ML23151A514

PR-MISC.(90-10) - 55FR53220 - Notice of Availability: Regulatory Impact Survey Report

ML23151A514
Person / Time
Issue date:	12/27/1990
From:	Chilk S NRC/SECY
To:
References
PR-MISC. (90-10), 55FR53220
Download: ML23151A514 (1)

Text

ADAMS Template: SECY-067 DOCUMENT DATE: 12/27/1990 TITLE: PR-MISC. (90-10) - 55FR53220 - NOTICE OF AVAILABILITY:

REGULATORY IMPACT SURVEY REPORT CASE

REFERENCE:

PR-MISC. (90-10) 55FR53220 KEYWORD: RULEMAKING COMMENTS Document Sensitivity: Non-sensitive - SUNSI Review Complete

STATUS OP ROLBMAltING PROPOSED RULE: PR-MISC. (90-10) OPEN ITEM (Y/N) B ROLE NAMES NOTICE OF AVAILABILITYz REGULATORY DIPACT SURVEY REPORT PROPOSED RULE FED REG CITE: 55FR53220 PROPOSED RULB PUBLICATION DATE: 12/27/90 :HUMBER OF COMMENTS: 26 ORIGINAL DATE FOR COMMENTSI 01/28/91 EXTENSION DATE: I I FINAL RULE FED. REG. CITE: PINAL RULE PUBLICATION DATE: I I NOTES OH FILE LOCATED ON Pl.

STATUS OF RULE 0 FIND THE STAFF CONTACT OR VIEW THE ROLEMAlCING HISTORY PRESS PAGE DOWN KEY HISTORY OP THE ROLE PART AFFECTED: PR-lllSC. (90-10)

RULE TITLE: NOTICE OF AVAILABILITY: REGULATORY IMPACT SURVEY REPORT ROPOSED RULE PROPOSED ROLE DATE PROPOSED RULE ECY PUER: 90-347 SRH DATE: 11/29/90 SIGNED BY SECRETARY: 12/20/90 FINAL RULE FINAL RULE DATE FINAL RULE SECY PAPER: 92-023 SRK DATE: I I SIGHED BY SECRETARY: I I STAFJ' CONTACTS OH THE ROLE COHTACT1: JON B. HOPKINS MAIL STOP: 12-E-4 PHONE: 492-1287 COHTACT2z HAIL STOP: PHOHBI

DOCKET NO. PR-MISC. (90-10)

(55FR53220)

In the Matter of NOTICE OF AVAILABILITY: REGULATORY IMPACT SURVEY REPORT DATE DATE OF TITLE OR DOCKETED DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT 12/26/90 10/09/90 POLICY ISSUE (NOTATION VOTE) SECY-90-347 TO COMMISSIONERS FROM EDO 12/26/90 12/20/90 NOTICE OF AVAILABILITY OF SECY 90-347, *REGULATORY IMPACT SURVEY REPORT* PUBLISHED ON 12/27/90 AT 55 FR 53220 01/28/91 12/11/90 COMMENT OF INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR POWER OPERATIONS (ZACK T. PATE, PRESIDENT) ( 1) 01/28/91 01/28/91 COMMENT OF GEORGIA POWER COMPANY (W. G. HAIRSTON~ III, SR. V.P.-NUCL.) ( 2) 01/28/91 01/28/91 COMMENT OF ALABAMA POWER COMPANY (W. G. HAIRSTON, III, SR. V.P.-NUCL.) ( 3) 01/28/91 01/25/91 COMMENT OF YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC COMPANY (DONALD W. EDWARDS, DIRECTOR) ( 4) 01/28/91 01/25/91 COMMENT OF OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT (W. G. GATES) ( 5) 01/28/91 01/28/91 COMMENT OF NUMARC (BYRON LEE, JR., PRESIDENT AND CEO) ( 6) 01/29/91 01/28/91 COMMENT OF CENTERIOR ENERGY (MICHAEL D. LYSTER) ( 7) 01/29/91 01/28/91 COMMENT OF DETROIT EDISON (WILLIAMS. ORSER, SR. VICE PRES.) ( 8) 01/29/91 01/29/91 COMMENT OF NORTHEAST UTILITIES (E. J. MROCZKA) ( 10) 01/29/91 01/28/91 COMMENT OF GPU NUCLEAR CORPORATION (JAMES KNUBEL) ( 11) 01/29/91 01/29/91 COMMENT OF NUCL UTIL BACKFITTING l REFORM GROUP (NICHOLAS S. REYNOLDS, ESQ.) ( 12) 01/30/91 01/28/91 COMMENT OF CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NY, INC.

(STEPHEN B. BRAM, VICE PRESIDENT) ( 13)

DOCKET NO. PR-MISC. (90-10) (55FR53220)

DATE DATE OF TITLE OR DOCKETED DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT 01/30/91 01/29/91 COMMENT OF FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT (W. H. BOHLKE, VICE PRESIDENT) ( 14) 01/31/91 01/28/91 COMMENT OF TU ELECTRIC (WILLIAM J. CAHILL, JR.) ( 15) 01/31/91 01/28/91 COMMENT OF ENTERGY OPERATIONS (DONALD C. HINTZ, EXEC. VICE PRES.) ( 16) 02/01/91 01/28/91 COMMENT OF CONSUMERS POWER (DAVID P. HOFFMAN, VICE PRESIDENT) ( 17) 02/01/91 01/28/91 COMMENT OF NEW YORK POWER AUTHORITY (JOHN C. BRONS) ( 18) 02/05/91 02/01/91 COMMENT OF E. J. WAGNER ( 19) 02/05/91 01/31/91 COMMENT OF WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM (G. C. SORENSEN) ( 20) 02/05/91, 01/28/91 COMMENT OF GULF STATES UTILTIIES (GSU) (W. H. ODELL) ( 21) 02/08/91 01/28/91 COMPIENT OF NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION (STANLEY W. WILCZEK, JR.) ( 22) 02/08/91 01/30/91 COMMENT OF CENTERIOR ENERGY (DONALD C. SHELTON, VICE PRESIDENT) ( 23) 02/15/91 01/28/91 COMMENT OF IOWA ELECTRIC LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY (DANIELL. MINECK) ( 24)

- 02/19/91 02/16/91 COMMENT OF OHIO CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBLE ENERGY,INC (SUSAN L. HIATT) ( 25) 03/01/91 02/25/91 COMMENT OF FLORIDA POWER CORP. - CRYSTAL RIVER #3 (P. M. BEARD, JR., SR. VICE PRES.) ( 26) 04/24/92 04/17/92 LTR E. J. WAGNER TO DSB UPDATING HIS COMMENT SUBMITTED IN HIS LETTER OF 2/1/91.

DOCKET NUMBER .

40 Mal lards CovePAOPOSEO RULE PR m IS{,.*

Duxbury, MA 02332 February 1, 1991 ~*

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V April 17, 1992 (R~ ~\~~Q n\

Secretary of the Commission (30_-I:!/

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission *92 APR 24 P2 :29 Washington, DC 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch

Dear Sir:

In a Federal Register notice of December 27, 1990 the NRC invited comments on SECY 90-347 concerning the "Regulatory Impact Survey Report. My comments 11 follow. These were initially submitted in my letter of February l, 1991 but are revised herein.

• The technology of the light water cooled reactor for nuclear power has matured since the original regulations were written. However, regulation has not developed in parallel with the technology. The evolution of regulations was toward increased detail and control of short-term, ongoing processes. As the NRC increased their detailed process control, the regulatory environment became regulation by bickering.

The legitimate reasons for the Federal Government to regulate nuclear power continue to be to control fissile material and to protect the public from the hazards of radiation and radioactivity. Regulations should use the knowledge of a matured technology to change from a process base to a performance base. This would eliminate causes of bickering, reduce the administrative costs of regulation for the industry and the NRC, and increase the effectiveness of regulation.

I suggest that the NRC, working with industry develop a plan for simplified, performance based regulation of nuclear power. Elements of the plan that would be essential are illustrated below in the form of specimen statements of revised regulations and are stated in order of importance to the safety of nuclear power.

The plan should identify major bodies of current process oriented regulation that should be eliminated consistent with performance based regulation. It is expected tr.at the proposed improvements can be accommodated with Rule changes vice legislation.

Safety Goal Historically, the deterministic methods used as bases for regulations nave always precluded the possibility of core damage accidents or release *of ,

radioactivity from containment. This approach implies a safety goal qf zero, although not explicitly stated in the regulations. ..,

A suggested addition to regulations would be "These regulations ,' wheifmet in their entirety, assure that severe core damage or release of radioactivity from containment cannot occur. 11 Over the past decade, methods have been developed to quantify the:

probability of core damage or radioactivity release. They use hi storical data to quantify the frequency with which people have historicall_y .-

violated the deterministic requirements during the design, proc~ "!,e~t

• U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIOt-.

e, DOCKETING SERVICE SECTION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE CO~:MISSION Oocumcnl Statistics Postmark Date ____j _(_;;;

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Secretary of the Convnission Page 2 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Convnission April 17, 1992 (Revised)

Safety Goal (Continued) manufacturing, construction, operation, maintenance, etc. of existing plants. The resultant, historically based probability of core damage is typically once per 100.,000 reactor years, signif1cantly higher than the deterministic intent of the regulation, i.e., zero.

The use of the probabilistic methods to quantify historical performance of the contributing people is probably appropriate and meaningful. However, to apply probabilistic methods in a forward sense to design, procurement, maintenance, etc. degrades the implied safety goal of zero core damage and is counterproductive to nuclear safety. Methods currently used include Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRA), Probabilistic Safety Assessments (PSA), Operability Evaluations and Reliabtlity Centered Maintenance (RCM).

Therefore, it is concluded that the NRC should persist in the intent of achieving through deterministic regulation, zero frequency of core damage and release of radioactivity. They should not encourage licensees to resort to probabilistic methods in a fontard sense nor allow probabilistic alternatives to compliance with the deterministic regulations.

Licensed Radiologic Amounts One of the least effective regulations addresses the quintessential difference between fossil fueled and nuclear powered electric generating plants - the effects of radiation and radioactivity. The original ALARA requirements for control of radiation and radioactivity had no credible quantitative bases because technology had not yet evolved. The qualitative regulation imposed (ALARA) has been given lip service both by the industry and the NRC.

Even the new 10 CFR 20 requirements on ALARA are non-quantitative. It is mainly in the area of control of radiation and radioactivity that new NRC regulations should forcefully and quantitatively address the performance of the licensee. Such regulation should directly address the impact of power reactors on the environment and on the public and provide the mechanism for reducing these impacts to deminimus as further evolution of technology will enable.

The following specimen statements are s,uggested to address the six fundamental quantities of radiation and tadioactivity pertinent to nuclear power plants by _establishing licensed li'.m1ts on radiologic amounts.

"A license for a power reactor allows the construction and operation of the reactor to result in the following cumulative radiologic amounts during the period of the license:

1. Release of fission products from the reactor fuel of 1/10 of 11 of the total fission product inventory of the fuel.

2. Industrial radiation exposure of 40 person-Sieverts (4000 person-Rem).

3. Radiation exposure to the public of 40 person-Sieverts (4000 person-Rem).

Secretary of the Comnission Page 3 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory COfMlission April 17, 1992 (Revised)

Licensed Radiologic Amounts (Continued)

4. Low level radioactive waste, exclusive of that resulting from decommissioning of a licensed power reactor of 5000 cubic meters disposal volume or 1000 Curies of radioactivity.

5. Low level radioactive waste from decolTITlissioning a licensed power reactor, including consequences of accidents of 2000 cubic meters disposal volume or l million Curies.

6. Loss of physical control of l kilogram of fissile material.

"The licensed radiologic amounts (l through 6 above) are reviewed by the NRC every ten years for application to new and renewal licenses and published under the proceedings for Rule changes.

"All licensees of power reactors shall report annually to the NRC their performance to date and projections to the end of the license period on each of the six licensed radiologic amounts. In addition, the licensee shall report within the time limit stated below if the licensee or any person in his employ determines that the licensed radiologic amounts are expected to be exceeded during the period of the license:

Licensed Radiologic Amount Reporting Time

l. Release of 1/10 of 1% of fission products from fuel l hour

2. Industrial radiation exposure of 40 person-Sieverts 30 days

3. Radiation exposure to the public of 40 person-Sieverts l hour

4. Low-level radioactive waste of 5000 cubic meters disposal volume or 1000 Curies 30 days

5. Low-level radioactive waste from deconmissioning of 2000 cubic meters oil million Curies 30 days

6. Loss of physical control of l kilogram of fissile materiaJ l day "The licenses of all power reactors owned by a licensee shall be subject to termination at any time during the term of a license that any one of the licensed radiologic amounts is exceeded."

In the above proposal the numerical quantities are based on years of experience but are exemplary; they are not final reconvnendations. They are also based on a 40-year initial license duration. Development of proposed regulations should determine the minimum licensed radiologic amounts that can be accomplished within today's technology and applied to the license of a new power reactor. They should also address the applicability to renewal of licenses for existing power reactors. The licensed radiologic amounts are obviously only operative during the Operating License but should apply to both the Construction and Operating License if both continue to exist.

Secretary of the Convnission Page 4 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Convnission April 17, 1992 (Revised)

Licensed Radiologic Amounts (Continued)

Inclusion of linkage among all licensed power reactors owned by the licensee is based upon the experience to date with variation in performance among plants of the same licensee. Performance variation is usually attributed to the variation in management of the individual plants of the licensee. The same argument obtains that if the common management of the licensee were performing acceptably, acceptable performance would be obtained in all of its licensed plants. Linking failure at any one licensed power reactor to the continuance of licenses at the other owned power reactors provides maximum incentive for the licensee's whole corporation to achieve adequate performance.

A review period of ten years for the licensed radiologic amounts is proposed to provide a vehicle for recognition of the continuing development of technology and its application to regulation. It is not intended to change the licensed radiologic amounts of any issued license.

The state of technology varies among the six licensed radiologic amounts.

Time-phased implementation of licensed radiologic amounts may be appropriate to recognize the difference in technological basis.

Equipment Specifications NRC regulations provide substantial control of the design and safety margins in systems and structures of nuclear power plants. However, components are not specified with equal rigor to control their design and to assure the supply of components with the desired margins of safety and reliability. In other industries, component specifications provide this control and standardization of the product.

It is suggested that the NRC add to its regulations a requirement about as follows: "Components shall be supplied in conformance with certification requirements of a nationally recognized safety organization.

Certification of the safety shall include, as a minimum, compliance with a detailed component specification that effectively controls safety and reliability features of the component, first-piece inspection for .

compliance with their specifications, in-process inspection of components to assure continuing compliance with the component specification and decertification for noncompliance."

A model the NRC might consider is the exquisitely effective and efficient control of the safety features of equipment accomplished by Underwriters Laboratory. Their method includes all the elements in the suggested specimen statement.

Component specifications are available for a nuclear power plant component certification program. These were initially developed in 1965 by the AEC for this purpose but were never invoked for convnercial nuclear power plants. Although updating would be needed, they would provide a substantial starting poi'nt for a certification program by a nationally recognized safety organization.

This Regulation should allow deletion of a large volume of current Regulation such as 10 CFR 50.49 and portions of 10 CFR 50 Appendices B and R.

Secretary of the Commission Page 5 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission April 17, 1992 (Revised)

Strict L1 abi 11 ty It is suggested that the regulations be changed to delete those provisions which protect the licensee from strict liability for nuclear hazards.

An appropriate use of PRA is for insurance determinations. As previously discussed, for all nuclear hazards, the deterministic methods of existing NRC regulations define a zero risk nuclear power plant. However, PRA's show us that the aggregate of human error that actually occurred in the design, procurement, manufacturing, construction, operation, maintenance, etc. of nuclear power plants increases the experienced risk from zero to about once in 100,000 reactor years.

A typical cost of a core damage accident, without release of radioactivity from containment, is about $1 billion to recover the plant and return to operation. At a core damage frequency of l per 100,000 years of reactor operation, the implied annualized cost of this risk would only be about

$10,000 per year per reactor. The industry should find this annual cost of risk to be acceptable, whether the licensee chooses to insure or self-insure.

Self-Incrimination Although these comments include actions toward reducing much of the reporting required of licensees, the remaining reporting could be substantially improved. The following specimen statement is suggested:

"Under no circumstances can the NRC use any self-discovered and self-reported infractions of these regulations to penalize the licensee or his employees. 11 The purpose of most current reporting requirements is not being achieved because the consequence of full disclosure is that the NRC often levies penalties or other actions against the licensee. Explicit, credible protection of the reporter would greatly enhance the quality and completeness of reporting and facilitate industry improvement.

I am commenting as an individual who has spent his lifetime in work associated with the lifetime of the nuclear power industry. I make no representation whether these comments reflect views of my current employer.

If I can be of service in this matter, please advise.

Very truly yours, a,_,,,~l-,_

. J Hag~

c: G. H. Davis, Executive Vice Boston Edi son Company -- ._

R. A. Anderson, Senior Vice Boston Edison Company

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DOCKETED USNRC

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Power CO RP O R ATION Crystal River Unit 3 February 25, 1991 NL91-0007 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Attn: Docketing and Service Branch

Subject:

Regulatory Impact Survey Report SECY-90-347 NRC Action To Effect Improvement 55 Fed . Reg. 53220 (1990)

Dear Sir :

Florida Power Corporation (FPC) is providing the following comments on the subject notice. FPC recognizes these comments are reaching the staff late but believes the issues are extremely important and hopes these comments will be given consideration. These comments supplement those supplied by NUMARC (Nuclear Utility Management and Resources Council) and NUBARG (Nuclear Utility Backfi tt i ng and Reform Group). FPC endorses the comments provided by both these organizations. In particular, we agree with the fundamental premise of the NUMARC comments which state that the actions documented in SECY-90-347 appear to fall short of effectively implementing the types of changes that will correct the root causes of problems identified by the survey. It has been FPC's expe kj ence that the NRC staff and its management are sincere professionals who are 1t r1 tng to carry out what they believe their mandate to be. However, that manda t~ \"eems to vary depending on the issue, external pressures and the management le*vel involved . This is not in the best interest of reliable regulatory performance. I 1 '.l'I.,

FPC offers the following examples that are similar to those raised in the NRC survey . The issues are i n various stages of resolut i on on the CR -3 docket a'hd are prov i ded he r e only as illustrations of the conseque nces of the r oot ca u~es i dent ifi ed by the survey . Most are prog ressing, but they should not have r equired the degree of interaction that has been necessary .

GENERAL OFFICE: 3201 Thirty-fourth Street South

• P.O. Box 14042

• St. Petersburg, Florida 33733 * (813) 866-5151 A Florida Progress Company

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DOCKETING & SERVICE SECTION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION Do~ment Statistics

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Regulatory Impact Survey NL-0007 Page 2

1) The regulations (10 CFR 50, Appendix G) have always allowed licensees the flexibility to submit limits on pressure/temperature combinations based on methodology appropriate for the probability of exceeding normal limits. In 1988, the NRC published a generic letter requesting implementation of Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2 and encouraging licensees to submit non-Appendix G based Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) restrictions. FPC and B&W developed an appropriate methodology, discussed it with the NRC staff in May of 1989 and addressed NRC concerns expressed at that time. FPC went forward and had B&W perform the necessary analysis at a cost of over $250,000. The results of this analysis were submitted to the NRC as a Technical Specification amendment request in late 1989. FPC periodically inquired regarding the progress of its review. Very recently, we were informed that the actual review had only recently begun and that the NRC staff was not initially receptive to our position. After further discussions, the NRC Staff does not yet have a position on what they will accept. The approach utilized by B&W is in accordance with ASME Code criteria that the NRC staff has accepted, and yet its utilization is meeting with considerable resistance.

This is indicative of several concerns. First, a generic letter was published with insufficient basis for the NRC staff to deal with the likely responses to it. Second, the NRC staff has not yet identified an error or nonconservative result from our application of an ASME based methodology and had ample opportunity to inform FPC of any concerns along these lines before FPC resources were expended. Finally, without an available methodology to address the LTOP issue, the implementation of the revised Regulatory Guide has or will put several plants in a condition where little or no operating margin is available.

2) Bulletin 88-04 requested licensees to reconfirm the ability of key plant pumps to operate in very low flow conditions. The particular concern was operation in recirculation lineups which typically occur during standby conditions. Due to commercial changes, one of our pump manufacturers was unwilling to recertify capability in this regime. Their time-frame for utilizing their test loop was unresponsive. Therefore, FPC chose to test the pumps in-place. A five-hour "mission time" was chosen based on an assessment provided by B&W. The pump was tested at twice that time with good results.

The ten hour test al so produced a sufficient number of loading cycles to demonstrate the pump could operate for a much l anger period without concern regarding fatigue induced failure. This conclusion was supported by a thorough technical assessment developed by a contractor with recognized expertise in the field which has been provided to the NRC Staff.

Regulatory Impact Survey NL-0007 Page 3 The NRC staff embarked on a series of reviews aimed at assessing the adequacy of FPC' s efforts. Consultants from a national lab and academia witnessed the testing and disassembly. They, too, considered the test a success and had only minor connnents that, in our judgement, focussed on expected differences between an in-situ test and testing in a test-loop. To clarify an earlier misconununication by FPC, the NRC staff requested FPC provide greater assurance that the mission time was correct. Simulator runs, which modeled best-estimate conditions (not licensing basis), were performed to s*at i sfy the request. These runs were in good agreement with the earlier assessments. However, s i nee these s i mul at i ans modeled the systems response with off-site power available, the NRC technical branch charged with a portion of the review could not accept the simulator run as valid demonstration of the mission time for the pumps. They contracted with additional consultants to review the basis for the original B&W estimate. These, too, were inconclusive. Most plants of our vintage are only licensed to reach hot standby utilizing safety-related equipment. Long-term mitigation capabilities were not exhaustively analyzed in accordance with current requirements. The issue remains open on the CR-3 docket even though it was closed on two very s'i mil ar pl ants.

Neither of these plants were required to provide the level of demonstrated assurance that has been required of FPC.

The following comments are pertinent to this exercise. FPC has been treated inconsistently; not only is the issue open, but we were criticized in the SALP for our handling of it. The NRC staff has not found any of our work to be invalid; yet the issue cannot be closed largely due to the NRC staff's apparent unwi 11 i ngness to exercise reasonable judgement without rigorous analysis that was not required. The reasons for this may be the multiple branches involved; each wanting the other to exercise the judgement while they treat the issue more rigorously. The current NRC staff direction is toward the development of another generic communication that may come out later this year. In this communication (probably through a supplement to the original bulletin), the NRC staff will identify how such mission times are to be determined. Thus, the NRC staff is still defining their expectations three (3) years after publication of the Bulletin 88-04.

3) FPC began licensing a standard spent fuel pool re-rack application many months ago. The review has been reasonably routine. One issue however, became troublesome. The vendor's seismic model, used on over a dozen applications for most of the last decade, was recently found by NRC staff to be described poorly in the associated topical report. The analytical results were valid, but the description of the model's treatment of rather complex mathematical relationships was not considered correct. This debate has held up approval. Such

Regulatory Impact Survey NL-0007 Page 4 untimely (re)review of a key topical report, at a site where the seismic hazard is more hypothetical than real, is not effective management of review resources.

4) Generic Issue - 124 dealt with 2-pump auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system reliability. Apparently the staff assumed that AFW systems with 3 pumps are inherently, sufficiently reliable while 2-pump systems are not. This included the presumed sufficiency of 3-pump configurations with less than 100% capacity for each pump. Further, many 3-pump systems have less reliable initiation and control systems.

The CR-3 2-pump AFW system was thoroughly upgraded with a new missile-proof water source, a very reliable initiation and control system, and many other improvements. The cost of these upgrades was over $20,000,000. This 2-pump system nearly meets the quantified Standard Review Plan (SRP) goal without any credit for other capabilities (e.g. HPI feed-and-bleed). With very limited partial credit for this capability (allowed by the SRP), the system significantly exceeded the goal. Further, the challenge rate (the frequency of loss of main feedwater events) was reduced substantially before the B&W Owners Group Safety and Performance Improvement Program began. The cha 11 enge rate has been reduced further as a result of participation in the program. Yet, the NRC staff, or its management, remained uncomfortable with a 2-pump system. Thus, despite meeting a11 applicable requirements and despite good reliability values demonstrated in a PRA reviewed and approved by the staff, FPC is installing a third pump. Even though the pump will reduce core damage frequency only slightly, FPC has been required to spend over $3,000,000 to resolve this issue.

5) Technical Specification Improvement was mentioned in the NUMARC comments as well as the subject SECY paper. FPC is the BWOG Lead Plant and has been in the forefront of TSIP since its inception.

TSIP is somewhat different from the previous examples where the staff, in FPC's judgement, took inappropriate actions or 'got ahead' of themselves. In this arena, the staff has been slow to progress and may yet risk missing the opportunity to move forward on an issue when the staff's interest and the industry's should be the same.

The industry just received a seven to eight thousand page rewrite of the industry developed topical reports. Apparently, distrust of the industry's motives; unrealistic expectations regarding the ability to control non-standard plants with overly~standardized specifications; a reluctance to relocate requirements to more appropriate documents; lack of understanding of what the principle users of Technical Specifications (operators) need; and not following the policy statement goals and direction may negate a project on which the industry and staff has expended millions of dollars. The industry has openly accepted its part of the blame for

Regulatory Impact Survey NL-0007 Page 5 delay but the bulk must fall squarely on the shoulders of those managing the review. We have now completed two complete cycles of Owners Group/NRC discussions and are not substantially closer to resolution than we were two years ago.

6) The NRC recently issued Generic Letter 90-06 which requested licensees to modify the testing associated with the PORV. As noted in the detailed response provided by FPC, aspects of this letter conflicted with Bulletin 88-11 on pressurizer surge line thermal stratification. The earlier letter required licensees to assure long-term fatigue capability of the surge line by performing analysis to codes to which the plants were not designed, altering operational practices, etc. The later letter, if followed, would introduce significant new transients thus reducing the service life.

FPC takes care to identify such conflicts and correct them in our responses to generic communications. We are certain the NRC staff intends to do so as we 11 . If the conflict in this case was recognized, it should have been clearly identified and the relative safety impacts convnunicated to the licensees.

7) The ATWS rulemaking required backfitting certain design capabilities at all plants. Significant additional guidance was provided in the associated Federal Register Notice. During the NRC's review of the B&W conceptual generic design, we became aware that the design was being reviewed against a substantially modified version of the guidance that had not been approved by NRC management.

This was brought to the attention of appropriate management and resolved on the CR-3 docket. However, such events remain troubling to licensees.

FPC al so agrees with the focus of the NU BARG comments which emphasize the potential weaknesses of the information we have received regarding the IRRIS program. The 'bottom line' is that for this type of program to be successful and endorsed by the industry, NRC management needs to demonstrate a commitment to its principles in the face of Congressional or public pressure. Previous programs have failed when cha 11 enged from such external sources. For instance, some plants with licensed Integrated Living Schedules (ILS) were nonetheless strongly persuaded to move forward many TMI follow-up items contrary to their relative merit within the ILS. A critical characteristic of any such program would be the willingness to permanently drop low priority issues.

Regulatory Impact Survey NL-0007 Page 6 FPC is strongly committed to constructive engagement in each issue significant to our nuclear operations and to the future of the nuclear option in our country.

It is hoped that these comments as well as future dialogue will continue to be well-received as constructive criticism. The tasks of the NRC, like our own, are difficult, and business-as-usual will Il.21 be sufficient in the current environment. We would be happy to provide further infonnation on the examples given if they would be of assistance. We will be challenging ourselves, the B&W Owners, NUMARC, etc., along similar lines. We believe these types of issues can be more effectively addressed and resolved. Your consideration of this input is appreciated.

Sincerely,

~~i Senior Vice President Nuclear Operations Attachment

WINSTON & STRAWN FREDERlCK H. WINSTON (1653-1888) 1400 L STREET. N.W. CHO.OO~

SILAS H. STRAWN (1891-19-46) WASHING10N, D.C. 20005-3502 3 5 WEST w.cKE11 DR1VE CHICAGO ILLJNOIS~

(312) MS-5600 (202) 371-5700 NEW 'IORK OFFICE FACSIMILE (202) 371.5g~

WRITER 9 DIRECT DIAL NUMB6A 175 W\TER STREET NEW YORK NY 1 ~

(212) :lljg2500 (PROMPT REVIEW REQUESTED)

MEMORANDUM January 21, 1991 To: NUBARG Policy Committee From: Nicholas S. Reyvs Daniel F. Steng Robert L. Draper Subj: Draft comments on Regulatory Impact survey Report Enclosed for your review is a draft of NUBARG comments on the recommendations found in the NRC Staff's "Regulatory Impact Survey Report" (SECY-90-347). ~ 55 Fed. Reg. 53220 (1990) and our memorandum of January 10, 1991.

As anticipated in our January 10 memorandum, the draft comments primarily concentrate on possible improvements in the Staff's proposed Integrated Regulatory Requirements Implementation Schedule ("IRRIS")

program. We have also emphasized the vagueness of the IRRIS proposal and the difficulty of providing specific comments without more detailed information. Because the Staff expects to issue guidance on IRRIS prioritization and scheduling procedures after completion of a two-year pilot program, we have suggested that the NRC seek additional comments once that guidance is available.

Any comments or suggestions on the attached draft will be helpful in finalizing our comments. Comments are scheduled to be filed with the NRC by Monday, January 28. Therefore, please provide any input to Dan Stenger at (202) 371-5742 or Rob Draper at (202) 371-5761 by noon on Monday, January 28, 1991.

Attachment

DRAFT January 21, 1991 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attn: Docketing and Service Branch Subj: Notice of Availability:

Regulatory Impact survey Report 55 Fed. Reg. 53220 (1990)

Dear Mr. Chilk:

In accordance with the Commission's request for comments in the above-captioned notice, the Nuclear Utility Backfitting and Reform Group ("NUBARG") hereby submits the following comments on the Regulatory Impact survey Report. Primarily, these comments will address the NRC Staff's recommendations for managing the cumulative impact of regulatory initiatives and, specifically, the proposed Integrated Regulatory Requirements Implementation Schedule ("IRRIS")

program.

I. Summary NUBARG favors the NRC Staff's planned improvement actions as they are outlined in SECY-90-347, "Regulatory Impact Survey Report."

In particular, NUBARG supports the Staff's proposals to create an integrated schedule for implementing important safety enhancements and to improve the scheduling and control of inspections. With respect to the requirements implementation proposal, NUBARG believes that the IRRIS program will not be a truly integrated or cumulative program if it excludes "adequate protection" and "compliance" actions. NUBARG also believes that the timetables for submittal and review of IRRIS agendas should be reconsidered to allow sufficient time for licensees to coordinate outage schedules, especially if the NRC requests that additional actions be included. As a result of the preliminary nature of the SECY paper's .improvement plans, many of the detailed aspects of

the proposed-IRRIS program are still unclear. NUBARG therefore suggests thabadditional public input be requested once the program and associated Staff guidance are in a more complete form, so that licensees might have the opportunity to submit more informed, more specific, and more useful comments.

II. Discussion A. cumulative, Integrated Imus Program SECY-90-347 indicates that "compliance" and "adequate protection" actions may not be included in licensees' IRRIS programs. The Staff, however, does not explain its reasons for adopting this approach. In our view, the IRRIS program may not prove useful or attractive to licensees unless they are allowed to include "adequate protection" and "compliance" actions in their IRRIS agendas. In order to maintain adequate flexibility, requirements could be excluded from IRRIS when an alternative implementation schedule is prescribed by regulation or when immediate implementation is otherwise shown to be justified in accordance with 10 c.F.R. § 50.109.

The goal of IRRIS is to address the cumulative impact of

• regulatory initiatives. Because a selective program can be neither cumulative nor integrated, the IRRIS program cannot fulfill its purpose unless it incorporates all categories of regulatory initiatives. Although the program, as proposed, would provide plant-by-plant analysis of unimplemented backfit initiatives, IRRIS agendas would not reflect the whole picture. Licensees would face two agendas, without any guidance on how implementation of backfit and backfit-exempt requirements should be prioritized and coordinated.

This is particularly important since approximately one-half of the Generic Letters and Bulletins issued in the past two years have been classified as "compliance" or "adequate protection" actions.

Furthermore, if the IRRIS program is properly carried out, inclusion of "adequate protection" and "compliance" requirements in IRRIS agendas would not affect the implementation priority of those requirements. Because the requirements review would prioritize and propose implementation schedules based primarily on contribution to safety, "adequate protection" and "compliance" requirements should naturally, and by definition, rise to the top of the IRRIS agenda. As the Staff already will have attached the initial level of safety significance to requirements through Section 50.109 determinations, the IRRIS program would serve to support those classifications and to preserve them through proper prioritization of requirements.1J 1/ This point suggests another disadvantage to the exclusion of "adequate protection" requirements from IRRIS. Under the proposed program, should the NRC feel that a particular requirement would best be implemented either within or outside (Footnote 1 continued on next page.

In short, we believe the IRRIS program should cover all regulatory initiatives, including regulatory requirements imposed by rule, regulation, or order, as well as the non-binding requests established by Generic Letter or Bulletin. All such initiatives should be included regardless of their c~assification as "compliance" or "adequate protection," unless a specific schedule is prescribed by regulation or the need for immediate implementation has been demonstrated.

B. '!'1w;111g of Pre-outage Requirements Reviews IRRIS appears to offer several improvements over the prior ISAP program, including a focus on outage periods and the "freezing" of requirements to be implemented during an outage. However, the focus on outage periods could benefit from the adoption of a more realistic timetable for IRRIS preparation. Under the proposed plan, the Staff would conduct requirements reviews one year before a licensee's refueling outage. Presumably the licensee would then be given some time (say 30 days) to examine the Staff's list of unimplemented regulatory requirements and respond with a proposed IRRIS agenda.

According the SECY-90-347, the Staff would then have 90 days within which to reject the proposed IRRIS. If the Staff were to oppose the

_IRRIS proposal toward the end of that 90-day period, follow-up action and submittal of a modified IRRIS proposal would presumably be necessary. This plausible scenario suggests that licensees could be left with fewer than 180 days in which to coordinate their outage schedules with their final IRRIS agendas. Even in the absence of NRC opposition to a proposed IRRIS, finalization of the IRRIS occurs only by failure of the NRC to respond within the 90 day period. This process would still leave the licensee with, at best, eight months in which to plan an outage schedule. Plant modifications require a significant amount of lead time (design, engineering, procurement of hardware). When IRRIS proposals are modified, licensees will likely need additional time to make adjustments and preparations. Under the proposed IRRIS. system, review and response timetables do not leave licensees sufficient time to make these final adjustments and coordinate their outage schedules, particularly if the NRC Staff were to require that additional modifications be made during the planned outage.

(Footnote 1 continued from previous_page.

the IRRIS program, that preference might unintenti~nally affect the initial classification of the requirement under 50.109. On the other hand, if all requirements are included in IRRIS, any prioritization preferences can be prescribed by regulation or instituted by a showing that priority is justified, rather than by further distorting the already controversial exceptions of Section 50.109(a) (4).

c. Need For More Detailed Guidance IN SECY-90-347, the Staff has announced that guidance on prioritizing and scheduling under the IRRIS program will be developed and issued following the completion of an IRRIS pilot program.

Because this guidance has not yet been developed, the mechanics of the program are relatively unclear, making it difficult to provide detailed comments and recommendations at this early stage. As a more detailed description of the IRRIS program* is developed, it should include consideration of several related factors. First, the timetable for finalizing IRRIS agendas, as discussed above, should be more carefully established. Second, the program could include guidance on the flexibility which licensees will be given at the time of an outage, i.e., the extent to which licensees will be able to make ongoing modifications to their IRRIS agendas. Such guidance could indicate whether licensees should provide ambitious estimates of their ability to implement actions during a particular outage (followed by completion of as many agenda items as possible) or whether conservative estimates should be adopted. In this regard, it is assumed that the length of outages will be determined by refueling needs and associated maintenance requirements and that the IRRIS

_agenda will be a "living" document which will carry unimplemented, low-priority items over to the next outage period. The NRC's guidance should indicate whether unimplemented items could ever extend to the next scheduled outage period, in which case licensees could be appropriately conservative in formulating IRRIS agendas. Finally, the guidance could touch on the extent to which the NRC Staff will consider existing IRRIS agendas when implementing new regulatory requirements on a plant-specific basis.

Again, NUBARG realizes that, as a result of the undeveloped state of the proposed IRRIS program and associated *guidance, many of these comments may be premature. In light of the unrefined nature of the program and the staff's aim of completing program guidance within two years (SECY-90-347, p.4), NOBARG suggests that public comments be requested again when the program and guidance are in more complete form. At that time, perhaps many of these uncertain issues will have been resolved and licensees will be able to provide more specific comments.

III. copolusion NOBARG appreciates this opportunity to comment on this important initiative. We believe the Staff proposals represent substantial strides toward the goal of minimizing the cumulative impact of new regulatory actions on licensees. With the improvements we have outlined above, we believe the IRRIS program will prove useful in reaching that goal.

Respectfully submitted, Nicholas S. Reynolds Daniel F. Stenger Robert L. Draper Counsel to the Nuclear Utility Backfitting and Reform Group

__/ ___,_ .t-L-<.-,. *"* <~---,,. /- /...../I .I NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT AND RESOURCES COUNCIL

-1776 ::ye Street. NW

• S0ite 300

• Washington :,C 20006-2496 (202) 872-1280 Byron Lee, Jr.

Pres.den: & Cnf

~'8Cui ve Ofticer January 16, 1991 10*: . NUMARC Administrative Points of Contact

SUBJECT:

Regulatory Impact Survey Report (SECY-90-347)

As we mentioned in our letter of January 8, 1991, comments on SECY 347, *Regulatory Impact Survey Report,* will be submitted by NUMARC to the NRC

• on January 28, 1991.

Enclosed is our draft of those coments. We intend to continue to revise this document over the next week to sharpen the focus of our colTITlents, but I do not expect that significant changes will be made to the general thrust or tone of our response. Our intent*is to be direct, but not antagonistic. Because the regulatory environment so pervasively affects so much of what licensees do, we strongly encourage you to file your own cOfllDents to the -NRC (hopefully endorsing the NUMARC c01111lE!nts) but giving them the benefit of each licensee's perspective and thus better understand why reform is necessary.

Please provide any connents you have directly to Bob Bishop, our General Counsel, by the close of business on January 21, 1991. Following our discussion of this matter at the Issues Management Convnittee meeting on January 23, 1991, and the Executive Convnittee meeting on January 24, 1991, we will Federal Express the final draft to you on January 24, 1991, so that you can have it available as you finalize your individual coanents for submittal to the NRC.

Sincerely,

~~:Jr.

JFC/RWB:bjb Enclosure cc: NUHARC Board of Directors (w/o enclosure)

NUMARC Executive Points of Contact (w/o enclosure}

January 28, 1991 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the C0n111ission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, D.C. - 20555 ATTENTION; Docketing and Service Branch Notice of Availability SECY-90-347 "Regulatory I11tpact Survey Report*

55 Fed. Reg. 53220 (December 27, 1990)

Request for comnents

Dear Mr. Chil k:

These conmients are submitted by the Nuclear Management and Resources Council, Inc. c*NUMARC*) in response to the request of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission c*NRC*) for conments on the Notice of Availability of SECY 90-347 "Regulatory Impact Survey Report* (dated October 9, 1990) (55 Fed.

Reg. 53220 (December 27, 1990)).

NUMARC is the organization of the nuclear power industry that is responsible for coordinating the cOlllbined efforts of all utilities licensed by the NRC to construct or operate nuclear power plants, and of other nuclear industry organizations, in all matters involving generic regulatory policy issues and on the regulatory aspects of generic operational and technical issues affecting the nuclear power industry. Every utility responsible for constructing or operating a c0111Dercial nuclear power plant in the United States is a member of NUMARC. In addition, NUMARC's members include major

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk January 28, 1991 Page 2 architect/engineering firms and all of the major nuclear steam supply system vendors.

The industry appreciates the NRC's initiative in the Fall of 1989 to conduct the Regulatory Impact Survey, now documented in draft NUREG-1395. As we described in our letter to the NRC on May 14, 1990, we believe this NRC initiative 1s an important step which can lead to an improved interface between the regulator and the regulated industry, to the benefit of the NRC, the industry, and public safety. We believe this effort, and the NRC and industry follow-on activities to directly address the regulatory environment and its impact, are vitally important because this issue so pervasively affects the oversight responsibilities of the NRC and the fundamental responsibilities of licensees in the design, construction and operation of coanerc1al nuclear power plants *in the public interest and to the public benefit.

The purpose of SECY-90-347 is to evaluate the results of the NRC's surveys and to describe the proposed actions the NRC intends to take to respond to the identified concerns. Three specific regulatory areas for improvement were identified:

(1) Consideration of the cumulative effect of the NRC's generic requirements and generic c0111nunications;

Mr. SaJRUel J. Chilk January 28, 1991

- Page 3 (2) Scheduling and control of inspections, especially team inspections; and (3) Training, prepar1tion, and management of inspectors.

We concur with the Staff that those areas deserve attention, and we have provided specific conments in Enclosures 1, 2 and 3 to this letter th1t detail

_our conments in each of those three areas. These are i1Aportant issues and our COIIIDents are intended to assist the Stiff in effectively addressing those identified concerns. The progress made in these three areas has been the result of cooperative activities between NRC Staff and the industry, and we agree that aore can be done.

One of the techniques that the industry, and the NRC, use to evaluate 1 problem is to gather all of information pertinent to the problem, critically assess that data to determine the root cause of the problem, and develop a plan to address the problem to preclude its recurrence. As we analyze SECY-90-347 and the underlying docU11ents, it appears that the three elements the Staff proposes to address, albeit important, are not in our view the root cause of the concerns regarding the regulatory environment identified in SECY-90-80, SECY-90-205 and SECY-90-250. Nor do those efforts* address the substantive issues identified on page 3 of SECY-90-347 that are identified as items 1, 2 and 4 regarding licensee concerns with current NRC regulatory activities and attitudes that were documented in SECY-90-80 and draft NUREG-1395.

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk January 28, 1991 Page 4 In our view, the one factor that all of those observations have 1n c0111110n, and the root cause of*so 11Uch of the non-productive tension between individual licensees and representatives of the NRC, can be traced to the lack of delineation of the role, responsibilities and management of the NRC staff vis a vis those of individual licensees. The three issues identified tn SECY- 347 that do not otherwise appear to be the focus of further NRC attention (t.e., licensee acquiescence to NRC requests, NRC domination of licensee resources through changing formal and infor11al requirements, and licensee acquiescence to avoid confrontations) point directly towards.that conclusion.

The industry has changed a great deal in the last decade, and indeed dramatically from the decades that precede it. Our technical knowledge continues to improve, as does our performance, by 1n1 measure. However, we have not seen a connensurate improveaent in the regulatory environment that we all, NRC and industry alike, believe can and must be achieved. In our view, the root cause of the concerns regarding the current regulatory environment and tts adverse i1npact on licensees ts the lack of a c011111itment by the NRC to appropriately recognize the complementary responsibilities of the regulator and individual licensees. The NRC and the nuclear utility industry fulfill different roles and have ~ifferent responsibilities in pursuing a coDDOn objective of assuring that the public health and safety is adequately protected.

Mr. Samuel J. Chtlk January 28, 1991 Page 5 Briefly stated, in both law and practice, the NRC ts responsible for establishing a regulatory syste111 that will ensure that adequate protection of public health and safety is not jeopardized by the construction and operation of connercial nuclear power plants. That system of regulation, and requirements imposed upon licensees, is embodied in Title 10 of -the Code of Federal Regulations. It is the licensee's responsibility to anage its resources and operate its facilities in-conformance with those regulations.

The NRC's responsibility as a regulator is to establish the parameters within which licensees aust function and to establish an effective oversight capability to ensure compliance with those requirements, but the NRC ust also establish the proper cli ate to allow licensees to meet these parameters and achieve even greater margins of safety and higher levels of performance.

The development of a professional relationship between the industry and the NRC, founded on those principles, 1s critical to the ability of licensees to 1111nage their facilities and personnel and to our ability as an industry to resolve the issues confronting us. The lack of that relationship is a principle factor that underlies the industry feedback as documented 1n NUREG-1395, and the industry's concerns are well-addressed 1n *Principles of Good Regulation* recently adopted by the C011111ission. The NRC has stepped beyond its role as a regulator and has becoae significantly involved in licensee management responsibilities. We agree the NRC must assess management of the plants to ensure public health and safety is adequately protected, but the present level and scope of this involvement hampers the licensee's ability to

Mr. S111uel J. Chilk January 28, 1991 Page 6 effectively perform its duties. The industry believes this could/can potentially affect the safe operation of its facilities.

Furthennore, this increased involve111ent has led to fewer and fewer constraints on the regulatory process, allowing requirements to be illlJ)osed and actions required to be performed as a result of subjective opinions expressed e during the thousands of annual interactions with NRC representatives.

Frequently, informal vehicles such as generic conmunications, SALP findings, 1nspecto~ connents, etc. are used to direct licensee activities, ~o in effect impose requirements, thereby circumventing the fonul rulemaking process. For example, the perception and implication that generic c011111unications have the effective force of requirements causes substantial COIIIJlitinents of licensee resources to be made, with significant implications on licensees with regard to their ability to conduct activities of higher priority. Often, licensees acquiesce to such inappropriate requests and/or activities to avoid appearing unresponsive and out of concern for NRC's negative reaction and potential subtle retaliation. A relationship such as this places the licensees in a defensive role, which results in either acquiescence or the further development of the adversarial character of our relationship as it stands today.

The industry has been repeatedly asked why inappropriate NRC activities have not been challenged or brought to the attention of NRC senior management.

In the present regulatory environment, it is not possible 'nor is it appropriate for licensees to become responsible for regulating the regulator.

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk January 28, 1991 Page 7 The industry cannot be placed in a position to raise such issues with NRC

_senior management; rather, the NRC should establish aanagement mechanisms to ensure that it properly manages its staff.

As Mr. McGrath, the Chairman of the NUMARC Board of Directors, described in his presentation to the NRC COlllllissioners on the state of the industry on

_e October 26, 1990, the attention and continuing involvement of senior management to manage its staff and resources is as important a principle at the NRC as it is at licensees. That direct involvement would also be consistent with the observations going back to the Kemeny Connission, and including the NRC's 1981. Regulatory Impact Survey, that a preoccupation with regulations alone cannot assure safety and, in fact, that such a preoccupation may well serve as a negative factor in nuclear safety. The NRC's focus should be on adherence to requirements established by the NRC to protect the health and safety of the public, and the industry's focus on performance and improvement to exceed those safety requirements. *Extensive NRC involvement in licensee management responsibility hampers the licensee's ability to effectively manage its resources and operate its facilities.

A stable, or as stated in the *Principles of Good Regulation,* a

• reliable* regulatory process is vital to the success of this industry's self-imposed obligation to exceed NRC requirements and to achieve excellence in its nuclear operations and, thus to the future of nuclear power in our country.

The stable process is one in which requirements are applied uniformly -- in which interpretations do not vary fro11 plant to plant and region to region --

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk January 28, 1991 Page 8

• and in which regulatory changes are carefully screened for r.iil safety benefit. A stable regulatory process is not static but is flexible -- the one constant is that no requirements are imposed that are not justifiable in the context of providing adequate protection to public health and safety. It sets priorities among issues and requirements, and allows licensees time and latitude to make necessary improvements. Perhaps most importantly, a stable

- process is interactive and requires an honest, professional and open arms-length relationship between the regulator and the regulated early enough to avoid the polarization that has characterized the relationship in recent years.

We think the NRC's initiative to conduct the Regulatory Impact Survey and its associated efforts are conmendable. However, we believe that the issues identified in that process require significant attention beyond that recomnended in SECY-90-347.

We reconmend that the C011111ission approve the staff's recORnendations advanced in SECY-90-347, consistent with these coanents and those tn the Enclosures to this letter; pursue resolution with the staff of the questions raised in the Staff Requirements MetROranda dated November 6, 1990, and November 29, 1990; and instruct the staff to address the concerns raised by the industry in the Regulatory Iapact Survey that are not addressed in SECY-90-347.

Mr *. Samuel J. Chilk January 28, 1991 Page 9 As we suggested in our letter of May 14, 1990, we are anxious to work with the NRC in a productive dialogue, to address the broader issues associated with the current regulatory environment and its impact. We have learned much about self-assessment and anagement 1n the past ten years and are anxious to share our experience and knowledge. We would welcome that opportunity at the C011111ission's earliest convenience.

Sincerely, Byron Lee, Jr.

Bljr/RWB:bjb Enclosures

Enclosure 1: Managing the CL111ulative Effect of the NRC's Generic Requirements and Comnunications Enclosure 1 describes four factors that underly the major concerns regarding the cumulative effect of NRC requirements and c011111unications. *c1) deficiencies in co11111unication with the regulated industry, (2) unauthorized imposition of informal requireaents, (3) insufficient industry coments on the developnent of or integrated implementation of requirements, and (4) staff initiatives like integrated schedules or the integrated safety assessment program did not result in substantial industry participation.*

Unfortunately, it appears that the root cause of the concerns first identified in SECY-90-205 has been readdressed from *[c]onsideration of* (in the body of the SECY) to *[m]anaging* the cumulative effect of the NRC's -

generic requirements and generic comnunications (title of Enclosure 1 of SECY-90-347). The change in title of this topic is more than semantics, because the focus inappropriately shifts to managing the burden rather than questioning how the burden was created and if, in fact, it_ has been

- appropriately justified during development and issuance of the generic requirements and coD111unications.

One of the main reasons for establishing NUMARC was to promote interactions on generic safety concerns between the-regulator and industry to achieve a more efficient and effective response by both. The industry -

embodies the operating experience, detailed plant-specific knowledge, and design basis and analysis capabilities necessary to critically assess the merits and limitations of proposed regulatory initiatives. Clearly, although

the industry's perspectives and responsibilities are different from that of NRC, the NRC and the nuclear industry share the co111110n objective of assuring that the public health and safety is adequately protected. To d~velop and implement the tremendous variety of generic requirements.and c011111unications without significant input froai the industry is detrimental to both NRC and industry efforts. To change this situation requires direct connunication between NRC staff senior management and the industry on generic issues, through NUHARC, and then co11111unication of the. proposed actions to be taken to its technical staff.

For instance, the staff notes that a biweekly letter is produced by the staff that lists generic letters, bulletins and information notices being developed by staff. Unfortunately, that information is of little value because many of the *deadlines* for issuance of the proposed generic colll1lllnications are postponed from biweekly letter to biweekly letter. In fact, two proposed Generic Letters have been on the list for more than two years. Further, when N~C staff attempts to discuss items on that list-with 9 the designated staff contacts, more often than not the NRC staff aember is unwilling or at least uncomfortable to have such an exchange. Apparently, in attempting to keep the relationship between the regulator and the industry at arms-length, some 11embers of the staff believe they are not allowed to have frank, direct contact with industry representatives whether or not at an open, public meeting. We believe that such discussions can and must take place, in full compliance with applicable law, if the NRC and the industry are to be able to carry out their respective responsibilities. Discussions with industry early in the development process rather than just prior to, or after, 2

publication of such generic requirements or colllDllnications should result in a 110re focused analysis of the problem to be solved as ~11 as a well thought-out and effective solution. Several examples come to mind where in the past few years, NUMARC and NRC staff working together have accomplished just that.

Such examples, however, tend to be only I fraction of the potential issues currently being assessed by NRC staff.

At the NRC Regional Workshops on Backf1tt1ng, NRC staff noted its intention to substantially revise NUREG/CR-3568, *A Handbook for Value-Impact e Assessment.* The SECY states that this revision would include *(I) Guidance on the consideration of cumulative effects of previous corrective actions during the development of new requirements, and (2) Guidance on evaluating new generic regulatory initiatives with respect to the Connission's safety goals and objectives.*

The industry supports this effort and believes that the NRC should use this opportunity to revise its cost/benefit evaluation methodology. We would 9 suggest that besides the two guidance issues noted above, ther,e are other iinportant issues that should be considered as part of that document's revision. In particular, we disagree with the current guidance contained in the NUREG/CR-3568 that reconmends onsite costs be included as part of the NRC's cost/benefit analysis. Instead, the staff should restrict itself to weighing the r.w. dollar costs of implementing a plant change against the benefit to the public's health and safety. Hypothesized costs incurred or avoided by a utility as the result of a postulated transient or accident at 3

its nuclear plant is an econ011ic risk factor of import to utility anagement, but is not a proper basis for regulatory decision-making.

We recognize this position conflicts with C011111ission guidance provided in the Staff Requirements Memorandum dated June 15, 1990, responding to SECY-89-102 that *supports the use of averted on-site costs as an offse~ against other licensee costs (and not as a benefit) in cost/benefit analyses.* We believe that such a use of Averted On-Site Costs (*AOst*) is not appropriate policy and is atnematically unjustifiable. Should the Connission maintain e AOSC is a key attribute for inclusion in a cost/benefit assessment, then its treatment when calculating the cost/benefit ratio for a particular plant illlJ)rovement should be revised. Specifically, permitting the co-mingling of real costs with AOSC may result in net costs being artificially small and therefore make justification easy of plant changes that provide little real incremental benefit in safety.

EPRI/NSAC report NSAC-143 was written to analyze the NRC's cost/benefit analyses of nuclear safety enhancements. It concludes that the NRC's current practices and technique~ such as not present-valuing health costs, as well as using an internally consistent economic methodology for use in making safety enhancement decisions, are not justifiable. Following widespread industry review and comnent as a draft, NSAC-143 has received broad support as an appropriate guideline for making such decisions. If the industry and NR~ are to reach appropriate decisions on nuclear safety enhancements, we must have -

value-impact techniques that are sound.

4

The staff indicated that in June 1990 the Coanission approved 13 actions relating to the Safety Goal Policy Statement of 1986 and identified how several of these approved actions will contribute to better management of the development and implementation of new requirements. However, the C0111111ssion

. also requested that staff propose a plan on how to perform an assessment of whether the existing body of regulations and regulatory prac~ices being imposed.on licensees results in plants operating in an adequately safe manner consistent with the Co11111ission's Safety Goal Policy Statement of 1986.

• Additionally, using this same framework of safety goals and subsidiary e objectives, staff would identify any existing regulations or regulatory practices that are not necessary to ensure adequate safety. In this manner, the body of regulations and regulatory practices imposed by the NRC on licensees would be organized in an integrated and coherent framework. This would allow a perspective to be provided of how a given regulation or regulatory practice affects the overall safety of a plant.

The C011111ission has directed the staff to establish a formal mechanism to ensure that future regulatory initiatives are evaluated for confonnity with the safety goals. *The ACRS has coanented that new regulations and/or regulatory practices be considered only in those areas where inadequacies are identified. The staff has yet to propose to the Coanission such a mechanism.

Whatever mechanism is developed should have similar precepts to those described in the above c0111Dent.

The staff has stated its intent to publish its revised guidance for public comment prior to seeking Connission approval. Although this is a 5

welcome step, the time period described in the regional workshops may not be sufficient to effectively resolve these fundamental matters. We suggest it would be more efficient and effective for staff and industry, in a public forLIII, to work cooperatively and to promptly address those areas that need clarification, change, deletion or addition.

The recently issued NUREG-1409, *sackfitting Guidelines* is an exa11ple of how such a cooperative effort can be effective. Issued in July 1990, NUREG-1409, and the subsequent workshops held by the NRC to explain and seek additional coument on the backfitting process, was a productive endeavor to explain the backfit process as well as address typical questions of the public and NRC staff. However, we do not believe the guidance within the document is appropriate with respect to the appropriate cost/benefit analysis to be conducted. For example, in Section 3.4, Response to Question 12, the staff guidance states:

• The backfit rule requires an analysis. This analysis will vary depending on the nature of the issue, the extent and type of information available, and the ease to which a complex situation can be analyzed by either quantitative or qualitative factors. In some cases, the Connission makes decisions on the basis of qualitative factors. Some of the factors to be addressed in the backfit analysis are not easily quantifiable. In addition, the rule includes consideration of other *relevant and material*

factors, some of which may be qualitative. Quantitative factors, where known, are used, but need not be the only basis for 6

approving a backfit analysis. The complexity and comprehensiveness of the analysis should be appropriate (limited) to what is necessary to provide an adequate base for aking a decision ***

• Although we understand the desire to avoid slavish adherence to numerical values that may be subject to some uncertainty, we are very concerned that the disciplined process appropriate for such an analysis may be undercut by the broad use of subjective judgment in the 11111)lementat1on of that practice. If qualitative judgement is allowed to re1110ve the quantification

-technique as the basis for decision-1naking, the purpose of§ 50.109 will not be achieved.

It is to the autual interest of the industry and the staff to reach agreement on cost/benefit economic 11E1thodologies that are internally consistent and that properly represent the nuclear safety enhancement situations that both the NRC and licensees must evaluate. The potentially large number of backfit issues that may arise as staff reviews licensee Individual Plant Examination submittals suggests that resolution of the proper application of 10 C.F.R. § 50.109 should be a high priority now.

In discussing plant specific programs, the staff is partially correct in its opinion that industry did not express significant interest in the Integrated Safety Assessment Program (~ISAP*) because of a lack of plant-specific probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) necessary for implementation of an !SAP at individual plants. But beyond that, the industry recognizes that 7

PRAs continue to be an evolving technology and, as Individual Plant Exuinations c*IPEs*) are showing, development of Level 1/2 PRAs are resource intensive and tiae consuming. Those utilities with experience in aintaining a PRA have experienced the need to connit substantial resources to that task on an on-going basis. Therefore, the fact each plant will soon have its own IPE does not necessarily aean that utilities will be willing or able to implement an ISAP progru. We do not believe benefits to the licensees of implementing an ISAP have been identified that ight warrant the significant expenditures of time and resources that such a progr111 would require.

With respect to the proposed Integrated Regulatory Requirements Implementation Schedule (*IRRIS*), the prioritization and scheduling of shutdown maintenance activities well in advance of an outage period is a necessity already. Lead times for 11aterial procurement, the conduct of applicable safety evaluations, and related activities required to develop a complete change package dictates that utilities generally freeze their outage plans 110nths tn advance of the scheduled outage. The need to integrate a ninety-day period for staff review into this process will further complicate the process. Further, the C0111Dent that the outage activities would be frozen under IRRIS may not provide the flexibility needed by a licensee to respond to changing circumstances.

Staff proposes that a set of guidelines and criteria be developed from the pilot progr111S which would be applied generically once demonstrated.

Because of concerns about how IRRIS would be implemented, we suggest such a process should be approached cautiously through a pilot program process. A 8

criteria that 11Ust be evaluated as part of the pilot progrua 1s whether safety enhancements are achieved in an appropriate priority, with due consideration to licensee resource and schedular impacts. An evaluation must also be made oft~ generic applicability of the pilot program results to different plants with significantly different design features and licensing bases.

Enclosure 2 Enclosure 2: Scheduling and Control of Inspections, Especially Tau Inspections Two major themes are identified in Enclosure 2 relating to NRC s_cheduling and control of inspections:- the development of staff policy regarding its inspection program and the implementation of that program; and

• the need for interaction between staff and licensees in coordinating NRC inspection activities with licensee activities.

As described in Enclosure 2, the staff creates unit-specific inspection plans following each SALP review and adjusts its plans each quarter during the subsequent SALP cycle. However, an analysts that NUMARC conducted in 1989 of SALP scores versus NRC inspection hours suggests that there is no meaningful correlation between the results of the SALP evaluations and the NRC coanttment of inspection resources (see Attachment 1). Thus, it does not appear that the SALP process has been effectively used.by the NRC to allocate its inspection resources. The fundamental purpose of the SALP process is no less valid than when it was coricetved, but the available evidence suggests it ts not being_

effectively utilized as a management tool for that purpose. Further, as the industry has connented in a variety of foruas, we continue to believe that the practice of assigning numerical perfornance ratings_, and the consequent

• financial and public perception proble11s that result, should be reevaluated because of the potential for the misuse of that data and the diversion of attention from the substantive analysis incorporated in the SALP assessment to.

the detriment of the program. As the Chairaan has told the industry several tines, details in the reports will give a aore definite message than the

scores. The industry agrees and furthermore feels the ratings serve no beneficial purpose.

Whatever the mechanism, we agree that the NRC should periodically evaluate the allocation of its inspection* resources based on plant performance, and that activity should lead to the development of an integrated unit-specific inspection plan. We also agree with the staff's reconmendation for it to substantiate the need for major teu, inspections to be conducted, announce such inspections in advance, and plan no 110re than can be handled without interfering with the safe operation of the plant. Promulgation by the NRC of a schedule of planned inspections will not only significantly assist a licensee in scheduling the allocation of internal resources necessary to acconnodate those inspections, but will assist in the coordination of activities such as INPO evaluations and the individual licensee site activities.

A aajor concern of licensees, which was documented in the RIS, is the negative impact that inspections, planned or otherwise, have on licensee activities and the need to coordinate those activities with third party inspections. The establishment by the NRC of guidelines to balance its regulatory oversight responsibilities with the licensee's operational requirements would be appropriate. Similarly, NRC site activities should be evaluated by the NRC in terms of relative importance so that licensees could better schedule the allocation of their resources in support of the higher priority NRC activities. The delineation in the NRC policy of what constitutes I major team inspection, as well as the nature and scope of each 2

of those t1pes of activities, would further assist the licensees in being able to support those activities. Because the conduct of these activities has such a dramatic effect on licensee activities, it would be appropriate for the NRC staff to solicit coarnent on its proposed policy and implementation program.

The NRC's c0111Ditment to periodically publish site activity schedules that address NRC planned major team inspections, other significant NRC site activities, and licensee site activities will significantly aid licensees in supporting resource-significant NRC site activities according to their

• priorities and yet maintain the licensee management involve111ent the NRC has been indicating is an important ingredient to safe operations.

Although the use of the NRC's Master Inspection Planning Systea

(*MIPS*), and its supplementary Inspection Follow-up System (*IFS*) is new to

_ the industry, as a whole, the stated purposes of the systems would seem consistent with the NRC's goals, and the industry's objectives, in ensuring that NRC inspection activities do not adversely impact plant operations and are appropriately coordinated with licensee activities to achieve that end.

3

Direct Inspection Effort (in Hours) versus Average NRC SALP Scores HOURS (T-housands) 10 8

6 * * * * -

I 4

• I I

• I

• I

• • . * .* *

• I 2 * **

• I I

Ii j _ __ _

0 I I .I I I I 1 1.2 1.4 1.8 t8 2 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3 SALP SCORES

lnclosure 3 Enclosure 3: Training, Preparation and Nanag1111nt of NRC Staff We believe ~hat the staff's recoae~dations are timely, useful and appropriate. From the industry perspective, a major beneficial result of the NRC's enhanced training will be improved consistency among inspection team leaders*and NRC staff. The lack of consistency .in.inspection activities is a recurring theme identified in the coanents from the industry in the Regulatory Information Survey. The training envisioned in this reconnendation should be an effective method for NRC senior unag81118nt to take the initial step towards coamunicating its expectations to staff and thus to achieve the de$ired consistency in NRC inspection activities. The direct involvement of NRC senior management, both regional and headquarters, in the development and implementation of the training and evaluation of the performance of NRC inspectors is critical to the develop11ent of an_ effective inspection program.

That involvement is important in the preparation of training course IRlterials, but critical in the implementation of the NRC's inspection responsibilities e under the Atomic Energy Act and to c01111Unicate the NRC's appropriate expectations of professional conduct on the part of its inspectors.

With respect to backfitting training, we strongly support the NRC's initiative to conduct the series of backfitting workshops that it held in 1990 and its c011111itaent to provide further training for NRC personnel on the application of the backfitting guidelines *. A proper understanding of the application of 10 C.F.R. § 50.109 is an objective not yet realized and the NRC's continued attention ~~_Jha~ matter in its tr*i~ing .~rc>jJ!"_~ would be

beneficial. Similarly, the NRC should ensure that its inspectors, and other NRC personnel, understand that generic comunications do'not have legal authority to impose_requirements on licensees other than advising the NRC as to what actions the licensee intends to take with respect to the subject of that generic c0111Dunication.

In all, we agree that enhanced training is a major contributor to the initial CORlllunicat1on of management expectations and goals. However, training alone ensures neither continued performance nor consistency of performance.

Follow-up and monitoring from senior management is a necessary component of this process. For instance, the inclusion of selected senior managers at entrance/exit meetings and/or during plant walk-downs would provide firsthand feedback regarding the activities of their inspectors.

Effective closure of numerous issues facing the industry has been hampered by the lack of NRC management involvement in its proceedings. For example, the industry has spent approximately $20 million dollars and has expended thousands of man-hours in voluntary, pro-active efforts to achieve 111tprovements in the area of technical specifications, yet that effort has yet to achieve closure, and a major factor has been the lack of NRC senior management involvement. Si ilarly, our efforts to effectively resolve issues such as hot particles and diesel generator reliability have not been successful. Further, the major issues identified by the utilities through NUREG-1395 (the increase in issuance and misuse of generic communications, the lack of NRC prioritization of NRC requirements, inconsistencies between regions, subjective imposition of requirements by inspectors, etc.) could have 2

been averted, or at least corrected, by senior aanagement oversight of these areas. If we are both to achieve our desired, and complementary goals, senior manage11ent involvement is necessary from both the industry Ifill the NRC.

3

Februa r y 16 , 1991 oocKET NUMBER PR Ai,sc. (ro- 10)

PROPOSED RULEL -' r~S-3 220) 5 COMMENTS OF OHIO CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBLE ON SECY 347 , " REGULATORY IMPACT SURVEY 5 3 220 (December 27 , 1990)

Fir s t, please accept these comments , even though period expired on January 28 , 1991. These comment be ca u se the December 27 Federal Register was not t h e lo c al library used by OCRE until February 5 ,

de l ay from that date until now was necessary SE CY- 90-34 7 from the Public Document Room and to evaluate - ~~~

docu men t and formulate comments .

OCRE be l ieves that the NRC has learned the wrong lessons from t h e Regulatory Impact Survey . Draft NUREG - 1395, although mostly a predictable industry complaint, that it doesn't want t o be regulated, did contain some serious , legitimate comments that are relevant to the NRC ' s regulatory mission . ror example :

Tech Spec surveillance testing is excessive and is prematurely wearing out equipm e nt. 'l'his testing may also cause un necessary transients . NUREC-1395 at 6.

The selection of Resident Inspectors is questionable in that a former shift supervisor became an RI at his former facility and another RI ' s son worked at the plant. NUREG-1395 at 11 .

Performance Indicators may inhibit operators from scramming the reactor when s~rams are appropriate. N REG-1395 at 15 .

Several licensees believe the operator licensing training process is turning out people who fol l ow procedures verbatim rather than being made to think. ,.. NUREG-1395 at 21.

The NRC should consider the safety significance of r emov ing systems from service . NUREG-1395 at A- 2 .

Some inservice testing put~ the plant at greater risk .

NUREG - 1395 at A-25 .

Th e s e are the types of comments which the NRC should i n vestigate for improving the regulatory process . Instead ,

SECY 347 is responding to the other comments : that there are to o ma ny regulatory requirements , that NRC inspections ., ,and ov ersight exact a significant resource burden on licen~~e~, **

th at NRC activities are jeopardizing the financial viab i lity of; *J nuc lear power, that the NRC is managing rather than regulpting ut i l i~ies , that the NRC is too adversarial , and tfiat NRC r ep orts , SALP ratings, etc . are negatively perceived by the med i a , economic regulators , and the public . These cypes~ of comme nts c o n cern economic and pub l ic relations aspects wrich ar e s i mp l y not within the NRC ' s jurisdiction . These comments Acknowledged by card .. .#i.1l1-.t.....Ht""'"

I .

• • . ,..~,,. ,~.

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U.S. t!UCLEAR REGlJLATORf '0 ~1'.1. S'*: !

OCKETING & SERVICE ffl. H .. ~i OFFICE OF THE SECREH\P.

OF THE COMt;JSSION

should fall on deaf ears .

Th e NRC ' s mission i s not to protec t the nuc l ear power i ndustry ,

but ra t her to protect the public from the hazards posed by the nuclear industry . If the licensees do not have the human ,

manage r ial, and financial resources to meet the NRC ' s r equirements, then they should not be licensees . The solution i n this situation is for the licensees to seek addit i onal fu n d in g from their economic regulators . If the reso urce limitat i on is so severe as to adversely impact the safe operation of the facility, then the NRC should take appropriate enforcement action to prevent plant operation until the deficiencies are corrected . The solution is more NRC e n forcement , not less .

Fortunate l y , a few licensees participating in the RIS had t h e c o u r age and intellectual honesty to depart from the party li ne and tell the truth : that the industry needs a strong ,

competent NRC for nuc l ear plant safety and for public a c ceptance of nuclear power (NUREG-1395 at 30 ); the SALP p r ocess is both necessary and appropriate, and licensees learn a n d improve as a result of the SALP program (NUREG-1395 at A- 61); and if plants and personnel perform well, good SALP ratings would follow (NUREG-1395 at A-70). That some license e s do not see NRC activities as an extreme burden and are capable o f meeting and exceeding NRC requirements should demonstrat e t hat the problem is not the NRC, but rather licensees who pr efer mediocrity rather than excellence.

SECY 347 notes that one of the factors underlying the issue o f the cumulative effect of the NRC ' s generic requirements and generic communications is "insufficient industry comments on t h e development of or integrated implementation 0£ requirements. It appears that this is a problem of the industry's own making, not the NRC's fault . If the various in dustry lobbying and advocacy groups, such as INPO and NUMARC, are not effectively serving their constituents , that is not the NRC ' s problem. The background information in SECY-90-347 indicates that the NRC bends over backwards to accomodate the industry. For example , it is n6~ed that NRR issues a biweekly letter to INPO listing generic letters , bulletins , and information notices being developed.

It is OCRE ' s understanding that this agreement with INPO actually goes much further than this . Pursuant to an October 20 , 1988 Memorandum of Agreement between NRC and INPO , the NRC has de l egated significant inspection responsibilities to I NPO ,

exp r essly for the purpose of lessening the burden on the industry. According to information available to OCRE , the MOA r eq u ires the NRC to consult with INPO before issuing I nfonmation Notices . The NRC is also to place INPO representatives on Incident Investigation Teams. These a rra n gements are improperly favoring the regulated industry and delegating the NRC ' s regulatory authority to the industry .

Th e reality is that the industry has many opportunities to par t icipate in the development of rules , regulatory guidance ,

a nd generic communications . As is noted in SECY-90-347 , the

industry had the opportunity to participate in the ISAP program, which would alleviate many of their burden and scheduling concerns , but they fai l ed to take advantage of thj_s opportunity. How can this be the NRC's fault?

The fact is that the indu stry has many opportunities and advantages in communicating with the NRC. As noted in SECY-90-347, "the staff has al ways e ntertained any appea l on a technical issue through its management c hain and will continue to do s o in accordance with the guidance contained in th e project manager's handb o ok ." SECY 34 7, Enclosure 4 . The lic ensees are always free to seek exemptions from th e regulation s , pursuant to 10 CFR 50 . 12. The Backfit Rule gives them unprecedented rights, including appeal rights , to prevent th e application of new regulatory requirements . What more do they want , the abolishment of the NRC?

Th e fact is that th e industry has been very successful in prev e nt i ng the development a nd implementation of new regulatory requirement s. The indu stry has prevented further progress on the proposed Maintenance Rule . They have succeeded in erod ing emergency p l anning standards to facilitate the licensing of Seabrook. They have reportedly succeeded in watering down th e Bulletin on substandard circuit breakers, such that the advice from Underwriters Laboratories and the National Electr i cal Manufacturer s Association was rejected. The i ndustry succeeded in preventing the development of new regulatory requir eme nts to enhanc e the ability o f existing plants to withstand severe accidents; th e proposed rulemaking of 1980 was r ejected in favor of a Severe Accident Policy Statement which says ex isting plants are safe enough as is. Again , what more do they want?

If only the public had the same opportunities for influencing the NRC that the indu stry e n joys . Since the NRC ' s job is to serve the public , the NRC should con duct a survey of the public asking their advice on how to improve the regulatory process .

The NRC is on the wrong track in SECY-90-347. Rather than catering to the industry's every -whim, the NRC should have as its pri mary goal being a tough, fair, and independent r eg ul a to r whose first, last, and only consideration is the p rote ct ion of the health and safety of th e public. This necessarily means keeping an arm's length relationship with the industry, not pandering to their interests.

Respectfully submitted ,

~-7'~~

Susan 'L . Hiatt OCRE Representative 8275 Munson Road Mentor, OH 44060

( 21 6 ) 255-3158 3

DOCKET NUMBER PROPOSED RULE PR A/1st* l/ 7CJtJ-//J'I,J

{_ssFR. 5'3 zu;)

DOCK[ iU)

USNHC Iowa Electric Light and Powe r Company January 28, 1991 *91 FEB 15 p 3 :s 5 NG-91-0222 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commi ssi on Washington, D. C. 20555 Attn : Docketing and Service Branch

Subject:

Duane Arnold Energy Center Docket No : 50-331 Op. License DPR-49 IELP Ccm~e nt s on SECY 90- 347 "Regul atory Impact Su r vey Report"

Reference:

Letter, B. Lee Jr. (NUMARC), to S. Chilk (NRC), dated January 28, 1991 File: A-106a

Dear Mr . Chilk :

We apprecia te th e opportu nity to commen t on the NRC' s proposed act ion s in re spon se t o th e Regulat ory Impact Survey , as de scribed in SECY 90-3 47 .

As a member of NUMARC, we endorse its comments as transmitted in the r eferenced let t er . In particul ar, we would like to re emphasize the comment regarding the need to improve the ove r al l management effectiveness of the NRC to achieve app ropriate management discipline and accountability over NRC regulatory activities ar.d actions."

To help better manage IELP resources, we have been i nv ol ved in an acti ve dialogue this past yea r with t he NRR and Regional Manag ement a ss ig ned to DAEC re garding the e stablishment of mutually-ag r eed upon prioriti es and schedules for futur e pro j ects . We are encouraged by these discussions and challenge the NRC to m~i ntain th e momen tum th at ha~ bee n cstab 1i sh~d a ~ we ~ove f rom phil osophical discus s i ons to actual implemen tation . We vi ew the se di scussions as a natural evolution i n t he Integrated Living Schedule (ILS) pro ce s s, which originated at the DAEC .

As a utility with an ILS, we are concern ed over the establishment of the Integrated Regulatory Requ ~rements Implementation Schedule (IRRIS) progra m.

We view the IRRIS program as a duplicate of the ILS without the benefit of accounting for licensee initiatives. We are concerned that the scope of the IRRIS is too limited to be truly useful in negotiating priorities with the NRC, and we are concerned over the fate of our ILS should t he NRC decide to fully impl ement the IRR I S.

Acknowledged by card .... !J ?/ 1.!..."'""'"""'

General Office

• P.O. Box 351

• Cedar Rapids, Iowa 524 06

• 319/398-441 1

, _ : ,*.. . r,._:GULATORY COMMi~Sk)N 7':. i<ETING & SERVICE SECTIO Or FICE OF THE SECRET ,RY OF THE COM, ISSIO Document Statistics Postmark Date __,,1,_ q___/ ____ _

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Mr. Samuel J. Chilk January 28, 1991 NG-91-0222 Page 2 In summary, IELP agrees with NRC's efforts to reduce the overall impact of NRC regulatory activitie s on the safe operation of nuclear power plants. Toward that end, we have reviewed SECY 90-347 and our comments are included in the attachment to this letter.

Sincerely,

~JlhtJ Daniel L. Mineck Manager, Nuclear Generation OLM/SC/pl

Attachment:

IELP Comments on NRC SECY 90-347 "Regulatory Impact Survey Report" cc : S. Catron L. Liu L. Root R. McGaughy

Attachment to NG-91-0222 Page 1 IELP Comments on NRC SECY 90-347 "Regulatory Impact Survey Report" Iowa Electric Light and Power (IELP) appreciates NRC's efforts to assess regulatory impact on utility management and operations. While we agree with the conclusions stated on page 3 of SECY 90-347, we feel that the proposed actions on page 4 do not completely address those concerns.

In addition to the themes currently addressed in SECY 90-347, IELP concludes from NUREG-1395 that the following three problems must also be addressed:

1. Licensees acquiesce to NRC requests to avoid poor SALP ratings

2. NRC domination of licensee resources through changing requirements

3. Licensees acquiesce to avoid confrontations because of fear of reprisals.

IELP believes that the themes presented on page 3 of SECY 90-347 indicate a need for more rigorous and effective oversight by NRC management of the performance of NRC employees. While it may seem reasonable to request licensees to challenge inappropriate NRC activities, it is impractical for licensees to do so. It is imperative that NRC management fulfill its responsibility both to the public and to utilities by establishing requirements for safe design and operation of nuclear facilities and enforce those requirements reasonably and consistently. IELP believes that greater detail in the "Inspection and Enforcement Manual" could improve the current situation in which individual inspectors often make determinations of adequacy which may be in excess of those intended by the regulations, i.e. help differentiate between enhancements and compliance.

Another point IELP would like to comment on is the concept of the Integrated Regulatory Requirements Implementation Schedule (IRRIS). Since the Duane Arnold Energy Center currently has an Integrated Living Schedule (!LS), IELP is very concerned about the development of a new program which appears to be only slightly different from the !LS. IELP is concerned about the differences between the !LS and IRRIS. By apparently excluding licensee-initiated programs and programs to meet adequate protection standards, the utility of the IRRIS is limited in setting overall goals and priorities. The !LS properly accounts for all these programs and thereby provides a superior forum for discussion of utility responsiveness to NRC initiatives by realistically describing utility resource commitments. IELP agrees with the need for a system to manage the cumulative effect of NRC requirements, but feels that refinement of the existing ILS concept -perhaps in a cooperative effort with NUMARC- is more desirable than the expense and effort of building a new program.

In Enclosure 2 to SECY 90-347, the section describing the "Inspection Program and Implementation Policy" states that "no more than four planned major team inspections will be conducted during any licensee SALP cycle. 11 IELP feels that four major team inspections would be an unbearable burden on our staff resources. IELP feels that any more than two major team inspections per SALP cycle would be unreasonable for smaller utilities. to SECY 90- 347 concerns training, preparation and management of NRC staff . IELP recognizes the benefit of training, however it cannot be substituted for effective management oversight. IELP feels that the NRC's failure to properly direct, control and monitor its inspectors has forced licensees to acquiesce to NRC inspector requests because the risks of announcing differences with inspectors are unacceptable. This situation has resulted in significant expenditures for operation of nuclear power plants without necessarily improving safety .

DOCKET NUMBER PROPOSED RULE PR tt(/SC!.

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CENTERIOR ENERGY DOCKErrn USNRC

( 55 FIZ 5 3 2. 2.o \

1/(z Donald C. Shelton

• 91 FEB -B p 5 :09 300 Madison Avenue Vice President -Nuclear Toledo, OH 43652-0001 Davis-Besse '~ i r , . _:. . , (419) 249-2300 J: I l.l,. 1 '!

Docket Number 50-346 License Number NPF- 3 Serial Number 1901 Januar y 30, 1991

- Secretary, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Docketing and Service Branch Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

Comments to SECY 90-347, "Regulatory Impact Survey Report" Gentlemen:

On December 27, 1990, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission published in the Federal Register, (55 FR 53220) a notice of availability of SECY 90-347, "Regulatory Impact Survey Report". The Federal Register solicited written comments from interested parties regarding the proposed corrective actions presented in the SECY paper. Toledo Edison, owner/operator of the Davis - Besse Nuclear Power Station, and subsidiary of Centerior Energy Corporation appreciates the opportunity to comment as an interested party.

As a 10 CFR Part 50 licensee, Toledo Edison has a vested interest in any policies the Commission may adopt that have the potential to affect the management and operation of a commercial nuclear power plant.

Toledo Edison's comments are reflected in comments which are being submitted on the industry's behalf by the Nu c lear Management and Resources Council (NUMARC) and the Nuclear Utility Backfitting and Reform Group (NUBARG).

Toledo Edison endorses the comments pr ovided by NUMARC and NUBARG.

One additional area that Toledo Ed i son would like to provide comment on concerns the NRC staff's priority ranking syst~ for the management of licensing reviews. In 1988, the NRC staff deve !aped and implemented a priority ranking system for the management of licensing reviews. This system assigned priorities on the basi s of safety significance, operational effect, and statutory responsibilities. In 1989, in an effort to reduce the growing backlog of licensing activities, the Staff completed a study of the backlog and established timeliness goals for the residence time of licen s ee s ' r eques ts . The effort to reduce this backlog has taken precedence over the prioritization system es tablished in 1988.

Operating Companies :

Cleveland Electric Illuminating Toledo Edison

c. now!ed ed by ~rd . $jJ.+,..,~.1 """"lffl'llllft

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DOCKETING & SERVICE SECTION OFFICE OF THE SECAETARV OF THE COMMISSION Document Statistics Postmarf: Date _c:2 __,_

/!+/-'-

9~1_ _ _ __

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• Docket Number 50-346 License Number NPF-3 Serial Number 1901 Page 2 Toledo Edison realizes that this effort was initiated at the request of the industry, but believes that the NRC staff is placing too much emphasis on reducing this backlog, thus not giving current issues enough attention.

Toledo Edison believes that the NRC staff should discuss, with the utilities, the outstanding licensing activities for each site and determine the priority of the issues based on safety significance, operational issues, and plant needs along with the reduction of backlog items.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact Mr. R. W. Schrauder, Manager - Nuclear Licensing, at (419) 249-2366.

Very truly yours,

~~~-

cc: P. M. Byron, DB-1 NRC Senior Resident Inspector A. B. Davis, Regional Administrator, NRC Region III D. C. Di Ianni, DB-1 NRC Senior Project Manager Utility Radiological Safety Board

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N T NIAGARA UMOHAWK DOCK[1[0 NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION/ 301 PLAIN FIELD ROAD, SYRACUSE, NY. 13212 / TELEPHONE (315) 474-1511

'91 FEB -8 P4 :36 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch

Dear Mr. Chilk:

In response to the Notice of Availability of SECY 90-347 "Regulatory Impact Survey Report" (55 Fed Reg. 53220 (December 27, 1990)), Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation submits these comments for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's consideration in addressing the identified concern.

As a member of the Nuclear Management and Resources Council, Inc. (NUMARC), Niagara Mohawk has participated with the industry in formulating comments being submitted on its behalf by NUMARC.

Niagara Mohawk fully endorses the NUMARC Submittal. We encourage the Commission to fully consider not only the specific comments, but also the broader issues of root cause and senior management involvement discussed in the cover letter.

As a licensee with (very) recent experience in critically assessing all available data for root cause and developing and implementing plans to address identified management problems, Niagara Mohawk knows first hand the benefits of active and continuous involvement of senior management in this process.

Setting overall standards and goals is an extremely important component, but senior management must continue to reinforce its commitment to those concepts by encouraging frequent self assessment and accountability at all levels. Niagara Mohawk believes the initiatives we have undertaken in the Nuclear Division and the Corporation will achieve the desired effect of strengthening its position in the nu c lear utility industry.

Acknowledged oy l-arel ... 2J.J.lf.!J,,..,rncnw11

U.S. NUCLEA.9 REGULATORY COMMISSION DOCKETING & SERVICE SECTION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION Document Statistics Postmark Da!o - '+/3

'=0"'-'/--'q'-'/-_ _ __

Copies Recaived._-'/_ _ _ _ __

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Mr. S. Chilk Page 2 Niagara Mohawk stands ready to participate with NUMARC and the NRC in fully addressing the root cause of issues identified through the "Regulatory Impact Survey".

Sincerely, Ju~

Stanley W. Wilczak, Jr.

• Vice President - Nuclear Support WDB/jac 000,460 I I Atta.chments cc: w. D. Baker P. E. Francisco

January 28, 1991 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Co11111ission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Connission Washington, O.C. - 20555 ATTENTION; Docketing and Service Branch

,&t.i. Notice of Availability SECY-90-347 *Regulatory Impact Survey Report*

55 Fed. Reg. 53220 (December 27, 1990)

Request for coanents

Dear Mr. Chilk:

These collln8nts are submitted. by the Nuclear Manage111ent and Resources Council, Inc. (*NUMARC*) in response to the request of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory C0111111ss1on (*NRC*) for connents on the Notice of Availability of SECY 90-347 *Regulatory Iinpact Survey Report* (dated October 9, 1990) (55 Fed.

Reg. 53220 (December 27, 1990)).

NUMARC is the organization of the nuclear power industry that is responsi.ble for coordinating the cOllbined efforts of all utilities licensed by the NRC to construct or operate nuclear power plants, and of other nuclear industry organizations, in all utters involving generic regulatory policy issues and on thl regulatory aspects of generic operational and technical issues affecting the nuclear power industry. Every utility responsible for constructing or operating a c0111111rcial nuclear power plant in th* United States is a inember of NUMARC. In addition, NUMARC's 111mbers include ajar

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk January 28, 1991 Page 2 architect/engineering firms and all of the major nuclear steam supply system vendors.

The industry appreciates the NRC's init1at1ve in the Fall of 1989 to conduct the Regulatory Impact Survey, now docWHnted in draft NUREG-1395. As we described in our letter to the NRC on May 14, 1990, we believe this NRC e initiative is an important step which can lead to an improved interface between the regulator and the regulated industry, to the benefit of the NRC, the industry, and public safety. We believe this effort, and the NRC and industry follow-on activities to directly address the regulatory environment

&nd its impact, are vitally important because this issue so pervasively affects the oversight respons1bi11ties of the NRC and the fundamental responsib1lities of licensees in the design, construction and operation of comercial nuclear power plants in the public interest and to the public

• benefit.

The purpose of SECY-90-347 _is to evaluate the results of the NRC's surveys and to describe the proposed actions the NRC intends to take to respond to the identified concerns. Three specific regulatory areas for improvement were identified:

(1) Consideration of the cU11Ulative effect of the NRC's generic requirements and generic connunications;

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk January 28, 1991 Page 3 (2) Scheduling and control of inspections, especially team inspections; and (3) Training, preparation, and management of inspectors.

We concur"wi,th the_. St~ff-that those areas-deserve-attention, -and we have provided specific c011111ents in Enclosures 1, 2 and 3 to this letter that detail our connents in each of those three areas. These are important issues and our comments are intended to assist the Staff in effectively addressing those identified concerns. The progress 111de in these three areas has been the result of cooperative activities between NRC Staff and the industry, and we agree that 110re can be done.

One of the techniques that the industry, and the NRC, use to evaluate a problem is to gather all of information pertinent to the problem, critically assess that data to deteraine the root cause of the problem, and develop a plan to* address the problea to preclude its recurrence. As we analyze SECY-90-347 and the underlying documents, it appears that the three elements the Staff proposes to address, albeit important, are not in our view the root cause of the concerns regarding the regulatory environaent identified in SECY-90-80, SECY-90-205 and SECY-90-250. Nor do those efforts address the substantive issues identified on page 3 of SECY-90-347 that are identified as items l, 2 and 4 regarding licensee concerns with current NRC regulatory activities and attitudes that were docUJ111nted in SECY-90-80 and draft NUREG-1395.

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk January 28, 1991 Page 4 In our view, the one factor that all of those observations have in conmon, and the root cause of so much of the non-productive tension between individual licensees and representatives of the NRC, can be traced to the lack of delineation of the role, responsibilities and management of the NRC staff vis a vi's those of individual 11censees.**The three issues identified in SECY-90-347 that do not otherwise appear to be the focus of further NRC attention (i.e., licensee acquiescence to NRC requests, NRC d011ination of licensee resources through changing formal and informal requirements, and licensee acquiescence to avoid confrontations) point directly towards that conclusion.

The industry has changed a great deal in the last decade, and indeed dramatically from the decades that precede 1t. Our technical knowledge continues to improve, as does our perfor111ance, by any 1111asure. However, we have not seen a conaensurate iaprov8118nt in the regulatory environment that we all, NRC and industry alike, believe can and must be achieved. In our view, the root cause of the concerns regarding the current regulatory environment and its adverse i11Pact on licensees is the lack of a c011111itment by the NRC to appropriately recognize the complementary responsibilities of the regulator and individual licensees. The NRC and the nuclear utility industry fulfill different roles and have different responsibilities in pursuing a c0111DOn objective of assuring that the public health and safety is adequately protected.

Mr. Suauel J. Chilk January 28, 1991 Page S Briefly stated, in both law and practice, the NRC is responsible for establishing a regulatory syste11 that will ensure that adequate protection of public health and safety is not jeopardized by the construction and operation of coaaercial nuclear power plants. That system of regulation, and requirements iinposed upon licensees, is embodied in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations. It is the licensee's responsibility to manage its resources an~ operate its facilities in conformance with those regulations.

The NRC's responsibility as a regulator is to establish the parameters within which licensees must function and to establish an effective oversight capability to ensure compliance with those requireNnts, but the NRC must also establish the proper cliaate to allow licensees to 111et these parameters and achieve even greater margins of safety and higher levels of performance.

The development of a professional relationship between the industry and the NRC, founded on those principles, is critical to the ability of licensees to manage their facilities and personnel and to our ability as an industry to resolve the issues confronting us. The lack of that relationship is a principle factor that underlies the industry feedback as documented in NUREG-1395, and the industry's concerns are well-addressed in *Principles of Good Regulation* recently adopted by the Coaission. The NRC has stepped beyond its role as a regulator and has become significantly involved in licensee management responsibilities. We agru the NRC must assess management of the plants to ensure public health and safety is adequately protected, but the present level and scope of this involvement hampers the licensee's ability to

Mr. Samuel J. Ch1lk January 28, 1991 Page 6 effectively perfor11 its duties: The industry believes this could/can potentially affect the safe operation of its facilities.

Furthermore, this increased involvement has led to fewer and fewer constraints on the regulatory process, allowing requirements to be imposed and actions required to be performed as a result of subjective opinions expressed during the thousands of annual interactions with NRC representatives.

Frequently, informal vehicles such as generic coanunications, SALP findings, inspector connents, etc. are used to direct licensee activities, to in e~fect impose requirements, thereby circumventing the forsal rulemaking process. For example, the perception and implication that generic cOR111Unications have the effective force of require1Rents causes substantial comitments of licensee resources to be made, with significant iaplications on licensees with regard to their ability to conduct activities of higher priority. Often, licensees acquiesce to such inappropriate requests and/or activities to avoid appearing unresponsive and out of concern for NRC's negative reaction and potential subtle retaliation. A relationship such as this places the licensees in a defensive role, which results in either acquiescence'or the further development of the adversarial character of our relationship as it stands today.

The industry has been repeatedly asked why inappropriate NRC activities have not been challenged or brought to the attention of NRC senior management.

In the present regulatory environaent, it is not possible nor is it appropriate for licensees to bec01111 responsible for regulating the regulator.

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk January 28, 1991 Page 7 The industry cannot be placed in I position to raise such issue~ with NRC senior 111nagesent; rather, the NRC should establish aanagement mechanisms to.

ensure that it properly unages its staff.

As Mr. McGrath, the Chainaan of the NUMARC Board of Directors, described in his presentation to the NRC COD111issioners on the state of the industry on October 26, 1990, the attention and continuing involveaent of senior management to anage its staff and resources is as important I principle at the NRC as it is at licensees. That direct involvement would also be consistent with the observations going back to the Keaeny Connission, and including the NRC's 1981 Regulatory Impact Survey, that a preoccupation with regulations alone cannot assure safety and, in fact, that such I preoccupation may well serve as I negative factor in nuclear safety. The NRC's focus should be on adherence to requirements established by the NRC to protect the health and safety of the public, and the industry's focus on performance and improvement to exceed those safety requireaents. Extensive NRC involvement in licensee management responsibility h111pers the licensee's ability to effectively aanage its resources and operate its facilities.

A stable, or as stated in the *Principles of Good Regulation,* a

• reliable* regulatory process is vital to the success of this industry's self-imposed obligation to exceed NRC requirements and to achieve excellence in its nuclear operations and, thus to the future of nuclear power in our country.

The stable process is one in which requirements are applied uniformly -- in which interpretations do not vary fr011 plant to plant and region to region --

Mr. Sun.aal J. Chilk January 28, 1991 Page 8 and in which regulatory changes are carefully screened for J:111 safety benefit. A stable regulatory process is not static but is flexible -- the one constant is that no requirements are imposed that are not justifiable in the context of providing adequate protection to public health and safety. It sets priorities among issues and requirements, and allows licensees time and lat~tude to make neces*sary 1aprovements. - Perhips most i111p0rtan'tly, a stable process is interactive and requires an honest, professional and open ams-length relationship between the regulator and the regula~ed early enough to avoid the polarization that has characterized the relationship in recenr-years.

We think the NRC's initiative to conduct the Regulatory Impact Survey and its associated efforts are connendable. However, we believe that the issues identified in that process require significant attention beyond that recoanended in SECY-90-347.

We rec011111end that the C01111ission approve the staff's reconnendations advanced in SECY-90-347, consistent with these coments and those 1n the Enclosures to this letter; pursue resolution with the staff of the questions raised in the Staff Require11ents Meaoranda dated November 6, 1990, and Noveaber 29, 1990; and instruct the staff to address the concerns raised by the industry in the Regulatory llll)act Survey that are not addressed in SECY-90-347.

Mr. SU1Uel J. Chilk January 28, 1991 Page 9 As we suggested in our letter of May 14, 1990, we are anxious to work with the NRC in a productive dialogue, to address the broader issues associated with the current regulatory environment and its iapact. We have learned auch about self-assessment and anag11111nt i~ the past ten years and are anxious to share our experience and knowledge. *We would welc011e that opportunity at the C011111ission's earliest convenience.

Sincerely, Byron Lee, Jr *

.BLJr/RWB:bjb Enclosures

Managing the C111Ulat1ve Effect of the NRC's Qener1c Requ1r111ants and Coalllun1cat1ons Enclosure 1 describes four factors that underly the major concerns regarding the cWDUlative effect of NRC requireaents and c0111J1unications. *c1) deficiencies in coanunication with the regulated industry, (2) unauthorized iiaposition of infonul requirements, (3) insufficient industry co11111ents on the I

development of or integrated i11plement1tion of requiresents, and (4) staff initiatives like integrated schedules or the integrated safety assessment program did not result -in substantial industry participation.*

Unfortunately, it appears that the root cause of the concerns first identified in SECY-90-205 has been readdressed from *[c]onsiderat1on of* (in the body of the SECY) to *[a]anaging* the c1.111Ul1tive effect of the NRC's generic requirements and generic cORDUnications (title of Enclosure 1 of SECY-90-347). The change in title of this topic is more than semantics, because the focus inappropriately shifts to managing the burden rather than questioning how the burden was created and if, 1n fact, it has been appropriately justified during development and issuance of the generic requirements and connunications.

One of the ain reasons for establishing NUMARC was to promote interactions on generic safety concerns between the regulator and industry to achieve a 110re efficient and effective response by both. The industry embodies the operating experience, detailed plant-specific knowledge, and design basis and analysis capabilities necessary to critically assess the merits and 1i itat1ons of proposed regulatory initiatives. Clearly, although

the industry's perspectives and responsibilities are different froa that of NRC, the NRC and the nuclear industry share the coanon objective of assuring that the* public hea1th and safety 1s adequately protected. To develop and implement the tremendous variety of generic requirements and comnunications without significant input from the industry is detriaental to both NRC and industry efforts. To change this situation requires direct c011nUnication between NRC staff senior unagement and the industry on generic issues, through NUMARC, and then coanunication of the proposed actions to be taken to its technical staff.

For instance, the staff notes that a biweekly letter is produced by the staff that lists generic letters, bulletins and inforsation notices being developed by staff. Unfortunately, that infonnation is of little value because 111ny of the *deadlines* for issuance of the proposed generic connunications are postponed from biweekly letter to biweekly letter. In fact, two proposed Generic Letters have been on the list for more than two years. Further, when NUMARC staff attempts to discuss items on that list with the designated staff contacts, more often than not the NRC staff lllellber is unwilling or at least unc011fortable to have such 1n exchange. Apparently, in attempting to keep the relationship between the regulator and the-industry at arms-length, s01111181Dbers of the staff believe they are not allowed to have frank, direct contact with industry representatives whether or not at an open, public meeting. We believe that such discussions can and twst take place~ *in full compliance with applicable law, if the NRC and the industry are to be able to carry out their respective responsibilities. Discussions with industry early in the develop1111nt process rather than just prior to, or after, 2

publication of such generic requ1r11111nts or coaunicat1ons should result in a 110re focused analysis of the problem to be solved as well as a well thought-out and effective solution. Several examples come to mind where in the past few years, NUMARC and NRC staff working together have accomplished just that.

Such examples, however, tend to be only a fraction of the potential issues currently being assessed by NRC staff.

At the NRC Regional Workshops on Backfitt1ng, NRC staff noted 1ts intention to substantially revise NUREG/CR-3568, *A Handbook for Value-Impact Assessment.* The SECY states that this revision would include *(I) Guidance on the consideration of cumulative effects of previous corrective actions during the development of new requirements, and (2) Guidance on evaluating new.

generic regulatory initiatives with respect to the Connission's safety goals and objectives.*

The industry supports this effort and believes that the NRC should use this opportunity to revise its cost/benefit evaluation methodology. We:-would suggest that besides the two guidance issues noted above, there are other important issues that should be considered as part of that document's revision *.. Jn __ particular, ~ disagree with the current guidance contained in the NUREG/CR-3568 that recomends onsite costs be included as part of the NRC's cost/benefit analysis. Instead, the staff should restrict itself to

---

;We-ighing *the-ro1-doll1r costs of~iapl111enting-a--plant~ange -against-the---~

benefit to the public's health and safety. Hypothesized costs incurred or avoided by a utility as the result of a postulated transient or accident at 3

its nuclear plant is an economic risk factor of iaport to utility 111n1gement, but is not a proper basis for regulatory decision-uking.

We recognize this position conflicts with C011111ission guidance provided in the Staff Requirements Memorandua dated June 15, 1990, responding to SECY-89-102 that *supports the use of averted on-site costs as an offset against other licensee costs (and not as a benefit) in cost/benefit analyses.* We believe that such a use of Averted On-Site Costs c*AOst*) is not appropriate policy and is mathematically unjustifiable. Should the Connission maintain AOSC is a key attribute for inclusion in a cost/benefit assessment, then its treatment when calculating the cost/benefit ratio for a particular plant improvement should be revised. Specifically, permitting the co-mingling of real costs with AOSC may result in net costs being artificially small and therefore 11ake justification easy of plant changes that provide little real incremental benefit in safety.

EPRI/NSAC report NSAC-143 was written to analyze the NRC's cost/benefit analyses of nuclear safety enhancements. It concludes that the NRC's current practices and techniques such as not present-valuing health costs, as well as using an internally consistent econoaic methodology for use in 111king safety enhancement decisions, are not justifiable. Following widespread industry review and co.ant as a draft, NSAC-143 has received broad support as an appropriate guideline for making such decisions. If the industry and NRC are to reach appropriate decisions on nuclear safety enhanceaents, we must have value-impact techniques that are sound.

4

The staff indicated that in June 1990 the Coanission approved 13 actions relating to the Safety Goal Policy Statement of 1986 and identified how several of these approved actions will contribute to better management of the development and implementation of new requirements. However, the C011111ission also requested that staff propose a plan on how to perform an assessment of whether the existing body of regulations and regulatory practices being imposed on licensees results in plants operating in an adequately safe manner consistent with the C011111ission's Safety Goal Policy Statement of 1986.

Additionally, using this same framework of safety goals and subsidiary objectives, staff would identify any existing regulations or regulatory practices that are not necessary to ensure adequate safety. In this manner, the body of regulations and regulatory practices imposed by the NRC on licensees would be organized in an integrated and coherent framework. This would allow a perspective to be provided of how a given regulation or regulatory practice affects the overall safety of a plant.

The Comnission has directed the staff to establish a formal mechanism to ensure that future regulatory initiatives are evaluated for conformity with the safety goals. The ACRS has comnented that new regulations and/or regulatory practices be considered only in those areas where inadequacies are identified. The staff has yet to propose to the Coanission such a mechanism.

Whatever Mchantsm is developed should have similar precepts to those described in the above conment.

The staff has stated its intent to publish its revised guidance for public c01111'18nt prior to seeking C0111ission approval. Although this 1s a 5

welcome step, the ti11e period described in the regional workshops ay not be sufficient to effectively resolve these fund111ental matters. Ve suggest it would be more efficient and effective for staff and industry, in a public forum, to work cooperatively and to promptly address those areas that need clarification, change, deletion or addition.

The'recently issued NUREG-1409, *sackfitting Guidelines* is an example of how such a cooperative effort can be effective. Issued in July 1990, NUREG-1409, and the subsequent workshops held by the NRC to explain and seek additional connent on the backfitting process, was a productive endeavor to explain the backfit process as well as address typical questions of the public and NRC staff. However, we do not believe the guidance within the document is appropriate with respect to the appropriate cost/benefit analysis to be conducted. For exu,ple, in Section 3.4, Response to Question 12, the staff guidance states:

• The backfit rule requires an analysis. This analysis will vary depending on the nature of the issue, the extent and type of information available, and the ease to which a c0111plex situation can be analyzed by either quantitative or qualitative factors. In s011e cases, the Coanission makes decisions on the basis of qualitative factors. S01118 of the factors to be addressed in the backfit analysis are not easily quantifiable. In addition, the rule includes consideration of other *relevant and 11ateria1*

factors, some of which uy be qualitative. Quantitative factors, where known, are used, but need not be the only basis for 6

approving a backfit analysis. The c011plexity and coaprehensiveness of the analysis should be appropriate (li ited) to what is necessary to provide an adequate base for *aking a decision ***

• Although we understand the desire to avoid slavish adherence to numerical values that 111y be subject to SOll8 uncertainty, we are very concerned that the disciplined process appropriate for such an analysis may be undercut by the broad use of subjective judgment in the implementation of that practice. If qualitative judgement is allowed to remove the quantification technique as the basis for decision-making, the purpose of§ 50.109 will not be achieved.

It is to the mutual interest of the industry and the staff to reach agreement on cost/benefit economic aethodologies that are internally consistent and that properly represent the nuclear safety enhancement

-- situations that both the NRC and licensees must evaluate. The potentially large number of backfit issues that may arise as staff reviews licensee Individual Plant Examination sublaittals suggests that resolution of the proper application of 10 C.F.R. -§ 50.109 should be a high priority now.

In discussing plant specific progr111S, the staff is partially correct in its opinion that industry did not express significant interest in the Integrated Safety Assess111nt Program c*1SAP*) because of a lack of plant-specific probabilistic risk assessiaents (PRAs) necessary for implementation of an ISAP at individual plants. But beyond that, the industry recognizes that 7

PRAs continue to be an evolving technology and, as Individual Plant Exilllinations c*IPEs*) are showing, developaent of Level 1/2 PRAs are resource intensive and tiae consuaing. Those utilities with experience in maintaining 1 PRA have experienced the need to c0111it substantial resources to that task on an on-going basis. Therefore, the fact each plant will soon have its own IPE does not necessarily mean that utilities will be willing or able to implement an ISAP program. We do not believe benefits to the licensees of implementing an ISAP have been identified that might warrant the significant expenditures of time and resources that such I progr111 would require.

With respect to the proposed Integrated Regulatory Requirements Implementation Schedule (*IRRIS*), the prioritization and scheduling of shutdown maintenance activities well in advance of an outage period is a necessity already. Lead ti1Res for aaterial procurement, the conduct of applicable safety evaluations, and related activities required to develop 1 complete change package dictates that utilities generally freeze their outage plans 110nths in advance of the scheduled outage. The need to integrate a ninety-day period for staff review into this process will further complicate the process. Further, the COIID8nt that the outage activities would be frozen under IRRIS aay not provide the flexibility needed by I licensu to respond to changing circ1111Stances.

Staff proposes that a set of guidelines and criteria be developed from the pilot programs which would be applied generically once demonstrated.

Because of concerns about how IRRIS would be implemented, we suggest such a process should be approached cautiously through I pilot program process. A 8

criteria that -..st be evaluated as part of the pilot prograai is whether safety enhancements are achieved in an appropriate priority, with due consideration to licensee resource and schedular iapacts. An evaluation must also be ade of the generic applicability of the pilot program results to different plants with significantly different design features and licensing bases.

9

Enclosure 2 Enclosure 2: Scheduling and Control of Inspections, Especially Team Inspections Two major themes are identified in Enclosure 2 relating to NRC scheduling and control of inspections: the development of staff policy regarding its inspection progr111 and the implementation of that program; and the need for interaction between staff and licensees in coordinating NRC inspection activities with licensee activities.

As described in Enclosure 2, the staff creates unit-specific inspection plans following each SALP review and adjusts its plans each quarter during the subsequent SALP cycle. However, an analysis that NUMARC conducted in 1989 of SALP scores versus NRC inspection hours suggests that there is no meaningful correlation between the results of the SALP evaluations and the NRC co11111itment of inspection resources (see Attachment 1). Thus, it does not appear that the SALP process has been effectively used by the NRC to allocate its inspection resources. The fundamental purpose of the SALP process is no less valid than when it was conceived, but the available evidence suggests it is not being effectively utilized as a 111nageaent tool for that purpose. Further, as the industry has coaaented in a variety of forums, we continue to believe that the practice of assigning numerical performance ratings, and the consequent financial and public perception probl1111s that result, should be reevaluated because of the potential for the misuse of that data and the diversion of attention from the substantive analysis incorporated in the SALP assessment to the detriaent of the progru. As the Chajrman has told the industry several times, details in the reports will give a more definite message than the I

scores. The industry agrees and further110re feels the ratings serve no beneficial purpose.

Whatever the mechanis , we agree that the NRC should periodically evaluate the allocation of its inspection resources based on plant perfonnance, and that activity should lead to the development of an integrated unit-specific inspection plan. We also agree with the staff's reconnendation for it to substantiate the need for major te111 inspections to be conducted, announce such inspections in advance, and plan no more than can be handled without interfering with the safe operation of the plant. Promulgation by the NRC of a schedule of planned inspections will not only significantly assist a licensee in scheduling the allocation of internal resources necessary to I

accOIIIDOdate those inspections, but will assist in the coordination of activities such as INPO evaluations and the individual licensee site activities.

A major concern of licensees, which was docuaented in the RIS, is the negative impact that inspections, planned or otherwise~ have on licensee activities and the need to coordinate those activities with third party inspections. The establishHnt by the NRC of guidelines to balance its regulatory oversight responsibilities with the licensee's operational requirements would be appropriate. Similarly, NRC site activities should be evaluated by the NRC in tenu of relative importance so that licensees could better schedule the allocation of their resources in support of the higher priority NRC activities. The delineation in the NRC policy of what constitutes I lllljor te1111 inspection, as well as the nature and scope of each 2

of those types of activities, would further assist the licensus in being able to support those activities. Because the conduct of these activities has such a dramatic effect on licensee activities, it would be appropriate for the NRC staff to solicit conaent on its proposed policy and implementation program.

The NRC's coanitllent to periodically publish site activity schedules that address NRC planned ujor tau inspections, other significant NRC site activities, and licensee site activities will significantly aid licensees in supporting resource-significant NRC site activities according to their

• priorities and yet maintain tha licensee aanag11D&nt involvement the NRC has been indicating is an important ingredient to safe operations.

Although the use of the NRC's Master Inspection Planning System

(*MIPS*), and its supplementary Inspection Follow-up System (*IFS*) is new to the industry, as a whole, the stated purposes of the systems would seem consistent with the NRC's goals, and the industry's objectives, in ensuring that NRC inspection activities do not adversely impact plant operations and are appropriately coordinated with licensee activities to achieve that end.

3

Direct Inspection Effort (in Hours) versus*

Average NRC SALP Scores HOURS (Thouaanda) 10 8

8 * * *

• 4 2 **

• ii*

• -L-------.

• I

• I I I ' I I I I I 0

1 1.2 1.4 . , 1.8 1.8 .2 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3 SALP $CORES

Enclosure 3 : Training, Preparation and Management of NRC Staff We believe that the staff's rec011Rendations are timely, useful and appropriate. Froa the industry perspective, a major beneficial result of the NRC's enhanced training will be improved consistency 1110ng inspection team leaders and NRC staff. The lack of consistency in inspection activities is a recurring theme identified in the coanents from the industry in the Regulatory Information Survey. The training envisioned in this recomendation should be -

an effective method for NRC senior manag8118nt to take the initial step towards conmunicating its expectations to staff and thus to achieve the desired consistency in NRC inspection activities. The direct involvement of NRC senior management, both regional and headquarters, in the development and implementation of the training and evaluation of the performance of NRC inspectors is critical to the developnaent of an effective inspection progr111.

That involvement is important in the preparation of training course uterials, but critical in the impl81R8ntation of the NRC's inspection responsibilities under the At011ic Energy Act and to c011111Unicate the NRC's appropriate expectations of professional conduct on the part of its inspectors.

With respect to backfitting training, we strongly support the NRC's initiative to conduct the series of backfitting workshops that it held in 1990 and its c01111itaent to provide further training for NRC personnel on the application of the backfitting guidelines. A proper understanding of the application of 10 C.F.R. § 50.109 is an objective not yet realized and the NRC's continued attention to that matter in its training programs would be

beneficial. Si ilarly, the NRC should ensure that its inspectors, and other NRC personnel, understand that generic coamunications do not have legal authority to impose require11ents on licensees other than advising the NRC as to what actions the licensee intends to take with respect to the subject of that generic coanunication.

In all, we agree that enhanced training ts a major contributor to the initial coanunication of 111nagement expectations and goals. However, training alone ensures neither continued performance nor consistency of performance.

Follow-up and monitoring from senior management is a necessary component of this process. For instance, the inclusion of selected senior managers at entrance/exit meetings and/or during plant walk-downs would provide firsthand feedback regarding the activities of their inspectors.

Effective closure of numerous issues facing the industry has been hampered by the lack of NRC management involvement in its proceedings. For example, the industry has spent approximately $20 million dollars and has

!'9 expended thousands of man-hours in voluntary, pro-active efforts to achieve improvements in the area of technical specifications, yet that effort has yet

- to achieve closure, and a llljor factor has been the lack of NRC senior manage11ent involv11111nt. Si ilarly, our efforts to effectively resolve issues such as hot particles and diesel generator reliability have not been successful. Further, the aajor i~sues identified by the utilities through NUREG-1395 (the increase in issuance and misuse of generic c0111DUnications, the lack of NRC prioritization of NRC requirements, inconsistencies between regions, subjective imposition of requir8118nts by inspectors, etc.) could have 2

been averted, or at least corrected, by senior unageaent oversight of these areas. If we are both to achieve our desired, and complementary goals, senior anageaent involvement is necessary from both the industry J.D.d. the NRC.

3

DOCKET NUMBER PROPOSED RULE PR i/)3G. (t/!J-/D)

(55 PR. 53'2QD)

GULF STATES UTILITIES CON.rPANY

~ "

RIVER BEND STATION POST OFFICE BOX 220 ST FRANCISVILLE. LOUISIANA 70775 *91 FEB -5 p 5 :13 AREA CODE 504 635 -6094 346-8651 0FFlf'f *i;: Sf CRf IA KV January 2 8Do@ ~* c; ,,. r; ;:*i,v icr RBG- 34 387 iJHANC~ ,.

File Code: G9.5.2 Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:

Gulf States Utilities (GSU) is pleased to comment on the NRC Regulatory Impact Survey Report (SECY 90-347 dated October 9, 1990; released for comment on December 27, 1990 - 55FR53220).

GSU, a voluntary survey participant, appreciates the NRC's initiative in conducting the Regulatory Impact Survey. GSU concurs with the NRC that the identified concerns delineated in the survey report are areas which deserve attention for improvement. These concerns are as follows:

( 1) Consideration of the cumulative effect of the NRC' s generic requirements and generic communications, (2) Scheduling and control of inspections, especially team inspections, (3) Training, preparation, and management of inspectors.

However, GSU feels that in order to effectively address each of these concerns, a more detailed evaluating approach is necessary and that the issues identified in the survey process require significant attention beyond that recommended in SECY-90-347.

GSU endorses NUMARC's position on this survey report and concurs with the comments made to the NRC by NUMARC. GSU appreciates the opportunity to provide these comments to the NRC.

Sincerely, Manager - Oversight River Bend Nuclear Group cknowledged by card . -~ 1/t L .........

U.S. I 'UCL Ml REGULA.TORY COMMISSION DOCKETING & SERVICE SECTION OFFICE OF THE SECAETAR¥ OF THE COMMISSION Document Statistics Postmark Date ~ 1Jc..;:1:...:q+/ .....

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• Richland, Washington 99352 c_lt) 1 91 FEB -5 PS :12 January 31, 1991 tJfrlC' OF SLt,r't lAKV DO CK [ TiNG <'< " t f<Vlf.f fll< AN CH Mr. Samuel J. Chilk, Secretary U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555

Subject:

COMMENTS ON SECY 90-347, "REGULATORY IMPACT SURVEY REPORT" The Washington Public Power Supply System (Supply System) has reviewed the subject report and offers the following comments for your consideration.

The Supply System congratulates the NRC on having conducted the Regulatory Impact Survey.

We believe the survey results provide the NRC with an honest assessment of licensee concerns.

Further, we support the NRC's planned improvement action as outlined in SECY 90-347. We believe the proposed Integrated Regulatory Requirements Implementation Schedule (IRRIS) represents a step in the right direction. However, by excluding "adequate protection" and "compliance" actions, the program will not represent a truly integrated program.

For licensees such as the Supply System, who are on an annual refueling outage schedule, the timetable for submittal and review of IRRIS does not allow sufficient time to adequately coordinate outage schedules. Since many of the details of the proposed IRRIS program are still unclear, we suggest additional public input be sought once the program has been more completely defined.

In the area of scheduling and control of inspections, especially team inspections, we believe the proposed actions will benefit both the NRC and licensees. Team inspections require significant commitment of licensee resources. These inspections often occur at times when the same resources are required to support an outage or some other critical effort.

The recommendations related to training, preparation and management of NRC staff are also on target. The incorporation of the eleven initiatives addressed in this portion of the report would significantly improve the quality of inspections and eliminate much of the adversarial environment that exists in some inspections.

U.S. NU LEAH REGULATORY COM ISS *-

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Mr. Samuel J. Chilk January 31, 1991 Page Two COMMENT ON SECY 90-347, "REGULATORY IMPACT SURVEY REPORT" We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the Regulatory Impact Survey Report. Should you have any questions related to our comments, please contact me.

Very truly yours,

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Regulatory Programs (280)

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• 91 FEB -S p 4 :32 40 Mallards Cove Duxbury, MA 02332 February l, 1991 Secretary of the Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch

Dear Sir:

In a Federal Register notice of December 27, 1990 the NRC invited comments on SECY 90-347 concerning the "Regulatory Impact Survey Report". My comments follow.

The technology of the light water cooled reactor for nuclear power has matured since the original regulations were written. However, regulation has not developed in parallel. The evolution of regulations was toward increased detail and toward control of short-term, ongoing processes. As the NRC increased their detailed process control, the regulatory environment became regulation by bickering.

The legitimate reasons for the Federal government to regulate nuclear power continue to be to control fissile material and to protect the public from the hazards of radiation and radioactivity. Regulations should use the knowledge of a matured technology to change from a process base to a performance base. This would eliminate causes of bickering, reduce the administrative costs of regulation for the industry and the NRC, and increase the effectiveness of regulation .

One of the least effective regulations addresses the quintessential difference between fossil fueled and nuclear powered electric generating plants - the effects of radiation and radioactivity. The original ALARA requirements for control of radiation and radioactivity had no credible quantitative bases because technology had not yet evolved. The qualitative regulation imposed (ALARA) has been given lip service both by the industry and the NRC. It is mainly in this area that new NRC regulations should forcefully and quantitatively address the performance of the licensee. Such regulation should directly address the impact of power reactors on the environment and on the public and provide the mechanism for reducing these impacts to deminimus as further evolution of technology will enable.

Acknowledged by card.3.~J/.ia.L.............."..

U.S. CLEAR REG\llAT0RY COW4SSD-l DOCKETING & SER~ SECTION OFFICE OF THE StCAETARV OF THE COMMJSSION Document Statisttcs Po!>tmark Date - co/c 9"-'

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I suggest that the NRC, working with industry develop a plan for simplified, performance based regulation of nuclear power. Elements of the plan that would be essential are illustrated in the following specimen statement of performance based regulation:

"The licenses of all power reactors owned by a licensee shall be subject to termination at any time during the term of a license that any one of the following conditions occur at the owner's licensed power reactor:

1. Release of fission products from the reactor fuel greater than 1/10 of 1% of the total fission product inventory of the fuel.

2. Industrial radiation exposure exceeds 40 person-Sieverts (4000 person-Rem).

3. Radiation exposure to the public exceeds 40 persons-Sieverts (4000 person-Rem).

4. Low level radioactive waste, exclusive of that resulting from decommissioning of a licensed power reactor, exceeds 5000 cubic meters disposal volume or 1000 Curies of radioactivity.

5. Low level radioactive waste from decommissioning a licensed power reactor, including consequences of accidents, exceeds 2000 cubic meters disposal volume or 1 million Curies.

6. Loss of physical control of 1 kilogram of fissile material.

The termination conditions (1 through 6 above) are reviewed every ten years for application to new and renewal licenses by the NRC and published under the proceedings for Rule changes."

In the above proposal the numerical quantities are based on years of experience but are exemplary; they are not final recommendations. They are also based on a 40 year initial license duration. Development of proposed regulations should determine termination conditions that can be accomplished within today's technology and applied to the license of a new power reactor.

They should also address the applicability to renewal of licenses for existing power reactors as proposed under 10CFR52. The termination conditions are obviously only operative during the Operating License but should apply to both the Construction and Operating License if both continue to exist.

Inclusion of linkage among all licensed power reactors owned by the licensee is based upon the experience to date with variation in performance among plants of the same licensee. Performance variation is usually attributed to the variation in management of the individual plants of the licensee. The same argument obtains that if the common management of the licensee were performing acceptably, acceptable performance would be obtained in all of its licensed plants. Linking failure at any one licensed power reactor to the continuance of licenses at the other owned power reactors provides maximum incentive for the licensee's whole corporation to achieve adequate performance.

A review period of ten years for the termination conditions is proposed to provide a vehicle for recognition of the continuing development of technology and its application to regulation. It is not intended to change the termination conditions of any issued license.

The plan should identify major bodies of current process oriented regulation that should be eliminated consistent with performance based regulation. The state of technology varies among the six termination conditions. A time-phased plan of implementation of license termination conditions may be appropriate to recognize the difference in technological basis . It is expected that inclusion of termination conditions for new or renewal licenses can be accommodated with Rule changes vice legislation.

I am commenting as an individual who has spent his lifetime in work associated with the lifetime of the nuclear power industry.

• I make no representation whether these comments reflect views of my current employer.

If I can be of any further assistance, feel free to call .

Very truly yours,

123 Main Street White Plains, New York 10601 DOCKET NUMBER PROPOSED RULE PR //,/1~

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. , Authority *91 FEB -1 p 2 :16 Executive Vice President Nuclear Generation Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 ATTENTION: Docketing and Service Branch

SUBJECT:

James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-333 Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-286 Comments on SECY-9(}347, "Regulatory Impact Survey Report"

Dear Sir:

This letter provides comments on SECY-90-347, "Regulatory Impact Survey Report." The Authority has also provided input to and concurs with the comments provided by the Nuclear Utility Management and Resources Council (NUMARC).

The Authority strongly endorses NRC senior management's efforts to evaluate the effect of NRC regulatory activities on the safety of nuclear power plants. The information gathered in surveys of NRC and utility staff and presented in draft NUREG-1395, "Industry Perceptions of the Impact of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission on Nuclear Power", is excellent. The analysis of this information and the resulting NRC action plan which are presented in SECY-90-347 are insufficient to complete this evaluation.

Page 3 of SECY-90-347 contains a list of seven "themes" distilled from the NRC's surveys. On the same page the NRC concludes that most of the survey comments were caused by one of three factors; and, as the result of an evaluation which is not described, the NRC has identified three specific regulatory areas for improvement.

The seven "themes" are significant problems in the regulatory process, even to the extent that they may reduce safety. They are not included in the three areas identified by the NRC staff for improvement and their root causes have not been determined.

Without an in-depth analysis, the potential benefits of the survey will be lost. The Authority recommends that NRC senior management perform a rigorous root cause analysis of the seven "themes", develop an action plan with industry input, and publish the analysis and plan for comment.

Acknowledged by card ..Jl:!Jj.J, .................

UCLEA-R REGULATORY COMMISSION DOCKETING & SERVICE SECTION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMISOON Document Statistics ark Da&e _,1,_/4___1+-0~9 I_____

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SECY-90-347 and draft NUREG-1395 indicate that licensees acquiesce to NRC requests to avoid confrontations or low SALP ratings. This is not discussed any further or included in the regulatory areas selected for improvement. Licensee acquiescence is a pervasive problem that has been identified in every forum that the NRC has provided for identifying regulatory problems. The hardened vent issue is a case in point. The NRC told utilities that if they did not volunteer to install a hardened vent, the NRC would issue an Order requiring them to do so. Almost all affected utilities acquiesced. This is exactly the regulation by intimidation that the backfit rule was intended to prevent.

Utilities are frequently intimidated into making commitments by the NRC.

Inspectors and reviewers imply that not fully committing to NRC "requirements" (which are actually staff interpretations of the requirements) is unresponsive to NRC safety concerns. The unstated implication is that the utility may be subject to notices of violation, or other enforcement action, or that SALP ratings will be affected.

The SALP process is a significant problem when it becomes a tool for use by N RC staff at all levels to insert themselves in the process of managing licensee business.

This effort is both uncoordinated and unguided. Inspectors who lack sufficient perspective to establish priorities, use the SALP to circumvent the regulatory process in the advancement of pet projects. SECY-90-347 simply ignores this issue.

The SALP process itself is a major cause of the problems identified in SECY 347 and draft NUREG-1395. Each SALP category is rated based upon several factors including licensee responsiveness to NRC initiatives. In the recent past, NRC initiatives have come to be initiatives "in pursuit of excellence." Licensees are now being rated in terms of how well they respond to the NRC staff's evolving definition of excellence. This helps to create a regulatory atmosphere in which utilities feel compelled to make commitments which they otherwise would not make. This is a principle cause of the discord between the NRC and the nuclear industry.

SECY-90-347 indicated that the NRC " ...dominates licensee resources through its existing and changing formal and informal requirements" and that the N RC " ... does not consider the cumulative effect of requirements on licensees ... " Enclosure 1 of SECY-90-347 describes a staff " .. .initiative to better manage the impact of implementing generic requirements." The staff ignores the issue of whether or not the impact of the requirements is justified at all. In fact, citing a statement to the contrary in Enclosure 1, the Commissioners reminded the staff that generic letters do not constitute requirements (Staff Requirements Memorandum of November 29, 1990).

To address this issue the staff proposes an Integrated Regulatory Requirements Implementation Schedule (IRRIS) program. IRRIS seems to include only modifications to be implemented during outages. Analyses, evaluations, studies and responses to NRC generic communications are not addressed. Yet they consume enormous utility resources on an ongoing basis.

An IRRIS schedule does not include requirements to meet regulations or the adequate protection standard and need not include utility improvements. This leaves only those requirements justified by the backfit rule. A Nuclear Utility Backfit and Reform Group (NUBARG) analysis shows that about one half of all generic requirements imposed since the backfit rule took effect were issued by the NRC as

exempt from the rule. Before establishing IRRIS to control the impact of regulatory requirements, the staff ought to reexamine the need for those requirements.

Many NRC "requirements" beyond those resulting in physical modifications have a significant impact on licensee resources without commensurate improvement in safety. Often NRC generic and licensee specific communications require detailed analysis, evaluations, studies and responses. Interactions between staff and licensees on these issues are protracted. The NRC calls for enforcement or management conferences on a regular basis on issues that have been resolved and effective corrective action implemented. Often the principle result of these conferences is the intimidation of the licensee. The time allotted to the licensee to prepare for these conferences is usually short. Since the effort to prepare is great, preparation takes a priority for licensee resources out of proportion for effective action and/or future performance. In many cases, this effort on the part of the licensee results in little benefit.

SECY-90-347 states that the NRC is establishing a policy that no more than four planned major team inspections may be conducted during any SALP cycle without NRC senior management approval. This would amount to one planned major team inspection every four months or so, which would have an enormous impact on licensee resources. SECY-90-347 says nothing about team inspections which are not "major" or not "planned." In addition, the NRC staff may be conducting team inspections but calling them something else.

For example, a group of regional based inspectors were sent to "assist" the Resident Inspector to inspect the Indian Point 3 start-up from a refueling outage.

Although the group held its own entrance and exit meetings and included items unrelated to the start-up in its scope, the NRC maintained that this was not a "team" inspection. Whatever its name, the impact of such an inspection is the same.

The Authority agrees that some of the regulatory improvements identified in SECY-90-347 should be implemented. This will not resolve the current regulatory crisis since the root causes have not been addressed. The findings of the N RC survey are virtually the same as those described in NUREG-0839, "A Survey by Senior NRC Management to Obtain Viewpoints on the Safety Impact of Regulatory Activities from Representative Utilities Operating and Constructing Nuclear Power Plant" (sic], dated August 1981.

The seven recommendations on page 8 of NUREG-0839 were developed by senior NRC managers. They are all related to senior NRC management involvement in the process of imposing regulatory requirements on licensees. The Authority considers the seven "themes" listed on page 3 of SECY-90-347 to be related to management control within the NRC. The staff's recommendations of NUREG-0839 support this conclusion. The Authority considers the lack of NRC senior management involvement in the process of imposing regulatory requirements to be the underlying cause of the problems identified in the NRC's 1981 and 1990 surveys. The Authority recommends that NRC senior management involvement be addressed in the analysis and planning recommended above. If it is not, SECY-90-347 will be another lost opportunity to make a lasting positive contribution to nuclear power plant safety.

If you have any questions, please contact J. A. Gray, Jr.

Very truly yours, G~-

n C. Brons Executive Vice President Nuclear Generation cc: Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 Office of the Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O. Box 136 Lycoming, NY 13093 David E. LaBarge Project Directorate 1-1 Division of Reactor Projects - 1/11 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 14 82 Washington, D.C. 20555 Resident Inspector's Office Indian Point 3 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O. Box337 Buchanan,N . Y. 10511 Mr. J. D. Neighbors, Sr. Project Manager Project Directorate 1-1 Division of Reactor Projects-I/Ill U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 14 82 Washington, D.C. 20555

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Power David P Hoffman POWERINli *91 FEB -j;;,ee~!liom NIICHlliAN'S PROliRESS General Offices: 1945 West Parnell Road, Jackson, Ml 49201 * (517) 788*0453 January 28, 1991 Mr Samuel J Chilk Att: Docketing and Service Branch Secretary of the Commission US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

SUBJECT:

NOTICE OF AVAILABILITY SECY 90-347, "REGULATORY IMPACT SURVEY REPORT" 55 FED REG 53220 (DECEMBER 27, 1990)

REQUEST FOR COMMENT

Dear Mr Chilk:

Consumers Power Company concurs with the comments by the Nuclear Management and Resources Council, Inc (NUMARC) in their letter of January 28, 1991 on SECY 90-347. In addition, the following points are also considered important:

1. The three issues identified in SECY 90-347, Page 3, do not otherwise appear to be the focus of further NRC attention, (i) licensee acquiescence to NRC requests, (ii) NRC domination of licensee resources through changing formal and informal requirements and (iii) licensee acquiescence to avoid confrontations. These three issues point directly to the lack of delineation of the role, responsibility and management of the NRC staff by senior NRC managers.

2, The NRC is not only responsible to establish the parameters within which licensees must function but it must also establish the proper climate to allow licensees to meet these parameters and achieve even greater margins of safety and higher levels of performance.

3. The NRC must assess management of the plants to ensure public health and safety is adequately protected but the present level and scope of this involvement hampers the licensee's ability to effectively perform its duties.

4. Subjective opinions resulting from interaction with NRC representatives should not be allowed as a basis for regulatory requirements.

A CM5 ENERGY COMPANY Acknowledged by card ..~) JJt/. ........._...

U.S. NUCLEAH AEGULATOAY COMMISSIOi-.

DOCKETING & SERVICE SECTION OFFICE OF THE SECRETAR¥ OF THE COMMISSION Document Stadstics Postmark Date ___,,,_~ ..;...q:..+/...,,

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5. NRC senior management should not expect licensees to challenge or even to call to their attention inappropriate NRC activities. Senior management appraisal of the NRC staff is as important as corporate management appraisal of the plant staff and should not be delegated.

Finally, over the last ten years, the operations of nuclear power plants have shown considerable improvement. This is due in some part to NRC involvement in licensee management responsibilities. However, extensive NRC involvement can be detrimental to effective management of resources and continued improvement of plant operations.

Yours very truly, CC: GBSlade, Palisades WLBeckman, Big Rock Point

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• 91 JAN 31 P5 :07 Exer:ut1ve Vice President and Chief Operating Oll1cer January 28, 1991 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 ATTENTION: Docketing and Service Branch

Subject:

Comments on SECY-90-34 7, "Regulatory Impact Survey Report" CNR0 -91/0 0001

Dear Mr. Chilk:

PURPOSE These comments are submitted by Entergy Operations, Inc. in response to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) request for comment on its SECY-90-347 "Regulatory Impact Survey Report." (55 Federal Register 3220, dated December 27, 1990).

SECY 347, GOOD INITIAL EFFORT Entergy Operations commends the NRC and its staff for the initiative taken in seeking industry (and regulatory staff) perceptions of the impact of NRC activities on the safe operations of nuclear power plants. The proposed NRC actions outlined in SECY-90-347 clearly reflect good faith consideration given by the NRC to industry comments and concerns provided as part of the NRC's Regulatory Impact Survey (RIS) effort.

On net, Entergy Operations agrees with the proposed evolutionary refinements of programs and processes that are associated with the three principal issue areas, as characterized by the NRC in SECY 347.

Further, we believe that successful application of those refinements, with appropriate consideration of comments provided in this submittal and by the Nuclear Management and Resources Council, Inc. (NUMARC) on this subject, can create an environment more conducive to effective NRC/licensee interface and improved management of both NRC and industry resources.

Jl5JGC4/JNSFLR-l Acknowledged by card ... :::11JJL. .............."

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DOCKETING & SERVICE SECTION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION Document Statistics Postmark Date_ µ _._/;)_ . _ _ _ __

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Comments on SECY-90-347 January 28, 1991 CNR0-91/00001 Page 2 of 4 ADDRESSING THE SOURCE(S) OF INCREASED REGULATORY BURDEN of SECY-90-34 7 focuses on the recurring survey response theme of "the quantity of NRC requirements." Section l.A goes on to note some underlying issues which we at Entergy Operations generally agree with.

However, the actions proposed by the NRC shift directly to managing the burden as opposed to effectively addressing what created the burden, what continues to create the burden, and whether that burden is proper and fully consistent with the public health and safety and the nation' s best interest regarding future energy needs.

In fairness to the NRC proposed actions, some of the measures considered and proposed in Enclosure 3 , do partially approach the issue of what creates the burden, e.g., backfit training for NRC Staff can help to curb unauthorized imposition of informal requirements. However, in large part, it does seem that the underlying root causes that give rise to regulatory burden have not been properly investigated, identified, or discussed, at least by our reading and understanding of SECY 347.

In the simplest terms we may, through these and other efforts, vastly improve our recognition and management of the cumulative burden of regulatory requirements, generic and plant specific . However, we may find that the level of burden, however well managed, is not compatible with resources available . This does not mean safety is or will be compromised.

It simply means that in the end, our jointly available resources may not be used effectively . In some cases, for some licensees, this will significantly detract from its resolve to continue with the nuclear option and will certainly impact future energy source selections.

EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATIONS The investigation as to the cause of increased regulatory burden and the management of that burden can not be separated from an assessment o f the quality of communications between the NRC Staff and licensees. The NRC cites in SECY-90-347 that its evaluation identified several recurring themes that in some way involve licensee decisions to acquiesce to NRC formal or informal requests .

In presentation and remarks made by Entergy Operations staff at the NRC-NUMARC workshop on the Backfit Rule (Region II, Atlanta, September 27, 1990), we indicated the industry must recognize its responsibility to work with the NRC to address the poor quality of NRC-licensee communications.

Licensees not only must be able to competently speak to the safety significance of an issue but also be able and willing to engage in frank, open discussion with the NRC on cost impact, cost/benefit concerns, the application of backfit requirements, etc.

Jl5JGC4/JNSFLR-2

Comments on SECY-90-347 January 28, 1991 CNR0-91/00001 Page 3 of 4 Surmnary themes, Items 1 and 4 of SEGY-90-347, highlight the tendency of licensees to acquiesce to NRC requests. However, the proposed NRC actions in the SECY report appear to neither identify nor address the factors underlying this failure of the NRC and industry to engage in open, balanced communications on regulatory issues and their impact.

For whatever reasons, these type of communications are not occurring as a matter of practice. It is the joint responsibility of the NRC and the industry to address and solve this problem.

NEED FOR FURTHER ROOT CAUSE ASSESSMENT For these reasons, we at Entergy Operations strongly encourage the NRC to pursue further root cause assessments of the issues revealed in the various surveys conducted. The objective of this effort would be to further identify those key factors that give rise to the creation of regulatory requirements and to confirm that adequate controls and analysis are applied to these sources. By this we can ensure that true, significant safety benefit is realized per unit of implementation cost incurred.

In fact both the NRC and the industry are quite experienced in this process of problem evaluation. It is generally the same as that used in the development and assessment of corrective actions designed to address plant deficiencies, programmatic findings from audits, inspection findings, diagnostic evaluations, etc. Further, since it's clearly in the best interest of the NRG and the industry to solve these problems, it seems logical that the NRG should solicit industry input on its view of root causes, causal factors, and improvement actions. The SECY-90-347 effort represents a good start at this process. It does appear, as listed above, and in the NUMARC comments on SECY-90-347, that there are issues that are, as yet, not fully addressed.

COOPERATION WITH NUMARC AND INDUSTRY ENCOURAGED We endorse the NUMARC comments on SECY-90-347 and strongly recommend that the NRC work with NUMARG and the industry as suggested in the NUMARC letter of May 14, 1990 to bring our collective talents to bear on these issues and on the ultimate goal of making the U.S. a world class nuclear performer.

JC/mp attachment cc: (See next page)

J15JGC4/JNSFLR-3

Comments on SECY-90-347 January 28, 1991 CNR0-91/00001 Page 4 of 4 cc: Mr. T. w. Alexion Mr. s. E. Ebneter Mr. L. L. Kintner Mr. Byron Lee, Jr.

Mr. R. D. Martin Ms. Sheri Peterson Mr. D. L. Wigginton Central File ( )

Entergy Operations File NRG Resident Inspector Office: Arkansas Nuclear One Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Waterford 3 J15JGC4/JNSFLR-4

Attachment CNR0-91/00001 SECY-90-347 Review & Conunent: Specific Comments on SECY-90-347 Enclosures

1. Managing the C-wnulative Effect of the NRC's Generic Requirements and COfllllUllications

1. Control of Generic Requirements The NRC discusses in Section 1.B. the role of CRGR. It has been our experiences that CRGR's effectiveness has been limited because of the following problems.

a. Several routes, exist for the NRG Staff to take positions that have generic implications, however, do not require CRGR action or involvement. Some examples of this are: (1) positions published in NRC Inspection Manual Part 9900, (2) draft Part 9900 positions circulated among Resident Inspectors with an implied authority that the unsigned documents somehow represent official NRC Staff positions, (3) formal letters to individual licensees on subjects with clear generic implications and subsequently utilized by NRC Staff as established Conunission positions, and (4) various internal NRC position papers intended to clarify and/or interpret regulations or to support training of NRC Staff.

This is not a comprehensive listing. Clearly, all such routes should be identified, evaluated as to whether or not CRGR (or other NRC management) should be involved, and appropriate guidance and training established.

b. Often a generic requirement document is issued, as is understandable, prior to some important aspects (or difficulties) in implementation being identified or fully understood by either the NRG or the licensee. Often the burden for interpretative guidance falls to the NRC Staff, principally the Project Manager.

This gives rise to widely varying standards applied. Further, there appears no method or process in place for CRGR (or other NRC Management) to assess consistency or effectiveness of implementation for the generic requirement. Some generic letters take several years to implement. Over that time, without some attempt at consistency of standard, the results achieved by the generic letter can vary widely.

2. Inefficient Technical Reviews One factor contributing to increased regulatory burden is the efficiency of the technical review provided by the NRC Staff. Occasionally Entergy Operations plants have experienced the change of technical reviewer staff while the review is in progress. We certainly recognize that this is often unavoidable. However, we do not note that the Staff takes any particular actions to mitigate the inefficiencies that may arise from dealing with a new reviewer. A reviewer change often results in longer J15JGC3/JNSFLR-5

reviews and the frustrating return to some issues that were considered to be resolved. In some cases we find that final SERs, as generated by the "new reviewer" have new and significant items that were not anticipated and perhaps could have been addressed and resolved differently.

We recommend that the Staff avoid reviewer changes to the extent practical while the review ls in progress. Further, we encourage the NRC to work with licensees to adopt some general guidelines to assist such a transition, to document interim agreements, and to minimize any adverse impact on both the NRG and licensees.

While reviewer changes can introduce inefficiencies (and added NRG review costs) to the review activity, a licensee has little control over the additional review or costs that result. Therefore, the NRG should consider providing the licensee some appropriate amount of credit under such circumstances.

3. Adequacy of "Systematic Communication Avenues"

a. The NRG noted under "Generic Issues Management" two systematic communication avenues for obtaining "industry input regarding safety significance." Neither "avenue" cited by the NRC is considered to be an effective mechanism for receiving and utilizing "industry inputs." Often the analyses and other underlying bases for these issues are not made available to licensees for review and evaluation of safety importance.

b. The NRC noted that the two avenues provide for industry input on safety significance. The NRG is encouraged to seek industry input on aspects much broader than safety significance. Certainly, the assessment of safety significance is of keen importance in that, on the basis of that assessment, the determination of priority and resource requirements on the part of both the NRC and the industry can be made. Following that determination industry input can be valuable in ensuring proper definition of the problem and assist in practical, effective actions to address the issue.

We, therefore, encourage effective communications and cooperative participation on these issues between the NRG and industry in the developmental stages of a requirement or NRC position. In this manner a cooperative effort can facilitate the identification and implementation of significant safety benefit through cost effective actions. This has happened to some degree in recent years, but the issues prioritized and approached in this way remain in the minority.

c. Schedules presented in these NRG "avenues" regarding NRC action are not stable, often given to delays, and therefore make it difficult for licensees to line up proper resources to efficiently and effectively address the issue. More accurate schedule information and/or improved communications on project status, perhaps through NUMARC, could assist licensees in better anticipation of resource needs to address these issues when finalized by the NRG.

Jl5JGC3/JNSFLR-6

4. Regulatory Analysis Guidelines

a. We overall agree with the NRG intent to revise the guidelines for regulatory analysis (NUREG/BR-0058) and for value-impact assessment (NUREG/GR-3568) and look forward to the opportunity to provide comment on the revised guidance.

b. We strongly encourage consideration of NUMARG criticisms of NUREG/GR-3568, as provided in the NUMARG comments filed regarding SECY-90-347.

Regarding onsite costs of regulation, the Staff should restrict itself to comparing the actual costs of implementing a plant change against the safety benefit. Potential costs incurred from the postulated event should be a critical matter included in licensee management decisions but not in the regulatory process.

Utilities face the challenge of continued escalation of nuclear operating and maintenance costs and at the same time must competently and effectively discharge their responsibilities regarding the protection of public health and safety. Inherent to any plan, such as SEGY-90-347, that intends to improve the regulatory/industry interface, and the regulatory process in general, must have an effective and efficient means of assessing cost/benefit for a given improvement. Simply, the industry should indeed pursue those improvements in physical plant and procedures that deliver substantial safety benefit and are, at the same time, cost effective to implement. Thus, our techniques for making these cost/benefit assessments must be sound and reasonable.

These techniques are critical to our decision making process and are vital to proper management of both NRG and industry resources.

And, given the significant economic challenges nuclear utilities face, we believe that our joint ability (NRG and industry) to make

• 5.

and agree upon accurate cost/benefit decisions may well contribute significantly to the overall viability of the nuclear option in this country.

Participation in Plant Specific Programs The NRG may have overlooked another reason for the lack of licensee enthusiasm for ISAP, namely uncertainty as to how consistently the NRG would permit issues to be resolved via an IPE type (PRA based) process.

On several occasions Entergy Operations plants have experienced situations where delays on plant modifications, to allow a detailed assessment under IPE, were not allowed. This NRG decision was made in spite of the likelihood that a PRA evaluation would reveal that the subject modifications produced negligible safety benefit.

Substantial industry effort is now being put forward toward the implementation of PRA based analysis capability. We strongly encourage the development and refinement of this technology and the NRG's review and acceptance of it as a meaningful, credible tool in the regulatory decision making process.

Jl5JGG3/JNSFLR-7

6. Integrated Regulatory Requirements Implementation Schedule (IRRIS)

a. We view the IRRIS as a concept with the potential to remedy some concerns regarding the cumulative impact of regulation. Some important points require clarification to support confidence in its overall effectiveness. The pilot program approach appears proper given the level of detail on IRRIS available at this point.

Criteria and guidelines governing the IRRIS should be developed in a cooperative effort with the industry. This not only would draw in industry input and expertise, but could facilitate greater industry participation once finalized. The criteria and guidelines, as well as pilot program progress and conclusions, should be made available for public corrnnent.

b. We note that the NRG expects that criteria and guidelines for IRRIS can be established within two years. For those utilities that currently have substantial improvement programs (or a similarly large regulatory workscope component), the IRRIS may not provide timely relief. During improvement program implementation it often becomes very difficult to deliver tasks on corrnnitted schedules due to the continual addition of items from the "normal" regulatory process.

(1.) Utilities under the special circumstances of an unusually high regulatory workload should be given the opportunity to work with the NRG to develop an interim IRRIS type concept to the extent that date extensions do not take an inordinate amount of justification. Date extensions should be considered and evaluated in an efficient process, given proper assessment of safety significance and resource availability. It must be recognized and accommodated that new issues do arise and may well dictate a revision to priority assignments and work order.

e (2.) Date extensions should be assessed on the individual merit of the issue and circumstances involved and should not have negative impact on the SALP evaluation.

c. The two year period to develop scheduling criteria seems excessive.

This may be due, in part, to the approach chosen to develop the criteria - i.e., the pilot plant licensees will individually establish criteria with NRR. Such an approach may suffer from lack of integration, be too plant-specific and not receive wide industry input or support. An approach which would be more coordinated and perhaps more timely would involve working through an industry group such as NUMARC to establish a draft set of criteria which could receive wide industry input and review, and then the application of those criteria to pilot plants for fine tuning.

d. The review period (1 year prior to refueling) for IRRIS is not sufficient. Design and procurement lead times for major activities often exceed one year. It is also not clear whether the one year refers to the start of the review process or the end. Since the licensee must wait up to 90 days for an NRG response in order to J15JGC3/JNSFLR-8

consider the proposed schedules acceptable, lead time is reduced to 9 months if the review period begins 1 year prior to refueling.

Licensees will likely reject IRRIS on this basis alone. An acceptable review period should begin 18 months prior to the start of a refueling outage with a manda~ed maximum review time for the Staff of 3 months.

e. The items on the !RRIS list" ... will not include those actions that have been imposed to meet adequate protection standards or to attain compliance with existing NRC regulations. NRC imposed actions on the list will be those which provide substantial additional protection in accordance with 10CFR50.109." This statement is not sufficiently clear to promote confidence that the IRRIS process will be useful. Apparently, all modifications associated with a 10CFR requirement (e.g. the ATWS rule) will be excluded from IRRIS - this is reasonably clear. However, the reliance on backfit criteria raises a number of questions:

• (1.) Are generic letter "recommendations" equivalent to "NRC imposed actions ... which provide substantial additional protection ... "? The NRC has consistently maintained that generic letter recommendations do not constitute requirements or imposed actions. If a licensee chooses to not accept a recommendation, will the recommendation be included in the list generated by the NRC? We recommend a definition that incorporates the idea of a licensee commitment in response to a generic communication?

(2.) Related to the above - generic communications such as bulletins and generic letters usually have some cost/benefit basis which supports the NRC's conclusion of "substantial additional protection" under the Backfit Rule. It is not unusual to find that when applying the generic recommendation to a particular plant, the cost/benefit basis changes radically from the generic evaluation. Simply because a generic conclusion has been reached on backfit does not mean that the safety benefit has been cost justified for a particular plant. [Actually, this discussion applies better to the point on who determines safety benefit, discussed below.]

(3.) Many plants still have unimplemented modifications which predate NRC's backfit evaluations. These are in the form of commitments, license conditions, etc. Will these be included in the IRRIS list? For instance, the GGNS license condition on neutron monitoring (stennning from the upgrade requirements of Revision 2 of Reg. Guide 1.97)? If not, the benefit of IRRIS would be greatly reduced.

f. IRRIS will prioritize implementation schedules" based upon safety significance ... " and secondarily on cost and schedule concerns. Of prime concern in a program such as this is "Who will determine safety significance?" As discussed above, generic safety significance may have been assessed by the NRC, but application at Jl5JGC3/JNSFLR-9

a particular plant may show negligible safety benefit. A good case in point is the Generic Letter 89-19 recorrnnendation on high steam generator level feedwater trip for Waterford 3. Neutron monitoring for GGNS is another case in point. Safety significance can be more complex for long term implementation connnitments, such as MOV testing. If valve testing priority is established at the beginning of the program such that high safety significant valves are addressed first, by the time we get to the end of the program, the remaining valves may have negligible significance.

For these questions of safety significance, the licensee will probably bear all the burden of justifying the safety significance level. NRR personnel, and the project managers in particular, will be relying on generic evaluations and are likely to demand technical justification tantamount to that required for exemption requests in order alter their perception of safety significance.

If licensees cannot succeed in simple deferral of a generic letter "recommendation" to IPE resolution, the prospects for a rational approach to outage scheduling based on safety significance are probably poor. It will be necessary for the NRC to develop criteria that recognize plant specific differences from generic evaluations; allow for a lower threshold of "proof" than necessary for resolving a regulatory issue; and train NRC personnel appropriately.

g. Certain NRC Staff have discouraged consideration of cost and scheduling difficulties on the part of the licensee, and in some instances, criticized the licensee for highlighting cost and schedule considerations. Incorporation of these criteria into IRRIS may be a fruitless undertaking without a significant commitment on the part of the NRC to train its staff on the criteria and maintaining management oversight of the process. This concern alone, if not addressed, would likely discourage industry participation in IRRIS .

2. Scheduling and Control of Inspections, Especially Team Inspections

1. "Team Inspection" Definition Since a cap will be placed on the number of team inspections conducted during a SALP period, it may be worthwhile to more exactly define what a "team inspection" is.

2. Sensitivity to Impact of Refueling Outage on Licensee Resources In scheduling team inspections, NRC guidance should be sensitive to the licensee's refueling outage schedule for inspections unrelated to outage activities. Inspections scheduled irrunediately following outages can be as burdensome as those scheduled during an outage for two reasons: 1) the outage end date is often determined by the amount of emergent work identified during the outage and may be extended to the point that the Jl5JGC3/JNSFLR-10

outage overlaps the team inspection, and 2) plant and other personnel necessary to support the inspection team have just completed an extended period of long working hours and generally schedule time off following an outage. As a result a team inspection irrunediately following an outage can have an adverse effect on employee morale. Both of the above factors applied to the recently completed EDSFI at GGNS.

3. Consideration for Non-Inspection NRC Activities The effect of major non-inspection NRC activities should also be considered in the scheduling and number of team inspections. Some licensees appear to receive an inordinate number of requests from the NRC (largely from NRR) to participate in voluntary research and information gathering activities that can result in resource impacts on the licensee which exceed those of a team inspection. For instance, GGNS is cooperating closely with Sandia National Labs in the long-term preparation of a PRA for low power and shutdown conditions. During the week of 1/14/91 alone, GGNS supported detailed discussions and plant walkdowns with 4 Sandia personnel and 2 NRR personnel. While Entergy Operations recognizes that the inspection role of the NRC must be fulfilled, we feel that some credit for extensive voluntary activities with the NRC should be given to offset the number of team inspections.

In addition, it is not clear that these types of activities are included, or intended to be included, in MIPS.

4. Measurement of Effectiveness of NRR Programs and Impact on Licensee Activities

a. We connnend the NRC for the staff's expansion to cover assessment of NRR program effectiveness. And, as is typical in improvement programs, it is proper that the assessment of impact on licensee activities be an integral, routine part of NRC evaluations.

b. In recent years the industry has made a number of shifts in the character and nature of audit and self-checking activities. One such shift was to move from compliance based quality audits to an assessment of effectiveness (e.g., of corrective action measures).

This has proven to be both timely and necessary, but nevertheless, a difficult change to make.

In that the NRC intends on routinely gauging effectiveness, we recorrnnend that the objectives of any audited NRR program or project be defined in a precise and auditable manner. Further, in that the NRC is seeking, in many cases, impact on licensee processes, we recorrnnend that the NRC seek industry input on the criteria for effectiveness and impact assessments. Such discussions would not only aid and benefit the NRC assessments but also would likely continue to improve NRC-industry dialogue.

5. Availability of Master Inspection Planning System

a. Coordination of NRC and licensee activities is a significant concern. We, therefore, encourage the development of the MIPS concept and its expeditious publishing.

J15JGC3/JNSFLR-11

b. It is conceivable that the MIPS data could be made available electronically to licensees to facilitate a more effective analysis of its total resource burden and thus enable the licensee to better manage its resources. In concert with improved safety significance techniques, an enhanced, integrated picture of resource requirements could greatly aid in overall decisions regarding safety improvement and add some stability to work schedules.

6. Potential Duplication of Effort Regarding Inspection Follow-up System Most, if not all licensees, already have in place some form of system that tracks not only inspection follow-up items but also commitments made in inspections. The NRC's proposed IFS may duplicate some aspects of those systems. To avoid inefficiency here, we recommend that the NRC publish for industry comment its objectives for having such a system and generally what details the NRC Staff now contemplates that such a system would do or contain.

3. Training, Preparation, and Management of NRC Staff

1. Training and Rotation Plan for NRC Project Managers The training plans for inspection personnel appear extensive, thorough and appropriate. However, given their importance and central role in licensee oversight and communications, Entergy Operations strongly supports a similar program for NRC Project Managers. We feel that there have been instances where an NRC Project Manager allowed personal opinion to overshadow his responsibilities to implement NRC policy such as contained in the PM Handbook, the Backfit Rule, etc. Proper training and management oversight could have alleviated some of these problems.

In the same vein, Entergy Operations also supports a policy of rotation of NRC Project Managers similar to that for Resident Inspectors, and for the same reasons.

2. Training Follow-up An essential element of training is subsequent follow-up to assess the degree to which training has been absorbed and applied by the trainees.

While the training discussed in SECY-90-347 appears appropriate, we feel that the program may be weak in assessing the effectiveness of that training. Entergy Operations continues to observe what we feel are misunderstandings on the part of NRC personnel in areas for which they have been trained (e.g. backfit). Simple questions such as "Has The Project Manager ever identified a plant-specific backfit and followed the appropriate process?" will go a long way to evaluating the quality of training being offered by the NRC.

3. Professionalism Definition We recommend that the NRC solicit industry input on some key characteristics of professionalism, in the context of regulatory-licensee interaction. In the recent years the industry has devoted considerable effort to the development of meaningful and understandable principles which embody professionalism in areas such as operations, maintenance, Jl5JGC3/JNSFLR-12

management, etc. As you can expect, many themes repeat and are cormnon to most areas. It seems that the NRC could approach the tasks outlined in Enclosure 3, Action C.2, much more efficiently by first seeking those standards and definitions already developed by utilities, NUMARC, and INPO.

4. Conduct of Inspection Team: Informal Inspector Comments As part of Action C.2 on refining expectations for inspection staff regarding licensee interface, we encourage particular review of guidance to inspectors on comments that do not have a regulatory basis. During the course of inspections, NRC inspectors may and typically do pass on comments labeled as observations, concerns, weaknesses, etc. This is often valuable information and should be acted on based on the licensee's judgment. However, on occasion an inspector returns and attempts to follow-up on some of these types of comments. Information passed on by the inspector that is undocumented and involved no regulatory basis should be for the licensee's use only and represent no regulatory liability. We recommend that the NRC review its guidance on this aspect of inspection interface and modify its training, as needed.

5. Training Effectiveness and Ultimate Job Performance As most training professionals recognize, testing after classroom training is a poor measure for how effective new skills have been learned or will be put into practice. Along this line we do commend staff intentions as stated in Action C.2 to review its expectations regarding job performance.

We commented above on apparent training (e.g., backfit area) that has little impact in day-to-day NRG-licensee interface. We also mentioned the need for increased management oversight. Expectations must be well defined and incorporated into "performance elements and standards" as is stated in Action C.2. To insure effective connnunications, the NRC states that "senior managers will conduct training on those expectations for inspectors and their supervisors." Time and time again, it is our experience that connnunicating performance expectations is important but unless expected performance standards are made part of the appraisal process then accountability for performance and for performance improvement is not achieved. That this is the NRC intent could be deduced from Action C.2; however, accountability for improvement is important enough to be re-emphasized.

6. And lastly, as commented earlier, the general theme of proposed actions in Enclosure 3 seems to focus largely on inspection staff. Clearly the same points on effective training, professionalism, accountability for performance and improvement apply broadly to all NRC staff.

Jl5JGC3/JNSFLR-13

4. Comment Topic Areas

1. Priority Assignment of NRC Programs: Industry Input In Item 2, "NRC Licensing Activities," the NRC discusses one of the goals of the Technical Specification Improvement Program (TSIP). NRC expectations regarding TSIP are described more broadly in NUREG-1100 "Budget Estimates for Fiscal Year 1991." In discussing the basis for the proposed 1991 FY budget, the staff notes (p.3 of NUREG-1100) that it "believes (the TSIP) will improve operational safety and reduce the industry's regulatory burden."

We concur with the expectations for TSIP; however, we were surprised in the summer of 1990 when NRC elected to cancel scheduled meetings with Grand Gulf staff on the refinement of the (BWR/6) lead plant application of improved technical specifications. The cancellation was not only disruptive to our resource planning but also removed opportunities for an important working dialogue with the NRC staff. We were advised that the decision to cancel these meetings was made due to NRC resource constraints on the project and that other NRC objectives had or will have higher priority in FY 1991, e.g., licensing renewal and review of standard designs.

This experience illustrates the need for the NRC and industry to have some degree of dialogue on priorities for the coming year, giving appropriate consideration to safety benefit, as well as to projects that are intended to positively influence the management of regulatory burden.

If such an assessment were applied to TSIP, we believe it would compete favorably for resources with high priority NRC staff activities such as standard design review and licensing renewal.

J15JGC3/JNSFLR-14

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1. TXX-91039

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'RJELECTRIC William J. Cahill, Jr.

Executive Vice President Secretary of Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Docketing and Service Bran ch Washington, DC 20555

SUBJECT:

COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION (CPSES)

COMMENTS ON DRAFT NRC REGULATORY IMPACT REPORT Ge ntlemen:

In response to NRC's SECY 90-347, "Regulatory Impact Survey Report,"

TU Electric hereby provides the following comments.

In general, TU Electric endorses the comments submitted by NUMARC. However.

TU Electric is providing additional comments with respect to the proposed Integrated Regulatory Requirements Implementation Schedule (IRRIS) program intended to better manage the impact of implementing generic requirements.

TU Electric agrees that implementation of such a program could prove beneficial when prioritizing and scheduling plant activities. However, there is some concern regarding what should be taken into consideration for such a program.

For example, SECY 90-347 indicates that the review will consist of all un i mplemented regulatory requirements excluding actions imposed to meet adequate protection standards or attain compliance with existing regulations.

Wi t hout proper consideration of the excluded actions, prioritization and scheduling of other activities may seem skewed or unresponsive on behalf of the licensee due to scheduled activities that do not show up on the schedule, but may have a greater safety impact. It appears that for IRRIS to be effective, al l activities, including those required to attain compliance with existing regulations/protection standards, and those that a r e self-initiated by the licensees, should be prioritized and scheduled in union.

SECY 90-347 seems to i mply that generic resolution s that are imposed as a requirement by generic communications, such as Generic Letters, NRC Bulletins, etc .. and plant specific NRC Requests for Additional Information, can be in cluded in IRRIS for prioritization and s cheduling considerations.

Tr aditionally, generic communications legally do not impose new NRC re quirements , but allow licensees to advise the NRC regarding licensee actions, if any, on the given subject. If the NRC intends to include licensee actions as a result of generic communications, this action should be considered as self-initiated by the licensee and part of the schedule.

400 North Olive Street L. B. 81 Dallas, Texas 75201 Acknowledaed bv card .. :?.l.'liiL ................

U.S. NUCLEAA REGULATORY COMMISSION DOCKETING & SERVICE SECTION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION Document Statis!i~

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TXX-91039 Page 2 of 2 Scheduled items to be implemented in a review period should not be frozen, nor should they rely solely on the application of 10CFRS0.109. Some flexibility should be allowed as scheduled items are prioritized, such that the list can be amended and scheduled items shifted to the next review period in the event of unexpected or hardship modifications based on tl1e plant's status during a review cycle. In addition, NRC imposed actions included on the list should not be based solely on 10CFRS0.109. In Enclosure 3 of SECY 90-347, NRC management has identified a need for making improvements in staff training in the backfit process. The backfit rule was revised in 1989, NRC backfit guidelines were issued in 1990, regional workshops with industry were conducted. and NRC staff training is scheduled through 1991. Therefore, in establishing the list of scheduled items, the NRC should exercise caution in the application of 10CFRS0.109 and continue to work closely with the licensee, until NRC training in the backfit process is complete.

Caution should be exercised in the development of NRC generic criteria and guidelines on prioritizing and scheduling. Guidelines set based on a pilot program which includes at least one plant from each NRC region may not accurately represent all plants. Characteristics which may affect the generic guidelines include vintage, containment type, A-E. design basis, licensing basis, and other considerations. Guidelines seem best to be applied on a case-by-case basis. In addition, it appears that at the earliest, guidelines for prioritizing and scheduling activities will be completed by 1993. Although IRRIS is a voluntary program, it does not appear that licensees can take any near term advantage of this program. On a case-by-case basis an interim voluntary program should be initiated to supplement the fir1dings of the pilot program.

Sincerely,

~{!~~

VPC/vld c - Mr. R. D. Martin, Region IV Resident Inspectors, CPSES (3)

Mr. J. W. Clifford. NRR

JANU~ 2 9 1991

• 91 JAN 30 P 4 :O? L-91-36 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch Re: Notice of Availability SECY 90-347, "Regulatory Impact Survey Report" 55 Fed. Reg. 53220 (December 27, 1990)

Request for Comments

Dear Mr. Chilk:

At 55 Fed. Reg. 53220, the NRC announced the availability of SECY 90-34 7, "Regulatory Impact Survey Report," for public comment.

These comments are submitted on behalf of the Florida Power & Light Company (FPL), a licensed operator of two nuclear power plant units in Dade County, Florida and two units in st. Lucie County, Florida.

The Nuclear Management and Resources Council, Inc. (NUMARC) has offered comments on SECY 90-347 under separate cover. FPL supports the comments submitted by NUMARC.

The NRC' s proposed actions to the industry surveys and FPL' s comments on each proposed action is as follows:

NRC Proposed Action -

(1) Establish a program [Integrated Regulatory Requirements Implementation Schedule (IRRIS)J to better account for and manage the cumulative impact of implementing generic requirements on a plant-specific basis.

FPL Response -

FPL supports the NUMARC comments and re-emphasizes a NUMARC statement that it appears that the root cause of the concerns first identified in SECY 90-205, "Results of Industry Survey on Licensee Management Involvement in Inspections and Audits," has been readdressed from

"[c]onsideration of" to "[m]anaging" the cumulative effect of the NRC' s generic requirements and generic communications (SECY 90-347). The focus has been inappropriately shifted to managing the burden rather than, 1) questioning how the burden was created, and 2) appropriately justifying the development and issuance of

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Notice of Availability SECY 90-347, "Regulatory Impact Survey Report" 55 Fed. Reg. 53220 (December 27, 1990)

Request for Comments Page Two FPL Response Continued -

the generic requirements and communication. FPL also re-emphasizes a NUMARC statement that outage activities frozen under IRRIS may not provide the flexibility needed by a licensee to respond to changing circumstances.

In addition to supporting the NUMARC comments, FPL supports the NRC statements that; 1) the IRRIS will not be incorporated in the plant operating license in any form, and 2) licensee participation in this program is voluntary (SECY 90-347, Enclosure 1, pg. 3). FPL also believes it would be appropriate for the NRC staff to solicit comments on any guidance and/or criteria resulting from the IRRIS pilot plant program.

NRC Proposed Action -

(2) Establish limits on the number of team inspections for a given site, and periodically publish the NRC's schedule for site activities.

FPL Response -

FPL supports the NUMARC comments and re-emphasizes a NUMARC statement that it would be appropriate for the NRC staff to solicit comments on its proposed policy and implementation program for establishing limits on the number of team inspections. Additionally, FPL believes that the NRC proposed four planned major team inspections during a SALP cycle would continue to adversely affect plant activities.

NRC Proposed Action -

( 3) Establish, communicate, and ensure higher management expectations for inspectors and their supervisors, establish a cadre of trained inspection team leaders, and improve the training and qualifications of professional inspection staff.

FPL Response -

FPL supports the NUMARC comments and re-emphasizes a NUMARC statement that a major beneficial result of the NRC's enhanced training will be improved consistency

Notice of Availability SECY 90-347, "Regulatory Impact Survey Report" 55 Fed. Reg. 53220 (December 27, 1990)

Request for comments Page Three FPL Response continued -

among inspection team leaders and the NRC staff. This consistency can only be obtained through direct involvement of NRC management, both regional and headquarters, in the development and evaluation of an effective inspection program.

FPL believes the NRC initiative to develop and/or enhance the NRC staff's activities in the areas outlined in SECY 90-347 can be an important step toward improving the regulatory process. However, FPL is concerned that the NRC's proposed actions do not completely address the root cause of the industry's concerns identified in the surveys. If these proposed actions are implemented, the NRC should be continuously monitoring the results of implementing these actions to determine their effectiveness and feasibility. These results need to be fed back to the NRC senior management in a timely manner, such that adjustments can be made, and to determine if the NRC actions are, in fact, addressing the industry's concerns.

FPL has observed that the NRC's proposed actions are, basically, enhancements of existing programs or of past proposed programs.

This could suggest that the proposed corrective actions would be merely addressing symptoms of the industry's concerns and not the root cause.

The NRC should be commended for their initiative to conduct the Regulatory Impact Survey and its associated efforts. In order for this initiative to work, FPL believes that increased senior NRC management involvement, including monitoring and follow-up, is the single most important action to be taken.

Thank you for the opportunity to comment.

W. ohlke Vice President Nuclear Engineering and Licensing WHB/spt

Stephen B. Bram Vice President DOCKET NUMBER PR ;f,,us<!. { 9CJ -1a)

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Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. 1 OCl'i~ ~t.L' Indian Point Station USNi~C Broadway & Bleakley Avenue January 28, 1991 Buchanan, NY 10511 Telephone (914) 737-8116 '91 JAN 30 P4 :07 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 ATTENTION: Docketing and Service Br anch RE: No t ice of Availability SECY 90- 347 "Regulatory Impact Survey Report" 55 Fed. Reg. 53220 (December 27, 1990)

Request for Comments Dea r Mr . Ch ilk :

Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc., submits these comments on the NRC's Regulato r y Impact Survey Report, SECY 347, in response to the NRC's request in 55 Federal Register 53220 (December 27, 1990). Con Edison concurs with and endorses the comments simultaneously submitted by the Nuclear Management and Resources Council (NUMARC).

We see the NRC's conduct of the Regulatory Impact Survey as a positive step in the NRC's efforts to more efficiently focus their regulatory activities on the objective of ensuring adequate public health and safety.

Improvement in the areas discussed in SECY- 90-347, in our view, calls for the attention and continuing involvement of senior NRC management. We at Con Edison share the NRC goal of safe nuclear plant operation, and accept our responsibility for achieving this goal. We recognize the need for a strong and credible NRC which enjoys the public's confidence. We agree with the SECY 347 recommendations for improvements. However, based on the survey results and our own experience, we offer the following additional comments.

We believe that a significant improvement in the regulatory climate could be achieved by a better matchup of regulatory priorities and resources with actual safety impacts. Too often it appears that disproportionate levels of NRC attention (and, as a consequence, licensee resources) are devoted to activities and projects which can be determined at a relatively early stage to have minimal potential for significantly affecting public health and safety. Examples of such instances may be the NRC's efforts relating to molded case circuit breakers (Bulletin 88-10) and potentially fraudulent flange material (Bulletin 88-05). Still other NRC FEB O4 1991 Acknowiedged by c rd ..................................

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DOCKETING & SERVICE SECTION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION Document Statistics Postmark Date £ G. 1/3D/C/1 Copies Received I ' '

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initiatives may actually warrant, from a risk standpoint, an increase in dedicated NRC resources. However, the allocation of finite NRC resources among competing efforts does not appear at this time to be driven sufficiently by considerations of the potential of a particular effort to achieve tangible improvements in safety levels.

To assist NRC management in its assessments of the safety significance of emerging issues, we urge that further input from industry be sought through NUMARC. NUMARC is the focus of industry efforts to enhance the operational effectiveness of licensees in regulatory-related matters, and to improve the quality and constructive character of the industry's contribution to the regulatory process. NUMARC is able to expedite input from many licensees during early stages of issue evaluations, and therefore represents a resource which NRC management can utilize more effectively for information exchange and evaluations.

We believe that NRC senior management involvement in all areas of NRC operation is as essential as licensee senior management involvement in nuclear power plants. NRC management involvement, wherever needed, will be the key to providing uniformity and stability in the regulatory process.

This stability will be evident in the consistent setting of priorities among issues and requirements. With a clear and steady focus on identified priorities, a stable regulatory course will also allow appropriate time and latitude for licensees to make improvements where needed. This in turn will enhance licensee performance and ensure the safe, efficient, reliable operation of plants.

We thank the NRC for the opportunity to respond to SECY-90-347 and present our views so that they can be considered in the improvement process. If further discussion is desired, please feel free to contact me.

Very truly yours,

OOCKt:1 NUMDCnPR lvl/SC, (CJO- Jo)

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WINSTON & STRAWN FREDERICK H. W INSlDN (1853-1886) 1400 L STRE ET, N.W. CHICAGO OFFICE SI LAS H. STRAWN (1891-1946) 3 5 WEST WACKER DRIVE WASHINGTON . D.C. 20005 -3502 CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60601 (312) 558-5600 (202) 371-5700 NEW YORK OFFICE FACSIMILE (202) 371-5950 175 WATER STREET WAITER ' S DIRECT DIAL NUMBER NEW YORK, NY 10038-4981 (212) 269-2500 January 29, 1991 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Wash i ngton, D.C. 20555 Attn : Docketing and Service Branch Subj: Notice of Availability:

Regulatory Impact survey Report 55 Fed. Reg. 53220 (1990)

Dear Mr. Chilk:

In accordance with the Commission's request for comments in the above-captioned notice, the Nuclear Utility Backfitting and Reform Group ("NUBARG") hereby submits the following comments on the Regulatory Impact Survey Report. These comments will primarily focus on certain backfitting aspects of the Staff report, with emphasis on the NRC Staff's recommendations for managing the cumulative impact of regulatory initiatives and, specifically, the proposed Integrated Regulatory Requirements Implementation Schedule ("IRRIS") program. We support the comments provided by the Nuclear Management and Resources Council ("NUMARC") on the Regulatory Impact Survey Report and intend our comments to be complementary to those of NUMARC.

I. Summary NUBARG favors the NRC Staff's planned improvement actions as they are outlined in SECY-90-347, "Regulatory Impact Survey Report."

In particular, NUBARG supports the Staff's proposals to create an integrated schedule for implementing important safety enhancements and to improve the scheduling and control of inspections. NUBARG is concerned, however, that by proposing a scheme for the effective management by licensees of regulatory actions already imposed, the Staff is attempting to treat the symptom (the cumulative effect of such actions) instead of addressing the root cause of the problem by taking measures on the front end to manage the number and pace of new FEB o4 1991 Acknowledged by card ..........n,ttmttttmflWfflfl

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regulatory actions, as well as their integration and coordination.

With respect to the requirements implementation proposal (if we correctly understand the proposal), NUBARG believes that the IRRIS program will not be a truly integrated or cumulative program if it excludes "adequate protection" and "compliance" actions. By excluding these actions, the IRRIS program addresses primarily those proposed actions which are beyond existing regulatory requirements and which, therefore, are more properly to be considered, prioritized, and scheduled at the discretion of licensee management. This appears to be a retreat from the approach taken in the Integrated Safety Assessment Program ("ISAP") and will render IRRIS much less effective than ISAP. NUBARG also believes that the timetables for submittal and review of IRRIS agendas should be reconsidered to allow sufficient time for licensees to coordinate outage schedules, especially in instances when the NRC requests that additional actions be included.

As a result of the preliminary nature of the SECY paper's improvement plans, many of the detailed aspects of the proposed IRRIS program are still unclear. NUBARG therefore suggests that additional public input be requested once the program and associated Staff guidance are in a more complete form, so that licensees might have the opportunity to submit more informed, more specific, and more useful comments.

II. Discussion A. IRRIS Program SECY-90-347 apparently contemplates that "compliance" and "adequate protection" actions may not be included in licensees' IRRIS programs. The staff, however, does not explain its reasons for adopting this approach which appears to be a retreat from the approach taken in the Integrated Safety Assessment Program. In our view, the IRRIS program will not prove useful or attractive to licensees unless they are allowed to include "adequate protection" and "compliance" actions in their IRRIS agendas. Without including these actions, IRRIS will generally encompass only those proposed actions which are outside existing regulatory requirements (such as actions to implement generic letters). The consideration, prioritization, and scheduling of such actions, however, are primarily the responsibility of licensee management and generally should not be subject to review by the NRC.

For the IRRIS program to meaningfully address the concerns of regulatory burden, it must encompass all regulatory actions including "adequate protection" and "compliance" matters. We recognize, of course, that any proposed alternative treatment(~, postponement or elimination) by IRRIS of "adequate protection" or "compliance" actions would require prior NRC Staff approval under 10 C.F.R. § 50.12.

The goal of IRRIS is to address the cumulative impact of regulatory initiatives. Because a selective program can be neither cumulative nor integrated, the IRRIS program cannot fulfill its purpose unless it incorporates all categories of regulatory initiatives. Although the program, as proposed, would provide plant-

by-plant analysis of unimplemented backfit initiatives, IRRIS agendas, by excluding "adequate protection" and "compliance" actions, would not reflect the whole picture. Licensees would face two agendas, without any guidance on how implementation of backfit and backfit-exempt requirements should be prioritized and coordinated. This is particularly important since approximately one-half of the Generic Letters and Bulletins issued in the past two years have been classified as "compliance" or "adequate protection" actions.

Furthermore, if the IRRIS program is properly carried out, inclusion of "adequate protection" and "compliance" requirements in IRRIS agendas would not affect the implementation priority of those requirements. Because the requirements review would prioritize and propose implementation schedules based primarily on contribution to safety, "adequate protection" and "compliance" requirements should naturally, and by definition, rise to the top of the IRRIS agenda. As the Staff already will have attached the initial level of safety significance to requirements through Section 50.109 determinations, the IRRIS program would serve to support those classifications and to preserve them through proper prioritization of requirements . .l/

Finally, IRRIS appears to include only physical plant modifications. The Regulatory Impact Survey indicates that 10 C.F.R.

§ 50.54(f) "information requests" are often used in generic communications to require analyses, studies, and even programs such as IPE. In view of the manpower and resources which Section 50.54(f) information requests can require, this is another category of regulatory initiative which should be considered for inclusion within IRRIS.

In short, we believe the IRRIS program should cover all regulatory initiatives, including regulatory requirements and the non-binding requests established by Generic Letter or Bulletin. All such initiatives should be included regardless of their classification as "compliance" or "adequate protection," unless a specific schedule is prescribed by regulation or the need for immediate implementation has been demonstrated .

.Y This point suggests another disadvantage to the exclusion of "adequate protection" requirements from IRRIS. Under the proposed program, should the NRC feel that a particular requirement would best be implemented either within or outside the IRRIS program, that preference might unintentionally affect the initial classification of the requirement under 50.109. On the other hand, if all requirements are included in IRRIS, any prioritization preferences can be prescribed by regulation or instituted by a showing that priority is justified, rather than by further distorting the already controversial exceptions of Section 50.109(a) (4).

B. Timing ot Pre-outage Requirements Reviews IRRIS appears to offer several improvements over the prior ISAP program, including a focus on outage periods and the "freezing" of requirements to be implemented during an outage. However, the focus on outage periods could benefit from the adoption of a more realistic timetable for IRRIS preparation. Under the proposed plan, the Staff would conduct requirements reviews one year before a licensee's refueling outage. Presumably the licensee would then be given some time (say 30 days) to examine the Staff's list of unimplemented regulatory requirements and respond with a proposed IRRIS agenda.

According to SECY-90-347, the Staff would then have 90 days within which to reject the proposed IRRIS. If the staff were to oppose the IRRIS proposal toward the end of that 90-day period, follow-up action and submittal of a modified IRRIS proposal would presumably be necessary.

This plausible scenario suggests that licensees could be left with fewer than 180 days in which to coordinate their. outage schedules with their final IRRIS agendas. Even in the absence of NRC opposition to a proposed IRRIS, finalization of the IRRIS occurs only by failure of the NRC to respond within the 90 day period. This process would still leave the licensee with, at best, eight months in which to plan an outage schedule. Plant modifications require a significant amount of lead time (design, engineering, procurement of hardware). When IRRIS proposals are modified, licensees will likely need additional time to make adjustments and preparations. Under the proposed IRRIS system, review and response timetables do not leave licensees sufficient time to make these final adjustments and coordinate their outage schedules, particularly if the NRC Staff were to require that additional modifications be made during the planned outage.

c. Need For More Detailed Guidance IN SECY-90-347, the Staff has announced that guidance on prioritizing and scheduling under the IRRIS program will be developed and issued following the completion of an IRRIS pilot program.

Because this guidance has not yet been developed, the mechanics of the program are relatively unclear, making it difficult to provide detailed comments and recommendations at this early stage. As a more detailed description of the IRRIS program is developed, it should include consideration of several related factors. First, the timetable for finalizing IRRIS agendas, as discussed above, should be more carefully established. Second, the program could include guidance on the flexibility which licensees will be given at the time of an outage, i.e., the extent to which licensees will be able to make ongoing modifications to their IRRIS agendas.

Such guidance could indicate whether l~9ensees should provide ambitious estimates of their ability to implement actions during a particular outage (followed by completion of as many agenda items as

possible) or whether conservative estimates should be adopted. In this regard, it is assumed that the length of outages will be determined by refueling needs and associated maintenance requirements and that the IRRIS agenda will be a "living" document which will carry unimplemented, low-priority items over to the next outage period. The NRC's guidance should indicate whether unimplemented items could ever extend to the next scheduled outage period, in which case licensees could be appropriately conservative in formulating IRRIS agendas.

Finally, the guidance could touch on the extent to which the NRC Staff will consider existing IRRIS agendas when implementing new regulatory requirements on a plant-specific basis.

Again, NUBARG realizes that, as a result of the undeveloped state of the proposed IRRIS program and associated guidance, many of these comments may be premature. In light of the unrefined nature of the program and the Staff's aim of completing program guidance within two years (SECY-90-347, p.4), NUBARG suggests that public comments be requested again when the program and guidance are in more complete form. At that time, perhaps many of these uncertain issues will have been resolved and licensees will be able to provide more specific comments.

D. controlling the Quantity of Generic Requirements NUBARG suggests the need for some means by which licensees can notify the Committee to Review Generic Requirements ("CRGR") of the existence of potential generic issues. At present, some such issues have a tendency to escape CRGR review. For example, positions which have generic implications are sometimes imposed on licensees on an individual basis during inspections and, therefore, outside the system of CRGR review. In order to prevent generic issues from effectively escaping the important screening and standardizing functions of CRGR, licensees must have a means of calling to the attention of CRGR potential generic issues arising via such routes. The Staff's recommendations on the Regulatory Impact Survey should provide a means for raising such issues to CRGR's attention.

E. Training of NRC staff With respect to training of the NRC staff, NUBARG feels that backfit training in particular is vital. Because the subject of backfitting has so many complexities and nuances, such training should include actual dedicated instruction to supplement the use of self-teaching reading materials based on written guidance. Such training, coupled with an assessment of compliance with the associated training objectives in the periodic evaluation of Staff personnel, could greatly ameliorate some of the pervasive and persistent backfitting problems reported by licensees.

F. Managing NRC Inspections NUBARG supports the staff in its efforts to improve the management of inspections. In order that the spirit of NRC's intent to limit the number of planned major team inspections to no more than four per SALP cycle be preserved, we suggest the need for a definition of "major team inspection." In addition, since four such inspections per SALP cycle is more than most licensees currently undergo and since the inspection burden is already considered by many utilities to be excessive, consideration should be given to reducing the number from four to three or two. Additional emergent team inspections to address specific incidents, which would be "unplanned", could still be accommodated.

Finally, NUBARG suggests two additional Deans of improving licensee inspection scheduling. First, where possible, the Staff should avoid scheduling heavy inspection loads during or immediately following an outage. Second, the Staff should consider the impact of non-inspection NRC activities (e.g., voluntary research activities or information-gathering efforts imposed under 10 C.F.R. § 5O.54(f)) when planning a licensee's inspection schedule.y y NUMARC notes in its comments on the Regulatory Impact survey Report that not all of the issues raised in the Regulatory Impact Survey are addressed in SECY-9O-347. We support NUMARC's position, as stated in those co:mments, that averted on-site costs ("AOSC") should not be included in the NRC's cost-benefit analyses. NRC's inclusion of AOSC in the*

denominator of the benefit-to-cost ratio allows the final benefit-to-cost ratio to be varied almos~ at will by careful selection of the somewhat subjective AOSC values. There is no way to accurately reflect in insurance premiums the mathematical product of probability and consequences of a particular component's role in accidental on-site property damage. In any event, on-site property costs cannot really be avoided by licensees since all licensees are effectively paying such costs in the form of premiums for mandated on-site property insurance of over one billion dollars under 10 C.F.R. § 5O.54(w) ~ many licensees maintain over $2 billion in on-site coverage. Backfit and regulatory cost-benefit analyses should concern th~elves with the more direct and quantifiable costs of proposed actions rather than with speculative considerations such as AOSC.

III. Conclusion NUBARG appreciates this opportunity to comment on these important initiatives. We believe the staff proposals represent substantial strides toward the goal of minimizing the cumulative impact of new regulatory actions on licensees. With the improvements we have outlined above, we believe these initiatives will prove useful in reaching that goal.

y submitted, Nichola Daniel F Robert e Nuclear Utility and Reform Group

DOCKET NUMBER ( ")

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January 28, 1991 C300-91-L019 C311-91-2009 C321-91-2027 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 ATTENTION: Docketing and Service Branch Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Stat i on (OCNGS)

Docket No. 50-219 Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station Un i t 1 (TMI-1)

Docket No. 50-289 RE: 1. Notice of Availability SECY- 90-347 "Regulatory Impact Survey Report" 55 Federal Register 53220 (December 27, 1990)

Request for Comments

2. Nuclear Management and Resources Council (NUMARC)

Letter of January 28, 1991 with Reference to SECY-90-347

Dear Mr. Chilk:

GPU Nuclear Corporation (GPUN) is submitting these comments in response to the inv itation of the United State Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for comments on the Notice of Availability of SECY-90-347 "Regulatory Impact Survey Report",

dated October 9, 1990 ( 55 Fed . Reg. 53220 (December 27, 1990)).

GPUN appreciates the invitation to comment on SECY 90-347 "Regulatory Impact Survey Report". We commend the NRC for undertaking the survey to obtain the perceptions of licensees and regulatory staff of the effect of NRC activities on the safe operation of Nuclear power plants and to assist the staff in determining if regulatory programs require modification. GPUN believes that this initiative by the NRC is an important step which can lead to an improved interface between the NRC and licensee, to the benefit of the NRC, licensee and public safety.

FEB o4 1991 Acknowledged by card ........................"........

GPU Nuclear Corporation is a subsidiary of General Public Utilities Corporation

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Samuel J. Chilk January 28, 1991 Page 2 GPUN believes that comments and recommendations made by NUMARC on SECY-90-347 as documented in reference 2 are appropriate and endorses these comments and recommendations in their entirety. It is not our intent in this letter to duplicate NUMARC's comments and recommendations. We, rather, intend to emphasize upon certain issues that, though evident in "summary list of themes" (reference 1, page 3), are not adequately addressed by NRC-identified three regulatory areas of improvement.

Out of the seven themes presented in reference 1, page 3, the NRC has identified three specific regulatory areas for improvement: (1) considerations of the cumulative effect of the NRC's generic requirements and generic communications, (2) scheduling and control of inspections, (especially team inspections), and (3) training, preparation and management of inspectors.

These issues, though important, do not encompass the larger concern of lack of delineations of the role, responsibilities and management of the NRC staff vis a vis those of licensees.

The seven points of the "Summary list of the themes" clearly point towards this lack of delineation. The NRC's responsibility as a regulator is to establish the parameters and oversight mechanism to enforce compliance with this parameters. The licensee's responsibility is to effectively and efficiently manage its resources to meet or exceed these parameters. However, as mentioned in #2 of "the Summary list of themes", when "NRC dominates licensee resources through its existing and changing formal and informal requirements (SECY-90-080)", it is tantamount of managing licensee resources.

An example of such involvement by the NRC into management of licensee resources is Integrated Regulatory Requirements Implementation Schedule (IRRIS). IRRIS appears to contemplate that licensees should freeze their outage plan a year in advance. This is difficult to do with any finality so far in advance. As NUMARC has suggested "the need to integrate a ninety-day period for staff review into this process will further complicate the process, and the staff's comment that the outage activities would be frozen under IRRIS may not provide the flexibility needed by a licensee to respond to changing circumstances." Such excessive involvement of NRC into operational management of licensee undercuts the authority and responsibility of licensee to manage its business effectively and efficiently to meet the requirements set forth by the regulations and is, therefore, counterproductive to its intended purpose ensuring public health and safety.

In addition to NRC's excessive involvement into licensee management, there are other concerns that result from the "Summary list of the themes". These include direction of licensee activity by informal vehicles such as generic ,

communication, licensees' acquiescence to avoid poor SALP ratings or to avoid confrontation, and volume and scheduling of NRC activities on site. GPUN recently had experience with the last concern mentioned above; volume and scheduling of NRC activities at site. During the fall of 1990 significant amount of GPUN resources were dedicated for planning for a major refueling outage for Oyster Creek. During the same period, the company had to provide resources for Electrical Distribution Safety System Functional Inspection (EDSSFI) at TMI-1. Concurrent with these activities, company was obligated to further stretch its resources for Diagnostic Evaluation Team's (DET) inspection at Oyster Creek, which involved significant coordination and management effort requiring dedicated effort by the same management and technical staff that were deployed for the other two activities. Such concurrent scheduling and volume put significant strain on resources and resource management of licensees.

Samuel J. Chilk January 28, 1991 Page 3 GPUN believes that the aforementioned concerns of delineation of roles and responsibilities, direction of licensee activity and the resultant licensee acquiescence, and volume and scheduling of the NRC activity on site are important regulatory activities that greatly impact licensee ability to comply with the regulation. The three issues identified by the NRC do not adequately address these concerns, therefore this emphasis. We request that NRC consider NUMARC's recommendations and address the broader issues mentioned above. We appreciate this opportunity to provide input on this important issue.

Sincerely, Director, Licensing & Regulatory Affairs JK/ST/cb C300L019 cc: Administrator, Region I Oyster Creek NRC Project Manager Senior NRC Resident Inspector, OC Senior NRC Resident Inspector, TMI-1 TMI-1 NRC Project Manager Byron Lee, ~r. (NUMARC)

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January 29, 1991 DoCKt:rEo Docket Nos. 50-213 50-245 50 -336 50-423 B13722 RE: 55 FR 53220 SECY-90-347 Mr. Samuel J . Chilk Secretary of the .Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch

Dear Mr. Chilk:

Haddam Neck Plant Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3 Response to SECY 347, Regulatory Impact Survey Report This letter is being submitted by Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company (CYAPCO) and Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO) in response to the NRC request, dated December 20, 1990, for comments on SECY 347, 11 Regulatory Impact Survey Report, dated October 9, 1990. A Federal 11 Register Notice of the availability of the SECY paper was also published on December 27, 1990. <

We commend the NRC Staff management for the actions being taken to identify regulatory impact concerns, and the progress on proposing and implementing solutions. SECY-90 -347 condenses information learned by the NRC from numerous sources, down to a handful of underlying causes, that the Staff is proposing to resolve as three issues :

1. The cumulative effect of requirements,

2. The scheduling of inspections, and

3. The training of NRC Staff personnel.

We believe the actions proposed in SECY-90-347 will achieve important improvements in these three areas. Our comments provided later in this letter provide additional perspectives and examples that support the Staff's proposals in these areas.

fEB O4 1991 0 S3422 REV . 4-88 Acknowledged by card ................................,

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIOM DOCKETING & SERVICE SECTION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION Document Statistics

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Mr. Samuel J. Chilk B13722/Page 2 January 29, 1991 However, there is an underlying root concern in much of the regulatory imp act i nfonnat ion that the Staff could address in a more stra tght forward manner. Simply stated, the role of the NRC Staff and the role of licensees is not appropriately maintained in some interactions. There remain instances of nonproductive tension, and unnecessarily adversarial interfaces associated with the present system.

As an example, NRC Staff personnel go beyond their regulatory role when they attempt to do the licensee's job, or try to impose a better idea (in their view). NRC points of view are too frequently represented or misunderstood as requirements, when in fact they may only be individual views on how to manage, engineer, design, operate, or maintain plants in areas which are the licensee's responsibility. The NRC should establish a regulatory framework and assess compliance to it, and allow licensees to manage their resources to most effectively operate within that framework.

The adverse impacts of not adhering to defined roles for the regulators is repeated throughout the sources of infonnation used by the Staff in preparing SECY-90-347. Some examples are:

o NRC dominates licensee resources.

0 Many inspection practices and positions taken are counterproductive.

o Subjective NRC op1n1ons are represented as regulatory expectations in thousands of interactions each year.

o Licensees acquiesce to avoid confrontation and achieve higher Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance ratings.

o Licensees need to be freer to manage their own resources.

o Inspectors and reviewers enforce obedience to individual interpretations, going beyond NRC regulations, through fonnal and informal communication.

A specific ongoing issue where NRC positions will apparently be imposed, when there is no clear need for new regalations, is t~)Emergency Response Data System (EROS). By letter dated August 14, 1990, CYAPCO and NNECO notified the NRC of our voluntary participation in the ERDS project for all four of our nuclear units. CYAPCO and NNECO are working closely with the NRC contractor to implement the ERDS. We strongly believe that a rule (1) E. J. Mroczka letter to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Co11111ission, dated August 14, 1990, "Haddam Neck Plant and Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3 Emergency Response Data System."

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk 813722/Page 3 January 29, 1991 governing EROS implementation should not be promulgated. We maintain that the Staff has not provided adequate justification for the rule pursuant to the requirements of 10CFRS0.109. Nevertheless, if the rulemaking process continues, then ~ numerous concerns we expressed in our letter of December 21, 1990, should be considered.

We greatly appreciated the opportunity to comment on the proposed EROS rule and supporting documents, and trust the convnents will be valuable in establishing a final regulation, should that option be chosen. However, we strongly maintain that new regulations should .Il21 be promulgated unless the thresholds established by 10CFRS0.109 are met. In this case, we believe they are not. Ironically (and illustrative of the concerns expressed previously in this letter), if the regulation is promulgated as proposed, we may be forced to seek certain technical exemptions in order to implement a superior system at reduced cost. A far more preferable approach is to continue ERDS implementation on a voluntary basis. We believe this rulemaking represents an opportunity for the NRC to respond in the spirit articulated in regulatory publications associated with the Regulatory Impact Survey.

Regarding the three issues that the Staff is proposing to address in SECY-90-347, we provide specific comments as follows:

1. The Cumulative Effect of Regyirements CYAPCO and NNECO would also like to take the opportunity to provide comments on the Integrated Regulatory Requirements Implementation Schedule (IRRIS), as discussed in Enclosure 1 of SECY-90-347. As presented in the background section of the enclosure, the Integrated Safety Assessment Program ( ISAP) addressed, among other things, the opportunity to establish and maintain a formal process mutually beneficial to the NRC Staff and the licensee to manage new requirements and the associated implementation schedules. Since we view IRRIS and ISAP as conceptually similar, we view the new IRRIS proposal as an affirmation of our ISAP experience.

We are encouraged to see the IRRIS process address plant-specific items with little safety enhancement going to the bottom of the prioritization list, and even not being implemented . . This is congruent with our threshold concept. Furthermore, IRRIS would 11 11 allow a licensee to balance its resources and bring stability to schedules. Cost could be a criterion used in prioritization, as well (2) E. J. Mroczka letter to S. J. Chilk, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, dated December 21, 1990, Haddam.Neck Plant and Millstone 11 Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos. 1, 2, 3 Emergency Response Data System, Comments on Proposed Rule."

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk B13722/Page 4 January 29, 1991 as impact on an area within the plant of several work activities.

Both of these concepts have also been considered within our ISAP.

As you recall, we have had ISAP in operation at our Haddam Neck Plant and at Millstone Unit No. 1 for years, since the ISAP pilot program.

We believe that our existing ISAP currently fulfills the three objectives of the IRRIS opportunity described in SECY-90-347:

Provide a simple mechanism that will encourage early implementation of plant modifications offering the most safety for resources spent; help to evaluate and set balanced priorities for an entire set of pending requirements; and help to avoid duplication of efforts to enhance safety.

The ISAP has allowed us to better manage the cumulative effect of the NRC's generic requirements and corrununications and our initiated efforts. We have conducted plant-specific, integrated assessments of proposed modifications, based on Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) and experience to improve the level of safety. The resulting prioritized ranking of projects are periodically submitted to NRC Staff in comprehensive ISAP reports which include Integrated Implementation Schedules to enhance convnunication between the NRC Staff and Northeast Utilities (NU).

The ISAP program was also mentioned in NU's Individual Plant Examination (IPE) response to the NRC Staff. Any proposed plant modifications, which result from the IPE, will be evaluated and scheduled accordingly in the ISAP, as described in NUREG-1335.

We have had docketed plans for some time and will be submitting the initial ISAP report for Mill stone Unit No. 3 shortly. These previously docketed plans also describe our intention to expand ISAP to Millstone Unit No. 2 following completion of the respective PRA, as discussed in NUREG-1335.

Again, we applaud the NRC Staff for acknowledging the mutual benefits that an IRRIS/ISAP type process can provide to the Staff and the licensee. We also apprt jate your continuing to extend the invitation for ISAP participation 3 as well as offering utilities the IRRIS option. We look forward to working with the Staff to more meaningfully implement the "threshold" concept in ISAP. We believe the development of the IRRIS process will present an excellent (3) For example, the enclosure to SECY 90-347 states: "However, the NRC continues to offer the opportunity to any licensee to do an integrated safety assessment."

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk B13722/Page 5 January 29, 1991 opportunity to complete the institutionalization of this important concept in ISAP.

While we view the ISAP framework to be the optimum one, there continue to be opportunities to further improve our interactions with respect to finalizing plant modifications and scheduling their implementation.

An example of possible detrimental effects of cumulative regulatory requirements concerns the implementation of the Station Blackout (SBO) rule. Millstone Unit No. 3 received its Safety Evaluation Report (SER) on SBO on August 27, 1990, which initiated the 2-year implementation schedule for any required hardware modifications.

However, we have since learned that the NRC is contemplating resolution of Generic Issue 23, RCP Seal Failure, by issuing a generic letter under 10CFR50.54(f) which would request licensees to adopt new assumptions to be used for SBO and thus potentially invalidate our SBO analyses and the associated NRC SER.

If it evolves that more conservative assumptions regarding RCP seal leakage are adopted, the adequacy of the planned SBO modifications is jeopardized. At this juncture, we are having difficulty arriving at the proper course of action. On the one hand, we could continue implementation of current plans, and find that our efforts are wasted because of the final outcome of Generic Issue 23. Conversely, we could suspend current implementation efforts, find that the resolution of Generic Issue 23 does not adversely impact our SBO plans, and be criticized by the NRC for not implementing the modifications on the originally anticipated schedule.

To date, we have not been able to find a vehicle to bring this situation to the attention of the Staff for resolution. Given recent past practice with respect to issuance of Generic Letters under 10CFR50.54(f), we are also skeptical as to the rigor of the backfitting analysis which would support the forthcoming Generic Letter. In summary, the current regulatory process seems to involve knowledgable and well-intentioned people fulfilling their individual responsibilities, but management of their "cumulative effect" would appear to be lacking. In today's environment, r~source efficiency is vital, and we encourage the Staff to pursue improvements in this area

, as expeditiously as possible. We would also welcome an opportunity to discuss the above described issue on a plant-specific basis.

l...-

• I .,_,,

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk B13722/Page 6 January 29, 1991

2. The Scheduling of Inspections We also support the NRC's plan to improve the scheduling and control of inspections and their impacts. This concern was conveyed to the NRC in our informational letter entitled "Impact of Inspections and Special Meetings," dated October 6, 1989. We reiterated our concern in our "Response to Generic Letter No. 90-01 Regulatory Impact Survey" dated March 1, 1990.

An example in this area concerns the recent scheduling of the Electrical Distribution System Functional Inspections (EDSFls) for CYAPCO and NNECO plants. In late 1990, Region I infonned us of the original schedule to conduct three EDSFis within six months of each other at the Haddam Neck Pl ant and Mill stone Un it Nos. 1 and 2. Wh 11 e we were app.reci at i ve of the advance notice for the two Mill stone units, the large resource expenditure (particularly within our Generation Electrical Engineering Branch) required of us to support these inspections, refueling outages, *and other activities were apparently not factored into the proposed inspection schedule.

Following several telephone discussions, the Region did agree to perform only two EDSFis (at Haddam Neck and Millstone Unit No. 1) separated by approximately six months. We look forward to an enhanced dialogue with the Staff in the area of scheduling inspections.

3. The Training of NRC Staff Personnel We have no specific comments regarding the training of NRC Staff personnel. We believe the actions proposed in SECY-90-347 will result in improvements in this area.

We trust that these comments will be useful to you, and we would be pleased to respond to any questions you may have.

Very truly yours, CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY E.J.Mrocz~

Senior Vice re cc: T. T. Martin, Region I Administrator A. B. Wang, NRC Project Manager, Haddam Neck Plant J. T. Shedlosky, Senior Resident Inspector, Haddam Neck Plant D. H. Jaffe, NRC Project Manager, Millstone Unit No. 1 G. S. Vissing, NRC Project Manager, Millstone Unit No. 2 J. F. Williams, NRC Project Manager, Millstone Unit No. 3 W. J. Raymond, Senior Resident Inspector, Millstone Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3

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~ nuary 28, 1991 RC-91-0 0 16 U. S. Nuclear Regu latory Commission Attn: Docketing and Service Branch Washington. D. C. 20555

References:

1) Fermi 2 NRC Docket No. 50-341 NRC License No. NPF-43

2) SECY-90-347. "Regulatory Impact Survey Report".

dated October 9. 1990

Subject:

Comments on SECY-90-347. "Regulatory Impact Survey '--.__

Re ort" Detroit Edison has reviewed SECY-90-347. "Regulatory Impact Survey Report". We applaud the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for initiating action in response to the Regu latory I mpact Survey and for providing the opportunity for public comment. Detroit Edison endorses NUMARC's general comments on SECY-90-347 and additionally would like you to consider the follow ing comments .

In general. the NRC improvement plan is a step in the right di rection in solving the problems identified in the Regulatory Impact Survey.

Howeve r. it does not go far enough in addressing the areas of informal requirements. NRR staff enhancements and reasons beh ind licensee acquie scence to NRR requests. We endorse the NUMARC comments on the latter item. so this letter will address the fi rst two items while discussing specific comments on the three areas the NRC h as targeted fo r action.

In the a re a of managing t he e ffect of cumulative requirements and generic communications. Detroit Edison agrees an integrated schedule is a good starting point. The NRC's plan to stabilize advanced planning of regulatory requirement implementation will be beneficial considering the long lead time needed for effect i ve engineering . work planning. and parts procur ement fo r plant modifications. We have developed a 5 year operating plan which includes major modifications and other pr ojects. including NRC mandated. NRC committed and self-initiated items. To be effective. all these items need to be included. To prevent ineffective use of resources. items from any source should be dropped if their priority. including their Acknowled ed b FEB O4- 1991 g ycard .........."""'"'"..'""""'

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USNRG January 28. 1991 NRG-91-0016 Page 2 safety-benefit, are low. For NRG mandated and committed activities, communication of deletion of these items should be conducted, but the NRG needs to be open to the elim ination of such items so that resources can be most effectively used. Also. the NRG should review existing prioritization and scheduling schemes in developing their guidance. We would be happy to provide a copy of our priori tization criteria fo r your consideration.

A last comment on the topic of generic requirements and communications is that the NRG should closely evaluate the use of the adequate protection standard. Items meeting the adequate protection criteria are not further evaluated for cost/benefit considerations and pe r SEGY-90-347 would not be eligible for prioritization review. At the Region III backf itting workshop. attendees expressed the opinion that the adequate protection c r iteria is overused in generic communications. We share that opinion.

Regarding scheduling and control of inspections. Detroit Edison is happy that the NRG now recognizes the large impact team inspections have on licensees. However. 4 team inspections within a year would still cause an extremely heavy impact on a plant. Typically. at least one employee is tied up during the inspection per inspector plus department heads and senior management are greatly involved.

Additional resources are used in followup activities. No more than 2 team inspections per year should be the threshold for the additional review and approval.

Detroit Edison endorses the NRG plan to announce significant NRC site activities. We reques t that the NRC also consider planned refueling outages in developing inspection schedules. The necessary extensive demands on personnel during a team inspection are more difficult to handle when plant personnel are already extremely busy during a refueling outage.

The last area the NRC has targeted for action is training, preparation and management of NRG staff. The majority of actions in this area are aimed at inspectors. These actions a re very important. However . many of these initiatives would serve to improve the professionalism and consistency of performance among all NRG personnel. not just inspectors. The backfitting training being given for both regional and NRR staff is a good example of an action that will benefit both the NRG and utilities by creating common understanding of the backfit rule. This. hopefully. will also reduce the number of informal re quirements that NRG personnel. regional. site, and headquarters, attempt to promulgate. These informal requirements. which are sometimes tied verbally to SALP scores, can engage conside rable plant resources whether the plant acquiesces or disagrees. Refresher training or discussions in the areas of backfitting and management expectations would also be helpful to keep NRC personnel focused in

USNRC January 28. 1991 NRC-91-0016 Page 3 the direction management expects and to prevent recurrence of some of the problems identified in the Regulatory Impact Survey.

Following the discu ssions of the three major improvement areas.

SECY-90-347 discusses othe r comment topic areas. One of the areas discussed is improved Technical Specifications. We are growing concerned at the continued delays in the issuance of the draft SER and whether the app rov ed Technical Specifications will be so different from what was proposed as to negate the benefits of the improvements.

To achieve the industry-wide benefits that were the original goals of this program. the approved version of the improved Technical Specifications has to be something the licensees are willing to adopt or this large NRC and licensee effort will have been in vain.

In the discussion on event reporting. SECY-90-347 mentions that the NRC staff is considering making a revision to 10CFR50.72 and 50.73 to eliminate unneces sary reports of ce rtain engineered safety features.

Detroit Edison strongly agrees with this idea. Eliminating unnecessary r epor ts on such "events" as scram signals when the reactor is shutdown and cleanup system isolations will save both NRC and licensee resources that can be used more effectively elsewhere. The primary focus of changes to event repor ting regulations should be on the safety significance of events be ing reported. This focus is being embodied in guidance unde r development by the BWR Owner's Group.

Detroit Edison has been actively participating in this effort.

In conclusion. Detroit Edison generally agrees with the actions discussed in SECY-90-347. but thinks additional steps are necessary to more fully addre ss the problems identified by the Regulatory Impact Survey. If you have any questions or would like to discuss any specific comment. please contact Lynne S. Goodman at (313) 586-4211.

Sincerely.

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• Nuclear (216) 259-3737 January 28, 1991 PY-CEI/NRR-1299 L Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 SECY-90-347 "Regulatory Impact Survey Report" 55 Fed. Reg. 53220 (December Request for Comments

Dear Mr. Chilk:

These comments are submitted in response to the Notice of Availability of SECY-90-347 "Regulatory Impact Survey Report," dated October 9, 1990; 55 Fed.

Reg. 53220 December 27, 1990). CEI appreciates the opportunity to comment on this important NRC initiative. As a 10 CFR Part 50 licensee, CEI has a vested interest in any policies the Commission may adopt that have the potential to affect the management and operation of commercial nuclear power plants.

Furthermore, we share with the industry and NRC the common objective that the results of the Regulatory Impact Survey be used to develop an action plan that results in real improvements in the regulatory process.

As discussed in the extensive comments submitted by NUMARC, it appears that the actions proposed by SECY-90-347 fall short of addressing some of the more significant issues identified by the survey. CEI fully supports the comments submitted by NUMARC on this document.

In particular, two key issues identified by NUMARC which deserve additional attention are: (1) NRC's increasing tendency to get involved in licensee management and performance issues, and (2) the NRC's shift in focus to managing/implementing the large number of NRC requirements rather than re-examining how the burden was created, i.e., have the additional requirements been appropriately justified?

Again, we appreciate the opportunity to provide an input on this important document and encourage the NRC to continue a dialogue with NUMARC on these issues.

}Ct, Michael MDL:RAN:njc cc: B. Lee Jr. NUMARC NRC Project Manager NRC Resident Office Operating Units :

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Byron Lee, Jr.

President & Chief Executive Officer January 28, 1991 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Convnission U.S . Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. - 20555 ATTENTION: Docketing and Service Branch Notice of Availability SECY-90-347 "Regulatory Impact Survey Report" 55 Fed. Reg. 53220 (December 27 , 1990)

Request for Comnents

Dear Mr. Chilk :

These comments are submitted by the Nuclear Management and Resources Council, Inc . ("NUMARC") in response to the request of the U.S. Nuclear Reg ulatory Commission ("NRC") for comments on the Notice of Availability of SECY-90-347 "Regulatory Impact Survey Report" (dated October 9, 1990) (55 Fed .

Reg . 53220 - December 27, 1990).

NUMARC i s the organization of the nuclear power industry that is responsible for coordinating the combined efforts of all utilities licensed by the NRC to construct or operate nuclear power plants, and of other nuclear industry organizations , in all matters involving generic regulatory policy issues and on the regulatory aspects of generic operational and technical issues affecting the nuclear power industry. Every utility responsible for constructing or operating a commercial nuclear power plant in the United States is a member of NUMARC. In addition, NUMARC's members include major arch i tect/eng i neering firms and all of the major nuclear steam supply system vendors .

The industry welcomed the NRC's decision in the Fall of 1989 to undertake the Regulatory Impact Survey, as documented in SECY-90-80, SECY 205, and SECY-90-250. We believe this NRC initiative is timely and the most important effort undertaken over the past ten years to improve the regulatory process. We strongly believe it can ; if completed thoroughly, lead to significant improvements in the regulatory process to the benefit of the public, the NRC , and the industry. This effort, and associated follow-on act i vities, are vitally important because this matter significantly affects the ability of the NRC to satisfy its statutory responsibilities and of licensees of commercial nuclear power plants to satisfy their fundamental responsibilities.

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Mr. Samuel J. Chilk January 28, 1991 Page 2 The NRC undertook the Regulatory Impact Survey to obtain the perceptions of the industry and of the regulatory staff of the effect of NRC activities on the safe operation of nuclear power plants and to assist the staff in determining if regulatory programs require modification. The draft survey report "Industry Perceptions of the Impact of the Nuclear Regulatory Conwnission on Nuclear Power Plant Activities" (Draft NUREG-1395) contains an excellent sunwnary by the staff of the candid comments provided by the personnel from various levels within the licensees that participated in the survey. We conwnend the survey team for an excellent job of listening and accurately reporting the information received. These comments clearly indicate that modifications to existing regulatory programs are needed.

The Regulatory Impact Survey effort has now reached its most important phase -- that of determining the proper corrective actions necessary to resolve the underlying causes of the concerns identified. In our letter to Chainnan Carr of May 14, 1990, we stressed that, "If real benefit is to be gained from this effort, the staff should apply the same principles they ask licensees to apply: evaluate all the information available, determine the root cause, and develop a plan with an implementation schedule to make corrections to the proces*s consistent with your regulatory responsibilities."

From the vast amount of infonnation provided to the staff in the Regulatory Impact Survey, the staff identified only three specific regulatory areas for improvement. We have provided specific conwnents on those and related areas in the Attachment to this letter to assist the staff in addressing those areas.

Unfortunately, the corrective actions proposed in SECY-90-347 fall short of addressing the significant, long-standing and pervasive problems in the regulatory process identified by the survey and will not correct the underlying causes of those problems. The reconwnended actions fail to address the two principal themes that were developed by the staff from licensee concerns with current NRC regulatory activities and attitudes, which were documented in draft NUREG-1395. Specifically:

(1) "licensees acquiesce to NRC requests to avoid poor numerical Systematic Assessment of Licensee Perfonnance ("SALP")

ratings and the consequent financial and public perception problems that result, even if the requests require the expenditure of significant licensee resources on matters of marginal safety significance; and (2) NRC so dominates licensee resources through its existing and changing formal and informal requirements that licensees believe that their plants, though not unsafe, would be easier to operate, have better reliability, and may even achieve a higher degree of

Hr. Samuel J. Chilk January 28, 1991 Page 3 safety, if they were freer to manage their own resources.*

From our evaluation of the comprehensive survey infonnation documented by the NRC we conclude that the underlying common element is the need for improvement in the overall management effectiveness of the NRC in order to achieve appropriate management discipline and accountability over NRC regulatory activities and actions. The surveys contain numerous examples that indicate the need for clearly defined management expectations to be established for all NRC activities and, more importantly, for the assessment and follow-up processes necessary to ensure that management expectations are properly carried out. The underlying cause of many of the issues identified by the survey has its roots in needed management involvement and follow-up and the development of a mechanism to measure the effectiveness of the NRC in conducting its regulatory programs and operating the agency. We firmly believe that if overall agency management effectiveness were improved, a major improvement in the regulatory environment would result, with a corresponding reduction in the adverse impact on licensee activities, all of which would be in the public interest.

The fundamental precept in nuclear regulation that both the industry and the NRC agree upon is that the ultimate responsibility for safe plant operation rests with the utility*holding the operating license. It has been repeatedly stressed in NRC's documents and reports by outside groups, that the licensee has -- and must have -- the day-to-day, week-by-week, and month-by-month responsibility for safety. The licensee is the frontline guardian of safety. The NRC's responsibility as stated in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, and NRC regulations is to provide reasonable assurance that the public health and safety and the environment are protected in the operation of nuclear power plants.

Over the past several years, we have seen a shift in the approach taken by the NRC. Some NRC personnel appear to believe that NRC must be, or attempt to be, all pervasive in their efforts to regulate licensee management and performance. This is apparently based on the premise that virtually every action a licensee takes could have~ impact on safety. This is manifested by the NRC's desire, and sometimes insistence, to participate in decisions that should be, indeed that must be, the responsibility of utility management or to measure utility performance on bases other than those required by the regulations (e.g., the definition for SALP categories 1, 2 and 3). The survey report contains many examples where NRC management and staff insert themselves in the licensee's management process. The damage in this approach is that, over time, it undermines the authority and responsibility of utility management and also tend~ to compromise the NRC's role as an independent safety regulator. We believe that a common theme of the concerns identified in the survey regarding the current regulatory environment is the failure by the NRC to appropriately recogn~ze and accept the complementary responsibilities of the regulator and individual licensees.

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk January 28, 1991 Page 4 We believe that strong and timely Conniss1on actiQn 1s necessary to ensure that the underlying causes of the problems expressed in the survey are identified so that effective corrective action to resolve those problems is undertaken. We are encouraged by the Commission's direction to the staff in the Staff Requirements Memorandum c*sRM*) on SECY-90-347 dated November 29, 1990. In that SRM and the accompanying vote sheets it 1s clear that the COIIUlission believes that additional action on these important issues is necessary. We agree, and we encourage the Commission to take advantage of this unique opportunity to address these fundamental, long-standing institutional and regulatory problems and we encourage the Comission to consider the use of outside assistance to evaluate and assess management effectiveness. Many in the industry have been faced with similar problems and have found benefit in connissioning independent analyses as well as conducting critical self-assessments to address these complex problems.

We request that the Connission consider our comments and not take action on the staff's recommendations until the more fundamental problems have been addressed. We are anxious to work with the NRC in a productive dialogue to address. the broader issues associated with the regulatory environment and its impact. We have learned much about self-assessment and management of nuclear facilities in the last ten years and are anxious to share our experience and knowledge. We would welcome that opportunity at the staff's and the Commission's earliest convenience -- thi~ important effort should not end with the closure of the conment period on SECY-90-347.

Sincerely,

~~~~Y1-Bljr/RWB: bjb Byrbn Lee, Jr. U Attachment cc: Chairman Kenneth M. Carr C011111issioner Kenneth C. Rogers Connissioner James R. Curtiss Contnissioner Forrest J. Remick James'M. Taylor, Executive Director for Operations

Attachment 1 REGULATORY IMPACT SURVEY Specific Conunents The purpose of the Regulatory Impact Survey was to derive feedback from the industry regarding NRC generic and site-specific activities because of concern that those activities "may be tending in a direction such that the desired safety effects may not be realized." (SECY-89-238, August 4, 1989).

That endeavor was consistent with the 1981 survey conducted by the NRC to obtain viewpoints on the safety impact of regulatory activities, documented in NUREG-0839, August 1981. Unfortunately, the feedback provided by these two separate analyses is remarkably similar, notwithstanding the significant period of time between these two efforts and the demonstrated improved performance by the industry over that time period. For example, NUREG-0839 contained the following observations, which are entirely consistent with the observations in draft NUREG-1395: "[a] basic concern of the licensees is the number and scope of requirements imposed by the NRC through its several organizational elements;* "NRC requirements, and pending requirements, are poorly integrated as to their overall effect on plant operation and utility resources;" "[c]hanging requirements provide[] a moving target which is wasteful of finite capital and manpower resources; "[t]he strongest colll11ents received on the NRC organization were that NRC presented the image of an uncontrolled organization;" "the lack of appreciation by NRC of the impact of requirements on their organizational effectiveness." The long-standing nature of these unresolved concerns is in itself a symptom of the overall problem.

The report of the President's Comnission on the Accident at Three Mile Island (the "Kemeny Report") detailed the Kemeny Commission's concern with a "preoccupation with regulations" which characterized the nuclear power safety program and its conclusion that a preoccupation with regulation, particularly once regulations become as voluminous and complex as the regulations then in place, can serve as a negative factor in nuclear safety. A similar concern was identified in the NRC's 1981 survey on the safety impact of regulatory activities, which was documented in NUREG-0839. Unfortunately, the tendency appears to continue to be to address any problem with the adoption of additional regulations or new programs. Broadly stated, the NRC needs to more effectively manage its resources, consistent with its statutory responsibilities, for the goals delineated in the Atomic Energy Act, as amended,, to be attained and for the industry to be able to effectively satisfy its own responsibilities to the public. The focus should be on the quality, not the quantity, of regulatory activities.

There have been widespread improvements in the safety of nuclear power plants and their operations over the last decade, and that conclusion is uncontroverted. With over a hundred plant-years of operational experience being accumulated annually, our experience and the predictability of system and equipment performance continues to grow. However, there are significant differences of opinion as to whether many of these improvements were, as suggested in SECY-90-347, a result of the increased NRC attention to

operational matters, or because of independent licensee and industry activities, which would have occurred in large measure without significant NRC involvement. The broad view of the industry feedback from both 1981 survey and the 1989 survey suggests it is probably a mixture of the two. What is missing is the necessary stability of the regulatory process wherein the NRC clearly communicates the basis for its regulatory actions and its expectations for licensee compliance, and establishes the management processes to effectively manage the agency's resources to that end.

A stable regulatory process, or a "reliablew process as that term is used in the Co11111ission's recently adopted "Principles of Good Regulation," is vital to the success of the industry's self-imposed obligation to achieve excellence in its nuclear operations, and thus to the future of nuclear power in our country. A stable process is one in which requirements are applied uniformly -- in which interpretations do not vary from plant to plant and region to region, and in which regulatory changes are carefully screened for

~ safety benefit. A stable regulatory process is flexible, sets priorities among issues and requirements, and allows licensees time and latitude to make necessary improvements. Perhaps most importantly, a stable process is interactive and requires a professional and open relationship between the regulator and the regulated early enough to avoid the polarization that has characterized relationships with the NRC in recent years.

The NRC and the nuclear utility industry fulfill different roles and have different responsibilities in pursuing a co11111on objective of assuring that the public health and safety is adequately protected.

Briefly stated, in both law and practice, the NRC is responsible for establishing a regulatory system that will ensure that adequate protection of public health and safety is not jeopardized by the construction and operation of conmercial nuclear power plants. That system of regulation, and requirements imposed upon licensees, is embodied in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations. The licensee is responsible for managing its resources and operating its facilities in conformance with those regulations. The NRC's responsibility as a regulator is to establish the parameters within which licensees must function and to establish an effective oversight capability to ensure compliance with those requirements, but the NRC must also establish the proper climate to allow licensees to meet these parameters and achieve even greater margins of safety and higher levels of performance.

The current Regulatory Impact Survey provides numerous examples that indicate that the NRC has become significantly involved in licensee management responsibilities. This increased involvement has led to fewer and fewer constraints on the regulatory process, allowing requirements to be imposed and actions required to be perfonned as a result of subjective opinions expressed during the thousands of interactions each licensee has annually with representatives of the NRC. We are concerned that such NRC involvement in licensee ma~agement responsibilities so dominates licensee resources that the licensees' ability to safely and effectively operate its plants may be impeded. This concern was one of the survey's principal themes.

2

Frequently, infonnal vehicles such as generic co11111unications, SALP findings, inspector conunents, etc. are used to direct licensee activities to, in effect, impose requirements -- thereby circumventing the formal rulemaking processes. For example, the perception and implication that generic c011111unications have the effective force of requirements (e.g., see SECY-90-347 Enclosure 1, page 4, 2nd paragraph) causes substantial commitments of licensee resources to be made, with significant implications on licensees with regard to their ability to.conduct activities of higher priority. Often, licensees acquiesce to such inappropriate requests and/or activities to avoid appearing unresponsive and out of concern for the NRC's negative reaction and potential retribution. A relationship such as this places licensees in a defensive role, which results in either acquiescence or the further development of the adversarial character of many relationships that exist today. Neither result serves the public interest well.

Inherent in the licensee's responsibility to operate its facilities in conformance with regulations, while at the same time conscientiously managing its resources, is the obligation to implement plant or procedure changes that are required for adequate protection for public health and safety and those that significantly benefit safety and, at the same time, are cost-effective ..

It is clearly in both the industry's and NRC's best interest, as well as public health and safety, when improvements are made that produce significant safety benefit relative to the cost incurred in implementation. However, it is the industry's experience that the NRC's assessment of the cost impact of changes being considered by the NRC frequently significantly understates the impact of a new requirement, and rarely acknowledges that the impacts vary widely among utilities. In many cases where the implications of generic co11111unications were being assessed, considerations of cost impact apparently were not factors of interest or held minimal significance in the NRC's decision-making process. In day-to-day interactions with the NRC staff, it often appears that not only does the NRC staff, at a working level, not recognize the licensee's responsibility to prudently manage its resources, but the NRC staff has also failed to recognize the potential adverse safety impact of resources being misapplied to issues of minimum safety benefit.

The lack of an effective prioritization process to which the agency and its personnel are co11111itted is a major reason why so many long-standing issues remain unresolved. A prioritization process is needed that evaluates an issue with respect to its overall safety benefit and ensures that the incremental safety benefit is still justifiable when the issue is considered in the context of all other outstanding issues. Many regulatory issues once determined to provide a small incremental safety benefit could be eliminated from concern if prioritized in an integrated manner based upon relative safety benefit. Attempting to address every issue as a priority so significantly dilutes resources, and management attention, that more important issues cannot get proper attention and brought to timely resolution.

Inappropriate NRC activities are infrequently challenged or brought to the attention of NRC senior management by individual utilities because doing so can prove to be counter-productive, particularly when the examples could be interpreted as criticism of the performance of individual NRC employees with whom there must be a continuing.association. Even though the NRC's Office of 3

Inspector General has statutory responsibilities in this area, NRC senior management needs to take the primary responsibility for establishing management mechanisms to ensure that its staff is properly managed. The diminution of NRC management control leads to an erosion of the regulatory process by pennitting inappropriate regulatory activities to take place to the detriment of the necessary professional relationship between licensees and the NRC.

Symptomatic of the need for improved management effectiveness is the significant effect that the rotation of key NRC personnel (e.g., a site resident inspector, branch chief) can have on programs and interpretation of regulatory requirements. This strongly denotes a lack of consistency of policy and program direction once established by NRC management.

There are many examples to indicate that direct NRC senior management involvement has provided the necessary direction to staff activities and catalyst for the effective resolution of problems. Such continued involvement would also provide feedback to management to enable evaluations to be made of confonnity to NRC policy and regulations and consistency in implementation by all NRC personnel. And a key precept should be establishing accountability for completing assigned tasks: the establishment by the NRC of a set of objectives by which it can measure its own perfonnance.

Managing the Cumulative Effect of the NRC's Generic Requirements and Connunications (SECY-90-347 Enclosure 1)

Generic Conmunications In SECY 90-347, the NRC identified Rconsideration" of the cumulative effect of the NRC's generic requirements and generic con111unications as a major area for improvement. Unfortunately, it appears that the root cause of the concerns first identified in SECY-90-205 has been readdressed from Rconsideration of" (in the body of the SECY) to RmanagingR the cumulative effect of the NRC's generic requirements and generic con111unications (the title of Enclosure 1 of SECY-90-347). The change in title of this topic is more than semantics, because the focus inappropriately shifts to managing the burden rather than questioning how the burden was created and if, in fact, it has been appropriately justified during the development and issuance of the generic requirements and connnunications.

The industry embodies the operating experience, detailed plant-specific knowledge, and design basis and analysis capabilities necessary to critically assess the merits and limitations of proposed regulatory initiatives.

Although the industry's perspectives and responsibilities are different from those of the NRC, the NRC and the nuclear industry share the common objective of assuring that the public health and safety is adequately protected. To develop and implement the tremendous variety of generic requirements and conununications without significant input from the industry is detrimental to both NRC and industry efforts. To change this situation requires direct con111unication between NRC staff senior management and the industry on generic issues, and clear con111unications to NRC technical staff of NRC senior 4

management's expectations. We believe that such discussions can and must take place, in full compliance with applicable law, if the NRC and the industry are to be able to carry out their respective responsibilities. Discussions with industry early in the generic communication development process rather than just prior to, or after, publication of such generic comnunications would result in a more focused analysis of the problem to be solved as well as a better detennination of effective solutions. In the past few years, the

~ industry and NRC staff working together have accomplished just that on a variety of issues (e.g. fraudulent materials, suspect pressure transmitters).

Such examples, however, tend to be only a fraction of the potential issues currently being addressed by NRC staff.

The discipline established in 10 C.F.R. § 50.109 for NRC rules and regulations is equally applicable as a management.tool for other activities in which the NRC undertakes. The management principle o{ ensuring that every action considered will result in a benefit that exceecls~its cost should be inculcated into NRC decision-making. Any safety benefit that may be derived from an NRC action should be evaluated, albeit not necessarily in the formal construct that 10 C.F.R. § 50.109 requires, to assure that the benefit is justifiable in terms of the cost.

Backfitt1ng and Cost/Benefit Analyses At the NRC Regional Workshops on Backfitting held in the Fall of 1990, NRC staff noted its intention to substantially revise NUREG/CR-3568, "A Handbook for Value-Impact Assessment.n SECY-90-347 states that this revision would include "(l) guidance on the consideration of cumulative effects of previous corrective actions during the development of new requirements, and (2) guidance on evaluating new generic regulatory initiatives with respect to the Co1T111ission's safety goals and objectives."

The industry supports this effort and believes that the NRC should use this opportunity to revise its cost/benefit evaluation methodology. Besides the two guidance issues noted above, there are other important issues that should be considered as part of that document's revision. In particular, we disagree with the current guidance contained in the NUREG/CR-3568 that recommends averted on-site costs be included as part of the NRC's cost/benefit analysis. Instead, the staff should restrict itself to weighing the~

dollar costs of implementing a plant change against the benefit to the public's health and safety. Hypothesized costs incurred or avoided by a utility as the result of a postulated transient or accident at its nuclear plant is an economic risk factor of import to utility management, but it is not a proper basis for regulatory decision-making.

In a Staff Requirements Memorandum dated June 15, 1990, the Commission stated that it "supports the use of averted on-site costs as an offset against other licensee costs (and not as a benefit) in cost/benefit analyses." We believe that such a use of Averted On-Site Costs ("AOSC") is not appropriate policy and is technically incorrect. Should the Co1T111ission maintain AOSC as a key attribute for inclusion in a cost/benefit assessment, then its treatment when calculating the cost/benefit ratio for a particular plant improvement should be revised. Specifically, pennitting the co-mingling of real costs 5

with AOSC may result in net costs being artificially small and therefore make justification easy for plant changes that provide little real incremental benefit in safety at that facility.

EPRI/NSAC Report NSAC-143 demonstrates that the NRC's current practices and techniques for analyzing nuclear safety enhancements are not justifiable (e.g., not using the present-value of health costs, using an internally inconsistent economic methodology for use in making safety enhancement decisions). If the industry and NRC are to reach apprgpriate decisions on nuclear safety enhancements, we must have value-impact-techniques that are sound.

• The recently ,issued NUREG-1409, "Backfitting Guidelines," provides guidance to NRC staff with respect to conducting cost/benefit analyses that we do not believe is appropriate. For exa111ple, Section 3.4 discusses the role of qualitative judgment in conducting a backfit analysis. Although we understand the desire to avoid slavish adherence to numerical values that may be subject to some uncertainty, we are concerned that the disciplined process appropriate for such an analysis may be undercut by the broad use of subjective judgment in the implementation of that practice. If qualitative judgement is allowed to remove the quantification technique as the basis for decision-making, the purpose of 10 C.F.R. § 50.109 will not be achieved.

It is in the mutual interest of the industry and the staff to reach agreement on cost/benefit economic methodologies that are internally consistent and that properly represent the nuclear safety enhancement situations that both the NRC and licensees must evaluate. The potentially large number of backfit issues that may arise as the staff reviews licensee Individual Plant Examination submittals suggests that resolution of the proper application of 10 C.F.R. § 50.109 should be a high priority now. We strongly recommend that these documents be released for public connnent prior to approval of proposed revisions.

Requlatorv Conformance with Safety Goals In June 1990, the CoDJDission approved 13 actions relating to the Safety Goal Policy Statement of 1986 and identified how several of these approved actions will contribute to better management of the development and implementati-0n of new requirements. The C0111Rission also requested that staff propose a plan on how to perfonn an assessment of whether the existing body of regulations and regulatory practices being imposed on licensees results in plants operating in an adequately safe manner consistent with the Connnission's Safety Goal Policy Statement of 1986. Additionally, using this same framework of safety goals and subsidiary objectives, staff would identify any existing regulations or regulatory practices that are not necessary to ensure adequate safety. In this manner, the body of regulations and regulatory practices imposed by the NRC on licensees would be organized in an integrated and coherent framework. This would allow a perspective to be provided of how a given regulation or regulatory practice affects the overall safety of a plant and enable an evaluation to be made of whether a contemplated change passes the appropriate threshold.

6

We believe that the Commission's direction to the staff to establish a formal mechanism to ensure that future regulatory initiatives are evaluated for conformity with the Conmission's safety goals is fully consistent with the Kemeny Commission reconnendations and the industry's coornents in both the 1981 and 1989 NRC regulatory impact surveys. We also agree with the ACRS recorrmendation that new regulations and/or regulatory practices be considered only in those areas where inadequacies are identified. Whatever mechanism is developed, if cons.istent with the precepts identified above, would significantly improve the regulatory environment as the Kemeny Conunission had advocated.

The staff has stated its intent to publish its revised guidance for public convnent prior to seeking Co11111ission approval. We recommend that it would be more efficient and effective for NRC staff and industry representatives, in a public forum, to work cooperatively to promptly address those areas that need clarification, change, deletion or addition, prior to publication for public conunent, so that the subsequent solicitation of comments can be more meaningfully focused.

Systematic Assessment of Licensee Perfonnance Program The Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance ("SALP") process has a significant impact on licensee activities and is a major cause of the problems identified in the Regulatory Impact Survey. The NRC staff's assessment of industry feedback, as contained in draft NUREG-1395, identified problems in the SALP process as one of the two principle themes emerging from all of the licensees' conunents. Further, the "Survey of The NRC Staff Insights On Regulatory Impact," SECY-90-250, confinned the findings of draft NUREG-1395, stating that " ... licensees are extremely sensitive to NRC activities and sometimes acquiesce to avoid confrontation that could create the perception that they are unresponsive. This makes licensees vulnerable to potential abuses of regulatory authority.*

We remain concerned that the SALP process is being decoupled from the Regulatory Impact Survey without the root causes of the problems described by both the industry and the staff having been properly identified and resolved.

Further, as the industry has commented in a variety of forums, the practice of assigning numerical performance ratings as part of the SALP process, with its consequent financial and public perception results, should be reevaluated because of the potential misuse of that data and the diversion of attention from the substantive analysis incorporated in the SALP assessment to the detriment of the program. We agree with the Commission that the details in the SALP reports give a more important, and definite, message than the numerical scores, and for that reason we believe that the ratings should be abolished because they serve no beneficial regulatory purpose.

Integrating and Prioritizing Programs In discussing programs to integrate regulatory requirements on a plant specific basis, the staff observed that industry did not express significant interest in the Integrated Safety Assessment Program (HJSAP"), in part because 7

of a lack of plant-specific probabilistic risk assessments c*PRAs*) necessary for implementation of an ISAP at individual plants. The industry recognizes that PRAs continue to be an evolving technology and, as Individual Plant Examinations c*IPEs") are showing, development of Level 1/2 PRAs required to sup po.rt ISAP are resource intensive and ti me consUJDi.ng. Those ut i1 it i es with experience in maintaining a PRA have experienced the need to comit substantial resources to that task on an on-going basis. Therefore, even though each plant will conduct its own IPE does not necessarily mean that all licensees will be willing or able to implement an ISAP program. We do not believe the benefits to licensees of implementing an ISAP have been identified that warrant the significant expenditures of time and resources that such a program would require.

Integrated Regulatory Requirements Implementation-Scheduie While we agree that there is a need to assess and manage the cumulative effect of generic requirements and generic coR111unications, we do not believe that the proposed Integrated Regulatory Requirements Implementation Schedule

("IRRIS*) will achieve the desired result. The'priorit1zation and scheduling of regulatory requirements well in advance of an outage period is already a necessity. Lead times for finalizing engineering and for material procurement, the conduct of applicable safety evaluations, and related activities required to develop a complete change package dictate that utilities generally freeze their outage plans months in advance of the scheduled outage, although rarely are those plans able to be developed with any finality one year in advance of an outage as IRRIS appears to contemplate.

The need to integrate a ninety-day period for staff review into the licensee's management process will further complicate the process, and the staff's comment that the outage activities would be frozen under IRRIS will not provide the flexibility needed by a licensee to respond to changing circumstances .

. Further, and perhaps indicative of the much larger concern of the industry with the current regulatory environment, the list of requirements that IRRIS would integrate will not include actions "imposed to meet adequate protection standards or to attain compliance with existing regulations."

Thus, as described, IRRIS would integrate only those actions that are justified under 10 C.F.R. § 50.109 because they will substantially increase overall protection to public health and safety at a cost that can be justified to produce that benefit. This is generally a very small subset of the NRC imposed requirements that licensees must meet and integrate into their daily operation. Further, even those requirements would not be prioritized on the basis of the NRC's cost/benefit evaluations but rather on some subjective determination of relative safety implication, with schedular effects and costs as "secondary considerations." If this is not the intent of IRRIS, the final explanation of IRRIS should contain an explicit description of the actions that IRRIS will include. Further, as appropriately noted in the Commission's Staff Requirements Memorandum dated November 29, 1990, generic correspondence can not impose requirements. Thus, because IRRIS is stated to be limited to regulatory requirements, it is not clear how licensee-initiated changes to respond to an issue identified in a generic communication will enter into the prioritization process because such actions do not fall within the 10 C.F.R.

8

§ 50.109 purview. The NRC's fundamental responsibility for establishing safety-related requirements includes a concomitant responsibility to establish the necessary priority for implementation of those requirements, yet it appears that IRRIS will not play any role in that process.

As stated previously, we recommend that the NRC not proceed to implement IRRIS because its narrow focus does not justify the need for additional NRC staff and licensee resources necessary to implement the program. However, if the NRC decides to proceed with the development of IRRIS, we suggest that the development of guidelines should be approached ca~~i04§!¥ through the pilot program process. One criterion that must be evaluated as part of the pilot program is whether safety enhancements are achieved iri an appropriate priority, with due consideration to licensee resource"~rid schedular impacts.

An evaluation must also be made of the generic applicability of the pilot program results to different plants with significantly different design features and licensing bases.

Upon completion of the pilot program, an evaluation should be conducted of the effect that the implementation of IRRIS will have upon those plants currently participating in the Integrated Living Schedule ("ILS") and the Integrated Safety Assessment Program ("ISAP") processes, as well as the cost versus benefit equation of the adoption of a formal IRRIS program. The most effective method to integrate requirements and allocate resources must be chosen and may well need to be different for different licensees. In fact, it may be that no formal program like IRRIS is necessary at all.

Scheduling and Control of Inspections, Especially Team Inspections (SECY-90-347 Enclosure 2)

The NRC identified two major themes in SECY 90-347 relating to NRC scheduling and control of inspections: the need for further development of staff policy regarding its inspection program and the implementation of that program; and the need for interaction between staff and licensees in coordinating NRC inspection activities with licensee and third-party activities. These are very important endeavors because the many NRC staff activities affecting operations generally dominate licensee resources more than those associated with physical modifications to the plant. The establishment by the NRC of guidelines to balance its regulatory oversight responsibilities with the licensee's operational requirements would be appropriate. Similarly, NRC site activities should be evaluated by the NRC in terms of relative importance so that licensees could better schedule the allocation of their resources in support of the higher priority NRC activities with those activities they believe are important.

We agree that the NRC should periodically evaluate the allocation of its inspection resources based on plant performance, and that activity should lead to the development of an integrated unit-specific inspection plan. We also agree with the staff's recommendation that it should substantiate the need for major team inspections to be conducted, announce such inspections in advance, and plan no more inspections at each plant than can be handled without interfering with the safe operation of the plant and effective allocation of 9

plant staff attention. Promulgation by the NRC of a schedule of planned inspections will not only significantly assist a licensee in scheduling the allocation of internal resources necessary to acc0111nOdate those inspections, but will assist in the coordination of licensee activities, many of which complement NRC regulatory activities.

As described in Enclosure 2 of SECY-90-347, the staff creates unit-specific inspection plans following each SALP review and adjusts its plans each quarter during the subsequent SALP cycle. However, it is not clear that there is any correlation between NRC inspection activity and SALP evaluations; it does not appear that the SALP process is being used effectively by the NRC to allocate its inspection resources.

Furthennore, the NRC policy of what constitutes a major team inspection, as well as the nature and scope of each of those types of activities, should be clearly delineated. Discrepancies regarding the definition of a team inspection may prove to be counterproductive to the actions being taken to effect improvement. For example, one utility has recently received a site visit by a five-member group that included an entrance and an exit meeting.

This utility was told by NRC staff on three separate occasions that the group visit was, in fact, not a "team" inspection.

Proper delineation of the NRC definition would assist the licensees in effectively supporting those activities. Because the conduct of these activities has such a dramatic effect on licensee activities, particularly on smaller utilities, it would be appropriate for the NRC staff to solicit comment on its proposed policy and implementation program. The NRC's commitment to periodically publish site activity schedules that address NRC planned major team inspections, and other significant NRC site activities, will significantly aid licensees in supporting resource-significant NRC site activities according to their priorities and yet maintain the licensee management involvement the NRC has been indicating is an important ingredient in ensuring safe plant operations. SECY-90-205 clearly demonstrates the diversion of plant management attention from their primary responsibilities that is associated with supporting external inspection activities.

Although the industry has little basis upon which to evaluate the potential benefits of the NRC's Master Inspection Planning System {"MIPSn),

and its supplementary Inspection Follow-up System {"IFS"), the stated purposes of the systems would seem consistent with the NRC's goals, and the industry's objectives, in ensuring that NRC inspection activities do not adversely impact plant operations and are appropriately coordinated with licensee activities to achieve that end.

Training, Preparation and Management of NRC Staff (SECY-90-347 Enclosure 3)

We believe that the staff's reco111Tiendations regarding the training, preparation and management of NRC staff are timely, useful and appropriate.

From the industry perspective, a major beneficial result of the NRC's enhanced training of NRC personnel should be improved consistency among inspection team 10

. leaders and NRC staff. The lack of consistency in inspection activities is a recurring theme identified in the comnents from the industry in the Regulatory Impact Survey. The training envisioned in this rec0111110ndation also could be an effective method for NRC senior management to.communicate its expectations to staff. Mechanisms should be created to provid~ feedback to enable evaluations to be made of how well the staff and team leaders are meeting those expectations. This would aid in achieving the desired consistency in NRC inspection activities.

The direct involvement of NRC senior management, both regional and headquarters, in the development and implementation of the training and evaluation of the perfonnance of NRC inspectors is critical to the development of an effective inspection program. That involvement is important in the preparation of training course materials, but critical in the implementation of the NRC's inspection responsibilities under the.Atom~c Energy Act and in its communication of the NRC's broader responsibilities.and expectattons of professional conduct on the part of its inspectors~, And that process should not be limited to the orientation and training of new employees but should become part of the NRC's ongoing personnel professional development activities. Similarly, the NRC should evaluate the need for subject matter training (including NRC policy implementation) as well as management skill development for NRC managers and supervisors.

The NRC should also consider the use of some fonn of management self-assessment to identify areas requiring increased management involvement. The result, as it has been shown through industry self-assessment evaluations, will be the identification of additional opportunities to evaluate the perfonnance of the NRC staff in meeting management expectations. Individual licensees have also obtained significant benefits from having an independent management/organizational analysis conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of the organization in meeting its assigned responsibilities. The NRC should give serious consideration to commissioning this type of activity because of the value that an independent analysis can provide.

With respect to backfitting training, we strongly support the NRC's initiative to conduct the series of backfitting workshops that it held in 1990 and its c011111itment to provide further training for NRC personnel on the application of the backfitting guidelines. A proper understanding of the application of 10 C.F.R. § 50.109 is an objective not yet realized and the NRC's continued attention to that matter in its training programs would be beneficial. Similarly, as noted in the Staff Requirements Memorandum dated November 29, 1990, the NRC should ensure that its inspectors, and other NRC personnel, understand that generic corrmunications do not have legal authority to impose requirements on licensees other than requiring licensees to advise the NRC as to ~hat actions the licensee intends to take with respect to the subject of that generic communication. This is another area where direct NRC management involvement is appropriate to ensure that the regulatory system functions correctly.

Further, effective closure of numerous issues facing the NRC and the industry has been hampered by the lack of direct NRC management involvement in the process. For example, the industry has expended thousands of man-hours 11

and has spent approximately $2011illion dollars in voluntary, proactive efforts to achieve improvements in technical specifications, yet that effort has still not achieved closure, and a major factor has been the lack of NRC senior management involvement. S.imilarly, the industry's efforts to effectively resolve issues such as diesel generator reliability have not been successful. Further, the major issues identified by the utilities through NUREG-1395 (e.g., the increase in issuance and misuse of generic communications; the lack of NRC prioritization of NRC requirements; inconsistencies between regions; subjective imposition of requirements by inspectors) could have been averted, or at least corrected, by senior management oversight in these areas.

In sum, we agree that enhanced training is a major contributor to the co11111unicat1on of management expectations and goals. However, training alone ensures neither continued performance nor consistency of performance. Follow-up and 1110nitoring by senior management is a necessary component of this process. An evaluation of the benefits of participation of NRC senior management in activities such as entrance/exit meetings, operator requalification examinations, and in enforcement conferences should be conducted because of the opportunities those activities could provide for NRC senior management to gain valuable insight into how NRC policy is being implemented.

It has been proven that when senior NRC management becomes involved, progress is made, and the process works. If we are both to achieve our desired, and complementary goals, senior management involvement is necessary from both the industry !rut the NRC.

12

OOCKET NUMBER '.a .,

PROPOSED RULE PR~ -(-1,{)- II))

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Omaha Public Power District 444 South 16th Street Mall '91 JAN 28 P4 :18 Omaha, Nebraska 68102-2247 402/636-2000 January 25 , 1991 LIC-91 -0046 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secr etary of the Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn : Docketing and Service Branch Washington, DC 20555 Reference : Docket 50 - 285

Dear Mr. Chilk:

Subj ect: Regulatory Impact Survey Report (SECY 90-347)

Omaha Public Power District has obtained and reviewed SECY 90-347 "Regulatory Impact Survey Report" dated October 9, 1990. Public comments on this document were requested in the December 27, 1990 Federal Register (55 FR 53220). Omaha Public Power District endorses comments submitted by the Nuclear Management and Resources Council, Inc. (NUMARC).

Sincerely,

,,Iv. ~ ~

W. G. Gates Divi s ion Manager Nuclear Operations WGG/pjc 45-5124 Employment with Equal Opportunity Male/Female FEBO 4 1991 ,

Acknowledged by card ...,..,n,sue,si!HIHiiHiHIWII

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DOCKETING & SERVICE SECTION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION Doci.1msnt Statistics Postmci.rx Data __,. ~....-~_,_f_?_t _ _ __

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• YANKEE A TOMJC ELECTRIC COMPA ,uv- - - Telephone (508) 779-6711 (s5 FR.s 3 2-2-0 TWX : 100: :~;~~61917/-\

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580 Main Street, Bolton, Massachusetts 01740-1398

• 91 JAN 2 8 P5 :13 January 25, 1991 FYC 91-1 SPS 91-11 Secretary of the Commission U. s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington , D.C. 205555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch

Subject:

SECY 90-347 "Regulatory Impact survey Report" (SSCFR53220)

Dear Sir:

Yankee Atomic Electric Company (Yankee) appreciates the opportunity to comment on the NRC Staff's evaluation of the Reg ulatory Impact Survey Report. Yankee owns and operates a nuclear power plant in Rowe, Massachusetts. our Nuclear Services Division also provides services to other nuclear power plants in the Northeast, including Vermont Yankee, Maine Yankee, and Seabrook.

The Nuclear Management and Resources Council (NUMARC) is also submitting comments on this SECY paper. Yankee is a member of NUMARC and fully endorses their comments.

SECY 90-347 was formulated as a response to NUREG 1395 "Industry Perception of the Impact of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission on Nuclear Power Plant Activities". The message of that report and the areas demanding attention were aptly described in a letter to the Commissioners from Mr. Lawrence E. Minnick, dated July 13, 1990. As a current member of the ACRS, Mr. Minnick's summary, "Impact of Regulatory Failure to Recognize the Law of Diminishing Returns" constitutes a serious warning that the regu latory process is becoming excessive and requires careful management attention. We hope that his valuable insights are incorporated into the final plans for improvements in regulation.

We believe that the proposed corrective actions discussed in SECY 90-347 would be made more effective by emphasis on the steps necessary to better manage the development of new regulatory requirements. Under the heading of Generic Issues Management, the SECY paper takes credit for "two systematic communication avenues" FEBO 4 1991

,\cknowledged by card ..................................

U.S NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DOCKETING & SERVICE SECTION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION Document Statistics Postmark Daie t/ .;).q /1 t Copies Reoeived ____l _ _ _ _ __

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SECY 90-347 PAGE 2 for licensees to provide input regarding the safety importance of issues. One "avenue" credited is the semi-annual publication of NUREG-0933, "Prioritization of Generic Issues". To the best of our knowledge, the NRC does not formally solicit comments on the amendments to this document. However, even if such comments were to be solicited, we are concerned that the prioritization method described in this report is not sufficient to effectively incorporate comments that would be provided. We believe that the value/impact analyses presently produced are seldom persuasive and that the prioritization process appears to be almost completely subjective. This is discussed further below.

The other "communications avenue" for industry input regarding safety importance cited in the SECY paper is the bi-weekly list of titles of generic NRC correspondence under development. We are at a loss to understand how the publication of this list of possible letter titles affords a meaningful opportunity to comment on the safety importance of issues. If anything, citing the publication of this list as one of the important tools in assessing and communicating the safety importance of individual issues under-scores the inadequacies of the present process.

SECY 90-34 7 notes that the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) is currently revising NUREG/BR-0058, Revision 1, "Regulatory Analysis Guidelines", and NUREG/CR-3568, "A Handbook for Value-Impact Assessment". It is not clear from the wording of the paper whether drafts of both documents or only NUREG/BR-0058 will be offered for public comment. We urge that both documents be offered for comment. We strongly urge that the staff give serious and careful consideration to the analyses and arguments provided in EPRI /NSAC report NSAC-143 when revamping the methodology for the cost/benefit analyses of nuclear safety enhancements.

We also believe the Commission should re-evaluate the position on the use of averted on-site costs as a negative cost in cost/benefit analyses. The question of whether averted on-site costs (AOC) should be considered in the cost/benefit equation at all is a major issue. Since they are entirely within the economic purview of the util i ty and do not bear on the protection of the health and safety of the public, we feel strongly they should not.

There are several ways in which inclusion of this cost for regu latory decisions can be shown to be improper in this regard.

This category of costs has been the pivotal factor in analyses of several critical and expensive backfits which are highly questionable (eg. BWR vents and A-45 Decay Heat Removal).

SECY 90-347 PAGE 3 We agree that the NRC should develop a method to replace the old one from NUREG 0933 which was developed in 1983. It should more quickly identify and dispose of issues not having the potential to significantly improve the safety of nuclear facilities. The new method should rely much more on objective and quantitative decisional criteria for both prioritization and closure. With respect to NRC closure of issues, we believe that the most effective way to achieve closure on important issues in a reasonable time would be to link responsibility for closure of given issues directly to specific senior staff members of the NRC and make issue conclusion a major element in their formal performance appraisals.

Improving the existing guidance for regulatory analyses clearly will be a positive step. However, we believe that it is equally important that the staff be accountable to implement the Commission's guidance in a consistent and highly responsible manner. We believe that too many of the regulatory/backfit analyses prepared by the staff rely on primarily subjective, poorly articulated and supported arguments. We would cite the analysis supporting the NRC's Proposed Rule on the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) as one of the recent, more glaring examples of this problem.

We endorse the general outline of the program described in the SECY paper particularly the initiative to improve the training, preparation, and management of the NRC. It is not clear how the NRC proposes to measure the effectiveness of this training ini t iative. We believe that one of the most effective means of measuring the success of training efforts is to include formal testing and certification of program participants. The general tenor of the SECY paper implies a strong emphasis on the improvement of the training of regional/inspection personnel. We bel i eve that there is a commensurate need to improve the training of h eadquarters personnel. Finally, we strongly urge that any staff member who has managerial responsibilities be afforded special training in management skills and practices.

Very truly yours, tl/;1),~

Donald W. Edwards Director, Industry Affairs DWE/cmd

DOCKET NUMBER PR/Ut sc. ( qo -I~

Alabama Power Company 40 Inverness Center Parkway Post Office Box 1295 Birmingham , Alabama 35201 PROPOSED RULE

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Telephone 205 868-5581 W. G. Hairston , Ill Senior Vice President Nuclear Operations Alabama Power A

the southern electric system January 28, 19~1 Docket Nos. 50-348 50-364 JAN 2 R 199 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk [)()CKE111ik,l A Secretary of the Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 ATTN: Docketing and Service Branch Comments on SECY 90-347 "Regulatory Impact Survey Report" (55 Federal Register 53220 of December 27. 1990)

Dear Mr. Chilk:

Alabama Power Company has reviewed SECY 90-347, "Regulatory Report," dated October 9, 1990 whose notice of availability for public comment was published in the Federal Register on 1990. In accordance with the request for comments, Alabama Impact Survey and request December 27, Power Company is in total agreement with the NUMARC comments which are to be provided to the NRC.

Should you have any questions, please advise.

Respectfully submitted, w..2 . ~ ~

W. G. Hai rs ton, I II WGH, I II/ JMG I,

I cc : Mr. S. D. Ebneter

• I Mr. S. T. Hoffman Mr. G. F. Maxwell

• I IEB o4 1991 "

Acknowledged by card ................................

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Georgia Power Company 333 Piedmont Avenue DOCKET NUMBER Atlanta, Georgia 30308 Telephone 404 526-3195 PROPOSED RULE PR /4 IS(!,.

Mailing Address:

(!55 ,CR_ 5 3?"2-0) 40 Inverness Center Parkway Post Office Box 1295 Birmingham, Alabama 35201 Telephone 205 868-5581 the soutl1ern electnc system W. G. Hairston , Ill Senior Vice President Nuclear Operations January 28, 1991 Docket Nos. 50-321 50-424 -1450 50-366 50-425 -02456 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 ATTN: Docketing and Service Branch Comments on SECY 90-347 "Regulatory Impact Survey Report" (55 Federal Register 53220 of December 27, 1990)

Dear Mr. Chilk:

Georgia Power Company has reviewed SECY 90-347, "Regulatory Impact Survey Report," dated October 9, 1990 whose notice of availability and request for public comment was published in the Federal Register on December 27, 1990. In accordance with the request for comments, Georgia Power Company is in total agreement with the NUMARC comments which are to be provided to

-the NRC.

Should you have any questions, please advise.

Respectfully submitted, t,J,j,. /ek~"7!L W. G. Hairston, III WGH, I II/ JMG

• FEB o4 1991 Acknowledged by card ..................................

v .S. NuGL\:AH REGULATORY COMMISSJO DOCKETING & SERVICE SECTION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSJON Document Statistics p:td Po:;tmark Date 1@of'n ( i/rzajt,,l Copies Received_ _,,/_ _ _ _ __

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• Mr. Samuel J . Chilk Page 2 cc: Georgia Power Company Mr. J. T. Beckham, Jr., Vice President - Nuclear, Plant Hatch Mr. C. K. McCoy, Vice President - Nuclear, Plant Vogtle Mr. W. B. Shipman, General Manager - Plant Vogtle Mr. H. L. Sumner, Jr., General Manager - Plant Hatch NORMS U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC Mr. K. N. Jabbour, Licensing Project Manager - Hatch Mr. D. S. Hood, Licensing Project Manager - Vogtle U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II Mr . S. 0. Ebneter, Regional Administrator Mr. L. D. Wert, Senior Resident Inspector - Hatch Mr. B. R. Bonser , Senior Resident Inspector - Vogtle

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Operations USNHC Suite 1500 1100 Circle 75 Parkway Atlanta , Georg ia 30339-3cf~ JAN 28 P3 :00 Telephone 404 953-3600 Telefax 404 953-7549 December 11, 1990 The Honorable Kenneth M. Carr Chairman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Chairman Carr:

As you are aware, there is a long-standing concern over the potentially adverse im-pact of this nation's regulatory process, particularly the cumulative impact on utility management's responsibilities and prerogatives related to nuclear safety. This concern has been raised in various reports in the past, including:

• Report of the President's Commission on The Accident at Three Mile Island (Kemeny Commission Report), October 1979

• Three Mile Island - A Report to the Commissioners and to the Public (Rogovin Report), January 1980

• A Survey by Senior NRC Management to Obtain Viewpoints on the Safety Impact of Regulatory Activities from Representative Utilities Operating and Constructing Nuclear Power Plants, August 1981

• Leadership in Achieving Operational Excellence, The Challenge for all Nuclear Utilities (Sillin Report), August 1986 Similar concerns were expressed in ACRS letters on coherence in the regulatory process and reevaluation of the SALP program (dated November 24, 1989; December 21, 1989; and September 12, 1990).

Acknowledged by cardf.~,-B.....olUAl4~ lL\IWMl1M1

December 11, 1990 Page 2 The regulatory impact surveys conducted by the NRC in 1989 and 1990 focus on this same theme. These surveys include the following:

• Industry Perceptions of the Impact of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission on Nuclear Power Plant Activities (NUREG-1395 - Draft Report, March 1990)

• Results of Industry Survey on Licensee Management Involvement in In-spections and Audits (SECY-90-205, June 7, 1990)

• Survey of the NRC Staff Insights on Regulatory Impact (SECY-90-250, July 16, 1990)

Most recently NUMARC and industry executives described these same types of concerns in their October 26, 1990 meeting with the Commissioners.

The central problem discussed in these documen-ts and the NUMARC briefing is consistent with the information INPO is receiving from our interactions with utilities and at the nuclear plants. We conclude, after extensive observation, that a key part of the solution resides in improved management controls, monitoring and follow up by senior NRC man-agement.

The Commission and senior NRC staff management are to be commended for the recent actions taken to further explore this concern. Our purpose in this letter is to offer

, additional input based on our experience in the hope that this long-standing concern can be successfully addressed.

A principal theme of the regulatory impact survey of utility management, as reported in draft NUREG-1395, was as follows:

"NRC so dominates licensee resources through its existing and changing formal and informal requirements that licensees believe that their plants, though not unsafe, would be easier to operate, have better reliability, and may even achieve a higher degree of safety, if they were freer to manage their own resources."

December 11, 1990 Page 3 SECY-90-250 dated July 16, 1990, which reported the results of a survey of NRC staff, stated the underlying observation is as follows:

"Licensees are extremely sensitive to NRC activities and sometimes acquiesce to avoid confrontations that could create the perception that they are unresponsive.

To this extent, licensees are vulnerable to potential abuses of regulatory authority."

Both surveys descnbe regulatory practices that, while well intentioned, are frequently coun-terproductive. Our experience with NRC senior staff management indicates that they do not condone such practices when they are aware of them. However, the fact that they have continued to recur over the last ten years shows how ingrained these practices are and sug-gests a fundamental need for mechanisms whereby NRC senior management can surface and_resolve such issues in a more vigorous and ~ely manner.

In a meeting with the Commission on October 15, 1990, the NRC staff identified three specific areas for improvement: consideration of the cumulative effect of NRC generic requirements, scheduling of inspections, and training of inspectors. While address-ing these specific areas would correct some of the symptoms, we believe it is unlikely that they will correct the basic underlying problem.

For example, the report of the regulatory impact survey of licensees (NUREG-1395) stated:

"Llcensees commented that NRC inspectors impose many unauthorized backfits by setting successively higher standards of performance."

and further:

"1be licensees consider informal guidance such as .... inspector and reviewer comments, to be nearly as binding as formal requirements since they do not want to appear unresponsive to NRC initiatives. [Emphasis added.]"

It is not clear how improvements in the three specific areas recommended by the staff would resolve the above issues. Our experience with our own evaluators is that manage-ment monitoring and follow-up to ensure field personnel explicitly implement J!!Bnage-ment's expectations are the most important means of addressing such problems. We have also found that additional training of field personnel, such as proposed by the NRC staff,

December 11, 1990 Page4 does not by itself result in the desired level of performance and consistency. Training ini-tially conveys management expectations, an important and necessary step, but does not provide timely identification of problems and proper accountability. Relying on feedback from utilities, as suggested by some NRC staff members, is not sufficiently timely and tends to encourage an adversarial relationship that is detrimental to professional interactions at the working level. Furthermore, experience clearly shows that utilities are unwilling to rou-tinely provide such feedback in the current environment. This approach, when it is used, also consumes an inordinate amount of nuclear utility line management time. Finally, reliance on this method (feedback from utilities) is seen by many as an abrogation of responsibility by NRC management.

The ACRS expressed similar concerns in their November 24, 1989 lctter stating that "the NRC seems to suffer increasingly from a lack of coherence in the formulation and im-plementation of its regulatory strategy." In their December 21, 1989 letter, the ACRS rec-ommended that you should make a clear statement of the purpose of SALP ratings, insist that your staff implement that purpose and no other, insist that the staff not use the ratings as weapons to enforce obedience to idiosyncratic policies that are not yours, greatly dilute the Regional autarchy in the process, and institute a workable set of checks and balances."

Other recent examples of the type problems resulting from the underlying theme are in the area of NRC licensed operator requalification examinations. This is an area where NRC senior management has established a reasonable program, however many problems are being experienced in the program implementation. In a number of situations, individ-ual examiners have gone beyond the NRC guidance in conducting requalification examina-tions by requiring utility training management to add individual simulator critical tasks.

Other examples have been provided to the NRC staff by utility management and NUMARC. A worrisome trend resulting from the NRC licensed operator requalification examinations is that a number of utilities are changing the training of operators to reflect the specific requests of NRC examiners rather than focusing on training and testing that maximize training effectiveness and, consequently, safe plant operations. Training should be driven by line management and not by the need to pass specific examinations.

Over the last several years, nuclear plant operations have improved in all categories.

Perhaps most importantly, the number of significant events has been reduced by about 67 percent over the last five years, as indicated by the NRC's own performance indicators. In addition, the severity of recent events is much Jess than in the past. Performancs indicators, both NRC's and the industry's, show significant overall improvement over the last ten years.

This improved performance is consistent with the improved quality of operator training, particularly the increased and more effective use of simulators. Indeed, it would not have been possible to achieve these improvements if there had not been a significant improve-ment in licensed operator performance.

December 11, 1990 Page 5 When viewed in this context, recent failure rates as high as 14 percent on operator requalification examinations stand out as an anomaly. The fact that one operator in seven is failing his requalification examination (or is part of a crew that fails) puts tremendous stress on operators and degrades efforts by the industry to improve operator professional-ism. No other professionals, to our knowledge, have recurring examinations that threaten their livelihood to such an extent. For example, based on contacts with airline industry personnel, the failure rate of professional airline pilots on their proficiency (requalification) examinations is only a very small fraction of the current failure rate for nuclear plant licensed operators. You can understand the impact on the nation's air transport system if over ten percent of all pilots were failing their proficiency examination. Likewise, we can expect problems when our professional nuclear operators are faced with such a high failure rate. Notwithstanding all the regulatory and industry attention to this matter, something fundamental is wrong with the examination process or its implementation when the re-qualification exam failure rate of licensed nuclear plant operators, at today's level of plant performance, approaches ten percent. Again, improving the three areas proposed by the NRC staff would not correct this situation and does not *address the inconsistency between overall operator performance and their requalification exam failure rates.

Another aspect of the regulatory impact surveys of particular concern is the numeri-cal SALP scores in individual performance areas. We support the position that you per-sonally took during the Commission discussions to eliminate SALP scores. INPO does not provide our utility members with assessments of individual technical areas such as chem-istry or maintenance, because we are concerned that a utility may focus inappropriate attention on a single area. For example, a licensee might focus excessive management attention or resources to raise security from a SALP 2 to a 1 and, at the same time, not be able to devote sufficient attention to human performance problems that are less visible and more subtle but more directly related to nuclear safety. We note that SALP reports de-scn'be in detail the plant's previous performance over the SALP period. The SALP appraisal could, as it did in the original SALP reports, emphasize utility corrective actions and the intensity of NRC follow-up needed. In this case, a numerical score would not be needed. The utilities' focus would then tend to be on action rather than numbers.

Further, it may ~ell be that the problem we are discussing is the principle root cause of the excessively adversarial relationship that often exists between the NRC and the utili-ties it regulates. We have stated on many occasions, that from INPO's perspective, a strong, credible, well managed NRC is essential to the health of commercial nuclear power.

However, we do not believe that a generally adversarial relationship is necessary. In our interactions with senior NRC managers, their intent, their views, and their own personal actions tend to support a professional (and less adversarial) relationship with the utilities.

However, these interactions and views are not consistently extended throughout the agency

December 11, 1990 Page6 to the routine interfaces with the utilities. It appears to us that here again the problem re-lates to the need for additional management controls, monitoring and feedback by senior management in NRC (as well as in many utilities as related to their own regulatory interac-tions).

In summary, the results of the regulatory impact surveys provide the Commission a unique opportunity to address some fundamental long-standing institutional and regulatory problems. While the NRC staff recommends processes and training of people, our experi-ence is that these, while important, are not the management actions needed to resolve the most important problems. A key part of the solution, in our view, lies in improved man-agement controls that anticipate rather than (only) react to problems. Likewise, the recent changes in the definition of the SALP categories do not relieve the pressure tha~ individual regulators are able to impose on licensees through numerical SALP scores. In this regard, we would urge the Commission to reopen the question of numerical SALP scores. H SALP scores for individual areas are not eliminated, then even stronger central management con-trol is necessary to avoid abuse. Lastly, the NRC staffs recommended improvements would not resolve the causes of the atypical failure rate among our professional nuclear operators. The problems descnbed in the regulatory impact surveys, along with this most recent example of creating excessive uncertainty for nuclear operators, underscore the importance of resolving the basic issues that hinder a more constructive regulatory approach and a more professional nuclear industry. We believe that increased senior NRC management involvement, including monitoring and follow-up, is the key to resolving this issue as well.

It is with some reluctance that INPO provides its views on these concerns. We are doing so only because of the long-standing nature of what we, as well as many others, have come to view as a key underlying problem, and because of its potentially detrimental affect on the high margin of operational safety we are all seeking to maintain. We urge the Commission to insist on a much higher level of involvement and control by the senior NRC managers.

We recognize that the NRC staff has only recently provided input to the Commis-sion regarding actions to resolve the issues in the regulatory impact surveys, and conse-quently the Commission and staff may already be addressing some of the points we have raised. However, we wanted to provide our thoughts concerning the resolution of these issues which we believe can have a significant impact on the long-term safety of the nation's nuclear plants.

December 11, 1990 Page 7 We also understand that the Commission may be requesting public comment on the NRC proposed responses to the recent surveys. In this regard, a reply to this letter is not necessary or expected; we request only that you take our comments into consideration.

Sincerely,

~!;rKPresident ZTP:mp cc: Commissioner Kenneth C. Rogers Commissioner James R. Curtiss Commissioner Forrest J. Remick Mr. James M. Taylor, EDO ACRS Chairman Carlyle Michelson

. ul hi... ; i.. L*

U~ Ni C

• 90 OEC 26 A9 :42 POLICY ISSUE October 9, 1990 (Notation Vote)

For: The Commissioners From: James M. Taylor Executive Director for Operations

Subject:

REGULATORY IMPACT SURVEY REPORT

Purpose:

To inform the Connnission of the staff's planned improvement actions resulting from an evaluation by the NRC senior management of the effect of NRC regulatory activities on the safe operation of nuclear power plants. To perform this evaluation, the senior management used data from three surveys conducted by the staff.

Background:

In the fall of 1989, the staff initiated the regulatory impact survey (RIS). This effort consisted of three surveys and was patterned after a survey condu~t~d in 1981 to determine utility views on the effect of the large number of NRC regulatory initiatives and requirements imposed in the wake of the accident at Three Mile Island Unit 2. As a result of the 1981 survey, NRC made a number of changes in its organization and regulatory practices.

This RIS was performed to obtain the perceptions of the industry and regulatory staff of the effect of NRC's current activities on the safe operation of nuclear power plants, to assist the staff in determining if its regulatory programs require modification.

In the fall of 1989, teams of senior NRC managers conducted the first survey on the effect of NRC regulatory activities at 13 utilities throughout the country. The staff compiled and summarized the results of the discussions in SECY-90-080, and draft NUREG-1395, "Industry Perceptions of the Impact of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conrnission on Nuclear Power Plant Activities."

The second survey began when the staff issued Generic Letter NOTE: TO BE MADE PUBLIC LY AVAILABLE WHEN THE FINAL SPJ-: IS MADE

Contact:

AVAILABLE T. E. Murley, NRR 492-1270

The Collllllis~ioners (GL) No. 90-01, Request For Voluntary Participation In NRC 11 Regulatory Impact Surve:y. The GL requested licensees to 11 provide estimates of the time spent by 6 levels of management in responding to 11 different kinds of inspections and audits.

The questionnaire asked ,that licensee managers should report on their direct involvement in preparing for the activity, participating in the inspection or audit, and performing the necessary follow-up actions. The staff received responses from 44 of the 54 nuclear utilities. The results of the survey were presented in SECY-90-205.

r The third survey on the effect of NRC regulatory activities began in January 1990, when teams of NRR staff members conducted interviews of regional and Headquarters staff ranging from engineers and middle managers to associate directors and regional administrators. The staff presented the results of this survey in SECY-90-250.

This paper forwards the senior management's evaluation of the re~.u 1ts of a 11 three surveys and the proposed actions to respond to the identified concerns.

Discussion: Following the Davis-Besse event of June 1985, the NRC concluded that it should focus more regulatory attention on improving the safe operation of co11111erc1a1 nuclear plants, particularly the poorer performing plants. Therefore, the staff changed the inspection program to be more diagnostic in nature, than it was in past years.

This change in focus has lead to an increase in the number of team inspections and a correspondin9 evaluation in systematic analysis of licensee performance (SALPJ reports toward more criti ca 1 *assessments of the safety management of nuclear plants.

The industry's performance indicators and NRC's accident precursor indicators ~how steady improvements since 1985.

On the basis of these trenas, the staff concludes that the regulatory focus on improving operational safety is correct and that th1s increased attention has contributed significantly to the improved safety.

The staff performed these surveys to gain a broader view of the effect of NRC activities on the safe operation of nuclear power plants. We sought out observations and perceptions of problems in NRC activities rather than co11111ents on the benefits or the positive effects of the agency's regulatory activities.

Therefore, these surv_eys were not intended to result in a balanced assessment of NRC activities. Based on the staff's evaluation of the couments and concerns in the surveys, we conclude that although the NRC's regulatory activities do not contain critical flaws, some important areas in these activitic~ require improvements.

The CoITITlissioners Each survey s responses were evaluated to determine concerns 1

and themes. Licensee convnents from the survey of 13 utilities were grouped into 10 areas and then evaluated by teams of s~nior managers to det~rmine the concerns in each area.

Senior ma.'Jagement then* further.distilled those concerns into 2 themes. Staff comments from the internal NRC survey were

• grouped into the same 10 .areas as. the first survey and evaluated by the staff to determine the concerns. Those concerns were then further distilled into four themes. The staff evaluated the licensees* responses to GL 90-01, and the staff determined one central theme.

After completing the final survey, the NRC staff evaluated the themes from all three surveys for co1111110n elements, and ldentified issues having sufficient importance.to warrant specific chang~s in NRC regulatory activities. The following is a* surrrriary 1ist of the themes presented in the reports discussing the three surveys:

1.. Licensees acquiesce to NRC requests to avoid poor numerical SALP ratings (SECY-90-080).

2. The NRC dominates licensee-resources through its existing and changing formal and informal requ*irements (SECY-90-080).

3. All leve1s of licensee management are s*ignificantly affected by the need to be *involved in various inspect1cms and audits (SECY-90-205). * .

4. Licensees sometimes acquiesce to avoid confrontations that coulc create the perception that they are unresponsive (SECY-90-250).

5. The.NRC doe~ not consider the cumulative effect of requirE-n~nts on licensees and does not adequately colT1ll"lunicate the priority of each new requirement to licensees _(SECY-90-250). *

6. The volume and scheduling of ' NRC activities on site significantly ~ffects licensees (SECY-90-250).

7. A continued loss of experienced professionals has depleted the knowledge and experience ~ase of the NRC (SECY-90-250).

From* our evaluation, we.have found three elements in the survey t~emes that caused the majority of the surveys' comments *

.These elen1ents are (1) the quantity.of NRC requirements, (2) the amount'of NRC onsite activities, and (3) the inte~actions between the NRC staff and licensee personnel. From these three elements we h~ve identified three specific regulatory areas for improvement:

(1) Considerati.on of the cuatUlative effect of the NRC s 1 generic requirements and generic conmunicat1ons;

.J

The Commissioners (2) Scheduling and control of inspections, especially team inspections; and (3) Training, preparation, and management of inspectors._

The staff has been planning and making improvements in these three areas for several years; however, the RIS results have shown that additional adjustments are needed to the staff's programs. The major adjustments developed as a result of the RIS are as follows:

(1) Establish a program (Integrated Regulatory Requirements Implementation Schedule) to better account for and manage the cumulative impact of implementing generic requirements on a plant-specific basis; (2) Establish limits on the number of team inspections for a given site, and periodically publish the NRC's schedule for site activities; and

, (3) Establish, conmrunicate, and ensure higher management expectations for inspectors and their supervisor~,

establish a cadre of trained inspection team leaders, and improve the training' and qualifications of professional inspection staff.

A more detailed discussion of. our improvement plans in these three areas are provided in Enclosures 1, 2, and 3, respectively.

SECY-90-080 identified actions that the staff would consider for the concerns raised in the 10 areas of licensee convnents presented in that report. The two subsequent surveys supported most of the concerns involved with those Rearly" actions identified. Our improvement plans discussed in Enclosures 1, 2, and 3 address most of the actions supported by the subsequent two surveys. Other regulatory activities that were either initiated or adjusted, but are not covered by the three major area improvement plans, are outlined in Enclosure 4.

Finally, as a completeness check, after developing* proposed adjustments to our continuing programs based on the RIS results, the staff compared the improvement plans to the RIS concerns raised in each of .the 10 areas and confirmed that all important issues are being addressed.

Recorrmendations: We have evaluated the information _gathered, determined the areas where improvement -is needed, and initiated some actions to make the necessary improvements. However, to assure that we make the appropriate improvelllf:!nts to our regulatory program, I recommend that the staff:

1. Publish a Federal Register notice requesting public comments on the proposed corrective actions presented in this paper;

The Commissioners 2. Evaluate the coimients, 'make appropriate changes to planned actions, ,and submit to the Commission a final paper that co~siaers public comments and transm1ts our plan in a proposed final version of the current draft NUREG-1395, "Industry Perceptions of the Impact of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission on Nuclear Power Plant Actiyities;u and

3. Issue.the final version of NUREG-1395 in accordance with Con-mission direction.

- )f-ames M. Taylor xecutive Director for Operations E~c1osures:

1. Managing the Cumulative Effect OT the NRC's Generic Reauirements and Generic Communications

2. Scheduling and Control*of Inspectio~s, Especially learn Inspections

3. Training, Preparation, and Man~gement of NRC Staff

4. Comment Topic Areas Commissioners' comments or* consent should be provided directly to the Office of the Secretary by COB Tuesday, October 23, 1990.

Commission Staff Office comments, if any; should be submitted

& to the Corrrrnissioners NLT Tuesday,* October 16, 1990, with an infor-

• mation copy to the Office of the Secre~ary; If 'the paper is of

• such a nature that* it*requires additional time for analytical review and comment, the Commissioners and the Secretariat should be apprised of when c*omments may be expected.

DISTRIBUTION:

Commissioners OGC OIG GPA REGIONAL OFFICES EDO ACRS ACNW ASLBP ASLAP SECY

Enclosure 1

f. MANAGI~G THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE NRC's GENERIC REQUIREMENTS AND GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS A. Issue The first major issue identified wa~ the quantity of NRC requirements.

• Specifically, the major area for improvement is the management of the cumulative effect.of the NRC's generic requirements and generic coD111Unications.

Uncie:rlying the major issue are: (1) defi,ciencies in conununication with the re~ulated industry, (2) unauthorized imposition of informal requirements, (3) insufficient industry comments on the development of or integrated implementation of requirements~.and (4) staff initiatives like. integrated

-schedules or the integrated safety assessment program did not.result in substantial industry parti ci pat ion.

B. BackgrO!J_nd A sulTdTlary of NRC's* continuing actions (Table 1) intended to improve the management of the jmposition and implementation of requirements is needed to form a basis on w~ich to develop what.is needed to improve the NRC

• • program.

Generic Issues Management The staff provides two systematic comnru~ications avenues providing for industry input regarding safety importance. NRC prioritiiation of generic safety issues (GSI) is published semiannually in revisions of NUREG-0933, "Prioritization of Generic Issues". Priorities are established using quantitative analyses, as applicable, to evaluate the change_in risk, cost, and relationship to other regulatory. actions.

• . NRR also issues a biweekly letter to INPO ltsting generic letters,*

bulletins, and information* notices being developed by the staff to communicate early identification-of safety issues. The safety i~sues represented in these letters are those for which resolution would be deal_t with by NRR alone in a relatively short tim£!'.

In March 1989, the staff presented proposals to the Connission regarding implementing.the safety goal policy of August 1986. In June 1990, the Connission reaffirmed its endorsement of qualitative goals anc quantitativ~ health effects objectives that would help in testing the adequacy of current requirements and the possible need for additional requirements. The Commission also approved 13 actions relating to the Safety .~oal Policy Statement. These actions included directives that the staff should routinely consider the safety goals in developing regulations

,and regulatory practice, and that the staff should establish a formal mechani_sm to ensure that future regulatory initiatives are evaluated for confonnity with the safety goa 1s'. Another directive stated that the staff should strive for a risk level consistent with the safety goals in developing or revising regulations. Each of these efforts will contribute to better manageme~t of the development and implementation of new*

requirements.

- 2 *. Enclosure 1 For* the past 10 years, the Con~ittee to Revjew Generic Requirements (CRGR) has reviewed final new requirenents proposals for the MPC. The Office for Analysis ano Evaluation of Operationa1 Data (AEOD) manages the CRGR function.

In April 1989,. AEOD conducted a survey of licensees to determine their perceptions of the backfitting process. The comments re~eived from the RIS generally confirmed and expanded on concerns that had been expressed in the earlier AEOD survey. In* De_ce,nber 19.89*, tl'ie staff responded by including a summary of backfttting considerations in generic letters and bulletins. In July 1990, the staff issued NUREG-1409, 11 Backfitting Guidelines, 11 to explain the backfitting process and to address typical question*s of the public a.nd the NRC staff. In the fall of 1990, the staff is conducting public workshops in the NRC regions.nationwide to e~plain and discuss backfit management principles.

The Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) is revis.ing the regulatory analysis guidelines, and this work includes re.vising_both

• NUREG/BR-0058, Rev. 1, "Regulatory Analysis Guidelines", and NUREG/CR-3568.

11 A l-landbook for Va foe-Impact Assessment." NURES/BR-0058 is an agency

• level policy document that will be modified to*i~clude guidance on key issues such as safety goals and cumulative accounting for-past and current requirements. NUREG/CR-3568 is a working level ha~dbook that provides methods and supporting information for all steps in regulatory analysis.

The revised* handbook will contain (1) gu"idance on the consideration of cun~lative effects of previous corrective actions during the development of new reouirements and (2) guidance on evaluating new generic regulatory initiatives with respect to th~ Ccm:nission's safety goals and objectives.

The activitit!s affecting regulatory a*nalysis {RA) guidanc~ are.o.f such importanct that the staff believe~ that the new, revised guidance for performing RAs should be published in the _Federal Register for public co1Td11ent. Upon resolution of the public comfenfs, tfie revised guidance will go. to the Commhsion for approval.'

Plant Specific Program~

In ,August 1987; the staff completed a pilot program for the integrated safety assessment program (ISAP). The objective of !SAP was to provide the t~chnical basis to resolve all outst*nding licensing actions, to establish overall schEd~les for pla~t improvements, and to be a b~nchmark with which to evaluate luture regulato,ry actions on a plant-specific basis.

The assessment ~as.to be based on (1) a _review of lessons learned from the Systematic Evaluation Program, (2) *performance of a plant-specific probabilistic safety assessment, and (3) a compilation and analysis of -,

plant operating experienct!. The ISAP review of a plant included an evaluation of all proposed actions in ,light of the* si,gnificance of all

~ther existinp actions. A generic lette~*issued to solicit interest in ISAP, following an NRG-sponsored pilot progrm, showed little industry interest in a _larger scale ISAP. This was attributed, in part, to an industry perception that t,he resulting* priorit~zed list of actions to be implemented would be subject to inspe_,et1on by the NRC and, in part, to the nece*ssity to do a probabili~tic safety assessment. Howev~r, ,the NRC

• continues to offer the opportunity to a11y .licensee- to do an integrated safety assessment. In March 1989., at public workshops, the staff reaffirmed

.t~at licensees could respond with a*n approach similar to ISAP to meet the requirements in the staff's November 1988 generic letter reouiring an individual plant examination (IPE) to look for vulnerabilities to severe accidents.

- . Enclosure 1 In November 1987, the Co111Tlission issued a proposed policy that offered the opportu~ity to develop integrated scheaules based upon a prioritization process developed by the licensee and approved by the staff. This. policy did not require a probabilistic- safety assessment. This policy did not attract significant licensee participation, due tp an industry perception that the

-finished i~tegrated schedule would be required to be incorporated into the plant cperating license~ -

The described activfti.es establish and maintain formal processes within the NRC to manage the issu~nce of new requirements and to ensure that thes~ requirements are promptly,and_ efficiently implemented. ISAP and integrated schedules have not been as effective as planned, but the staff will continue to pursue the objectives of these efforts. Accordingly, comments from the current surveys have resulted in* another effort to prompt licensee participation in the process to establish and implement

• requirements. This actibn is described in following paragraphs.

C. ~ction to Effect Improvement In addition to activities already underway to enhance the staff's management of new requirements, the staff will begin a major new initiative to better manage the impact of implementing generic requirements. Staff expects th~t this new action will provide an easily implemented option that will entail a minimum of regulctcry process burden, while facilitating the management of cumulative effect.

Conceptually the staff's proposal invclves a periodic review (e.g. 1 year prior to refueling) en a plant specifi'c basis of'all unimplemented regulatory requirements excluding those required to meet an adequate protection standard. The review would prforitize and propose, implementation schedules for regulatory requirements based upon safety benefit and ~ould consider cost and othe~ schedular impacts. The licensee would comrrdt based upon this integrated review to implement certain new requirements for the next outage. Followi~g a period for staff review and absent NRC disapproval, the licensee scheduled items for the next outage would be frozen with nc additional regulatory requirements added to the next outage.

• The process would be repeated for the following outage in approximately 12-18 months depending upon the licensee's refueling frequency. Further details are provided below.

A listing of requirements imposed~ but not yet implemented by the licensee, will be issued to the licensee for each plant. This list will not include those actions that have been imposed to meet adequate protection standards or to attain compliance with existing NRC regulations. NRC imposed actions on the list will be those which provide substantial additional protection in accordance with 10 CFR 50.109.

Licensees will be req~ested to respond to the provided lists with their proposed integrated regulatory requirements implementation schedule (IRRIS)

. for imp-lementing each action; The IRRIS will not be incorporated *in the

'plant opera-ting license in any form. In its response, the licerisee may include implen~ntation items initiated by the licensee. However, these items wi 11 not be requested by *the -NRC.

• Licensee participation in this program is yoluntary.

Enc,losure 1 Licensees should propose schedules *on the basis of safety priority as Ue first consideration, with costs and scheduling efficiencies as secondary considerations. The NRC will develop and issue.guidance on prioritizing and scheduling, and evaluate the feasibility of allowing very low priority actions to not be implemented. Participation in the program will require NRC approval of the licensee's method for establishing a schedule based on approvea guidelines. The staff will consider licensee justifications for implementing licensee-initiated changes before NRC imposed changes within an overall schedule, based on achieving the maximum safety addition commensurate with rational cost/benefit analyses. If the licensee does not receive an NRC response to the submittal within 90 days, the proposed scheaules will be considered acceptable and will not be changed by the NRC. Schedules will be reviewed by project managers. Guidance on evaluating priorities will be de-veloped for use by project managers.

Normally, generic resolutions of issues that are imposed by generic letter or other generic issuance will ask for scheduled implementation within two refueling.outages. However, those licensees that choose to respond by including the new requirement in an IRRIS will receive consideration of the schedule proposed in the prioritized IRRIS.

The NRC will ir.1tiate this action to establish a new opportunity for licensee participation in establishing a rational, integrated schedule for implementing important safety Enhancements in less time .and with efficient resource application. Cf particular importance are the criteria used in selecting the order of implementing the scheduled work items.

Accordingly, a pilot program is ~lanned which will include at least one plant from each NRC region. For each of these licensees, the staff will d~tennine the implementation status for all pending issues. Then the licensee and NRR/Division of Reactor Projects will establish a set of criteria and guidelines that ensure that the objectives of the prioritizing effort are achieved. The NRC will collate the results from the effort for each plant, and establish a set of criteria and guidelines that are generally applicable nationwidE. The staff expects that the pilot program, will be completed and generic guidelines can be established within two years.

The staff expects that the IRRIS will eventually provide a simple mechanism that will encourage early implementation of plant modifications offering the most safety for resources spent,*will help to evaluate and set balanced priorities for an entire set of pending requirem~nts, and will help to avoid duplication of efforts to enhance safety.

Fiscal Year TABLE 1. - -

MAJOR GENERIC REQUIREMENTS INITIATIVES 1967 1988 1989 1990

---

~~--~~-

Prioritized generic Issued policy state- Announced intention Expanded explana- Establi5h guidance issues (NUREfi-0933) ment on integrated to implement ISAP tion of bases for a for plant-specific schedules (SECY 89-101) new requirement fn lists of imposed generic communica- requirements Completed ISAP pilot Initiated bi-weekly Proposed Safety Goal tions program. Recommended letter to INPO listing Policy Implementation Commence pilot extension to all generic letters, bul- (SECY 89-102) Published backfit program for plant-licensees (SECY-87-219) letins, information guidance (NUREG- specific lists of notices, and temporary Conducted survey of 1409) imposed requirements instructions utilities regarding bildfitting Conunenced revision of the regulatory analysis guidelines dnd the Value-Impact Handbook Co11111ission directives on formally implement-ing safety goals in regulatory rules and practice

Enclosure 2

2. SCHEDULING AND CONTROL OF INSPECTIONS, ESPECIALLY TEAM INSPECTIONS A. Issue*

The second major issue identified was .the amount of NRC onsite activities.

Specifically, the major area for i-mprovement is the scheduling and control of inspections, especially team inspections. The problems with the amount of NRC onsite activities relate to the (1) inspection program and implementation policy and (2) inspection scheduling and coordination.

B. Ba c. k[_r~~

A SUIYlllary of NRC's recent past and present initiatives in inspection _

manacernent is usefu 1 to understand how the current conditions developed, and to understand what the current needs are to improve the staff s 1 program.

Since ihe 1987 ~eorganization of the Office of *Inspection and Enforcement into the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRRJ, the staff s 1 continuing process:of identifying and addressing lessons learned in

• insp~ction program implementation has resulted in a number of major .

program initiatives to ensure that the li~ited resources available for the reactor inspe:ction program are effi<:fently and effectively al located to enhance reactor .safety.

The results of the RIS as related to the reactor inspection program confir~ that the past and continui~g program initiatives from 1987-1990 correctly ac!dressed tht:: inspection program issues resulting from the survey-. Table 2 reflects areas where the NRC was making needed adjustments to enhance the effectiveness of the inspection program before, during, and after the RIS.* These 8 program office initiatives are:

(1) A major restructuring of the inspection program in 1988 and a further development of its implementation in 1989; (2) A major r*evision to the inspection manual providing guidance on inspection reports*, which focused on improving cowrumicatfons with licensees on the safety .significance of inspectors I findings and th~ir relationship to the licensee 1 s performance; (3) A revision to the inspect1on manual to provide further Headquarters control of Part 21 reports which provided for elimination of unnecessar)' generfc inspection follow-up by regions; (4) The 'developr.ient of a Master Inspection Planning System (MIPS);

(5) A clarification of the EDO Field Manual Policy of regional authority over th~ tcintrol of NRC site visits; *

(6) Development of a manual chapter cov~ring NRR policy for coordination of NP.C site visits;

Enclosure 2 (7) A major c~cnge in the focus of the regional operation plan to move from budget-oriented to performance-oriented goals; and (8) A ctange to the scope of NRR regional assessments of program implemeritation to include monitor_ing the .effects of inspection aPJd licensing programs on licensee activities.

C. ActiEn to Effect Improvement The following two items contain discussions of the resolution of issues raised by the RIS regarding the scheduling and control of inspections.

1. Inseection Program and Implementation Policy The staff is reviewing and addressing the effect of NRC activities on licensees through further clarification o,f inspection program implementation as provided by the inspection manual. ThE: revised policy will ,ensure {1) that the status of licer.see onsite activities is known, (2) that inspections planned by the regions ere scheduled and reviewed each quarter, and (3) that planned inspections do not negatively affect licensee activities or third party inspections.

Further, in response to the 1'.IS, the staff h*as reassessed the effect of major team inspections on licensee activities and is incorporating additional policy tc ensure the f o11 ow.i ng: (1) the need for a major team inspection is established based on licensee performance or generic safety significance, (2) major team inspections are annou~ced to minimize the effect on licensees, and (3) the

_ current inspection implementatior, policy is being amended to specify that no more than four planneo major team inspections shall be conducted during any 1icenst:e SALP cycle withCJut approval of the deputy regiona 1 administrator following coordir.ation with the associate director of projects, NRR. In addition to the no more than four planned major team inspections, operator licensing and reGualification exam1nation visits will be conducted at the request of the licensee.

In 1990, NRR expanded the scope uf its activities to assess its inspection program to include a r~view of the effectiveness of NRR programs and their impact on licensee activities. NRR added this review to identify areas in which the overall effect of NRC programs could adversely affect plant safety.

This ir.itiative is being incorporated into the inspection manual chapter now under development.

2. Inseection Scheduling In concert with the restructuring of the inspection program (initiated in 1988),

the staff began implementing and tracking the concept of adjusting inspection effort based on SALP by means of unit-specific plans created after each SALP cycle. During the next SALP cycle, the staff formally revie~,s and adjusts these plans each quart~r, Recently, the staff began recording and integrating all major site activities into these unit-specific inspection plans to ensure that the inspection resources _are used effectively, and that the effect on the licensee i's minimized. The regions create ana w~intain these unit-specific inspection plans with input 'from the Headquarters program offices. This system e~ables the staff to schedule inspection resources based on plant performa~ce and to develop an integrated unit-specific inspection plan. B~fore conducting

Enclosure 2 the RIS, the staff had recognized the nee:d for a centrelized computer-based system for planning and scheduling inspections to integrate*the scheduling and trdcking of inspections at each commercial reactor. In 1988, the staff initiated the Master Inspection Planning System (MIPS) to accomplish this.

Before approving and iwplementing an inspection plan, the senior regional management reviews the fornrulation and tracks the implementation of the inspection schedule and.reviews the ability of regional and program office supervisors and managers to access and review the plans by computer network.

To enhance this process and provide for consistency~ NRR will review the appropriate unit-specific inspection plans to verify that the inspection schedule is properly focused, maintained, and implemented. Additionally, along with the available computer-based records* of inspection plan reviews, the staff has established management systems that track the inspection effort according to category of inspection program and according to SALP performance to .ensure the appropriate application and scheduling of inspection activities and resources. ,Lastly, in response to the RIS, NRC wi.ll periodically publish site activity schedules, that address NRC planned major team inspections, other NRC site activities that the staff dete~mines are significant, and licensee site activities, except for third-party initiatives. This will inform licensees

.about resourc:e significant NRC site: activities .

. The staff is continuing to implement ,the MIPS. The seccnd phase of MIPs, nThe Inspection Follow-up System" (IFS), is scheduled for implementation in 1991 and will document a*nd track inspection follow-up items. Together, MIPS and IFS will permit tracking of inspection activity from early planning *activities through the performance of the inspection to the final resolution of the findings.

The staff has also assigned to the regions .the overal1 responsibility for schedulir.g NRC visits to reactor sites and directs that NRC activities at licensee facilities be coordinated between Headquarters program offices and the

• regions. The staff has issued this policy in the Field Policy Manual and the NRC Inspection Manual. This policy establishes a contact person in Headquarters to coordinate site visits by Headquarters with the regional office:s. The staff will use MIPS tu dccument and track the implementation of this pclicy. Using this process, the regional offices will review and integrate proposed visits with the established schedule for inspection and licensee activities.

Fiscal Year TABLE 2. - -

MAJOR OPERATING REAClOR INSPECTION PROGRAM INITIATIVES

.1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 Hew inspection progr~m Restructured MC-2515 Core task group ( CTG)

• MC-2515 Rev. CTG Valuation of concept insp. program elements evaluation of new -* Core revised program

- Core program. - Discretionary MC-0610* inspection, - regional initiative/ - Initiative Issue HC-0610 reports reactive flRR/reg ion mgt. - Reactive revision

- Improve comnrunication - Area of emphasis review &direction to - Team with licensees on: imp.lement CTG recom- - Area .of emphasis Implen,ent IFS

- Safety issues Revise MC-0970-LIC reports mended program - Safety issue TI

~ Strengths/weaknesses Control/reduce NRC changes - Generic area

• EDO field manual review/inspection of Focused policy for region Part 21 reports MIPS phase I implemen- control of NRC

.ted for.scheduling NRC MC-0610 site visits Initiated development of inspection and site Identified need for MIPS activities further revisions Issue MC-0301

- Report surmnary

- Open .i terns Inspection Follow-up System (IFS) under *development Developed MC-0301 policy for coordina-t fon of NRC site vi sits

TABLF 2. MA'R OPERATING REA~TOR INSPECTION,OGRA~ INITIATIVE~

Fiscal Year

• 1987 1988 1989 1990 Developed teem leader Conducted team leader Continue team training tra infng leader training Developed new MC-1201 Tssued Mr.-1201 Monitor inspec-

"Conduct of Employees" tion practices Regional operating Region submit~

plan change focus new operating from budget to

• plan performance Regiondl assessments- NRR assessments to include assessment of region inspec-of NRC region impact tion program on 1i censees imp 1ementa tiori conducted, etc.

Enclosure 3

3. TRJIHJING, PREPARATION, ANr t'iANAGEMENT OF NRC STAFF A. Issue The third major issue identified was the interaction between the staff and the licensees. Specifically, the major area for improvement is the training, preparation, and management of the NRC professional staff. The problems in NRC interactions with the licensees relate to lack of clear (1) management expectations for inspector professionalism, (2) oversight of the NRC staff, and (3) training provided to the NRC staff.

e B. Backgrou~

Since the Davis-Besse event of June 1985, the emphasis of the inspection and licensing programs has shifted towards plant operations from construction and licensing. The inspection process has also shifted to the use of more team inspections and individual inspecti'ons that evaluate safety and performance rather than only compliance. ,

_ The results of the RIS related to staff interaction with the licensee confinn that past and continuing training and qualification program initiatives during, 1987-1990 were in need of some adjustment to address specific issues resulting from the survey~ Table 3 demonstrates that the NRC has been making needed improvements to training activities affecting the qualifications of the professional staff before, during, and after the RIS. The initiatives addressed Ue followir.g:

(1) The development *and conduct of specialized team leader training; (2) The expansion of the training advisory group (TAG) following the NRR r~organization to pruvide feedback and recommendations en technical training; (3) The development. and implementation of guidance on the conduct of'employees; (4) The development and implementation of interpersonal skills and corrmunication ski 11 s courses; (5) The implementation of the fllndamentals of Inseection course for NRR personnel; .

(6) The deve1opment and condurt nf backfitting training for NRC personnel; (7) The cor.duct of backfitting workshops for the nuclear industry in each region; (8) The development of generic training requirements for NRR personnel; (9) The establishment of a working group to reevaluate inspector training and qualificetion requirements;

Enclosure 3 (10) The deve]opment of a senior oversight con~ittee for technical training; and (11) The development of a targeted recruiting and development program for technical interns.

C. Action to Effect Imerovement In the review of this major issue of the survey, the staff found four areas needing improvement under the broad context of training and qualification.

• 1. Team leader training

2. Professionalism (including management oversight)

3. Backfitting training 4~ Staff training program To correct the noted training and qualification weaknesses, the staff is adjusting its planned improvements to staff training requirements and is improving management oversight. The following items describe the resolution of the aspects of th~ ~RC training and qualification program causing this issue of the RIS. .

1. ~m Leader Training The staff has recognized the need to conduct specialized training for team

• leade'rs. A well qualified team leader is essential to the performance of the*

team and is needed to manage the activities of the inspectors. In developing and implementing the maintenance team inspections in 1988, NRC management identified the need to conduct special training for the team leaders. To improve the maintenance team inspections, ttie staff *conducted specialized training on the inspection objectives and procedures before the inspections, and each of t~e initial team leaders participated as a team member on a pilot team inspection. Subsequently, reg1ona*1 offices developed internal programs to qualify team leaders for these specialized inspections, and NRR conducted lessons learned workshops for the team leaders. To reinforce the importance of the team leader, NRC management will take action to establish team leader positions 1n, each region.*

• Followi~g the re6rg~nizat~on of NRC in 1987, ~rograrns were initiated to develop new courses and modify available -courses for team leaders and inspectors. In 1987, a new training course, Ins~ecting for Performance, was developed and presented to help emphasize tne ecfiniques for a*perrormance-oriented, technical based inspection; In 1987, NRR developed a-course, ~ff!ctiv!.

Communications fer NRC Ins ectors Conductin Exit Interviews) wn1cfi was given o . an

• reg ona personne n For many*y~ars several courses have been available to the NRC staff through the Office of Personnel, on various management techniques. These courses include

• Sma-11 ~roue o nami~s 1 Conducting Meeting~ 1 Resolving Co'!flicts1- and Su~cessful 1

lnierv1ewfng ecnn1qµes. ~Tfnougn fnese courses were weTT received, ffiey did not sp_eciffca1Ty appTy to. activities conducted by team leaders.

Enclosure 3 Following participation in several *team inspections in 1988, the Office of Personnel .developed several additional courses targeted to the needs of team leaders-including Leading NRC Work Teams and Gathering Inseection Information Through Interviews. Tfiese courses werepilof tested and liave 6een given at -

Headquarters and several regional offices. The Office of Personnel will review the content of the existing courses to'determine if any revisions are necessary in response to the RIS. In addition, other courses are being developed to assist in the training of team leaders and inspectors.

In.response to the RIS, a team leader counterpart meeting- was conducted in September 1990. The meeting was conducted to allow NRC management an opportunity to reinforce the importance of the team leader and management's expettation~.

• Duri~g the*meeting, the team leaders discussed various inspection techniques, coll1llon problems, and perceptions.from the RIS. The meeting was well received and will be conducted annually.

2. Professionalism (including, management oversight)

The ~RC management has always expected the staff to exhibit professionalism in its interactions with the licensees. To support this expectation, the Funda~ntals of Inseection course, which has been given to new inspectors for many years, covers su6jects such as personal conduct of inspectors, effective communications, and conducting exit meetings. In 1988, NRR management identified the need for a similar course for NRR employees and established its own version of the fundamentals of Inseection course, which was given by the professional staff. _ ..

. To address areas identified following review of the RIS issues, the staff ~ill perform the following: (1) refine the essential elelJ"ents of the existing Fundamentals of Inseection course; (2) conduct Fundamentals of Inseection re-f'resfier training; and (j) conduct advanced trainfng in interpersonal, communicative, and problem-solving skills for more e_xperienced inspectors.

These improvements are discussed in more detail in the fol.lowing paragraphs.

A. The existihg Fundamentals of Inseection cou~se for inspector~ ~ill be modified intnose-*areas deallng wifli methods and processes for planning and pocume~t1n9 inspection results, guidelines for inspectors' conduct, and insights on professionalism.

Each new inspector should receive this training within the first year after being hired or transferred to an inspector position.

B. A Fundamentals of I~seection refresher course is being developed to refororce fnspecHon sHHs and techniques and to provide the opportunity for NRC management to coMIOOnicate their expectations to the inspectors. In addition, lessons learned can be discussed. The current working title of this course is Inspection Philosophy.

Advanced courses for more experienced inspectors and their supervtsors will be provided. These courses will focus on improving inspection evaluation techniques in'cluqing -i ntervi ewi ng, meeting management, problem-solving and co1TU11unication skills, and will use practical

• exerci~es, role playing, and case studies. Resident insp~ctors will have first priority for receiving this training, followed by regional ana headquarters personnel, respectively.

Enclosure 3 The NRC staff is instituting an improved ~rogram of interpersonal skills training. This program will be developed from programs currently available, suppleented as necessary, considering the RIS corrments.

In response to cornne~ts in the RIS, the staff will review its expectations regard i rig job performance for inspectors, their supervisors, and their managers to promote better management of inspectors. This review will result in revised position descriptions and performance elements and standards. Possible revisions under consideration include addressing backfitting~ colll'IJUnications with the public, and management oversight of inspection activities. To fully communicate expectations regarding job performance, senior managers will conduct training on those expectations for inspectors and their supervisors.

One of the expectations for regional management is increased oversight of individual inspectors. This includes site supervision by region section chiefs and their management of inspectors conducting entrance and exit meetings and perfonning their 'inspections. This increased oversight may require adjustment to staffing and other inspection program resource requirements to provide region supervisors a~d management the time necessary for more onsite supervision of inspectors.

The NRC al so e:xpects region manager.ient to have increased cor.vnuni catior1 between each manager and the respective licensee counterpart when the manager is onsite. Continual open communication at all management levels to discuss any concerns related to the NRC is necessary for a balanced professional relationship.

HRC managers wili ensure that opportunities are provided to di~cuss and address licensee concerns openly. This continual open corr~~nication with licensees at all levels of NRC management will also provide the response necessary to reduc£ the need for another RIS.

3. Backfittin.9... Trainin__a NRC management has previously recognized the need for staff training on the backfit process. In 1986, following the revision of the Backfit rule and approval of NRC Manual Chapter 0514, training seminars were conducted for NRC personnel on the baclrfitting process. In 1989, following another revision of the Backfit rule, additional presentations on the backfit program were given to Regional and Headquarters offic~s.

a In April 1989, AEOD conducted survey of the nuclear industry to obtain their perceptions of the backfit program implementation. In response to this survey AEOD initiated several actions. In July 1990, the staff issued NUREG-1409, "Backfitting Guidelines" to explain the backfitt1ng process and to answer coDITlOn questions raised in NRC staff training and from industry. The NRC staff is conducting regional workshops on backfitting for licensees and NRC staff. The workshops address many of the issues identified in the Backfit Survey and RIS.

The NRC is coordinating these workshops with NUMARC. In addition, beginning in September, the r!P.R staff wil1 receive backfit training and will ~pecifically discuss pldnt-specific backfitting. In 1991, the NRC will coordinate further training opportunitits for NRC regional personnel with resident inspector meetings.

Enclosure 3

4. Staff Training Program The NRC began the development of revisea qualifica~ion programs for its technical personnel in FY1988. Since the technical training needs of headquarters technical positions were not as well defined as those of regional technical positions, which were described in NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 1245, a plan was designed to determine headquarters needs over time. This plan was designed to identify the headquarters technical positions for which qualification programs should be developed ,and ~ provide a process for defining the qualification and technical training require111ents for thes~

technical positions.

In 1989, a Generic Technical _Training Program was implemented to identify qualification and traini:lg requirements for technical employees. A training

• matrix for each staff member was developed to indicate the minimum training requirements and to estab'lish an overall training plan for each individual.

This training matrix includes technical, administrative, and professional training. Additionally, a formal qualification p.rogram has been established in several branches in NRR which are frequently involved in site inspection activities. These prcgrams are patterned after the regions' inspector qualification programs.

In regard to inspector training, the*staff is significantly upgrading ~C-1245, 1

• Inspector Qualifications," to include new policy and specific mandatory requirements for initial and supplemental training that must be completed to dChieve qualification to independently perform inspections.

The st~ff is also obtaining arid developing the staff required to fulfill future technical positions. These efforts include the Reactor Engineer Intern Program, the Development Prograc, for Non-Nuclear Trained Specialists, and the Development

.Program for Technical Professionals with Prior Nuclear Experience. The training program necessary to develop the technical skills of these new hires is being coordinated with the_Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data and Technical Training Center. The combination of experienced and entry level hires will balance the work force -and provide long-term stability and continuity.

MAJOR OPERATING REAOTOR INSPECTTON PROGRAM INITIATIVES Fiscal Year

]987 . 1988 1989 1990 1991 Instecting for MTI and EOP team Leaning NRC Work Team leader (TL) Conduct annual TL T'er ormance course leader tndning Teams course developed counterpart meeting meeting conducted Effective Communica- Effective Communica- Gatheriny Information NUREG-1409 issued Establish TL fions for R~C Ins~ec- fi ons Course Tfirougfi nferviews positions in fio~ course deve oped implemented course developed Eackfit training for regions NRR conducted Regional Fund. of Revised Regional Backfitting training Review of current Inseection course fund. of Inseection seminars conducted Backfit workshops courses ongoing course connnenced Backfit Survey conducted Develop Fund. of Training advisory group NRR Fundamentals of MC-1245 working group Inseection .

membership expanded I~ection course- NRR and AEOD Generic established refresfier course established Technical Training Programs developed

_*Development of revised Revised MC-1245 Continue backfit qualification programs Developed new MC-1201 to ensuri inspector training and work-

"Conduct of Employees" training needs are shops defined Engineer Intern Program Issue MC-1245 Issued MC-1201 revision Monitor inspection practices PIRR 1ssue OL on employee conduct Develop Program for Non-Nuclear Trained Specialists

TABLE 3. MAJOP CP,ATING REACTOR INSPECTION PROGR.JNITIATIVES Fiscal Year 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 Develop program for technical professionals with prior nuclear experience Review supervisor elements &standards

- assure professionalism

- licensee interaction

- ? -

Enclosure 4 COMMENT TOPIC AREAS In the dra.f.t Regulatory Impact Survey' Report (SECY-90-080), the staff categorized utility comn~nts into 10 topic areas. In those areas, the staff identified actions that would be considered for the licensees' issues.

Subsequently, the second and .third surveys supported many of the issues and actions identified for consideration. Actions that are not addressed by t~e staff's three major improvement plans are suirmarized in the following section under the appropriate licensee comment topic.

'1. Requirements and Perceived Requireme~ts Staff actions are discussed in Enclosure 1.

• 2. NRC Licensing Activitie~

One of the goals of the technical specifications improvement program (TSIP) is to eliminate many of the concerns that have developed regarding the current technical specifications. The TSIP focuses attention on those aspects of reactor opEration that are most safety significant and ensures

. that the requ1rements established in these areas are clear and concise, and adequately balance. ail of the relevant technical considerations.

Furth~r, the staff has always entertained any appeal on a technical issue through its management chain and will continue to do so in accordance with the guidance contained in the project manager's handbook.

In 1988, the staff developed and implemented a priority ranking system for-management of licensing revi'ews. The system assigns priorities on the: basis of _s_afEty significance, operational effect, .and statutory responsibilities. In Jun~ 1989, the staff completed a study of the backlog of licensing ac.tions and* established timeliness goals for the residence tiJ11e of licensee requests. These efforts have provided s1g_n1ficant, measurable results, meeting and exceeding in fiscal year

.(FY) 1989 the Five-Year Plan goal for overall licensing action backlog redu*ction. For FY 1990, NRR has maintained the current inventory level, such that thi backlog of licensing actions has not increased.

3. .BBf. Inseect ion Activities Staff actions are discussea in-Enclosures 2 and 3. In addition, a regional administrator may recoumend to senior management, a reallocation-of resident inspection resources for plants that have exceptional performance, such that an N plus _one residE:nt inspection staff level is npt necessary +-or that plant site for the duration of the SALP cycle. This recommendation by the__ regional administrator would be* similar to a reconnendation to

2_ - Enclosure 4 extend a SALP cycle to 24 months and would occur during the semi-annual meetings of senior headquarters and regional managers to review overall safety performance at operating plartts. This flexibility with resident inspector staffing for exceptionally performing .plants would not be used to relocate resident. inspectors, but would be used for example, to delay filling an open resident inspector position or to increase an inspector's assignn~nts of inspecting other sites.

4. Performance Evaluations Even before the RIS was performed, the staff was developing proposed changes to SALP procedures. The staff.has now completed development of proposed changes to the SALP procedures. On May 25, 1990, the staff ser1t SECY-90-189 with draft Manual -Chapter 0.516 to the Coirmission. The proposed manual chapter includes revisions to the performance category definitions, retains numerical ratings, and deletes 11 respcinsiveness to NPC initiatives" as an evaluation criterion. The staff found that a major restructuring*of the SALP Program was not necessary. In accordance with Commission direction of August 10, 1990, the staff will implement the new SALP procedures. The staff has also prepared for the Collillission a draft policy paper that addresses the potential for misuse of SALP scores in establishing performance incentive programs by public utility conmissions.

On November 28, 1989, the staff issued revised guidance regarding the use and limitations of NRC performance indicators. The staff reissues this guidance with each quarterly performance indicator report and has inserted the guidance into the staff's computer software for performance indicators, sue~ that the guidance always appears on the screen first and r,lUst be *acknowledged before reviewing the performance indicator data.

5. _!!rJJ,act of Multiele Overs~ght Organizations As ciscussed in Enclosure 2, inspectio~ program policy and MIPS will help ensure that unintended coincident inspections by NRG.and INPO and duplica-tive inspections will not occur. Regarding the potential for the impact of state resident enginetrs on licensee attivities, the staff notes that the Corrvnissiori policy of February 1989 and* a draft subagreement with the State of Illinois ( submitted for .Cammi ss1on approval on September 18*, 1990) would spec1ffcally limit state initiated inspections to those fully in accord with NRC inspection plans and practices.

6. Oeerator Licensing The,staff revised examiner standards in NUREG-1021, Revision 6, "Operator 1icensing Examiner Standards," issued in June 1990. The revision more explicitly defines the individual simulator critical tasks and reduces the number of tasks per scenario. The staff discussed this app~oach with industry. In addition, in meetings in Dallas, Texas, and Washington, D.C., the staff and industry discussed changes to the requalification program. Th~ staff inccrporated those changes into NUREG-1021, Revision

6. Revision 6 is expected to provide stability to the examination process

Enclosure 4 for a substantial period, because licensee involvement was utilized in establishing these revised standards. Lastly, the staff will evaluate the potential to reduce its administrat'ion of requalification examinations for plants at which successful requalification examination experience is demonstrated. Guidance and criteria will be developed to support this initiative. The initiative, including guidance and criteria, will be submitted for Commission approval.

7. Enforcement and Investigations The Director, Office cf Enforcement, (OE) has provided additional guidance to the staff concerning implementation of the enforcement policy allow~ng the staff to reduce a civil penalty or not issue a citation if a licensee appropriately identifies and corrects violations. OE is now providing the Commission a monthly report on the status of enforcement actions. In aadition to this new reporting requirement, since October 1989, OE has issued monthly timeliness reports that are distributed to the regional administrators. In addition, the staff is reviewing the enforcement policy relative to safeguards violations.

8. Reportina Events Begin~ing in September 1990, the staff will co~duct regional workshops on the reporting requirement~ of 10 CFR 50.72, 50.73, and 73.71 along with the backfit workshops. The workshops will focus on the NRC staff use of event reporting to provide responses regarding operating experience to licensees. Finally, the staff is considering making a revision to 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73 to eliminate unnecessary reports of the actuation of certain engineered safety features such as cleanup system isolation.

9. Con~unications Staff actions are discussed 1n Enclosure 3.

10. Qual1ficationsL Training, and Professionalism of NRC Personnel Staff actions are discussed in Enclosure 3.

DOCKET NUMBER PROPOSED RULE PR HI~. (t/o..J/O)

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• 90 OEC 26 A9 :31 Regulatory Impact Su r vey Report AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Corrmission.

ACTION : Notice of availability.

SUMMARY

The Nuclear Regulatory Commiss i on (NRC) is announcing the availability cf SECY 90-347 "Regulatory Impact Survey Report" (dated October 9, 1990) for public comment. In particular, the NRC invites comment on the issue of consistency and uniformity among its regions and among its inspectors.

SECY 90-347 is available in the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street, Washington, DC, telephone (202) 634-3273.

In the fall of 1989, the staff in itiated the regulatory impact survey (RIS). This effort consisted of three surveys and was pat t er~1ed after a survey conducted in 1981 to determine utility views on the effect of t he ldrge number of NRC regul ato ry initiatives and requirements imposed in the wake of the accident at Three Mile Island Unit 2. As a result of the 1981 survey, NRC made a number of changes in its organization and regulatory practices.

This RIS was performed to obtain the perceptions of the industry and regulatory staff of the effect of NRC's current activities on the safe operation of nuclear power plants, to assist the staff in determining if its regulatory programs require modifi cat i0n.

SECY 90-347 contains the senior management' s evaluation of the results of all three surveys and the proposed actions to respond to the identified concerns.

In accordance with Nuclear Regulatory Commission direction given in a staff requirements memorandum dated November 29, 1990, the staff is requesting public comment on the proposed corre cti ve ac ti 0n presented in the staff paper, SECY-90-347.

DATES: The comment period expires January 28, 1991 .

ADD RES SES: Send written comments to the Secretary of the Commission Li.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, (Attention: Docketing and Service Branch). Hand deliver comme nts to 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Jon B. Hopkins, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, telephone (301) 492-1287.

~

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this )-Oday of])~

1990.

Regulatory Commission, a ueT ~;f.-1:nTl Secretary of t Commission.