, swimming, or showering. In that TRR, the NRC staff found that a daily average inhalation rate needs to include significant periods of sleep and rest that were inconsistent with those activities. Although the inhalation dose was not a dominant exposure pathway in the DOE 2020 PA, in that TRR, the NRC staff found that the projected dose could become more significant if the DOE modeling assumptions changed. The NRC staff will monitor whether inhalation rates in the DOE Dose and Exposure Pathways Model are consistent with the modeled activities (e.g., caring for crops, swimming, showering).

As described in the NRC TER (ML23024A099), the NRC Opened a new low priority monitoring factor entitled Inhalation Pathway Parameters under MA 10 (Biosphere) under the POs of both

§61.41 and §61.42.

The NRC expects to Close MF 12.02 (Inhalation Pathway Parameters) under the PO of §61.41 after the NRC has determined that there is adequate DOE support for the inhalation pathway parameters in the SDF PA model.

3.11 MA 14 - Future Scenarios and Conceptual Models Future site scenarios (i.e., future scenarios) are composed of features, events, and processes (FEPs) that exist or will exist at the disposal site and their interactions with one another. In the NRC TRR entitled, Future Scenarios and Conceptual Models for the U.S. Department of Energy 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A088), the NRC staff described how future scenarios and conceptual models for the area around the SDF could be developed and what the NRC staff did to evaluate those DOE future scenarios and conceptual models did develop in the DOE 2020 PA (ML20190A056).

3.11.1 MF 14.01: Scenario Development and Defensibility As described in the NRC TRR entitled, Future Scenarios and Conceptual Models for the U.S.

Department of Energy 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A088), the NRC staff found that, although the DOE had screened out the FEP entitled, Climate Change, due to the FEP being too broad in scope, it

3-40 was unclear to the NRC staff how more discrete and detailed FEPs had been incorporated into the DOE 2020 PA (ML20190A056). Climate change is a general and very inclusive FEP, so that the number of FEPs related to that general FEP is large as are the number of interdependencies and interrelationships between it and other FEPs. Besides monitoring and evaluating documents and model results pertaining to scenario development and defensibility, the NRC staff will also monitor how the processes of climate change affect the DOE 2020 PA performance results.

In that TRR, the NRC staff found that the DOE alternative scenarios lacked plausibility, which meant that the interdependencies and interrelationships between the FEPs were not addressed and, frequently, not all plausible FEPs for a specific DOE alternative scenario were included.

Therefore, the NRC staff found that the DOE exclusion of erosion, weathering, and mass wasting from being incorporated into a future scenario for the DOE 2020 PA was not adequately supported. In the DOE 2020 PA, the DOE indicated that mass wasting would be limited because the DOE planned to perform a slope stability analysis prior to finalizing the closure cap design and the DOE will alter the closure cap design to ensure slope stability. Therefore, the NRC staff will monitor the development of model support for including or excluding FEPs related to erosion, weathering, and mass wasting. The NRC staff expects to determine if the DOE model support is adequate only after the DOE determines that the final design for the closure cap.

Note that in the DOE 2020 PA, the DOE indicated that the closure cap design and implementation plans had not yet been finalized.

The DOE does not expect episodic flow (i.e., strong short term pulse-like flow) to affect disposal structure degradation because disposal structure degradation is dominated by diffusive processes. In that TRR, the NRC staff found that the DOE did not have sufficient support for that expectation because the DOE did not address the potential for advective processes to become more significant to disposal structure degradation during episodic flow. Therefore, the NRC staff will monitor the development of model support for including or excluding FEPs related to episodic flow. More detailed information on scenario development and defensibility is in Sections 3.1, 3.3, and 4.3 of that TRR.

As described in the NRC 2023 TER (ML23024A099), the NRC Opened a new medium priority monitoring factor entitled Scenario Development and Defensibility under MA 14 (Future Scenarios and Conceptual Models) under the POs of both §61.41 and §61.42. Note that the previous MF 10.14 (Scenario Development and Defensibility) was Closed; but the technical issues from it were incorporated and expanded into the new MF 14.01.

The NRC expects to Close MF 14.01 (Scenario Development and Defensibility) under the PO of

§61.41 after the NRC has determined that the DOE demonstrated that: (1) all plausible future site scenarios have been evaluated in the SDF PA; and (2) the DOE model support for the exclusion or inclusion of the processes and impacts related to plausible climate change, episodic flow, erosion, weathering, and mass wasting are adequate.

3.11.2 MF 14.02: Defensibility of Conceptual Models As described in the 2020 NRC TRR entitled, Future Scenarios and Conceptual Models for the U.S. Department of Energy 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A088), uncertainty in conceptual models is difficult to capture in dose models; but it can dominate the uncertainty in dose projections. For example, an alternate conceptual model in which saltstone oxidizes for a long period of time during which little or no water flows into the waste and then is suddenly exposed to increased water flow

3-41 (e.g., through HDPE failure) could generate a much larger peak dose than a more gradual failure.

The NRC will monitor the DOE consideration of alternate conceptual models in future DOE PAs because of the potential importance of alternate conceptual models to dose projections. The NRC will monitor the defensibility of the DOE conceptual models for releases of radionuclides and potential exposures to offsite members of the public and will evaluate if the effects of plausible conceptual models that were not included in the SDF PA will result in projected doses that are significantly less than the dose limits of the POs of both §61.41 and §61.42. More detailed information on defensibility of conceptual models is in Section 4.0 of that TRR.

As described in the NRC 2023 TER (ML23024A099), the NRC Opened a new high priority monitoring factor entitled Defensibility of Conceptual Models under MA 14 (Future Scenarios and Conceptual Models) under the POs of both §61.41 and §61.42. Note that the previous MF 10.02 (Defensibility of Conceptual Models) was Closed; but the technical issues from it were incorporated into the new MF 14.02.

The NRC expects to Close MF 14.02 (Defensibility of Conceptual Models) under the PO of

§61.41 after either the NRC has determined that: (1) the DOE demonstrated that all plausible conceptual site models are evaluated in the SDF PA; or (2) the effects of plausible conceptual models that were not included in the SDF PA have been bounded by the effects of the plausible conceptual models that were included by the DOE.

3.11.3 MF 14.03: Implementation of Conceptual Models In the NRC 2023 TER (ML23024A099), the NRC staff described the importance of implementation of the PA conceptual model. It is important for modeling codes to appropriately represent the conceptual models. More information on implementation of conceptual models is in Sections 6.2 and 7.0 of the NRC 2023 TRR entitled, Model Integration of the Department of Energy 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A090) and in Section 4.0 of the NRC 2023 TRR entitled, Future Scenarios and Conceptual Models for the U.S. Department of Energy 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A088).

As described in the NRC 2023 TER, the NRC Opened a new medium priority monitoring factor entitled Implementation of Conceptual Models under MA 14 (Future Scenarios and Conceptual Models) under the POs of both §61.41 and §61.42. Note that the previous MF 10.01 (Implementation of Conceptual Models) was Closed; but the technical issues from it were incorporated into the new MF 14.03.

The NRC expects to Close MF 14.03 (Implementation of Conceptual Models) under the PO of

§61.41 after the NRC has determined that all plausible conceptual site models incorporated in the SDF PA are appropriately represented (e.g., that the modeling codes can appropriately represent the conceptual models). Alternatively, the NRC may determine that any effect of the representation will not be significant enough to affect the DOE ability to meet the PO of §61.41 at the SDF.

3.11.4 MF 14.04: Identification and Screening of FEPs As described in the 2023 NRC TRR entitled, Future Scenarios and Conceptual Models for the U.S. Department of Energy 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at

3-42 the Savannah River Site (ML23017A088), in the bottom-up site scenario formation, the screened in FEPs are combined to form a limited number of plausible future site scenario. It is important that all risk-significant FEPs are screened in and included in the simulation due to their potential effect on the final dose value. Development of a comprehensive FEPs list typically involves the use of generic FEPs lists and the identification of other site-specific FEPs. That is followed by a screening process to exclude certain FEPs from further consideration. Possible justifications for excluding a FEP may include prohibition by regulation, low probability, or limited consequence. The retained FEPs are then combined into site scenarios (i.e., central and alternative site scenarios) for evaluation.

In both the 2023 TER and that TRR, the NRC staff did not find the DOE process for screening FEPs to be entirely acceptable. For example, the DOE indicated that the FEPs analysis could have benefited from including additional team members with a greater range of disciplines and knowledge in topic areas since the results of the FEPs analysis were limited by the experiences and knowledge base of the FEPs team members. More importantly, the NRC staff found that the use of general FEPs, instead of more specific FEPs related to discrete features of the SDF, was unclear and caused significant discrete FEPs to be left out the FEPs analysis. For example, the closure cap was treated as a single component in various sensitivity analyses rather than as separate engineered features of the closure cap (i.e., erosion barrier, drainage layers, HDPE/GCL composite barrier, etc.). The NRC staff found the DOE responses for not explicitly parsing discrete or specific FEPs not to be adequate because: (1) the FEPs analysis team members were apparently not given an opportunity to explicitly evaluate the individual components of specific FEPs that had been grouped together; (2) those specific FEPs which were grouped into broader FEPs may have contributed to the development of risk-significant alternative scenarios or alternative conceptual models if they had been treated separately; and (3) sensitivity cases cannot evaluate the significance of FEPs as accurately as a plausible alternative scenario or alternative conceptual model unless the sensitivity analyses include all significant interdependencies and interrelationships of the FEP in question, which is especially true for one-off, one-on type of sensitivity cases. Potentially significant FEPs frequently have impacts on other FEPs either by their presence or by their absence.

The NRC staff will monitor the DOE identification and screening of FEPs to determine if the identification and screening of FEPs results in risk-significant FEPs being excluded from consideration in the alternative scenario or conceptual model development process (e.g., all significant interdependencies and interrelationships of the FEP need to be captured in sensitivity analyses). More detailed information on identification and screening of FEPs is in Sections 3.2.2 and 4.2.2 of that TRR.

As described in the NRC 2023 TER, the NRC Opened a new medium priority monitoring factor entitled Identification and Screening of Features, Events, and Processes (FEPs) under MA 14 (Future Scenarios and Conceptual Models) under the POs of both §61.41 and §61.42.

The NRC expects to Close MF 14.04 (Identification and Screening of FEPs) under the PO of

§61.41 after the NRC has determined that the DOE demonstrated adequate identification and screening of FEPs.

3.11.5 MF 14.05: Future Designs and Analyses as They Pertain to Potential Degradation Processes and Performance As described in the NRC 2023 TER (ML23024A099) and further detailed in the NRC 2023 TRR, entitled, Future Scenarios and Conceptual Models for the U.S. Department of Energy 2020

3-43 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A088), the NRC found that many potentially risk-significant degradation processes were assumed not to take place by the DOE because the specific features will be part of a DOE future design that has not been finalized. In the DOE 2020 PA (ML20190A056), the DOE assumed that the future designs would prevent much of the degradation from occurring so that the SDF performance will not be negatively affected. The DOE reliance on future designs and analyses limits the NRC staff ability to make determinations by having potentially significant processes and features depend on future DOE designs and activities.

The NRC staff will monitor future DOE designs and activities with regard to the model support provided in excluding or minimizing degradation processes at the SDF. Specifically, the NRC staff expects to monitor that until the NRC staff determines if the DOE future designs and analyses (e.g., slope stability analyses) can exclude or minimize the occurrence of degradation processes. For example, the NRC staff expects that the DOE future closure cap design would specify a fill material for the erosion barrier in order to limit the flow of water towards the disposal structures and to allow sufficient water to flow through the erosion barrier to minimize saturated conditions and possible mass wasting in the layers above the disposal structures.

More detailed information on future designs and analyses as they pertain to potential degradation processes and performance is in Sections 3.2.2, 4.1, and 4.2.2 of that TRR. Note that in the DOE 2020 PA, the DOE indicated that the closure cap design and implementation plans had not yet been finalized.

As described in the NRC 2023 TER, the NRC Opened a new high priority monitoring factor entitled Future Designs and Analyses as They Pertain to Potential Degradation Processes and Performance under MA 14 (Future Scenarios and Conceptual Models) under the POs of both §61.41 and §61.42.

The NRC expects to Close MF 14.05 (Future Designs and Analyses as They Pertain to Potential Degradation Processes and Performance) under the PO of §61.41 after the NRC has determined that the DOE future designs and analyses can exclude or minimize the occurrence of degradation processes previously identified by the NRC enough that the degradation processes will not affect the DOE ability to meet the PO of §61.41 at the SDF.

3.11.6 MF 14.06: Groundwater Yield of the UTRA-UAZ in the SRS Z-Area As described in the NRC 2023 TRR entitled, Future Scenarios and Conceptual Models for the U.S. Department of Energy 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A088), the NRC staff found that the DOE 2020 PA (ML20190A056) did not address the exposure to a hypothetical receptor in all plausible alternative conceptual models of the future SDF site. In particular, the DOE did not evaluate hypothetical receptor doses in a conceptual model in which there is a significant flow and contaminant transport to the 100 m (~328 ft) boundary within the UTRA-UAZ and in which the UTRA-UAZ serves as the main water source for a hypothetical receptor. As described in the NRC 2023 TRR, entitled, NRC Technical Review: Hydrogeology, Groundwater Monitoring, and Far-Field Modeling for the 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A084), the NRC staff found evidence for preferred lateral flow in the UTRA-UAZ within the SRS Z-Area to be convincing and sufficient for the development of an alternative conceptual model; although, that might not be true at every location within the SRS Z-Area due to irregular topography of the bottom UTRA-UAZ (i.e.,

coterminous with the top of the TCCZ) that determines the thickness of the UTRA-UAZ. In the TRR related to Hydrogeology, Groundwater Monitoring, and Far-Field Modeling, the NRC staff

3-44 found that sufficient UTRA-UAZ water may be available at many locations in the SRS Z-Area to be the main source of water for a hypothetical receptor and the NRC staff expects that the plausibility of the UTRA-UAZ acting as the main receptor water source would increase with a wetter climate.

The NRC staff will monitor the future DOE analysis of the groundwater yield of the UTRA-UAZ in the SRS Z-Area to either support a hypothetical receptor using the UTRA-UAZ as its main water supply or to demonstrate that the groundwater yield would be clearly insufficient for the development of a plausible alternative conceptual model for the SDF. The intention of a future DOE groundwater yield analysis would be for the DOE to demonstrate the plausibility or implausibility of an alternative conceptual model for the SDF consisting of a hypothetical receptor using the UTRA-UAZ as its main water supply. More detailed information on DOE future designs and analyses as they pertain to groundwater yield of the UTRA-UAZ in the SRS Z-Area is in Sections 3.4 and 4.4 of the NRC 2023 TRR related to Future Scenarios and Conceptual Models.

As described in the NRC 2023 TER (ML23024A099), the NRC Opened a new high priority monitoring factor entitled Groundwater Yield of the UTRA-UAZ in the SRS Z-Area under MA 14 (Future Scenarios and Conceptual Models) under the POs of both §61.41 and §61.42.

The NRC expects to Close MF 14.06 (Groundwater Yield of the UTRA-UAZ in the SRS Z-Area) under the PO of §61.41 after the NRC has determined that the DOE analysis of the groundwater yield of the UTRA-UAZ in the SRS Z-Area is adequate.

(Intentionally Left Blank)

4-1 4.0 MONITORING TO ASSESS COMPLIANCE WITH 10 CFR 61.42

§61.42, Protection of Individuals from Inadvertent Intrusion Design, operation, and closure of the land disposal facility must ensure protection of any individual inadvertently intruding into the disposal site and occupying the site or contacting the waste at any time after active institutional controls over the disposal site are removed.

The NRC will continue to assess the DOE compliance with the §61.42 PO by evaluating the DOE intruder analysis. A specific dose limit is not in the PO. However, the NRC used a dose limit comparable to a total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) 5 mSv/yr (500 mrem/yr) in the draft environmental impact statement for 10 CFR Part 61 for development of the waste classification requirements2, which were developed to provide for inadvertent intruder protection. As described in NUREG-1854, NRC Staff Guidance for Activities Related to U.S. DOE Waste Determinations - Draft Final Report for Interim Use (ML072360184), the NRC staff uses that 5 mSv/yr (500 mrem/yr) dose limit in evaluating intruder scenarios.

In the NRC 2023 TER (ML23024A099), the NRC concluded with reasonable assurance that the dose to an inadvertent intruder was likely to be below 5 mSv/yr (500 mrem/yr), based on the DOE analyses in which an individual inadvertently drills into a disposal structure. As described in the NRC 2023 TRR entitled, Intrusion Analysis for the 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A085), the NRC staff found that the most important sources of uncertainty in the projected dose to an inadvertent intruder is the composition of the drill cuttings (i.e., grout or soil) and the volume of drill cuttings brought to the surface. Although the projected infiltration rate also affects the projected dose to an inadvertent intruder, the infiltration rate was not the largest source of uncertainty in the DOE analysis.

The pathways that the DOE assumed in the chronic intruder agriculture calculation for the

§61.42 PO in the DOE 2020 PA (ML20190A056) were the same as those assumed for the member of the public for the §61.41 PO, except that the groundwater concentrations were based on different well locations (i.e., on the SDF instead of outside the 100 m (~328 ft) boundary). In the Compliance Case intruder assessment for the §61.42 PO, the DOE assumed that the well would not go directly through the disposal structures because the disposal structures contain long-lasting materials that are clearly distinguishable from the surrounding soil. The DOE determined that because the local soil was generally sandy and local well drillers do not expect to need to drill through high-strength geologic materials when constructing a drinking water well. Consequently, the well driller would stop operations and move to a different location upon encountering engineered barriers, such as the closure cap erosion barrier or the disposal structure concrete roof. Although the DOE does not consider the construction of a well through saltstone to be a credible scenario, the DOE performed two sensitivity analyses to assess the potential dose resulting from drilling directly into a disposal structure and determined that the dose from the groundwater pathway bounds the dose from drill cuttings. In the NRC 2023 TER, the NRC determined that the scenarios and pathways that the DOE considered for an inadvertent intruder were appropriate because, collectively, the DOE intrusion analyses 2 In the original analysis to develop 10 CFR Part 61 in the early 1980s, the NRC staff derived waste concentrations based on the ICRP-2 critical organ approach, with organ dose constraints of 5 mSv (500 mrem) for the total body or bone; 15 mSv (1,500 mrem) for the liver, kidney, lung, or gastrointestinal tract/lower large intestine; and 30 mSv (3,000 mrem) for the thyroid.

4-2 represented the main sources of radioactivity, intrusion exposure scenarios, and exposure pathways, based on the regional practices near SRS.

As indicated in the Executive Summary above, information in one chapter of the SDF Monitoring Plan, Rev. 2 that is the same as an earlier chapter will not be repeated in the latter chapter.

Much of the information in the monitoring areas and monitoring factors in Chapter 3 (Monitoring to Assess Compliance with 10 CFR 61.41) is the same as the information in Chapter 4 (Monitoring to Assess Compliance with 10 CFR 61.42) and so that same information also applies to Chapter 4 and will not be repeated in Chapter 4.

The objective of the NDAA-WIR Monitoring activities related to the §61.42 PO is to assess whether the DOE disposal of salt waste at the SDF meets the PO. The monitoring areas related to the §61.42 PO are the following: Inventory (MA 1); Infiltration and Erosion Control (MA 2);

Waste Form Hydraulic Performance (MA 3); Waste Form Physical Degradation (MA 4); Waste Form Chemical Degradation (MA 5); Disposal Structure Performance (MA 6); Subsurface Flow and Transport (MA 7); Environmental Monitoring (MA 8); Site Stability (MA 9); Biosphere (MA 12); Inadvertent Intrusion (MA 13) and Future Scenarios and Conceptual Models (MA 14).

Except for Inadvertent Intrusion (MA 13), those are the same monitoring areas that were important to the §61.41 PO. Except for Infiltration and Erosion Control (MA 2) and Site Stability (MA 9), they are important to the §61.42 PO for the same reasons as they are important to the

§61.42 PO.

MA 2, MA 9, and MA 13 are important to the §61.42 PO because:

Infiltration and Erosion Control (MA 2) - Erosion control slows the degradation of barriers that are intended to deter inadvertent intrusion and provide physical stabilization for the disposal site.

Site Stability (MA 9) - Limits the infiltration through the SDF and important to maintaining an adequate barrier to intrusion.

Inadvertent Intrusion (MA 13) - Focuses on factors that could affect the dose to an individual who inadvertently intrudes into waste at the SDF.

4.1 MA 1 - Inventory The information in this section for the §61.42 PO is similar to the information in Section 3.1 above for the §61.41 PO.

In addition to the radionuclides identified as potentially risk-significant to a member of the public (i.e., Tc-99, I-129) for the §61.41 PO, the DOE determined in the DOE 2020 PA (ML20190A056) that Pu-239, Sn-126, Pu-240, and Am-241 may also be risk-significant in an acute intrusion case where an individual drilled directly into a disposal structure for the §61.42 PO.

As described in the NRC 2023 TRR entitled, Intrusion Analysis for the 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A085), the NRC staff found that Sr-90 may also be risk-significant to the inadvertent intruder in an alternative acute exposure case where an individual drills into a disposal structure after the end of the Institutional Control Period (i.e., 100 years after SDF closure); but, before complete degradation of the disposal structure roofs for the §61.42 PO.

4-3 4.1.1 MF 1.01: Inventory in Disposal Structures The information in this section for the §61.42 PO is similar to the information in Section 3.1.1 above for the §61.41 PO.

In the DOE 2020 PA (ML20190A056), the distribution of inventory among the disposal structures will be important in determining potential doses to an inadvertent intruder because a single disposal structure can dominate the dose to an inadvertent intruder. Each disposal structure inventory needs to be consistent with the DOE assumptions in the most recent DOE SDF PA so that the NRC can continue to conclude with reasonable assurance that the DOE disposal actions meet the §61.42 PO.

The NRC will monitor the inventory in each disposal structure in comparison to the values in the DOE 2020 PA Table 3.3-6 entitled, [Most Probable and Defensible] SDF Radionuclide Inventory Estimate (Ci) at Closure. As described above in Section 3.1.1 for the §61.41 PO, if the inventory of a radionuclide in a particular disposal structure is higher than the values in that table, then an NRC analysis should be performed to understand the dose consequences of the increased inventory. Although the dose to an inadvertent intruder is expected to be dominated by an individual disposal structure, the plume from neighboring disposal structures may contribute to the dose and should be considered as part of that analysis. For more information about inventory in disposal structures, see Section 3.1.1 above.

The NRC expects to Close MF 1.01 (Inventory in Disposal Structures) under the PO of §61.42 after the DOE has completed waste disposal at the SDF and the NRC has determined that there is adequate support for the final inventory in each disposal structure.

4.1.2 MF 1.02: Methods Used to Assess Inventory The information in this section for the §61.42 PO is similar to the information in Section 3.1.2 above for the §61.41 PO.

The NRC will monitor the methods the DOE uses to assess radionuclide inventories because of the considerable uncertainty in inventory estimates and the importance of radionuclide inventory to dose to an inadvertent intruder.

In addition to the radionuclides specified above in Section 3.1.2 for the §61.41 PO, under the

§61.42 PO, as described in the NRC 2023 TRR entitled, Inadvertent Intrusion Analysis for the U.S. Department of Energy 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A085), the NRC will also focus on monitoring the inventory of Pu-239, Sn-126, Pu-240, Am-241, and Sr-90 because those radionuclides are risk-significant for meeting the §61.42 PO. For more information about methods used to assess inventory, see Section 3.1.2 above.

The NRC expects to Close MF 1.02 (Methods Used to Assess Inventory) under the PO of

§61.42 after the DOE has completed waste disposal at the SDF and the NRC has determined that there is adequate support for the final inventory in each disposal structure.

4-4 4.2 MA 2 - Infiltration and Erosion Control The information in this section for the §61.42 PO is similar to the information in Section 3.2 above for the §61.41 PO.

As described in the NRC 2023 TER (ML23024A099), the closure cap is important to intruder protection primarily because the erosion barrier is expected to discourage inadvertent intrusion by presenting a physical barrier and maintaining cover depth. In addition, the cover is expected to limit radionuclide releases to groundwater by limiting groundwater infiltration to the SDF, especially in the first few centuries after SDF closure, when the potential risk to an inadvertent intruder from short-lived radionuclides is the greatest. For more information about infiltration and erosion control, see Section 3.2 above.

4.2.1 MF 2.01: Hydraulic Performance of Closure Cap The information in this section for the §61.42 PO is the same as the information in Section 3.2.1 above for the §61.41 PO.

The NRC expects to Close MF 2.01 (Hydraulic Performance of Closure Cap) under the PO of

§61.42 after the NRC has determined that the DOE support for the assumed hydraulic performance of the as-built closure cap is adequate. Given the importance of construction activities on the performance of the closure cap, this monitoring factor will not be closed prior to construction of the closure cap.

4.2.2 MF 2.02: Erosion Control of the SDF Engineered Surface Cover and Adjacent Area The information in this section for the §61.42 PO is similar to the information in Section 3.2.2 above for the §61.41 PO.

As described in the NRC 2023 TRR, entitled, Percolation Through and Potential Erosion near the Closure Cap for the 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site, (ML23017A083), the DOE needs more model support to demonstrate that the physical stability of the final closure cap is consistent with the assumed performance of the closure cap in the DOE 2020 PA (ML20190A056). The NRC staff will evaluate preliminary erosion protection designs, any significant changes to the design before construction, construction quality, the erosion barrier, potential confining conditions in the drainage layer, and information related to the physical stability of the vegetative and topsoil layers. For more information about how the closure cap relates to erosion control, see Section 3.2.2 above.

The NRC expects to Close MF 2.02 (Erosion Control of the SDF Engineered Surface Cover and Adjacent Area) under the PO of §61.42 after the NRC has determined that the projected level of erosional degradation of the SDF closure caps and the area adjacent to the SDF closure caps will not be significant enough to affect the DOE ability to meet the PO of §61.42 at the SDF under the DOE Central Scenario climate conditions as well as plausible future wetter and drier climate states. Given the importance of construction activities on the performance of the final engineered surface cover, this monitoring factor will not be closed prior to construction of the cover.

4-5 4.2.3 MF 2.03: Confidence in QA/QC for HDPE/GCL Composite Barrier and Drainage Layer Installation The information in this section for the §61.42 PO is the same as the information in Section 3.2.3 above for the §61.41 PO.

The NRC expects to Close MF 2.03 (Confidence in QA/QC for HDPE/GCL Composite Barrier and Drainage Layer Installation) under the POs of §61.42 after the NRC has determined that the DOE installation of the upper HDPE/GCL composite barrier and the ULDL in the planned SDF closure caps is adequate.

4.2.4 MF 2.04: Long-Term HDPE/GCL Composite Barrier and Drainage Layer Degradation The information in this section for the §61.42 PO is the same as the information in Section 3.2.4 above for the §61.41 PO.

The NRC expects to Close MF 2.04 (Long-Term HDPE/GCL Composite Barrier and Drainage Layer Degradation) under the PO of §61.42 after both are met: (1) the NRC has confidence that HDPE degradation in the heat-affected zones near welded seams and at edges, HDPE degradation due to root penetration, GCL degradation due to HDPE defects, and drainage layer degradation due to diminishing hydraulic conductivity will not be significant enough to affect the DOE ability to meet the PO of §61.42 at the SDF; and (2) the NRC has determined that modeled flow rates through the LLDL barrier will not be increasing, so as to become significant enough to affect the DOE ability to meet the PO §61.42 at the SDF.

4.2.5 MF 2.05: Potential Confined Conditions in the ULDL The information in this Section for the §61.42 PO is the same as the information in Section 3.2.5 above for the §61.41 PO.

The NRC expects to Close MF 2.05 (Potential Confined Conditions in the ULDL) under the PO of §61.42 after the NRC has confidence that confined conditions in the ULDL will not occur.

Alternatively, the NRC may determine that, if confined conditions do occur, then they will not become significant enough to affect the DOE ability to meet the PO of §61.42 at the SDF.

4.2.6 MF 2.06: Long-Term Erosion Barrier Performance The information in this Section for the §61.42 PO is the same as the information in Section 3.2.6 above for the §61.41 PO.

The NRC expects to Close MF 2.06 (Long-Term Erosion Barrier Performance) under the PO of

§61.42 after the erosion barrier has been constructed by the DOE and the NRC has determined that there is a sufficiently strong technical basis to support the simulated hydraulic performance above, below, and through the erosion barrier. Alternatively, the NRC may determine that any effect due to the DOE assumptions and properties of the erosion barrier will not be significant enough to affect the DOE ability to meet the PO of §61.42 at the SDF.

4.2.7 MF 2.07: Shallow Infiltration The information in this Section for the §61.42 PO is the same as the information in Section 3.2.7 above for the §61.41 PO.

4-6 The NRC expects to Close MF 2.07 (Shallow Infiltration) under the PO of §61.42 after the NRC has determined that there is a sufficiently strong technical basis to support the DOE method for estimating shallow infiltration rates. Alternatively, the NRC may determine that shallow infiltration rates will not affect the DOE ability to meet the PO of §61.42 at the SDF.

4.3 MA 3 - Waste Form Hydraulic Performance The information in this section for the §61.42 PO is the same as the information in Section 3.3 above for the §61.41 PO.

4.3.1 MF 3.03: Applicability of Laboratory Data to Field-Emplaced Saltstone The information in this section for the §61.42 PO is the same as the information in Section 3.3.3 above for the §61.41 PO.

The NRC expects to Close MF 3.03 (Applicability of Laboratory Data to Field-Emplaced Saltstone) under the PO of §61.42 after the NRC has determined that the DOE representation of the hydraulic properties of field-emplaced saltstone with the hydraulic properties of laboratory-produced samples is adequate. Alternately, the NRC may determine that the DOE appropriately based the hydraulic properties of saltstone on the properties of an appropriate range of samples of field-emplaced saltstone, rather than on measurements of laboratory-produced samples.

4.4 MA 4 - Waste Form Physical Degradation The information in this section for the §61.42 PO is the same as the information in Section 3.4 above for the §61.41 PO.

4.4.1 MF 4.01: Waste Form Matrix Degradation The information in this section for the §61.42 PO is the same as the information in Section 3.4.1 above for the §61.41 PO.

The NRC expects to Close MF 4.01 (Waste Form Matrix Degradation) under the PO of §61.42 after the NRC has determined that the DOE support for modeled changes in the saturated hydraulic conductivity and diffusivity during the 10,000 year Performance Period is sufficient.

4.4.2 MF 4.02: Waste Form Macroscopic Fracturing The information in this section for the §61.42 PO is the same as the information in Section 3.4.2 above for the §61.41 PO.

The NRC expects to Close MF 4.02 (Waste Form Macroscopic Fracturing) under the PO of

§61.42 after the NRC has determined that the DOE model support for the assumed formation of macroscopic fractures during the 10,000 year Performance Period is sufficient.

4.4.3 MF 4.03: Moisture Characteristic Curves for Saltstone The information in this section for the §61.42 PO is the same as the information in Section 3.4.3 above for the §61.41 PO.

4-7 The NRC expects to Close MF 4.03 (Moisture Characteristic Curves for Saltstone) under the PO of §61.42 after the NRC has determined that the DOE model support for the assumed moisture characteristic curves for saltstone is adequate, if the MCCs or risk significance of the MCCs changes in future revisions.

4.5 MA 5 - Waste Form Chemical Performance The information in this section for the §61.42 PO is the same as the information in Section 3.5 above for the §61.41 PO.

4.5.1 MF 5.01: Radionuclide Release from Field-Emplaced Saltstone The information in this section for the §61.42 PO is the same as the information in Section 3.5.1 above for the §61.41 PO.

The NRC expects to Close MF 5.01 (Radionuclide Release from Field-Emplaced Saltstone) under the PO of §61.42 after the NRC has determined that the DOE measurements of radionuclide release rates from field-emplaced saltstone used in the SDF PA are reliable.

4.5.2 MF 5.02: Chemical Reduction of Tc by Saltstone The information in this section for the §61.42 PO is the same as the information in Section 3.5.2 above for the §61.41 PO.

The NRC expects to Close MF 5.02 (Chemical Reduction of Tc by Saltstone) under the PO of

§61.42 after the NRC has determined that the DOE has adequate model support for the chemical reduction of Tc(VII) to Tc(IV) as it is transported through saltstone.

4.5.3 MF 5.03: Reducing Capacity of Saltstone The information in this section for the §61.42 PO is the same as the information in Section 3.5.3 above for the §61.41 PO.

The NRC expects to Close MF 5.03 (Reducing Capacity of Saltstone) under the PO of §61.42 after the NRC has determined that the DOE information for the initial reducing capacity of saltstone and the expected evolution of redox conditions over time is adequate.

4.5.4 MF 5.04: Kd Values for Saltstone The information in this section for the §61.42 PO is similar to the information in Section 3.5.4 above for the §61.41 PO.

As described in the NRC 2023 TRR entitled, Intrusion Analysis for the 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A085),

under the §61.42 PO, the NRC will monitor I, Tc, Pu, Sn, Am, and Sr. For more information about certain risk-significant Kd values for saltstone, see Section 3.5.4 above.

The NRC expects to Close MF 5.04 (Kd Values for Saltstone) under the PO of §61.42 the NRC has determined that the DOE model support for the sorption coefficients assumed for saltstone is adequate.

4-8 4.6 MA 6 - Disposal Structure Performance The information in this section for the §61.42 PO is similar to the information in Section 3.6 above for the §61.41 PO.

As described in the NRC 2023 TRR entitled, Inadvertent Intrusion Analysis for the U.S.

Department of Energy 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A085), for the §61.42 PO, the degradation of the disposal structure roofs is important to the inadvertent intruder assessment because the DOE inadvertent intrusion model relies on the assumption that the steel-reinforced disposal structure roofs will prevent drilling into saltstone for between 518 years and 1,371 years after site closure, depending on the type of disposal structure.

4.6.1 MF 6.01: Kd Values in Disposal Structure Concrete The information in this section for the §61.42 PO is the same as the information in Section 3.6.1 above for the §61.41 PO.

The NRC expects to Close MF 6.01 (Kd Values in Disposal Structure Concrete) under the PO of

§61.42 after the NRC has determined that the DOE information about sorption in disposal structure concrete is acceptable.

4.6.2 MF 6.03: Performance of Disposal Structure Roofs and HDPE/GCL Layers The information in this section for the §61.42 PO is the same as the information in Section 3.6.2 above for the §61.41 PO.

The NRC expects to Close MF 6.03 (Performance of Disposal Structure Roofs and HDPE/GCL Layers) under the PO of §61.42 after the NRC has determined that the DOE model support for the amount of water that DOE expects to be diverted by the LLDL, including support for the hydraulic conductivity of the relevant engineered layers, is sufficient. Alternately, the NRC may determine that the DOE conservatively assumes less diversion around the disposal structures in the SDF PA model.

4.6.3 MF 6.04: Disposal Structure Concrete Fracturing The information in this section for the §61.42 PO is the same as the information in Section 3.6.3 above for the §61.41 PO.

The NRC expects to Close MF 6.04 (Disposal Structure Concrete Fracturing) under the PO of

§61.42 after the NRC has determined that the DOE support for the amount of fracturing of each of the disposal structures floor and walls expected to occur during the 10,000 year Performance Period is adequate. Alternately, the NRC may determine that the estimate of the amount of fracturing in the SDF PA model is conservative.

4.6.4 MF 6.05: Integrity of Non-Cementitious Materials The information in this section for the §61.42 PO is the same as the information in Section 3.6.4 above for the §61.41 PO.

4-9 The NRC expects to Close MF 6.05 (Integrity of Non-cementitious Materials) under the PO of

§61.42 after the NRC has determined that DOE support for the assumed performance of non-cementitious materials used in the disposal structures is adequate. For example, the DOE may perform accelerated testing to estimate long-term performance. Alternately, the DOE may be able to use a conservative estimate of long-term performance in the SDF PA model.

4.6.5 MF 6.06: Localized Contaminant Release The information in this section for the §61.42 PO is the same as the information in Section 3.6.5 above for the §61.41 PO.

The NRC expects to Close MF 6.06 (Localized Contaminant Release) under the PO of §61.42 after the NRC has determined that the DOE assumptions about the physical distribution of contaminants release from disposal structures is realistic or conservative.

4.6.6 MF 6.07: Moisture Characteristic Curves for Disposal Structure Concrete The information in this section for the §61.42 PO is the same as the information in Section 3.6.6 above for the §61.41 PO.

The NRC expects to Close MF 6.07 (Moisture Characteristic Curves for Disposal Structure Concrete) under the PO of §61.42 after the NRC has determined that the DOE model support for the assumed moisture characteristic curves for disposal structure concrete is sufficient adequate, if the MCCs or risk significance of the MCCs changes in future revisions.

4.7 MA 7 - Subsurface Flow and Transport The information in this section for the §61.42 PO is similar to the information in Section 3.7 above for the §61.41 PO.

As described in the NRC 2023 TRR, entitled, Hydrogeology, Groundwater Monitoring, and Far-Field Modeling for the 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A084), the modeling of the subsurface flow and transport of radionuclides that have leached from the saltstone waste form can have a significant effect on the projected dose. The vadose and groundwater modeling generally affects the projected dose to an offsite member of the public under the §61.41 PO more than the dose to an inadvertent intruder under the §61.42 PO due to the longer distance to the point of compliance for the offsite member of the public. However, certain aspects of the subsurface modeling could still affect the projected dose to an inadvertent intruder under the §61.41 PO. For example, the amount of sorption in the unsaturated zone beneath the disposal structures can potentially affect the projected dose to an inadvertent intruder, particularly if the release from the saltstone is pulse-like. For more information about subsurface flow and transport, see Section 3.7 above.

4.7.1 MF 7.02: Kd Values for SRS Soil The information in this section for the §61.42 PO is the same as the information in Section 3.7.1 above for the §61.41 PO.

The NRC expects to Close MF 7.02 (Kd Values for SRS Soil) under the PO of §61.42 after the NRC has determined that the DOE support for surface and subsurface Kd values is acceptable

4-10 and adequately accounts for SDF characteristics and physical processes that could cause a difference between surface and subsurface Kd values.

4.7.2 MF 7.03: Confidence in GSA Modeling Results The information in this section for the §61.42 PO is the same as the information in Section 3.7.3 above for the §61.41 PO.

The NRC expects to Close MF 7.03 (Confidence in GSA Modeling Results) under the PO of

§61.42 after the NRC has determined that the DOE modeled unsaturated thicknesses below the disposal structures, the local recharge rates, and the far-field model calibration, particularly in the area near the SDF, are adequate. Alternately, the NRC may determine that the differences in the local velocity fields and the velocity fields from the GSA model are not significant to dose.

4.7.3 MF 7.04: Confidence in Local SDF Modeling Results The information in this section for the §61.42 PO is the same as the information in Section 3.7.4 above for the §61.41 PO.

The NRC expects to Close MF 7.04 (Confidence in Local SDF Modeling Results) under the PO of §61.42 after the DOE has constructed the closure caps and the NRC has determined that the modeled future flow conditions underneath the SDF are adequately reflected in the local SDF groundwater model. Alternatively, the NRC may determine that any effect of reduced groundwater recharge due to the closure caps will not be significant enough to affect the DOE ability to meet the PO of §61.42 at the SDF.

4.7.4 MF 7.05: Impact of Calcareous Zones on Contaminant Flow and Transport The information in this section for the §61.42 PO is the same as the information in Section 3.7.5 above for the §61.41 PO.

The NRC expects to Close MF 7.05 (Impact of Calcareous Zones on Contaminant Flow and Transport) under the PO of §61.42 after the NRC has determined that the DOE appropriately investigated potential preferential pathways due to subsurface calcareous zones. Alternatively, the NRC may determine that any impact of calcareous zones will not be significant enough to affect the DOE ability to meet the PO of §61.42 at the SDF.

4.8 MA 8 - Environmental Monitoring The information in this section for the §61.42 PO is similar to the information in Section 3.8 above for the §61.41 PO As described in Section 1.5.2.4 of the NRC 2023 TER (ML23024A099), the DOE conducts an effluent monitoring and environmental surveillance program on an ongoing basis at SRS. The NRC staff expects that groundwater monitoring data from SRS Z-Area will be the most appropriate to monitor in assessing compliance with the §61.42 PO because the groundwater pathway is expected to dominate long-term doses to inadvertent intruders. Although the monitoring wells at the SDF are located further from the disposal structures than a hypothetical inadvertent intruder, groundwater data from those wells still provides useful information regarding the potential dose to an inadvertent intruder. For example, if the groundwater data indicated that an early release of radionuclides from saltstone had occurred, then that could

4-11 mean that the performance of the saltstone and disposal structures was worse than was assumed in the SDF PA and the dose to an intruder may be higher than was projected. The sumps installed beneath SDS 3A and SDS 6 through SDS 12 will provide important information regarding the early performance of the saltstone waste form and disposal structures. For more information about environmental monitoring, see Section 3.8 above.

4.8.1 MF 8.01: Leak Detection The information in this section for the §61.42 PO is the same as the information in Section 3.8.1 above for the §61.41 PO.

The NRC expects to Close MF 8.01 (Leak Detection) under the PO of §61.42 after the DOE stops pumping water from sumps installed in disposal structures, which the NRC expects to occur after DOE final waste disposal is completed and the NRC has determined that it has sufficient information to evaluate the potential for early releases from the disposal structures.

4.8.2 MF 8.02: Groundwater Monitoring The information in this section for the §61.42 PO is the same as the information in Section 3.8.2 above for the §61.41 PO.

The NRC does not expect to Close MF 8.02 (Groundwater Monitoring) under the PO of §61.42 because the NRC will monitor groundwater data in perpetuity at the SDF.

4.8.3 MF 8.03: Identification and Monitoring of Groundwater Plumes in the SRS Z-Area The information in this section for the §61.42 PO is the same as the information in Section 3.8.3 above for the §61.41 PO.

The NRC expects to Close MF 8.03 (Identification and Monitoring of Groundwater Plumes in the SRS Z-Area) under the PO of §61.42 after the NRC has determined that the DOE demonstrated that the groundwater monitoring system in the SRS Z-Area can: (1) identify whether saltstone contaminants are in the groundwater at no more than 46 m (150 ft) from a disposal structure in both the UTRA-UAZ and the UTRA-LAZ; (2) obtain background concentration measurements from monitoring wells in the UTRA-UAZ and the UTRA-LAZ upgradient of the SDF; and (3) track the movements of the SDS 4 groundwater plume (e.g., know the horizontal and vertical extent of the plume; be able to follow the approximate path of the peak of the plume).

4.9 MA 9 - Site Stability The information in this section for the §61.42 PO is similar to the information in Section 3.9 above for the §61.41 PO.

As described in the NRC 2023 TRR entitled Site Stability for the 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A114),

site stability is directly applicable to maintaining compliance with the §61.44 PO. In addition, site stability is important in both limiting infiltration through the SDF and maintaining an adequate barrier to intrusion, where both of those are important to protection of an inadvertent intruder under the §61.42 PO. Limiting infiltration is important because the NRC staff agreed with the DOE assumption that the dose to an inadvertent intruder at the SDF will be dominated by radionuclide releases to groundwater rather than direct exposure to saltstone. Site stability also

4-12 enhances intruder protection under the §61.42 PO because limiting erosion is important to maintaining sufficient cover depth to limit intrusion. In addition, site stability is expected to increase the probability that the SDF remains recognizable as an engineered facility and that the saltstone remains recognizable as waste.

4.9.1 MF 9.01: Settlement Due to Static-Loading and Seismic Loading The information in this section for the §61.42 PO is the same as the information in Section 3.9.1 above for the §61.41 PO.

The NRC expects to Close MF 9.01 (Settlement Due to Static-Loading and Seismic Loading) under the PO of §61.42 after the NRC has determined that the DOE settlement projections are consistent with the values assumed in the SDF PA. Alternatively, the NRC may determine that the impacts of settlement on the closure cap, saltstone, and disposal structure concrete will not adversely affect SDF performance enough to affect the DOE ability to meet the PO of §61.42 at the SDF.

4.9.2 MF 9.02: Settlement Due to Dissolution of Calcareous Sediment The information in this section for the §61.42 PO is the same as the information in Section 3.9.2 above for the §61.41 PO.

The NRC expects to Close MF 9.02 (Settlement Due to Dissolution of Calcareous Sediment) under the PO of §61.42 after the NRC has determined that any future impacts due to dissolution of calcareous sediment or sink formations (including site stability) will not be significant enough to affect the DOE ability to meet the PO of §61.42 at the SDF.

4.9.3 MF 9.03: Gullying of the Closure Cap The information in this section for the §61.42 PO is the same as the information in Section 3.9.3 above for the §61.41 PO.

The NRC expects to Close MF 9.03 (Gullying of the Closure Cap) under the PO of §61.42 after the NRC has determined that gullying of the closure cap will not adversely affect SDF performance enough to affect the DOE ability to meet the PO of §61.42 at the SDF.

4.9.4 MF 9.04: Sheet and Rill Erosion of the Closure Cap The information in this section for the §61.42 PO is the same as the information in Section 3.9.4 above for the §61.41 PO.

The NRC expects to Close MF 9.04 (Sheet and Rill Erosion of the Closure Cap) under the PO of §61.42 after the NRC has determined that soil loss due to sheet and rill erosion of the closure cap will not adversely affect SDF performance enough to affect the DOE ability to meet the PO of §61.42 at the SDF.

4.9.5 MF 9.05: Slope Stability of the SDF Closure Cap The information in this section for the §61.42 PO is the same as the information in Section 3.9.5 above for the §61.41 PO.

4-13 The NRC expects to Close MF 9.05 (Slope Stability of the SDF Closure Cap) under the PO of

§61.42 after the NRC has confidence that a relatively impermeable closure cap in a humid environment under saturated conditions can remain stable for the 10,000 year Performance Period. Alternatively, the NRC may determine that any closure cap instability will not be significant enough to affect the DOE ability to meet the PO of §61.42 at the SDF.

4.9.6 MF 9.06: Flow Through the ULDL The information in this section for the §61.42 PO is the same as the information in Section 3.9.6 above for the §61.41 PO.

The NRC expects to Close MF 9.06 (Flow through the ULDL) under the PO of §61.42 after the NRC has determined that that loss of sand from the ULDL due to flow and entrainment will not adversely affect SDF performance enough to affect the DOE ability to meet the PO of §61.42 at the SDF.

4.9.7 MF 9.07: Degradation of the Erosion Barrier The information in this section for the §61.42 PO is the same as the information in Section 3.9.7 above for the §61.41 PO.

The NRC expects to Close MF 9.07 (Degradation of the Erosion Barrier) under the PO of

§61.42 after the NRC has determined that that potential degradation of the erosion barrier will not adversely affect SDF performance enough to affect the DOE ability to meet the PO of

§61.42 at the SDF.

4.9.8 MF 9.08: Settlement Due to Waste Bags in SDS 4 The information in this section for the §61.42 PO is the same as the information in Section 3.9.8 above for the §61.41 PO.

The NRC expects to Close MF 9.08 (Settlement due to Waste Bags in SDS 4) under the PO of

§61.42 after the final amount of grout pumped into SDS 4 Cell C and Cell I, relative to the volume of those cells, has been verified by the NRC and the NRC has determined that the projected settlement of SDS 4 had been modeled adequately. Alternatively, the NRC could determine that the settlement in SDS 4 will not be significant enough to affect the DOE ability to meet the PO of §61.42 at the SDF.

4.10 MA 12 - Biosphere The information in this section for the §61.42 PO is similar to the information in Section 3.10 above for the §61.41 PO.

As described in the 2023 TRR entitled, Dose and Exposure Pathways Model for the U.S.

Department of Energy 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A113), the term biosphere generally refers to parts of an environmental system that a potential human dose receptor typically would interact with. For example, surface soil, plants, animals, surface water, and groundwater pumped to the surface for domestic, agricultural, or other uses are all part of the biosphere. In the intrusion assessment that the DOE included in the DOE 2020 PA (ML20190A056) under the §61.42 PO, the DOE represented radionuclide transport through the biosphere with the same dose and exposure

4-14 pathways model that the DOE used in the DOE 2020 PA model for an offsite member of the general population under the §61.41 PO. The main difference was that the soil and groundwater concentrations that the DOE used as inputs to the dose and exposure pathways model under the §61.41 PO differed for the offsite receptor and an inadvertent intruder under the §61.42 PO.

In addition to dose contributions from radionuclides transported in environmental pathways, the DOE intrusion analysis in the DOE 2020 PA also evaluated the dose contribution of direct exposure to saltstone grout. The NRC staff will monitor parameters related to that dose contribution under MA 13 - Inadvertent Intrusion (see Section 4.11 below).

4.10.1 MF 12.01: Ingestion Pathway Parameters The information in this section for the §61.42 PO is the same as the information in Section 3.10.1 above for the §61.41 PO.

The NRC expects to Close MF 12.01 (Ingestion Pathway Parameters) under the PO of §61.42 after the NRC has determined that there is adequate DOE support for the ingestion pathway parameters in the SDF PA model.

4.10.2 MF 12.02: Inhalation Pathway Parameters The information in this section for the §61.42 PO is the same as the information in Section 3.10.2 above for the §61.41 PO.

The NRC expects to Close MF 12.02 (Inhalation Pathway Parameters) under the PO of §61.42 after the NRC has determined that there is adequate DOE support for the inhalation pathway parameters in the SDF PA model.

4.11 MA 13 - Inadvertent Intrusion As described in the NRC 2023 TRR entitled, Inadvertent Intrusion Analysis for the U.S.

Department of Energy 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A085), the NRC staff evaluated the DOE inadvertent intrusion analysis in the DOE 2020 PA (ML20190A056).

The conceptual model for an inadvertent intruder evaluated under the §61.42 PO differs from the conceptual model for an offsite member of the general population evaluated under the

§61.41 PO in two key respects. First, under the §61.42 PO, an inadvertent intruder is postulated to be located within the boundary of a disposal site at the end of an institutional control period; whereas under the §61.41 PO, a member of the general population is assumed to be located offsite. For the SDF, a member of the general population is assumed to be located 100 m

(~328 ft) from the boundary of the SDF. Second, under the §61.42 PO, an intrusion analysis typically assumes an individual has unknowingly disrupted the waste; whereas under the §61.41 PO, no such disruption is assumed an intrusion analysis.

In the DOE 2020 PA, the DOE indicated that it expected that the most likely type of intrusion would be for an individual to drill a water well into soil near a disposal structure. The DOE also considered an alternative scenario where an individual drilled directly into a disposal structure.

In that TRR, the NRC staff referred to those DOE scenarios as the soil-drilling case and the grout-drilling case. As described in that TRR, the DOE used results from soil-drilling cases in its compliance demonstration. Although the DOE indicated that it would be highly unlikely for an

4-15 individual to drill a well directly into saltstone grout, the NRC agreed with the DOE choice to evaluate the grout-drilling scenario because of the large uncertainty in the degraded properties of disposal structure concrete and saltstone grout within 10,000 years of SDF closure. Based on the long half-lives of the key radionuclides in the intrusion analyses for the SDF (e.g., Tc-99, I-129, Pu-239), the NRC determined that it would use drilling into saltstone to assess compliance with the §61.42 PO.

As described in that TRR, the DOE modeled different intrusion times for the soil-drilling and grout-drilling scenarios. Although the DOE plans to maintain control of SRS in perpetuity, the NRC staff found that in the DOE deterministic inadvertent intrusion analysis in the DOE 2020 PA, the DOE assumed an individual would drill a well into soil near a disposal structure 100 years after closure. For the grout-drilling intrusion scenario, the DOE assumed that an individual would only drill into saltstone grout after a disposal structure roof was completely degraded. In that TRR, the NRC staff found that the DOE basis for the modeled intrusion time was acceptable; however, the NRC staff also conducted an independent analyses of earlier intrusion into saltstone grout to risk-inform the NRC staff review.

As described in that TRR, for both the soil-drilling and grout-drilling cases, the DOE evaluated chronic and acute exposure scenarios. The DOE acute exposure scenarios projected the dose to the hypothetical individual who drilled a well into either contaminated soil or saltstone grout.

The DOE chronic exposure scenarios projected the dose to an individual who lived on the SDF after contaminated drill cuttings were brought to the surface. The results of the DOE analyses showed larger projected doses for a chronically exposed individual than for an acutely exposed individual. In the DOE chronic exposure scenario, the NRC staff found that Tc-99 and I-129 were the only two risk-significant radionuclides. For the acute scenario, the DOE projected that Pu-239, Sn-126, Pu-240, and Am-241 were the most risk-significant radionuclides. In that TRR, the NRC performed independent analyses and the NRC staff found that Sr-90 could be a significant dose contributor in acute exposure scenarios in a grout-drilling case if the modeled time of intrusion was moved from the assumed time of complete disposal structure roof degradation (e.g., 1,371 years for a 375-foot disposal structure) to the time of the assumed end of institutional controls (i.e., 100 years after SDF closure).

4.11.1 MF 13.01: Intrusion Source Terms As described in the NRC 2023 TRR entitled, Inadvertent Intrusion Analysis for the U.S.

Department of Energy 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A085), the NRC staff evaluated the DOE intrusion assessment in the DOE 2020 PA (ML20190A056), where the DOE assumed that a driller would use mud rotary drilling to drill into SRS soil and then would switch to a coring bit after the driller encountered increased resistance from a disposal structure.

In that TRR, the NRC staff found that DOE assumption had a significant effect on the projected dose because it affected the modeled volume of drill cuttings brought to the surface. The NRC staff found the DOE assumption that a driller would use a coring bit to drill through a disposal structure was acceptable because it is consistent with current practice of well drillers near SDF when encountering an unusually hard drilling material described in a NRC 2020 Contract Report entitled, Implications of Domestic Water Well Drilling Practices for Inadvertent Intruder Scenarios, (ML20349G094). In that TRR, the NRC staff found the resulting grout cutting volume was acceptable for modeling chronic exposure because, when a driller uses a coring bit,

4-16 only the part of the grout in the annular region of the bit would be pulverized and spread on the land surface.

In that TRR, the NRC staff did not find the volume to be applicable to the DOE modeling of the dose to an acutely exposed individual because a well driller would be exposed to the intact part of the core prior to disposal. Although the NRC staff expects an intact core to provide self-shielding, which would limit the effect of the larger inventory in the drill core compared to the annular region, the self-shielding may not eliminate the effect of the larger inventory in the intact core. The NRC staff found that the projected dose from direct exposure was risk-significant because those were the top two DOE exposure pathways for an inadvertent intruder in a grout-drilling, acute exposure scenario.

In that TRR, the NRC staff did not expect that adding direct exposure from the intact core would change the DOE compliance demonstration. The NRC staff determined that excluding exposure to the core was inconsistent with the DOE exposure scenario for intrusion into a disposal structure, which the NRC staff considered to be a plausible exposure scenario. Therefore, the NRC staff will monitor the development of information related to the dose from external exposure in the acute grout-drilling scenario.

In that TRR, for the grout-drilling chronic exposure scenario, the NRC staff found that the DOE support for the minimum garden size, which the DOE based on the volume of the drill cuttings in a soil-drilling scenario, would not apply. Therefore, the NRC staff will monitor the development of information about the volume of soil that grout drill cuttings could be mixed with. More detailed information on Intrusion Source Terms is in Section 3.4 of that TRR.

As described in the NRC 2023 TER (ML23024A099), the NRC Opened a new low priority monitoring factor entitled Intrusion Source Term under MA 13 (Inadvertent Intrusion) under the PO of §61.42.

The NRC expects to Close MF 13.01 (Intrusion Source Terms) under the PO of §61.42 after the NRC has determined that there is adequate DOE support for the source term assumptions in the DOE intrusion assessment.

4.11.2 MF 13.02: Intrusion Exposure Pathways As described in the NRC 2023 TRR entitled, Inadvertent Intrusion Analysis for the U.S.

Department of Energy 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A085), the NRC staff found a resident farmer exposure scenario and the exposure pathway parameters that the DOE used for chronic exposures in the DOE 2020 PA (ML20190A056) were acceptable.

In that TRR, the NRC staff found well drilling was an acceptable exposure scenario for the DOE acute scenarios in the DOE 2020 PA. The NRC staff found most parameters used in the well drilling scenario in the DOE 2020 PA were either realistic or conservative. The NRC staff did not find the soil mass loading the DOE used to represent soil inhalation while drilling to be adequately supported in the DOE 2020 PA because the technical basis did not apply to ground-disrupting activities, such as well drilling. As described in that TRR, after performing independent analyses, the NRC staff found that changing the air mass loading during drilling to a more applicable value increased the projected dose by approximately a factor of 10.

Therefore, the NRC staff will monitor the DOE basis for the mass loading factor for the acute

4-17 intrusion well drilling scenario. More detailed information on Intrusion Exposure Pathways is in Section 3.5 of that TRR.

As described in the NRC 2023 TER (ML23024A099), the NRC Opened a new medium priority monitoring factor entitled Intrusion Exposure Pathways under MA 13 (Inadvertent Intrusion) under the PO of §61.42.

The NRC expects to Close MF 13.02 (Intrusion Exposure Pathways) under the PO of §61.42 after the NRC has determined that there is adequate DOE support for the exposure pathway parameters in the DOE intrusion assessment.

4.12 MA 14 - Future Scenarios and Conceptual Models The information in this section for the §61.42 PO is similar to the information in Section 3.11 above for the §61.41 PO.

As described in the NRC 2023 TRR, entitled, Future Scenarios and Conceptual Models for the U.S. Department of Energy 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A088), future site scenarios and conceptual site models are important to the NRC assessing the DOE compliance with the §61.42 PO because future site scenarios determine the environment that an inadvertent intruder would be drilling in, and conceptual site models could help determine the location an intruder may drill or excavate. For more information about Future Scenarios and Conceptual Models, see Section 3.11 above.

4.12.1 MF 14.01: Scenario Development and Defensibility The information in this section for the §61.42 PO is the same as the information in Section 3.11.1 above for the §61.41 PO.

The NRC expects to Close MF 14.01 (Scenario Development and Defensibility) under the PO of

§61.42 after the NRC has determined that the DOE demonstrated that: (1) all plausible future site scenarios have been evaluated in the SDF PA; and (2) the DOE model support for the exclusion or inclusion of the processes and impacts related to plausible climate change, episodic flow, erosion, weathering, and mass wasting are adequate.

4.12.2 MF 14.02: Defensibility of Conceptual Models The information in this section for the §61.42 PO is similar to the information in Section 3.11.2 above for the §61.41 PO.

The NRC will monitor the defensibility of the DOE conceptual models for releases of radionuclides and potential exposures to an inadvertent intruder. If the NRC determines that plausible alternate conceptual models for inadvertent intrusion were not evaluated by the DOE, then the NRC will assess whether the projected doses from those conceptual models are bounded by the models that the DOE evaluated.

The NRC expects to Close MF 14.02 (Defensibility of Conceptual Models) under the PO of

§61.42 after either: (1) the NRC has determined that the DOE demonstrated that all plausible conceptual site models are evaluated in the SDF PA or (2) the effects of plausible conceptual models that were not included in the SDF PA have been bounded by the effects of the plausible conceptual models that were included.

4-18 4.12.3 MF 14.03: Implementation of Conceptual Models The information in this section for the §61.42 PO is similar to the information in Section 3.11.3 above for the §61.41 PO.

For the §61.42 PO, the NRC will evaluate if all plausible conceptual site models of inadvertent intrusion are incorporated in the SDF PA are appropriately represented.

The NRC expects to Close MF 14.03 (Implementation of Conceptual Models) under the PO of

§61.42 after the NRC has determined that all plausible conceptual site models incorporated in the SDF PA are appropriately represented (e.g., that the modeling codes can appropriately represent the conceptual models). Alternatively, the NRC may determine that any effect of the representation will not be significant enough to affect the DOE ability to meet the PO of §61.42 at the SDF.

4.12.4 MF 14.04: Identification and Screening of FEPs The information in this section for the §61.42 PO is the same as the information in Section 3.11.4 above for the §61.41 PO.

The NRC expects to Close MF 14.04 (Identification and Screening of FEPs) under the PO of

§61.42 after the NRC has determined that the DOE demonstrated adequate identification and screening of FEPs.

4.12.5 MF 14.05: Future Designs and Analyses as They Pertain to Potential Degradation Processes and Performance The information in this section for the §61.42 PO is the same as the information in Section 3.11.5 above for the §61.41 PO.

The NRC expects to Close MF 14.05 (Future Designs and Analyses as They Pertain to Potential Degradation Processes and Performance) under the PO of §61.42 after the NRC has determined that the DOE future designs and analyses can exclude or minimize the occurrence of degradation processes previously identified by the NRC enough that the degradation processes will not affect the DOE ability to meet the PO of §61.42 at the SDF.

4.12.6 MF 14.06: Groundwater Yield of the UTRA-UAZ in the SRS Z-Area The information in this section for the §61.42 PO is the same as the information in Section 3.11.6 for the §61.41 PO.

The NRC expects to Close MF 14.06 (Groundwater Yield of the UTRA-UAZ in the SRS Z-Area) under the PO of §61.42 after the NRC has determined that the DOE analysis of the groundwater yield of the UTRA-UAZ in the SRS Z-Area is adequate.

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5-1 5.0 MONITORING TO ASSESS COMPLIANCE WITH 10 CFR 61.43

§61.43, Protection of individuals during operations Operations at the land disposal facility must be conducted in compliance with the standards for radiation protection set out in part 20 of this chapter, except for releases of radioactivity in effluents from the land disposal facility, which shall be governed by

§61.41 of this part. Every reasonable effort shall be made to maintain radiation exposures as low as is reasonably achievable.

The term as low as is reasonably achievable is defined in the Definitions section of this monitoring plan.

The objective of the NDAA-WIR Monitoring activities related to the §61.43 PO is to monitor and assess the DOE compliance with the §61.43 PO through the end of the Institutional Control Period (i.e., 100 years after SDF closure) by determining whether the DOE disposal actions meet the §61.41 PO requirements and the §20.1101(d) requirements for protection of individuals during operations. For workers performing duties on a controlled DOE site under a DOE Radiation Protection Program, the 50 mSv/yr (5 rem/yr) radiation worker dose limit applies.

For members of the public, including workers performing limited activities not covered under a DOE Radiation Protection Program, the 1 mSv/yr (100 mrem/yr) dose limit for members of the public applies for doses from sources other than effluents. The dose to members of the public from effluents is limited to the 0.25 mSv/yr (25 mrem/yr) dose requirement of the §61.41 PO.

10 CFR 20.1101(d) further specifies a constraint of 0.10 mSv/yr (10 mrem/yr) from airborne emissions, excluding Rn-222 and its daughters, to a member of the public likely to receive the highest dose.

In the 2023 NRC TER (ML23024A099), the NRC determined that the NRC staff will continue to monitor the DOE activities under both MA 8 (Environmental Monitoring) and MA 11 (Radiation Protection Program) during DOE operations. The NRC concluded that it had reasonable assurance that waste disposal at the SDF meets the §61.43 PO because the NRC staff evaluated the DOE Radiation Protection Program in one of the early OOVs and found that Program was acceptable and the DOE provides the NRC with routine updates on the doses recorded under the DOE Radiation Protection Program.

The objective of the NDAA-WIR Monitoring activities related to the §61.43 PO is to assess whether the DOE disposal of salt waste at the SDF meets the PO. The monitoring areas related to the §61.43 PO are the following: Environmental Monitoring (MA 8) and Radiation Protection Program (MA 11). Those monitoring areas are important to the §61.43 PO because:

Environmental Monitoring (MA 8) - Monitoring radioactivity in the soil, air, and groundwater at the SRS Z-Area allows the NRC staff to assess the projected dose to individual in the SRS Z-Area during operations.

Radiation Protection Program (MA 11) - Monitoring the DOE implementation of the DOE Radiation Protection Program at the SDF allows the NRC staff to assess the DOE program for monitoring doses to individuals during operations.

5-2 5.1 MA 8 - Environmental Monitoring The information in this section for the §61.43 PO is similar to the information in Section 3.8 above for the §61.41 PO.

Environmental monitoring provides information about the concentrations of radionuclides in the soil, air, and groundwater. Therefore, it provides information about radiological sources an individual could be exposed to onsite during operations. Under MA 8, both MF 8.01 and MF 8.02 affect the §61.43 PO, while MF 8.03 does not affect the §61.43 PO.

5.1.1 MF 8.01: Leak Detection The information in this section for the §61.43 PO is similar to the information in Section 3.8.1 above for the §61.41 PO.

In addition to providing an indication of saltstone waste and disposal structure performance, the concentrations of radionuclides in water pumped from disposal structure pumps also provides information about one of the sources of radioactivity workers can be exposed to during SDF operations.

The NRC expects to Close MF 8.01 (Leak Detection) under the PO of §61.43 after the DOE stops pumping water from sumps installed in disposal structures, which the NRC expects to occur after DOE final waste disposal is completed, and the NRC has determined that it has sufficient information to evaluate the potential for early releases from the disposal structures.

5.1.2 MF 8.02: Groundwater Monitoring The information in this section for the §61.43 PO is similar to the information in Section 3.8.2 above for the §61.41 PO.

As described in the NRC 2023 TRR entitled, Hydrogeology, Groundwater Monitoring, and Far-Field Modeling for the 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site, Rev. 1 (ML23017A084), the DOE monitoring well network and associated DOE plan are designed to detect releases associated with a disposal structure. The DOE groundwater monitoring will continue to expand with the construction of and operation of additional disposal structures. The DOE Saltstone Production Facility is permitted at SRS as a wastewater treatment facility per the South Carolina regulations. The SDF is permitted at SRS as a Class 3 Landfill per the South Carolina regulations. The DOE monitoring wells are sampled and samples are sent for analyses to laboratories certified by SCDES. If a 30 pCi/L threshold is exceeded by a well sample, then the same well and the applicable background well are resampled within 30 days for the specific constituents. If any contingent constituent is above maximum background well concentrations, then it will be added to the list of semi-annual constituents. If the following sample event confirms the exceedance results for a constituent, then a characterization plan to determine plume extent will be developed and submitted to SCDES within 60 days.

The NRC will continue to monitor the DOE groundwater monitoring program and the groundwater monitoring data. The NRC staff expects that groundwater monitoring data may provide information regarding early release of radionuclides from saltstone. The NRC staff expects that monitoring should help ensure protection of individuals during operations because

5-3 the data may provide indicators of saltstone performance, such as unexpected plumes of nitrate or increased alkalinity, and prevent inadvertent intrusion in such a contaminated water body.

The NRC does not expect to Close MF 8.02 (Groundwater Monitoring) under the PO of §61.43 because the NRC will monitor groundwater data in perpetuity at the SDF.

5.2 MA 11 - Radiation Protection Program As described in the NRC 2023 TER (ML23024A099), the DOE has a radiation protection program in place to ensure the protection of individuals during operations. In the DOE Final Basis for Waste Determination for the SDF (ML102850319), the DOE provided a crosswalk of the relevant DOE regulation or limit consistent with that in 10 CFR Part 20 to demonstrate that the DOE regulation or limit provides an equivalent level of protection as 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff evaluated the DOE Radiation Protection Program in OOVs in October 2007 (ML073461038) and March 2008 (ML081290367). Based on those OOVs, the NRC staff determined that the DOE Radiation Protection Program was acceptable. During most, if not all OOVs, the DOE continues to provide the NRC with routine updates on recorded doses. In the NRC 2023 TER,the NRC indicated that the DOE activities for MA 11 (Radiation Protection Program) would be monitored at the SDF through the end of the Institutional Control Period (i.e., 100 years after SDF closure) to verify that the DOE Radiation Protection Program was in place for operations, including worker dose, groundwater, and air effluent.

5.2.1 MF 11.01: Dose to Individuals During Operations As described in the NRC 2023 TER (ML23024A099), the DOE did not provide any information about meeting the §61.43 PO in the DOE 2020 PA (ML20190A056).

The NRC staff expects the DOE compliance with the dose requirements for protection of individuals during operations to be assessed through the use of dosimetry and the monitoring of both radiation data and radiation records. At least annually, the NRC staff should review the DOE reports and records related to dose during waste disposal operations (e.g., records and radiological control documents associated with saltstone operations, including worker dose records) to evaluate whether or not the doses are within the limits in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff typically reviews documentation of doses to SDF workers at each OOV.

The NRC staff should periodically confirm that the programs and policies in the 2006 DOE Final Basis for Waste Determination (ML102850319) continue to be in effect during the operational period. In particular, the NRC staff should verify that personnel involved in the waste disposal operations are provided dosimetry and are familiar with the requirements of the DOE Radiation Protection Program. The NRC staff should verify that the dose to members of the public is assessed appropriately.

As described in the NRC 2023 TER (ML23024A099), the NRC kept MF 11.01 Open as periodic priority under the PO of §61.43.

The NRC expects to Close MF 11.01 (Dose to Individuals During Operations) under the §61.43 PO at the end of the Institutional Control Period (i.e., 100 years after SDF closure).

5-4 5.2.2 MF 11.02: Air Monitoring As described in the SDF Monitoring Plan, Rev. 1 (ML13100A113), the DOE monitors the air quality at the SRS using air sampling stations located at the SRS boundary and in other locations throughout SRS. Also, the DOE monitors the airborne effluents from operating facilities by sampling the emissions from the stacks. On an annual basis, the NRC staff should review air monitoring data associated with the disposal of salt waste during the operation of the SDF to determine whether or not the activity released in the air emissions could cause a member of the public to receive an annual dose of greater than 0.10 mSv/yr (10 mrem/yr) through the air pathway.

The NRC staff should periodically confirm that the DOE air monitoring program continues to adequately assess the airborne emissions from the SDF, particularly if there are any major configuration changes to either the DOE facilities or the air sampling equipment or protocol. The NRC staff should evaluate whether or not the sampling locations and sampling methodology are adequate to assess the dose to a member of the public due to airborne emissions from the SDF. The NRC staff expects the dose from airborne emissions to be small. However, if the airborne emissions dose becomes more risk-significant, then the NRC staff will evaluate the air monitoring program in greater detail.

As described in the NRC 2023 TER (ML23024A099), the NRC kept MF 11.02 Open as periodic priority under the PO of §61.43.

The NRC expects to Close MF 11.02 (Air Monitoring) under the §61.43 PO at the end of the Institutional Control Period (i.e., 100 years after SDF closure).

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6-1 6.0 MONITORING TO ASSESS COMPLIANCE WITH 10 CFR 61.44

§61.44, Stability of the disposal site after closure The disposal facility must be sited, designed, used, operated, and closed to achieve long-term stability of the disposal site and to eliminate to the extent practicable the need for ongoing active maintenance of the disposal site following closure so that only surveillance, monitoring, or minor custodial care are required.

The NRC will continue to assess the DOE compliance with the §61.44 PO regarding closure cap integrity and protection against inadvertent intrusion. Ensuring site stability helps to minimize the access of water to the waste form by helping to maintain the performance of the closure cap. In addition, site stability is important in protecting against inadvertent intrusion because: (1) an intact erosion barrier may deter intruders; and (2) stability increases the likelihood of the site and waste being recognizable for a long period of time.

Site stability is affected by features, events, and processes (FEPs) that affect multiple barriers and by FEPs that are more localized within a single barrier. MA 9 (Site Stability) addresses FEPs that are external to the individual disposal facility components. For example, settlement of the subsurface due to static-loading and dissolution of calcareous sediment (MF 9.01 and MF 9.02) are important because settlement may affect the stability of the disposal structures, waste form, and closure cap. FEPs that are internal to individual components are discussed under the MA most related to that component. For example, erosion of the topsoil layer is discussed under MA 2 (Infiltration and Erosion Control).

The objective of the NDAA-WIR Monitoring activities related to the §61.44 PO is to assess whether the DOE disposal of salt waste at the SDF meets the PO. The DOE is to ensure that the SDF remains physically stable during both operations and the 10,000-year Performance Period. Assessment, which includes an assessment of the physical stability of the waste, disposal structures, engineered barriers above the disposal structures, and the closure cap.

The monitoring areas related to the §61.44 PO are the following: (1) Infiltration and Erosion Control (MA 2); and (2) Site Stability (MA 9). Those monitoring areas are important to the

§61.44 PO because:

Infiltration and Erosion Control (MA 2) - Erosion control slows the degradation of barriers that provide physical stabilization.

Site Stability (MA 9) - Site stability is the §61.44 PO.

6.1 MA 2 - Infiltration and Erosion Control The information in this section for the §61.44 PO is similar to the information in Section 3.2 above for the §61.41 PO.

The closure cap is important to site stability because various components of the closure cap slow erosion (e.g., rip-rap, erosion barrier, expected vegetation) and maintain physical stability.

For more information Infiltration and Erosion Control, see Section 3.2 above.

6-2 6.1.1 MF 2.01: Hydraulic Performance of Closure Cap The information in this section for the §61.44 PO is the same as the information in Section 3.2.1 above for the §61.41 PO.

The NRC expects to Close MF 2.01 (Hydraulic Performance of Closure Cap) under the PO of

§61.44 after the NRC has determined that the DOE support for the assumed hydraulic performance of the as-built closure cap is adequate. Given the importance of construction activities on the performance of the closure cap, this monitoring factor will not be closed prior to construction of the closure cap.

6.1.2 MF 2.02: Erosion Control of the SDF Engineered Surface Cover and Adjacent Area The information in this section for the §61.44 PO is the same as the information in Section 3.2.2 above for the §61.41 PO.

The NRC expects to Close MF 2.02 (Erosion Control of the SDF Engineered Surface Cover and Adjacent Area) under the PO of §61.44 after the NRC has determined that the projected level of erosional degradation of the SDF closure caps and the area adjacent to the SDF closure caps will not be significant enough to affect the DOE ability to meet the PO of §61.44 at the SDF under the DOE Central Scenario climate conditions as well as plausible future wetter and drier climate states. Given the importance of construction activities on the performance of the final engineered surface cover, this monitoring factor will not be closed prior to construction of the cover.

6.1.3 MF 2.03: Confidence in QA/QC for HDPE/GCL Composite Barrier and Drainage Layer Installation The information in this section for the §61.44 PO is the same as the information in Section 3.2.3 above for the §61.41 PO.

The NRC expects to Close MF 2.03 (Confidence in QA/QC for HDPE/GCL Composite Barrier and Drainage Layer Installation) under the POs of §61.44 after the NRC has determined that the DOE installation of the upper HDPE/GCL composite barrier and the ULDL in the planned SDF closure caps is adequate.

6.1.4 MF 2.04: Long-Term HDPE/GCL Composite Barrier and Drainage Layer Degradation The information in this section for the §61.44 PO is the same as the information in Section 3.2.4 above for the §61.41 PO.

The NRC expects to Close MF 2.04 (Long-Term HDPE/GCL Composite Barrier and Drainage Layer Degradation) under the PO of §61.44 after both are met: (1) the NRC has confidence that HDPE degradation in the heat-affected zones near welded seams and at edges, HDPE degradation due to root penetration, GCL degradation due to HDPE defects, and drainage layer degradation due to diminishing hydraulic conductivity will not be significant enough to affect the DOE ability to meet the PO of §61.44 at the SDF; and (2) the NRC has determined that modeled flow rates through the LLDL barrier will not be increasing, so as to become significant enough to affect the DOE ability to meet the PO §61.44 at the SDF.

6-3 6.1.5 MF 2.05: Potential Confined Conditions in the ULDL The information in this section for the §61.44 PO is the same as the information in Section 3.2.5 above for the §61.41 PO.

The NRC expects to Close MF 2.05 (Potential Confined Conditions in the ULDL) under the PO of §61.44 after the NRC has confidence that confined conditions in the ULDL will not occur.

Alternatively, the NRC may determine that, if confined conditions do occur, then they will not become significant enough to affect the DOE ability to meet the PO of §61.44 at the SDF.

6.1.6 MF 2.06: Long-Term Erosion Barrier Performance The information in this section for the §61.44 PO is the same as the information in Section 3.2.6 above for the §61.41 PO.

The NRC expects to Close MF 2.06 (Long-Term Erosion Barrier Performance) under the PO of

§61.44 after the erosion barrier has been constructed by the DOE and the NRC has determined that there is a sufficiently strong technical basis to support the simulated hydraulic performance above, below, and through the erosion barrier. Alternatively, the NRC may determine that any effect due to the DOE assumptions and properties of the erosion barrier will not be significant enough to affect the DOE ability to meet the PO of §61.44 at the SDF.

6.1.7 MF 2.07: Shallow Infiltration The information in this section for the §61.42 PO is the same as the information in Section 3.2.7 above for the §61.41 PO.

The NRC expects to Close MF 2.07 (Shallow Infiltration) under the PO of §61.44 after the NRC has determined that there is a sufficiently strong technical basis to support the DOE method for estimating shallow infiltration rates. Alternatively, the NRC may determine that shallow infiltration rates will not affect the DOE ability to meet the PO of §61.44 at the SDF.

6.2 MA 9 - Site Stability The information in this section for the §61.44 PO is similar to the information in Section 3.9 above for the §61.41 PO.

As described in the NRC 2023 TRR entitled Site Stability for the 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A114),

the key attributes responsible for providing stability of the SDF are the grout waste form and the erosion protection barrier associated with the closure cap. The use of grout will create a solid monolith with little void space and eliminate differential settlement of the cover due to structural collapse of the disposal structures. The proper DOE design, construction, and performance of the erosion barrier are expected by the NRC staff to limit surface water erosion and direct contact of the waste by potential inadvertent intruders.

As described in that TRR, site stability could also be affected by subsurface settlement, which could lead to cracking of the disposal structures and the grout waste form. Cracking is not expected to result in significant structural collapse of the disposal structures; however, the integrity of disposal structure concrete and waste form is important to radionuclide release.

6-4 Settlement could impact the performance of the closure cap due to modifications of the closure cap slope and surface drainage patterns and disruption to closure cap components (e.g., HDPE/GCL composite layer, foundation layer, lateral drainage layer). For more information on Site Stability, see Section 3.9 above.

6.2.1 MF 9.01: Settlement Due to Static-Loading and Seismic Loading The information in this section for the §61.44 PO is similar to the information in Section 3.9.1 above for the §61.41 PO.

As described in the NRC 2023 TRR entitled Site Stability for the 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A114),

the additional loading from the grouting of the disposal structures and the presence of the overlying closure cap will exceed preexisting conditions. That increased overburden may result in the compression of subsurface layers and, consequently, differential settlement. Differential settlement has the potential to disrupt the HDPE/GCL composite layer, which acts as a significant barrier to infiltration in the early part of the 10,000 year Performance Period.

Differential settlement may also affect the performance of the foundation layer and lateral drainage layer, both of which provide long-term barriers to infiltration. The NRC staff will monitor the development of information related to the effects of increased overburden on site stability.

The NRC expects to Close MF 9.01 (Settlement Due to Static-Loading and Seismic Loading) under the PO of §61.44 after the NRC has determined that the DOE settlement projections are consistent with the values assumed in the SDF PA. Alternatively, the NRC may determine that the impacts of settlement on the closure cap, saltstone, and disposal structure concrete will not adversely affect SDF performance enough to affect the DOE ability to meet the PO of §61.44 at the SDF.

6.2.2 MF 9.02: Settlement Due to Dissolution of Calcareous Sediment The information in this section for the §61.44 PO is similar to the information in Section 3.9.2 above for the §61.41 PO.

As described in the NRC 2023 TRR entitled Site Stability for the 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site (ML23017A114),

dissolution of calcareous sediment and the subsequent consolidation of soft zones may result in settlement. In that TRR, the NRC staff described that, in a 1992 document (WSRC-RP-92-450, ML111240587), an ongoing evolution of the subsurface was demonstrated by evidence of dissolution based on elevated bicarbonate ion concentrations and relatively high pH values for groundwater samples collected in or near the Santee formation. Although dissolution of the calcareous sediment in the saturated zone is likely to be a very slow process, the DOE has not demonstrated that dissolution is insignificant with respect to site stability over the course of a 10,000 year Performance Period. For example, in that TRR, the NRC found that subsidence beneath the SDF could result in fracturing in the saltstone grout and disposal structures with increased localized infiltration because of run-in from the surrounding area. The NRC staff will monitor the development of information related to the potential for sink development. The NRC staff should evaluate the DOE assumptions regarding the potential ongoing dissolution of calcareous sediment. The NRC staff should evaluate any new information that the DOE provides to support the determination that projected future dissolution of calcareous sediment is significant to site stability.

6-5 The NRC expects to Close MF 9.02 (Settlement Due to Dissolution of Calcareous Sediment) under the PO of §61.44 after the NRC has determined that any future impacts due to dissolution of calcareous sediment or sink formations (including site stability) will not be significant enough to affect the DOE ability to meet the PO of §61.44 at the SDF.

6.2.3 MF 9.03: Gullying of the Closure Cap The information in this section for the §61.44 PO is the same as the information in Section 3.9.3 above for the §61.41 PO.

The NRC expects to Close MF 9.03 (Gullying of the Closure Cap) under the PO of §61.44 after the NRC has determined that gullying of the closure cap will not adversely affect SDF performance enough to affect the DOE ability to meet the PO of §61.44 at the SDF.

6.2.4 MF 9.04: Sheet and Rill Erosion of the Closure Cap The information in this section for the §61.44 PO is the same as the information in Section 3.9.4 above for the §61.41 PO.

The NRC expects to Close MF 9.04 (Sheet and Rill Erosion of the Closure Cap) under the PO of §61.44 after the NRC has determined that soil loss due to sheet and rill erosion of the closure cap will not adversely affect SDF performance enough to affect the DOE ability to meet the PO of §61.44 at the SDF.

6.2.5 MF 9.05: Slope Stability of the SDF Closure Cap The information in this section for the §61.44 PO is the same as the information in Section 3.9.5 above for the §61.41 PO.

The NRC expects to Close MF 9.05 (Slope Stability of the SDF Closure Cap) under the PO of

§61.44 after the NRC has confidence that a relatively impermeable closure cap in a humid environment under saturated conditions can remain stable for the 10,000 year Performance Period. Alternatively, the NRC may determine that any closure cap instability will not be significant enough to affect the DOE ability to meet the PO of §61.44 at the SDF.

6.2.6 MF 9.06: Flow Through the ULDL The information in this section for the §61.44 PO is the same as the information in Section 3.9.6 above for the §61.41 PO.

The NRC expects to Close MF 9.06 (Flow through the ULDL) under the PO of §61.44 after the NRC has determined that that loss of sand from the ULDL due to flow and entrainment will not adversely affect SDF performance enough to affect the DOE ability to meet the PO of §61.44 at the SDF.

6.2.7 MF 9.07: Degradation of the Erosion Barrier The information in this section for the §61.44 PO is the same as the information in Section 3.9.6 above for the §61.41 PO.

6-6 The NRC expects to Close MF 9.07 (Degradation of the Erosion Barrier) under the PO of

§61.44 after the NRC has determined that that potential degradation of the erosion will not adversely affect SDF performance enough to affect the DOE ability to meet the PO of §61.44 at the SDF.

6.2.8 MF 9.08: Static-Loading Induced Settlement The information in this section for the §61.44 PO is the same as the information in Section 3.9.8 above for the §61.41 PO.

The NRC expects to Close MF 9.08 (Settlement due to Waste Bags in SDS 4) under the PO of

§61.44 after the final amount of grout pumped into SDS 4 Cell C and Cell I, relative to the volume of those cells, has been verified by the NRC and the NRC has determined that the projected settlement of SDS 4 had been modeled adequately. Alternatively, the NRC could determine that the settlement in SDS 4 will not be significant enough to affect the DOE ability to meet the PO of §61.44 at the SDF.

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7-1

7.0 REFERENCES

Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (https://www.congress.gov/108/plaws/publ375/PLAW-108publ375.pdf)

U.S. Department of Energy, WSRC-RP-92-450, Rev. 0, Groundwater Geochemistry of the Savannah River Site and Vicinity, March 31, 1992. ML111240587

_____, Secretary of Energy 3116 Determination for Salt Waste Disposal at the Savannah River Site, January 17, 2006. ML17136A069

_____, DOE Final Basis for Section 3116 Determination for Salt Waste Disposal at the Savannah River Site, January 17, 2006. ML102850319

_____, DOE Disposal Structure Construction Photographs from February 2010, Rev. 0, ML100550095

_____, SRR-CWDA-2018-00036, Rev. 0, Evaluation of Soil and Groundwater Contamination from Saltstone Disposal Unit 4, July 2018. ML20206L238

_____, SRR-CWDA-2019-00001, Rev. 0, Performance Assessment for the for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site, March 2020. ML20190A056

_____, DOE Order 435.1-1, Change 2, Radioactive Waste Management January 11, 2021.

ML21035A224

_____, DOE Manual for DOE Order 435.1-1, Change 3, Radioactive Waste Management Manual, January 11, 2021. ML21035A232

_____, SRR-CWDA202100072, Rev. 1, Comment Response Matrix for the Second Set of U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Staff Requests for Additional Information on the Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site, November 2021. ML21321A087.

_____, SRMC-CWDA-2023-00013, Rev. 1, DOE Presentation for February 1, 2023, NRC Onsite Observation Visit to Savannah River Site Saltstone Disposal Facility, February 2023.

ML23055A095

_____, SRMC-2023-00042, Rev. 0, Saltstone Inventory: Salt Waste Processing Characterization Update, April 27, 2023. ML23122A208 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), EPA-600-R-090-052F, Rev. 0, Exposure Factors Handbook, September 2011. ML14007A666 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), NUREG-1563, Rev. 0, Branch Technical Position on the Use of Expert Elicitation in the High-Level Radioactive Waste Program, November 1996.

ML033500190

_____, SRM-SECY-01-0148, Processes for Revision of 10 CFR Part 20 Regarding Adoption of ICRP Recommendations on Occupational Dose Limits and Dosimetric Models and Parameters, April 12, 2002. ML021050104

7-2

_____, NRC Technical Evaluation Report for the U.S. DOE Savannah River Site Draft Section 3116 Basis for Waste Determination for Salt Waste Disposal, Rev. 0, December 28, 2005.

ML053010225

_____, NRC Plan for Monitoring the U.S. DOE Salt Waste Disposal at the Savannah River Site in Accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Rev. 0, May 3, 2007. ML070730363

_____, NRC NUREG-1854, Rev. 0, NRC Staff Guidance for Activities Related to U.S. DOE Waste Determinations - Draft Final Report for Interim Use, August 2007. ML072360184

_____, NRC Report for Onsite Observation Visit to SRS SDF on October 29-30, 2007, Rev. 0, January 31, 2008. ML073461038

_____, NRC Report for Onsite Observation Visit to SRS SDF on March 24-28, 2008, Rev. 0, June 5, 2008. ML081290367

_____, NRC Report for Onsite Observation Visit to SRS SDF on March 25-26, 2009, Rev. 0, May 22, 2009. ML091320439

_____, NRC Report for Onsite Observation Visit to SRS SDF on June 3, 2009, Rev. 0, September 30, 2009. ML092170006

_____, Package for NRC Documents for NRC Onsite Observation Visit to SRS SDF on April 19, 2010, Rev. 0, July 7, 2010. ML101460044

_____, NRC Report for Onsite Observation Visit to SRS SDF on July 29, 2010, Rev. 0, November 19, 2010. ML102180254

_____, Package for NRC Documents for NRC Onsite Observation Visit to SRS SDF on January 27, 2011, March 15, 2011. ML110670458

_____, NRC Report for Onsite Observation Visit to SRS SDF on April 26, 2011, Rev. 0, August 19, 2011. ML111890319

_____, NRC Technical Evaluation Report for the Revised Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site, South Carolina, Rev. 1, April 2012.

ML121170309

_____, NRC Type-IV Letter of Concern Regarding U.S. DOE Disposal Activities at the Savannah River Site Saltstone Disposal Facility, April 30, 2012. ML120650576

_____, NRC Plan for Monitoring Disposal Actions Taken by the U.S. DOE at the Savannah River Site Saltstone Disposal Facility in Accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Rev. 1, September 2013. ML13100A113

_____, NRC Report for Onsite Observation Visit to SRS SDF on February 4-5, 2015, Rev. 0, May 27, 2015. ML15041A562

7-3

_____, NRC Report for Onsite Observation Visit to SRS SDF on July 7-8, 2015, Rev. 0, September 28, 2015. ML15236A299

_____, NRC Report for Onsite Observation Visit to SRS SDF on April 19-21, 2016, Rev. 0, July 15, 2016. ML16147A197

_____, NRC Technical Review Report: Saltstone Waste Form Hydraulic Performance, Rev. 0, March 23, 2017. ML17018A137

_____, NRC Supplement to the 2013 NRC Saltstone Disposal Facility Monitoring Plan, June 5, 2017. ML17097A351

_____, NRC Supplement to the 2013 NRC Saltstone Disposal Facility Monitoring Plan, March 1, 2018. ML18033A071

_____, NRC Technical Review Report: Groundwater Monitoring at and Near the Planned Saltstone Disposal Facility, May 17, 2018. ML18117A494

_____, NRC Technical Review Report: Update on Projected Technetium Release from Saltstone, Rev. 1, May 22, 2018. ML18095A122

_____, NRC Supplement to the 2013 NRC Saltstone Disposal Facility Monitoring Plan, June 29, 2018. ML18107A161

_____, NRC Supplement to the 2013 NRC Saltstone Disposal Facility Monitoring Plan, October 16, 2018. ML18219B035

_____, NRC Report for Onsite Observation Visit to SRS SDF on July 9-11, 2018, Rev. 0, November 1, 2018. ML18219B859

_____, NRC Technical Review Report: Saltstone Waste Form Physical Degradation, Rev. 0, May 28, 2019. ML19031B221

_____, NRC Supplement to the 2013 NRC Saltstone Disposal Facility Monitoring Plan, August 5, 2019. ML19150A295

_____, NRC Report for Onsite Observation Visit to SRS SDF on September 17, 2019, Rev. 0, November 27, 2019. ML19289A525

_____, NRC Periodic Monitoring Report for the U.S. DOE Non-High-Level Waste Disposal Actions (formerly, NUREG-1911) Report for Calendar Year 2014 through Calendar Year 2018, Rev. 6, October 21, 2019. ML19058A272

_____, NRC Acknowledgement of the U.S. DOE Submittal of the 2020 Savannah River Site Saltstone Disposal Facility Performance Assessment, for Technical Review and Closure of the April 30, 2012, NRC Type-IV Letter Of Concern, July 10, 2020, ML20148M201

_____, NRC Contractor Report, Implications of Domestic Water Well Drilling Practices for Inadvertent Intruder Scenarios, December 2020. ML20349G094

7-4

_____, Package for NRC Documents for NRC Onsite Observation Visit to SRS SDF on August 12, 2021, Rev. 0, September 28, 2021. ML21242A509

_____, NRC Supplement to the 2013 NRC Saltstone Disposal Facility Monitoring Plan, October 18, 2021. ML21279A173

_____, Package for NRC Documents for NRC Onsite Observation Visit to SRS SDF on February 1, 2023, Rev. 0, May 28, 2023. ML23080A284

_____, NRC Technical Evaluation Report for the 2020 Performance Assessment for the Saltstone Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site, Rev. 2, April 2023. ML23024A099

_____, NRC Meeting Summary: U.S. DOE Salt Waste Sampling and Characterization for the Saltstone Disposal Facility, May 31, 2023. ML23122A207

_____, NRC Technical Review Report: Dose and Exposure Pathways Model for the 2020 Performance Assessment for the SDF at the SRS, Rev. 1, April 18, 2023. ML23017A113

_____, NRC Technical Review Report: Future Scenarios and Conceptual Models for the 2020 Performance Assessment for the SDF at the SRS, Rev. 1, April 18, 2023. ML23017A088

_____, NRC Technical Review Report: Hydrogeology, Groundwater Monitoring, and Far-Field Modeling for the 2020 Performance Assessment for the SDF at the SRS, Rev. 1, April 18, 2023. ML23017A084

_____, NRC Technical Review Report: Intrusion Analysis for the 2020 Performance Assessment for the SDF at the SRS, Rev. 1, April 18, 2023. ML23017A085

_____, NRC Technical Review Report: Inventory for the 2020 Performance Assessment for the SDF at the SRS Rev. 1, April 18, 2023. ML23017A087

_____, NRC Technical Review Report: Model Integration for the 2020 Performance Assessment for the SDF at the SRS, Rev. 1, April 18, 2023. ML23017A090

_____, NRC Technical Review Report: Near Field Flow and Transport for the 2020 Performance Assessment for the SDF at the SRS, Rev. 1, April 18, 2023. ML23017A086

_____, NRC Technical Review Report: Percolation Through and Potential Erosion near the Closure Cap for the 2020 Performance Assessment for the SDF at the SRS, Rev. 1, April 18, 2023. ML23017A083

_____, NRC Technical Review Report: Performance of the Composite Barrier Layers and Lateral Drainage Layers for the 2020 Performance Assessment for the SDF at the SRS, Rev.

1, April 18, 2023. ML23017A089

_____, NRC Technical Review Report: Site Stability for the 2020 Performance Assessment for the SDF at the SRS, Rev. 1, April 18, 2023. ML23017A114

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8-1 8.0 LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Name Title/Degrees Harry Felsher Senior Project Manager M.S., Nuclear Engineering, The Ohio State University M.S., Nuclear Engineering, Texas A&M University B.S., Engineering, University of Maryland A. Christianne Ridge Senior Risk Analyst Ph.D., Environmental Engineering, University of California-Berkeley M.S., Environmental Engineering, Cornell University B.A., Physics, Drew University George Alexander Risk Analyst Ph.D., Energy & Geo-Environmental Engineering, The Pennsylvania State University M.S., Energy & Geo-Environmental Engineering, The Pennsylvania State University B.S., Geo-Environmental Engineering, The Pennsylvania State University Hans Arlt Senior Risk Analyst Dr. rer. nat. (rerum naturalium), Natural Science, Technical University of Berlin B.S., Geological Sciences, University of Wisconsin B.A., International Relations, University of Wisconsin Gianni Nelson Project Manager B.S., Nuclear Engineering, South Carolina State University