ML23151A552

PRM-050-050 - 53FR32624 - Charles Young: Filing of Petition for Rulemaking

ML23151A552
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Issue date:	08/26/1988
From:	Chilk S NRC/SECY
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PRM-050-050, 53FR32624
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ADAMS Te'mplate: SECY-067 08/26/1988 PRM-050-050 - 53FR32624 - CHARLES YOUNG: FILING OF PETITION FOR RULEMAKING PRM-050-050 53FR32624 RULEMAKJNG COMMENTS Document Sensitivity: Non-sensitive - SUNSI Review Complete

STATUS OF RULEMAltDJG PROPOSED RULE:

PRM-050-050 RULB RAMEI CHARLES YOUNG: FILING OF PETITION FOR RULEMAXING PROPOSED RULE FED REG CITE:

53FR32624 PROPOSED RULE PUBLICATION DATE:

08/26/88 ORIGINAL DATE FOR COMMENTS: 10/25/88 HUMBER OF COMMENTS:

EX'l'EHSIOB DATE:

I I

9 FntAL RULB FED. ~~G. CITE: 56FR01749 FINAL RULE PUBLICATION DATE: 01/17/91 NOTES ON PETITION IS CONCERNED WITH OPERATORS DEVIATING FROM TECHNJ:CAL SPEC TATUS IFICATIONS DURING AN EMERGENCY.

PETITION DENIED.

DENIAL PUBLISHB RULE DAT 56FR01749. FILE LOCATED ON Pl.

TO l'IND THE STAFF CONTACT OR VIEW THE RULBKAltilfG lll:STORY PRESS PAGE DOWN KEY HISTORY OF THE RULB PART AFFECTED: PRM~oso-oso RULB TITLE:

CHARLES YOUNG: FILING OP' PETITION FOR RULEMAKING

,.OPOSED RULE SECY PAPER&

P'IlfAL RULB SECY PAPER:

PROPOSED RULE SRM DATE:

FINAL RULE BRM DATE:

DATB PROPOSED RULB I

I SIGNED BY SECRETARY:

08/22/88 DATE FINAL RULE I

I SIGHED BY SECRETARY:

01/11/91 STAFF CONTACTS ON THE RULB CONTACTl: JUANITA BEESON COHTACT2:

KAIL STOP: P-209 KAIL STOP:

PHONE: 492-8926 PHONE:

DOCKET NO. PRM-050-050 (53FR32624)

In the Matter of CHARLES YOUNG: FILING OF PETITION FOR RULEMAKING DATE DATE OF TITLE OR DOCKETED DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT 10/04/88 09/20/88 COMMENT OF DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY (J. D. SIEBER, VICE PRESIDENT) (

1) 10/12/88 10/21/88 10/11/88 RECEIPT OF PETITION FOR RULEMAKING; CORRECTION 10/17/88 COMMENT OF NEW YORK POWER AUTHORITY (JOHN C. BRONS, EXECUTIVE VICE) (

2) 10/24/88 10/25/88 10/21/88 COMMENT OF DETROIT EDISON (B. RALPH SYLVIA) (

10/25/88 COMMENT OF BISHOP, COOK, PURCELL l REYNOLDS (NICHOLAS S. REYNOLDS,) (

4) 10/25/88 10/26/88 10/20/88 COMMENT OF DUKE POWER COMPANY (HAL B. TUCKER) (

10/24/88 COMMENT OF COMMONWEALTH EDISON (L. O. DELGEORGE, ASSISTANT Y.P.) (

6) 10/27/88 10/25/88 COMMENT OF BALTIMORE GAS l ELECTRIC (JOSEPH A. TIERNAN) (

7) 11/10/88 11/07/88 COMMENT OF GEORGIA POWER COMPANY (W. G. HAIRSTON, III) (

8) 04/26/89 04/13/89 COMMENT OF CHARLES YOUNG (

9) 06/13/89 05/29/89 C. YOUNG'S LETTER TO CHAIRMAN ZECH CONCERNING THE STATUS OF HIS PETITION 06/13/89 06/05/89 CHAIRMAN ZECH'S LITTER TO C. YOUNG STATING THAT

3)

5)

YOUNG'S LITTER OF 5/29/89 WAS FORWARDED TO THE EDO FOR ACTION 01/15/91 01/11/91 DENIAL OF PETITION FOR RULEMAKING 01/22/91 01/22/91 LETTER TO CHARLES YOUNG FORWARDING DENIAL OF PETITION FOR RULEMAKING RE: HIS LETTER TO S. CHILK DATED 1/17/91.

AGENCY:

ACTION:

D CKET NUMBER P:TITiON RULE PRM 5 t>-5 0 J)

(5'3Ple :3Z,2-V NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 CFR Part 50

[Docket No. PRM-50-50]

Charles Young; Denial of Petition for Rulemaking Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Denial of petition for rulemaking.

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SUMMARY

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is denying a petition for rulemaking submitted on April 18, 1988, by Mr. Charles Young of Glen Ellyn, Illinois, in his own behalf which requests that the Commission rescind 10 CFR 50.54 paragraphs (x) and (y) to preclude deviation from license conditions or technical specifications for licensed nuclear power plants in an emergency when this action is immediately needed to protect the public health and safety and no action consistent with license conditions and technical specifications t hat can provide adequate or equivalent protection is immediately apparent.

ADDRESSES:

Copies of comments and documents cited in this notice are available for public inspection at the NRC Public Document Street, (Lower Level), NW., Washington, D.C.

2 FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Mr. Morton R. Fleishman, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U. S. Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, Telephone 301-492-3794.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

Background

By letter dated April 18, 1988, Charles Young, 262 Sheffield Lane, Glen El lyn, Illinois, petitioned the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to rescind the provision that authorizes nuclear power plant operators to devi ate from technical specifications during an emergency.

The petitioner notes that the technical specifications (a) prescribe settings for safety systems at nucl ear power plants, such as the emergency core cooling system, so that action of a safety system will correct an abnormal condition before fuel design limits are exceeded; and (b) require an automatic safety system to operate as long as the abnormal condition which threatens the nuclear fuel exists in the plant. The petitioner cites several cases of pract ices involving nuclear power reactors that he considers to be hazardous.

In his opinion, these practices could lead to an accident similar to the one at Three Mile Island, Unit 2.

The petitioner claims that three official investigations have confirmed that damage to the nuclear reactor at Three Mi le Island, Unit 2, could have been prevented if the operators had fol lowed the requirements of the plant's operating license and technical specifications.

According to the petitioner, the three investigations and their applicable findings are as follows:

3 (1)

The President's Commission found that reactor core damage would have been prevented if the high pressure injection system had not been throttled. [Kemeny Commission Finding #4, pg 28]

(2)

Calculations by the Special Inquiry Group show that use of the high pressure injection system would have prevented overheating of the fuel and release of radioactive material.

(Rogovin, Vol II, Part 2, pgh D.2.b, pgs 558, 561]

(3)

The Special Investigation by the Senate Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation found the cause of severe damage to the reactor core was the inappropriate overriding of automatic safety equipment by plant and managers.

[Hart Report Chapter 2, Findings and Conclusions, #2, pg 9]

The petitioner believes that the NRC shoul d rescind the existing provisions in paragraphs (x) and (y) of 10 CFR 50.54 to adequately protect the public health and safety from the hazards of nuclear radiation from nuclear power reactors.

Notice of receipt of the petition and request for public comment was published in the Federal Register on August 26, 1988 (53 FR 32624].

On October 20, 1988 the original notice of receipt for PRM-50-50 was corrected to provide addi tional information in support of the petitioner's original intent by revising two sentences in the Grounds for the Petition. The correction had the effect of increasing the number of plants included in the basis for the petition [53 FR 40432].

The sixty-day comment period of the original petition expired on October 18, 1988.

A total of seven (7) public comment letters were received, representing eleven organizations. All of the

4 commenters were opposed to the petition for rulemaking.

The comment letters may be examined in the NRC public document room.

All comment letters have been evaluated by the NRC staff.

Discussion It is the Commission's position that emergency conditions can arise during which a license condition could prevent necessary protective action by the licensee. Technical specifications contain a wide range of operating limitations and requirements concerning actions to be taken if certain systems fail and if certain parameters are exceeded.

Most technical specifications are devoted to keeping the plant parameters within safe bounds and keeping safety equipment operable during normal operation.

However, technical specifications also require the implementation of a wide range of operating procedures which go into great detail as to actions to be taken in the course of operation to maintain facility safety. These procedures are based on the various conditions - normal, transient, and accident conditions - analyzed as part of the licensing process.

Nevertheless, unanticipated circumstances can occur during the course of emergencies.

These circumstances may call for responses different from any considered during the course of licensing.

For example, the need to isolate the accumulators to prevent nitrogen injection to the core while there was still substantial pressure in the primary system was not foreseen in the licensing process before TMl-2; thus, the technical specifications prohibited this action. Other circumstances requiring a deviation from license requirements can arise during emergencies involving multiple equipment failure

5 or coincident accidents where plant emergency procedures could be in conflict, or not applicable to the circumstances.

An accident can take a course different from that visualized when the emergency procedure was written, thus requ iring a protective response at variance with a procedure required to be followed by the licensee.

In addition, performance of routine surveillance testing, which might fall due during a period for which the plant is in an emergency status, may have to be delayed or cancelled because it could ei ther divert the attention of the operating crew from the emergency or cause loss of equipment needed for proper protective action.

It was fo r these reasons that the Commission added paragraphs (x) and (y) to 10 CFR 50.54 (47 FR 35996).

Paragraph (x) of 10 CFR 50. 54 is similar to the so-called "General Prudential Rule" contained in both the International Regulati ons for Preventi ng Collisions at Sea, 1972, and t he Inland Navigational Rules Act of 1980.

This rule states:

"In construing and complying with these Rules due regard shall be had to all dangers of navigation and collision and to any special circumstances, including the limitations of the vessels involved, which make a departure from those rules necessary to avoid immediate danger."

Thus, a Commandi ng Officer of a ship is permitted to deviate from written rules to the extent necessary to save the sh ip.

Paragraph (x) of 10 CFR 50.54 is also very similar to a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) rule govern ing the operation of aircraft, 14 CFR 91.3, which states that "[i]n an emergency requi ring immediate action, the pilot in

6 command may deviate from any rule... to the extent necessary to meet that emergency.

Each pilot in command who deviates from a rule... shall, upon the request of the Administrator, send a written report of that deviation to the Administrator."

As the Commission stated in t he Statement of Considerations for the final rule adopting 10 CFR 50.54 paragraphs (x) and (y),

11The Commission had both the General Prudential Rule and the FAA rule in mind when it framed the proposed rule" [48 FR 13966; April l, 1983].

All of the public comments received by the staff on the petition opposed any change to 10 CFR 50.54 paragraphs (x) and (y).

Most of the commenters observed that technical specifications do not dictate mitigation strategies or recovery actions under accident condi tions as the petitioner states; rather, generic emergency operating procedures approved by the NRC are relied upon for this purpose instead.

Examples of proceduralized deviations from technical specifications were cited. These examples included: inhibi t ing detrimental automatic plant responses; defeating interlocks to allow preferred flow paths; taking manual control of automatic systems; maintaining plant parameters (such as reactor water level) outside normal ranges; and cross-tying non-safety equipment to perform accident mitigation functions.

One commenter noted that without 10 CFR 50.54 paragraphs (x) and (y),

operators may be reluctant to take reasonable actions in an emergency immediately needed to protect the health and safety of the public. Another commenter noted that requiring operators to obtain permission from the NRC to deviate from technical specifications during an emergency could result in diversion of personnel resources at a critical time.

7 A third commenter, a legal firm representing five utility licensees, stated that even if the petitioner's statement that the TMI accident would not have occurred had operators complied with technical specification and operating license conditions were true, t his conclusion did not support elimination of 10 CFR 50.54 paragraphs (x) and (y).

As the Kemeny Commission found, "[t]he accident at... TMI occurred as a result of a series of human, institutional, and mechani cal failures." The commenter further stresses that "10 C.F.R. §§ 50.54(x) and (y) were promulgated subsequent to TMI."

Furthermore, the commenter pointed out that one of the lessons learned from TMI is that the range of circumstances addressed by the technical specifications is limited and that strict adherence to them in an emergency can actually be hazardous to public health and safety.

The petitioner has not shown that the requested rule change to rescind paragraphs (x) and (y) of 10 CFR 50.54 would enhance the public health and safety or lessen the impact on the environment.

Hence, the Commission has decided to deny the petition for rulemaking.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Secretary of the Commission

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 Mr. Charles Young 262 Sheffield Lane Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Dear Mr. Young:

January 11, 1991 On April 18, 1988 you filed a petition for rulemaking (PRM-50-50) requesting that the Commission rescind its regulation 10 CFR 50.54 paragraphs (x) and (y) which authorizes nuclear power operators to deviate from technical specifications during an emergency. Notice of the receipt of the petition and request for public comment was published in the Federal Register on August 26, 1988 [53 FR 32624].

On October 20, 1988 the original notice of receipt of PRM-50-50 was corrected in response to your letter of September 3, 1988 to provide additional information in support of your intent by revising two sentences in the Grounds for the Petition. The correction had the effect of increasing the number of plants included in the basis for the petition [53 FR 40432].

Public comments were received in response to the notices in the Federal Register of August 26 and October 17, 1988.

For the reasons set forth in the enclosed notice, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has denied your petition for rulemaking.

Enclosure:

Notice of Denial of Petition for Rulemaking

DOCKET NUMBER PETITIO RULE PAM oCJ -S C5 0 UNITED STATES

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 t)OCK[T[O U:)NHC January 22, 1991 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY Mr. Charles Young 262 Sheffield Lane Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Dear Mr. Young:

• 91 JAN 22 5 :OS Enclosed is a copy of the Federal_Reiist!r notice announcing denial of a petition for rulemaii ng submitted by you.

This notice was inadvertently omitted from your letter.

Please accept my apologies for any inconvenience the omission may have caused you.

Enclosure:

Notice of Denial of Petition for Rulemaking Sincerely,

~(J-~

Elizabeth A. Tipto n, Chief Correspondence and Records Branch

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk 262 Sheffield Lane Glen Ellyn, IL 60137 Januaiy 17, 1991 Secretary of the Commission u.s.Nuclear Regulatory Commiss i on Washington,D.C. 20555

Dear Mr. Chilk:

I have received your letter dated January 11, 1991. In this l etter you inform me that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission denied my petition for rulemaking. This petition was filed on April 18, 1988. You inform me that my petition was denied by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for reasons set forth in a Notice. The Notice is not enclosed with your letter.

Please send me the Notice of Denial of Petition for Rulemaking.

Sincerely, el-<

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Charles Young

POCKET NUMBER UNITED STATES PRM sa-so NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION RETITION RULE ___

Mr. Charles Young 262 s~~:fj_eld Lanf Gl.,&,D."ii~, IL 60137

Dear ~ung:

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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 June 5, 1989 I regret that I was unavailable to respond to your call last week.

I understand that my technical assistant arranged for the ~RC staff to respond to your question regarding the status of a petition for rulemaking you initiated last year.

I have forwarded your letter to the NRC's Executive Director for Operations for appropriate acticn.

Sincerely, Lando W. Zech, Jr.

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Glen Ellyn, IL 6013 Hay 29, 1989 Hr. Lando Zech Chairman U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, o.c. 20555

Dear Lando:

I called you Tuesday t o ask about my Petition. I told your secretary I would cal l again Monday.

In my Petition, I write that Commonwealth Edison risks a serious accident at the company's twelve nuclear power plants in northern Illinois. Commonwealth Edison risks an accident because of the company policy for operating a nuclear power plant.

Commonwealth Edison's policy is promulgated in the company's VICE PRESIDENT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 1-0-17. The first version of this policy was signed by Byron Lee Jr. on October 22, 1979.

At the time, I was Compliance Administrator in Commonwealth Edison's nuclear organization and I opposed the policy.

on June, 13, 1979, I recommended to Hr. Lee that we publish a policy that company nuclear power plants be operated in accordance with the Operating License and Technical Specifications. Hy recommendation was part of a study that Hr. Lee asked me to make to improve the operations of Zion Station.

In January 1980, I completed a study of the Three Hile Island accident. I found a similarity between the cause of the damage to the TMI nuclear reactor and operations at our Zion station. THI operators shut down the high pressure injection safety system at the beginning of the accident attempting to shorten plant down time. On February 2, 1979, a Senior Reactor Operator at Zion station blocked a safety injection signal attempting to prevent reactor down time. Blocking a safety injection signal by Senior Reactor Operators was accepted practice at Zion under certain circumstances.

on January 29, 1980, I wrote a letter to Hr. J.J. O'Connor, Commonwealth Edison's President. I n my letter, I explained the need for a policy affirming that the company's nuclear power plants be operated safely. I enclosed a draft requiring that Commonwealth Edison's nuclear plants be operated in

... i.~... -.... c.:.-.-~-~gordance with the Operating License and Technical Specifications.

As a result of my letter, Mr. O'Connor established a committee to review the company's nuclear operations. Mr.

O'Connor hired Bob Laney to assist this committee. Before a committee meeting on April 18, 1980, I spoke briefly to Bob about the VICE-PRESIDENT'S INSTRUCTION. I told him the policy was defective ~nd pointed out one of the problems with the policy. The policy authorizes a Senior Reactor Operator to turn off a safety system if reactor coolant system pressures, temperatures and levels are following expected trends. If the Senior Reactor Operator were mistaken about the trends expected, however, it would be dangerous to turn off a safety system.

In September 1980, I was transferred from Chicago to Braidwood Station, a nuclear station under construction about sixty miles from the city. I was told that the transfer was necessary because I disagreed with Byron Lee's management of the company's nuclear operations.

On March 1, 1981, a revision to VICE-PRESIDENT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 1-0-17 was published. "Following expected trends" was eliminated from the policy.

During a meeting in his office in Chicago on July 22, 1981, Mr. Lee fired me. He told me there had to be" a parting of the ways" between Commonwealth Edison and me because I disagree with the company pol i cy for operating nuclear power plants.

Commonwealth Edison's VICE-PRESIDENT'S INSTRUCTION is still defective. The INSTRUCTION dated August 18, 1986, authorizes a senior Reactor Operator to turn off a safety system during an emergency. A Senior Reactor Operator is authorized to shut down emergency pumps pumping water into the reactor if reactor coolant system pressures, t emperatures and levels are stable.

But technical specifications require emergency systems to be operable when the nuclea r reactor is operating. During a loss of coolant accident in a pressurized water reactor, technical specifications require an emergency core cooling system to pump water into the nuclear reactor as long as reactor coolant system pressure is below t he actuation setpoint of the safety system.

Commonwealth Edison's policy for operating a nuclear power plant is dangerous. Turning off a safety system during a loss of coolant accident, risks damaging the reactor's nuclear fuel, release of fission products and exposure of plant workers and people nearby to hazardous radiation.

Commonwealth Edison violates the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

The Operating License issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, stipulates that the utility shall operate the nuclear power plant in accordance with Technical Specifications. By authorizing a senior Reactor Operator to deviate from Technical Specifications in an emergency, Commonwealth Edison violates the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

I reported that Commonwealth Edison falls to comply with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954:

- To Hr. Victor Stello, Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulator y Commission, Washington, o.c.; on July 2, 1981,

- To the Regional Administrator, Region III, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Glen Ellyn, IL.; on January 29, 1988, I reported to Hr. J.J. O'Connor, Commonwealth Edison's President, that our company creates a substantial safety hazard by our policy for operating nuclear power plants. As Compliance Administrator, I made this report pursuant to Commonwealth Edison's Quality Assurance Program and the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 21; on September 4, 1980.

Hr.

O'Connor, informed Region III.

An emergency core cooling system's safety function is to prevent damage to the reactor's nuclear fuel and release of fission products during a loss of coolant accident. By the company policy for operating a nuclear power plant, Commonwealth Edison Company risks a serious accident - a loss of safety function and a major reduction in the protection provided public health and safety at twelve nuclear plants operating in northern Illinois.

I will call you later this week to ask about my Petition.

Enclosure Sincerely yours, Cha;{Js Young

0

SUBJECT:

Company Policy Re&ardi ng Adherence to Nuclear Procedures and Technical Specifications I

Effective: October 22, 19 Cancels:

Prod Instn 1-3-B-3 (l,-2Q-7j This Instruction reaffirms Company policy regarding adherence to nuclear procedures and technical specifications.

The prime concern of the Company with respect to the operation of its nuclear generating plants is to ensure t]le health and safety of the public as well e station personnel.

Plant operation is to be within the boundaries specified in our technical specifications and in adherence to procedures and operating orders.

Systems which could affect the public health and safety (including emerger core cooling system, rad-waste, etc.) are to remain in the operating mode as pre-scribed in the technical specifications.

In rare, unforeseen circumstances, prudent operation may require station operation outside of the prescribed technical specifications, procedures or operatir orders.

This should be done only when necessary and only after careful consideratic and approval by the licensed Senior Reactor Operator immediately available, in ordei to prevent (1) potential injury to the public or Company personnel, (2) potential releases off-site above technical specification limits, or (3) damage to equipment.

Infrequently, it may be necessary to withdraw a system from operation by placing it in a manual or pull-to-lock mode. This should be done only when conditi 1 are "stable and under control", or when it is apparent that continued operation would aggravate or worsen the plant condition. In all instances such action shocld be taken only after careful consideration, and it must.be reviewed and approved by the licensed Senior Reactor Operator immediately available.

Whenever a system is withdra'Wll from operation as outlined, continuing surveillance of the relevant parameters must be maintained by a licensed Reactor Operator to assure the safe operation of the plant until the system can be restored to its normal operating mode or until it is no longer needed, as prescribed by the technical specifications. The conditions of "stable and under control" are conside to exist (1) if the radiation levels and the pressure and temperature in the primar containment are stable or following expected trends, (2) if there is adequate core cooling as indicated by stable reactor coolant system pressures, temperatures and levels, or (3) if these parameters are following expected trends.

In all cases outlined above, when the technical specification boundaries are violated or when a system is withdrawn from operation, a report shall be promp1 made to the Di.vision Manager of Nuclear Stations.

All station management shall be informed of thi-s policy and it shall be included in our training program.

262 Sheffield Lane Glen Ellyn, IL 6 ()Wj 7 APR 26 pl :JJ April 13, 1989 Mr. Lando Zech Chairman U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Lando:

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,.. N The NRC staff found that following technical specifications does not pose a safety problem for operating power reactors.

This was the principle finding of an NRC study group. Don Beckman was Project Director and Samuel Bryan was Assistant Director of the Technical Specification Improvement Project organized in 1985 to consider the entire subject of Technical Specifications. The first recommendation of the study group ls to retain Safety Limits and Limiting Safety system settings in the technical specifications for a nuclear power plant.

Safety limits are limits on reactor power, reactor coolant system pressure, temperature, and flow. Limited safety systems settings are settings for protective devices chosen so automatic protective action will correct an abnormal plant condition before a safety limit ls exceeded.

Following technical specifications ensures that safety systems operate to prevent safety limits from being exceeded.

Following technical specifications prevents overheating of the nuclear fuel, and ensures the integrity of physical barriers which guard against the uncontrolled release of radioactivity.

Public health and safety are protected by preventing the uncontrolled release of radioactivity from a nuclear reactor.

To protect public health and safety when operating a nuclear power plant, follow technical specifications.

The rule which my petition would rescind, authorizes a senior operator to deviate from a nuclear plant technical specification in an emergency to protect public health and safety. The finding of the Technical Specification Improvement Project contradicts this rule.

The rule, published in paragraphs (x) and (y) of 10 CFR 50.54, uses these phrases:

".. may take reasonable action.. "

".. to protect the public health and safety.. "

".. no action consistent with.. technical specifications..

.. can provide adequate protection.* "

MAY 2 5 1989-~~

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These phrases may sound good but the rule makes no sense to an operator who understands technical specifications.

When I talked to Victor Stello last August, I remarked that the rule sounds like it was written by lawyers. Mr. Stello laughed and agreed with me.

Mr. John Brons is Executive Vice President Nuclear Generation for the New York Power Authority. Mr. Brons responded to my petition. In a letter dated October 21, 1988, he describes the Commission's position on deviation from technical specifications. He writes that operation beyond technical specifications may be required under degraded conditions -

the degraded condition having been caused by operating outside technical specifications in the first place.

A utility should require that a nuclear power plant be operated in accordance with the prime rule - the plant Technical Specifications. Compliance with the prime rule negats the need for the secondary rule.

Technical Specifications are a utility's rules for operating a nuclear power plant. An executive submits these rules to the NRC as part of an application to use nuclear fuel to produce power.

The NRC issues an Operating License by a letter addressed to a utility executive. Technical Specifications are attached to and are a part of the Operating License. The Operating License stipulates that the plant shall be operated in accordance with Technical Specifications - the utility's rules. My petition is written to spell out the responsibility of the executive inherent in his accepting an Operating License to operate a nuclear power plant.

I am writing this to assist you in your review of the staff's decision on my petition.

Sincerely yours

~

Charles Young 2

OCKET NUMBER -

Georgia Power Company 333 Piedmont Avenue Atlanta. Georg,a 30308 Telephor>e 404 'i26-6526 PETITION RULE PRM

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Ma,ling Address Post Office Box 4545 Atlanta, Georgia 30302 W. G. Hairston, ltl Senior Vice President Nuclear Operations

'88 NOV 1 0 AlO : 1 0 November 7, 1988 Secretary of the Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Corrmission Attention:

Docketing and Service Branch Washington, D.C.

20555 Gentlemen:

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY COMMENTS ON PETITION FOR RULEMAKING:

10 CFR 50.54(x) AND (y) ADHERENCE TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS (53FR32625) outr Hn eit>clnc 11 m HVS-73 1298U X7GJ1 7-C220 On August 26, 1988, the Nuclear Regulatory Comnission (NRC) published in the Federal Register a petition for rulemaking to amend NRC regulations (i.e., 10 CFR 50.54{x) and {y)) to rescind the provision that authorizes nuclear power plant operators to deviate from the Technical Specifications during an emergency.

The Georgi a Power Company { GPC) ho 1 ds NRC operating licenses for the Hatch Nuclear Plant, located in Appling County, Georgia, and for Unit l of the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, located in Burke County, Georgia.

In addition, GPC holds a construction pennit for Unit 2 of the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant.

As a licensee of nuclear power plants, the potential rulemaking would directly affect GPC.

The Technical Specifications provide normal and anticipated operating limitations for nuclear power plants.

As such, they are based on expected parameter envelopes.

The petition implies that the Technical Specifications cover all possible conditions for a nuclear power plant.

However, during an emergency the potential exists for the plant to be in a condition outside the anticipated parameter envelopes.

Part of the basis of the operators' training is that the Technical Specifications, by their nature, cannot anticipate every course for every accident scenario.

The operator needs certain freedom to use his training and experience in these extreme cases.

This need was recognized and addressed in the generic emergency procedure guidelines (EPGs) developed by the industry in response NOV 1 6 1988 Acknowledged by card.************._

ULccAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DOCKETING & SERVICE SECTION OFFl:E OF THE SECRETARY o:= THE COMMISSION Dc,rnmcnl Stal isl ics

Georgia Power,\\

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conmission November 7, 1988 Page 2 to the events of Three Mil e Island Unit 2.

In the safety evaluation and approvals of those EPGs, the NRC concurred in the use of extraordinary means to address extraordinary circumstances.

The initial codification of 10 CFR 50.54(x) and (y) also impl icitly acknowledged this need for flexibility.

To restrict the operators actions in the event of an emergency, when it is clearly desirable to deviate from the Technical Specifications, could jeopardize the safety of the public.

GPC appreciates this opportunity to conwnent on the petition for rulemaking.

We view these potential changes as being counter-productive to the overall safety goals.

GPC recommends that the Conmission deny the proposed petitions for rulemaking.

If you have any questions in this regard, please contact this office.

Sincerely, N). J. '--;;#: ~

W. G. Hairston, III t.\\JB:ju c: Geor~ia Power Com§any Mr ** Bockhold,r., General Manager - Plant Vogtle Mr. H. C. Nix, Jr., General Manager - Plant Hatch Mr. L. T. Gucwa, Manager Hatch Engi neering and Licensing Mr. J.P. Kane, Manager Vogtle Engineering and Licensing GO-NORMS 1298U

CHARLES CENTER* P. 0. BOX 1475

• BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21203

• aa OCT 27 JOSEPH A. TIERNAN VICE PRES I DENT NUCLEAR ENERGY October 25, 1988 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 ATTENTION:

SUBJECT:

Docketing and Service Branch Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Unit Nos. 1 & 2; Docket Nos. 50-317 & 50- 318

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Comments on Petition for Rulemaking by Charles Young (PRM 50)

Gentlemen:

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I The following comments are submitted by the Baltimore Gas and Electric Company in response to Federal Register Notice 53 FR 32624, dated August 26, 1988. This notice provided a petition for rulemaking by Mr. Charles Young requesting that the Commission amend its regulations (10 CFR Part 50.54) authorizing a senior operator in a nuclear power plant to deviate from Technical Specifications in an emergency. We appreciate the opportunity to provide these comments.

We have reviewed the subject petition, and have compared it to the present regulations regarding Technical Specification compliance.

Mr.

Young's

petition, to rescind a

licensee's right to deviate from the Technical Specifications during emergency conditions has no technical basis.

In his

petition, Mr.

Young claims that three official reports on the Three Mile Island accident confirm damage to the reactor could have been avoided if the operators had followed the requirements of the plant's operating license and Technical Specifications. The intent of 10 CFR 50.54(x) is to allow operators to deviate under emergency conditions that may not be covered by existing procedures. To compare situations where operators fail to follow procedures with situations where procedures do not exist is the major problem with Mr. Young's petition and is the reason we feel it should be denied. Our specific comments on the petition are provided as an attachment.

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Docketing and Service Branch October 25, 1988 Page 2 Should you have any questions regarding these comments, we would be pleased to discuss them with you.

JAT/MDM/dlm Attachment cc:

D. A. Brune, Esquire J. E. Silberg, Esquire R. A. Capra, NRC S. A. McNeil, NRC W. T. Russell, NRC D. C. Trimble/V. L. Pritchett, NRC T. Magette, DNR

ATTACHMENT Comments on Petition for Rulemaking Mr. Charles Young; Deviation from Technical Specifications in an Emergency The subject petition for rulemaking requests that 10 CFR 50.54 be amended to:

1.

Rescind the current wording in paragraphs (x) and (y) of 10 CFR 50.54. The regulation authorizes a senior operator in a nuclear power plant to deviate from Technical Specifications in an emergency.

2.

Amend sections (x) and (y) to state that Technical Specifications should be approved by the NRC, followed by the licensee, and used in accordance with policy set forth by the Chief Executive Officer of each utility.

In support of the proposed amendments, the petitioner has submitted the following grounds for petition:

1.

The petitioner asserts the licensee at the Dresden and Quad Cities Nuclear Power Plants, Commonwealth Edison Company of Chicago, has violated regulations that could have led to an accident similar to the one at Three Mile Island.

2.

Three official investigations of the Three Mile Island each confirmed that core damage could have been prevented operators had followed the requirements of the plant's license and Technical Specifications.

accident if plant operating The Technical Specifications for Nuclear Power Plants are written to address a wide range of normal operating conditions and requirements.

Most of the Technical Specifications are designed to keep the plant parameters within safe bounds and ensure adequate safety equipment is available for all conditions. To maintain the plant in a safe condition, detailed operating procedures revolving around the Technical Specifications have been implemented.

In stating his

case, the petitioner uses examples of previous accidents that had occurred and that had detailed procedures in place to address them.

However, circumstances can occur during the course of emergencies that may call for responses different from any considered during the course of licensing. The accident may take a course different from that visualized when the emergency procedure was written.

Although the three reports stated by the petition fault the operator's actions at Three Mile Island, a fourth report, NUREG-0616, "Report of Special Review Group, Office of Inspection and Enforcement on Lesson Learned from Three Mile Island," states, "When a plant becomes involved in serious accident situations like TMI, the applicability of Technical Specification requirements may become essentially undefined because the context in which they were established may no longer exist." To require the Licensee to blindly follow procedures regardless of changing conditions or unanalyzed scenarios

- l -

ATTACHMENT Comments on Petition for Rulemaking Mr. Charles Young; Deviation from Technical Specifications in an Emergency could seriously jeopardize plant equipment, plant personnel, and the health and safety of the public.

With respect to the proposed amendments, the existing requirements in paragraphs (x) and (y) demand ~

adherence to regulations or Technical Specifications unless it can be determined the accident will worsen by following the regulations or Technical Specifications.

Adequate oversight is provided by requmng prior licensed senior operator approval before deviating from the Technical Specifications; additionally, the licensee is required to report such deviations within one hour to the NRC per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(i)(B). To accept Mr. Young's petition and amend paragraphs (x) and (y) of 10 CFR 50.54 would remove a vital tool which may be necessary to protect the public health and safety.

In conclusion, we agree the NRC should continue to enforce the regulations established by a nuclear power plant's safety analyses and Technical Specifications. Under normal transient and accident conditions, analyzed as part of the licensing process, adherence to the Technical Specifications is appropriate. However, we believe conditions may arise that warrant a valid deviation from procedures and Technical Specifications and that the guidelines for such deviation are adequately covered under the existing Code of Federal Regulations. Therefore, we are opposed to this petition for rulemaking.

ATTACHMENT Comments on Petition for Rulemaking Mr. Charles Young; Deviation from Technical Specifications in an Emergency could seriously jeopardize plant equipment, plant personnel, and the health and safety of the public.

With respect to the proposed amendments, the existing requirements in paragraphs (x) and (y) demand ~

adherence to regulations or Technical Specifications unless it can be determined the accident will worsen by following the regulations or Technical Specifications.

Adequate oversight is provided by requmng prior licensed senior operator approval before deviating from the Technical Specifications; additionally, the licensee is required to report such deviations within one hour to the NRC per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(i)(B). To accept Mr. Young's petition and amend paragraphs (x) and (y) of IO CFR 50.54 would remove a vital tool which may be necessary to protect the public health and safety.

In conclusion, we agree the NRC should continue to enforce the regulations established by a nuclear power plant's safety analyses and Technical Specifications. Under normal transient and accident conditions, analyzed as part of the licensing process, adherence to the Technical Specifications is appropriate. However, we believe conditions may arise that warrant a valid deviation from procedures and Technical Specifications and that the guidelines for such deviation are adequately covered under the existing Code of Federal Regulations. Therefore, we are opposed to this petition for rulemaking. t(

Commonwealth Edison One First National Plaza, Chicago, Illinois Address Reply to: Post Office Box 767 Chicago, Illinois 60690 October 24, 1988 Mr. Samuel Chilk Secretary Docketing and Service Branch U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20555 Subject : Petition for Rulemaking submitted by Charles Young, Docket No. PRM-50-50

Dear Mr. Chilk :

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Mr. Charles Young submitted the subject petition for rulemaking to revise 10 CFR 50.54( x)-(y) on April 18, 1988.

Notice of Mr. Young' s petition was subsequently published in the Federal b.g_i&.te.r, and public comment on the petition was sought by October 25, 1988.

A correction to the original notice was published in the Federal Register on October 17, 1988.

Sections 50.54(x) and (y) presently authorize reactor licensees to depart from license conditions and technical specifications in emergency situations under certain prescribed conditions.

The authority to depart from such requirements is to be used in connection with an emergency protective action only when no other alternative is immediately apparent.

Further, the use of the authority must be approved by at least a Licensed Senior Operator and such action must be reported immediately to the NRC.

These regulations are based on the reality that it is not possible to establish license requirements and technical specifications that foresee and accommodate every eventuality that may occur during an emergency situation at an operating reactor ; and because of that fact, licensees are provided with the flexibility to depart from license requirements and technical specifications, if it is necessary to do so to protect public health and safety.

Mr. Young disagrees.

He asserts, in his petition, that only continuous adherence to plant technical specifications will assure plant safety.

Hence, Mr. Young would revise sections 50.54(x) and (y) to eliminate the present operating flexibility and require strict adherence to license requirements and technical specifications.

Sections 50.54(x) and (y) were added to the regulations as a result of an NRC rulemaking which was conducted in 1982 and 1983.

The rulemaking was initiated in response to an NRC recommendation t o provide reactor licensees with the authority to depart from license requirements in emergency situations.

The recommendation was one of the lessons learned from the accident at Three Mile Island, and it was included in NRC's comprehensive evaluation of the causes of that accident, which was docwnented in NUREG-0616.

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• c COMMIS5l0N NRC took careful account of the thirty-seven public comments which were received in response to the rulemaking proposal to establish sections 50.54(x) and (y).

Thirty-five of the comments favored the rule.

Mr. Young did not submit comments.

One commenter pointed out that the authority to depart from established operating requirements in emergency circumstances has long been in place in the shipping and airline industries.

NRC acknowledged that it was mindful of these precedents and that its authority to fashion a similar requirement was consistent with the views of Congress.

53 Fed. Reg. 13967-968 (April 1, 1983).

The balance of the favorable commenters supported the need for the rule in the nuclear industry.

NRC, in response to one of the dissenting commenters who thought the authority to depart from license requirements would be abused, stressed that reporting requirement and the subsequent review by NRC of the use of the authority would provide sufficient assurance that the rule would not be abused.

In sum, the basis supporting NRC's issuance of sections 50.54(x) and (y) was thoughtfully considered and well-founded.

Mr. Young's petition to change these regulations, on the other hand, lacks this sound basis.

Mr. Young's petition relies primarily on the unjustified assertion that Commonwealth Edison Company's operating policy permits reactor operators to "turn off water being pumped into a nuclear reactor during an emergency before the safety system has finished its job," and that such a policy, in Mr.

Young's understanding, is justified by Edison by sections 50.54(x) and (y).

(NRC's corrected notice, 53 Fed. Reg. 40432, October 17, 1988).

Mr. Young concludes further that such a practice could cause an accident at any of Commonwealth Edison's plants similar to the one at Three Mile Island.

Thus, Mr. Young concludes that the authority, provided by section 50.54(x), to depart from license requirements in emergency situations should be rescinded.

Commonwealth Edison Company does nQj;_ have an operating policy for its nuclear reactors that permits, as Mr. Young suggests, the indiscriminate shut-down of a safety system.

The company does have a policy that implements sections 50.54(x) and (y).

That policy incorporates the limitations and safeguards of these regulations as explained above.

Thus, any decision to depart from license requirements would be made rigorously within this framework; and not improvidently, as implied by Mr. Young's characterization of "turning off" a safety system before it "has finished the job." Mr.

Young's concerns are misplaced.

The petition, therefore, lacks basis and it should be rejected.

Mr. Young also argues in his petition that Commonwealth Edison Company has engaged in several hazardous practices at its Dresden and Quad Cities plants. It appears from the NRC's corrected Federal Registe~ notice that Mr. Young is not offering these alleged hazardous practices as support for his petition.

Nevertheless, these misstatements should be corrected to remove any question as to their validity.

Mr. Young complains that, contrary to the technical specifications for the Dresden nuclear plant, the primary containment area for Unit 2 was deinerted while the reactor was operating to allow entry by workers.

Although the primary containment area, generally, must be inerted while the reactor is operating, the Dresden technical specifications allow deinerted operation for periods not to exceed 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

The NRC reviewed a number of instances when this practice was employed by Edison, and it concluded that the application of the 24-hour exception to the inerting technical specification requirement when properly implemented was not an unsafe practice.

This conclusion is documented in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-237/81-29, tl _al., dated July 12, 1982.

In addition, Commonwealth Edison Company complies with the occupational radiation exposure limits and guidelines of 10 CFR Part 20 for its nuclear workers, including workers who enter the primary containment areas at Dresden and Quad Cities when the plants are operating in accordance with the 24-hour exception noted above.

In sum, Mr. Young's assertion to the contrary and his criticism of the inerting practices at Dresden are erroneous and without credence.

We appreciate this opportunity to submit our views on Mr. Young's peti t ion.

Sincerely,

~!!!:r-Assistant Vice-President gd 1750n

I Duke Power Company P.O. Box 33198 Charlotte, N.C. 28242 e DUKEPOWER

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~d::>er 20, 1988 The Secretary of the Comnission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Carmission Washington, DC 20555 ATI'ENTICN:

Ik>cketing and Sez:vice Branch SUbject:

NRC N:>tioe of Ieceipt of Petitioo.

for Ruleneking by Charles Yoong Duke Power O l!NiPJlls

Dear Sir:

• as OCT 25 P 4 :28 I

HAL 8. Tucker Vice President Nuclear Production (704)373 4531 In the Federal Register (53FR32624) dated August 26, 1988, the Nuclear Regulatory Carmission ?]blis~ for cxmrent a petition for rule.making dated April 18, 1988, which was filed with the Comnission by Cllarles Young.

'!he petitioner requests the Carmission to amend its regulations to rescind the provision that authorizes nuclear power plant operators to deviate fran

'Iechnical Specifications during an arergency.

Duke Power Carpany has reviewed the petition and feels that paragraphs 50.54 (X) and (Y) should remain as now stated in the Code of Federal Regulations.

Not all situations related to operating a nuclear power plant can be anticipated and addressed in License Conditions,

'lechnical Specifications or plant procedures.

'!he paragraphs are needed to allow

~r plant operators, in an arergency, to take appropriate reasonable action to protect the health and safety of the public even if the action departs fran a License Condition or 'Iechnical Specification.

Without the existing wording in 50.54(X) and (Y), ~

plant operators may be reluctant to take reasonable action in an energency which is needed to

.imrediately protect the health and safety of the public.

Power plant operators nust be given the authority to use their knowledge gained from training and experience, as awroved by at least a Senior Reactor ~tor, to handle situations which could arise that "WOUld be outside the scope of written requireirents.

Since the acx::ident at 'lhree Mi.le Island, Unit 2, there have been extensive upgrades in plant equi:EJiellt, systans and operator training (reference NUREG 0 73 7, Clarification of 'lMI Action Plan IEqu.i.rements) *

'lhese upgrades should ensure another accident similar to '1hree Mi.le Island, Unit 2, will not occur.

But in case there is a need to take reasonable action that departs fran the

'Iechni cal Specifications or a License Condition, the licensee must be granted the freed.am to do so.

'lherefore, the request by Mr. Cllarles Young should be denied.

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WRITER'S DIRECT DIAL L AW OFFICES BISHOP, COOK, PURCELL & REYNOLDS 1400 L STREET, N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005*3502 (20 2) 371*5700 October 25, 1988 "88 OCT 25 P 2 : 12 11rr*,

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TELEX, 440574 INTLAW UI j ELECOPIER, (202) 371-5950 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission D':(

l'JMBER U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20555 Attn:

Docketing and Service Branch Re:

Proposed Amendment to 10 C.F.R.

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§§ 50.54(x) and (y) -- Deviation From Technical Specifications In Emergencies (53 Fed. Reg. 32624)

Dear Mr. Chilk:

On August 26, 1988, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC" or "Commission") published in the Federal Register for public comment a notice of receipt of a Petition for Rulemaking f r om Mr. Charles Young.

The petition requests the Commission to amend its regulations to rescind the provisions of 10 C.F.R.

§§ 50.54(x) and (y).

These provisions authorize a licensee t o deviate from a license condition or technical specification in an emergency, when such action is immediately needed to protect the health and safety of the public.

On behalf of Arkansas Power & Light Company, Florida Power Corporation, System Energy Resources, Inc., TU Electric Company, and Washington Public Power Supply System, we respectfully submit the fo l lowing comments in strong opposition to the proposed amendments.

1.

Summary To briefly summarize, the proposed amendment woul d e l imina t e the provisions which authorize a licensee to take r e a sonable actions which deviate from a license condition or technical specification in an emergency to protect the public health a nd safety.

The reasons asserted in support of this amendment a r e devoid of technical support.

The petition first seeks to justify the propose d amendments by objecting to NRC authorization of work in the drywel l wi th the reactor producing power at the Dresden and Quad Ci t ies Stations.

The NRC has specifically addressed the inci dents cited and found no non-compliances with safety regulat i ons.

The peti tion also completely fails to recognize tha t the eme rge ncy

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action by the licensee.",2/ It is our belief that the regulations, as currently written, offer the best practical method of effectively dealing with potentially hazardous emergency situations, allow necessary deviations only in emergency circumstances, allow deviations only with appropri ate approvals, and therefore promote the health and safety of the public as required by the Atomic Energy Act.

5.

Conclusion In conclusion, the petition for rulemaking is completel y lacking in technical support.

On one level, the proposed revisions of the rules are completely unnecessary to achieve t he ends generally sought by Mr. Young; i.e., compliance with technical specifications and protection of public safety.

However, on an even more important level, we believe that t he proposed amendments could compromise the ability of plant operators to safely and quickly react to an emergency s i tua t ion.

The amendments could also result in unnecessary new technical specifications, if the NRC were to seek to prescribe e qu i pment,

methods, and procedures necessary to deal wi th emergencies not currently addressed in technical specifications.

Because o f these reasons, we strongly recommend that the Commission decline to amend the well-supported regulation.

Nicho R. All

BISHOP, OQK, PURCELL & REYNOLDS

.2/

48 Fed. Reg. 13966 (April 1, 1983).

2 -

deviations allowed under§§ 50.54(x) and (y) have absolutely no application to the cited incidences of non-emergency mai ntenance.

Sections 50.54(x) and (y) have never been rel i ed upon at Dresden and Quad Cities.

The petitioner also cites as further grounds to amend

§§ 50.54(x) and (y) his opposition to NRC authorization for Commonwealth Edison operators to turn off water being pumped into a nuclear reactor.

Once again, however, the petitioner has presented no evidence that would undermine either the NRC's approval of the licensee's procedures or§§ 50.54(x) and (y).

Not only has the NRC reviewed and approved the licensee's procedures, but the petitioner also fails to recognize that the NRC, in promulgating the rules sought to be amended, specifically recognized the need for licensees to deviate from technical specifications in an an emergency in order to prevent harm to the public health and safety.

Finally, the petitioner misrepresents the findings regarding the causes of the Three Mile Island (TMI} accident in an attempt to roughly correlate technical specification deviations authorized in§§ 50.54(x) and (y) with the series of human, institutional and mechanical failures that caused the TMI accident.

In short, the petition utterly fails to connect the alleged incidences of hazardous activities at TMI with the provisions of§§ 50.54(x) and (y).

2.

No connection between alleged violations and

§§ 50.54(x) & (y) 10 C.F.R. §§ 50.54(x) and (y) authorize a senior operator of a nuclear power plant to take reasonable actions in an emergency which deviate from the operating license or technical specifications, when the actions are necessary to protect the public health and safety.

In essence, Mr. Young's petition to amend§§ 50.54(x) and (y) alleges that strict adherence to technical specifications will prevent the occurrence of any emergency, and thereby enhance plant safety.

However, should an emergency occur, he broadly asserts that compliance with the technical specifications is the most effective way to neutral ize the potentially hazardous situation.

Therefore, he would essentially eliminate the provisions allowing deviations.

The petitioner specifically cites several incidents which he apparently believes support his petition.

First, he alleges that Commonwealth Edison has violated technical specifications, with NRC approval, in allowing "work in a reactor containment vessel with the reactor producing power."

He charges that this "deviation" causes exposure "of workers to hazardous radiation" in violation of the Atomic Energy Act.

However, there is no

3 -

attempt made to relate these alleged circumstances to

§§ 50.54(x) and (y).

The connection escapes us, given that

§§ 50.54(x) and (y) have never been relied upon at Dresden and Quad Cities.

Furthermore, Mr. Young previously directed these same allegations to the NRC on February 24, 1988.

I n his r esp onse for the NRC, Mr. Edward G. Greenman, Director, Division of Reactor Projects, Region III, concluded that the NRC does not agree that Mr. Young's concerns represent violations of federa l regulations.".l/

Mr. Greenman noted that radiation workers perform the work described by Mr. Young only infrequently and then only within established restrictions on power level and radiological monitoring.

To further ensure the health and safety of workers and the public, an independent appraisal of the neutron energy and flux in the drywells at power was conducted by Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories at the Dresden and Quad Cities power plants.

The results i nd i cated neutron dose rates far lower than gamma dose rates at all locations, and that stringent plant procedures regulate drywe l l entries.

Accordingly, the NRC determined that Commonwealth Edison's programs and procedures are within the gamma and neutron doses of 10 C.F.R. Part 20 limits and i n accordance with NRC regulations.

3.

No connection between safetv pump operation criticized and §§50.54(x) and (y)

Petitioner next criticizes NRC authorization to Commonweal t h Edison to "turn off water being pumped into a nuclea r rector by a safety system before the system has finished its j ob during an emer gency."

The result predicted is "a nucl ear fue l meltdown, release of highly radioactive fission products, and exposure o f plant personnel and people nearby to hazardous radiation."

Again, this is no support for amendment to§§ 50.54(x) and (y ).

The NRC has once again specifically responded to this allegation through Mr. Greenman.

The NRC reviewed this emergency procedure and in inspection reports acknowledged that situations may arise when it may be necessary to operate outs i de station procedures or technical specifications.

As the Commission recognized in issuing§§ 50.54(x) and (y), this lati tude is intended, and is necessary, to protect public health and safety.

The NRC has explained the necessity of these provisions by stating that "[i]f operators are not permitted t o exercise judgment in this area" of emergency deviation from Technical Specifications, the results could cause other undesirable effects because, "[o]bviously, safety system

.l/ Letter from E.G. Greenman to c. Young, March 31, 1988, at 3.

4 -

automatic actuations and Technical Specifications cannot prescribe actions for every combination of conditions. 11y

4.

No connection between TMI findings and§§ 50.54(x) and (y)

Finally, petitioner alleges that 11three official investigations confirmed that operating Three Mile Island as required by the Operating License and Technical Specifications, would have prevented damage to the nuclear reactor."

Even assuming this is true, however, the conclusion does not support eliminating§§ 50.54(x) and 50.54(y).

Compliance with license conditions and technical specifications during normal and emergency operations is addressed as part of the NRC's enforcement program.

See 10 C.F.R. § 50.110; 10 C.F.R. Part 2, Appendix c.

Sections 50.54(x) and (y) refer instead to special circumstances in which deviations are justified to protect safety.

Although Mr. Young has cited correctly some of the content of the specified TMI reports, he has failed to include some very important information.

The Kemeny Commission Report states that

"(t]he accident at... TMI occurred as a result of a series of human, institutional, and mechanical failures. 111/ The report further states that "[e]quipment failures *.. contributed to the failure of operational personnel to recognize the actual condition of the plant.

Their training was deficient and left them unprepared for the events that took place. 11.4./

In response to these findings, the NRC has taken considerable steps to upgrade the quality of both the training of the personnel and the quality of the equipment at nuclear power stations.

It is also not without significance that 10 C.F.R. §§ 50.54(x) and (y) were promulgated subsequent to TMI.

One of the important lessons learned by the NRC since TMI is that, due to the limited range of circumstances addressed in the technical specifications, strict adherence to them in emergency circumstances can actually be hazardous to the health and safety of the public.

In promulgating§§ 50.54(x) and (y) the Commission specifically addressed the need to allow deviation from technical specifications in emergencies because 11 (e]mergency situations can arise... during which a license condition or a technical specification could prevent necessary protective y

Id. at 3.

V The President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island, The Need For Change:

The Legacy of TMI 2 (1979)

[emphasis added].

.4./

Id. at 27 [emphasis added).

Detroit Edison B. Ralph Sylvla Senior Vice President 6400 North D1x1e Highway Newport. Michigan 48166 (313) 586-4150 The secretary of the carmission

u. s. Nuclear Regulatory Canmission Washington, D. C.

20555 Attention:

Docketing and Service Branch

References:

1)

Fermi 2 NOC Docket No. 50-341 NRC License No. NPF-43

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Octd:>er 21, 1988 NOC-88-0248 DOCKET NUMBER PETITION RULE PRM..::50,.::,-tJ S3Flt. -:!>2~.:Z"/-

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Charles Young; Filing of Petition for Rulemaking (Federal Register, Vol. 53, SUbject:

No. 166, daterl August 26, 1988, FR Doc. 88-19428)

Detroit F.dison's Cooments on the Filing of Petition for Rulemaking PY Charles Young The Nuclear Regulatory Cormnission has published for public comnent a notice of receipt of a petition for rulemaking, dated April 18, 1988, filed with the Cormnission by Charles Young. The petitioner requested the Ccmnission to amend its regulations to rescind the provision that authorizes senior nuclear power plant operators to deviate from Technical Specifications during an energency.

The Detroit F.dison Company would like to make the following comnents on the proposed petition for rulemaking.

1. Regardless of the effort expended to formalize guidance to plant operators during energency conditions (i.e., energency operating procedures {EOP), etc.), there will still be situations not covered that require the operator to act outside of the Technical Specifications and Facility Q;)erating License. In fact, the rationale utilized to allow performance of some EOP steps is that 10CFR 50.54{x) authorizes the deviation in order to assure the continued health and safety of the public. It would be better therefore, to deviate from Technical Specifications un:ler an approved nethodology than to blindly follow a Technical Specification that does not adequately address a particular situation.

OCT 2 7 1988

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Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 DOCKET NUMBER PETITION RULE PRM SJ ~ A

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Attention:

Dear Sir:

Docketing and Service Branch James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-333 Indian Point Unit 3 Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-286 Deviation from Technical Specifications during an Emergency NRC Notice of Receipt of Petition for Rulemaking, 53 FR 32624, dated August 26, 1988.

The New York Power Authority has reviewed and evaluated the referenced petition for rulemaking.

The petition requested that the NRC amend paragraphs (x) and (y) of 10 CFR 50.54 such that deviation from technical specification never be allowed, even under emergency conditions. The Authority has evaluated the petition in light of current operating and accident management philosophy.

This letter summarizes the Authority's comments on the petition.

The Authority agrees with the petition that routine operation within the bounds of technical specifications provides assurance that the plant will be operated safely and would be prepared to mitigate the consequences of postulated transients and accidents. In the event of an emergency such as a severe accident beyond the design basis of the plant, however, flexibility in the regulations is necessary to allow manual actions that would mitigate the emergency condition, but which are prohibited by technical specifications. The current regulations, 10 CFR 50.54(x) and (y), provide for that flexibility while maintaining adequate administrative control over its use. These sections of the federal regulations currently read:

(x)

A licensee may take reasonable action that departs from a license condition or a technical specification (contained in a license issued under this part) in an emergency when this action is immediately needed to protect the public health and safety and no action consistent with license conditions and technical specifications that can provide adequate or equivalent protection is immediately apparent.

(y)

Licensee action pennitted by paragraph (x) of this section shall be approved, as a minimum, by a licensed senior operator prior to taking the action.

Accident mitigation strategy is based upon the concept of taking advantage of all available plant systems, whether safety grade or not, which can function to lessen the severity or terminate the event.

This is reflected in our symptomatic emergency operating procedures which are, in turn, based upon the NRC approved generic emergency procedures guidelines (EPG). These procedures invoke the

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2. The rule proposed by the petitioner would require plant operations personnel to obtain permission from the NUclear Regulatory Commission to deviate from Technical Specifications during an emergency. This may result in a diversion of personnel resources at a critical time thus jeopardizing safe operation or shutdown of a given facility. The current rules require notification to the NRC of deviations authorized by 10CFR50.54(x).

If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Arnold Jaufmann at (313) 586-4213.

cc: Mr. A. B. Davis Mr. R. C. Knop Mr. W. G. Rogers Mr. J. R. Stang

1 23 Ms n S*re t Wh te Pl 11 New York '0601 914 681.6240 John C. Bron*

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.88 OCT 21 A11 EiA::u ie Vice President rtu~ le, Generation October 17, 19~f, I\\

JPN-88-054 t!UCt*.

IPN-88-046

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Secretary of the Commission DOCKET NUMBER U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention:

Docketing and Service Branch PETITION RULE PRM oV ~~

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Dear Sir:

James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-333 Indian Point Unit 3 Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-286 Deviation from Technical Specifications during an Emergency NRC Notice of Receipt of Petition for Rulemaking, 53 FR 32624, dated August 26, 1988.

The New York Power Authority has reviewed and evaluated the referenced petition for rulemaking.

The petition requested that the NRC amend paragraphs (x) and (y) of 10 CFR 50.54 such that deviation from technical specification never be allowed, even under emergency conditions. The Authority has evaluated the petition in light of current operating and accident management philosophy.

This letter summarizes the Authority's comments on the petition.

The Authority agrees with the petition that routine operation within the bounds of technical specifications provides assurance that the plant will be operated safely and would be prepared to mitigate the consequences of postulated transients and accidents. In the event of an emergency such as a severe accident beyond the design basis of the plant, however, flexibility in the regulations is necessary to allow manual actions that would mitigate the emergency condition, but which are prohibited by technical specifications. The current regulations, 10 CFR 50.54(x) and (y), provide for that flexibility while maintaining adequate administrative control over its use. These sections of the federal regulations currently read:

(x)

A licensee may take reasonable action that departs from a license condition or a technical specification (contained in a license issued under this part) in an emergency when this action is immediately needed to protect the public health and safety and no action consistent with license conditions and technical specifications that can provide adequate or equivalent protection is immediately apparent.

(y)

Licensee action pennitted by paragraph (x) of this section shall be approved, as a minimum, by a licensed senior operator prior to taking the action.

Accident mitigation strategy is based upon the concept of taking advantage of all available plant systems, whether safety grade or not, which can function to lessen the severity or terminate the event.

This is reflected in our symptomatic emergency operating procedures which are, in turn, based upon the NRC approved generic emergency procedures guidelines (EPG). These procedures invoke the OCT 2 7 1991

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sections of 10 CPR quoted above when actions, appropriate to protect the health and safety of the general public, cannot be performed within the framework of the technical specifications.

Revision 4 of the EPGs, approved by the Commission on 9 /12/88, require many actions which would not ordinarily be allowed under technical specifications. In the safety evaluation for the new guidelines, the Commission considers *the actions specified in the Emergency Procedure Guidelines to be generally correct and appropriate and within the operators' capability." They also *provide guidance for operator response to transients and accidents for the entire range of available systems. Guidance is provided for the use of all systems capable of performing a function* whether or not they are allowed by technical specifications.

Proceduralized deviations from technical specifications under specific emergency conditions may include: inhibiting detrimental automatic plant responses; defeating interlocks to allow preferred flow paths; taking manual control of automatic systems; maintaining plant parameters (such as reactor water level) outside normal ranges; and cross-tying non-safety equipment to perform accident mitigation functions.

The Commission's position on deviation from technical specifications is clearly stated in section 2.4 of the safety evaluation for Revision 4 to the EPGs which states in part:

This is not to imply that operation beyond the technical specifications is recommended in an emergency. Rather, such operation may be required under certain degraded conditions. The limits specified in the guidelines establish the boundaries within which continued safe operation of the plant can be assured.

Therefore, confomiance with the guidelines under degraded conditions does not ensure strict confomiance with a plant's technical specifications or other licensing bases. The licensing specifications will already have been exceeded in order to get into such a situation in the first place and the safe recovery of the plant becomes the matter of paramount importance.

This ability to deviate from technical specifications under emergency conditions is clearly an enhancement to safety. If a deviation from technical specifications is the best or only way to protect the health and safety of the general public and plant workers, it is imperative that the action be permitted.

To assure that such deviations are not made unless absolutely necessary, prior approval of a licensed senior operator is required. All licensed senior operators have the extensive training and experience necessary to recognize the need for emergency actions. The Shift Supervisor, an experienced senior reactor operator, in the main control room would be making decisions under emergency conditions.

He is responsible for direct control of the plant and is authorized to take all actions he considers necessary to operate the plant safely and to protect the welfare of the general public. A Shift Supervisor is at the plant 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day and is immediately available to make decisions as required. It is appropriate that his approval be required before actions which deviate from technical specifications be made.

The existing regulations provide assurance that technical specifications for nuclear power plants will be adhered to during normal operation. Because it is impossible to predict, plan, and provide technical specifications suitable for every possible combination of abnormal plant conditions, deviation from technical specifications must be allowed in the regulations when emergency conditions so dictate.

Mitigation activities, not explicitly allowed under the technical specifications, provide additional flexibility to protect the health and safety of the general public and plant workers under abnormal conditions. The Authority strongly recommends that the Commission retain the existing sections, 10 CPR 50.54(x) and (y), of the regulations and deny the referenced petition for proposed rulemaking.

Should you or your staff have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Mr. J. A. Gray, Jr.

of my staff.

cc:

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 Office of the Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O.Box136 Lycoming, NY 13093 Resident Inspector's Office Indian Point Unit 3 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O.Box337 Buchanan, NY 10511 Mr. Harvey Abelson Project Directorate 1-1 Division of Reactor Projects - 1/Il U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 14 B2 Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. Joseph D. Neighbors, Sr. Proj. Mgr.

Project Directorate 1-1 Division of Reactor Projects - 1/Il U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 14 B2 Washington, D.C. 20555 Very truly yours, I"

('#--.John C. Brons Executive Vice President Nuclear Generation

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 CFR Part 50

[Docket No. PRM-50-50)

[7590-01)

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• ,t,fr r "88 OCT 12 A10 :35 DOCl<ET NUMBER PRM vO 51' Charles Young; PETITION RULf 53,c~ 3}0il-J Filing of Petition for Rulemaking

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AGENCY:

Nuclear Regulatory Conmission.

ACTION:

Receipt of Petition for Rulemaking; correction.

SUMMARY

This document clarifies a portion of the notice of receipt for a petition for rulemaking filed by Charles Young and docketed as PRM-50-50.

The notice of receipt for this petition was published August 26, 1988 (53 FR 32624). This notice provides additional information in support of the petitioner's original intent.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

John D. Philips, Acting Chief, Regulatory Publications Branch, Division of Freedom of Information and Publications Services, Office of Administration and Resources Management, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Telephone: 301-492-3783.

In the notice of receipt for PRM-50-50 published on August 26, 1988 (53 FR 32624),

under the headfog, 11II. Grounds for the Petition," remove the first two sentences and insert the following sentences in their place:

2 The petitioner states that not following technical specifications in an emergency could lead to an accident similar to the one at Three Mile Island, Unit 2.

The petitioner states that Federal Regulations require a nuclear plant safety system to pump water into a nuclear reactor as long as the abnormal condition which activated the system persists; but, that Co11111onwealth Edison's Policy permits operators to turn off water being pumped into a nuclear reactor during an en~rgency before the safety system has finished its job.

The petitioner notes that turning off water being pumped into a nuclear reactor during an emergency can cause a nuclear fuel meltdown, release of highly radioactive fiss ion products, and exposure of plant personnel and people nearby to hazardous radiation. The petitioner offers that during a Proceeding before the Illinois Conunerce Comission on September 15, 1987, Commonwealth Edison's attorney cited 10 CFR 50.54, paragraphs {x) and (y) as authority for their policy. The petitioner states that this policy applies to all of Commonwealth Edison's nuclear power plants; therefore, the petitioner concludes that Conwnonwealth Edison risks an accident such as the accident at Three Mile Island Unit 2 at twelve nuclear power plants.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this _...,{ __ (_!( __ day of f}fcf;-z,u 1988.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Contnission.

1,-

"samuel Secretary of the Convnission.

I Duquesne ug,t Company JOHN D. SIEBER Vice President - Nuclear Group Beaver Valley Power Station P.O. Box4 Shippingport. PA 15077-0004

'88 OCT -4 A11 :42 (412) 643-5255 Secretary, u. s. Nuclear Regulatory Washington, D.C.

20555 ATTN: Docketing and Service Branch September 20, 1988 DOCl<ET NUMBER Commission PEp,.1T(J1Al\\1 ot II r: PRM R POSED.JRCTtE-=~

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Reference:

Notice of Receipt of Petition for Rul emaking:

Charles Young, Docket No. PRM 50, 53FR32624 Gentlemen:

The Duquesne Light Company (DLC) is pleased to provide comments regardi ng the petition f i l ed by Charles Young, Doc ket No. PRM-50-50.

The notice of receipt of petition for rulemaking was published in the Federal Register on August 26, 1988 (53FR32624).

The petitioner has requested the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to amend its regulations to rescind the provision that authorizes nuclear power plant operators to deviate from technical specifications during an emergency

[10CFR50.54(x) and (y)].

The Technical Specifications, in principle, establish the minimum functional requirements for continued plant operation and do not dictate mitigation strategies or recovery actions under accident conditions.

The emergency operating procedures are,

however, utilized for these purposes.

Verbatim compliance to the Technical Specifications,

under accident conditions, could result in scenarios where the health and safety of the public could be compromised if the current provisions of 10CFR50.54(x) and (y) were not provided.

The following examples are cited to support this contention:

1.

A plant with turbine-driven weather induced failure of auxiliary feedwater.

Specifications would result in main feedwater pumps experiences a the suction tank supplying all Compliance with the Technical a loss of all feedwater.

2.

An operating limit on pressurizer level, specified in the Technical Specifications, is erroneously adhered to under a loss of coolant accident and results in termination of safety injection without regard to subcooling requirements specified in the emergency procedures.

This action results in a sustained core uncovery.

OCT - 4 1988

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DOCKETING & SERVI(( SECTION OFflCE OF THE SECRET~ C?Y Special OF THE COMMISSION 7 1 3

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. ', Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Notice of Receipt of Petition for Rulemaking Charles Young, Docket No. PRM-50-50, 53 FR 32624 Page 2

3.

An operator notices that an ECCS pump is exhibiting abnormal vibration under accident conditions and the second backup pump is operating satisfactorily.

Since the Technical Specifications require both pumps to be operable, the operator would have to leave the pump in service, which could potentially degrade the mechanical integrity of the pump, and result in a release which exceeds 10CFR100 limits.

Codification of the petitioner's proposed revision to 10CFR50.54(x) and (y) is undesirable for the reasons discussed herein.

Licensed personnel at Duquesne Light Company are to operate Beaver Valley Power Station within established guidelines which include the Technical Specifications and the Final Safety Analysis Report.

Sections 10CFR50.54(x) and (y) are provided for when the plant is outside these boundaries and the health and safety of the public depends upon immediate operator action.

Any such action taken under 10CFR50.54(x) and (y) results from extenuating circumstances.

The proposed changes would impose undue restr a i ning r equirements on licensed operators in coping with severe accidents.

The proposed revisions are errant in that they attempt to provide prescriptive measures for precluding core damaging events by imposing requirements which were not specifically derived for that purpose.

Very truly yours,

~~

{~ice President Nuclear Group

I Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

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Notice of receipt of petition for Rulemaking Charles Young, Docket No. PRM-50-50, 53 FR 32624 Page 3 bee: w. s. Lacey T. P. Noonan R. J. Druga Reference Memorandum from W. s. Lacey to K. D. Grada

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 CFR Part 50 Docket No. PRM-50-50 Charles Young; Filing of Petition for Rulemaking AGENCY:

Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION:

Notice of Receipt of Petition for Rulemaking.

• aa AUG 23 Pl2 :22

SUMMARY

The Commission is publishing for public comment this notice of receipt of a petition for rulemaking dated April 18, 1988, which was filed with the Commission by Charles Young.

The petition was docketed by the Commission on July 3,1988, and has been assigned Docket No. PRM-50-50.

The petitioner requests the Commission to amend its regulations to rescind the provision that authorizes nuclear power plant operators to deviate from technical specifications during an emergency.

DATE:

Submit comments by October 25, 1988.

Comments received after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but assurance of consideration cannot be given except as to comments received on or before this date.

ADDRESSES:

Submit comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

~Sashington, DC 20555.

Attention: Docketing and Service Branch.

For a copy of the petition, write: Rules Review and Editorial Section, Regulatory Publications Branch, Division of Freedom of Information and Publications Services, Office of Administration and Resources Management, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555.

2 FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Juanita Beeson, Chief, Rules Review and Editorial Section, Regulatory Publications Branch, Division of Freedom of Information and Publications Services, Office of Administration and Resources Management, Washington, DC 20555, Telephone (301) 492-8926.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

I. Petitioner 1s Interest Mr. Charles Young, the petitioner, is requesting the NRC to rescind paragraphs (x) and (y) of §50.54 of 10 CFR.

The regulation, issued on June 1, 1983 (48 FR 13966), authorizes a senior operator in a nuclear power plant to deviate from technical specifications in an emergency.

The petitioner opposes the regulation because he believes that nuclear power plants should be operated in accordance with the operating license and appropriate technical specifications and that requiring a senior operator to follow the technical specifications during an emergency enhances plant safety.

The petitioner notes that technical specifications (a) prescribe settings for safety systems at nuclear power plants, such as the emergency core cooling system, so that action of a safety system wil1 correct an abnormal condition before fuel design limits are exceeded; and (b) require an automatic safety system to operate as long as the abnormal condition which threatens the nuclear fuel exists in the plant.

3 II. Grounds for the Petition The petitioner cites several cases of hazardous practices where, the petitioner asserts, the licensee has violated Federal regulations at the Dresden and Quad Cities Nuclear Power Plants, owned by Commonwealth Edison Company, Chicago, Illinois. The petitioner believes that these practices could lead to an accident similar to the one at Three Mile Island, Unit 2.

The petitioner claims that three official investigations have confirmed that damage to the 41t nuclear reactor at Three Mile Island, Unit 2, could have been prevented if plant operators had followed the requirements of the plant 1s operating license and technical specifications. According to the petitioner, the three investigations and their applicable findings are as follows:

(1) The President's ColT'lllission found that reactor core damage would have been prevented if the high pressure injection system had not been throttled.

(Kemeny Commission Finding #4, pg 28)

(2) Calculations by the Special Inquiry Group show that use of the high pressure injection system would have prevented overheating of the fuel and release of radioactive material.

(Rogovin, Vol II, Part 2, pgh D.2.b, pgs 558,561)

(3) The Special Investigation by the Senate Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation found the cause of severe damage to the reactor core was the inappropriate overriding of automatic safety equipment by plant operators and managers.

(Hart Report Chapter 2, Findings and Conclusions, #2, pg 9)

The petitioner believes the NRC should rescind the existing provisions in paragraphs (x) and (y) of §50.54 to adequately protect the public health and safety from the hazards of nuclear radiation when nuclear energy is producing power.

4 III. Petitioner's Proposal The petitioner proposes that 10 CFR 50.54 (x) and (y) be amended to read as follows:

§50.54 Conditions of Licenses.

(x)

The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 stipulates that a licensee shall operate a co1m1ercial nuclear power plant in accordance with technical specifications. Technical specifications define the specific characteristics of a nuclear power plant which ensure that fuel design limits are not exceeded during normal operations and emergencies.

By review of a nuclear power plant's safety analysis and technical specifications, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission determines that utilization of special nuclear material will be in accord with the coITlllon defense and security and will provide protection to the health and safety of the public.

To prevent fuel damage and protect public health and safety from the hazards of nuclear radiation, a licensee shall follow technical specifications when operating a commerical nuclear power plant.

(y) The Chief Executive Officer of a public utility or other organization licensed to operate a commerical nuclear power plant shall establish policy for operating the plant.

The Chief Executive Officer shall direct that the nuclear power plant be operated in accordance with the Operating License and Technical Specifications.

Dated at Rockville, MD, this 1--Y day of~

1988.

Regulatory Commission.

Commission.

Mr. Lando Zech Chairman 262 Sheffield Lane G 1 en E 11 yn,

I l.

6 0 l 3 7 April 18, 1988 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Lando:

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P/<.141-so -so r

In May 1987, I ma=e a formal Complaint to the Illinois Commerce Commiss~on against Commonwealth Edison Company, the Chicago based ut~lity. I complained that Commonvealth Edison risks the health and safety of Illinois citizens when operating nucl~ar power plants in northern Illinois.

J' During proceedings conducted by the Illinois Commerce Commission, Commonwealth Edison*s lawyer acknowledged that Company officials authorize work in a reactor containment vessel with the reactor producing power at Dresden and Quad Cities Stations. The lawyer also acknowledged that Company officials authorize operators to turn off water being pumped into a nuclear reactor by a safety system before the system has finished its job during an emergency. Commonwealth Edison*s lawyer moved that my Complaint be dismissed because the Nuclear Regulatory Commission resolved these issues in 1982 and nuclear safety is a matter under federal jurisdiction.

The Illinois Coi:nmerce Commission dismissed my Complaint for want of jurisdiction. In a letter dated January 13, 1988, the Chairman of the Commerce Commission suggested that I write to Region III of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

On January 29, 1988, I wrote to the Regional Administrator, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region III. I cited the hazardous practices at Commonwealth Edison*s nuclear power plants. In a follow up letter dated February 24, 1988, I wi::ote that employees work near a nuclear reactor producing power at the Company*s Dresden and Quad Cities Stations, but risking a fuel meltdown by turning off a safety system can occur at any Commonwealth Edison nuclear power plant.

Mr. Charles H. Well, Investigation and Compliance Specialist, acknowledged my letters. In a letter dated March 31, 1988, Mr. Edward G. Greenman, Director Division of Reactor Projects, replied to my complaints.

Hr. Greenman wt:ites that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission approves of employees working in a reactor containment vessel when the reactor is producing power at Commonwealth Edison*s Dresden and Quad Cities Stations. Mr. Greenman writes that when workers are inside the containment vessel with the

reactor producing power, the containment vessel is always deinerted, But Dresden Unit 2 Technical Specification 3.7.A.S.a. requires that the c~ntainment vessel be lnerted -

oxygen concentration ieduced t: less than 5\\ with nitrogen -

during reactor power operations. Commonwealth Edison officials therefore violate Operating Licenses and Technical Specifications when they work employees in a reactor containment vessel with the reactor producing power at Dresden and Quad Cities Stations.

Mr. Greenman also writes that :ne Nuclear iegulatory Commission approves of employees working in a containment vessel with the reactor produc:ng power because Commonwealth Edison officials ensure that t~e radiation dose limits of 10 CFR Part 20 are not exceeded. But 10 CFR Part 20 reads, in addition to complying with stipulated dose limits, officials shall make ev~ry reasonable effort to maintain radiation exposures of nuclear plant emp!oyees as low as reasonably achievable. Because of high raciation levels, General Electric engineers designed the bolling water reactors at Dresden and Quad Cities to operate without workers-entering the containment vessel during pover operations (General Electric Manuals NED0-10128 an~ NEDO-10260). Commonwealth Edison officials therefore violate 10 CFR Part 20 and plant Operating Licenses, when they expose workers to hazardous radiation by sending them into a reactor containment vessel vith the reactor producing power at Dresden and Quad Cities s~ations.

Hr. Greenman writes that the Nc=lear Regulatory Commission considers it reasonable to turr. off a nuclear plant safety system in an emergency. But Feceral Regulations require a nuclear plant safety system to pump water into a nuclear reactor as long as the abnor111a! condition which activated the system, persists. Commonwealth Edison's Policy permits operators to turn off water being pumped into a nuclear reactor during an emergency before the safety system has finished its job. Turning off water being pumped into a nuclear reactor during an emergency, can cause a nuclear fuel meltdown. Commonwealth Edison's Polley can cause a nuclear fuel meltdown, release of high!y radioactive fission products, and exposure of plant personnel and people nearby to hazardous radiation. Hr.

Greenman writes that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission affirms this Policy - a Policy that can cause an accident like Three Hile Island.

Regarding the Three Mile Islan~ accident, Victor Stello writes:

"** had the operators allowed the emergency core cooling system to perform Its intended function, damage to the core would most likely have been prevented." (FORWARD to NUREG-0600, fifth paragraph)

In July, 197S, Hr. Stello commissioned a Spe=ial Review Group to review the lessons learned from the Three Mile Island accident. The Special Review Group found if cperators had adhered to Technical Specifications, the hig~ pressure injection system would not have been throttled with the reactor coolant system at low pressure conditions. (NUREG-0616, pgs 87, 88)

Three official investigations confirm that operating Three Mile Island as required by the Operating License and Technical Specifications, would have prevented damage to the nuclear reac~o~:

(1) The President's Commission found that reactor core damage would have been prevented if the high pressure injection system had not been throttled. (Kemeny Commission Finding #4, pg 28)

(2) Calculations by the Special Inquiry Group show that use 2 of the high pressure injection system would t.ave prevented overheating cf the fuel and release of radioactive material.

(Rogovin Vol II Part 2, pgh D.2.b, pgs 558,561)

(3) The Special Investigation by the Senate Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation found the cause of severe damage to the reactor core was the inappropriate overriding of automatic safety eguipaent by plant operators and managers. (Hart Report Chapter 2, Findings and Conclusions, 12, pg 9)

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued a new Regulation on June 1, 1!83. This Regulation, 10 CFR 50.54 (x) and (y),

authorizes a Senior Operator in a nuclear plant to deviate from technical specifications in an emergency. Technical specifications prescribe settings for nuclear plant safety systems. Settings for automatic protective systems -

emergency core cooling systems for example - are defined so that action of a safety system will correct an abnormal condition before fuel design limits are exceeded.

Technical Specifications require an automatic safety system to operate as long as tt:e abnormal condition. which threatens the nuclear fuel exists in the plant.

Following technical specifications during an emergency leads to plant safety. Safety will not require a Senior Operator to deviate from technical specificatiocs. Mr. Stello believes that following technical specifications ls the safe way to operate a nuclear plant l.

To protect public health and safety from the hazards of nuclea% radiation when nuclear energy 1s producing power, I urge you to cancel Federal Regulation 10 CFR 50.54 paragraphs (x) and (y). Enclosed ls a draft to replace these paragraphs.

Sincerely yours,

~

'1 I Charles Young 3

1 On December 31, 1984, t~e Office of Nuclear Reactor Requlation established a 7echnical Specification lmproveme~=

Project to consider the e~=ire subject of Technical Specifications and provice recommendations for improvemen:.

The Group concluded that r=oblems identified with Technica~

Specifications do not pos~ an acute safety problem for operating power reactors. ~r. Stello sent the Report to tt~

Commissioners in a letter ~ated January 13, 1986. In his letter, Mr. Stello endorse~ the principal finding of the Group. The Group*s princi;:e finding is that there are nc acute safety concerns ass::~ated with Technical Specifications which supp:=t. a mandato-ry program of change:::

to the Technical Specifica:ions of operating reactors.

Enclosure Copy to:

Hs. Mary Bushnell Chairman Illinois Commerce Commlssi~~

DRAFT - Suggested change to Part 50, Ee=:ion 50.54, Title 10,

~

~ode q:£ Federal Regulations.

"50.5~ C~nditions of Licenses.

(x)

The Atomic Energy Act of 195~ s:ipulates that a licensee shall operate a commercial n~=:~ar power plant in accorca~=e with technical specificatic~~

Technical specifications define the specific cha:a=~eristics of a nuclear ;ower plant which ensure that =~~1 design limits are not exceeded during norma'l operations an: emergencies. By revie~ o: a nuclear power plant's safe~y analysis and technica: specifications, the Nuclear Re;ulatory Commission determines that utilization of special n=clear material will

)

be in accord with the corrunon defense and security and w111*

provide protection to the health and safety of the public. To prevent :~el damage and protect public health and safety from the hazards of nuclear radiation, a licer.see shall follow technical specifications when operatin; a commercial nuclear power plant.

(y) The Chief Executive Officer of a public utility or other organization licensed to operate a commercial nuclear power plant shall establish policy for operating the plant.

The Chief Executive Officer shall direct that the nuclear power plant be operated in accordance vith the Operating License and Technical Specifications.*

References:

(1)

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Section 2232 (2)

Code of Federal Regulations,,itle 10, Part 50 Sections 50.34, 50.36, 50.46, 50.57, and Criterion 10, APPE..~DIX A.