ML23200A201
| ML23200A201 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 06/27/2023 |
| From: | NRC/RGN-III |
| To: | DTE Energy |
| Bryan Bergeon | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML22007A063 | List: |
| References | |
| Download: ML23200A201 (1) | |
Text
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 1 of 12 Simulator Scenario Summary NRC Form 3.3-1 Scenario Outline Facility:
Fermi 2 Scenario #:
1 Source:
New Op Test #
2023 ILT Examiners:
Applicants/
Operators:
Validating Operators:
A. Snowberger (CRS)
J. Walters (BOP)
D. Roberts (ATC)
J. Holdwick (CRS)
S. Erickson (ATC)
G. Pezzino (BOP)
Initial Conditions:
68%, no equipment out of service, Rod Pattern Adjust (RPA) is in progress Turnover:
Reactor Power is at 68% near the end of a Rod Pattern Adjustment. When you take the shift, you will be expected to withdraw control rods to achieve the target rod pattern in accordance with the rod pull sheets to be provided.
Critical Tasks:
(CT-1, SC-SCRAM) With reactor at power and with a primary system discharging into the secondary containment MANUALLY SCRAM the reactor, before any area exceeds the Maximum Safe Operating (MSO) levels.
(CT-2, SC-ED) With a primary system discharging into the secondary containment and area radiation/temperature/water levels exceed maximum safe operating levels in more than one area, INITIATE Emergency Depressurization.
Event No.
Malf No.
Event Type* /
Position Event Description 1
N/A R
ATC The exam team will brief the crew on the status of the plant, specifically regarding the rod pattern adjustment in progress.
The crew will take the shift and perform a short brief for the rod pull evolution. The crew will then complete the rod pull as briefed.
2 C51MF0197 I
ATC/SRO When the 5th rod, which is CR 30-55, is selected and withdrawn past position 14, RBM A will fail. The crew will need to respond using ARPs, which will send them to 23.607 to bypass the RBM. The CRS will evaluate Tech Specs and determine TS 3.3.2.1 is applicable.
TS SRO
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 2 of 12 Simulator Scenario Summary Event No.
Malf No.
Event Type* /
Position Event Description 3
D11MF0021 TS SRO East Fuel Pool Division 1 Radiation Monitor will fail downscale.
The crew will take action per ARP 3D27 to investigate the cause. This CRS will evaluate Tech Specs and determine that TS 3.3.6.2 and TS 3.3.7.1 are applicable.
4 Multiple C
ATC/SRO Loss of CRD Pump suction pressure caused by failure of the CRD Suction Pressure Control Valve will cause the running CRD pump to trip. If the standby pump is started, it will also trip. A CRD pump will be restored by directing field actions to manually bypass the CRD pump suction PCV and then starting a CRD pump 5
N30MF0051 C
BOP/SRO An event will occur that will cause a loss of the in-service pressure regulator to fail low. As a result, the system will swap to the backup regulator. The crew will take actions per the AOP to complete the swap to the backup pressure regulator.
MC BOP 6
E41MF0007 E41RF0033 M
ALL Steam leaking from the HPCI system will cause the crew to enter 20.000.02, Abnormal Release of Radioactive Material and 29.100.01 Sheet 5, Secondary Containment Control.
Attempts to isolate the steam leak will be unsuccessful and HPCI room temperatures will approach the Maximum Safe Operating (MSO) value 7
P603_A048_3 C
ATC/SRO With HPCI room temperatures approaching MSO, the SRO should direct the Mode Switch taken to Shutdown BEFORE the MSO is reached (CT-1, SC-SCRAM).
MC ATC 8
N30MF0070 N30MF0072 B21MF0030 C
BOP/SRO With the HPCI watertight door unable to be closed, the crew will attempt to anticipate emergency depressurization by opening Main Turbine Bypass Valves. Both BPVs will fail to operate.
Div 2 CSS Pump Room temperature will begin to rise and eventually exceed Maximum Safe Operating temperature of 210F. This will prompt the crew to emergency depressurize the plant using 5 SRVs, ADS preferred (CT-2, SC-ED).
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Tech Spec, (MC)Manual Control
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 3 of 12 Simulator Scenario Summary A. INITIAL CONDITIONS / PRE-SHIFT BRIEFING:
Plant is at 68% power for Rod Pattern Adjustment, with the following:
The Core Monitor is inhibited.
Core flow is approximately 70%.
The Rod Line is approximately 85%.
GOP Section 5.0, Power Decrease, was completed through Step 5.2.13.
o Turbine Flow Limiter is 5% above reactor power.
o CFD H was removed from service.
o East HFP was shut down.
GOP 22.000.03 Section 4.0, Power Increase, is in progress currently at step 4.2.18 (next action to take is at 75% power).
The crew is to continue rod withdrawal when you take the shift.
The STA will perform duties as the Rx Management SRO.
The 3rd LNO will perform duties as the Rod Movement Verifier.
Signed, approved copies of the Reactivity Maneuvering Plan Step Sheets are available. In summary, withdrawal Group 10/1 rods as follows:
o Group 10/1 from 00 to 12. Predicted power increase is 2% total (0.5% per rod).
o Group 10/1 from 12 to 20. Predicted power increase is 2% total (0.5% per rod).
o Group 10/1 from 20 to 30. Predicted power increase is 2.5% total (0.6% per rod). RBM Upscale may occur during these rod pulls. Analyses for Thermal Limit verifications have been pre-performed.
o Group 10/1 from 30 to 48. Predicted power increase is 2.0% total (0.5% per rod).
Additional RMP Step Sheets, and guidance for raising Core Flow, will be provided after the above is complete.
Please conduct your Reactivity Management brief, and prepare all procedures to support rod withdrawal, prior to taking the shift.
No additional equipment is out of service.
All licensed operators are in the Main Control Room (MCR).
Normal shift complement of non-licensed operators are available.
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 4 of 12 Simulator Scenario Summary B.
SUMMARY
OF EVENTS Event 1:
Pull Rods to target rod pattern using provided pull sheets The exam team will brief the crew on the status of the plant, specifically regarding the rod pattern adjustment in progress. The crew will take the shift and perform a short brief for the rod pull evolution. The crew will then complete the rod pull as briefed.
Event 2:
On 3rd rod pull, RBM A failure will occur When the 5th rod, which is CR 30-55, is selected and withdrawn past position 14, RBM A will fail. The crew will need to respond using ARPs, which will send them to 23.607 to bypass the RBM. The CRS will evaluate Tech Specs and determine TS 3.3.2.1 is applicable.
Event 3:
FP Vent Exhaust Downscale East Fuel Pool Division 1 Radiation Monitor will fail downscale. The crew will take action per ARP 3D27 to investigate the cause. This CRS will evaluate Tech Specs and determine that TS 3.3.6.2 and TS 3.3.7.1 are applicable.
Event 4:
Loss of CRD Suction Loss of CRD Pump suction pressure caused by failure of the CRD Suction Pressure Control Valve will cause the running CRD pump to trip. If the standby pump is started, it will also trip. A CRD pump will be restored by directing field actions to manually bypass the CRD pump suction PCV and then starting a CRD pump Event 5:
Pressure Regulator Fault An event will occur that will cause a loss of the in-service pressure regulator to fail low. As a result, the system will swap to the backup regulator. The crew will take actions per the AOP to complete the swap to the backup pressure regulator.
Event 6:
HPCI Steam Leak to MSO Steam leaking from the HPCI system will cause the crew to enter 20.000.02, Abnormal Release of Radioactive Material and 29.100.01 Sheet 5, Secondary Containment Control. Attempts to isolate the steam leak will be unsuccessful and HPCI room temperatures will approach the Maximum Safe Operating (MSO) value
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 5 of 12 Simulator Scenario Summary Event 7:
HPCI>MSO, Mode Switch fails, RPS push buttons work, Div 2 CS Pump area temp rising With HPCI room temperatures approaching MSO, the SRO should direct the Mode Switch taken to Shutdown BEFORE the MSO is reached (CT-1, SC-SCRAM).
When the Mode Switch is taken to Shutdown, the crew will be informed that the watertight door to the HPCI room is open and unable to be closed. This will cause rising temperatures in the Div 2 Core Spray Pump Room area Event 8:
Anticipate ED, BPV failure, 2 areas > MSO, ED With the HPCI watertight door unable to be closed, the crew will attempt to anticipate emergency depressurization by opening Main Turbine Bypass Valves. Both BPVs will fail to operate.
Div 2 CSS Pump Room temperature will begin to rise and eventually exceed Maximum Safe Operating temperature of 210F. This will prompt the crew to emergency depressurize the plant using 5 SRVs, ADS preferred (CT-2, SC-ED).
Termination Criteria Scenario is terminated following ED when plant is stable, at the discretion of the Lead Evaluator.
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 6 of 12 Simulator Scenario Summary C. SIMULATOR SETUP SCENARIO SPECIFIC SETUP:
- 1. Initialize the simulator to IC-171
- a. SELECT any withdrawn rod and notch in then out to clear IPCS alarms.
- b. FREEZE the simulator and save the IC for later use (or in case something happens).
- 2. PLACE the simulator in RUN.
- 3. OPEN and EXECUTE lesson ILT 2023 Scenario 1.
- 4. TRIGGER Setup step
- 5. For ROD PULL Steps, PRINT and SIGN the following and place on CRSs desk:
- a. The first page of RMP Step Sheets for group 10/1 (from 00 to 12).
- b. Predictor sheet for the rod pulls.
- c. Maneuvering plan.
- 6. MARK GOP 22.000.03 complete through step 5.2.13 (Power Decrease section).
- 7. Turn GOP 22.000.03 to page 16, Step 4.2.18 (Power Increase section).
- 8. REMOVE red CRAM Array dots.
- 9. REMOVE CRAM Book from MCR.
GENERIC SETUP:
- 1. PROVIDE crew a list of available NOs
- 2. ENSURE that all annunciators are acknowledged and the plant is stable
- 3. ACKNOWLDGE DCS alarms
- 4. VERIFY GSW placard is in place and indicates INTERMITTENT.
- 5. VERIFY CFD placard has current dates (within the last 14 days is acceptable).
- 6. COMPLETE Attachment 1 of NTWI 5.12
- 7. ALLOW the operators to enter the room, provide them with a turnover in accordance with Section E, and allow them to walk down the panels
- 8. ENSURE simulator alarms are NOT silenced
- 9. TRIGGER steps as directed by the guide/Lead Evaluator
- 10. START Simulator data recorder
- 11. RECORD communications with crew members on NTWI 5.12 Attachment 3
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 7 of 12 Simulator Scenario Summary D. CRITICAL TASKS CRITICAL TASK EVALUATION CRITERIA SAT UNSAT NA CT-1, SC-SCRAM - With reactor at power and with a primary system discharging into the secondary containment, MANUALLY SCRAM the reactor before any area exceeds any Maximum Safe Operating (MSO) value.
Safety Significance: If temperatures in any one of the areas listed in in tables 11, 12, 13, or 14 of the Secondary Containment Control EOP approach their maximum safe operating value, adequate core cooling, containment integrity, safety of personnel, or continued operability of equipment required to perform EPG actions can no longer be assured. A reactor scram is initiated through entry of the RPV Control guideline to reduce the primary system discharge into secondary containment and in anticipation of possible RPV depressurization.
Safety significant boundary conditions: Defined by the BWROG EPGs/SAGs, appendix B, rev 4. This analysis requires that a reactor scram be initiated prior to any area radiation, water level, or temperature reaches its max safe value. If indicated parameters in any one of the areas listed in tables 11, 12, 13, or 14 of the Secondary Containment Control EOP approach their maximum safe operating value, adequate core cooling, containment integrity, safety of personnel, or continued operability of equipment required to perform EOP related actions can no longer be assured. Therefore, a manual scram is required prior to reaching any of these indicated values.
Failure Criteria reasoning: Crew will fail if the reactor is not scrammed BEFORE any secondary containment parameter (Radiation / Temperature / Water Level) reaches its max safe (MSO) value.
Initiating Cue: Primary system discharging into secondary containment and any area parameter is approaching maximum safe operating levels.
Measurable Performance Standard: Mode Switch is placed in Shutdown and/or RPS pushbuttons depressed prior to the MSO value being reached.
Performance Feedback: RPS actuates, all control rods indicate full in and reactor power decreasing.
Expected action: Reactor Mode Switch placed in Shutdown and/or RPS pushbuttons depressed.
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 8 of 12 Simulator Scenario Summary CRITICAL TASK EVALUATION CRITERIA SAT UNSAT NA CT-2, SC-ED - With a primary system discharging into the secondary containment and area radiation/temperature/water levels exceed maximum safe operating levels in more than one area, INITIATE Emergency Depressurization.
Safety Significance Should secondary containment temperatures exceed their maximum safe operating values in more than one area, the RPV must be depressurized to preclude further temperature increases.
Safety significant boundary conditions: Defined by the BWROG EPGs/SAGs, appendix B, rev 4. This analysis requires that an emergency depressurization be performed if secondary containment temperatures continue to increase and exceed their maximum safe operating values in more than one area. RPV depressurization places the primary system in its lowest possible energy state, rejects heat to the suppression pool in preference to outside the containment, and reduces the driving head and flow of primary systems that are un-isolated and discharging into the secondary containment.
Failure Criteria reasoning: Crew will fail if 2 SRVs or the Main Turbine Bypass valves are not open and area radiation/temperature/water levels exceed maximum safe operating levels in more than one area for greater than 6 minutes (2 x validated time).
Initiating Cue: Primary system discharging into the secondary containment and area temperatures exceed maximum safe operating levels in more than one area.
Measurable Performance Standard: Initiate emergency depressurization using SRVs - OR - anticipate emergency depressurization and depressurize using Bypass valves ignoring cooldown rates such that the reactor vessel is depressurized.
Performance Feedback: SRVs or BPVs indicate open and reactor pressure lowering.
Expected action: Open 5 SRVs - OR - fully open main turbine bypass valves.
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 9 of 12 Simulator Scenario Summary E. LIST OF MALFUNCTIONS The following malfunctions and/or remote functions are to be active/activated as indicated in the time line:
MF/RF/PO/LBL DESCRIPTION TARGET VALUE STEP NO.
RAMP DELAY insert C11RF0398 Mode SW Failure RESET S1 0
0 insert C71MF0006 ACTIVE 0
0 cd= P603_A048_1 EQ 1 AND H_P804_B002_2 EQ 0
East and West BPVs fail closed when MS in S/D N/A S2 0
0 insert N30MF0070 ACTIVE 0
5 insert N30MF0072 ACTIVE 0
5 Insert C51MF0197 cd= H_P603_A0550631_2 eq 1 and H_P603_B091_2 eq 1 and P603_A059_3 eq 1
RBM A Failure conditional on rod select ACTIVE 1A 0
0 insert D11MF0021 N010A Fuel Pool Vent D1 East Rad Mon Fail 0.0 3
0 0
insert C103N018ZNPCAP Loss of CRD Suction 30.0 4
0 0
insert C101F412TASTEM 0
0 0
insert C101F412ZMANTYP 1
0 0
insert C101F212ZDIREC TRUE 0
0 insert C97MF0298 Failed-On 0
0 insert C101F412TASTEM Manual CRD Suction Control 1.0 4a 0
0 insert C103N018ZNPCAP 0.001431 41 0
0 insert C97MF0298 Inactive 0
0 insert C11RF0210 Reset CRD High Temp RESET 4b 0
0 insert N30MF0051 Press Reg Fails LOW 900.0 5
60 0
insert EOPRF0022 Unisolable HPCI Steam Leak DEFEAT 6
0 0
insert E4BDK34TVSP 0
0 0
insert E41MF0007 25 700 0
insert E41MF0008 cd='H_P602_B112_2 EQ 1'
99 0
0
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 10 of 12 Simulator Scenario Summary MF/RF/PO/LBL DESCRIPTION TARGET VALUE STEP NO.
RAMP DELAY insert E41RF0033 cd='H_P602_B206_2 EQ 1' OPEN 0
0 insert C71MF0006 cd=H_P603_B211_1 EQ 1 Clears scram MF with RPS Pushbuttons CLEAR 6A 0
0 P603_A048_1 Triggers Event 7/8 steps EQ 1 7/8 0
0 cd=NBKGANA_COND795 942OUT LE 350 AND H_P601_A197_2 EQ 0 Continues Temp Ramp if RPV < 350 psig BEFORE ED N/A 7/8 0
0 insert TA20TEN207TFASIS TRUE 0
0 insert TA20TEN207ZSOUT delay=0 ramp=on=0 off=0 225 300 0
insert TA20TEN206ZSOUT delay=0 ramp=on=0 off=0 225 360 0
cd= TA20TEN207ZSOUT GT 140 Ramps Temp in 2nd area N/A 0
0 insert TA20TEN206TFASIS TRUE 0
0 insert TA20TEN206ZSOUT 225 360 0
cd=H_P601_A197_2 EQ 1 Ramps down Room Temps after ED N/A 0
0 insert TA20TEN207TFASIS TRUE 0
0 insert TA20TEN206ZSOUT 100 600 0
insert TA20TEN207ZSOUT 100 600 0
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 11 of 12 Simulator Scenario Summary F. REFERENCES The following is a list of expected Procedure References used in this scenario:
PROCEDURE TITLE 1D66 STEAM LEAK DETECTION AMBIENT TEMP HIGH 1D70 STEAM LEAK DETECTION DIFF TEMP HIGH 3D1 CRD PUMP A/B SUCTION PRESSURE LOW 3D5 CRD CHARGING H2O PRESSURE LOW 3D10 CRD ACCUMULATOR TROUBLE 3D13 CRD HYDRAULIC TEMPERATURE HIGH 3D18 IPCS MONITORED INPUTS ABNORMAL 3D27 DIV I/II FP VENT EXH RADN MONITOR DNSCL/INOP 3D34 SEC CONTM TEMP HIGH-HIGH EOP ENTRY 3D96 MOTOR TRIPPED 3D109 RBM UPSCALE/INOP 3D110 RBM DOWNSCALE 3D111 RBM TROUBLE 3D113 CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL BLOCK 4D91 ELECTRIC GOVERNOR TROUBLE 5D126 NORMAL HOTWELL SUPPLY PUMP AUTO START 16D27 FIRE ALARM 20.000.02 ABNORMAL RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL 20.106.01 CRD HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FAILURE 20.109.02 REACTOR PRESSURE CONTROLLER FAILURE
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 12 of 12 Simulator Scenario Summary PROCEDURE TITLE 23.106 CONTROL ROD DRIVE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM 23.607 ROD BLOCK MONITORING SYSTEM 23.601 INSTRUMENT TRIP SHEETS 23.623 REACTOR MANUAL CONTROL SYSTEM 29.ESP.21 DEFEAT OF TORUS WATER MANAGEMENT ISOLATIONS AND TORUS LEVEL CONTROL TS 3.3.2.1 Control Rod Block Instrumentation TS 3.3.6.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation TS 3.3.7.1 Control Room Emergency Filtration (CREF) System Instrumentation
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 1 Page 1 of 19 Event 1 Rod pattern adjustment Type:
RX Event
Description:
The exam team will brief the crew on the status of the plant, specifically regarding the rod pattern adjustment in progress. The crew will take the shift and perform a short brief for the rod pull evolution. The crew will then complete the rod pull as briefed.
Symptoms/Cues: Crew begins rod pull after taking the shift.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior T0 min Booth Action Trigger Event 1 placeholder. Event 2 will trigger automatically when CR 30-55 is withdrawn past position 14 T0 +1 min CRS/ATC Will conduct brief of reactivity manipulation.
T0 +5 min ATC Continues rod withdrawal, as directed, per the approved rod pull sheets:
Turns on Rod Select Power.
Selects next Control Rod (CR) using Rod Select Matrix Push Button.
Verifies the correct CR is selected using the 4-Rod Display, the RWM, the Full Core Display, IPCS and the Rod Block Monitor.
Communicates selected CR, and target position, to the Rod Movement Verifier.
Withdraws selected CR to one notch shy of target position.
Withdraws selected CR to target position.
Communicates CR position to Rod Movement Verifier.
Selects the next CR for movement.
Completes the above actions for these rod movements:
Group 10/1 (30-55, 30-07, 54-31 and 06-31) from 00 to 12.
Group 10/1 (30-55) from 12 to 20.
NOTE: When CR 30-55 is moved past position 14, Event 2 will automatically trigger.
SRO Provides oversight of CR withdrawals.
Acknowledges communications from the ATC.
Ensures BOP is monitoring secondary plant for power rise.
BOP Monitors secondary plant for power rise.
Assists ATC as necessary to support CR withdrawal.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 1 Page 2 of 19 Event 2 RBM A Failure Type:
I, TS Event
Description:
When the 5th rod, which is CR 30-55, is selected and withdrawn past position 14, RBM A will fail. The crew will need to respond using ARPs, which will send them to 23.607 to bypass the RBM. The CRS will evaluate Tech Specs and determine TS 3.3.2.1 is applicable.
Symptoms/Cues: Alarms 3D110, RBM DOWNSCALE and 3D113, CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL BLOCKED will be received. RBM A will indicate downscale.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior T0 +25 min ATC Responds to 3D110, RBM DOWNSCALE and 3D113, CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL BLOCKED:
Monitors RBM displays to determine cause.
Notes that RBM A power is 0.0% and reports to CRS.
May recommend bypassing RBM per 23.607.
May direct NO to Relay Room to investigate.
Role Play NO/STA: If contacted to walk down RBM A in the RR:
Wait 2 minutes and REPORT: RBM A shows downscale in the Relay Room. No obvious indications as to why.
SRO Acknowledges report from RO and:
Directs ATC to bypass RBM A per 23.607 section 5.1 May contact SNE to evaluate cause of alarm and actions to be taken.
Evaluates TS for INOPERABLE RBM.
Role Play SNE: If contacted about 3D110, 3D113 and RBM failure:
ACKNOWLEDGE report from the MCR.
ATC Acknowledges CRS direction to bypass the RBM.
Bypasses RBM IAW 23.607 Section 5.1:
Places RBM BYPASS joystick in position A Verifies white RBM A Bypassed light is ON Verifies BYPASS displayed on RBM A display May direct NO to walk down RBM display in the Relay Room.
Role Play NO/STA:If contacted walk down RBM A in the RR after it has been bypassed.
Wait 1 minute and REPORT: RBM A shows bypassed.
SRO Conducts follow-up brief for actions to contact WWM, write CARD, etc., and TS Impact. LCO: TS 3.3.2.1, Control Rod Block Inst.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 1 Page 3 of 19 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior TS Impact TS 3.3.2.1, Control Rod Block Instrumentation:
The control rod block instrumentation for each Function-in table 3.3.2.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One rod block monitor (RBM) channel inoperable A.1 Restore RBM channel to OPERABLE status 24 Hours
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 1 Page 4 of 19 Event 3 East Fuel Pool Div 1 Rad Monitor downscale failure Type:
TS Event
Description:
East Fuel Pool Division 1 Radiation Monitor will fail downscale. The crew will take action per ARP 3D27 to investigate the cause. This CRS will evaluate Tech Specs and determine that TS 3.3.6.2 and TS 3.3.7.1 are applicable.
Symptoms/Cues: 3D27, Div I/II FP Vent Exh Rad Monitor Dnscl/Inop and downscale indication on the Div 1 East Fuel Pool Vent Exh Radiation Monitor (back of H11-P601).
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior T0 +40 min Booth Action:
Trigger Event 3 to initiate East FP Div 1 Rad Monitor Downscale Failure (D11MF0021).
ATC/BOP Responds to alarm 3D27, Div I/II FP Vent Exh Rad Monitor Dnscl/Inop.
Directs an NO/LNO/RTC to the H11-P606 panel to check Rad Monitors at D11-R605.
Role Play NO/LNO/RTC: If dispatched wait 3 minutes and REPORT: D11-K609A (Div 1 Fuel Pool East Vent Exh Duct Rad Monitor) is downscale (<0.01 mr/hr) with a white downscale light lit. All other Fuel Pool Rad Monitors indicate about 0.1 mr/hr.
NO/LNO/RTC: If asked (per ARP), Mode Switch is in OPERATE.
NO/LNO/RTC: If asked to attempt to clear the alarm (per the ARP), report that you depressed the RESET pushbutton and the indications are the same as before.
BOP Checks indications on back of P601.
Recognizes and reports Div 1 East Fuel Pool Vent Exh Rad Monitor is downscale.
SRO Acknowledges reports for Fuel Pool Rad Monitor failure.
Reviews 23.601 and Evaluates Technical Specifications Conducts follow up brief with crew.
May notify Work Control personnel of Rad Monitor failure.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 1 Page 5 of 19 TS Impact TS 3.3.6.2, Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation:
The secondary containment isolation instrumentation for each function in Table 3.3.6.2-1 shall be OPERABLE. Function 3 is affected.
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more channels inoperable A.1 Place channel in trip 24 Hours TS Impact TS 3.3.7.1, Control Room Emergency Filtration (CREF) System Inst.
The CREF System instrumentation for each Function in table 3.3.7.1-1 shall be OPERABLE. Function 3 is affected.
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required channels inoperable A.1 Enter condition referenced in table 3.3.7.1-1 for the channel.
Immediately B. As required by Required Action A.1 and referenced in table 3.3.7.1-1 B.2 Place channel in trip.
24 Hours
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 1 Page 6 of 19 Event 4 Failed CRD Suction Pressure Control Valve Type:
C Event
Description:
Loss of CRD Pump suction pressure caused by failure of the CRD Suction Pressure Control Valve. This will cause the running CRD pump to trip. If the standby pump is started, it will also trip. A CRD pump will be restored by directing field actions to manually bypass the CRD pump suction PCV and then starting a CRD pump.
Symptoms/Cues: 3D1, CRD Suction Pressure Low. Trip of the running CRD Pump.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior T0 +50 min Booth Action Trigger Event 4 to initiate Loss of CRD Pump Suction.
ATC Recognizes and reports trip of the running CRD Pump.
Recognizes and reports receipt of 3D1, CRD PUMP A/B SUCTION PRESSURE LOW.
SRO Acknowledges report of tripped CRD Pump:
Enters 20.106.01 - Loss of CRD Hydraulics AOP.
Makes plant announcement.
Reviews / discusses Immediate Actions (not applicable when RPV Pressure > 900 psig.
Directs monitoring for Override conditions.
Directs Condition A of AOP.
Directs verifying CRD suction pressure in accordance with 3D1.
ATC Directs NO to:
Investigate CRD Suction Control Valve indications locally.
Walkdown 64B-B11 Check CRD Suction Pressure locally (will have to valve in suction pressure gauge).
Isolate Reference Leg Backfill.
Monitors for accumulator trouble alarm(s) and informs CRS when 2nd one received, with at least one on a withdrawn control rod.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 1 Page 7 of 19 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Role Play RB NO: If dispatched:
Wait 3 minutes REPORT: C11-F412 (CRD Suction PCV) is closed locally.
REPORT: Local CRD Suction Pressure is fluctuating between 5 and 15 psig.
RB NO: If dispatched to investigate 64B-B11:
Wait 3 minutes REPORT: No abnormalities found at 64B-B11.
RB NO: If directed to isolate Ref Leg Backfill per 20.106.01 Step A5:
Wait 5 minutes REPORT: Ref Leg Backfill is isolated (no simulator actions necessary).
SRO Acknowledges receipt of accumulator trouble alarm.
Directs monitoring for 20 minutes per Override when 2nd alarm received, with at least one on a withdrawn control rod.
Acknowledges reports of status of CRD Suction Pressure PCV.
Directs bypassing CRD Suction PCV, per 3D1, IAW SOP 23.106.
NOTE:
Override for 20.106.01 - place mode switch in shutdown within 20 minutes if:
Reactor Pressure > 900 psig.
AND More than one accumulator trouble light received (at least one on a withdrawn control rod).
AND No CRD pump running.
ATC/BOP Coordinates / directs NO to bypass CRD Suction PCV IAW 23.106, Section 5.6.2 (ATTACHED)
Reports actions taken and status of CRD to CRS.
Role Play RB NO: When directed to bypass CRD Suction Pressure Controller:
23.106 Sec 5.6 is attached to scenario guide. Follow along with MCR.
Repeat back steps, with 30 second delay, as directed.
RB NO: When directed to throttle open C1100-F031:
Wait 30 seconds Trigger Step 4a - Manual CRD Suction Pressure Control.
Report: Final Pump Suction Pressure is 35 psig.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 1 Page 8 of 19 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Directs standby CRD Pump started IAW 20.106.01 Condition A.
ATC RO perform the following from 20.106.01, Condition A:
Direct NO to Isolate Reference Leg Backfill.
Start Standby CRD Pump Adjust CRD flow (37 to 63 gpm) and drive water pressure (255 to 265).
Contact I&C to restore Reference Leg Backfill.
RO may dispatch NO to check pump ready for start prior to start.
RO inform NO of start of CRD Pump.
Role Play RB NO: If directed to check/report status of CRD Pump:
CRD Pump(s) ready for start.
CRD Pump looks good on start (when re-started after adjusting CRD suction pressure).
RB NO: When directed to clear 3D13:
TRIGGER Step 4b to clear 3D13 malfunction REPORT CRD Hydraulic Temperature High has been reset RB NO: IF asked, report that you made an adjustment and CRD Suction pressure is 35 psig.
I&C: When directed to restore reference leg backfill:
ACKNOWLEDGE direction to isolate reference leg backfill.
No further simulator booth action required.
SRO May conduct follow-up brief
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 1 Page 9 of 19 Event 5 Pressure Regulator Fault Type:
C, MC Event
Description:
An event will occur that will cause a loss of the in-service pressure regulator to fail low. As a result, the system will swap to the backup regulator. The crew will take actions per the AOP to complete the swap to the backup pressure regulator.
Symptoms/Cues: 4D91, ELECTRIC GOVERNOR TROUBLE with a slight rise (~3.5 psig) in reactor pressure and reactor power (~1%).
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior T0 +65 min Booth Action Trigger Event 5 to fail the in-service Pressure Regulator LOW.
ATC/BOP Recognizes and reports a rise in reactor power and reactor pressure.
Responds to 4D91, Electric Governor Trouble.
Diagnoses and reports failure of the in-service pressure regulator.
Diagnoses and reports that auto transfer to the backup pressure regulator.
May direct NO to the RR to investigate.
SRO Acknowledges report from RO.
Enters AOP 20.109.02, Pressure Controller Failure with a Crew Update.
Directs Actions of Condition B of 20.109.02.
BOP Acknowledge direction / performs Actions for 20.109.02 Condition B:
Verify the following:
o Backup Pressure Regulator takes control.
o Indicated Pressure Regulator Setpoints are the same as before the failure.
o Indicated Pressure controlling ~ 3.5 psi higher Return Pressure Setpoint to value prior to failure by:
o Depress Regulator No. 1(2) pushbutton for Pressure Regulator in control.
o Depress Pressure Controls LOWER pushbutton to lower Regulator Pressure Setpoint.
Verify Reactor Pressure returns to value prior to Regulator failure.
SRO Acknowledges actions taken and status of the Pressure Regulator / Reactor Pressure.
Directs BOP to perform Actions of Condition C of 20.109.02.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 1 Page 10 of 19 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Acknowledges direction and directs/coordinates with NO/STA to perform Actions of Condition C of 20.109.02.
Relays information (status) of Reactor Pressure Regulator indications from the RR.
Role Play NO/STA: IF directed to the RR:
WAIT 3 minutes; Then REPORT the lamp test on all 3 alarm modules was sat. The Press. Ref. light is lit on the Pressure Control Module. No other alarm lights are lit.
SRO Directs Actions of Condition D of 20.109.02.
May conduct follow-up brief.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 1 Page 11 of 19 Event 6 HPCI Steam Leak to MSO Type:
MAJ Event
Description:
Steam leaking from the HPCI system will cause the crew to enter 20.000.02, Abnormal Release of Radioactive Material and 29.100.01 Sheet 5, Secondary Containment Control.
Attempts to isolate the steam leak will be unsuccessful and HPCI room temperatures will approach the Maximum Safe Operating (MSO) value.
Symptoms/Cues: 16D27, FIRE ALARM, with no automatic start of the Electric or Diesel Fire Pumps.
Temperature and radiation levels in the HPCI Room will indicate a steam leak rather than a fire.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior T0 +75 min Booth Action Trigger Event 6 to initiate Unisolable HPCI Steam Leak.
BOP Responds to alarm 16D27, Fire Alarm, monitors for start of fire pumps and report to CRS.
Recognizes and reports fire alarm is from Zone 4, HPCI Quad.
Monitors and reports no Auto Start of EFP/DFP.
Monitors for and reports rising temperatures and radiation levels in the HPCI Quad.
May recommend entering AOP for Abnormal Release of Radioactive Material.
May recommend isolating the HPCI System.
SRO Enters EOP 20.000.02 Sheet 5, Abnormal Release of Radioactive Material with a crew update.
May direct RO to attempt to isolate HPCI.
Sounds plant area alarm and announces steam leak over the Hi-Com.
BOP Responds to 1D66, Steam Leak Detection Ambient Temperature High and 1D70, Steam Leak Detection Diff Temp High alarms.
Responds to 3D34, Sec Contm Temp High-High EOP Entry.
Directs an operator to the Steam Leak Detection Panel.
Recognizes and reports EOP entry condition on high HPCI Room Temp.
Role Play NO: IF directed to Steam Leak Detection Panel (RR):
WAIT 5 minutes; Then REFER to IPCS in the Booth REPORT room temperatures as directed by the LNO.
SRO Enters 29.100.01 Sh 5, Secondary Containment Control, on high HPCI room temperature.
Directs isolating the HPCI System.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 1 Page 12 of 19 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Attempts to isolate the HPCI system as directed Recognizes and reports inability to isolate HPCI.
May respond to 2D73, HPCI MOVs Overload, and direct NO to investigate 2PB-1-11B.
Recognizes and reports HPCI Room Temperature still rising and approaching Max Safe Operating (MSO) Value of 210°F.
Role Play NO: IF directed to investigate 2PB1 Pos 11B:
WAIT 5 minutes; Then REPORT 2PB1-11B is tripped on Thermal Overload and there is an acrid odor in the area of the MCC.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 1 Page 13 of 19 Event 7 HPCI>MSO, Mode Switch fails, RPS push buttons work, Div 2 CS Pump area temp rising Type:
C, MC Event
Description:
With HPCI room temperatures approaching MSO, the SRO should direct the Mode Switch taken to Shutdown BEFORE the MSO is reached (CT-1, SC-SCRAM).
When the Mode Switch is taken to Shutdown, the crew will be informed that the watertight door to the HPCI room is open and unable to be closed. This will cause rising temperatures in the Div 2 Core Spray Pump Room area Symptoms/Cues: HPCI room temperature approaches MSO, requiring shutdown.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior T0 +75 min Note Event 7/8 will automatically trigger when MS is taken to shutdown.
Be ready to give Role Play in Event 8 after the MS is taken to Shutdown.
SRO Directs Mode Switch to S/D prior to 210°F.
Enters EOP 20.000.02 Sheet 1, RPV Control for scram (from SH 5)
Announces events over the Hi-Com Requests scram reports ATC Places Mode Switch in S/D when directed.
Recognizes Failure to Scram and pushes manual scram push buttons.
Recognizes all rods are inserted.
CT-1, SC-SCRAM - With reactor at power and with a primary system discharging into the secondary containment, MANUALLY SCRAM the reactor before any area exceeds any Maximum Safe Operating (MSO) value.
Inserts IRMs and SRMs as Immediate Action.
Provides scram reports, including failure of the Mode Switch, when directed.
BOP Provides scram reports when directed.
SRO Acknowledges scram reports from panel operators.
Directs reports for isolations and actuations for Level as they occur.
Directs 173-214 level band.
Directs 500-700 psig pressure band.
Directs entry into/actions from the AOP 20.000.21, Reactor Scram.
Directs monitoring for second area temperature rise and assigns as critical parameter.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 1 Page 14 of 19 Event 8 Anticipate ED, Both BPVs fail, 2 areas > MSO, ED Type:
C Event
Description:
With the HPCI watertight door unable to be closed, the crew will attempt to anticipate emergency depressurization by opening Main Turbine Bypass Valves. Both BPVs will fail to operate.
Div 2 CSS Pump Room temperature will begin to rise and eventually exceed Maximum Safe Operating temperature of 210F. This will prompt the crew to emergency depressurize the plant using 5 SRVs, ADS preferred (CT-2, SC-ED).
Symptoms/Cues: Console operator will deliver Role Play following MS being taken to shutdown.
Temperature in Div 2 CSS Pump Room will begin to rise.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior T0 +75 min Role Play CALL on the radio and REPORT as RB Rounds: I was in the Reactor Building Southeast Sub-Basement. I heard a loud bang and saw a cloud of steam. I tried to close the watertight door to the HPCI area, but the door WOULD NOT close. I have left the area and am exiting the RB..
BOP Acknowledges report from RB rounds, relays information to CRS.
Attempts to lower pressure using the Bypass Valves.
Recognizes / reports failure of the East & West BPVs.
Recognizes / reports rising temperature in Div 2 CSS Pump Room.
Recognizes / reports when Div 2 CSS Pump Room > MSO temperature (210°F).
SRO Directs actions to Anticipate ED by fully opening MT BPVs (if above failure not yet detected).
Acknowledges report of Bypass Valve failure.
Directs monitoring for 2 areas >MSO temperature.
Transitions to ED leg when 2 areas >MSO.
Directs opening 5 SRVs, ADS preferred.
Directs bypassing and restoring Drywell Pneumatics.
BOP/ATC Opens 5 ADS SRVs and reports to CRS.
CT-2, SC-ED - With a primary system discharging into the secondary containment and area radiation/temperature/water levels exceed maximum safe operating levels in more than one area, INITIATE Emergency Depressurization.
Bypasses and restores Drywell Pneumatics per 23.406 Encl. C (attached hardcard) and reports to CRS.
Recognizes and reports EOP Entry Condition on High TWT and High TWL
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 1 Page 15 of 19 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Enters 29.100.01 Sheet 2, Primary Containment Control on High TWT/TWL with Crew Update.
Directs RO to place RHR in Torus Cooling, with cooling maximized.
Directs RO to lower TWL, using TWMS, defeating interlocks if necessary, using 29.ESP.21.
BOP/ATC Places RHR in Torus Cooling and maximizes cooling per 23.205 Encl. A (attached hardcard).
Places RHRSW in operation per 23.208 Encl. B (attached hardcard).
Evaluates RHRSW Temperature and places MDCT fans in service as applicable.
Refers to 29.ESP.21 to lower Torus Water Level.
Lead Evaluator Scenario is terminated following ED when plant is stable and Torus Cooling has been established, at the discretion of the Lead Evaluator.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 1 Page 16 of 19 Trigger step 4a
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 1 Page 17 of 19
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 1 Page 18 of 19
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi 2023 Scenario No.: 1 Page 19 of 19
Predictor Table for 2295 RPS - FOR TRAINING USE ONLY!
Pg 1 of 1 Date/Time Pwr% Flw% Mflcpr Mflpd Maprat Pcrat Rod Line Xe/Rated Keff Delta-T Comment Qual Nightshift / 0600 67.0 70.0 0.734 0.805 0.675 0.908 84.70 0.923 1.00725 1.50 Raise flow to 70%
0001FTNP Dayshift / 0830 69.2 70.0 0.746 0.799 0.687 0.916 87.27 0.945 1.00746 0.30 Withdraw Group 10/1 from 00 to 12 0002FTNP Dayshift / 0840 71.4 70.0 0.829 0.782 0.692 0.882 90.85 0.953 1.00746 0.30 Withdraw Group 10/1 from 12 to 20 0003FTNP Dayshift / 0850 73.7 70.0 0.912 0.823 0.708 0.957 93.27 1.064 1.00746 0.30 Withdraw Group 10/1 from 20 to 30 0004FTNP Dayshift / 0900 76.0 70.0 0.922 0.806 0.712 0.966 95.82 0.946 1.00752 0.30 Withdraw Group 10/1 from 30 to 48 0005FTNP Dayshift / 0910 79.0 70.0 0.946 0.802 0.720 0.994 99.26 0.939 1.00753 0.30 Withdraw Group 10/2 from 00 to 10 0006FTNP Dayshift / 0930 82.0 75.5 0.911 0.860 0.760 1.112 99.42 0.914 1.00748 1.00 Ramp at 3% power per hour 0007FTNF Dayshift / 1030 85.0 80.3 0.902 0.873 0.772 1.151 99.56 0.905 1.00754 1.00 Ramp at 3% power per hour 0008FTNF Dayshift / 1130 88.0 84.5 0.898 0.885 0.783 1.190 99.72 0.895 1.00754 1.00 Ramp at 3% power per hour 0009FTNF Dayshift / 1230 91.0 89.0 0.892 0.897 0.794 1.229 99.92 0.886 1.00752 1.00 Ramp at 3% power per hour 0010FTNF Dayshift / 1330 94.0 93.7 0.886 0.908 0.804 1.267 100.17 0.877 1.00750 1.00 Ramp at 3% power per hour 0011FTNF Dayshift / 1430 97.0 98.4 0.880 0.918 0.813 1.306 101.13 0.870 1.00750 1.00 Ramp at 3% power per hour 0012FTNF Dayshift / 1530 100.0 103.2 0.875 0.928 0.822 1.345 101.28 0.864 1.00751 1.00 Ramp at 3% power per hour 0013FTNF RPA - FOR TRAINING USE ONLY!
Prepared By:
Reviewed By:
Approved By:
Station Nuclear Engineer (Qual #42001413)
Station Nuclear Engineer (Qual #42001413)
Supervisor - RXE Ops Review:
FOR TRAINING USE ONLY!
FOR TRAINING USE ONLY!
John Smith #21654789 Bill Wallace Jr. #46985431 Mike McScrugginsby 4/3/2023 5/10/2023
REACTIVITY MANEUVERING PLAN STEP SHEET 59 55 12 of 51 47 43 39 35 31 12 12 27 23 19 15 11 Control Rod 07 12 LPRM Location 03 02 06 10 12 18 22 26 30 34 38 42 46 50 54 58 Group:
/
/
/
10/1 Notes Page ROD FROM TO P603 Initials Verifier Initials 30-55 00 12 30-07 00 12 54-31 00 12 06-31 00 12 Licensed SRO Date Prepared:
Certified SNE Date Reviewed:
Approved:
Certified SNE / STA Date File: RMP Step Sheets. FOR TRAINING USE ONLY Printed: 7/20/2022 11:00 AM Today Today Today
REACTIVITY MANEUVERING PLAN STEP SHEET 59 55 20 of 51 47 43 39 35 31 20 20 27 23 19 15 11 Control Rod 07 20 LPRM Location 03 02 06 10 12 18 22 26 30 34 38 42 46 50 54 58 Group:
/
/
/
10/1 Notes Page ROD FROM TO P603 Initials Verifier Initials 30-55 12 20 30-07 12 20 54-31 12 20 06-31 12 20 Licensed SRO Date Prepared:
Certified SNE Date Reviewed:
Approved:
Certified SNE / STA Date File: RMP Step Sheets. FOR TRAINING USE ONLY Printed: 7/20/2022 11:00 AM Today Today Today
REACTIVITY MANEUVERING PLAN STEP SHEET 59 55 30 of 51 47 43 39 35 31 30 30 27 23 19 15 11 Control Rod 07 30 LPRM Location 03 02 06 10 12 18 22 26 30 34 38 42 46 50 54 58 Group:
/
/
/
10/1 Notes Page ROD FROM TO P603 Initials Verifier Initials 30-55 20 30 30-07 20 30 54-31 20 30 06-31 20 30 Licensed SRO Date Prepared:
Certified SNE Date Reviewed:
Approved:
Certified SNE / STA Date File: RMP Step Sheets. FOR TRAINING USE ONLY Printed: 7/20/2022 11:00 AM Today Today Today
REACTIVITY MANEUVERING PLAN STEP SHEET 59 55 48 of 51 47 43 39 35 31 48 48 27 23 19 15 11 Control Rod 07 48 LPRM Location 03 02 06 10 12 18 22 26 30 34 38 42 46 50 54 58 Group:
/
/
/
10/1 Notes Page ROD FROM TO P603 Initials Verifier Initials 30-55 30 48 30-07 30 48 54-31 30 48 06-31 30 48 Licensed SRO Date Prepared:
Certified SNE Date Reviewed:
Approved:
Certified SNE / STA Date File: RMP Step Sheets. FOR TRAINING USE ONLY Printed: 7/20/2022 11:00 AM Today Today Today
Standing Reactivity Maneuvering Plan Major Downpower to Support Maintenance Revision 2 List of steps in 57.000.22 that are N/A for this evolution:
57.000.22 (Reactivity Maneuvering Plan Development) steps 7.2.7 thru 7.2.11, and 7.3.4 do not apply to this Standing RMP.
Prepared By G--
00 I rz/ 7S3
/~iuv(
Qual# 42001413 Station Nuclear Engineer Reviewed By AVody ta/J/{
R QuaI# 42001413 Station Nuclear Engineer Approved By v
N AS
'0 Supervisor, Reactor Engineering Approved By ei e-nI tz is Operations Engineer Activated By I
Shift Manager
/
Date Deviations from this plan require approval from the Supervisor, Reactor Engineering and the Shift Manager Standing RMP - Major Downpower to Support Maintenance Rev 2.docx Page I of 8
Standing Reactivity Maneuvering Plan Standing RMP - Major Downpower to Support Maintenance Rev 2.docx Page 2 of 8 1.0 Purpose 1.1 This Reactivity Maneuver Plan (RMP) is used in conjunction with MOP19, GOP 22.000.03, Power Operation 25% to 100% to 25%, and the current CRAM/Sequence array to change Core Thermal Power (CTP) to support maintenance activities.
1.2 The purpose of this RMP is to guide planned entry to or planned recovery from reduced power operation that is necessary for performing maintenance work.
1.3 For significantly low power levels (less than 35% CTP), actuation of the standing RMP, Reactor Shutdown should be considered.
2.0 Prerequisites 2.1 The starting conditions of the Maneuver are within the range of the conditions described in section 3.0, Initial Conditions.
2.2 For the duration of this maneuver, Reactor Power will be maintained above 35% Core Thermal Power.
2.3 For the duration of this maneuver, the Main Unit Generator will be synchronized to the grid.
3.0 Initial Conditions 3.1 The reactor is in Mode 1 and operating above the Low Power Setpoint.
3.2 The reactor is in Dual Loop Operation.
3.3 The power level required to support maintenance activities has been determined and communicated to Operations and Reactor Engineering.
4.0 Assumptions 4.1 Immediate impact of low power operation has been analyzed by Operations and Reactor Engineering. Strategies for mitigating any identified issues will be implemented in conjunction with this RMP and discussed in a Pre-Job Brief.
4.2 Real-time look-ahead predictors will be performed on shift.
4.3 An Augur/Predictor study has been performed for restoring power after maintenance has been completed.
4.4 Reference the Augur/Predictor study for the intermediate rod pattern (if applicable).
During the maneuver, the intermediate rod pattern may be adjusted by the Station Nuclear Engineer as needed to manage current and upcoming margins for power, thermal limits, fuel conditioning, and rodline.
Standing Reactivity Maneuver Plan Standing RMP - Major Downpower to Support Maintenance Rev 2.docx Page 3 of 8 5.0 General Statements and Expectations 5.1 This Reactivity Maneuver Plan (RMP) provides guidance regarding the sequence and coordination of activities. Steps are performed in accordance with MOP19, GOP 22.000.03, and other applicable plant procedures.
5.2 This document meets the definition of a Standing RMP (per 57.000.22, Reactivity Maneuvering Plan Development). This RMP can be re-used to implement major downpowers to support maintenance activities.
5.3 Per 57.000.22, Reactor Engineering will provide just-in-time predictor analyses and RMP Step Sheets to confirm adequate fuel conditioning, thermal limit, and rod line margins. Reactivity manipulations directed by RMP Step Sheets are within the parameters of this RMP.
5.4 Reactor Engineering will compare core monitor results to predictor cases to assess validity of assumed uncertainties. Significant deviation from predicted results indicates a need to re-analyze.
5.5 Power ascension ramp rates are determined by Reactor Engineering and may be delivered through RMP Step Sheets and Reactor Engineering Night Orders.
5.6 Reactivity changes caused by manual core flow adjustments are considered gradual reactivity changes, and therefore, do not require blocking the core monitor.
5.7 SNEs may break shift in accordance with Section 8.0, Prerequisites to Break Shift Checklist.
5.8 Chemistry sampling will occur if power changes greater than 15% occur during the course of this RMP per 22.000.03, or as required in Chemistry Night Orders and applicable ODMIs.
5.9 The following power level constrains apply to Section 7.1, Achieve Low Power Operation.
5.9.1 Power shall not be decreased below 35% CTP.
5.9.2 Rod line is limited to 110.0% (as shown on the power-to-flow map) in predictor analysis to account for differences in core flow indication sources.
5.10 Section 7.2, Restore Normal Operation may be performed at the discretion of the on-shift SNE in order to achieve desirable plant conditions.
Standing Reactivity Maneuver Plan Standing RMP - Major Downpower to Support Maintenance Rev 2.docx Page 4 of 8 5.11 The following power level constrains apply to Section 7.2, Restore Normal Operation:
5.11.1 Rod line is limited to 110.0% (as shown on the power-to-flow map) in predictor analysis to account for differences in core flow indication sources.
5.11.2 Upon reaching 3486 MWth and 105% core flow, a RR speed reduction to achieve 3430 MWth while maintaining 105% core flow will be necessary to stay within the Power-to-Flow map during coast down.
5.12 APRMs are expected to diverge from % CTP during rod adjustments, and it is possible that the Tech Spec LCO will be entered. This is therefore a "planned" entry.
With one APRM exceeding 2% Tech Spec requirement, if a second APRM reaches 1.5% then calibration will be performed at completion of the current group step.
(Note that APRM evaluation should occur when CTP is stable - that is, at least 2 minutes following a power change).
6.0 Fuel Conditioning Expectations 6.1 Fuel conditioning guidelines are prescribed in 57.000.13, Fuel Preconditioning Guidelines/Operating Strategies and the current Fuel Conditioning Guidelines found in the Reactor Engineering Databook.
6.2 The following guidelines apply for ramping power by using flow through the Reactor Recirc speed oscillation region.
6.2.1 Raise power with flow to obtain 49% RRMG set speeds.
6.2.2 Raise power with flow to obtain 54% RRMG set speed. Traverse the Speed Oscillation Region (SOR) one pump at a time with a hold between pumps.
Minimum duration of hold (in hours) equals the power increase (in % CTP) from moving the first MG set through the SOR divided by the ramp rate (in %
CTP per hour).
Min Hold (hours) = % CTP Increase (from 1 MG Set through the SOR)
Ramp Rate (in % CTP per hour) 6.3 The following applies to operation with a fuel failure.
6.3.1 A Pre-Job Brief shall be conducted for all SNEs.
6.3.2 Power ascension using flow shall be maintained within the Fuel Conditioning Guidelines for operation with failed fuel.
Standing Reactivity Maneuver Plan Standing RMP - Major Downpower to Support Maintenance Rev 2.docx Page 5 of 8 Note (1): Individually large power changes should include a 3-minute wait to allow for an observable plant response.
Note (2): Core Monitors are demanded at each bank step, following a 2 minute wait for stable data.
7.0 Reactivity Manipulations Note (1): Power level constraints are in effect per Section 5.0 step 5.9 of this RMP.
Note (2): The intent of this section is to define the script for a power decrease to support maintenance activities. This section may be used multiple times as necessary to adapt the holding power level to changing plant conditions.
7.1 Achieve Low Power Operation 7.1.1 If not completed, inhibit the Core Monitor.
Note (1): It may be necessary to follow a downpower sequence that diverges from the CRAM array in order to avoid extended periods of operation at certain operating regions (RR Speed Oscillation Region, near MELLLA boundary, etc.).
7.1.2 Decrease power to desired power level by following the CRAM/Sequence array OR by following RMP Step Sheets provided by the on-shift Station Nuclear Engineer.
7.1.3 Restore the Core Monitor.
7.1.4 Maintain power through the following xenon transient using Core Flow and/or Control Rod movements per RMP Step Sheets.
7.1.5 When maintenance is completed, continue to Section 7.2, Restore Normal Operation.
Standing Reactivity Maneuver Plan Standing RMP - Major Downpower to Support Maintenance Rev 2.docx Page 6 of 8 Note (1): Power level constraints are in effect per Section 5.0 step 5.11 of this RMP.
Note (2): The intent of this section is to define the script for a power increase following maintenance activities and subsequent downpowers needed to obtain the interim or target rod pattern. This section may be used multiple times as necessary.
7.2 Restore Normal Operation 7.2.1 If not already done, inhibit the Core Monitor.
7.2.2 If necessary, establish the desired rod pattern.
1.
Verify correct Target Rod Pattern with the Core Follow Engineer.
2.
Establish a Core Power level using Core Flow to achieve conditions to begin control rod movements as determined by Reactor Engineering.
3.
Perform rod movements per RMP Step Sheets.
a.
Fuel conditioning is performed per Section 6.0 of this RMP and applicable Reactor Engineering Standing Orders (RXESOs).
b.
Monitor APRMs.
c.
Power may be changed using Core Flow with Operations and Reactor Engineering concurrence to provide more margin to fuel conditioning limits, thermal limits, OPRM enabled region, or other operational constraints if the change in power does not cause a significant deviation to the analyzed sequence.
d.
If necessary, perform a Heat Balance Validation at 50% CTP.
e.
If necessary, perform a Heat Balance Validation at 75% CTP.
f.
If necessary, perform a Heat Balance Validation at 95% CTP.
4.
Restore the Core Monitor.
Standing Reactivity Maneuver Plan Standing RMP - Major Downpower to Support Maintenance Rev 2.docx Page 7 of 8 7.2.3 After the desired rod pattern (interim or target) has been established, achieve desired power level using Core Flow.
1.
Increase power using Core Flow until the desired power level or maximum Core Flow is reached, whichever comes first.
a.
Fuel conditioning is performed per Section 6.0 of this RMP and applicable Reactor Engineering Standing Orders (RXESOs).
b.
Monitor APRMs.
c.
If necessary, guidelines for ramping power by using flow through the RR speed oscillation region are contained in Section 6.0 of this RMP.
d.
If necessary, perform a Heat Balance Validation at 75% CTP.
e.
If necessary, perform a Heat Balance Validation at 95% CTP.
Note: The Prerequisites to Break Shift Checklist section is generic and some steps not applicable.
It is up to the SNE breaking shift to evaluate the need for each item.
8.0 Prerequisites to Break Shift Checklist 8.1 Interim (or target) Rod Pattern established.
8.2 Augur/predictor study completed for subsequent rod adjustment, if not at target.
8.3 New CRAM and Sequence Arrays issued. Red CRAM rod tape in place.
8.4 Automatic Core Monitor enabled, OPS shift informed and log in SNE log.
8.5 Face-to-face turnover with the CRS and SM.
8.6 RXE night order issued. Potential items to include:
8.6.1 Core monitoring requirements (e.g., run a core monitor at least hourly during current xenon transient).
8.6.2 Expected power/flow conditions while holding/maintaining power that may impact the plant (e.g., APRM GAFs, RR flow changes).
8.6.3 APRMs are expected to diverge from %CTP as power shape changes. Perform APRM Calibration as needed.
8.6.4 Plans for subsequent rod adjustments, if not at target.
Standing Reactivity Maneuver Plan Standing RMP - Major Downpower to Support Maintenance Rev 2.docx Page 8 of 8 Note:
Procedures listed below may or may not be used during the course of this Maneuver.
9.0 References
- 1. MOP19, Reactivity Management
- 2. MOP19-100, Reactivity Management Implementation
- 3. 22.000.03, Power Operation 25% to 100% to 25%
- 4. 23.623, Reactor Manual Control System
- 5. 54.000.06, APRM Calibration
- 6. 24.605, APRM Calibration Above 25% Power
- 7. 54.000.07, Core Performance Parameter Check
- 8. 57.000.22, Reactivity Maneuvering Plan Development
- 9. Fuel Conditioning Guidelines from RXE Data Book
- 10. Reactor Engineering Standing Orders (RXESOs)
END
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 1 of 14 Simulator Scenario Summary NRC Form 3.3-1 Scenario Outline Facility:
Fermi 2 Scenario #:
3 Source:
New Op Test #
2023 ILT Examiners:
Applicants/
Operators:
Validating Operators:
A. Snowberger (CRS)
J. Walters (ATC)
D. Roberts (BOP)
J. Holdwick (CRS)
S. Erickson (BOP)
G. Pezzino (ATC)
Initial Conditions:
100%, South RFP West Lube Oil Pump B OOS for motor replacement Turnover:
After the crew takes the shift, the operating Steam Tunnel Cooler will be shifted from North to South due to High Vibes for North cooler Critical Tasks:
CT-1, ATWS-ADS: With a reactor scram required, reactor not shutdown, INHIBIT ADS to prevent an uncontrolled RPV depressurization, and to prevent causing a significant power excursion.
CT-2, ATWS-T&P: During an ATWS with conditions met to perform power/level control TERMINATE AND PREVENT INJECTION into the RPV until conditions are met to re-establish injection.
Event No.
Malf No.
Event Type* /
Position Event Description 1
N/A N
BOP/SRO The crew will perform the normal evolution of shifting the in-service Steam Tunnel Cooler, from the North to the South, in accordance with 23.414, Steam Tunnel Cooling.
2 C11MF0741 C
TS ATC/SRO SRO Control Rod 38-31 will drift out of the core requiring operators to enter AOP 20.106.07 and perform immediate actions to insert the drifting control rod. Operators will then disarm the control rod. The CRS will evaluate the impact on TS and determine that TS 3.1.3 is applicable.
3 T41MF0004 C
TS BOP/SRO SRO Div 1 CCHVAC Return Fan will trip. The crew will identify the alarms associated with the failure and review the applicable ARPs. The CRS will enter AOP 20.413.01. The crew will start D2 CCHVAC and shutdown D1. The CRS will evaluate TS LCO 3.7.4 & 3.7.3.
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 2 of 14 Simulator Scenario Summary Event No.
Malf No.
Event Type* /
Position Event Description 4
P50MF0014 P502PSE_N415TF ASIS C
MC BOP/SRO BOP The unloader valve will fail for the in-service (West) Station Air Compressor (SAC) and the standby (Center) SAC will not auto start. The crew will recognize this failure and act, either directly or upon entry into AOP 20.129.01, Loss of Station and Control Air, to start the standby SAC to restore air system parameters.
5 NB06N2102C002_
PBTVBRVIB NB06N2102C015_
TB_BTVTBGVIB NB06N2102C015_
TB_CTVTBGVIB C
BOP/SRO High Vibration on the South Reactor Feedwater Pump (RFP) Pump and Turbine will cause the crew to evaluate alarms and indications. The BOP trips the pump per ARP 5D28 due to exceeding 6 mils for more than 15 seconds.
6 B31RF0031 B31RF0033 C
MC ATC/SRO ATC North (A) Recirculation pump fails to run back when the crew trips the South RFP. ATC should recognize the failure and manually run back the RRMG set.
7 N/A R
ATC The ATC will plot position on the P/F Map and insert the CRAM Rods to restore operation outside of the Stability Awareness Region.
8 C11MF0393 C11MF0207 C
ATC/SRO Multiple rod drifts will require a reactor scram per immediate actions of 20.106.07.
9 EOPRF0011/12/13/
14 M
ALL When the Mode Switch is taken to Shutdown, RPS will fail to actuate requiring performance of ATWS Actions. ARI will also fail to initiate, resulting in an electronic ATWS.
Per the EOPs, the crew will prevent Automatic ADS Initiation (CT-1, ATWS-ADS).
Manual rod insertion will be successful. Control rod insertion will occur when either the scram fuses are pulled or the scram air header is vented. BOP controls RPV water level and ATC steps through ESP to insert rods manually (CT-2, ATWS-T&P) 10 P603_A019(20/21/
22)_3 0 C71MF0006 C41MF0002 C
ATC/SRO Operators inject SLC and determine failure to start. Crew will then start the opposite SLC pump and SLC will inject.
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Tech Spec, (MC)Manual Control
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 3 of 14 Simulator Scenario Summary A. INITIAL CONDITIONS / PRE-SHIFT BRIEFING:
The plant is at 100% Power with the South RFPT West Lube Oil Pump B tagged out for motor replacement.
Expected return to service is 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.
After the crew takes the shift, the operating Steam Tunnel Cooler will be shifted from North to South per SOP 23.414.
No additional equipment is out of service.
All licensed operators are in the Main Control Room (MCR).
Normal shift complement of non-licensed operators are available.
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 4 of 14 Simulator Scenario Summary B.
SUMMARY
OF EVENTS Event 1:
Steam Tunnel Cooler shift The crew will perform the normal evolution of shifting the in-service Steam Tunnel Cooler, from the North to the South, in accordance with 23.414, Steam Tunnel Cooling.
Event 2:
CR 38-31 drifts out of core Control Rod 38-31 will drift out of the core requiring operators to enter AOP 20.106.07 and perform immediate actions to insert the drifting control rod. Operators will then disarm the control rod. The CRS will evaluate the impact on TS and determine that TS 3.1.3 is applicable.
Event 3:
Div 1 CCHVAC Return Fan trip Div 1 CCHVAC Return Fan will trip. The crew will identify the alarms associated with the failure and review the applicable ARPs. The CRS will enter AOP 20.413.01. The crew will start D2 CCHVAC and shutdown D1. The CRS will evaluate TS LCO 3.7.4 & 3.7.3.
Event 4:
West SAC unloads and Center SAC fails to auto start The unloader valve will fail for the in-service (West) Station Air Compressor (SAC) and the standby (Center)
SAC will not auto start. The crew will recognize this failure and act, either directly or upon entry into AOP 20.129.01, Loss of Station and Control Air, to start the standby SAC to restore air system parameters.
Event 5:
RFP High Vibes, RFP fails to trip High Vibration on the South Reactor Feedwater Pump (RFP) Pump and Turbine will cause the crew to evaluate alarms and indications. The BOP trips the pump per ARP 5D28 due to exceeding 6 mils for more than 15 seconds.
Event 6:
North RRMG Set auto runback failure Event 7:
Evaluate P/F Map and insert CRAM array North (A) Recirculation pump fails to run back when the crew trips the South RFP. ATC should recognize the failure and manually run back the RRMG set.
The ATC will plot position on the P/F Map and insert the CRAM Rods to restore operation outside of the Stability Awareness Region
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 5 of 14 Simulator Scenario Summary Event 8:
Multiple rods drift, place the Mode Switch in Shutdown Event 9:
Electric ATWS Event 10:
SLC fails to start When the Mode Switch is taken to Shutdown, RPS will fail to actuate requiring performance of ATWS Actions.
ARI will also fail to initiate, resulting in an electronic ATWS. Operators inject SLC and determine failure to start.
Crew will then start the opposite SLC pump and SLC will inject. Per the EOPs, the crew will prevent Automatic ADS Initiation (CT-1, ATWS-ADS)
Manual rod insertion will be successful. Control rod insertion will occur when either the scram fuses are pulled or the scram air header is vented. BOP controls RPV water level and ATC steps through ESP to insert rods manually (CT-2, ATWS-Power)
Termination Criteria Scenario is terminated after all rods have been inserted or at the discretion of the Lead Evaluator.
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 6 of 14 Simulator Scenario Summary C. SIMULATOR SETUP SCENARIO SPECIFIC SETUP:
- 1. Initialize the simulator to IC-20
- 2. PLACE the simulator in RUN.
- 3. OPEN lesson ILT 2023 Scenario 3.lsn.
- 4. EXECUTE the lesson.
- 8. TRIGGER Setup step to:
- c. Insert ATWS malfunctions
- 9. Verify the CRAM array book is correct and free from marks.
GENERIC SETUP:
- 1. PROVIDE crew a list of available NOs
- 2. ENSURE that all annunciators are acknowledged and the plant is stable
- 3. ACKNOWLDGE DCS alarms
- 4. VERIFY GSW placard is in place and indicates INTERMITTENT.
- 5. VERIFY CFD placard has current dates (within the last 14 days is acceptable).
- 6. COMPLETE Attachment 1 of NTWI 5.12
- 7. ALLOW the operators to enter the room, provide them with a turnover in accordance with Section E, and allow them to walk down the panels
- 8. ENSURE simulator alarms are NOT silenced
- 9. TRIGGER steps as directed by the guide/Lead Evaluator
- 10. START Simulator data recorder
- 11. RECORD communications with crew members on NTWI 5.12 Attachment 3
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 7 of 14 Simulator Scenario Summary D. CRITICAL TASKS CRITICAL TASK EVALUATION CRITERIA SAT UNSAT NA CT-1, ATWS-ADS - With a reactor scram required, reactor not shutdown, INHIBIT ADS to prevent an uncontrolled RPV depressurization, and to prevent causing a significant power excursion.
Safety Significance: In order to effect a reduction in reactor power, actions may be taken to lower RPV water level to a level below the automatic initiation setpoint of ADS. This actuation imposes a severe thermal transient on the RPV and may significantly complicate efforts to restore and maintain RPV water level. Further, rapid and uncontrolled injection of large amounts of relatively cold, unborated water from low pressure injection systems may occur. This would quickly dilute in-core boron concentration and might add sufficient positive reactivity to cause a reactor power excursion large enough to severely damage the core.
Failure Criteria reasoning: Candidate will fail if ADS is NOT inhibited within the 105 second time delay. If an automatic depressurization occurs without sufficient preparation, a severe thermal transient will occur.
Initiating Cue: ATWS, prevent an uncontrolled RPV depressurization.
Measurable Performance Standard: Inhibit ADS.
Performance Feedback: ADS inhibited white lights and alarm window.
Expected action: Inhibit ADS.
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 8 of 14 Simulator Scenario Summary CRITICAL TASK EVALUATION CRITERIA SAT UNSAT NA CT-2, ATWS-T&P: During an ATWS with conditions met to perform power/level control TERMINATE AND PREVENT INJECTION into the RPV until conditions are met to re-establish injection.
Safety Significance: To prevent or mitigate the consequences of any large irregular neutron flux oscillations induced by neutronic/thermal-hydraulic instabilities, RPV water level is lowered sufficiently below the elevation of the feedwater sparger nozzles. This places the feedwater spargers in the steam space providing effective heating of the relatively cold feedwater and eliminating the potential for high core inlet subcooling.
Failure Criteria reasoning: Candidate will fail if feedwater is not completely terminated, or if injection is restored inappropriately, either of which would increase the time until water level is lowered sufficiently below the elevation of the feedwater sparger nozzles (114), increasing the likelihood of large irregular flux oscillations.
Initiating Cue: Reactor power is above 3% and RPV water level is above 114.
Measurable Performance Standard: RPV injection is terminated, as indicated by all Feedwater Check Valves going closed, and prevented until RPV water level is reduced below 114.
Performance Feedback: Feedwater flow drops to zero, Feedwater System Injection Check Valves close, and RPV Water Level drops.
Expected action: Perform ATWS Actions of 29.ESP.01 to terminate injection, until RPV Water Level drops below 114, at which time injection can be re-established.
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 9 of 14 Simulator Scenario Summary E. LIST OF MALFUNCTIONS The following malfunctions and/or remote functions are to be active/activated as indicated in the time line:
MF/RF/PO/LBL Description Target Value Step No.
Ramp Delay EOPRF0011 Electric ATWS DEFEAT S1 EOPRF0012 DEFEAT EOPRF0013 DEFEAT EOPRF0014 DEFEAT EOPRF0041 DEFEAT EOPRF0042 DEFEAT EOPRF0043 DEFEAT EOPRF0044 DEFEAT P603_A019_3 0
P603_A020_3 0
P603_A021_3 0
P603_A022_3 0
C41MF0003 SLC Pump A Trip (P603_B002_1 EQ 1 and C41MF0004 NE 1)
Active S3 30 C41MF0004 SLC Pump B Trip (P603_B002_3 EQ 1 and C41MF0003 NE 1)
Active S4 30 R11RF0321 S. RFP West LO Pump OFF S2 C11MF0741 CR 38-31 Drifts OUT ACTIVE 2
C11MF0741 Disarm CR 38-31 CLEAR 2a T41MF0002 Trip Div 1 CCHVAC Return Fan 1
3 P50MF0014 West SAC Unloader Failure 1.0 4
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 10 of 14 Simulator Scenario Summary MF/RF/PO/LBL Description Target Value Step No.
Ramp Delay P502PSE_N415T FASIS Stby SAC Fails to Start TRUE NB06N2102C015
_TB_BTVTBGVIB Turb Vibe MFs to 0.7 = 3.2 mils =>
above alarm 0.7 5
300 NB06N2102C015
_TB_CTVTBGVIB 0.7 320 NB06N2102C015
_TB_BTVTBGVIB Turb Vibe MF to 1.0 = 4.4 mils -- NOT enough to TRIP 1.0 5a 100 NB06N2102C015
_TB_CTVTBGVIB 1.0 100 NB06N2102C015
_TB_CZCTBGVIB Vibration Failure Intensity - To Trip 5.8 150 NB06N2102C002
_PBTVBRVIB Pump vibe MF to 0.7 = 3.0 mils 0.7 150 cd=P805_B028_2 EQ 1 AND P805_B028_3 EQ 1
Removes High Vibes AFTER Trip NB06N2102C015
_TB_BTVTBGVIB 0.1 30 NB06N2102C015
_TB_CTVTBGVIB 0.2 20 NB06N2102C015
_TB_CZCTBGVIB 0.0 30 NB06N2102C002
_PBTVBRVIB 0.0 10 B31RF0031 Set #2 and #3 Limiters to 64.79 for North RRMG 64.79 6
B31RF0033 64.79 C11MF0055 Multiple rod drifts ACTIVE 8
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Page 11 of 14 Simulator Scenario Summary MF/RF/PO/LBL Description Target Value Step No.
Ramp Delay C11MF0219 ACTIVE C11MF0549 ACTIVE cd=P603_A048_1 eq 1 Clears Rod Drifts when MS in Shutdown C11MF0055 CLEAR C11MF0219 CLEAR C11MF0549 CLEAR EOPRF0007 29.ESP.11 defeat 8a EOPRF0010 defeat EOPRF0048 Remove Scram Fuses 1
8b 0
EOPRF0050 1
10 EOPRF0049 1
20 EOPRF0051 1
30 EOPRF0052 1
70 EOPRF0053 1
90 EOPRF0054 1
100 EOPRF0055 1
130 EOPRF0048 Install Scram Fuses 2
8b1 0
EOPRF0050 2
10 EOPRF0049 2
20 EOPRF0051 2
30 EOPRF0052 2
70 EOPRF0053 2
90
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 12 of 14 Simulator Scenario Summary MF/RF/PO/LBL Description Target Value Step No.
Ramp Delay EOPRF0054 2
100 EOPRF0055 2
130 C103ANA_COND
_C11GAIN Vent Scram Air Header 0
8c
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Page 13 of 14 Simulator Scenario Summary REFERENCES The following is a list of expected Procedure References used in this scenario:
PROCEDURE TITLE 3D18 IPCS MONITORED INPUTS ABNORMAL 3D80 CONTROL ROD DRIFT 3D110 RBM DOWNSCALE 3D113 CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL BLOCK 5D28 SOUTH RFP/RFPT SHAFT TROUBLE 5D85 LOSS OF HEATER DRAINS 7D53 STATION AIR HEADER PRESSURE LOW 7D48 AUX BOILER CONTROL AIR PRESSURE LOW 7D50 DIV I/II CONTROL AIR COMPRESSOR AUTO START 7D57 STATION AIR ISOLATION VALVE CLOSED 7D59 CONTROL AIR ISOLATION VALVE CLOSED 7D60 RHR COMPLEX CONTROL AIR PRESSURE LOW 7D72 MOTOR TRIPPED 7D56 INTERRUPTIBLE CONTROL AIR DRYER TROUBLE 8D5 DIV I CONTROL ROOM A/C TROUBLE 8D72 MOTOR TRIPPED 8D10 DIV I MCR BUILDING PRESSURE HIGH/LOW 17D27 DIV II CONTROL ROOM A/C TROUBLE 17D55 DIV II MCR BUILDING PRESSURE HI/LO 20.106.07 CONTROL ROD DRIFT 20.107.01 LOSS OF FEEDWATER OR FEEDWATER CONTROL 20.107.02 LOSS OF FEEDWATER HEATING 20.413.01 CONTROL CENTER HVAC SYSTEM FAILURE 20.129.01 LOSS OF STATION/CONTROL AIR 23.413 CONTROL CENTER HVAC 23.414 STEAM TUNNEL COOLING
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0
Page 14 of 14 Simulator Scenario Summary PROCEDURE TITLE 29.ESP.03 ALTERNATE CONTROL ROD INSERTION METHODS 29.ESP.11 DEFEAT OF RPV MSIV LEVEL 1 AND OFFGAS HIGH RAD ISOLATION SIGNALS 29.ESP.10 DEFEAT OF ARI LOGIC TRIPS TS 3.1.3 Control Rod OPERABILITY TS 3.7.3 Control Room Emergency Filtration (CREF) System TS 3.7.4 Control Center Air Conditioning (AC) System
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi ILT 2023 Scenario No.: 3 Page 1 of 18 Event 1 Steam Tunnel Cooler shift Type:
N Event
Description:
The crew will perform the normal evolution of shifting the in-service Steam Tunnel Cooler, from the North to the South, in accordance with 23.414, Steam Tunnel Cooling.
Symptoms/Cues: This will be included with the initial conditions for this scenario.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior T0 min Booth Action None T0 +5 min BOP May conduct a short brief of the evolution.
Shifts In-Service Steam Tunnel Coolers IAW 23.414, Section 5.0:
Verifies open P4200-F603, S Stm Tnl Clr RBCCW Outlet Iso.
Opens P4200-F602 S Stm Tnl Clr RBCCW Inlet Iso.
Starts T4100-B023B, Steam Tunnel Cooler B, by placing its CMC switch in RUN.
Shuts down T4100-B023A, Steam Tunnel Cooler A, by placing its CMC switch in OFF/RESET.
Closes P4200-F600, N Stm Tnl Clr RBCCW Inlet Iso.
Maintains open P4200-F601, N Stm Tnl Clr RBCCW Outlet Iso to allow for thermal expansion.
Informs CRS of completion of Steam Tunnel Cooler shift.
CRS Monitors and provides oversight of evolution.
ATC May provide peer check of evolution.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi ILT 2023 Scenario No.: 3 Page 2 of 18 Event 2 CR 38-31 drifts out of core Type:
C, TS Event
Description:
Control Rod 38-31 will drift out of the core requiring operators to enter AOP 20.106.07 and perform immediate actions to insert the drifting control rod. Operators will then disarm the control rod. The CRS will evaluate the impact on TS and determine that TS 3.1.3 is applicable.
Symptoms/Cues: 3D80, Control Rod Drift Alarm with accompanying indication that Control Rod 38-31 is drifting out of the core.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior T0 +10 min Booth Action Trigger Event 2 to initiate Control Rod 38-31 drifting out of the core.
ATC Responds to 3D80, Control Rod Drift and reports to CRS.
Turns on rod select power and selects the drifting rod.
Fully inserts CR 38-31 by holding Rod Out Notch Override Switch (RONOR) in EMER ROD IN (IMMEDIATE ACTION).
Reports status of CR 38-31 when fully inserted, with Reactor Power, to CRS.
Dispatches operator to HCU for CR 38-31.
BOP May assist ATC with detecting drifting Control Rod.
May handle communications to rounds operators for ATC.
SRO Enters 20.106.07, Control Rod Drift AOP with a Crew Update.
Ensures Immediate Actions are carried out.
Makes plant announcement.
Assigns critical parameter for 2nd Rod Drift.
Directs actions of 20.106.07, Condition B.
Evaluates LCO 3.1.3 for CR 38-31.
TS Impact TS 3.1.3, Control Rod Operability:
Each control rod shall be OPERABLE CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. One or more control rods inoperable for reasons other than Condition A or B.
C.1 Fully insert 38-31 AND C.2 Disarm 38-31 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 4 hours
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi ILT 2023 Scenario No.: 3 Page 3 of 18 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC/BOP For HCU 38-31, Directs NO to close (in this order):
C11-F103.
C11-F105.
Releases ROD Out Notch Override Switch (H11-P603) and verifies rod stays at desired position.
Informs CRS of status of rod 38-31.
Places ROD DRIFT ALARM switch in RESET and verifies alarm clears.
Role Play NO:
When sent to HCU 38-31:
WAIT 3 minutes REPORT On station at HCU for CR 38-31 RESPOND to directions to close C11-F103/F105 at HCU 38-31.
TRIGGER Step #2a to clear rod drift to simulate rod settling at 00 when the F103 is closed.
REPORT C11-F103/F105 are closed for HCU 38-31 SRO Conducts AOP Follow-up brief.
Briefs impact of CR 38-31 drifting on Tech Specs.
May contact RTC to direct tagging HCU for CR 38-31.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi ILT 2023 Scenario No.: 3 Page 4 of 18 Event 3 Div 1 CCHVAC Return Fan trip Type:
C, TS Event
Description:
Div 1 CCHVAC Return Fan will trip. The crew will identify the alarms associated with the failure and review the applicable ARPs. The CRS will enter AOP 20.413.01. The crew will start D2 CCHVAC and shutdown D1. The CRS will evaluate TS LCO 3.7.4 & 3.7.3.
Symptoms/Cues: Various alarms on H11-P808 with Tripped light lit on T4100-C031, Div 1 CCHVAC Return Air Fan.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior T0 +20 min Booth Action Trigger Event 3 to initiate a trip of Div 1 CCHVAC Return Air Fan.
BOP Identify 8D5, 8D72, 8D10, 17D55, and Division 1 CCHVAC Return Fan tripped and report to CRS Dispatch operator to investigate Trip of Div 1 CCHVAC Return Fan Dispatch operator to check Division 1 CCHVAC Return Fan breaker for a cause of trip.
Role Play NO:
When dispatched to Investigate trip of Division 1 CCHVAC Return Fan, WAIT 3 minutes REPORT hot bearing on D1 CCHVAC Return Fan When dispatched to investigate Division 1 CCHVAC Return Fan Breaker at 72C-2A Pos 1B, WAIT 3 minutes REPORT thermal overload trip of 72C-2A Pos 1B SRO Acknowledge report from RO.
Enter AOP 20.413.01, Control Center HVAC System Failure.
Direct Actions of AOP 20.413.01 Condition A.
Announce event over Hi-Com.
Review impact on Technical Specifications.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi ILT 2023 Scenario No.: 3 Page 5 of 18 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior TS Impact TS 3.7.3, CREF System:
The CREF System shall be OPERABLE.
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One CREF subsystem inoperable for reasons other than Condition B A.1 Restore CREF subsystem to OPERABLE status.
7 days TS 3.7.4, Control Center Air Conditioning (AC) System:
Two control center AC subsystems shall be OPERABLE.
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One control center AC subsystem inoperable.
A.1 Restore control center AC subsystem to OPERABLE 30 days ATC Monitors reactor parameters.
May assist BOP with communications to NOs.
BOP Inform RB of starting Division 2 CCHVAC Start Division 2 CCHVAC using AOP 20.413.01 Condition A:
Shutdown the malfunctioning division of CCHVAC by placing the Mode Select Switch in ALL STOP.
Start the standby Division of CCHVAC by placing the Mode Select Switch in ALL AUTO.
Report Division 2 CCHVAC is running to CRS.
Monitor for correct operation of CCHVAC IAW 23.413 Section 5.3.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi ILT 2023 Scenario No.: 3 Page 6 of 18 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Role Play NO:
IF contacted to walkdown Div 2 CCHVAC Rad Monitor:
WAIT 5 minutes REPORT Rad Monitor walkdown is complete. No abnormalities noted.
If contacted to verify good start of Div 2 CCHVAC:
WAIT 2 minutes REPORT Good start of Div 2 CCHVAC If asked to check parameters IAW 23.413:
WAIT 3 minutes REPORT All parameters are in band.
SRO Monitors actions by panel operators.
Acknowledges status of Div 2 CCHVAC when started.
Conducts follow-up brief, including impact on Tech Specs.
May contact RTC for follow-up actions like troubleshooting, writing a CARD, etc.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi ILT 2023 Scenario No.: 3 Page 7 of 18 Event 4 West SAC unloads and Center SAC fails to auto start Type:
C, MC Event
Description:
The unloader valve will fail for the in-service (West) Station Air Compressor (SAC) and the standby (Center) SAC will not auto start. The crew will recognize this failure and act, either directly or upon entry into AOP 20.129.01, Loss of Station and Control Air, to start the standby SAC to restore air system parameters.
Symptoms/Cues: 7D53, Station Air Header Pressure Low, low amps on the running (West) SAC and lowering air header pressures.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior T0 +35 min Booth Action Trigger Event 4 to fail the in-service (West) Station Air Compressor Unloader valve AND cause an Auto-Start failure of the standby (Center) Station Air Compressor (P50MF0014, P502PSE_N415TFASIS).
NOTE: Triggering Event 4 also starts the ramp to increase vibrations on the S.
RFP Pump and Turbine, for added realism.
BOP Responds to 7D53 and reports to CRS.
Recognizes and reports lowering air header pressures.
Recognizes and reports lower than normal amps on the running (West) SAC.
Recognizes and reports failure of the standby (Center) SAC to auto start.
May inform SRO of start failure and manually start the Center SAC.
May direct NO to walkdown West SAC.
SRO Acknowledges reports from LNO.
Enters AOP 20.129.01, Loss of Station and Control Air with a Crew Update.
Makes a plant announcement using the Hi-Com.
Directs LNO to start any available SAC IAW 20.129.01 Condition A.
If Station Air Pressure lowers to 85 psig, orders 20.129.01 Condition B and C.
Monitors actions taken by the LNO and provides oversight.
BOP Manually starts the standby (Center) SAC by placing its CMC Switch in RUN.
May start the East SAC by placing its CMC to RUN.
If directed to complete conditions B and C of 20.129.01:
Verifies P5000-F401 closed.
Verifies auto start of Div 1 / Div 2 Control Air Compressors.
Verifies closed P5000-F402, P5000-F440, and P5000-F441.
Observes air system parameters and reports status to the CRS.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi ILT 2023 Scenario No.: 3 Page 8 of 18 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Monitors actions by the LNO.
Acknowledges status of air system parameters and status.
Conducts follow-up brief including:
Assigning Overrides to the ATC to monitor for degradation of the station and control air systems.
Assigning further actions that may be necessary, depending on air system status, due to how low pressure got before it was recovered.
May contact RTC for follow-up actions like troubleshooting, writing a CARD, etc.
Role Plays NO:
If directed to walkdown West SAC:
WAIT 3 minutes REPORT Walkdown of West SAC is complete. Everything looks normal WWM:
Acknowledge reports/orders from MCR No further action required
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi ILT 2023 Scenario No.: 3 Page 9 of 18 Event 5 RFP High Vibes, RFP fails to trip Type:
C Event
Description:
High Vibration on the South Reactor Feedwater Pump (RFP) Pump and Turbine will cause the crew to evaluate alarms and indications. The BOP trips the pump per ARP 5D28 due to exceeding 6 mils for more than 15 seconds.
Symptoms/Cues: 5D28, South RFP/RFPT Shaft Trouble, and rising vibration for the S. RFP Turbine and Pump on N21-R837B, SRFP/RFPT Vib Mon Sys Chart Recorder.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior T0 +50 min Booth Action Trigger Event 5 to cause vibration on the S. RFP Pump and Turbine to rise above the alarm setpoint.
BOP Responds to ARP 5D28, South RFP/RFPT Shaft Trouble.
Verifies on N21-R837B, SRFP/RFPT Vib Mon Sys Chart Recorder:
S RFP Turbine Vibes are >3 mils.
S RFP Pump Vibes are <4 mils.
Reports vibration data to the CRS.
Informs CRS of ARP guidance to trip South RFP if vibes >6 mils or an unusual noise develops.
May direct NO to outside of RFP rooms to listen for unusual noise.
Role Play NO:
If dispatched to the South RFP:
WAIT 2 minutes.
REPORT I am outside of the South RFP room and nothing sounds abnormal.
SRO Acknowledges report from LNO.
Conducts brief to cover contingency actions, critical parameters, etc.
Assigns critical parameter and actions following brief.
Booth Action AFTER brief and contingency monitoring / actions have been assigned (and with concurrence of the Lead Evaluator):
Trigger Step #5a to cause South RFPT Vibes ramp above 6 mils.
BOP Identifies and reports rising vibrations on S. RFP and RFPT.
Recognizes and reports when >6 mils.
Trips the South RFP.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi ILT 2023 Scenario No.: 3 Page 10 of 18 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Monitors actions and ensures S. RFP is tripped.
Enters AOP 20.107.01, with Crew Update.
Makes plant announcement.
Verifies RO carries out Immediate Actions
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi ILT 2023 Scenario No.: 3 Page 11 of 18 Event 6 North RRMG Set auto runback failure Type:
C, MC Event 7 Evaluate P/F Map and insert CRAM array Type:
R Event
Description:
The North RRMG Set fails to run back to Limiter 3 following trip of the S. RFP.
The ATC will recognize this failure and manually run back the RRMG set. The ATC will check rod line and insert the cram rods to lower rod line < 80%.
Symptoms/Cues: Trip of RFP with RRMG set failing to run back automatically. Insert CRAM array to < 80% rod line.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior T0 +60 min Booth Action NOTE: This event automatically triggers with Event 5 above, preventing the N.
RRMG Set from running back to the #2 Limiter when the S. RFP is tripped.
ATC Verifies #2 limiter is enforcing and monitors RRMG sets for runback.
Recognizes / reports that North RRMG Set failed to run back to the #2 Limiter.
Manually runs back the North RRMG Set.
Verifies the N. RFP restores Reactor Water Level to the normal band.
After runback, checks rod line.
Determines that the rod line is > 80%.
Informs CRS and inserts CRAM Array to reduce rod line < 80%.
SRO Conducts brief for RFP Trip.
Assigns panel operator(s) to perform 20.107.01 overrides and immediate actions with monitoring criteria.
BOP Recognizes and reports loss of Heater Drains.
SRO When CRAM array is inserted directs Subsequent Actions D of AOP 20.107.01:
Monitor Core Thermal Limits and notify SNE Enters 20.107.02, loss of Feedwater Heating.
Directs verification of Feedwater temperature reduction BOP Verifies Reactor Power 65%.
Shuts down or verifies SBFW shutdown.
Verifies feedwater temperature reduction is consistent with the power reduction, per 20.107.02, loss of Feedwater Heating and informs CRS.
SRO Conducts follow-up brief.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi ILT 2023 Scenario No.: 3 Page 12 of 18 Event 8 Multiple rods drift, place the Mode Switch in Shutdown Type:
C Event 9 Electric ATWS, Type:
MAJ Event 10 SLC fails to start Type:
C Event
Description:
When the Mode Switch is taken to Shutdown, RPS will fail to actuate requiring performance of ATWS Actions (CT-2, ATWS-T&P). ARI will also fail to initiate, resulting in an electronic ATWS. Operators inject SLC and determine failure to start. Crew will then start the opposite SLC pump and SLC will inject. Per the EOPs, the crew will prevent Automatic ADS Initiation (CT-1, ATWS-ADS).
Manual rod insertion will be successful. Control rod insertion will occur when either the scram fuses are pulled or the scram air header is vented. BOP controls RPV water level and ATC steps through ESP to insert rods manually Symptoms/Cues: 3D80, Control Rod Drift Alarm with accompanying indication that multiple (3)
Control Rods are drifting out of the core. RPS failure is indicated by 8 blue lights remaining lit and the Scram Air Header remaining pressurized.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior T0 +75 min Booth Action Trigger Event 8 to initiate multiple Control Rod Drifts with an electric (failure of RPS and ARI) ATWS. Events 9 and 10 were inserted as part of Setup Steps.
ATC Recognizes and reports multiple Control Rod Drifts.
Places Mode Switch in Shutdown.
Recognizes failure of RPS to actuate and depresses manual scram pushbuttons.
Reports Failure to Scram to CRS, with Reactor Power.
SRO When multiple control rod drifts are reported, directs ATC to place Mode Switch in Shutdown.
Acknowledges failure to scram and enters EOP 29.100.01 Sheet 1A, RPV Control - ATWS.
Directs ATWS Actions.
Announces event over the Hi-Com.
Provides oversight of ATWS Actions.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi ILT 2023 Scenario No.: 3 Page 13 of 18 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Acknowledges ATWS Actions order.
Performs CRLNO ATWS Actions:
Takes RFP Controllers to Manual Lowers Speed to STOP feed flow.
Reports when RPV level <114.
Re-establishes injection and maintains RPV Water level as directed.
CT-2, ATWS-T&P: During an ATWS with conditions met to perform power/level control TERMINATE AND PREVENT INJECTION into the RPV until conditions are met to re-establish injection.
SRO Acknowledges BOP ATWS Actions report and:
When <114, directs RPV Level Band 50-100.
Directs RPV Pressure Band 900-1050 psig.
Directs confirm Isolations and Actuations for level as they occur ATC Acknowledges ATWS Actions order.
Starts SLC pump Identifies that first SLC pump failed to start and starts other SLC pump Verifies SLC system parameters and determines SLC is injecting Verifies RWCU isolation Informs CRS of SLC injecting, SLC tank level, and SLC pump failure Inhibits ADS CT-1, ATWS-ADS: With a reactor scram required, reactor not shutdown, INHIBIT ADS to prevent an uncontrolled RPV depressurization, and to prevent causing a significant power excursion.
Completes SLC Hard Card, 23.139 Enclosure A.
Orders out 29.ESP.11 Bypasses/Restores Drywell Pneumatics Takes the following actions:
o HPCI Aux Oil Pump to OFF o SBFW CMC switches to OFF o Div 1&2 CS pumps to OFF o Div 1&2 RHR pumps to OFF When RPV Level is <Level 2:
o Recognizes ARI failure to initiate.
o Arms and initiates ARI manually.
o Trips RR Pumps.
o Reports FSQ 1-8 is complete, with current Reactor Power.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi ILT 2023 Scenario No.: 3 Page 14 of 18 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Role Play NO/RTC:
When directed to Perform 29.ESP.11:
WAIT 10 minutes TRIGGER Step 8a.
REPORT 29.ESP.11 field actions are complete.
SRO Acknowledges ATC ATWS Actions report Enters 29.100.01 SH1A and directs:
Confirm isolations and actuations for level as they occur.
Verifies ADS Inhibited. (May have already been reported)
Pressure Band of 900-1050 psig Directs order out 29.ESP.10 and insert Control Rods per 29.ESP.03.
Acknowledges report of SLC failure, subsequent success with 2nd SLC pump, SLC tank level and RWCU isolation status.
Identifies EAL flag and reports to Shift Manager.
BOP Acknowledges direction to Confirm Isolations and Actuations for Level.
Verifies Isolations and Actuations for Level and reports completion to CRS.
Controls pressure using the MT Bypass Valves by depressing Low-Low Set logic Reset Pushbuttons as required by Pressure Control Leg of EOPs and ARP 1D38.
Verifies SRV(s) close and pressure is being controlled by Bypass Valves.
May report status of Low-Low set logic and Bypass Valves to CRS.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi ILT 2023 Scenario No.: 3 Page 15 of 18 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Directs 29.ESP.10.
Recognizes failure of RPS and ARI to actuate.
Correctly transition 29.ESP.03 flowchart and directs:
29.ESP.03, Section 5.0 - De-energize Scram Solenoids AND/OR 29.ESP.03, Section 7.0 - Vent Scram Air Header.
Attempts to drift control rods IAW 29.ESP.03, Section 2.0 - Increase CRD Cooling Water Differential Pressure Place C11-K612, CRD Flow Controller, in MANUAL.
Start standby Control Rod Drive pump.
Open Flow Control Valve using C11-K612, CRD Flow Controller.
Open C1152-F003, CRD Drive/Clg Water PCV, to maximize cooling water flow (Control Rods may drift in by virtue of increased pressure on the underside of the drive piston).
Aligns CRD and manually inserts Control Rods using 29.ESP.03, Section 3.0 -
Manual Control Rod Insertion.
Place C11-K612, CRD Flow Controller, in MANUAL.
Start both CRD pumps.
If no CRD pump can be started, exit this method of Alternate Control Rod Insertion.
As necessary, throttle C1152-F003, CRD Drive/Clg Water PCV, to maintain sufficient drive water D/P for rod motion.
As necessary, adjust C11-K612, CRD Flow Controller, to maintain sufficient drive water D/P for rod motion.
Place the Rod Worth Minimizer keylock switch in BYPASS.CAUTION Higher than normal radiation levels may be present while executing the following step If unable to maintain sufficient drive water D/P with C1152-F003 and C11-K612, send an Operator to close C1100-F034, CRD Charging Water Header Isolation Valve (RB1-G10).
Insert the Cram Array using EMERGENCY IN.
When the Cram Array has been inserted, attempt to achieve a checkerboard control rod pattern using EMERGENCY IN as follows:
o Select and fully insert control rods in a spiral out from center pattern, other concurrent actions may preclude obtaining an actual checkerboard pattern.
Continue to fully insert all remaining control rods using EMERGENCY IN as follows:
o Select and fully insert control rods in a spiral out from center pattern Reports status of Control Rod insertion to CRS.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi ILT 2023 Scenario No.: 3 Page 16 of 18 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Role Play NO:
When directed to Perform 29.ESP.10:
ACKNOWLEDGE order.
No Simulator actions required IF directed to perform 29.ESP.03 section 5.0 - De-energize Scram Solenoids:
WAIT 6 minutes TRIGGER Step 8b to De-energize Scram Solenoids.
When all fuses have been pulled (use Instructor Actions Summary, 130 seconds for last fuse), REPORT: 29.ESP.03 Section 5 is complete, all scram fuses are removed.
IF directed to re-install scram fuses:
WAIT 2 minutes.
TRIGGER Step 8b1.
When all fuses have been installed (use Instructor Actions Summary, 130 seconds for last fuse), REPORT: Scram fuses are installed.
IF directed to perform 29.ESP.03 section 7.0 - Vent Scram Air Header:
WAIT 5 minutes TRGIGER Step 8c to Vent Scram Air Header.
REPORT: 29.ESP.03 Section 7 is complete, and you are venting the scram air header.
BOP Recognizes when power < 25% and transitions to the SULCV using 23.107 Enclosure F (attached hardcard).
Maintains RPV Level using SBFW, HPCI or FW on the SULCV.
Monitors and reports RPV pressure.
Recognizes and reports when power <3%.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi ILT 2023 Scenario No.: 3 Page 17 of 18 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC IF 29.ESP.03 Section 5.0 being performed:
Places C1100-M018, SDV Iso Vlvs Switch, in TEST to close the SDV Vent and Drain Valves.
As scram fuses are being pulled, recognizes and reports control rod insertion.
When rod motion stops, directs scram fuses to be re-installed.
Places C1100-M018, SDV Iso Vlvs Switch, in NORMAL to open the SDV Vent and Drain Valves.
IF 29.ESP.03 Section 7.0 being performed:
As air header is being vented, recognizes and reports control rod insertion.
Verifies all rods in with RWM and full core display.
Informs CRS or Crew Update: All rods inserted.
May direct NO to re-install Scram Fuses per 29.ESP.03, Section 5.
SRO After all rods in, direct shutdown of SLC.
Transition to 29.100.01 Sheet 1.
Direct RO to restore and maintain RPV water level 173 to 214 inches.
Direct entry/performance of Scram AOP actions.
Restores RPV Level to 173 to 214.
Performs Scram AOP actions as directed Lead Evaluator Scenario is terminated after all rods have been inserted or at the discretion of the Lead Evaluator.
Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op Test No.: Fermi ILT 2023 Scenario No.: 3 Page 18 of 18