IR 05000390/2022003

Reissue Watts Bar Nuclear Plant - Integrated Inspection Report 05000390/2022003 and 05000391/2022003

ML23128A275
Person / Time
Site:	Watts Bar
Issue date:	05/09/2023
From:	Louis Mckown NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB5
To:	Jim Barstow Tennessee Valley Authority
References
IR 2022003
Download: ML23128A275 (18)

Text

SUBJECT:

REISSUE WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000390/2022003 AND 05000391/2022003

Dear Jim Barstow:

The NRC identified that the inspection report sent dated November 14, 2022, contained administrative errors including but not limited to inspectors left from the list of inspectors, the infrequent inspection procedure (IP) 50001 authorization paragraph in the inspection report, the infrequent inspection procedure (IP) 93100 authorization paragraph in the cover inspection report letter, and clarifying information as to the IP 93100 scope of assessment and follow-up actions. As a result, the NRC is reissuing the report in its entirety to correct these administrative errors which could result in misinterpretation of the agencys assessment of licensee performance. The content and context provided by these changes do not represent a change in the agencys assessment of licensee performance over the defined inspection period. The agencys assessment of the licensee remains the same as that previously discussed at exit.

On September 30, 2022, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant. On October 24, 2022, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Anthony Williams and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified during this inspection.

The Regional Administrator has authorized staff to use IP 50001, Steam Generator Replacement Inspection, to inspect Watts Bar Unit 2 Steam Generator Replacement because the steam generator replacement inspection is an infrequent inspection and outside of the routine reactor oversight process (ROP) baseline inspections.

The Regional Administrator has authorized staff to use IP 93100, Safety-Conscious Work Environment (SCWE) Issue of Concern Followup, to perform an independent inspection of the SCWE concern in Chemistry Department at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant because the SCWE inspection is an infrequent inspection and outside of the routine ROP baseline inspections.May 9, 2023 This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely, Lou McKown, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 05000390 and 05000391 License Nos. NPF-90 and NPF-96

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Numbers: 05000390 and 05000391

License Numbers: NPF-90 and NPF-96

Report Numbers: 05000390/2022003 and 05000391/2022003

Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority

Facility: Watts Bar Nuclear Plant

Location: Spring City, TN 37381

Inspection Dates: July 01, 2022 to September 30, 2022

Inspectors: N. Childs, Senior Project Engineer P. Cooper, Senior Reactor Inspector N. Karlovich, Resident Inspector M. Keefe-Forsyth, Safety Culture Program Manager, Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)

K. Kirchbaum, Operations Engineer M. Magyar, Reactor Inspector N. Peterka, Fuel Facility Inspector M. Riley, Senior Project Engineer D. Simpkins, Sr. Tech Training Program Specialist J. Steward, Senior Resident Inspector D. Turpin, Resident Inspector J. Weaver, Allegations and Enforcement Specialist D. Willis, Allegation Team Leader, NRR

Approved By: Lou McKown, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified.

Additional Tracking Items

None.

PLANT STATUS

Unit 1 began the inspection period at 100 percent rated thermal power (RTP). On July 21, Unit 1 was reduced to 98 percent power due to condenser vacuum and returned to 100 percent RTP on July 28. On August 2, 2022, Unit 1 was briefly reduced to 70 RTP to repair D common station service transformer (CSST) and returned to 100 RTP on the same day. The unit remained at or near RTP for the entire inspection period.

Unit 2 began the inspection period at Mode 1 following the refueling outage and returned to 100 RTP on July 5, 2022. On August 2, 2022, Unit 1 was reduced to 70 RTP to repair D CSST and returned to 100 RTP on the same day. The unit remained at or near RTP for the entire inspection period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program

- Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

(1) Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 2A on August 12, 2022.

(2) Unit 1 and 2 125V DC System Channel I, II, and IV on August 24, 2022

(3) Safety Injection Pump (SI) 1A on September 21, 2022

Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the Essential Raw Cooling System (ERCW) on August 17, 2022.

71111.05 - Fire Protection

Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

(1) Diesel Generator Building (Elevation 742' and 760.5') on July 22, 2022.

(2) Auxiliary Building Rooms (Elevation 692' - Charging Pump Rooms and Pipe Chases)on Aug 5, 2022.

(3) Auxiliary Building Corridor (Elevation 692) on August 5, 2022.

(4) Transformer Yard (Elevation 729') on August 15, 2022.

(5) Control Building (Elevation 692', 708', 729', and 755') on August 12, 2022.

Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the onsite fire brigade training and performance during two unannounced fire drills one on July 13 in the Control Building Cable Spreading Room and on August 9 in the Unit 1 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump area.

71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures

Inspection Activities - Internal Flooding (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the:

(1) Intake Pump Station (IPS) A train rooms

(2) 480V / Motor Control Center (MCC) board rooms

71111.08P - Inservice Inspection Activities (PWR) PWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample (IP Section 03.01)

(1) The inspectors evaluated pressurized water reactor non-destructive testing by reviewing the following examinations from March 7 - July 25, 2022:

1. Ultrasonic Testing (UT)a. RSG-3-H-SE, Primary Nozzle to Safe End, Class 1 (reviewed)b. RSG-3-C-SE, Primary Nozzle to Safe End, Class 1 (reviewed)c.

3065 FW-1, RCS Hot Leg Elbow to RSG Nozzle Safe End, Class 1 (reviewed)d. 3065 FW-2, RCS Crossover Leg Elbow to RSG Nozzle Safe End, Class 1 (reviewed)2. Radiographic Testing (RT)a. 3065 FW-1, RCS Hot Leg Elbow to RSG Nozzle Safe End, Class 1 (reviewed)b. 3065 FW-2, RCS Crossover Leg Elbow to RSG Nozzle Safe End, Class 1 (reviewed)3. Penetrant Testing (PT)a. 3065 FW-1, RCS Hot Leg Elbow to RSG Nozzle Safe End, Class 1 (reviewed)b. 3065 FW-2, RCS Crossover Leg Elbow to RSG Nozzle Safe End, Class 1 (reviewed)4. Visual Testing (VT)a. R-033, Reactor Vessel Closure Head, Code Case N-729-6 (reviewed)

The Inspectors evaluated the licensees boric acid corrosion control program performance.

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the Main Control Room during a dual unit downpower to 70% power, swap of electrical buses and return to 100% power on August 2, 2022.

Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated the following licensed operator requalification simulator scenarios: crew A on July 20, 2022, and crew A on August 17, 2022. Both observations make up one sample.

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:

(1) Risk assessment for (week of) August 1, 2022, with the D CSST failure on 7/31 and swaps to A CSST.

(2) Risk assessment for (week of) July 11, 2022, with the B MCR Chiller out of service for maintenance.

(3) Risk assessment for maintenance feed to D CSST swap on the 6.9KV shutdown Boards, on September 15, 2022.

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

(1) CR 1793858 - Shutdown Board 1B-B secondary block maintenance, on August 3, 2022.

71111.18 - Plant Modifications

Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:

(1) Temporary modification WBN-2-2022-068-001, Removal of Unit 2 Loop 1 T Cold 2 RTD from scan in Eagle 21 on July 19, 2022.

71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing

Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following post-maintenance testing activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:

(1) 1-SI-62-901-A, 1A-A Centrifugal Charging Pump (CCP) Quarterly Performance Test, following preventative maintenance, on July 5, 2022, (WO 122055915).

(2) 2-SI-63-901-B, Safety Injection Pump 2B-B Quarterly Performance Test, after preventative maintenance was performed under WOs 122517428 and 122517424.

(3) 2-SI-3-907-B, Valve Position Indication Verification (Train B) Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System, after replacement of 2-FSV-003-0359-B, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2B-B recirculation flow solenoid valve, under WO 122419369.

(4) N-VT-4, In-service Visual Examination after replacement of the High Pressure Fire Water (HPFW) strainer outlet isolation valves (WBN-0-ISV-026-0553, WBN-0-ISV-026-0549, WBN-0-ISV-026-0575, and WBN-0-ISV-026-0582), under WOs

===113642168, 120411298, 120716471, and 120919948.

(5) 1-SI-61-901-A, Valve Full Stroke Exercising During Plant Operation Ice Condenser System (Train A), WO 122610129 on August 23, 2022.

(6) 0-TI-50.045, 2B-B Diesel Starting Air System Quarterly Check Valve Test, WO 122610225 on August 23, 2022.

71111.22 - Surveillance Testing

The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance testing activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:

Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01)===

(1) Surveillance Instruction 1-SI-63-51, 18-Month Channel Calibration RWST Level, Channel II Loop 1-LPL-63-51, on July 13, 2022 (WO 122561234)

(2) Surveillance Instruction 0-SI-82-11-B, Monthly Diesel Generator Start and Load Test DG 1B-B, on August 11, 2022 (WO 122609865)

(3) Surveillance Instruction 1-SI-61-6, Weekly Ice Condenser Intermediate Deck Doors Visual Inspection, on September 13, 2022 (WO 122658134).

(4) Surveillance Instruction 1-SI-74-901-B, Residual Heat Removal Pump 1B-B Quarterly Performance Test, on August 24, 2022 (WO 122610132)

Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) Surveillance Instruction 2-SI-63-901-A, Safety Injection Pump 2A-A Quarterly Performance Test, on August 31,2022, (WO 122610433)

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03)

The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

(1) Corrective actions and referenced calculations associated with the as-left open running loads for the Unit 2 RCS loop 4 to RHR inlet bypass isolation valve, 2-MVOP-074-0009-B, not meeting acceptance criteria on September 28 and 29, 2022.

71153 - Follow Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Personnel Performance (IP Section 03.03)

(1) The inspectors evaluated a dual unit downpower to 70%, swap of electrical buses and return to 100% power and licensees performance on August 2,

OTHER ACTIVITIES

- TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL

===50001 - Steam Generator Replacement Inspection

The Regional Administrator has authorized staff to use IP 50001, Steam Generator Replacement Inspection, to inspect Watts Bar Unit 2 Steam Generator Replacement because the steam generator replacement inspection is an infrequent inspection and outside of the routine reactor oversight process (ROP) baseline inspections.

During the Watts Bar Unit 2 Spring 2022 refueling outage, all four of the Westinghouse model D3 (Alloy 600) original steam generators (OSGs) were replaced with Westinghouse Model 68AXP (Alloy 690) replacement steam generators (RSGs). This inspection report documents inspection activities required by inspection procedure (IP) 50001, Steam Generator Replacement Inspection, that were completed during the third quarter of 2022 and provides an overall summary of inspection activities completed during the first, second, and third quarters of 2022. The table below identifies and correlates specific IP 50001 inspection requirements examined over the first, second, and third quarters of 2022, with the corresponding quarterly reports in which the inspection activities were completed.

IP 50001 Requirement Quarterly Integrated Section Report(s)

02.02.a.1 Verify that selected design changes and modifications to 2022-001 systems, structures, and components (SSCs) described in 2022-002 the updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR) reviewed 2022-003 for compliance with 10 CFR 50.59.

02.02.a.2 Review key design aspects and modifications for the 2022-001 RSGs and other modifications associated with steam 2022-002 generator (SG) replacement. Include design reviews for 2022-003

temporary containment opening.

02.02.b Review engineering design, modification, testing, and 2022-001 analysis associated with SG lifting and rigging.

02.02.c Review radiation protection program controls, planning, 2022-002 and preparation.

02.02.d Review security considerations associated with vital and 2022-001 protected area barriers and plans to minimize any adverse impact on the operating unit and common systems.

02.03.a Review special procedures for welding and non-2022-002 destructive examination (NDE); training and qualifications 2022-003 for welding and NDE personnel; NDE results and work packages for selected welds; completion of pre-service NDE requirements for welds; and completion of baseline eddy current examination of new SG tubes.

02.03.b Review activities associated with lifting and rigging.

2022-001 2022-002

02.03.c Observe portions of old and new SG cutting, movement, 2022-001 and reconnection inside and outside containment.

2022-002

02.03.d Major structural modifications to facilitate SG replacement 2022-002 and review condition of old SG hold down bolts for 2022-003 degradation.

02.03.e Inspect activities associated with containment access and 2022-002 restoration of temporary containment opening and 2022-003 containment leakage testing.

2022-001 02.03.f Inspect establishment of operating conditions including 2022-002 defueling, RCS drain down, system isolation and safety tagging; implementation of radiation protection controls; foreign material exclusion (FME) controls associated with the primary and secondary side of the SGs and in related RCS openings; and installation, use, and removal of temporary services.

02.03.g Review radiological safety plans for temporary storage or 2022-002 disposal of retired SGs and components.

02.04 Conduct SG post-installation inspections and verifications 2022-003 in accordance with the inspection plan including, containment leak testing, RCS leakage testing, and SG secondary side leakage testing.

Steam Generator Replacement Inspection===

(1) Design Changes and Modifications to Systems, Structures, and Components - 10 CFR 50.59 Review (Sections 02.02.a.1 and 02.02.a.2)

The inspectors reviewed design documentation for restoration of the shield building dome after replacement of the Unit 2 steam generators to verify that the acceptance criteria for the restoration, as specified in the design documentation, were met.

(2) Welding and Non-Destructive Examination (NDE) Activities (Section 02.03.a)

In accordance with the guidance of IP 71111.08, the inspectors reviewed the following nondestructive examination (NDE) documentation associated with the fabrication and preservice examinations of the steam generator (SG) replacement project.

ASME Section III radiography, magnetic particle, and ultrasonic examination of the tubesheet and primary head weld ASME Section XI ultrasonic examinations of the tubesheet and primary head weld Eddy Current examination for the SG tubes

The inspectors also reviewed welding and NDE associated with the reconnection of the steam generator (SG) to the reactor coolant system. These items are documented in section 71111.08P of this report.

(3) Old and New SG Cutting, Movement, and Reconnection Inside and Outside Containment (Section 02.03.c)

Observations of reconnection activities were completed in the second quarter of 2022. During this inspection period, the inspectors reviewed welding and NDE associated with the reconnection of the steam generator (SG) to the reactor coolant system. These items are documented in section 71111.08P of this report.

(4) Major Structural Modifications to Facilitate SG Replacement (Section 02.03.d)

As required by IP 50001, Section 02.03.d, the inspectors reviewed documentation associated with the inspection of the SG hold down bolts to verify that any degradation identified was appropriately addressed.

(5) Containment Access and Restoration of Temporary Containment Opening and Containment Leakage Testing (Section 02.03.e.)

The inspectors reviewed results of quality control acceptance testing performed on materials (cement, fine and coarse aggregate, water, and admixtures) selected for batching of the concrete. The inspectors also reviewed the concrete mix data to ensure that selected trial mix met concrete design strength requirements, and that Quality Control (QC) acceptance criteria specified in the procedures for the concrete were based on the trial mixes.

The inspectors reviewed related concrete testing and sampling activities to assure compliance with American Concrete Institute (ACI) and American Society for the Testing of Materials (ASTM) codes.

(6) SG Post-Installation Verification and Testing (Section 02.04)

As required by IP 50001, Section 02.04, the inspectors performed selective documentation reviews, consistent with the safety significance, of the following areas:

snubber pre-service testing; containment leak testing; RCS leakage testing; SG secondary side leakage testing; and calibration and testing of instrumentation for both the primary (RCS) and secondary side (feedwater and main steam) systems affected by the SG replacement.

93100 - Safety-Conscious Work Environment Issue of Concern Followup Safety-Conscious Work Environment Issue of Concern Followup

(1) The Regional Administrator has authorized staff to use IP 93100, Safety-Conscious Work Environment (SCWE) Issue of Concern Followup, to perform an independent inspection of the SCWE concern in Chemistry Department at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant because the SCWE inspection is an infrequent inspection and outside of the routine ROP baseline inspections.

INSPECTION RESULTS

Assessment 93100 NRC qualified safety culture assessors performed a limited assessment of the safety conscious work environment (SCWE) in the Chemistry Department at Watts Bar in accordance with IP 93100, Safety Conscious Work Environment Issue of Concern Follow-up. The objectives of the assessment were to:

(1) determine whether actions taken by Tennessee Valley Authority improved the work environment in the Chemistry Department; (2)determine if employees are currently reluctant to raise safety or regulatory issues; and (3)determine if employees are currently being discouraged from raising safety or regulatory issues.

The chemistry and radiation protection departments are two separate entities, with different work functions and organizational hierarchies (different supervisors and managers). The radiation protection department is not the subject of the current concerns regarding safety conscious work environment. The team did not identify similar issues with the work environment in radiation protection. All interviewed employees within the radiation protection department stated they would raise nuclear safety issues without fear of retaliation and are encouraged and rewarded when they do. The corrective actions put in place to correct previously identified work environment issues in this department have been effective.

The team interviewed all available employees

(25) from the Chemistry and Radiation Protection Departments, which consisted of technicians, chemists, supervisors, managers, and the employee concern program (ECP) manager. In general, at the time of the inspection, the team determined that many employees in the chemistry department are hesitant to raise safety concerns through multiple avenues out of fear of retaliation or have the perceptions that nothing will be done with their concerns if they do raise them. The team noted that some will not use the ECP; some are hesitant to talk to the NRC; and while they are sometimes willing to write condition reports (CRs), they have an overall perception that nothing will be done with the CRs once they write them. The team heard that the amount of turnover and churn among the staff and supervisors is causing tremendous strain on the organization. The team also reviewed TVAs responses to the GLINT assessment, the USA Alliance nuclear safety culture assessment and responses to NRC Requests for Information, which all identified the Chemistry Department as an area of concern and have determined that corrective actions are new and have not yet been effective at fixing the previously identified work environment issues within the Chemistry Department. In addition, the team determined that the corrective actions are not comprehensive enough to address the work environment issues within the department.

The NRC determined that there is a chilled work environment in the Chemistry Department, meaning individuals are hesitant to raise nuclear safety concerns for fear of retaliation and perceive that Chemistry supervision is retaliating against chemistry employees for bringing up concerns. The NRC reviewed the NRC allegation manual guidance, Section 5.2.i.6(a)(2),to determine if a chilling effect letter (CEL) is warranted at this time. The NRC concluded that the CEL is not appropriate at this time because the licensee had recently implemented corrective actions and is still evaluating the effectiveness of corrective actions. Follow-up safety culture assessments will determine effectiveness in 2023. In the meantime, our resident inspectors will continue to monitor safety culture on site.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

On October 24, 2022, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr.

Anthony Williams and other members of the licensee staff.

On October 31, 2022, the inspector presented the SGRP inspection results to Mr.

Anthony Williams and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

50001 Miscellaneous 2-PI-CEM-15.0 Watts Bar Chemistry Primary to Secondary Leak Rate (data) 07/11/2022 -

07/17/2022

31814-116-PO Purchase Order - WP3730 Ready Mix Concrete for Dome 03/03/2022

Reinstall

31814-CGDP-001 SGT commercial grade dedication plan for concrete for Revision 1

reinstallation of WBN2 shield building dome following

replacement of SGs

31814-SPEC-C-SGT Specification - Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2 - Concrete and Revision 5

004 Grout

Work Orders WO 120927614 visual examination record for initial preservice exam of rigid 05/29/2022

supports - SG#3

WO 120931694 visual examination record for initial preservice exam of rigid 05/29/2022

supports - SG#1

WO 120931715 visual examination record for initial preservice exam of rigid 05/28/2022

supports - SG#2

WO 120931760 visual examination record for initial preservice exam of rigid 05/28/2022

supports - SG#4

WO 121321481 Reinstall Hydraulic Tubing and Hoses to SG 2-1 Snubbers 06/08/2022

WO 121879786 0-SI-0-914 Snubber Functional Testing - Unit 2 06/09/2022

WO 122343467 pressure testing of SCV liner after replacement/repairs per 06/24/2022

TI-88.01

WO 122498103 2-SI-68-32 Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory 07/07/2022

Balance

71111.04 Corrective Action CR 1803952 NRC Identified: Error in system 63 Power Checklists 9/21/2022

Documents

Drawings 0-45W700-1 120VAC and 125VDC Vital Plant Control Power System 85

1-47W811-1-ISI Flow Diagram Safety Injection System 85

Procedures 0-SI-0-3 Weekly Log 72

1-SOI-63.01 Safety Injection System 20

1-SOI-63.01 ATT-Safety Injection System Handswitch 0

1H

1-SOI-63.01 ATT-Safety Injection System Power Checklist 9

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

1P

1-SOI-63.01 ATT-Safety Injection System Valve Checklist 16

1V

71111.05 Fire Plans Fire Plans WBN-PREFIREPLAN-AUX-0-692-01, Rev. 4/Rev. 3, AUX-0-

2-02, Rev. 3/Rev. 3, AUX-0-692-03, Rev. 8/Rev. 2, AUX-

0-692-04, Rev. 1/Rev. 2

Miscellaneous WBN FHAR, Part Introduction, Table I-1 Summary Compliance Fire Protection60

71111.06 Calculations MDN-000-999-WBN PRA Internal Flooding Analysis Notebook 2

2008-0146

WBN-OSG-4099 Moderate Energy Line Break Flooding Study 16

Drawings 37W201-1 Intake Pumping Station, Mechanical Drawing 9

WBN-46W401-8-Architectural Plan EL 772.0, 782.0, & 786.0 7

AD

Miscellaneous WB-DC-40-31 Evaluating the Effect of Flooding due to Moderate Energy 5

Pipe Failures Inside and Outside Containment

WBN-DC-40-29 Flood Protection Provisions 19

71111.11Q Procedures 1-GO-4 Normal Power Operations 33

71111.13 Miscellaneous eSOMS

Daily risk status sheets

71111.15 Corrective Action Condition Report WBN-1-BD-211-B-B, 6.9KV Shutdown Board 1B-B

Documents 1793858

Miscellaneous 0-15E500-1 Key Diagram Station Aux Power System 85

71111.18 Engineering WBN-2-2022-068-Removal of Unit 2 Loop 1 Tcold2 RTD from scan in Eagle 06/29/2022

Changes 001 21

71111.19 Procedures 2-SI-63-901-B Safety Injection Pump 2 B-B Quarterly Performance Test 9

Work Orders 122517424 Testing of Large 2 Pole Motors-Safety Injection Pump 2B-B09/06/2022

2517428 Safety Injection Pump 2 B-B, Inspect, Clean, 09/06/2022

Sample/Change Oil

2658395 Safety Injection Pump 2 B-B Quarterly Performance Test 09/06/2022

71111.22 Drawings WBN-2-47W811-Unit 2 Safety Injection System Flow Diagram 85

1-ISI-ISI

Procedures 2-SI-63-901-A Procedure, Safety Injection Pump 2A-A Quarterly 8

Performance Test

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

2-SOI-63.01 Safety Injection System 23

Work Orders WO 122610433 Safety Injection Pump 2A-A Quarterly Performance Test 08/31/2022

71152A Calculations MDQ0020742008-Documentation of Design Basis Review, Required 7

0302 Thrust/Torque Calculations and Valve and Actuator

Capability Assessment for Valve 2-FCV-74-009

Corrective Action CR 1763323

Documents

Miscellaneous DS-M18.2.21 Motor Operated Valve Thrust and Torque Calculations 28

S1001032800 Decommitment Package 17-2 3/21/2001

Procedures NPG-SPP-22.300 Corrective Action Program Rev 24

Work Orders 122176385

71153 Procedures 0-SOI-211.02 6.9KV Shutdown Board 1B-B 6

1-GO-4 Normal Power Operation 33

1-SOI-201.03 6.9 KV Unit Board 1C 5

93100 Corrective Action 1659255, 1750872,

Documents and 1749249

Corrective Action 1805670

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

Miscellaneous GLINT Survey Conducted

February 7-

10, 2022

USA Alliance Watts Bar Nuclear Safety Culture Assessment Conducted

22 February 7-

10, 2022

15